diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777675/EFTA02777675.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777675/EFTA02777675.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..70fb5e4a7bfd885ecec2bc8efb99699dd8b3cdb2 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777675/EFTA02777675.md @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ +# EXHIBIT A + +UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +X + +UNITED. STATES OF AMERICA + +JEFFREY EPSTEIN, + +Defendant. + +x + +SEALED + +INDICTMENT + +19 Cr. + +19 CRIM 490 + +COUNT ONE (Sex Trafficking Conspiracy) + +The Grand Jury charges: + +#### OVERVIEW + +1. As set forth herein, over the course of many years, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, sexually exploited and abused dozens of minor girls at his homes in Manhattan, New York, and Palm Beach, Florida, among other locations. + +2. In particular, from at least in or about 2002, up to and including at least in or about 2005, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, enticed and recruited, and caused to be enticed and recruited, minor girls to visit his mansion in Manhattan, New York (the "New York Residence") and his estate in Palm Beach, Florida (the "Palm Beach Residence") to engage in sex acts with him, after which he would give the victims hundreds of dollars in cash. Moreover, and in order to maintain and increase his supply of victims, EPSTEIN also paid certain of his victims to recruit additional girls to be similarly abused by EPSTEIN. In + +this way, EPSTEIN created a vast network of underage victims for him to sexually exploit in locations including New York and Palm Beach. + +3. The victims described herein were as young as 14 years old at the time they were abused by JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, and were, for various reasons, often particularly vulnerable to exploitation. EPSTEIN intentionally sought out minors and knew that many of his victims were in fact under the age of 18, including because, in some instances, minor victims expressly told him their age. + +4. In creating and maintaining this network of minor victims in multiple states to sexually abuse and exploit, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, worked and conspired with others, including employees and associates who facilitated his conduct by, among other things, contacting victims and scheduling their sexual encounters with EPSTEIN at the New York Residence and at the Palm Beach Residence. + +## FACTUAL BACKGROUND + +5. During all time periods charged in this Indictment, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, was a financier with multiple residences in the continental United States, including the New York Residence and the Palm Beach Residence. + +6. Beginning in at least 2002, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, enticed and recruited, and caused to be enticed and + +recruited, dozens of minor girls to engage in sex acts with him, after which EPSTEIN paid the victims hundreds of dollars in cash, at the New York Residence and the Palm Beach Residence. + +7. In both New York and Florida, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, perpetuated this abuse in similar ways. Victims were initially recruited to provide "massages" to EPSTEIN, which would be performed nude or partially nude, would become increasingly sexual in nature, and would typically include one or more sex acts. EPSTEIN paid his victims hundreds of dollars in cash for each encounter. Moreover, EPSTEIN actively encouraged certain of his victims to recruit additional girls to be similarly sexually abused. EPSTEIN incentivized his victims to become recruiters by paying these victim-recruiters hundreds of dollars for each girl that they brought to EPSTEIN. In so doing, EPSTEIN maintained a steady supply of new victims to exploit. + +#### The New York Residence + +8. At all times relevant to this Indictment, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, possessed and controlled amulti-story private residence on the Upper East Side of Manhattan, New York, i.e., the New York Residence. Between at least in or about {sup}`2002` and in or about 2005, EPSTEIN abused numerous minor victims at the New York Residence by causing these victims to be recruited to engage in paid sex acts with him. + +9. When a victim arrived at the New York Residence, she typically would be escorted to a room with a massage table, where she would perform a massage on JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant. The victims, who were as young as 14 years of age, were told by EPSTEIN or other individuals to partially or fully undress before beginning the "massage." During the encounter, EPSTEIN would escalate the nature and scope of physical contact with his victim to include, among other things, sex acts such as groping and direct and indirect contact with the victim's genitals. EPSTEIN typically would also masturbate during these sexualized encounters, ask victims to touch him while he masturbated, and touch victims' genitals with his hands or with sex toys. + +10. In connection with each sexual encounter, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, or one of his employees or associates, paid the victim in cash. Victims typically were paid hundreds of dollars in cash for each encounter. + +11. JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, knew that many of his New York victims were underage, including because certain victims told him their age. Further, once these minor victims were recruited, many were abused by EPSTEIN on multiple subsequent occasions at the New York Residence. EPSTEIN sometimes personally contacted victims to schedule appointments at the New York Residence. In other instances, EPSTEIN directed + +employees and associates, including aNew York-based employee ("Employee-1"), to communicate with victims via phone to arrange for these victims to return to the New York Residence for additional sexual encounters with EPSTEIN. + +12. Additionally, and to further facilitate his ability to abuse minor girls in New York, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, asked and enticed certain of his victims to recruit additional girls to perform "massages" and similarly engage in sex acts with EPSTEIN. When avictim would recruit another girl for EPSTEIN, he paid both the victim-recruiter and the new victim hundreds of dollars in cash. Through these victimrecruiters, EPSTEIN gained access to and was able to abuse dozens of additional minor girls. + +13. In particular, certain recruiters brought dozens of additional minor girls to the New York Residence to give massages to and engage in sex acts with JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant. EPSTEIN encouraged victims to recruit additional girls by offering to pay these victim-recruiters for every additional girl they brought to EPSTEIN. When avictimrecruiter accompanied anew minor victim to the New York Residence, both the victim-recruiter and the new minor victim were paid hundreds of dollars by EPSTEIN for each encounter. In addition, certain victim-recruiters routinely scheduled these + +encounters through Employee-1, who sometimes asked the recruiters to bring a specific minor girl for EPSTEIN. + +## The Palm Beach Residence + +14. In addition to recruiting and abusing minor girls in New York, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, created a similar network of minor girls to victimize in Palm Beach, Florida, where EPSTEIN owned, possessed and controlled another large residence, i.e., the Palm Beach Residence. EPSTEIN frequently traveled from New York to Palm Beach by private jet, before which an employee or associate would ensure that minor victims were available for encounters upon his arrival in Florida. + +15. At the Palm Beach Residence, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, engaged in a similar course of abusive conduct. When a victim initially arrived at the Palm Beach Residence, she would be escorted to a room, sometimes by an employee of EPSTEIN's, including, at times, two assistants ("Employee-2" and' "Employee-3") who, as described herein, were also responsible for scheduling sexual encounters with minor victims. Once inside, the victim would provide a nude or semi-nude massage for EPSTEIN, who would himself typically be naked. During these encounters, EPSTEIN would escalate the nature and scope of the physical contact to include sex acts such as groping and direct and indirect contact with the victim's genitals. EPSTEIN would also typically masturbate during these encounters, ask victims + +to touch him while he masturbated, and touch victims' genitals with his hands or with sex toys. + +16. In connection with each sexual encounter, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, or one of his employees or associates, paid the victim in cash. Victims typically were paid hundreds of dollars for each encounter. + +17. JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, knew that certain of his victims were underage, including because certain victims told him their age. In addition, as with New York-based victims, many Florida victims, once recruited, were abused by JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, on multiple additional occasions. + +18. JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, who during the relevant time period was frequently in New York, would arrange for Employee-2 or other employees to contact victims by phone in advance of EPSTEIN's travel to Florida to ensure appointments were scheduled for when he arrived. In particular, in certain instances, Employee-2 placed phone calls to minor victims in Florida to schedule encounters at the Palm Beach Residence. At the time of certain of those phone calls, EPSTEIN and Employee-2 were in New York, New York. Additionally, certain of the individuals victimized at the Palm Beach Residence were contacted by phone by Employee-3 to schedule these encounters. + +19. Moreover, as in New York, to ensure a steady stream of minor victims, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, asked and enticed certain victims in Florida to recruit other girls to engage in sex acts. EPSTEIN paid hundreds of dollars to victimrecruiters for each additional girl they brought to the Palm Beach Residence. + +## STATUTORY ALLEGATIONS + +20. From at least in or about 2002, up to and including in or about 2005, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, and others known and unknown, willfully and knowingly did combine, conspire, confederate, and agree together and with each other to commit an offense against the United States, to wit, sex trafficking of minors, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section. 1591(a) and (b). + +21. It was a part and object of the conspiracy that JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, and others known and unknown, would and did, in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce, recruit, entice, harbor, transport, provide, and obtain, by any means a person, and to benefit, financially and by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture which has engaged in any such act, knowing that the person had not attained the age of 18 years and would be caused to engage in a + +commercial sex act, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1591(a) and (b)(2). + +#### Overt Acts + +22. In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the illegal object thereof, the following overt acts, among others, were committed in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere: + +a. In or about 2004, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, enticed and recruited multiple minor victims, including minor victims identified herein as Minor Victim-1, Minor Victim-2, and Minor Victim-3, to engage in sex acts with EPSTEIN at his residences in Manhattan, New York, and Palm Beach, Florida, after which he provided them with hundreds of dollars in cash for each encounter. + +b. In or about 2002, Minor Victim-1 was recruited to engage in sex acts with EPSTEIN and was repeatedly sexually abused by EPSTEIN at the New York Residence over {sup}`a` period of years and was paid hundreds of dollars for each encounter. EPSTEIN also encouraged and enticed Minor Victim-1 to recruit other girls to engage in paid sex acts, which she did. EPSTEIN asked Minor Victim-1 how old she was, and Minor Victim-1 answered truthfully. + +c. In or about 2004, Employee-1, located in the Southern District of New York, and on behalf of EPSTEIN, placed + +{sup}`a`telephone call to Minor Victim-1 in order to schedule an appointment for Minor Victim-1 to engage in paid sex acts with EPSTEIN. + +d. In or about 2004, Minor Victim-2 was recruited to engage in sex acts with EPSTEIN and was repeatedly sexually abused by EPSTEIN at the Palm Beach Residence over {sup}`a` period of years and was paid hundreds of dollars after each encounter. EPSTEIN also encouraged and enticed Minor Victim-2 to recruit other girls to engage in paid sex acts, which she did. + +e. In or about 2005, Employee-2, located in the Southern District of New York, and on behalf of EPSTEIN, placed {sup}`a`telephone call to Minor Victim-2 in order to schedule an appointment for Minor Victim-2 to engage in paid sex acts with EPSTEIN. + +f. In or about 2005, Minor Victim-3 was recruited to engage in sex acts with EPSTEIN and was repeatedly sexually abused by EPSTEIN at the Palm Beach Residence over {sup}`a` period of years and was paid hundreds of dollars for each encounter. EPSTEIN also encouraged and enticed Minor Victim-3 to recruit other girls to engage in paid sex acts, which she did. EPSTEIN asked Minor Victim-3 how old she was, and Minor Victim-3 answered truthfully. + +In or about 2005, Employee-2, located in the Southern District of New York, and on behalf of EPSTEIN, placed a telephone call to Minor Victim-3 in Florida in order to schedule an appointment for Minor Victim-3 to engage in paid sex acts with EPSTEIN. + +h. In or about 2004, Employee-3 placed a telephone call to Minor Victim-3 in order to schedule an appointment for Minor Victim-3 to engage in paid sex acts with EPSTEIN. + +(Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.) + +#### COUNT TWO (Sex Trafficking) + +The Grand Jury further charges: + +23. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 19 and 22 of this Indictment are repeated and realleged as if fully set forth within. + +24. From at least in or about 2002, up to and including in or about 2005, in the Southern District of New York, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, willfully and knowingly, in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce, did recruit, entice, harbor, transport, provide, and obtain by any means a person, knowing that the person had not attained the age of 18 years and would be caused to engage in a commercial sex act, and did aid and abet the same, to wit, EPSTEIN recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, and obtained numerous + +individuals-who were less than 18 years old, including but not limited to Minor Victim-1, as described above, and who were then caused to engage in at least one commercial sex act in Manhattan, New York. + +> (Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1591(a), (b)(2), and 2.) + +#### FORFEITURE ALLEGATIONS + +25. As a result of committing the offense alleged in Count Two of this Indictment, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant, shall forfeit to the United States, pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 1594(c)(1), any property, real and personal, that was used or intended to be used to commit or to facilitate the commission of the offense alleged in Count Two, and any property, real or personal, constituting or derived from any proceeds obtained, directly or indirectly, as {sup}`a`result of the offense alleged in Count Two, or any property traceable to such property, and the following specific property: + +a. The lot or parcel of land, together with its buildings, appurtenances, improvements, fixtures, attachments and easements, located at 9 East 71st Street, New York, New York, with block number 1386 and lot number 10, owned by Maple, Inc. + +#### Substitute Asset Provision + +26. If any of the above-described forfeitable property, as a result of any act or omission of the defendant: + +- (a) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence; +- (b) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third person; +- (c) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the Court; +- (d) has been substantially diminished in value; or +- (e) has been commingled with other property which cannot be subdivided without difficulty; + +it is the intent of the United States, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 853(p) and 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c), to seek forfeiture of any other property of the defendant up to the value of the above forfeitable property. + +(Title 18, United States Code, Section 1594; Title 21, United States Code, Section 853(p); and Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461.) + +FOAEPERSON + +(t hs-GEOFFR Y BERMAN United States Attorney Form No. USA-33s-274 (Ed. 9-25-58) + +#### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +## UNITED STATES OF AMERICA + +v. + +JEFFREY EPSTEIN, + +Defendant. + +## 'INDICTMENT + +(18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1591(a), (b)(2), and 2) + +> GEOFFREY S. BERMAN United States Attorney + +> > U 14/.0.I.GFCiowas \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777675/EFTA02777675.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777675/EFTA02777675.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..41dbd853e672209f47feefde262bf674683e8f28 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777675/EFTA02777675.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -28, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777675", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "f14f9da5d56cf8cb8201fcfd39c88954ee9b0b381a53f2a71be93e7a07b0bb3b", + "output_sha256": "a73e2f10a6aefb25ba6d424f149d8de2976952ce795c9b72d2f40e7829212c73", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777690/EFTA02777690.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777690/EFTA02777690.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7c301d27fe8758363fc395c104227258d74a902f --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777690/EFTA02777690.md @@ -0,0 +1,242 @@ +### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Plaintiff, CASE NO: + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, + +Defendants. + +I + +## COMPLAINT + +BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP + +Plaintiff by her attorneys Boies Schiller Flexner LLP, for her Complaint against Defendants, Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn in their capacities as the executors of the Estate of Jeffrey Edward Epstein ("Epstein") and Ghislaine Maxwell ("Maxwell") (collectively, "Defendants"), avers upon personal knowledge as to her own acts and status and upon information and belief and to all other matters as follows: + +## NATURE OF THE ACTION + +- I. This suit arises out of Defendants' sexual abuse of Plaintiff beginning when Plaintiff was 16 years old. +- 2. When Plaintiff was 16, she was sexually trafficked by Defendants as part of Epstein and Maxwell's organized ring of procuring young women and girls for sex. +- 3. Epstein's trafficking scheme involved recruiting young women and girls by making false promises and using his wealth, power and threats to intimidate the females into submission to his demands. This same pattern was repeated numerous times with numerous young women and girls. +- 4. As United States District Judge Kenneth Man found, "From between about 1999 and 2007, Jeffrey Epstein sexually abused more than 30 minor girls . . . at his mansion in Palm Beach, Florida, and elsewhere in the United States and overseas. . . . In addition to his own sexual abuse of the victims, Epstein directed other persons to abuse the girls sexually. Epstein used paid employees to find and bring minor girls to him. Epstein worked in concert with others to obtain minors not only for his own sexual gratification, but also for the sexual gratification of others." Doe 1 v. United States, 359 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1204 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (internal citations omitted). + +5. Epstein organized this sex trafficking network to obtain hundreds of young girls for himself for sex, and also lent these girls out to other powerful and wealthy individuals to be sexually abused. + +6. Despite his significant criminal activity, in 2008 Epstein received a shockingly minimal charge pleading guilty to a single Florida state law charge of procuring a minor for prostitution and a non-prosecution agreement (a "NPA") with the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida. Unknown to the public and the victims at the time, Epstein's lawyers were pressuring the Government to commit to the NPA without informing the victims. Epstein's multiple victims were kept in the dark and told to be "patient" while Epstein's lawyers worked to protect him and other potential co-conspirators from prosecution. Epstein served one year in jail, but was afforded the privilege of being able to leave the jail to go to work for twelve hours per day, six days per week. + +7. The NPA allowed Epstein to escape proportionate punishment for his actions and to continue operating his sex trafficking enterprise with liberty. + +8. A few years later, Epstein flippantly referred to his sexual abuse of multiple young women and girls, and the slap on the wrist he had received for it, in a 2011 interview with the New York Post: "Billionaire pervert Jeffrey Epstein is back in New York City — and making wisecracks about his just-ended jail stint for having sex with an underage girl. 'I am not a sexual predator, I'm an offender,' the financier told The Post yesterday. 'It's the difference between a murderer and a person who steals a bagel,' said Epstein." Amber Sutherland, Billionaire Jeffrey Epstein: I'm a Sex Offender Not a Predator, N.Y. Post (Feb. 25, 2011), https://nypost.com/2011/02/25/billionaire-jeffrey-epstein-im-a-sex-offender-not-a-predator/. + +9. In August 2018, just one year before his death, Epstein told a New York Times reporter "that criminalizing sex with teenage girls was a cultural aberration and that at times in history it was perfectly acceptable." James B. Stewart, The Day Jeffrey Epstein Told Me He Had Dirt on Powerful People, N.Y. Times (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/12/business/jeffrey-epstein-interview.html. + +10. Maxwell spent years overseeing and managing Epstein's sex trafficking network, and actively recruited underage girls to provide to Epstein and others for sex. + +II. Epstein and Maxwell conspired with friends and hired staff to maintain and keep secret this network of sexual abuse for years, which sprawled throughout Epstein's residences in New York, Florida, New Mexico, the United States Virgin Islands, and Paris. Epstein's preference was to have three different girls a day for his sexual pleasure and Maxwell was in charge of recruiting the girls. + +12. Maxwell facilitated Epstein's sexual trafficking ring by activities including, but not limited to: (1) identifying and recruiting girls, including several minors, for Epstein's sexual pleasure and that of his co-conspirators, including herself; (2) identifying and hiring individuals to recruit underage girls; (3) scheduling appointments between the trafficked girls, many of whom were minors, and Epstein; (4) administering Epstein's sex trafficking organization and hiding it from criminal repercussions; and (5) intimidating girls, many of whom were minors, who attempted to escape or report Epstein's sex trafficking operation. + +13. Epstein and Maxwell committed sexual assault and battery upon Plaintiff when she was 16 years old. As such, the Defendants are responsible for battery, unlawful imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress pursuant to New York common law. The damage to Plaintiff has been severe and lasting. + +14. This action has been timely filed pursuant to the Child Victims Act, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-g. The actions described herein constitute sexual offenses by Defendants under New York Penal Law Article 130, and were committed against Plaintiff when she was a child less than eighteen years of age, for which she suffered physical, psychological, and other injuries as a result. + +15. This action has been timely filed pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(8)(a), which provides that a plaintiff shall have at least one year from the termination of a criminal action against the same defendant to commence an action with respect to the event or occurrence from which the criminal action arose. A criminal action against Epstein with respect to the same sex trafficking enterprise from which Plaintiff's claims arise was terminated on August 29, 2019. + +16. Any statute of limitations applicable to Plaintiff's claims, if any, is tolled due to the continuous and active deception, duress, threats of retaliation, and other forms of misconduct that Defendants used to silence their many victims, including Plaintiff. Defendants' actions deprived Plaintiff of the opportunity to commence this lawsuit before Epstein's death. Until his death, Plaintiff feared that Epstein and his co-conspirators, including Maxwell, would harm her or her family, or ruin her life, if she came forward. + +17. Defendants are equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense. Allowing Defendants to do so would be unjust. Defendants intimidated each of their victims into silence by threatening their lives and their livelihoods. They therefore prevented Plaintiff from commencing this lawsuit before Epstein's death. By using threats, along with his wealth and power, Epstein was able to escape punishment for his intolerable and brutal crimes against countless young women and underage girls for the duration of his life. + +#### PARTIES + +- 18. Plaintiff is a citizen and resident of Texas. +- 19. Defendant Darren K. Indyke is sued in his capacity as an appointed executor of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein. +- 20. Defendant Richard D. Kahn is sued in his capacity as an appointed executor of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein. +- 21. Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell is a New York citizen and is domiciled in the Southern District of New York. + +### JURISDICTION AND VENUE + +- 22. Jeffrey Epstein was a citizen of the United States domiciled in the U.S. Virgin Islands at the time of his death. Jeffrey Epstein maintained a residence in the Southern District of New York. As the legal representatives of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn are deemed citizens of the U.S. Virgin Islands. +- 23. Defendant Maxwell is a citizen of both the United States and the United Kingdom and is domiciled in the Southern District of New York. +- 24. The amount in controversy in this action exceeds the sum or value of \$75,000.00 excluding interests and costs and is between citizens of different states. Accordingly, jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. +- 25. Venue is proper in this Court as the sexual abuse of Plaintiff by Defendants Epstein and Maxwell began and occurred in New York, New York, where they recruited her at the age of 16, physically molested her, and began grooming her for sex in their organized sex trafficking ring. + +26. Many of the events giving rise to these causes of action occurred in the Southern District of New York, where a substantial amount of Epstein's property is located. Thus, venue in this district is proper. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(bX2). + +## FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS + +### A. Epstein's Sex Traffickine Enterprise + +27. Jeffrey Epstein was widely renowned as a billionaire who used his vast connections to powerful individuals, and seemingly unlimited wealth and resources, to create a web of transcontinental sex trafficking that served himself, his coconspirators, and some of the most powerful people in the world. + +28. Epstein owned multiple residences and frequently travelled between them, including at 9 East 71' Street, New York, New York 10021, and at 49 Zorro Ranch Road, Stanley, New Mexico 87056, where the illegal sexual crimes against Plaintiff occurred. Epstein conservatively valued his New York townhome at \$55,931,000.00. Epstein conservatively valued his New Mexico ranch at \$17,246,208.00. In addition, Epstein owned residences in the Virgin Islands, Florida, France, and even on his own island, Great St. James Island, where his transcontinental sex trafficking of hundreds of young girls servicing him, his co-conspirators, and wealthy and powerful individuals around the world occurred. + +29. The allegations herein concern Epstein's and Maxwell's tortious acts against Plaintiff while in New York, where Epstein was staying at his 71' Street mansion, and at his ranch in New Mexico. + +30. At all times material to this cause of action, Jeffrey Epstein utilized his seemingly unlimited power, wealth, and resources, as well as his deep connections to powerful and politically connected individuals to intimidate and manipulate his victims of sexual abuse. 31. Epstein and Maxwell had perfected a scheme for manipulation and abuse of young females. As part of the scheme, Maxwell or another female would approach a young female and strike up a conversation in an effort to quickly learn about the young female's background and any vulnerabilities they could expose. Maxwell would then manipulate the young female into coming back to one of Epstein's residences by offering the young female something she needed. At times Maxwell's lure would be a modeling opportunity, money for education, help for the young female's family, and a whole host of other related offers depending on their target's situation. Once in the residence, Maxwell and Epstein would work in concert to impress and intimidate the young female with displays of vast wealth, including having employees that were butlers and maids formally dressed around the house. They would also strategically place photographs of very powerful political and social figures amongst photographs and art displaying nude females in an effort to normalize the sexual abuse. They would also normalize the sexual abuse by placing a massage table and spa related products around the massage area in an effort to legitimize the area where the abuse was set to occur. Once abused, Epstein and Maxwell continued to manipulate the victims, using their financial power, promises, and threats to ensure that the victim returned as directed and remained compliant with their demands. + +## B. The Arrest, Prosecution, and Death of Epstein + +32. The sexual trafficking ring described herein started at least as early as 1995 and continued up until at least July 2, 2019, when the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York ("SDNY") charged Epstein with sex trafficking conspiracy and sex trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591. He was arrested on July 8, 2019, pursuant to the SDNY's Sealed Two Count Indictment, which is attached as Exhibit A. + +33. The Indictment described Epstein's conduct and his abuse and trafficking of females in the same trafficking operation he used to abuse and traffic Plaintiff. + +34. Epstein's last will and testament (the "Will") was executed on August 8, 2019, at the Metropolitan Correctional Center. The witnesses were Martel Colon Mire and Gulnora Tali. The Will included affidavits from Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in which they swear an "Oath of Willingness to Serve as Executor and Appointment of Local Counsel." + +35. Epstein was found dead in his cell at the Metropolitan Correctional Center on August 10, 2019. + +36. Epstein's last will and testament was filed on August 15, 2019, in the Probate Division of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands. + +37. Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn filed a Certificate of Trust in the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands for Epstein's 1953 Trust on August 26, 2019. See Certificate of Trust, In the Matter of the Estate ofJeffrey E. Epstein, Probate No. ST-19-PB-80 (Super. Ct. V.I. Aug. 26, 2019). + +38. Epstein's will was entered into probate on September 6, 2019, and the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands accordingly authorized Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn to administer Epstein's estate. See Order for Probate, In the Matter of the Estate ofJeffrey E. Epstein, Probate No. ST-19-PB-80 (Super. Ct. V.I. Sept. 6, 2019); Letters Testamentary, In the Matter of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Probate No. ST-I 9-PB-80 (Super. Ct. V.I. Sept. 6, 2019). + +39. The Will's first article directs Epstein's executors "to pay from my estate all expenses of my last illness, my funeral and burial expenses, the administration expenses of my estate and all of my debts duly proven and allowed against my estate." The Will further directs that "after the + +payments and distributions provided in Article FIRST," Epstein "give[s] all of my property, real and personal, wherever situated ... to the then acting Trustees of The 1953 Trust." + +40. Following Epstein's death, SDNY submitted a proposed nolle prosequi order in the criminal matter against him because it was required by law to do so after Epstein was deceased. On August 29, 2019, U.S. District Judge Richard Berman formally dismissed SDNY's indictment against Epstein, terminating the criminal action against him. + +C. + +• was born on July 2, 1979. parents divorced when she was young, and her mother struggled financially to support Annie and her siblings. + +42. In 1995 and 1996, Annie was a high school student at Xavier College Preparatory in Phoenix, Arizona. She was a top performing student with the goal of going to college. + +43. In approximately 1995, Annie's sister, . was an artist and a graduate student in New York. She met Epstein and Maxwell at an art show. Epstein noticed her artwork. Epstein offered to help her in her art career if she sold Epstein some of her artwork. + +44. Epstein asked Maria if she had a father. He also asked her personal questions about her family situation, including about her younger sister, Annie. Maria explained that her parents were divorced, and that she and her family were financially struggling. + +45. Maria accepted a job offer from Epstein to purchase art for him. + +46. Her role later included keeping records of people who entered Epstein's New York mansion. Maria observed that Defendant Maxwell was regularly bringing over school-aged girls to the New York mansion. Maxwell told Maria that these girls were interviewing for Victoria's Secret modeling positions. + +47. Maxwell described her role to Maria as recruiting Victoria's Secret models for Epstein. Maria witnessed Maxwell spotting girls and talking to them outside of the mansion, which Maxwell claimed was for recruiting purposes. Maxwell would leave the mansion claiming she had "to go get girls for Jeffrey." + +48. At the time, Maria was unaware of the sex trafficking conspiracy and believed the girls were being recruited for modeling positions. + +49. Annie understood her older sister, Maria, to be working for a billionaire in New York. + +50. Epstein began taking an interest in Annie. He asked Maria questions about her younger sister in Arizona. He presented this interest to Maria in a friendly and fatherly manner. Maria was very proud of Annie's strong academic record, and supported Annie's goal of going to a good college after high school. + +51. Epstein offered Maria ideas on how he could help Annie get into college. He used this as a ruse to get Annie to come to New York so that he could abuse her. Epstein purchased Annie's plane tickets, and she flew to New York. + +52. Epstein gave Maria money to buy Annie a dress. He paid for a limousine to pick up the sisters and take them to Epstein's townhome. He talked to Annie about going to college and potential schools before sending them to see a Broadway show. + +53. During Annie's stay in New York, Epstein asked Annie and Maria to go to the movie theater with him. This is where he began initiating non-consensual physical contact with Annie in an attempt to groom Annie for sexual activity and normalize sexual behavior with him. + +54. At the movie, Epstein intentionally positioned himself between the sisters to ensure they were separated, and to prevent Maria from seeing that he was touching Annie. Epstein began caressing and petting Annie on various parts of her body against her will. He would repeatedly touch Annie only when Maria was unaware and looking away. Annie was distressed, frightened, and confused. + +55. Annie then left to go back home to Arizona. + +56. Epstein began calling Annie and her mother from New York under the false pretense of discussing Annie's education and plans for college. He offered to send Annie on an international trip to help with her college applications. + +57. As part of his plan to recruit Annie for sexual purposes, Epstein explained to Annie's mother that he sponsored educational trips for high school students, and was sponsoring an event in New Mexico at his ranch called Zorro Ranch. He invited Annie. He explained that Maxwell would be a host or chaperone for Annie at the event. Under these false pretenses, Annie's mother agreed to send Annie to Epstein's program for high school students. + +58. Epstein and Maxwell, who were in New York at the time, arranged and paid for Annie to fly to New Mexico in the spring of 1996. Epstein mailed her airline tickets from New York to her mother in Arizona. When Annie arrived in New Mexico, Epstein had a driver take her to his ranch. Epstein's Zorro Ranch sits on over 10,000 acres and is very remote. Upon arriving at the ranch, Annie learned that Epstein had not invited any other students. She was the only person at the massive ranch in a different state, away from her family in Arizona, her sister in New York, and anyone she knew. She was alone with Maxwell and Epstein. + +59. Maxwell appeared charming and friendly to Annie. Upon arriving, Maxwell and Epstein took Annie shopping and lavished her with gifts, including beauty products and a pair of brand new cowboy boots. After returning to the ranch, Maxwell began pressuring Annie to touch Epstein and give him a foot massage. Annie was very scared and did not want to touch Epstein, but Maxwell was relentless and demanded that Annie massage Epstein. Both adults explained to Annie that it was just a massage, and attempted to normalize this sexual behavior with an adult to her. + +60. Epstein and Maxwell took Annie to a movie theater. While in line for the movie, Maxwell pulled down Epstein's sweatpants, exposing part of his buttocks. Both Epstein and Maxwell repeatedly fondled each other in front of Annie, trying to normalize sexual behavior to Annie, a child. + +61. In the movie theater in New Mexico, Epstein caressed and petted various parts of Annie's body against her will. Annie was incredibly scared, and did not know how to escape because she was a child alone with Epstein and Maxwell. Annie did not have a phone or any other means of communication without Epstein or Maxwell knowing. + +62. Epstein, Maxwell, and Annie returned to Epstein's ranch. Upon returning from the movie, Maxwell repeatedly told Annie that she wanted to give her a massage. Annie was very uncomfortable with the idea of Maxwell touching her, but realized that she was completely alone with Epstein and Maxwell. Annie feared what would happen if she did not comply with their demands. Annie said that she had never had a massage and tried to avoid having Maxwell touch her body, but Maxwell continued to pressure her. Maxwell directed Annie to take off all of her clothes and lay on the massage table. Annie was extremely scared to be naked in front of Epstein and Maxwell. + +63. Maxwell left the door open so that Epstein could view Annie's naked body during the massage. + +64. Maxwell touched intimate parts of Annie's body against her will for the sexual benefit of Maxwell and Epstein. + +65. Maxwell exposed Annie's breasts and groped her. + +66. Annie was extremely distressed and afraid. She was a child in a massive ranch in New Mexico, away from her family in Arizona, and isolated from any source of help. She was alone with Epstein and Maxwell. She had no way to access a phone or other method of communication without Epstein or Maxwell knowing. She had no way of leaving. + +67. Annie woke up the next morning to find Epstein entering her room. He climbed into the bed with her and announced, "I want to cuddle." Without her consent, Epstein got into the bed with Annie, physically restrained her with his arms and proceeded to press his body (including his genitals) against Annie. Annie was frozen in fear. She was sixteen years old. + +68. Annie knew she had no way of escaping Epstein's massive estate, and attempted to escape by saying she needed to use the restroom. She was in shock, and frightened by what she was experiencing. She feared for her safety, knowing she was alone in Epstein's ranch in another state and that Maxwell and Epstein were closely monitoring her activity. + +69. Annie escaped to Epstein's bathroom. She was in extreme fear and emotional distress, not knowing how to escape Epstein's ranch in New Mexico, where these two adults were groping her, a child, against her will. + +70. Epstein and Maxwell eventually allowed Annie to fly back home to Arizona and they returned to New York. Out of fear of what could happen to her and her family because of Epstein and Maxwell's great power, wealth, and connections that they had displayed to her, Annie did not tell anyone about Epstein and Maxwell touching her against her will. + +71. Devastatingly, Annie was not the only family member that Epstein and Maxwell sexually abused. During that summer, Maria was lured into an "artist in residence" position by Epstein at billionaire Les Wexner's Ohio estate on which Epstein owned a guest house. There, Epstein and Maxwell both sexually assaulted Maria. Wexner's security personnel did not allow Maria to exit his estate, even after she pleaded with them and told them about her assault. There was only one entrance with a guard house to Wexner's estate. + +72. After Maria's sexual assault in Ohio, Maxwell called on behalf of Epstein and threatened Maria in order to keep her quiet: "We're going to burn all your art. And I just want you to know that anything you ever make will be burned. Your career is burned." + +73. Instead of letting Maxwell's words silence her, Maria reported her assault to the Sixth Precinct of the New York City Police Department ("NYPD"). The NYPD referred Maria to the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). Maria followed the instruction and called the FBI to make a report of the abuse. To the extreme detriment of Maria and Annie—and also countless other victims who came after them—authorities ignored Maria's reporting efforts and took no action. + +74. Maria also called Annie, who was overseas studying at an educational seminar for high performing high school students. During the call, Annie shared with Maria her own assaults in New York and New Mexico, as well as her false imprisonment at Epstein's New Mexico ranch. + +75. Frustrated that authorities did not appear to be taking any action and in the hopes of exposing the crimes that Maxwell and Epstein were committing, Annie and Maria decided to share their stories with Vanity Fair magazine. Tragically for Annie and Maria, Epstein threatened and intimidated the magazine and Vanity Fair bent to those threats and ultimately published a profile of Epstein without mentioning the sisters or their allegations. + +76. Once Maxwell and Epstein learned that Maria had revealed the abuse to Vanity Fair, they embarked on a campaign to destroy Maria's reputation and art career. Afraid for her safety, having informed the NYPD, FBI, and media to no avail, Maria left New York and Annie moved + +to Alaska. Annie and Maria's fear of Epstein's power was exacerbated by the fact that state and federal authorities, as well as the media, were not taking action against Epstein. + +77. Annie was deeply affected by her harrowing experiences at the hands of Epstein and Maxwell as a child. She suffers severe emotional distress from an experience that has affected her for her entire life. + +78. The Defendants' sexual assault, battery, and false imprisonment of Annie continue to cause her significant distress and harm. + +## FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION + +# (Battery) + +79. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations stated above in paragraphs 1-78 as if fully set forth herein. + +80. Epstein and Maxwell intentionally committed battery by sexually assaulting Plaintiff when she was a young girl. As described above, on multiple occasions Epstein and Maxwell intentionally touched Plaintiff in an offensive and sexual manner without her consent. + +81. Epstein and Maxwell's actions constitute sexual offenses as defined in New York Penal Law Article 130, including but not limited to forcible touching as defined in Article 130.52, inasmuch as Epstein and Maxwell intentionally and forcibly touched sexual and intimate parts of Plaintiff's body for their own sexual gratification on multiple occasions. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214g. + +82. A criminal action against Epstein with respect to the same sex trafficking enterprise from which Plaintiff's first cause of action arises was terminated on August 29, 2019, less than one year prior to the filing of this Complaint. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(8Xa). + +83. As a direct and proximate result of Epstein's and Maxwell's criminal acts, Plaintiff has in the past and will in the future continue to suffer extreme emotional distress, humiliation, fear, psychological trauma, loss of dignity and self-esteem, and invasion of her privacy. + +## SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION + +### (False Imprisonment) + +84. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations stated above in paragraphs 1-78 as if fully set forth herein. + +85. As a direct result of these allegations as stated, Defendants falsely imprisoned Plaintiff at Epstein's New Mexico residence while Plaintiff was a young girl for the purpose of degrading her, abusing her, or gratifying their sexual desires. + +86. Epstein and Maxwell brought Plaintiff to Epstein's New Mexico Ranch with the intent to confine her in that location so that they could sexually abuse her. Plaintiff was conscious of her confinement and did not consent that confinement. Epstein and Maxwell prevented Plaintiff, a child with no way to communicate with anyone other than Epstein and Maxwell and with no access to a car or other means of transportation, from leaving the premises, Epstein's remote 10,000 acre Zorro Ranch in New Mexico. + +87. A criminal action against Epstein with respect to the same sex trafficking enterprise from which Plaintiff's second cause of action arises was terminated on August 29, 2019, less than one year prior to the filing of this Complaint. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(8Xa). + +88. As a direct and proximate result of Epstein and Maxwell's criminal acts, Plaintiff has in the past and will in the future continue to suffer extreme emotional distress, humiliation, fear, psychological trauma, loss of dignity and self-esteem, and invasion of her privacy. + +### THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION + +### (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress) + +89. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations stated above in paragraphs 1-78 as if fully set forth herein. + +90. As a direct result of these allegations as stated, Defendants committed intentional infliction of emotional distress against Plaintiff. + +91. Defendants' actions, described above, constitute extreme and outrageous conduct that shocks the conscience. Epstein and Maxwell's plan to recruit, entice, and assault Plaintiff, a sixteen-year-old child, on multiple occasions, goes beyond all possible bounds of decency and is intolerable in a civilized community. + +92. Defendants knew or disregarded the substantial likelihood that these actions would cause Plaintiff severe emotional distress. + +93. A criminal action against Epstein with respect to the same sex trafficking enterprise from which Plaintiff's third cause of action arises was terminated on August 29, 2019, less than one year prior to the filing of this Complaint. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(8Xa). + +94. As a direct and proximate result of Epstein and Maxwell's criminal acts, Plaintiff has in the past and will in the future continue to suffer extreme emotional distress, humiliation, fear, psychological trauma, loss of dignity and self-esteem, and invasion of her privacy. + +## PRAYER FOR RELIEF + +WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests judgment against Defendants, awarding compensatory, consequential, exemplary, and punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial; costs of suit; attorneys' fees; and such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper. + +### JURY DEMAND + +Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury on all causes of action asserted within this pleading. + +Dated: November 12, 2019. + +Is/ Joshua I. Schiller + +David Boies BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP 333 Main Street Armonk, NY 10504 (914) 749-8200 + +Joshua I. Schiller BOWS SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP 55 Hudson Yards New York, NY 10001 (212) 446-2300 + +Sigrid McCawley (Pro Hac Vice Pending) BOWS SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP 401 E. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1200 Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301 (954) 356-0011 \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777690/EFTA02777690.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777690/EFTA02777690.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4d94d0dba94aacd3cbc16a6428f8db3a99841901 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777690/EFTA02777690.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777690", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "942744d567eaf0b4eadf1ad36f90b3f70113223ccc8649b3db566f561ce2bdf0", + "output_sha256": "942744d567eaf0b4eadf1ad36f90b3f70113223ccc8649b3db566f561ce2bdf0", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777709/EFTA02777709.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777709/EFTA02777709.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f96d9031079f9fdfb9a041326d040d90c69d33e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777709/EFTA02777709.md @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +JS 44C/SDNY REV. 08/01/17 + +PI AINTIFFS + +The JS-44 OW cover sheet and the information contained herein nether replace nor supplement the Sling and smite of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by love rules of coon This lemi, approved by the Judicial Conference of Me United States in September 1974.1 required for use of IN Clerk of Court for the purpose of inibabrig the chi docket sheet + +ATTORNEYS (FIRM NAME, ADDRESS, AND TELEPHONE NUMBER Joshua I. SchiNer Boles Schiller Flexner LLP 55 Hudson Yards. New York, NY 10001 (212) 446-2300 + +CIFFFNDANTS DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN. in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN and GHISLAINE MAXWELL ATTORNEYS (IF KNOWN) Bennet J. Moskowitz (attorney for Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn) 875 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022 + +CAUSE OF ACTION (CITE THE U.S. CML STATUTE UNDER WHICH YOU ARE FILING AND KR ITE A BRIEF STATEMENT OF CAM) (DO NOT CITE JURISDICTIONAL STATUTES UNLESS DIVERSITY) + +28 U.S.C. § 1332: New York causes of action + +Has this action. case. Of proceeding, or one essentially the same been previously filed in SONY at any time? No6:Nes O Judge Previously Assigned + +If yes, was this case Vol O Incl. O Dismissed. NO ❑ Yes O If yes. give dale 8. Case No. + +Is MS AN iNTIMATIONAL ARBITRATION CAW No El Yes D + +(PLACE AN(xf IN ONE BOX ONLY) + +TORTS + +| CONTRACT | PERSONAL INJURY | PERSONAL INJURY +[ ] 367 HEALTH CARE/ +PHARMACEUTICAL PERSONAL +INJURY/PRODUCT LIABILITY +[ ] 365 PERSONAL INJURY +PRODUCT LIABILITY +[ ] 368 ASBESTOS PERSONAL +INJURY PRODUCT +LIABILITY | FORFEITURE/PENALTY | BANKRUPTCY | OTHER STATUTES | +| ---------- | ----------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| [ ] 110 | INSURANCE | [ ] 310 AIRPLANE | [ ] 625 DRUG RELATED | [ ] 422 APPEAL | [ ] 375 FALSE CLAIMS | +| [ ] 120 | MARINE | [ ] 315 AIRPLANE PRODUCT | SEIZURE OF PROPERTY | 28 USC 158 | [ ] 378 QUI TAM | +| [ ] 130 | [ ] ACT | LIABILITY | 21 USC 881 | [ ] 423 WITHDRAWAL | [ ] 400 STATE | +| [ ] 140 | NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT | [ ] 320 ASSAULT, LIBEL & SLANDER | [ ] 690 OTHER | 28 USC 157 | REAPPORTIONMENT | +| [ ] 150 | RECOVERY OF OVERPAYMENT & ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT | [ ] 330 FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY | PROPERTY RIGHTS | [ ] 410 ANTITRUST | [ ] 410 ANTITRUST | +| [ ] 150 | MEDICARE ACT | [ ] 340 MARINE | [ ] 620 COPYRIGHTS | [ ] 430 BANKS & BANKING | [ ] 430 BANKS & BANKING | +| [ ] 151 | RECOVERY OF DEFAULTED STUDENT LOANS (EXCL VETERANS) | [ ] 345 MARINE PRODUCT LIABILITY | [ ] 830 PATENT | [ ] 450 COMMERCE | [ ] 450 COMMERCE | +| [ ] 152 | RECOVERY OF DEFAULTED STUDENT LOANS (EXCL VETERANS) | [ ] 350 MOTOR VEHICLE PRODUCT LIABILITY | [ ] 835 PATENT-ABBREVIATED NEW DRUG APPLICATION | [ ] 460 DEPORTATION | [ ] 470 RACKETEER INFLU-ENCED & CORRUPT ORGANIZATION ACT (RICO) | +| [ ] 153 | RECOVERY OF OVERPAYMENT OF VETERANS BENEFITS | [ ] 365 MOTOR VEHICLE PRODUCT LIABILITY [ ] 360 OTHER PERSONAL INJURY | [ ] 840 TRADEMARK | [ ] 480 CONSUMER CREDIT | [ ] 490 CABLE/SATELLITE TV | +| [ ] 160 | STOCKHOLDERS SUITS | [ ] 362 PERSONAL INJURY - MED MALPRACTICE | [ ] 830 PATENT | [ ] 851 HIA (1396ff) | [ ] 850 SECURITIES/ COMMODITIES/ EXCHANGE | +| [ ] 160 | STOCKHOLDERS SUITS | [ ] 365 PROPERTY DAMAGE PRODUCT LIABILITY | [ ] 710 FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT | [ ] 863 DIV/CDIWW (405(g)) | [ ] 890 OTHER STATUTORY ACTIONS | +| [ ] 190 | OTHER CONTRACT CONTRACT PRODUCT LIABILITY | [ ] 520 HABEAS CORPUS CORPUS | [ ] 720 LABOR/MGMT RELATIONS | [ ] 865 RSI (405(g)) | [ ] 890 OTHER STATUTORY ACTIONS | +| [ ] 195 | CONTRACT CONTRACT PRODUCT LIABILITY | [ ] 463 ALIEN DETAINEE | [ ] 740 RAILWAY LABOR ACT | [ ] 871 IRS-THIRD PARTY | [ ] 891 AGRICULTURAL ACTS | +| [ ] 195 | CONTRACT CONTRACT PRODUCT LIABILITY | [ ] 510 MOTIONS TO VACATE SENTENCE 28 USC 2255 | [ ] 751 FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT (FMLA) | [ ] 870 TAKES (U.S. Plaintiff or Defendant) | [ ] 893 ENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS | +| [ ] 196 | FRANCHISE | [ ] 535 DEATH PENALTY | [ ] 791 EMPL RET INC (FMLA) | [ ] 871 IRS-THIRD PARTY 28 USC 7609 | [ ] 895 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT | +| | | [ ] 540 MANDAMUS & OTHER (Non-Prisoner) | [ ] 750 OTHER LABOR LITIGATION | [ ] 875 TAKES (U.S. Plaintiff or Defendant) | [ ] 899 ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT/REVIEW OR APPEAL OF AGENCY DECISION | +| | | [ ] 440 OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS (Non-Prisoner) | [ ] 791 EMPL RET INC (FMLA) | [ ] 875 TAKES (U.S. Plaintiff or Defendant) | [ ] 950 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE STATUTES | +| | | [ ] 440 OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS (Non-Prisoner) | [ ] 750 OTHER LABOR LITIGATION | [ ] 870 TAKES (U.S. Plaintiff or Defendant) | [ ] 895 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT | +| | | [ ] 440 OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS (Non-Prisoner) | [ ] 751 FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT (FMLA) | [ ] 870 TAKES (U.S. Plaintiff or Defendant) | [ ] 890 OTHER STATUTORY ACTIONS | +| | | [ ] 540 MANDAMUS & OTHER (Non-Prisoner) | [ ] 791 EMPL RET INC (FMLA) | [ ] 871 IRS-THIRD PARTY 28 USC 7609 | [ ] 895 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT | +| | | [ ] 440 OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS (Non-Prisoner) | [ ] 750 OTHER LABOR LITIGATION | [ ] 870 TAKES (U.S. Plaintiff or Defendant) | [ ] 899 ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT/REVIEW OR APPEAL OF AGENCY DECISION | +| | | [ ] 440 OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS (Non-Prisoner) | [ ] 750 OTHER LABOR LITIGATION | [ ] 871 IRS-THIRD PARTY 28 USC 7609 | [ ] 950 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE STATUTES | +| | | [ ] 440 OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS (Non-Prisoner) | [ ] 790 OTHER LABOR LITIGATION | [ ] 875 TAKES (U.S. Plaintiff or Defendant) | [ ] 895 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT | +| | | [ ] 440 OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS (Non-Prisoner) | [ ] 790 OTHER LABOR LITIGATION | [ ] 875 TAKES (U.S. Plaintiff or Defendant) | [ ] 950 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE STATUTES | +| | | [ ] 440 OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS (Non-Prisoner) | [ ] 700 FEDERAL TAX SUITS | [ ] 895 ENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS | [ ] 895 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT | +| | | [ ] 440 OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS (Non-Prisoner) | [ | | | + +NATURE OF SUIT + +O + +a + +ACTIONS UNDER STATUTES + +Check if demanded in complaint. + +n CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION UNDER F.R.C.P. 23 + +DEMAND \$ OTHER JUDGE DOCKET NUMBER + +Check YES only if demanded in complaint + +JURY DEMAND: a YES 510 + +DO YOU CLAIM THIS CASE IS RELATED TO A CIVIL CASE NOW PENDING IN S.O.N.Y. AS DEFINED BY LOCAL RULE FOR DIVISION OF BUSINESS 13? IF SO, STATE: + +NOTE. You must also submit at the lime of filing the Statement of Relatedness form (Form IH-32). + +0 1 Ongind 02 Removed from 03 Remanded 0 4 Reinstated c O 5 Trend wed from O 6 M"Illtna 7 Ants to District Proceeding Slate Court from Reopened (SPecity District) litigation 1,--, Judge from Appetite (Transferred) Magistrate Judge 0 a. ad dirges 'preowned Court O8 Muttelistna Lagabm (Direct File) O b. At least one petty Is pron. + +## (PLACE AN x IN ONE BOX ONLY) BASIS OF JURISDICTION IF DIVERSITY, INDICATE + +01 U.S. PLAINTIFF O 2 U.S. DEFENDANT 0 3 FEDERAL QUESTION 04 DIVERSITY CITIZENSHIP BELOW. (U.S. NOT A PARTY) + +## CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (FOR DIVERSITY CASES ONLY) + +(Place an (X) in one box for Plaintiff and one box for Defendant) + +PTF DEF PTF DEF PTF DEF CITIZEN OF THIS STATE I II ( 11 CITIZEN OR SUBJECT OF A [13[ 13 INCORPORATED and PRINCIPAL PLACE [ I 5 f I 5 FOREIGN COUNTRY OF BUSINESS IN ANOTHER STATE CITIZEN OF ANOTHER STATE [td 2 latj 2 INCORPORATED or PRINCIPAL PLACE [ I 4 [ I4 FOREIGN NATION [ IS I )6 OF BUSINESS IN THIS STATE + +PLAINTIFF(S) ADDRESS(ES) AND COUNTY(IES) + +1907 North Lamar Boulevard Suite 240 Austin, TX 78705 + +DEFENDANT(S) ADDRESS(ES) AND COUNTY(IES) + +Darren K. Indyke, Richard D. Kahn: U.S. Virgin Islands Ghislaine Maxwell: 116 East 65th Street, New York, NY 10065 + +DEFENDANT(S) ADDRESS UNKNOWN + +REPRESENTATION IS HEREBY MADE THAT. AT THIS TIME. I HAVE BEEN UNABLE. WITH REASONABLE DILIGENCE. TO ASCERTAIN THE RESIDENCE ADDRESSES OF THE FOLLOWING DEFENDANTS: + +Darren K. lndyke and Richard D. Kahn are sued as executors of the Estate of Jeffrey Epstein. Per 28 U. S.C. § 1332, Defendants are deemed citizens of the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI), decedent Epstein's domicile. Defendants' residential addresses are unknown to Plaintiff. Their counsel is listed above. + +O + +### COURTHOUSE ASSIGNMENT + +I hereby certify that this case should be assigned to the courthouse indicated below pursuant to Local Rule for Division of Business 18, 20 or 21. + +Check one: THIS ACT(jON HOULD 3B S ED O: D PLAINS QMANHATTAN + +DATE 11/12/2019 SI qTT Y OF RE ORD ADMITTED TO PRACTICE IN THIS DISTRICT + +NO pd YES (DATE ADMITTED Mo.08 Yr. 2009 ) RECEIPT # Attorney Bar Code a JS3315 + +Magistrate Judge is to be designated by the Clerk of the Court. + +Magistrate Judge is so Designated. + +Ruby J. Krajick, Clerk of Court by Deputy Clerk, DATED \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777709/EFTA02777709.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777709/EFTA02777709.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1f70ab1350c6d7a1d743c086820f5bccf8a21e8c --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777709/EFTA02777709.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -7545, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777709", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 149, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.table-boundary-padding\", \"epstein_legal.flight-log-tables.normalize\", \"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "9687839f4b4b99c26b2f3f855de492aa52a4575fd37906fb3499aded45fd06c8", + "output_sha256": "e5ea51ca36bef09b06d5b4d85cb5cc3a02dd0a4779041d08b91049ac8f0b72f0", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777711/EFTA02777711.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777711/EFTA02777711.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..284d97b61cc3a266d7a1b6d7abebe924731ffe74 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777711/EFTA02777711.md @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT + +for the + +Southern District of New York + +Plaintiff(s) + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREYEDWARD EPSTEIN, and GHISLAINE MAXWELL + +Defendant(s) + +Civil Action No. + +## SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION + +To: (Defendant's name and address) Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn do Bennet J. Moskowitz, attorney 875 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022 + +A lawsuit has been filed against you. + +Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) — or 60 days if you are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (aX2) or (3) — you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney, whose name and address are: Joshua Schiller + +Boies Schiller Flexner LLP 55 Hudson Yards New York, NY 10001 (212)446-2300 jischilleriabalp.com + +If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint. You also must file your answer or motion with the court. + +Date: + +CLERK OF COURT + +Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk + +Civil Action No. + +## PROOF OF SERVICE + +(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Pet R. Civ. P. 4 (1)) + +This summons for (name of individual and title. ij any) was received by me on (dare) + +O I personally served the summons on the individual at (mace) on (date) ; or + +O I left the summons at the individual's residence or usual place of abode with (name) , a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there, on (date) , and mailed a copy to the individual's last known address; or + +O I served the summons on (name of individual) designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of (name of organization) on (date) ; or , who is + +O I returned the summons unexecuted because ; or + +O Other (specify): + +My fees are \$ for travel and for services, for a total of \$ 0.00 + +I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true. + +Date: Server's signature + +Printed name and title + +Server's address + +Additional information regarding attempted service, etc: \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777711/EFTA02777711.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777711/EFTA02777711.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b5a19f5865a0b2d0d827aeba782589f85d8479a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777711/EFTA02777711.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777711", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "a42a293c0f352133903428a9f09db052b9737babec034de8ec00ee117e7b9517", + "output_sha256": "a42a293c0f352133903428a9f09db052b9737babec034de8ec00ee117e7b9517", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777713/EFTA02777713.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777713/EFTA02777713.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e295641d2961cb27be921d895dcde2984401abf2 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777713/EFTA02777713.md @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT + +for the + +Southern District of New York + +Plaintiffis) + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE, RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, and GHISLAINE MAXWELL + +Defendant(s) + +Civil Action No. + +## SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION + +To: (Defendant's name and address) Ghislaine Maxwell 116 East 65th Street New York, NY 10065 + +A lawsuit has been filed against you. + +Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) — or 60 days if you are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (aX2) or (3) — you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney, whose name and address are: Joshua Schiller + +Boies Schiller Flexner LLP 55 Hudson Yards New York, NY 10001 (212) 446-2300 jischiller@bsfllp.com + +If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint. You also must file your answer or motion with the court. + +Date: + +CLERK OF COURT + +Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk + +Civil Action No. + +## PROOF OF SERVICE + +(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed R. Civ. P. 4 (1)) + +This summons for (name of individual and title. ij any) was received by me on (date) + +O I personally served the summons on the individual at (place) on (date) ; or + +O I left the summons at the individual's residence or usual place of abode with (name) , a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there, on (date) , and mailed a copy to the individual's last known address; or + +O I served the summons on (name of individual) designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of (name of organization) on (date) ; or , who is + +O I returned the summons unexecuted because ; or + +O Other (speciM: + +My fees are \$ for travel and \$ for services, for a total of \$ 0.00 + +I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true. + +Date: Server's .signature + +Printed name and title + +Server's address + +Additional information regarding attempted service, etc: \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777713/EFTA02777713.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777713/EFTA02777713.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..64fc77da5919e417860f49962a4e46b842b67706 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777713/EFTA02777713.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777713", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "f496cdc794746eed02333a5547a2432fb3a39f864a41faef7cdd67d88d6fdbbb", + "output_sha256": "f496cdc794746eed02333a5547a2432fb3a39f864a41faef7cdd67d88d6fdbbb", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777715/EFTA02777715.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777715/EFTA02777715.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c67b0d0f97a0cb320b5c9c5c1c374435dde0cb26 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777715/EFTA02777715.md @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT + +for the + +Southern District of New York + +![](_page_0_Picture_138.jpeg) + +*Plaintiff(s)* + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, +in their capacities as the executors of the +ESTATE OF JEFFREYEDWARD EPSTEIN, +and GHISLAINE MAXWELL + +*Defendant(s)* + + +Civil Action No. + +## SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION + +To: *(Defendant's name and address)* Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn +c/o Bennet J. Moskowitz, attorney +875 Third Avenue +New York, NY 10022 + +A lawsuit has been filed against you. + +Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) — or 60 days if you are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (a)(2) or (3) — you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney, whose name and address are: + +Joshua Schiller +Boies Schiller Flexner LLP +55 Hudson Yards +New York, NY 10001 +(212) 446-2300 +jischiller@bsfllp.com + +If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint. You also must file your answer or motion with the court. + +CLERK OF COURT + +Date: 11/13/2019 + +/s/ P. Canales + +*Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk* + +Civil Action No. + +## PROOF OF SERVICE + +(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fet R. Civ. P. 4 (1)) + +This summons for (name of-individual and title. ijany) was received by me on (date) + +O I personally served the summons on the individual at (mace/ on (date) ; or + +O I left the summons at the individual's residence or usual place of abode with (name) , a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there, on (date) , and mailed a copy to the individual's last known address; or + +O I served the summons on (name of individual) designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of (name of organization) on (date) ; or , who is + +O I returned the summons unexecuted because ; or + +O Other (speciM: + +My fees are \$ for travel and \$ for services, for a total of \$ 0.00 + +I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true. + +Date: Server's signature + +Printed name and title + +Server's address + +Additional information regarding attempted service, etc: \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777715/EFTA02777715.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777715/EFTA02777715.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2617e238d842e55c9406b37fab3fbf557e1fcde4 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777715/EFTA02777715.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -63, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777715", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 2, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.empty-image\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "38c1cb134107bbc509a88344baae6db227a51c53fb16476bfeca4650aa575e80", + "output_sha256": "b186cb2bf859bc3e5925b54eb39e89ffa553f5990d12ed1e6de3bb21adbf2449", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777717/EFTA02777717.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777717/EFTA02777717.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b54123d8885e70cc8acc45dad307b699337932e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777717/EFTA02777717.md @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT + +for the + +Southern District of New York + +![](_page_0_Picture_134.jpeg) + +*Plaintiff(s)* + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE, RICHARD D. KAHN, +in their capacities as the executors of the +ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, +and GHISLAINE MAXWELL + +*Defendant(s)* + + +Civil Action No. + +## SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION + +To: *(Defendant's name and address)* Ghislaine Maxwell +116 East 65th Street +New York, NY 10065 + +A lawsuit has been filed against you. + +Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) — or 60 days if you are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (a)(2) or (3) — you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney, whose name and address are: + +Joshua Schiller +Boies Schiller Flexner LLP +55 Hudson Yards +New York, NY 10001 +(212) 446-2300 +jischiller@bsfllp.com + +If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint. You also must file your answer or motion with the court. + +CLERK OF COURT + +Date: 11/13/2019 + +/s/ P. Canales + +*Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk* + +Civil Action No, + +## PROOF OF SERVICE + +(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Pet R. Civ. P. 4 (1)) + +This summons for (name of-individual and title. if any) was received by me on (date) + +O I personally served the summons on the individual at (place) on (date) ; or + +O I left the summons at the individual's residence or usual place of abode with (name) , a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there, on (date) , and mailed a copy to the individual's last known address; or + +O I served the summons on (name of individual) designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of (name of organization) on (date) ; or , who is + +O I returned the summons unexecuted because ; or + +O Other (specify): + +My fees are \$ for travel and \$ for services, for a total of S 0.00 + +I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true. + +Date: Server's signature + +Printed name and title + +Server's address + +Additional information regarding attempted service, etc: \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777717/EFTA02777717.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777717/EFTA02777717.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..239c5b1340d6b55b6f34e2cbe55fc829b37dc74d --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777717/EFTA02777717.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -59, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777717", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 2, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.empty-image\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "1395eb31ddfd2d213cdcf9610847cf105b9e114f9116de95d9d5e81ba04d0609", + "output_sha256": "11737b157d4481cc5456c653c371e22117405d71a12479e56609a931c551da31", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777719/EFTA02777719.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777719/EFTA02777719.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e6965826862e9ddd26fd297a4fc5d7507cb97f77 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777719/EFTA02777719.md @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ x + +Plaintiff(s), : + +USDC SONY DOCUMENT ELECTRONICALLY PILED DOC I+: DATE FILED: November 1\$, 2019 + +19 Civ. 10475(LGS) + +-against- ORDER + +Darren K. Indyke, et al., + +Defendant(s), : \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ ------------- -------- X + +LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, District Judge: + +This case has been assigned to me for all purposes. It is hereby ORDERED that counsel for all parties appear for an initial pretrial conference with the Court at the time and place listed below. All pretrial conferences must be attended by the attorney who will serve as principal trial counsel. Parties who are not local (within the Metropolitan tri-state area) may request to attend by phone by filing a letter motion via ECF. Any open legal issues can be addressed at the conference. + +All parties are required to register promptly as filing users on ECF. Counsel are further required to review and comply with the Court's Individual Rules and Procedures ("Individual Rules") (available at the Court's website, hup://nysd.uscourts.gov/judge/Schofield). + +Counsel are directed to confer with each other prior to the conference regarding settlement and each of the other subjects to be considered at a Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 conference. Additionally, in accordance with the Court's Individual Rules, the parties are hereby ORDERED to prepare a joint Proposed Civil Case Management Plan and Scheduling Order in the form available at the Court's website (http://nysd.uscourts.gov/judge/Schofield) and append it to their joint letter described below. The parties must propose dates for the various deadlines even if they intend to request a stay of discovery. + +IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall file a joint letter on ECF at least seven calendar days prior to the initial pre-trial conference, not to exceed 5 pages, providing the following information in separate paragraphs: + +- (1) A brief statement of the nature of the case, the principal claims and defenses, and the major legal and factual issues that are most important to resolving the case, whether by trial, settlement or dispositive motion; +- (2) A brief statement by plaintiff as to the basis of subject matter jurisdiction and venue, and a brief statement by each other party as to the presence or absence of subject matter jurisdiction and venue. Statements shall include citations to relevant statutes. + +In addition, in cases for which subject matter jurisdiction is founded on diversity of citizenship, the parties shall explain the factual basis for such jurisdiction, including (i) in the case of a corporation, the principal place of business and place of incorporation, (ii) in the case of a partnership, limited liability company or trust, the citizenship of each of the entity's members, shareholders, partners and/or trustees. If this information is lengthy, it may be included in an Appendix to the letter, not to be included in the page limit. + +- (3) A brief description of any (i) motions that any party seeks or intends to file, including the principal legal and other grounds in support of and opposition to the motion, (ii) pending motions and (iii) other applications that are expected to be made at the status conference; +- (4) A brief description of any discovery that has already taken place, and any discovery that is likely to be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence and material to proof of claims and defenses raised in the pleadings. (This is narrower than the general scope of discovery stated in Rule 26(bX1)); +- (5) A computation of each category of damages claimed, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iii); +- (6) A statement describing the status of any settlement discussions and whether the parties would like a settlement conference; and +- (7) Any other information that the parties believe may assist this Court in resolving the action. + +If this case has been settled or otherwise terminated, counsel are not required to appear, provided that a stipulation of discontinuance, voluntary dismissal, or other proof of termination is sent prior to the date of the conference via email to the Orders and Judgment Clerk at the following email address: orders\_andjudgments@nysd.uscourts.gov. + +Any request for an extension or adjournment shall be made only by letter as provided in Individual Rule I.B.2 and must be received at least 48 hours before the deadline or conference. Unless counsel are notified that the conference has been adjourned, it will be held as scheduled. + +Counsel who have noticed an appearance as of the issuance of this order are directed (i) to notify all other parties' attorneys in this action by serving upon each of them a copy of this order and the Court's Individual Rules forthwith, and (ii) to file proof of such notice with the Court. If unaware of the identity of counsel for any of the parties, counsel receiving this order must send a copy of this order and Individual Rules to that party personally. + +**DATE AND PLACE OF CONFERENCE:** January 9, 2020 at **10:40 a.m**, in **Courtroom 1106** of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Thurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse at **40 Foley Square**, New York, New York. Please monitor the docket the day before the conference, as the time may change slightly. + +Dated: November 18, 2019 +New York, New York + diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777719/EFTA02777719.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777719/EFTA02777719.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..86e4cc3f3609a801b159ca7f1ffb4f050e2042ae --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777719/EFTA02777719.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -5, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777719", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.empty-image\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "9faa866e999bd204bb6f9164c062b70e926e959f265901380c406c6ea5506d42", + "output_sha256": "2eb4cd47355f77cfaafaf56566467b5c3410646a47c65a4d4914817abf3dbcc0", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777722/EFTA02777722.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777722/EFTA02777722.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8a1f126cf3dadbbfd270b931605b633a84b34ff8 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777722/EFTA02777722.md @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Plaintiff, + +vs. + +DARREN I. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, + +Defendants. + +Case No. 1:19-cv- 10475 (LGS) + +## NOTICE OF APPEARANCE + +PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned attorney, David Boies, who is a member in good standing of the bar of this Court, hereby appears as counsel for Plaintiff in the above-captioned proceeding. + +Dated: New York, New York November 20, 2019 + +BOLES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP + +By: /s/ David Boies David Boies 333 Main Street Armonk, NY 10504 Telephone: (914) 749-8200 Fax: (914) 749-8300 dboies@bsflIp.com + +Attorney for Plainta \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777722/EFTA02777722.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777722/EFTA02777722.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9b3be00e6062202f506734daaef5cfceb512257d --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777722/EFTA02777722.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777722", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "a4f1ef0c4869ade997929add9071938c4720ae5ff87ff16c07c8cc92db6f57bc", + "output_sha256": "a4f1ef0c4869ade997929add9071938c4720ae5ff87ff16c07c8cc92db6f57bc", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777723/EFTA02777723.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777723/EFTA02777723.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c849bc0e1afcd5ded3978da361d33164b79506b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777723/EFTA02777723.md @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Plaintiff, + +VS. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, + +Defendants. + +Case No. 1:19-cv-10475 (LGS) + +DECLARATION OF SIGRID S. MCCAWLEY IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE + +I, Sigrid S. McCawley, hereby declare as follows: + +- I. I have never been convicted of a felony. +- 2. I have never been censured, suspended, disbarred or denied admission or readmission by any court. +- 3. There are no pending disciplinary proceedings against me in any state or federal court. +- 4. I am a member in good standing of the bar of the State of Florida. + +I hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statements are true and correct. + +Dated: November 21, 2019 Respectfully Submitted, + +/s/ SiRrid S. McCawlev + +Sigrid S. McCawley + +Boles Schiller Flexner LLP + +401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1200 + +Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 + +Tel: (954) 356-0011 + +Fax: (954) 356 0022 + +Email: smccawley@bsfllp.com + +Counsel for Plaintiff \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777723/EFTA02777723.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777723/EFTA02777723.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cebec30a1179ed35400481ecc71e511bf311a252 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777723/EFTA02777723.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777723", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "e7acbec4c9af3814dac2908449f176f387512b5b4c6c50d026094f4677afe314", + "output_sha256": "e7acbec4c9af3814dac2908449f176f387512b5b4c6c50d026094f4677afe314", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777724/EFTA02777724.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777724/EFTA02777724.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d7f8f4e33fcf42ba03379827de25c76860fdec06 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777724/EFTA02777724.md @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +# Supreme Court of Florida Certificate of Good Standing + +*I JOHN A. TOMASINO, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Florida, do hereby certify that* + +**SIGRID [REDACTED] MCCAWLEY** + +*was admitted as an attorney and counselor entitled to practice law in all the Courts of the State of Florida on November 6, 1997, is presently in good standing, and that the private and professional character of the attorney appear to be good.* + +*WITNESS my hand and the Seal of the Supreme Court of Florida at Tallahassee, the Capital, this November 20, 2019.* + +![](_page_0_Picture_62.jpeg) + +*Clerk of the Supreme Court of Florida.* \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777724/EFTA02777724.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777724/EFTA02777724.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cd2bccd623a0aff50a6f22d982870deb0f5bd719 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777724/EFTA02777724.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -5, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777724", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.empty-image\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "398a01f1f1deb5901d6113fe18df92a4beb8c21d33b6026258084beb6cb11aa9", + "output_sha256": "1c5d422e498e981cf6a1c846f828e722582f57c3859cf58a81f1ec9e1188c475", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777725/EFTA02777725.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777725/EFTA02777725.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f4f301ff4531db29d0c4c4e9cd02cebdde023561 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777725/EFTA02777725.md @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Plaintiff, VS. DARREN K. INDYICE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, Defendants. + +Case No. 1:19-cv-10475 (LGS) + +## ORDER FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE + +The motion of Sigrid S. McCawley, for admission to practice Pro Hac Vice in the above captioned action is granted. + +Applicant has declared that she is a member in good standing of the bar of the State of Florida; and that her contact information is as follows: + +Sigrid S. McCawley Boies Schiller Flexner LLP 401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1200 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 Telephone: (954) 356-0011 Fax: (954) 356-0022 smccawley@bsfilp.com + +Applicant having requested admission Pro Hac Vice to appear for all purposes as counsel for Plaintiff in the above entitled action; + +IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Applicant is admitted to practice Pro Hac Vice in the above captioned case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. + +All attorneys appearing before this Court are subject to the Local Rules of this Court, including the Rules governing discipline of attorneys. + +Dated: + +United States District Judge \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777725/EFTA02777725.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777725/EFTA02777725.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..53708a51d032d04b83d07eddbfb928fd4a91e7c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777725/EFTA02777725.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777725", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "7ab166aef4e1aac05f87d02dc59428f0a2484679375550fc8f67c8f797846f44", + "output_sha256": "7ab166aef4e1aac05f87d02dc59428f0a2484679375550fc8f67c8f797846f44", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777727/EFTA02777727.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777727/EFTA02777727.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f060c8d936f5510d325c5a6d071b2a6d99011ef9 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777727/EFTA02777727.md @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Plaintiff, + +VS. + +DARREN INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, + +Defendants. + +Case No. l :19-cv- 10475 (LGS) + +## MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE + +Pursuant to Rule 1.3 of the Local Rules of the United States Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, I, Sigrid S. McCawley, hereby move this Court for an Order for Admission to practice Pro Hac Vice to appear as counsel for Plaintiff, in the above-captioned action. + +I am in good standing in the bar of the State of Florida and there are no pending disciplinary proceedings against me in any state or federal court. I have never been convicted of a felony. I have never been censured, suspended, disbarred or denied admission or readmission by any court. I have attached the affidavit pursuant to Local Rule 1.3. + +Dated: November 21, 2019 Respectfully Submitted, + +/s/ Sigrid S. McCawlev + +Sigrid S. McCawley Boies Schiller Flexner LLP 401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1200 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 Tel: (954) 356-0011 Fax: (954) 356 0022 Email: smccawlev@bsfilp.com \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777727/EFTA02777727.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777727/EFTA02777727.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c85d75a34f5f41fd7ebcea7c1b99f2052ed9b829 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777727/EFTA02777727.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777727", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "26f8e921f9d62284fde087664052698e59453809841a2a056d2e0a47a254b755", + "output_sha256": "26f8e921f9d62284fde087664052698e59453809841a2a056d2e0a47a254b755", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777728/EFTA02777728.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777728/EFTA02777728.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6a60eb7bbb91e5e7d6ae8e1a53dc9f56756fda96 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777728/EFTA02777728.md @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +AO 399 i0 l: (NI %Val tr of the SET% Ice of Summons + +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT + +for the + +Southern District of New York + +Plaintiff + +v. + +Darren I Indyke et al + +E14/ fiqUialll + +To: David Boles + +Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-10475-LGS + +## WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS + +(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff) + +1 have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you. + +I. or the entity I represent. agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case. + +I understand that I, or the entity I represent. will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service. + +I also understand that I. / the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from it/ 7214 , the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent. + +Date: /1 /2 5/1 9 + +Darren Indyke and Richard D. Kahn + +Printed name ofparty waiving service of summons + +Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party + +Bennet Moskowitz + +Printed name + +Troutman Sanders LLP 875 Third Avenue. New York. NY 10022 + +Address + +Bennet.Moskowitz@troutman.com + +(212) 704-6087 + +E-mail address + +Telephone number + +## Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons + +Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure. + +"Good cause" does nor include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property. + +If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections. but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service. + +If you waive service. then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and Ale a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form. you arc allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777728/EFTA02777728.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777728/EFTA02777728.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6aac8a9c571c70ced5e5c00ec38bd4f71b69d486 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777728/EFTA02777728.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777728", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "56b3ee3d212885800f05bbc604a425b4c26e4494c6747e7acf3d86040a6dc794", + "output_sha256": "56b3ee3d212885800f05bbc604a425b4c26e4494c6747e7acf3d86040a6dc794", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777729/EFTA02777729.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777729/EFTA02777729.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..54c15637c35f998568d3dbf786169e4aeade4578 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777729/EFTA02777729.md @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +Bennet J. Moskowitz bennetmoskowitz@troutman.com + +January 2, 2020 + +ECF + +Hon. Lorna G. Schofield Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse 40 Foley Square New York, NY 10007 + +Re: v. Darren K. lndyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as the executors of the Estate of Jeffrey Edward Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell, Case No. 19-cv-10475-LGS + +Dear Judge Schofield: + +We represent Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (together, "Defendants") in the referenced action. Defendants respectfully request that the Court refer this action to Magistrate Judge Debra C. Freeman for General Pretrial (including scheduling, discovery, non-dispositive pretrial motions, and settlement). Plaintiff consents to this request. + +As a matter of context, several other Judges in this District have collectively referred to Magistrate Freeman for General Pretrial numerous actions against Defendants in their capacities as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, including two actions in which the parties are represented by the respective counsel of record in this action.' Magistrate Freeman held a status conference on November 21, 2019, which counsel of record for the parties to this action attended. Magistrate Freeman requested the parties in the matters referred to Her Honor to submit status reports on January 10, 2020. + +{sup}`&#`x27;See v. Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as the executors of the Estate of Jeffrey Edward E tin No. 19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF, Order of Reference (ECF Doc. 6) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2019); v. Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as the executors of the Estate of Jeffrey Edward Epstein, Case No. 19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF, Order of Reference (ECF Doc. 8) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2019). + +The parties are aware that this Court had planned for the parties to submit Joint Letters and Civil Case Management Plans and Scheduling Orders today. However, in light of this request for referral to Magistrate Judge Freeman, the parties request the Court's guidance on whether these documents should be submitted. + +Respectfully submitted, + +s/Bennet J. Moskowitz Bennet J. Moskowitz \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777729/EFTA02777729.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777729/EFTA02777729.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b6419bff4635c6b71de214d25fdf0bec71c56ebd --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777729/EFTA02777729.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -4, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777729", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "7166518335899fd342120def0f6066af948e963a9ea71206144864fd0c9c4bb3", + "output_sha256": "2ed63cc3caf0e07789076c26d0f0844d2aa5cd7a90e50362cff65f2e92a15da6", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777731/EFTA02777731.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777731/EFTA02777731.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..22cb2f3576f0c3fa5c294f9aea94ee232bb8322d --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777731/EFTA02777731.md @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +Troutman Sanders LLP +875 Third Avenue +New York, New York 10022 + +troutman.com + +| USDC SDNY | +| ------------------------------- | +| DOCUMENT | +| ELECTRONICALLY FILED | +| DOC #: _____ | +| DATE FILED: 01/02/2020 | + +**Bennet J. Moskowitz** +bennet.moskowitz@troutman.com + +Application GRANTED. A referral order will issue separately. The initial pretrial conference, scheduled for January 9, 2020, is canceled. + +January 2, 2020 + +Dated: January 2, 2020 +New York, New York + +**ECF** + +Hon. Lorna G. Schofield +Thurgood Marshall +United States Courthouse +40 Foley Square +New York, NY 10007 + +**LORNA G. SCHOFIELD** +**UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE** + +**Re:** [REDACTED] v. *Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as the executors of the Estate of Jeffrey Edward Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell, Case No. 19-cv-10475-LGS* + +Dear Judge Schofield: + +We represent Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (together, "Defendants") in the referenced action. Defendants respectfully request that the Court refer this action to Magistrate Judge Debra C. Freeman for General Pretrial (including scheduling, discovery, non-dispositive pretrial motions, and settlement). Plaintiff consents to this request. + +As a matter of context, several other Judges in this District have collectively referred to Magistrate Freeman for General Pretrial numerous actions against Defendants in their capacities as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, including two actions in which the parties are represented by the respective counsel of record in this action.{sup}`1` Magistrate Freeman held a status conference on November 21, 2019, which counsel of record for the parties to this action attended. Magistrate Freeman requested the parties in the matters referred to Her Honor to submit status reports on January 10, 2020. + +{sup}`1`See [REDACTED] v. *Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as the executors of the Estate of Jeffrey Edward Epstein, Case No. 19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF*, Order of Reference (ECF Doc. 6) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2019); [REDACTED] v. *Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as the executors of the Estate of Jeffrey Edward Epstein, Case No. 19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF*, Order of Reference (ECF Doc. 8) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2019). + +The parties are aware that this Court had planned for the parties to submit Joint Letters and Civil Case Management Plans and Scheduling Orders today. However, in light of this request for referral to Magistrate Judge Freeman, the parties request the Court's guidance on whether these documents should be submitted. + +Respectfully submitted, + +s/Bennet J. Moskowitz Bennet J. Moskowitz \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777731/EFTA02777731.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777731/EFTA02777731.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e3d6d45e41de78b3d15a638237feb2b752fa0581 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777731/EFTA02777731.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -78, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777731", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 7, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.empty-image\", \"builtin.table-boundary-padding\", \"epstein_legal.flight-log-tables.normalize\", \"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "8cd72f1f42ce11bcf72da71ae002e6954650607908d0bb7ed56eae6554ecd520", + "output_sha256": "3b11bad06af72bb8e9f09cc3bf9223c7ef461e0bf15c01c5121df4676b506b3a", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777733/EFTA02777733.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777733/EFTA02777733.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..dfff3b909757ce6ce6e185928188f4c5bcef1fe8 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777733/EFTA02777733.md @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF Document 14 Filed 0 ltYgbt ' 1 DOCUMENT ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOC #: DATE FILED:January 2, 2020 + +UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +-against- + +DAREN K. INDYKE, et al. + +Plaintiff(s), : 19 Civ. 10475 (LGS) + +Defendant(s). : --------- X + +LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, District Judge: + +## ORDER OF REFERENCE TO A MAGISTRATE JUDGE + +The above entitled action is referred to the Hon. Debra Freeman United States Magistrate Judge, for the following purpose(s): + +✓ GENERAL PRE-TRIAL (includes scheduling, discovery, non-dispositive pre-trial motions and settlement) + +GENERAL PRE-TRIAL & DISPOSITIVE MOTION (all purposes except trial) + +DISPOSITIVE MOTION (i.e., a motion requiring a Report & Recommendation) + +SPECIFIC NON-DISPOSITIVE MOTION / DISPUTE (including discovery dispute) • + +JURY SELECTION + +SO ORDERED. + +Dated: January 2, 2020 New York, New York + +\* Do not check if already referred for General Pre-Trial. + +HABEAS CORPUS INQUEST AFTER DEFAULT / DAMAGES HEARING + +SOCIAL SECURITY SETTLEMENT + +CONSENT UNDER 28 U.S.C. 636(c) FOR ALL PURPOSES (including trial) + +CONSENT UNDER 28 U.S.C. 636(c) FOR LIMITED PURPOSE OF + +> LO A G. SCHOFIEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777733/EFTA02777733.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777733/EFTA02777733.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fef8be548c6be05262e9c2ce4de85a156c31ba0c --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777733/EFTA02777733.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777733", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "693f2c4e0d9e8c5d85913a033ef4a05741eebd0ae717f31e37d099eab56f9336", + "output_sha256": "693f2c4e0d9e8c5d85913a033ef4a05741eebd0ae717f31e37d099eab56f9336", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777734/EFTA02777734.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777734/EFTA02777734.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..dfbeda8a0df03531eaca104b4684e5ac18cdfcec --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777734/EFTA02777734.md @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +January 10, 2020 + +## VIA ECF + +The Honorable Debra Freeman Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007-1312 + +> Re: v. Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as executors of the Estate ofJeffrey Edward Epstein, 19-10479 Jane Doe 1000 v. Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as executors o the Estate ofJetey Edward Epstein, 19-10577 v. Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as executors of the Estate of Jeji•ey Edward Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell, 19- 10475 v. Darren K Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as executors of the Estate of Jeji•ey Edward Epstein, 19-10476 + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +Pursuant to the Court's request at the November 21, 2019, Case Management Conference, Plaintiffs and Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, jointly submit this letter to provide the Court with an update as to the progress of discussions regarding both discovery and settlement. + +The parties have thus far engaged in two productive conferences pursuant to Rule 26(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. During those conferences, the parties agreed to exchange initial disclosures by January 23, 2020, and to exchange discovery plans one week thereafter, on January 30, 2020. + +As the Court is aware, Defendants have arranged for a Victims' Compensation Program that will be available to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' counsel has conferred with the Program's designers and administrators, the Program's administrators provided Plaintiffs with a proposed protocol for the Program, and Plaintiffs have provided some feedback to the administrators. The motion for the Superior Court of the United States Virgin Islands to approve the establishment of the Program will be heard on February 4, 2020. + +The parties request a conference with the Court on February 6 or 7, 2020, to resolve any potential disagreements as to how these matters should proceed. The parties will provide the Court with their proposed discovery plan(s) 48 hours before any such conference. + +Respectfully submitted, + +/s/ Joshua I. Schiller + +David Boies, Esq. Joshua I. Schiller, Esq. Sigrid S. McCawley, Esq. Boies Schiller Flexner LLP + +/s/ Bennet J. Moskowitz + +Bennet J. Moskowitz, Esq. Troutman Sanders LLP + +cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777734/EFTA02777734.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777734/EFTA02777734.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cf20bf1d7d64bec9575b74041028caf65af14fa9 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777734/EFTA02777734.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777734", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "d30be457f7e4b9aa1c7e48415935fa61b9877a29bcc863b82261330176355cae", + "output_sha256": "d30be457f7e4b9aa1c7e48415935fa61b9877a29bcc863b82261330176355cae", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777736/EFTA02777736.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777736/EFTA02777736.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..eca0df9ff2199cc0e758112cd8964bb952ee45a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777736/EFTA02777736.md @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +The Clerk of Court of the Southern District of New York is directed to docket the within ORDER in each of the following actions: + +VE v. Nine East 71st Street et al., No. 1:19-cv-07625 (AJN) (DF) + +Katlyn Doe v. Indyke et at, No. 1:19-cv-07771 (PKC) (DF) + +Priscilla Doe v. Indyke et al., No. 1:19-cv-07772 (ALC) (DF) + +Lisa Doe v. Indyke et al., No. 1:19-cv-07773 (ER) (DF) + +Jane Doe v. Indyke et al., No. 1:19-cv-08673 (KPF) (DF) + +v. Indyke et aL, No. 1:19-cv-10475 (LGS) (DF) + +v. Indyke et aL, No. 1:19-cv-10476 (PGG) (DF) + +v. Indyke et aL, No. 1:19-cv-10479 (ALC) (DF) + +Jane Doe 1000 v. Indyke et al., No. 1:19-cv-10577 (LGS) (DF) + +Jane Doe 15 v. Indyke et al., No. I :19-cv-10653 (PAE) (DF) + +Mary Doe v. Indyke et aL, No. 1:19-cv-I 0758 (PAE) (DF) + +v. Indyke et al, No. 1:19-cv-10788 (GHW) (DF) + +Anastasia Doe v. Indyke et al, No. 1:19-cv-11869 (MN) (DF) + +![](_page_0_Picture_15.jpeg) + +## DEBRA FREEMAN, United States Magistrate Judge: + +The above-referenced cases — all brought by plaintiffs claiming that they were sexually abused by Jeffrey Epstein and seeking damages from his estate — have been neither consolidated for any purpose, nor designated as "related" by the Court. Nonetheless, these cases (together with certain other, similar cases, not listed above) have been referred to the undersigned for general pretrial supervision, so that discovery — and potentially settlement — may be coordinated as reasonable. While, at the parties' request, discovery in the other Jeffrey Epstein cases referred to this Court has been stayed pending a further report on the parties' settlement efforts, the parties to each of the above-referenced cases have requested, by submissions dated January 10, 2020, that this Court set a discovery schedule. This Court's having reviewed the parties' submissions, it is hereby ORDERED that: + +- 1. In each of the above-referenced cases in which the parties have not yet submitted a jointly proposed discovery plan pursuant to Rule 26(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties are directed to submit a proposed discovery schedule for this Court's review no later + +than February 6, 2020. This submission should address all of the matters set out in Rule 26(f)(3), and should specifically include proposed deadlines for: + +- a service of initial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1); +- b. service of initial document requests and interrogatories; +- c. any motion for joinder of other parties or amendment of the pleadings; +- d. completion of fact discovery; and +- e. expert disclosures and the completion of expert discovery, if any. + +2. As to each of the above-referenced cases, this Court will hold a pretrial conference pursuant to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on February 11, 2020, at 10:00 a.m., in Courtroom 17A at the United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007. The parties should be aware, however, that the mere fact that this Court will be holding a single, joint case-management conference does not necessarily mean that this Court will set an identical discovery schedule in each case. At the conference, counsel should be prepared to address whether there are reasons why these cases should be treated differently for scheduling purposes. + +Dated: New York, New York January 14, 2019 + +SO ORDERED + +Ahleet A9-7 DEBRA FREEMAN United States Magistrate Judge + +Copies to: + +All counsel in the above-referenced cases (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777736/EFTA02777736.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777736/EFTA02777736.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..41c8471a887e473dede10213b57ed9b95ee06a3a --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777736/EFTA02777736.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777736", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "fac1d24dd82a22bf53e11f1fad9ee0b4934991e22173d9a4d16903fafe596d3e", + "output_sha256": "fac1d24dd82a22bf53e11f1fad9ee0b4934991e22173d9a4d16903fafe596d3e", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777738/EFTA02777738.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777738/EFTA02777738.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b8d2d311b34eb87793d9fe84e0ba87f4c607fd5b --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777738/EFTA02777738.md @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +Bennet J. Moskowitz bennet.moskowitz@troutman.com + +January 24, 2020 + +ECF + +Hon. Lorna G. Schofield Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse 40 Foley Square New York, NY 10007 + +Re: v. Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as the executors of the Estate of Jeffrey Edward Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell, 19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF + +Dear Judge Schofield: + +We represent Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (together, the "Co-Executors"), in the above-referenced action. We write pursuant to Your Honor's Individual Rule III(C)(2) to request a conference on and to explain the bases for the Co-Executors' anticipated motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss the time-barred claims and demand for punitive damages in Plaintiff ("Plaintiff") Complaint (ECF No. 1). We propose the following briefing schedule: moving brief by February 24, 2020; opposition brief by March 25, 2020; and reply brief by April 8. 2020. + +## 1. Plaintiff is a Texas resident who alleges Decedent committed torts against her in the 1990's, primarily in New Mexico; Plaintiff's causes of action based on torts in New Mexico expired by 1999. + +Plaintiff, a Texas citizen and resident, alleges that, in 1995 and/or 1996, when she was 16, Mr. Epstein ("Decedent"), now deceased, committed sexual offenses against her in New York and New Mexico. (Compl. 11111, 18, 53-54, 58, 67.) Plaintiff asserts three causes of action — battery, false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress — and demands punitive damages. (Id. ¶¶ 79-94, p. 18.) + +New York's borrowing statute, CPLR § 202, provides that when a non-New York resident such as Plaintiff sues on causes of action accruing outside New York (here, New Mexico), the complaint must be timely under the statute of limitations of both New York and the jurisdiction where the claim accrued.' New Mexico law provides a 3-year statute of limitations for claims sounding in personal injury (N.M. Stat. § 37-1-8); and minors have 1-year from reaching the age of majority to commence such actions (N.M. Stat. § 37-1-10). + +I "In diversity cases in New York, federal courts apply ... C.P.L.R. § 202." Commerzbank AG v. Deutsche Bank Nat? Tr. Co., 234 F. Supp. 3d 462, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (citation omitted). + +Therefore, under New Mexico law, Plaintiff's causes of action based on events occurring there expired by sometime in 1999. Per CPLR § 202, those claims, including Plaintiff's cause of action for false imprisonment in its entirety, are untimely. + +## 2. Plaintiff's attempts to plead around the statute of limitations fail. + +Plaintiff erroneously alleges her claims are timely per CPLR § 215(8)(a), her claims were equitably tolled, and that the Co-Executors are equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense. (Compl. ¶¶ 12-15.) Each of these arguments fails as a matter of law. + +First, CPLR § 215(8)(a) does not apply here. CPLR § 215(8)(a) provides: "Whenever it is shown that a criminal action against the same defendant has been commenced with respect to the event or occurrence from which a claim governed by this section arises, the plaintiff shall have at least one year from the termination of the criminal action ... to commence the civil action" (emphasis added). Decedent's criminal indictment (the "Indictment") attached to Plaintiff's Complaint does not concern Plaintiff's allegations. Rather, the Indictment charges Decedent sexually abused minor girls from 2002 to 2005 in New York and Florida. (Compl., Ex. A at ¶¶ 1, 2.) + +Plaintiff alleges the torts against her occurred in 1995 and/or 1996, mostly in New Mexico. Therefore, this action and the Indictment arise from different occurrences. + +New York courts apply CPLR § 215(8)(a) narrowly. See Christodoulou v. Terdeman, 262 AD2d 595, 596 (2d Dept. 1999) (CPLR § 215(8)(a) applied only to claims based on events of February 26, 1993 and December 28, 1993, because it was only in connection with events of those two days that criminal prosecution was commenced against defendant); Gallina v. Thatcher, No. 52980/2017, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 8435 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cnty. Oct. 23, 2018) (CPLR § 215(8)(a) inapplicable where incidents charged in criminal action and those alleged in civil action occurred on different dates); McElligott v. City of N.Y., 15-cv-7107 (LGS), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201829, at \*13 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2017) (CPLR § 215(8)(a) inapplicable to claims against civil defendants not charged as co-defendants in criminal action, notwithstanding same events gave rise to both actions). Plaintiff alleges a far more tenuous connection to the Indictment than the criminal-civil links unsuccessfully asserted in those cases. + +Second, even if § 215(8)(a) applies, which it does not, Plaintiff's claims for torts occurring in New Mexico are still untimely per N.M. Stat. § 37.1-8 and CPLR § 202. + +Third, Plaintiff failed to meet her burden to allege extraordinary circumstances sufficient to justify equitable tolling or estoppel. Equitable tolling is only applied where a plaintiff is "prevented in some extraordinary way from exercising h[er] rights." Viti v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 10-cv-2908 (ALC) (MHD), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189633, at \*30 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2012), adopted by, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174145 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2013) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Under this doctrine, a court may, "under compelling circumstances, make narrow exceptions to the statute of limitations ... 'to prevent inequity.'" Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). "That the doctrine is to be employed only sparingly -- in 'extraordinary and 'compelling' circumstances -- is reflected in the fact that the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion to show that tolling is + +justified." Id. (emphasis added) (citing Boos v. Runyon, 201 F.3d 178, 185 (2d Cir. 2000)). A late-filing party seeking equitable tolling must also demonstrate she acted with "reasonable diligence" in pursuing her claims during the period she seeks to toll. Id. at \*32 (citation omitted). Equitable estoppel only applies where a plaintiff knows her cause of action exists but the defendant's conduct causes her to delay in bringing her lawsuit. Yesh, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101744, at '5 (citation omitted). Equitable estoppel requires a plaintiff to show: (i) the defendant made a definite misrepresentation of fact and had reason to believe the plaintiff would rely on it; and (ii) the plaintiff reasonably relied on the misrepresentation to her detriment. Id. (citation omitted). Tolling is inappropriate where, as here, a plaintiff fails to articulate any acts by a defendant that prevented the plaintiff from timely commencing suit. Id. at \*6 (citation omitted). + +Plaintiff's threadbare allegations of "deception," "threats" and the like (Compl. ¶16) do not establish "extraordinary" circumstances justifying tolling. Nor has Plaintiff alleged (i) that Decedent made a misrepresentation to her and had reason to believe she would rely on it, or (ii) that Plaintiff reasonably relied on it to her detriment. + +Plaintiff's own allegations refute any notion that she was prevented from exercising her rights. Rather, Plaintiff's allegations establish she was both willing and able to come forward about the alleged wrongdoing—she disclosed it long ago to Vanity Fair Magazine (Id. ¶ 75). There is no "extraordinary" basis to toll the statute of limitations or estop the Co-Executors from asserting a statute of limitations defense given these allegations. + +## 3. Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages fails as a matter of law.2 + +Plaintiff's punitive damages claim must be dismissed as a matter of law. Neither New Mexico law nor New York law permits punitive damages against a decedent tortfeasor's estate. See Jaramillo v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 117 N.M. 337, 346 (N.M. 1994) ("punishment and deterrence are not accomplished by enabling recovery of punitive damages from the estate"); NY EPTL § 11-3.2 (a)(1) ("an action may be brought or continued against the personal representative of the decedent, but punitive damages shall not be awarded nor penalties adjudged in any such action brought to recover damages for personal injury."). That is the law in most jurisdictions, as reflected in the Restatement. See Restat. (Second) Of Torts § 908 cmt. a (punitive damages not available against representatives of deceased tortfeasor). + +Respectfully submitted, + +s/Bennet J. Moskowitz + +Bennet J. Moskowitz + +{sup}`2` Courts in this District regularly dismiss punitive damages claims. See The Cookware Co. (USA). LW v. Austin, 15-5796, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177691, at '17 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2016) (dismissing punitive damages claim without leave to replead); SJB v. N.Y.C. Dept of Educ., 03-6653, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13227, at '25.26 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 14, 2004) (dismissing punitive damages claims not statutorily available). \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777738/EFTA02777738.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777738/EFTA02777738.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b17e1970cdfa42fe62b1bb6277423d9295c52321 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777738/EFTA02777738.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -4, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777738", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "b6dd46f6ae11df45eb5e79aab4c270ee8130e167a7b28ac550a1bbd42965a003", + "output_sha256": "c43c1516f4fa6b7c78e280fd00b32562092f2ba0c27e3a066394a0c21a46e5bb", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777741/EFTA02777741.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777741/EFTA02777741.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0c3ad50eb67c0a1b196af6c0c58a4ece27871255 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777741/EFTA02777741.md @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Plaintiff, CASE NO: 19-cv-10475-LOS-DCF + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, + +Defendants. + +## NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO APPROVE ALTERNATE SERVICE PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 4(e)(1) + +PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that upon the accompanying memorandum of law dated January 27, 2020, Plaintiff will move this Court for an order granting Plaintiff's Motion to Approve Alternative Service Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)( I ) upon Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell and finding that the service efforts made by Plaintiff's counsel are sufficient to notify Defendant Maxwell of the claims against her in this matter. + +Dated: January 27, 2020 Respectfully Submitted, + +/s/ Joshua I. Schiller + +David Boies BOWS SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP 333 Main Street Armonk, NY 10504 (914) 749-8200 + +Joshua I. Schiller Bows SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP 55 Hudson Yards New York, NY 10001 (212) 446-2300 + +Sigrid McCawley (Pro Hac Vice) BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP 401 E. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1200 Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301 (954) 356-0011 + +Counsel for Plaintiff, \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777741/EFTA02777741.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777741/EFTA02777741.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8e085b2f085c1a96ad666602b7fe9a14a8bde726 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777741/EFTA02777741.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777741", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "4c28350b30e10a9d2c393276eac00ac1f567d8aa5016d209c53ba9a7dfec31c5", + "output_sha256": "4c28350b30e10a9d2c393276eac00ac1f567d8aa5016d209c53ba9a7dfec31c5", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777743/EFTA02777743.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777743/EFTA02777743.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7eddda884429f4ba4f05c10be658b9b7bf4e6ee9 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777743/EFTA02777743.md @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Plaintiff, CASE NO: 19-cv-10475-LOS-DCF + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, + +Defendants. + +## MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO APPROVE ALTERNATE SERVICE PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 4(e)(1) + +Plaintiff by and through her undersigned attorneys, respectfully submits this memorandum of law in support of her motion to approve alternate service upon Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell. + +#### BACKGROUND + +Jeffrey Epstein was one of the world's most prolific sexual predators, using his wealth and connections to create a transcontinental sex trafficking ring. Ghislaine Maxwell was Epstein's main "recruiter"—she spent years overseeing and managing Epstein's sex trafficking network, and actively recruited underage girls to provide to Epstein and others for sex. Compl. II 10, 27-31. Since Epstein's most recent arrest on July 8, 2019, and his eventual death on August 10, 2019, Compl. yq 32, 35, Maxwell has been in hiding. Numerous media outlets have reported on her unknown whereabouts, including The Sun, the Washington Examiner, Vanity Fair, BBC, CNN, CNBC, the Telegraph, The Guardian, and Page Six.' At the same time, her counsel is actively litigating in this Court to keep shielded from public view thousands of pages of court records that would expose her involvement and participation in Epstein's heinous crimes. v. Maxwell, 15-cv-7433-LAP (S.D.N.Y.). + +On November 12, 2019, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Ghislaine Maxwell and the co-executors of Epstein's Estate, alleging that, when she was 16 years old, Maxwell and Epstein trafficked her, sexually assaulted her, and falsely imprisoned her at Epstein's + +ISee e.g. https://www.vanityfair.cominews/2019/1 Uhunt-for-jeffrey-epstein-alleged-cnabler-ghislainc-maxwell: https://www.theguardian,comlus-news/2019/nov/18/ghislaine-maxwell-prince-andrew-friend-jeffrey-epsteincontroversy-hiding; httes://www.theetumlian.com/us-news/2019/dec/12/she-was-so-dangerous-where-in-the-worldis-the-notorious-ghislaine-maswell- https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-50927651 https://edition.cnn.corn/2019/12/08/uldwho-is-ghislainc-maxwell-jeffrey-epstein-intl-gbdindcx.html: hilps://www.enbc.com/2019/08/14/ehislaine-maxwell-location-unknown-ieffrev-eestein-accusers-eve-her.html: hites://www.washinetonexaminer.com/newsfibi-investieatine-ieffrev-epstein-facilitator-ehislaine-maxwell: prosecutors-announced/: hdos://pagesix.com/2020/01/11/ehislaine-maxwell-flies-under-the-radar-while-lawyeringup-for-epstein-lawsuit/. + +New Mexico ranch. Comp1.11 1-2, 79—80, 84-85. Plaintiff has attempted to locate and personally serve Maxwell to no avail. Her counsel has conducted extensive public records searches and located various addresses for Maxwell. Some of those addresses belong to properties that Maxwell has sold in recent years, such as her New York City home on 65th Street. And all of those addresses have been available to the media and the public for years, yet no one has been able to locate Maxwell at any of those addresses. Plaintiff's counsel also sent an email attaching a copy of the summons and complaint to the only publicly known email address associated with Maxwell (gmax@ellmax.com). Mariella Decl., Ex. A. That email was not returned as undelivered, but counsel did not receive a response. Mariella Dec1. 13. + +Despite being in hiding, Maxwell has been actively participating in a defamation lawsuit that filed against her in this Court. See v. Maxwell, 15-cv-7433-LAP (S.D.N.Y.). In that case, Maxwell is vigorously fighting to keep thousands of pages of court filings under seal in order to shield her own wrongdoing from the public. On December 6, 2019, and December 16, 2019, Plaintiff's counsel sent two emails to Maxwell's attorneys in that matter, Jeffrey S. Pagliuca, Laura A. Menninger, and Ty Gee of Haddon, and P.C. ("Haddon M''), attaching a copy of the summons and Complaint and asking them to accept service on Maxwell's behalf. Mariella Decl., Ex. B. Maxwell's counsel did not respond to either email. Mariella Decl. 1 4. This is despite the fact that Haddon has submitted filings to Judge Loretta A. Preska on Maxwell's behalf in that matter as recently as January 17, 2020. v. Maxwell, 15 Civ. 7433-LAP (S.D.N.Y), ECF No. 1020. In addition, after a conference before Judge Preska on January 16, 2020, Plaintiff's counsel asked Ms. Menninger once again if she would accept service on behalf of Maxwell. Mariella Decl. 1 5. Ms. Menninger said that she was not authorized to do so, despite her active participation at the conference on behalf of Maxwell. Id. + +Even before Epstein's 2019 arrest and death, locating and serving Maxwell was impracticable. In 2017, a victim suing Maxwell in yet another matter related to Maxwell's participation in Epstein's sex trafficking scheme, attempted to serve Maxwell in a number of ways, including by providing Maxwell's attorneys at Haddon a copy of the summons and complaint, emailing a copy of the summons and complaint to gmax@ellmax.com and attempting to effectuate service at three locations associated with Maxwell in New York and New Jersey. Jane Doe 43 v. Epstein, et al., 17 Civ. 00616-JGK (S.D.N.Y.), ECF No. 97 at 2-3. Despite those attempts, was unable to personally serve Maxwell and filed a motion asking the court to approve alternative service. Id. On January 30,2018, the Honorable John G. Koeltl held that had demonstrated that serving Maxwell was impracticable under New York law and that providing copies of the summons and complaint to Haddon Maxwell's attorneys in v. Maxwell, was reasonably calculated to provide Maxwell with notice of the lawsuit given that they were presumably in contact with Maxwell. v. Epstein, No. 17- CV-616 (JGK), 2018 WL 637421, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30,2018). + +## ARGUMENT + +Rule 4(eX1) of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure provides that service upon a party may be effected by "following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or where service is made." Accordingly, Defendant Maxwell may be served pursuant to New York C.P.L.R. § 308, which provides several methods by which service upon a natural person may be effectuated, including personal service; service by "delivering the summons . . . to a person of suitable age and + +discretion at the actual place of business, dwelling place or usual place of abode of the person to be served" and then mailing the summons to the individual's "last known residence;" or service by "affixing the summons to the door of either the actual place of business, dwelling place or usual place of abode within the state of the person to be served" and then "mailing the summons to such person at his or her last known residence" or to his or her place of business so called "nail and mail" service. CPLR §§ 308(1), (2) & (4). + +If service under CPLR §§ 308(1), (2) & (4) is impracticable, CPLR § 308(5) permits service "in such manner as the court, upon motion without notice, directs." The determination of whether service is impracticable "depends upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case." S.E.C. v. HGI, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 3866 (DLC), 1999 WL 1021087, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 1999). Although the plaintiff must show impracticability of service, there is no requirement of "proof of due diligence or of actual prior attempts to serve a party under the other provisions of the statute." Id. Giving notice under a substitute system is permissible provided that it is "reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." See SEC v. Tome, 833 F.2d 1086, 1093 (2d Cir. 1987). + +New York Courts consistently direct or approve alternative methods of service where regular service has been deemed "impracticable." For example, in Dobkin v. Chapman, 236 N.E.2d 451, 455 (N.Y. 1968), the New York Court of Appeals held that where a plaintiff could not accomplish the methods of service set forth in § 308, a Court is "given the discretion to fashion other means adapted to the particular facts of the case before it" pursuant to § 308(5) (referred to in Dobkin as § 308(4), the predecessor to § 308(5)). Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that a Court's discretion to fashion such methods of service "must be broad" if the statute is to be "meaningful." Id. + +Plaintiff has demonstrated that personally serving Maxwell is impracticable "because she has made numerous efforts to obtain information about [Maxwell's] current residence and general contact information to effectuate personal service but has been unable to locate Maxwell." See 2018 WL 637421, at \*1; see also Rampersad v. Deutsche Bank Secs., Inc., No. 02 Civ. 7311 (LTS), 2003 WL21073951, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2003) (authorizing alternative service under § 308(5) when Plaintiff was unable to determine defendant's residence or place of business after "extensive Internet searches" and inquires with defendant's former clients); HCI, 1999 WL 1021087, at \*1 (service by publication in USA Today authorized because defendant's whereabouts were unknown, efforts to locate his home or business address by searching computer databases failed, and there existed no record that he designated an agent for service). + +In addition to trying to locate contact information for Maxwell, who is purposely evading the media and justice system, Plaintiff has tried alternate avenues to serve Maxwell to no avail, including ( I) sending the documents to her current lawyers at Haddon M, who are actively litigating on Maxwell's behalf in another case and are most certainly in regular contact with her, and (2) emailing the documents to Maxwell's publicly available email address. Personal service under these circumstances is impracticable. + +Plaintiff has also demonstrated that the steps she has already taken to serve Maxwell are "reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise [the] interested partly] of the pendency of the action." See Tome, 833 F.2d at 1093. Haddon is actively litigating on Maxwell's behalf and appeared in court for Maxwell as recently as January 16, 2020. See v. Maxwell, 15 Civ. 7433-LAP (S.D.N.Y), ECF No. 1016 (ordering counsel to appear at January + +16, 2020 conference). There is no doubt that Maxwell has had actual notice and knowledge of the claims asserted in Plaintiff's Complaint or that Haddon can easily and quickly notify her of those claims. As a result, this Court should deem the service methods attempted to be sufficient and grant the motion for alternate service. See Bozza v. Love, No. 15-CV-3271 (LGS), 2015 WL 4039849, at \*2 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2015) (holding that service upon the defendant's counsel in an unrelated matter was sufficient). + +Maxwell should not be permitted to dodge allegations of serious wrongdoing against her while at the same time actively litigating to keep court records exposing that wrongdoing under seal. She has been using this Court as a sword and a shield for many years, and she, Jeffrey Epstein, and their other co-conspirators have attempted to thwart their victims from obtaining justice for decades. Maxwell must face the allegations against her, and the Court should deem the service methods attempted to be sufficient as Judge Koeltl did in 2016. + +# CONCLUSION + +For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant Plaintiff's Motion to Approve Alternative Service Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(1) upon Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell and find that the service efforts made by Plaintiff's counsel as described herein are sufficient to apprise Maxwell of this action. + +Dated: January 27, 2020 Respectfully Submitted, + +/s/ Joshua I. Schiller + +David Boies BOIFS SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP 333 Main Street Armonk, NY 10504 (914) 749-8200 + +Joshua I. Schiller Bows SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP 55 Hudson Yards New York, NY 10001 (212) 446-2300 + +Sigrid McCawley (Pro Hac Vice) Bows SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP 401 E. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1200 Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301 (954) 356-0011 + +Counsel for Plaintiff, \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777743/EFTA02777743.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777743/EFTA02777743.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..51a2d163f4cbae13392457be1891e86fa6383aaa --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777743/EFTA02777743.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777743", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "560436edf6b9c08952df719ac5c85990d29a8c9c648dce352f56970e291e2006", + "output_sha256": "560436edf6b9c08952df719ac5c85990d29a8c9c648dce352f56970e291e2006", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777751/EFTA02777751.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777751/EFTA02777751.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7ee86dd73c48d66de525dc6338837b93196fd4e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777751/EFTA02777751.md @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +## EXHIBIT A + +From: To: Cc: Subject: Date: Attachments: Sabina Mariana gmaziaelkoaxsam Sigrid MrCawley; lorthiller Summons & Complaint: v. Ghislaine Maxwell (19-cv-10475) Monday, December 23, 2019 3:42:23 PM + +M. Maxwell, + +Please be advised that we represent a victim of Jeffrey Epstein, who filed a lawsuit against you on November 12, 2019, in the Southern District of New York (Docket No. 19-cv-10475). I am attaching summons and complaint to this email. Please confirm receipt of this email. + +Thank you, + +Sabina Mariella + +Associate + +BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP + +55 Hudson Yards + +New York, NY 10001 + +(t) +1 212 754 4541 + +(m) + +crnanellaObcfIlo corn + +www bsrllosord \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777751/EFTA02777751.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777751/EFTA02777751.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..016a579db74cd0d3c05f22c29be03a423a9c2087 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777751/EFTA02777751.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777751", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "f24facb1fa732ffff1723e44aac17f681d1bc593754e306bdbaad66836dfcb14", + "output_sha256": "f24facb1fa732ffff1723e44aac17f681d1bc593754e306bdbaad66836dfcb14", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777753/EFTA02777753.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777753/EFTA02777753.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..59545b2b9576db1e680347157fb2c5b7fd3a51f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777753/EFTA02777753.md @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +## EXHIBIT B + +From: To: Cc: Bcc: Subject: Date: Attachments: Sabina Marcella 'Ioaollucardhmfaw.com'• "linenninotrahmtlaw.com": 'Toeetdhmflaw.rcer Stolid Mrfaydry: Andrew IliRansil RE: Complaint Against Ghislaine Maxwell Monday, December 16, 2019 10:31:00 AM + +Mr. Pagliuca, Ms. Menninger, and Mr. Gee, + +I am writing to follow up on my December 6 email regarding accepting service on behalf of your client, Ghislaine Maxwell. We understand that you still actively represent her in v. Maxwell, 15-cv-7433, but please let me know if I am mistaken. I am attaching complaint and the summons to Ms. Maxwell for your convenience. + +Thank you, Sabina Mariella + +From: Sabina Mariella Sent: Friday, December 6, 2019 12:35 PM To: ljpagliuca®hmflaw.comi ; 'Imenninger@hmflaw.com' ; 'tgee®hmflaw.corns Subject: Complaint Against Ghislaine Maxwell + +Mr. Pagliuca, Ms. Menninger, and Mr. Gee, + +We represent a victim of Jeffrey Epstein, S who has recently filed a lawsuit against your client, Ghislaine Maxwell, in the Southern District of New York (Docket No. 19-cv-10475). I am writing today to ask whether you will accept service of our complaint. Please let me know your position. + +Thank you, + +Sabina Mariella + +Associate + +BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP + +55 Hudson Yards New York, NY 10001 (t) +1 212 754 4541 (m) smanellaafikasztai systx.bglInseica \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777753/EFTA02777753.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777753/EFTA02777753.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d420299303b8d8dafb7064ee68fe63bc5954761f --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777753/EFTA02777753.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777753", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "cbce6586e7cd22688831bb8ae597597b4343e5ff071d60a6cec7e60e732ec611", + "output_sha256": "cbce6586e7cd22688831bb8ae597597b4343e5ff071d60a6cec7e60e732ec611", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777755/EFTA02777755.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777755/EFTA02777755.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b1d624364169bb818fdef771de13c5a862088b41 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777755/EFTA02777755.md @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Plaintiff, CASE NO: 19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, + +Defendants. + +## DECLARATION OF SABINA MARIELLA + +SABINA MARIELLA, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, declares under penalty of perjury that the following is true and correct: + +- I. I am an associate at the law firm Boies Schiller Flexner LIP and am duly licensed to practice law in the State of New York and before this Court. I represent PlaintiS in this matter. +- 2. I respectfully submit this Declaration in support of Plaintiff's Motion to Approve Alternate Service Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(I). +- 3. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of an email that I sent to gmax@ellemax.com on December 23, 2019, which attached a copy of the Complaint in this matter (ECF No. I) and the summons as to Ghislainc Maxwell (ECF No. 6). I did not receive a response to that email. I also did not receive any indication that the email had not been delivered. + +SM + +4. Attached hereto as Exhibit 13 arc true and correct copies of two emails that I sent Ghislaine Maxwell's attorneys, Jeffrey S. Pagliuca, Laura A. Menninger, and Ty Gec of Haddon, and , P.C., on December 6, 2019. and December 16, 2019. The December 16. 2019 email attached a copy of the Complaint in this matter (ECF No. I ) and the summons as to Ghislaine Maxwell (ECF No. 6). I did not receive a response to either email. + +5. On January 16, 2020, I attended a conference in.. v. Maxwell, I 5-cv-7433- LAP (S.D.N.Y.). The conference was held in the Honorable Loretta A. Preska's courtroom in the Daniel = Moynihan United States Courthouse. 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007. Laura A. Menninger of Haddon,= and P.C., was present at that conference on behalfof her client, Ghislaine Maxwell. I asked Ms. Menninger whether she would accept service on behalf of Maxwell in a case that my client, had filed against her. Ms. Menninger told me that she was not authorized to accept service on behalf of Maxwell and that she represents Maxwell only in v. Maxwell. + +Dated: January 27. 2020 Ncw York, New York + +Mariella \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777755/EFTA02777755.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777755/EFTA02777755.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..af1df1e024e9a83996ee0009dc0ba5965839b4e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777755/EFTA02777755.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777755", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "71e57cc1ba705029014b5c411d817eef7df14d3e0ed94dc82e40302b279185d8", + "output_sha256": "71e57cc1ba705029014b5c411d817eef7df14d3e0ed94dc82e40302b279185d8", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777757/EFTA02777757.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777757/EFTA02777757.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b89366f5a2d2d78f84b46ee47d35018e9fe252e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777757/EFTA02777757.md @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +Troutman Sanders LLP +875 Third Avenue +New York, New York 10022 + +troutman.com + +| USDC SDNY | +| ------------------------------- | +| DOCUMENT | +| ELECTRONICALLY FILED | +| DOC #: _____ | +| DATE FILED: 01/28/2020 | + +**Bennet J. Moskowitz** +bennet.moskowitz@troutman.com + +January 24, 2020 + +Plaintiff shall file a letter response by January 31, 2020. + +**ECF** + +Dated: January 28, 2020 +New York, New York + +Hon. Lorna G. Schofield +Thurgood Marshall +United States Courthouse +40 Foley Square +New York, NY 10007 + +**LORNA G. SCHOFIELD** +**UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE** + +**Re:** [REDACTED] v. *Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as the executors of the Estate of Jeffrey Edward Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell,* +**19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF** + +Dear Judge Schofield: + +We represent Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (together, the "Co-Executors"), in the above-referenced action. We write pursuant to Your Honor's Individual Rule III(C)(2) to request a conference on and to explain the bases for the Co-Executors' anticipated motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss the time-barred claims and demand for punitive damages in Plaintiff [REDACTED] ("Plaintiff") Complaint (ECF No. 1). We propose the following briefing schedule: moving brief by February 24, 2020; opposition brief by March 25, 2020; and reply brief by April 8, 2020. + +**1. Plaintiff is a Texas resident who alleges Decedent committed torts against her in the 1990's, primarily in New Mexico; Plaintiff's causes of action based on torts in New Mexico expired by 1999.** + +Plaintiff, a Texas citizen and resident, alleges that, in 1995 and/or 1996, when she was 16, Mr. Epstein ("Decedent"), now deceased, committed sexual offenses against her in New York and New Mexico. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 18, 53-54, 58, 67.) Plaintiff asserts three causes of action – battery, false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress – and demands punitive damages. (*Id.* ¶¶ 79-94, p. 18.) + +New York's borrowing statute, CPLR § 202, provides that when a non-New York resident such as Plaintiff sues on causes of action accruing outside New York (here, New Mexico), the complaint must be timely under the statute of limitations of both New York and the jurisdiction where the claim accrued.{sup}`1` New Mexico law provides a 3-year statute of limitations for claims sounding in personal injury (N.M. Stat. § 37-1-8); and minors have 1-year from reaching the age of majority to commence such actions (N.M. Stat. § 37-1-10). + +{sup}`1` "In diversity cases in New York, federal courts apply ... C.P.L.R. § 202." *Commerzbank AG v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co.*, 234 F. Supp. 3d 462, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (citation omitted). + +Therefore, under New Mexico law, Plaintiff's causes of action based on events occurring there expired by sometime in 1999. Per CPLR § 202, those claims, including Plaintiff's cause of action for false imprisonment in its entirety, are untimely. + +## 2. Plaintiff's attempts to plead around the statute of limitations fail. + +Plaintiff erroneously alleges her claims are timely per CPLR § 215(8)(a), her claims were equitably tolled, and that the Co-Executors are equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense. (Compl. ¶¶ 12-15.) Each of these arguments fails as a matter of law. + +First, CPLR § 215(8)(a) does not apply here. CPLR § 215(8)(a) provides: "Whenever it is shown that a criminal action against the same defendant has been commenced with respect to the event or occurrence from which a claim governed by this section arises, the plaintiff shall have at least one year from the termination of the criminal action ... to commence the civil action" (emphasis added). Decedent's criminal indictment (the "Indictment") attached to Plaintiff's Complaint does not concern Plaintiff's allegations. Rather, the Indictment charges Decedent sexually abused minor girls from 2002 to 2005 in New York and Florida. (Compl., Ex. A at ¶¶ 1, 2.) + +Plaintiff alleges the torts against her occurred in 1995 and/or 1996, mostly in New Mexico. Therefore, this action and the Indictment arise from different occurrences. + +New York courts apply CPLR § 215(8)(a) narrowly. See Christodoulou v. Terdeman, 262 AD2d 595, 596 (2d Dept. 1999) (CPLR § 215(8)(a) applied only to claims based on events of February 26, 1993 and December 28, 1993, because it was only in connection with events of those two days that criminal prosecution was commenced against defendant); Gallina v. Thatcher, No. 52980/2017, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 8435 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cnty. Oct. 23, 2018) (CPLR § 215(8)(a) inapplicable where incidents charged in criminal action and those alleged in civil action occurred on different dates); McElligott v. City of N.Y., 15-cv-7107 (LGS) 2017 11.5. Disi LEXIS 201829. at \*13 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2017) (CPLR § 215(8)(a) inapplicable to claims against civil defendants not charged as co-defendants in criminal action, notwithstanding same events gave rise to both actions). Plaintiff alleges a far more tenuous connection to the Indictment than the criminal-civil links unsuccessfully asserted in those cases. + +Second, even if § 215(8)(a) applies, which it does not, Plaintiff's claims for torts occurring in New Mexico are still untimely per N.M. Stat. § 37.1-8 and CPLR § 202. + +Third, Plaintiff failed to meet her burden to allege extraordinary circumstances sufficient to justify equitable tolling or estoppel. Equitable tolling is only applied where a plaintiff is "prevented in some extraordinary way from exercising h[er] rights." Viti v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 10-cv-2908 (ALC) (MHD), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189633. at \*30 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2012), adopted by, 2013 1I.S. Dist. LEXIS 174145 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2013) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Under this doctrine, a court may, "under compelling circumstances, make narrow exceptions to the statute of limitations ... 'to prevent inequity.'" Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). "That the doctrine is to be employed only sparingly -- in 'extraordinary and 'compelling' circumstances -- is reflected in the fact that the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion to show that tolling is + +justified." Id. (emphasis added) (citing Boos v. Runyon 701 F 3d 178. 185 (2d Cir. 2000)). A late-filing party seeking equitable tolling must also demonstrate she acted with "reasonable diligence" in pursuing her claims during the period she seeks to toll. Id. at \*32 (citation omitted). Equitable estoppel only applies where a plaintiff knows her cause of action exists but the defendant's conduct causes her to delay in bringing her lawsuit. Yesh, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101744. at '5 (citation omitted). Equitable estoppel requires a plaintiff to show: (i) the defendant made a definite misrepresentation of fact and had reason to believe the plaintiff would rely on it; and (ii) the plaintiff reasonably relied on the misrepresentation to her detriment. Id. (citation omitted). Tolling is inappropriate where, as here, a plaintiff fails to articulate any acts by a defendant that prevented the plaintiff from timely commencing suit. Id. at \*6 (citation omitted). + +Plaintiff's threadbare allegations of "deception," "threats" and the like (Compl. ¶16) do not establish "extraordinary" circumstances justifying tolling. Nor has Plaintiff alleged (i) that Decedent made a misrepresentation to her and had reason to believe she would rely on it, or (ii) that Plaintiff reasonably relied on it to her detriment. + +Plaintiff's own allegations refute any notion that she was prevented from exercising her rights. Rather, Plaintiff's allegations establish she was both willing and able to come forward about the alleged wrongdoing—she disclosed it long ago to Vanity Fair Magazine (Id. ¶ 75). There is no "extraordinary" basis to toll the statute of limitations or estop the Co-Executors from asserting a statute of limitations defense given these allegations. + +## 3. Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages fails as a matter of law.2 + +Plaintiff's punitive damages claim must be dismissed as a matter of law. Neither New Mexico law nor New York law permits punitive damages against a decedent tortfeasor's estate. See Jaramillo v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co. 117 N.M. 337. 34Q (N.M. 1994) ("punishment and deterrence are not accomplished by enabling recovery of punitive damages from the estate"); NY EPTL § 11-3.2 (a)(1) ("an action may be brought or continued against the personal representative of the decedent, but punitive damages shall not be awarded nor penalties adjudged in any such action brought to recover damages for personal injury."). That is the law in most jurisdictions, as reflected in the Restatement. See Restat. (Second) Of Torts § 908 cmt. a (punitive damages not available against representatives of deceased tortfeasor). + +Respectfully submitted, + +s/Bennet J. Moskowitz + +Bennet J. Moskowitz + +{sup}`2` Courts in this District regularly dismiss punitive damages claims. See The Cookware Co. (USA). LW v. Austin, 15-5796, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177691. at '17 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2016) (dismissing punitive damages claim without leave to replead); SJB v. N.Y.C. Dept of Educ., 03-6653 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13227. at .25.2Q (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 14, 2004) (dismissing punitive damages claims not statutorily available). \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777757/EFTA02777757.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777757/EFTA02777757.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a0cbd61151dbf479d80a64efe364a06ea0870cba --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777757/EFTA02777757.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -82, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777757", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 7, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.empty-image\", \"builtin.table-boundary-padding\", \"epstein_legal.flight-log-tables.normalize\", \"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "baf8d5675e8bba597c0cb3d70ad267c53164c886962cb2647b8753fdc5d09df8", + "output_sha256": "67e8f3d83c1386031e28c6dd0a7edb63edcb56c2827b0e27551a1572a3637e24", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777760/EFTA02777760.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777760/EFTA02777760.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..dcc3b7162650b233c70ae75f0c6af9279e445491 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777760/EFTA02777760.md @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +January 31, 2020 + +#### VIA ECF + +The Honorable Lorna G. Schofield District Court Judge United States District Court Southern District of New York 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007 + +Re: v. In vke et al. Case No. 19-cv-10475 + +Dear Judge Schofield, + +Pursuant to Individual Rules III.A.1 and III.C.2, Plaintiff hereby responds to Defendants' request for a pm-motion conference in connection with their anticipated motion to dismiss. Dkt. 17. Plaintiff's claims are timely under New York's statutes of limitation and the doctrine of equitable estoppel, and Defendants' proposed motion "to dismiss" Plaintiff's request for punitive damages is procedurally improper. For the following masons, the Court should deny Defendants' anticipated motion in its entirety.' + +#### I. Plaintiff's Claims Are Timely Under New York lArn. + +Plaintiff's claims are timely under the Child Victims Act (CVA), CPLR § 214-g, which says that: + +[E]very civil claim or cause of action brought against any party alleging intentional or negligent acts or omissions by a person for physical, psychological, or other injury or condition suffered as a result of conduct which would constitute a sexual offense as defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law committed against a child less than eighteen years of age, . . . is hereby revived, and action thereon may be commenced . . . not later than one year and six months after the effective date of this section. + +The Complaint alleges that Epstein and Maxwell's actions constitute sexual offenses under Article 130 of the Penal Law, and that those actions were committed against Plaintiff when she was 16 years old. Compl. 11 80, 81. Further, Plaintiff filed the Complaint approximately three months after the CVA's revival period began on August 14, 2019, well within the one-year window. Defendants do not contest the CVA's applicability to Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiffs' claims are therefore timely. + +To the extent the Court allows Defendants to file a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff requests 30 days from the date of Defendants' motion to file an opposition, with Defendants' reply brief due 10 days thereafter. + +# BSF + +Plaintiff's claims are also timely under New York's CPLR § 215(8)(a), which provides: "Whenever it is shown that a criminal action against the same defendant has been commenced with respect to the event or occurrence from which a claim governed by this section arises, the plaintiff shall have at least one year from the termination of the criminal action . . . to commence the civil action." (Emphasis added). Here, Epstein's criminal action in this District terminated on August 29, 2019. Compl. 1 40. Because Plaintiff filed the Complaint less than three months later, the action is timely under CPLR § 215(8)(a). Defendants' arguments against CPLR § 2 I 5(8)(a)'s application to these facts are meritless. + +First, Defendants' argument that CPLR § 215(8)(a) does not apply because Plaintiff was not named as a victim in Epstein's indictment is incorrect. New York courts have held that CPLR § 215(8)(a) is "plain, clear and unambiguous" that it does not require that the plaintiff be "the victim or the specific person upon whom the crime had been committed." Clemens v. Nealon, 202 A.D.2d 747, 749 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). + +Second, Defendants' narrow construction of § 215(8)(a)'s "event or occurrence" language is improper, especially in light of the breadth of Epstein's indictment. The charges were not limited to crimes committed against specific victims. For example, the overt acts alleged for the sex trafficking conspiracy charge were enticing and recruiting multiple victims, "including minor victims identified herein." Compl., Ex. A (S.D.N.Y Indictment) 1 22(a) (emphasis added). As another example, the Indictment's sex trafficking count charged Epstein with the sex trafficking of "numerous individuals . . . including but not limited to Minor Victim-1." Id. 1 24. The Indictment was targeted at Epstein's sex-trafficking scheme as a whole, and that scheme is the event or occurrence from which Plaintiff's civil claims arose. See Kashef v. BNP Paribas S.A., 925 F.3d 53, 56-57, 62 (2d Cir. 2019) (guilty plea conceding "knowledge of the atrocities being committed in Sudan" allowed victims of the atrocities in Sudan use 215(8)(a) because causes of action arose out of defendant's general conspiracy with Sudan to violate U.S. sanctions put in place to stop atrocities). Because Plaintiff's claims arise out of this common scheme, they fall within CPLR § 215(8)(a). + +The cases Defendants cite are inapposite because the criminal charges in those cases were much narrower than Epstein's, and related to events that occurred on specified dates. See Christodoulou v. Terdeman, 262 A.D.2d 595, 596 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (prosecution commenced only in connection with events on February 26, 1993 and December 28,1993); Gilliam v. Thatcher, No. 2017-52980, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 8435, at •3 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 23, 2018) (indictment "charged [the defendant] for incidents occurring on three (3) specific dates"). Epstein's Indictment was much broader, covering sexual abuse that occurred "over the course of many years" "from at least in or about 2002, up to and including at least in or about 2005." S.D.N.Y. Indictment ¶1 I-2, 8, 20, 24 (emphases added). Plaintiff's claims are therefore timely under CPLR § 215(8)(a) because the scheme the Indictment targeted is the event or occurrence from which Plaintiff's civil claims arise. + +Defendants also assert that Plaintiff's claims are untimely under New York's borrowing statute, CPLR § 202. This argument fails for two reasons. First, CPLR § 202 only applies if a Plaintiff's cause of action accrues outside of New York. But the term "accrued" in CPLR § 202 means "the time when, and the place where, the plaintiff first had the right to bring the cause of action." Glob. Fin. Corp. v. Triarc Corp., 715 N.E.2d 482, 484 (N.Y. 1999) (emphasis added). + +# BSF + +Epstein first injured Plaintiff in New York when he forcibly touched her in a movie theater when she was a minor. Compl. 1 54. Plaintiff's claims therefore accrued in New York, and CPLR § 202 does not apply. + +Second, even if New York's borrowing statute did apply and Plaintiff's claims were otherwise untimely, they would still not be barred because the CVA provides for a revival window of civil claims "[n]otwithstanding any provision of law which imposes a period of limitation to the contrary." CPLR § 214-g. Again, Defendants do not contest the CVA's applicability to Plaintiff's claims. Because CPLR § 202 would impose a period of limitation contrary to the CVA, it does not apply to Plaintiff's claims and those claims are not subject to any New Mexico statute of limitations. + +### H. Plaintiff Has Sufficienth Pled Facts Supporting Equitable Estoppel and Tolling. + +Even if Plaintiffs claims were otherwise time-barred under New York's statutes of limitation (they are not), they would still be timely under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Defendants assert that Plaintiff "fails to meet her burden to allege extraordinary circumstances sufficient to justify tolling or equitable estoppel." Dkt. 17 at 2. But the Complaint alleges in detail the methods of intimidation and control that Jeffrey Epstein and his co-conspirators used to deter their victims from seeking justice. Equitable estoppel applies "where it would be unjust to allow a defendant to assert a statute of limitations defense," Zumpano v. Quinn, 849 N.E.2d 926, 929 (N.Y. 2006), due to "deception, concealment, threats, or other misconduct," Zoe G. v. Frederick F.G., 208 A.D.2d 675, 675 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). The Complaint alleges that Epstein and his co-conspirators manipulated their victims using "financial power, promises, and threats to ensure that the victim returned as directed and remained compliant with their demands"; that Plaintiff did not immediately tell anyone about the sexual assaults out of fear for herself and her family; and that Defendants repeatedly threatened Plaintiff's sister to try to prevent her from reporting their crimes. Compl. If 31, 70, 72, 76. The allegations concerning Epstein's purposeful silencing of his victims (and Plaintiff specifically) easily provide the requisite "extraordinary circumstances" for equitable tolling. + +Because equitable estoppel and equitable tolling are fact-specific doctrines, Defendants' attempt to resolve the issue at the motion to dismiss stage is inappropriate, and any motion challenging whether or not those doctrines apply should be reserved until after the parties have conducted discovery. See, e.g., Carelock v. United States, 2015 WL 5000816, at \*8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2015). + +### III. The Court Should Address Punitive Damages After Discovery + +Federal Rule 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to file a motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Defendants' request for the Court to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages does not relate to either of Plaintiff's clams (battery and intentional infliction of emotion distress) and does not relate to the sufficiency of the allegations in the Complaint. The issue of what type of damages to which Plaintiff is entitled should therefore be dealt with at a later stage of this litigation. See, e.g., Okyere v. Palisades Collection, LLC, 961 F. Supp. 2d 522, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (denying "motion to 'dismiss' plaintiff's request for punitive damages as procedurally premature"). + +![](_page_3_Picture_4.jpeg) + +Respectfully submitted. + +Is/Joshua L Schiller + +David Boies, Esq. Joshua I. Schiller. Esq. Sigrid S. McCawley, Esq. + +cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777760/EFTA02777760.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777760/EFTA02777760.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6de511393bb148ef69b2b8798105609a1ec5a7ac --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777760/EFTA02777760.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777760", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "a8e09809e149920831111b2caaadd1cbddeb881864145f11f443397496cc59b4", + "output_sha256": "a8e09809e149920831111b2caaadd1cbddeb881864145f11f443397496cc59b4", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777764/EFTA02777764.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777764/EFTA02777764.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fd237e341530b0520626a017ff02765ecbeb84d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777764/EFTA02777764.md @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT +SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +-----X +[REDACTED], +Plaintiff, +-against- +DARREN █ INDYKE, et al., +Defendants. : +-----X + +USDC SDNY +DOCUMENT +ELECTRONICALLY FILED +DOC #: \_\_\_\_\_ +DATE FILED: 02/04/2020 + +19 Civ. 10475 (LGS) + +ORDER + +LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, District Judge: + +WHEREAS, on January 24, 2020, Defendants filed a letter motion for conference regarding Defendants' proposed motion to dismiss; + +WHEREAS, on January 31, 2020, Plaintiff filed a letter responding to Defendants' letter motion for conference; it is hereby + +**ORDERED** that a pre-motion conference will be held on **February 13, 2020, at 10:40 a.m.** + +The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to close the motion at Dkt. No. 17. + +Dated: February 4, 2020 +New York, New York + diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777764/EFTA02777764.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777764/EFTA02777764.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4ec3f8b1304d5d45c9414c677e592d64bf8e5a0c --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777764/EFTA02777764.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -5, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777764", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.empty-image\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "d1242b15c361fbf2fae41208604c4554821d4fc166fe68e1ce4db9d7f07c40f1", + "output_sha256": "16ded5f92fea007a40ba7037b7c5717e68f6a4a2c440d3b6c55395fd3d5f030d", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777765/EFTA02777765.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777765/EFTA02777765.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1d288619a68eb81d3f898a6c296d56848e637b16 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777765/EFTA02777765.md @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +Telephone: (954) 356-0011 Email: amccawley@ballo.corri + +February 6, 2020 + +## VIA ECF + +The Honorable Judge Lorna G. Schofield District Court Judge United States District Court Southern District of New York 40 Foley Square New York, NY 10007 + +> Re: v. linMe, et al., Case No. Ig-n -1 0475 + +Dear Judge Schofield: + +Pursuant to Individual Rule I.B.2, Plaintiff respectfully requests an adjournment of the premotion conference, Dkt. 23, currently scheduled for February 13, 2020, at 10:40 a.m. The undersigned is unavailable on that date, and through February 20, 2020, due to family obligations. Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn consent to this request. Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell has yet to appear. See Dkt. 18. The parties are available on February 21, and during the week of the 24'h with the exception of February 27. This is Plaintiff's first request for an adjournment. + +Sincerely, + +/s/ Sigrid S. McCawlev + +Sigrid S. McCawley, Esq. + +cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777765/EFTA02777765.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777765/EFTA02777765.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b8aa7672744ef84ce318a8f7b6c9c484d8ee67b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777765/EFTA02777765.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777765", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "4a256f90cd97a51cc1766649ec6920690659f5d7dfe202c17a5e4c32e63314f3", + "output_sha256": "4a256f90cd97a51cc1766649ec6920690659f5d7dfe202c17a5e4c32e63314f3", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777766/EFTA02777766.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777766/EFTA02777766.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ccf9c4a22081583825156ae527a6415d2f0647eb --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777766/EFTA02777766.md @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +#### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Plaintiff, CASE NO: 19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF + +#### DISCOVERY PLAN + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, + +Defendants. + +Pursuant to the Court's January 14, 2020, order (Dkt. 16), the parties submit the following report addressing the required topics under Rule 26(f)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: + +- (A)The parties have already exchanged initial disclosures. +- (B) Plaintiff seeks discovery as to Jeffrey Epstein's documents concerning + - a. The Plaintiffs; + - b. Mr. Epstein's sex-trafficking conspiracy; + - c. Visitors and/or passengers at any of Mr. Epstein's multiple residences or aircraft where the sex trafficking occurred; + - d. Communications between Mr. Epstein and his co-conspirators; + - e. Communications between Mr. Epstein and his employees; + +- f. Communications between Mr. Epstein and any government official regardless of country; +- g. Mr. Epstein's flight logs and helicopter logs; +- h. Video tapes and photographs taken at Mr. Epstein's properties or on his planes; +- i. Financial records; +- j. Mr. Epstein's message pads and any phone call logs or phone/contact directories; and +- k. Amazon.com account details, including order history. + +The Co-Executors preserve all of their discovery rights including the right to object to Plaintiff's discovery requests. The Co-Executors' position is that the general subjects of discovery in this action are: (1) Mr. Epstein's alleged abuse of Plaintiff; and (2) Plaintiff's alleged damages. + +There is no need to conduct discovery in phases, or otherwise limit discovery to particular issues. + +(C)The parties shall confer and stipulate as to a protocol for the exchange of documents including the production of electronically stored information, no later than April 13, 2020. + +(D)— (F) There are no further issues requiring the Court's attention at this time. + +A proposed scheduling order is attached hereto as Exhibit A. Where the parties are in disagreement regarding a particular deadline, their respective positions are noted. + +For additional context, the Co-Executors seek a longer discovery schedule in this action than in the other actions filed against them by counsel for Plaintiff due to the following position: + +In , a longer schedule than the other cases is needed so that discovery does not commence before the Court rules on Plaintiff's motion for alternative service on Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell. + +Plaintiff's position is that the case should proceed without regard to Maxwell's appearance and participation in this case, so long as Maxwell continues to remain in hiding and to mask her whereabouts through her counsel representing her in v. Maxwell, No. 15 Civ. 7433 (LAP). Should the need arise to extend any deadlines to accommodate Maxwell's participation, the parties may raise the issue with the Court at that time. + +Respectfully submitted, + +Is/ Sigrid S. McCawley + +David Boies, Esq. + +Joshua I. Schiller, Esq. + +Sigrid S. McCawley, Esq. + +Is/ Bennet J. Moskowitz + +Bennet J. Moskowitz, Esq. + +cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF) + +# EXHIBIT A + +#### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Plaintiff, CASE NO: 19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF + +[PROPOSED] SCHEDULING ORDER + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN and GHISLA1NE MAXWELL, + +Defendants. + +### DEBRA FREEMAN, United States Magistrate Judge: + +It is hereby ORDERED that: + +- I. Plaintiff's proposal: The parties shall serve their initial document requests and interrogatories no later than March 12, 2020. The Co-Executors' proposal: 60 days from the Court's entry of this Order. +- 2. The Co-Executors' proposal: Plaintiffs shall provide HIPAA-compliant medical records release authorizations to the Defendants no later than 14 days from Defendants' request. Plaintiff's position: Any request for HIPAA releases shall be by motion if the parties are unable to reach agreement without Court intervention, after discovery requests are served. +- 3. Any motions to amend the pleadings or to join any additional parties shall be filed no later than March 27, 2020. + +- 4. The parties shall confer and stipulate as to a protocol regarding the production of documents and electronically stored information no later than April 13, 2020. +- 5. Plaintiff's proposal: All fact discovery shall be completed no later than June 10, 2020. The Co-Executors' proposal: 190 days from the Court's entry of this Order. +- 6. Expert discovery shall be conducted on the following schedule: + - a. Plaintiff's proposal: Each party bearing the affirmative burden of proof on a claim or defense shall serve its expert report(s) with respect to that claim or defense no later than May 27, 2020. The Co-Executors' proposal: 220 days from the Court's entry of this Order (i.e., 30 days after the close of fact discovery). + - b. Rebuttal reports shall be served no later than June 26, 2020. The Co-Executors' proposal: 250 days from the Court's entry of this Order (i.e., 60 days after the close of fact discovery). + - c. Expert discovery shall be completed no later than July 27, 2020. The Co-Executors' proposal: 270 days from the Court's entry of this Order. +- 7. The parties may stipulate to modify interim deadlines in this Scheduling Order, without seeking prior leave of Court. + +Dated: New York, New York + +February , 2020 + +SO ORDERED + +DEBRA FREEMAN United States Magistrate Judge + +## Conies to: + +All counsel (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777766/EFTA02777766.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777766/EFTA02777766.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b0ff5505bbc0c538af6c979c93ece4ac6aaafe96 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777766/EFTA02777766.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777766", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "d426cdebc0501e9c54fc561bcba10bf2a712923352643bafbccec4bf1be6a13b", + "output_sha256": "d426cdebc0501e9c54fc561bcba10bf2a712923352643bafbccec4bf1be6a13b", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777773/EFTA02777773.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777773/EFTA02777773.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b3aef7bfd24abd00311f20459f1edb6dfac24b3d --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777773/EFTA02777773.md @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +February 6, 2020 + +## VIA ECF + +The Honorable Judge Lorna G. Schofield District Court Judge United States District Court Southern District of New York 40 Foley Square New York, NY 10007 + +> Re: v. lariat', et al., Case No, 19-e% - I 0475 + +Dear Judge Schofield: + +APPLICATION GRANTED. + +Telephone: (954) 356-0011 Email: smceawlev@bsfIlmom + +> USDC SDNY DOCUMENT ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOC #: DATE FILED: 2/7/2020 + +The pre-motion conference set for February 13, 2020, at 10:40 A.M. is adjourned to March 5, 2020, at 10:40 A.M. + +Dated: February 7, 2020 + +New York, New York A G. SCIIINI + +UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE + +Pursuant to Individual Rule I.B.2, Plaintiff respectfully requests an adjournment of the premotion conference, Pkt 23, currently scheduled for February 13, 2020, at 10:40 a.m. The undersigned is unavailable on that date, and through February 20, 2020, due to family obligations. Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn consent to this request. Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell has yet to appear. See Pkt. 18. The parties are available on February 21, and during the week of the 24'h with the exception of February 27. This is Plaintiff's first request for an adjournment. + +Sincerely, + +/s/ Sigrid S. McCawley + +Sigrid S. McCawley, Esq. + +cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777773/EFTA02777773.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777773/EFTA02777773.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cb33ce7b45fc13d0464f6f181615de75578180ad --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777773/EFTA02777773.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777773", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "cda895a013f9e42e61c401b1a0b0ee504660e3bdb64839e4874c81bef7663234", + "output_sha256": "cda895a013f9e42e61c401b1a0b0ee504660e3bdb64839e4874c81bef7663234", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777774/EFTA02777774.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777774/EFTA02777774.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..85d5fd3a44df461d38a0d35d3951a3cb67c49495 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777774/EFTA02777774.md @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +The Clerk of Court of the Southern District of New York is directed to docket the within ORDER in each of the following actions: + +USDC SDNY DOCUMENT ELECTRONICALLY FILED poc tr. DATE FILEIT-41411Q2a. VE v. Nine East 71st Street et aL, No. 1:19-cv-07625 (AJN) (DF) + +Katlyn Doe v. Indyke et at, No. 1:19-cv-07771 (PKC) (DF) + +Priscilla Doe v. Indyke et at, No. 1:19-cv-07772 (ALC) (DF) + +Lisa Doe v. Indyke et at, No. 1:19-cv-07773 (ER) (DF) + +Jane Doe v. Indyke et at, No. 1:19-cv-08673 (KPF) (DF) + +v. Indyke et aL, No. 1:19-cv-10475 (LGS) (DF) + +v. Indyke et aL, No. 1:19-cv-10476 (PGG) (DF) + +v. Indyke et at, No. 1:19-cv-10479 (ALC) (DF) + +Jane Doe 1000 v. Indyke et aL, No. 1:19-cv-10577 (LGS) (DF) + +Jane Doe 15 v. Indyke et aL, No. 1:19-cv-10653 (PAE) (DF) + +Mary Doe v. Indyke et at, No. 1:19-cv-10758 (PAE) (DF) + +v. Indyke et at, No. l:19-cv-10788 (O1-1W) (DF) + +Anastasia Doe v. Indyke et aL, No. 1:19-cv-11869 (AJN) (DF) + +## DEBRA FREEMAN, United States Magistrate Judge: + +The Court having held a case management conference on February 11, 2020, with counsel for all parties in the above-referenced cases, it is hereby ORDERED, as stated at the conference, that: + +- 1. To the extent not already made, the parties shall make initial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure no later than February 25, 2020. +- 2. The parties shall serve their initial document requests and interrogatories no later than March 10, 2020. In their initial interrogatories, the parties may, as reasonable, seek information outside the scope of Local Civil Rule 33.3(a). +- 3. Any motions to amend the pleadings or to join any additional parties shall be filed no later than April 30, 2020. + - 4. All fact discovery shall be completed no later than June 10, 2020. + +- 5. Expert discovery shall be conducted on the following schedule: + - a. Plaintiffs' expert reports shall be served no later than June 10, 2020. + - b. Defendants' rebuttal reports shall be served no later than July 10, 2020. + - c. Expert discovery shall be completed no later than July 31, 2020. + +6. The parties may stipulate to modify interim deadlines in this Scheduling Order, without seeking prior leave of Court. + +7. The parties to the above-referenced cases shall submit joint status reports to the Court, regarding discovery and the progress of settlement discussions, no later than April 30, 2020. + +Dated: New York, New York February 11, 2020 + +SO ORDERED + +DEBRA FREEMAN United States Magistrate Judge + +Copies to: + +All counsel in the above-referenced cases (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777774/EFTA02777774.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777774/EFTA02777774.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..02e164db5ee4237019e76bb9b494cc499fc98c63 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777774/EFTA02777774.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777774", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "bc3b46b5e9e6c87aafb2483ad2d2f101fceff403744546070794dcb2b5422d12", + "output_sha256": "bc3b46b5e9e6c87aafb2483ad2d2f101fceff403744546070794dcb2b5422d12", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777776/EFTA02777776.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777776/EFTA02777776.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..eaedd88ac715cf9db2366b00e65b0e5ff90a4fb4 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777776/EFTA02777776.md @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +X + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, and GHISLAINE MAXWELL + +Defendants. + +X + +Index No. 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF + +## AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE + +I, Mary "Molly" S. DiRago, declare as follow: + +1. I am a member in good standing of the State Bar of Illinois and an associate with the law firm Troutman Sanders LLP, counsel for Defendants, Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (together, the "Co-Executors"). I submit this affidavit in support of my Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice before this Court. + +2. I have never been convicted of a felony. + +3. I have never been censured, suspended, disbarred, or denied admission or readmission by any court. + +4. There are no disciplinary proceedings presently against me. + +I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct. + +Dated: February 13, 2020 Respectfully Submitted, + +/s/ Mary "Molly" S. DiRago + +Mary "Molly" S. DiRago (Pro Hac Vice Pending) + +Troutman Sanders LLP + +One North Wacker Drive, Suite 2905 + +Chicago, 60606 + +(312) 759-1926 + +(312) 759-1939 (Fax) + +molly.dirago®troutman.com + +Attorneys for Defendants Darren K. Indyke and + +Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of + +Jeffrey E. Epstein \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777776/EFTA02777776.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777776/EFTA02777776.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f2a71e22dc28005b0dc4ef74636f17190bd176e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777776/EFTA02777776.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777776", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "4807a0cf5549915b31df1b08d009e92c5e3b1be6ed727ca2581f23e595e614a6", + "output_sha256": "4807a0cf5549915b31df1b08d009e92c5e3b1be6ed727ca2581f23e595e614a6", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777778/EFTA02777778.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777778/EFTA02777778.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1040deecbd3960b5ced626af9648cd5c77dd62fb --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777778/EFTA02777778.md @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +## Certificate of Admission To the Bar of Illinois + +I, Carolyn Taft Grosboll, Clerk of the Supreme Court of Illinois, do hereby certify that + +Mary Sharon DiRago + +has been duly licensed and admitted to practice as an Attorney and Counselor at Law within this State; has duly taken the required oath to support the CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES and of the STATE OF ILLINOIS, and also the oath of office prescribed by law, that said name was entered upon the Roll of Attorneys and Counselors in my office on 11/04/2004 and is in good standing, so far as the records of this office disclose. + +> IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto subscribed my name and affixed the seal of said Court, this 31st day of January, 2020. + +> > C roy G-bsieree + +Clerk, Supreme Court of the State of Illinois + +## CERTIFICATE OF GOOD STANDING + +![](_page_1_Picture_2.jpeg) + +United States of America + +}ss. Mary S DiRago + +Northern District of Illinois + +G. Bruton , Clerk of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, + +DO HEREBY CERTIFY That Mary S DiRago was duly admitted to practice in said Court on (12/08/2004) and is in good standing as a member of the bar of said court. + +Dated at Chicago, Illinois on (01/29/2020 ) + +G. Bruton , Clerk, + +By: Tina Lag Deputy Clerk \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777778/EFTA02777778.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777778/EFTA02777778.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..301249e65e5610ae218d1c0fa46f08d4183f8b24 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777778/EFTA02777778.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777778", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "04c02f2a63493f2315d1c6ca90357ad0207e0223b5599da0f2fa839b366e1f18", + "output_sha256": "04c02f2a63493f2315d1c6ca90357ad0207e0223b5599da0f2fa839b366e1f18", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777780/EFTA02777780.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777780/EFTA02777780.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..625771831413e25eeb6efec6b7d38f9e55dc31ad --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777780/EFTA02777780.md @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +X + +Plaintiff, + +v. Index No. 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, and GHISLAINE MAXWELL + +Defendants. + +X + +## ORDER FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE + +The motion of Mary "Molly" S. DiRago for admission to practice Pro Hac Vice in the above captioned action is granted. + +Applicant has declared that she is a member in good standing of the bar(s) of the state(s) of Illinois; and that her contact information is as follows: + +Mary "Molly" S. DiRago Troutman Sanders LLP One North Wacker Drive, Suite 2905 Chicago, 60606 (312) 759-1926 (312) 759-1939 (Fax) molly.dirago@troutman.com + +Applicant having requested admission Pro Hac Vice to appear for all purposes as counsel for Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (together, the "Co-Executors") in the above entitled action; + +IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Applicant is admitted to practice Pro Hac Vice in the above captioned case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. All attorneys appearing before this Court are subject to the Local Rules of this Court, including the Rules governing discipline of attorneys. + +Dated: + +United States District/Magistrate Judge \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777780/EFTA02777780.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777780/EFTA02777780.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a901bfe7c6e9567593ea128f453215c7bc92cd24 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777780/EFTA02777780.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777780", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "4346d2c0693c1fd0cf988a3f3455e82efad5dfdde81f762627e6ea28d519442f", + "output_sha256": "4346d2c0693c1fd0cf988a3f3455e82efad5dfdde81f762627e6ea28d519442f", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777782/EFTA02777782.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777782/EFTA02777782.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..af29a81b4adfce4e0cd69eeaf278ddf31222ee2b --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777782/EFTA02777782.md @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +X + +Plaintiff, + +v. Index No. 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, and GHISLAINE MAXWELL + +Defendants. + +X + +## MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE + +Pursuant to Rule 1.3 of the Local Rules of the United States Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, Mary "Molly" S. DiRago hereby moves this Court for an Order for admission to practice Pro Hac Vice to appear as counsel for Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (together, the "Co-Executors"), in the above-captioned action. + +I am in good standing of the bar(s) of the state of Illinois and there are no pending disciplinary proceedings against me in any state or federal court. I have never been convicted of a felony. I have never been censured, suspended, disbarred or denied admission or readmission by any court. I have attached the affidavit pursuant to Local Rule 1.3. + +Dated: February 13, 2020 Respectfully Submitted, + +/s/ Mary "Molly" S. DiRago + +Mary "Molly" S. DiRago (Pro Hac Vice Pending) + +Troutman Sanders LLP + +One North Wacker Drive, Suite 2905 + +Chicago, 60606 + +(312) 759-1926 + +(312) 759-1939 (Fax) + +molly.dirago@troutman.com + +Attorneys for Defendants Darren K. Indyke and + +Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of + +Jeffrey E. Epstein \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777782/EFTA02777782.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777782/EFTA02777782.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1044942e394f2f5294afc127f2cad526fcb782e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777782/EFTA02777782.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777782", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "1388a74eff3252cddcbe55833ad3bd96b3f928d0b0e65ad495fbe9ab82d3acd6", + "output_sha256": "1388a74eff3252cddcbe55833ad3bd96b3f928d0b0e65ad495fbe9ab82d3acd6", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777784/EFTA02777784.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777784/EFTA02777784.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..53e4cf914d8d1119a9dab3c80d397650cbd8f745 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777784/EFTA02777784.md @@ -0,0 +1,486 @@ +# Exhibit A + +**From:** Sabina Mariella +**Sent:** Wednesday, February 12, 2020 10:57 AM +**Cc:** Sigrid McCawley; Josh Schiller +**Subject:** RE: Summons & Complaint: [REDACTED] v. Ghislaine Maxwell (19-cv-10475) +**Attachments:** [006] 2019.11.13 (19-cv-10474) ELECTRONIC SUMMONS ISSUED as to Maxwell.pdf; [001-00] 2019.11.12 (19-cv-10474) [REDACTED] Complaint.pdf; [REDACTED] v. Indyke, et al., 19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF.PDF + +Ms. Maxwell, + +Please see the below text order granting our motion to approve alternate service on you in [REDACTED] v. *Indyke, et al.*, 19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF, which is docket entry number 27 on the attached docket. I am also reattaching a copy of the summons and complaint for your reference. + +02/12/2020 27 ORDER granting [REDACTED] Motion to Approve Alternate Service on Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell ("Maxwell"). Plaintiff's motion is unapposed, and, based on her representations regarding her ability to locate a current address for Maxwell despite diligent efforts, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately demonstrated that personal service would be imposed on [REDACTED] v. Epstein, No. 17cv016 (JGK), 2018 WL-637421, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2018). This Court further finds that Plaintiff's provision of a copy of the Summons and Complaint by email to Maxwell's counsel of record in another action before the Court [REDACTED] v. Maxwell, 15cv7433 (LAP)(S.D.N.Y.), as well as to an email address publicly associated with Maxwell (see Plaintiff's Memorandum (Dkt. 19), at 3), was reasonably called for place Maxwell on notice of this suit and to constitute sufficient service unless the circumstances No later than 2/14/20, Plaintiff is directed to serve Maxwell with a copy of this Text Order by the same names (i.e., by email to Maxwell's counsel of record in the [REDACTED] case and to the email address publicly associated with Maxwell), and to file proof of such service on the Docket of this action. Maxwell may then have until 3/6/20 to move, answer, or otherwise respond to the Complaint. (HEREBY ORDERED by Magistrate Judge Listra Freeman)(Text Only Order) (Freeman, Debra) (Entered: 02/12/2020) + +Thank you, +Sabina Mariella + +--- + +**From:** Sabina Mariella +**Sent:** Monday, December 23, 2019 3:42 PM +**Cc:** Sigrid McCawley ; Josh Schiller +**Subject:** Summons & Complaint: [REDACTED] v. Ghislaine Maxwell (19-cv-10475) + +Ms. Maxwell, + +Please be advised that we represent a victim of Jeffrey Epstein, [REDACTED], who filed a lawsuit against you on November 12, 2019, in the Southern District of New York (Docket No. 19-cv-10475). I am attaching [REDACTED] summons and complaint to this email. Please confirm receipt of this email. + +Thank you, + +**Sabina Mariella** +Associate + +**BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP** + +New York, NY 10001 +(t) +1 212 754 4541 +(m) [REDACTED] +[smariella@bsfllp.com](mailto:smariella@bsfllp.com) +[www.bsfllp.com](http://www.bsfllp.com) + +# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT + +for the + +Southern District of New York + +![](_page_2_Picture_28.jpeg) + +*Plaintiff(s)* + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE, RICHARD D. KAHN, +in their capacities as the executors of the +ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, +and GHISLAINE MAXWELL + +*Defendant(s)* + + +Civil Action No. + +## SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION + +To: *(Defendant's name and address)* Ghislaine Maxwell +116 East 65th Street +New York, NY 10065 + +A lawsuit has been filed against you. + +Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) — or 60 days if you are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (a)(2) or (3) — you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney, whose name and address are: + +Joshua Schiller +Boies Schiller Flexner LLP +New York, NY 10001 +(212) 446-2300 +jischiller@bsfllp.com + +If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint. You also must file your answer or motion with the court. + +CLERK OF COURT + +Date: 11/13/2019 + +/s/ P. Canales + +*Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk* + +Civil Action No. + +### PROOF OF SERVICE + +(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (1)) + +This summons for (name of individual and title. ijany) was received by me on (date) + +O I personally served the summons on the individual at (place) on (date) ; or + +O I left the summons at the individual's residence or usual place of abode with (name) , a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there, on (date) , and mailed a copy to the individual's last known address; or + +O I served the summons on (name of individual) designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of (name of organization) on (date) ; or , who is + +O I returned the summons unexecuted because ; or + +O Other (specify): + +My fees are \$ for travel and for services, for a total of 0.00 + +I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true. + +Date: Server's signature + +Printed name and title + +Server's address + +Additional information regarding attempted service, etc: + +# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Plaintiff, CASE NO: + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, + +Defendants. + +# COMPLAINT + +BOWS SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP + +Plaintiff by her attorneys Boies Schiller Flexner LLP, for her Complaint against Defendants, Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn in their capacities as the executors of the Estate of Jeffrey Edward Epstein ("Epstein") and Ghislaine Maxwell ("Maxwell") (collectively, "Defendants"), avers upon personal knowledge as to her own acts and status and upon information and belief and to all other matters as follows: + +# NATURE OF THE ACTION + +- I. This suit arises out of Defendants' sexual abuse of Plaintiff beginning when Plaintiff was 16 years old. +- 2. When Plaintiff was 16, she was sexually trafficked by Defendants as part of Epstein and Maxwell's organized ring of procuring young women and girls for sex. +- 3. Epstein's trafficking scheme involved recruiting young women and girls by making false promises and using his wealth, power and threats to intimidate the females into submission to his demands. This same pattern was repeated numerous times with numerous young women and girls. +- 4. As United States District Judge Kenneth Marra found, "From between about 1999 and 2007, Jeffrey Epstein sexually abused more than 30 minor girls . . . at his mansion in Palm Beach, Florida, and elsewhere in the United States and overseas. . . . In addition to his own sexual abuse of the victims, Epstein directed other persons to abuse the girls sexually. Epstein used paid employees to find and bring minor girls to him. Epstein worked in concert with others to obtain minors not only for his own sexual gratification, but also for the sexual gratification of others." Doe 1 v. United States, 359 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1204 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (internal citations omitted). + +5. Epstein organized this sex trafficking network to obtain hundreds of young girls for himself for sex, and also lent these girls out to other powerful and wealthy individuals to be sexually abused. + +6. Despite his significant criminal activity, in 2008 Epstein received a shockingly minimal charge pleading guilty to a single Florida state law charge of procuring a minor for prostitution and a non-prosecution agreement (a "NPA") with the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida. Unknown to the public and the victims at the time, Epstein's lawyers were pressuring the Government to commit to the NPA without informing the victims. Epstein's multiple victims were kept in the dark and told to be "patient" while Epstein's lawyers worked to protect him and other potential co-conspirators from prosecution. Epstein served one year in jail, but was afforded the privilege of being able to leave the jail to go to work for twelve hours per day, six days per week. + +7. The NPA allowed Epstein to escape proportionate punishment for his actions and to continue operating his sex trafficking enterprise with liberty. + +8. A few years later, Epstein flippantly referred to his sexual abuse of multiple young women and girls, and the slap on the wrist he had received for it, in a 2011 interview with the New York Post: "Billionaire pervert Jeffrey Epstein is back in New York City — and making wisecracks about his just-ended jail stint for having sex with an underage girl. 'I am not a sexual predator, I'm an offender,' the financier told The Post yesterday. 'It's the difference between a murderer and a person who steals a bagel,' said Epstein." Amber Sutherland, Billionaire Jeffrey Epstein: I'm a Sex Offender Not a Predator, N.Y. Post (Feb. 25, 2011), https://nypost.com/20 I 1/02/25/billionaire-jeffrey-epstein-im-a-sex-offender-not-a-predatort + +9. In August 2018, just one year before his death, Epstein told a New York Times reporter "that criminalizing sex with teenage girls was a cultural aberration and that at times in history it was perfectly acceptable." James B. Stewart, The Day Jeffrey Epstein Told Me He Had Dirt on Powerful People, N.Y. Times (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/12/business/jeffrey-epstein-interview.html. + +10. Maxwell spent years overseeing and managing Epstein's sex trafficking network, and actively recruited underage girls to provide to Epstein and others for sex. + +II. Epstein and Maxwell conspired with friends and hired staff to maintain and keep secret this network of sexual abuse for years, which sprawled throughout Epstein's residences in New York, Florida, New Mexico, the United States Virgin Islands, and Paris. Epstein's preference was to have three different girls a day for his sexual pleasure and Maxwell was in charge of recruiting the girls. + +12. Maxwell facilitated Epstein's sexual trafficking ring by activities including, but not limited to: (I) identifying and recruiting girls, including several minors, for Epstein's sexual pleasure and that of his co-conspirators, including herself; (2) identifying and hiring individuals to recruit underage girls; (3) scheduling appointments between the trafficked girls, many of whom were minors, and Epstein; (4) administering Epstein's sex trafficking organization and hiding it from criminal repercussions; and (5) intimidating girls, many of whom were minors, who attempted to escape or report Epstein's sex trafficking operation. + +13. Epstein and Maxwell committed sexual assault and battery upon Plaintiff when she was 16 years old. As such, the Defendants are responsible for battery, unlawful imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress pursuant to New York common law. The damage to Plaintiff has been severe and lasting. + +14. This action has been timely filed pursuant to the Child Victims Act, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-g. The actions described herein constitute sexual offenses by Defendants under New York Penal Law Article 130, and were committed against Plaintiff when she was a child less than eighteen years of age, for which she suffered physical, psychological, and other injuries as a result. + +15. This action has been timely filed pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(8)(a), which provides that a plaintiff shall have at least one year from the termination of a criminal action against the same defendant to commence an action with respect to the event or occurrence from which the criminal action arose. A criminal action against Epstein with respect to the same sex trafficking enterprise from which Plaintiff's claims arise was terminated on August 29, 2019. + +16. Any statute of limitations applicable to Plaintiff's claims, if any, is tolled due to the continuous and active deception, duress, threats of retaliation, and other forms of misconduct that Defendants used to silence their many victims, including Plaintiff. Defendants' actions deprived Plaintiff of the opportunity to commence this lawsuit before Epstein's death. Until his death, Plaintiff feared that Epstein and his co-conspirators, including Maxwell, would harm her or her family, or ruin her life, if she came forward. + +17. Defendants are equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense. Allowing Defendants to do so would be unjust. Defendants intimidated each of their victims into silence by threatening their lives and their livelihoods. They therefore prevented Plaintiff from commencing this lawsuit before Epstein's death. By using threats, along with his wealth and power, Epstein was able to escape punishment for his intolerable and brutal crimes against countless young women and underage girls for the duration of his life. + +### PARTIES + +- 18. Plaintiff is a citizen and resident of Texas. +- 19. Defendant Darren K. Indyke is sued in his capacity as an appointed executor of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein. +- 20. Defendant Richard D. Kahn is sued in his capacity as an appointed executor of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein. +- 21. Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell is a New York citizen and is domiciled in the Southern District of New York. + +# JURISDICTION AND VENUE + +- 22. Jeffrey Epstein was a citizen of the United States domiciled in the U.S. Virgin Islands at the time of his death. Jeffrey Epstein maintained a residence in the Southern District of New York. As the legal representatives of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn are deemed citizens of the U.S. Virgin Islands. +- 23. Defendant Maxwell is a citizen of both the United States and the United Kingdom and is domiciled in the Southern District of New York. +- 24. The amount in controversy in this action exceeds the sum or value of \$75,000.00 excluding interests and costs and is between citizens of different states. Accordingly, jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. +- 25. Venue is proper in this Court as the sexual abuse of Plaintiff by Defendants Epstein and Maxwell began and occurred in New York, New York, where they recruited her at the age of 16, physically molested her, and began grooming her for sex in their organized sex trafficking ring. + +26. Many of the events giving rise to these causes of action occurred in the Southern District of New York, where a substantial amount of Epstein's property is located. Thus, venue in this district is proper. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(bX2). + +# FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS + +# A. Eastein's Sex Tratfickine Enterprise + +27. Jeffrey Epstein was widely renowned as a billionaire who used his vast connections to powerful individuals, and seemingly unlimited wealth and resources, to create a web of transcontinental sex trafficking that served himself, his coconspirators, and some of the most powerful people in the world. + +28. Epstein owned multiple residences and frequently travelled between them, including at 9 East 71' Street, New York, New York 10021, and at 49 Zorro Ranch Road, Stanley, New Mexico 87056, where the illegal sexual crimes against Plaintiff occurred. Epstein conservatively valued his New York townhome at \$55,931,000.00. Epstein conservatively valued his New Mexico ranch at \$17,246,208.00. In addition, Epstein owned residences in the Virgin Islands, Florida, France, and even on his own island, Great St. James Island, where his transcontinental sex trafficking of hundreds of young girls servicing him, his co-conspirators, and wealthy and powerful individuals around the world occurred. + +29. The allegations herein concern Epstein's and Maxwell's tortious acts against Plaintiff while in New York, where Epstein was staying at his 71' Street mansion, and at his ranch in New Mexico. + +30. At all times material to this cause of action, Jeffrey Epstein utilized his seemingly unlimited power, wealth, and resources, as well as his deep connections to powerful and politically connected individuals to intimidate and manipulate his victims of sexual abuse. 31. Epstein and Maxwell had perfected a scheme for manipulation and abuse of young females. As part of the scheme, Maxwell or another female would approach a young female and strike up a conversation in an effort to quickly learn about the young female's background and any vulnerabilities they could expose. Maxwell would then manipulate the young female into coming back to one of Epstein's residences by offering the young female something she needed. At times Maxwell's lure would be a modeling opportunity, money for education, help for the young female's family, and a whole host of other related offers depending on their target's situation. Once in the residence, Maxwell and Epstein would work in concert to impress and intimidate the young female with displays of vast wealth, including having employees that were butlers and maids formally dressed around the house. They would also strategically place photographs of very powerful political and social figures amongst photographs and art displaying nude females in an effort to normalize the sexual abuse. They would also normalize the sexual abuse by placing a massage table and spa related products around the massage area in an effort to legitimize the area where the abuse was set to occur. Once abused, Epstein and Maxwell continued to manipulate the victims, using their financial power, promises, and threats to ensure that the victim returned as directed and remained compliant with their demands. + +# B. The Arrest, Prosecution, and Death of Epstein + +32. The sexual trafficking ring described herein started at least as early as 1995 and continued up until at least July 2, 2019, when the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York ("SDNY") charged Epstein with sex trafficking conspiracy and sex trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591. He was arrested on July 8, 2019, pursuant to the SDNY's Sealed Two Count Indictment, which is attached as Exhibit A. + +33. The Indictment described Epstein's conduct and his abuse and trafficking of females in the same trafficking operation he used to abuse and traffic Plaintiff + +34. Epstein's last will and testament (the "Will") was executed on August 8, 2019, at the Metropolitan Correctional Center. The witnesses were Martel Colon Mire and Gulnora Tali. The Will included affidavits from Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in which they swear an "Oath of Willingness to Serve as Executor and Appointment of Local Counsel." + +35. Epstein was found dead in his cell at the Metropolitan Correctional Center on August 10, 2019. + +36. Epstein's last will and testament was filed on August 15, 2019, in the Probate Division of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands. + +37. Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn filed a Certificate of Trust in the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands for Epstein's 1953 Trust on August 26, 2019. See Certificate of Trust, In the Matter of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Probate No. ST-19-PB-80 (Super. Ct. V.I. Aug. 26, 2019). + +38. Epstein's will was entered into probate on September 6, 2019, and the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands accordingly authorized Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn to administer Epstein's estate. See Order for Probate, In the Matter of the Estate ofJeffrey E. Epstein, Probate No. ST-19-PB-80 (Super. Ct. V.I. Sept. 6, 2019); Letters Testamentary, In the Matter of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Probate No. ST-19-PB-80 (Super. Ct. V.I. Sept. 6, 2019). + +39. The Will's first article directs Epstein's executors "to pay from my estate all expenses of my last illness, my funeral and burial expenses, the administration expenses of my estate and all of my debts duly proven and allowed against my estate." The Will further directs that "after the + +payments and distributions provided in Article FIRST," Epstein "give[s] all of my property, real and personal, wherever situated ... to the then acting Trustees of The 1953 Trust." + +40. Following Epstein's death, SDNY submitted a proposed nolle prosequi order in the criminal matter against him because it was required by law to do so after Epstein was deceased. On August 29, 2019, U.S. District Judge Richard Berman formally dismissed SDNY's indictment against Epstein, terminating the criminal action against him. + +C. + +• was born on July 2, 1979. parents divorced when she was young, and her mother struggled financially to support Annie and her siblings. + +42. In 1995 and 1996, Annie was a high school student at Xavier College Preparatory in Phoenix, Arizona. She was a top performing student with the goal of going to college. + +43. In approximately 1995, Annie's sister, . was an artist and a graduate student in New York. She met Epstein and Maxwell at an art show. Epstein noticed her artwork. Epstein offered to help her in her art career if she sold Epstein some of her artwork. + +44. Epstein asked Maria if she had a father. He also asked her personal questions about her family situation, including about her younger sister, Annie. Maria explained that her parents were divorced, and that she and her family were financially struggling. + +45. Maria accepted a job offer from Epstein to purchase art for him. + +46. Her role later included keeping records of people who entered Epstein's New York mansion. Maria observed that Defendant Maxwell was regularly bringing over school-aged girls to the New York mansion. Maxwell told Maria that these girls were interviewing for Victoria's Secret modeling positions. + +47. Maxwell described her role to Maria as recruiting Victoria's Secret models for Epstein. Maria witnessed Maxwell spotting girls and talking to them outside of the mansion, which Maxwell claimed was for recruiting purposes. Maxwell would leave the mansion claiming she had "to go get girls for Jeffrey." + +48. At the time, Maria was unaware of the sex trafficking conspiracy and believed the girls were being recruited for modeling positions. + +49. Annie understood her older sister, Maria, to be working for a billionaire in New York. + +50. Epstein began taking an interest in Annie. He asked Maria questions about her younger sister in Arizona. He presented this interest to Maria in a friendly and fatherly manner. Maria was very proud of Annie's strong academic record, and supported Annie's goal of going to a good college after high school. + +51. Epstein offered Maria ideas on how he could help Annie get into college. He used this as a ruse to get Annie to come to New York so that he could abuse her. Epstein purchased Annie's plane tickets, and she flew to New York. + +52. Epstein gave Maria money to buy Annie a dress. He paid for a limousine to pick up the sisters and take them to Epstein's townhome. He talked to Annie about going to college and potential schools before sending them to see a Broadway show. + +53. During Annie's stay in New York, Epstein asked Annie and Maria to go to the movie theater with him. This is where he began initiating non-consensual physical contact with Annie in an attempt to groom Annie for sexual activity and normalize sexual behavior with him. + +54. At the movie, Epstein intentionally positioned himself between the sisters to ensure they were separated, and to prevent Maria from seeing that he was touching Annie. Epstein began caressing and petting Annie on various parts of her body against her will. He would repeatedly touch Annie only when Maria was unaware and looking away. Annie was distressed, frightened, and confused. + +55. Annie then left to go back home to Arizona. + +56. Epstein began calling Annie and her mother from New York under the false pretense of discussing Annie's education and plans for college. He offered to send Annie on an international trip to help with her college applications. + +57. As part of his plan to recruit Annie for sexual purposes, Epstein explained to Annie's mother that he sponsored educational trips for high school students, and was sponsoring an event in New Mexico at his ranch called Zorro Ranch. He invited Annie. He explained that Maxwell would be a host or chaperone for Annie at the event. Under these false pretenses, Annie's mother agreed to send Annie to Epstein's program for high school students. + +58. Epstein and Maxwell, who were in New York at the time, arranged and paid for Annie to fly to New Mexico in the spring of 1996. Epstein mailed her airline tickets from New York to her mother in Arizona. When Annie arrived in New Mexico, Epstein had a driver take her to his ranch. Epstein's Zorro Ranch sits on over 10,000 acres and is very remote. Upon arriving at the ranch, Annie learned that Epstein had not invited any other students. She was the only person at the massive ranch in a different state, away from her family in Arizona, her sister in New York, and anyone she knew. She was alone with Maxwell and Epstein. + +59. Maxwell appeared charming and friendly to Annie. Upon arriving, Maxwell and Epstein took Annie shopping and lavished her with gifts, including beauty products and a pair of brand new cowboy boots. After returning to the ranch, Maxwell began pressuring Annie to touch Epstein and give him a foot massage. Annie was very scared and did not want to touch Epstein, but Maxwell was relentless and demanded that Annie massage Epstein. Both adults explained to Annie that it was just a massage, and attempted to normalize this sexual behavior with an adult to her. + +60. Epstein and Maxwell took Annie to a movie theater. While in line for the movie, Maxwell pulled down Epstein's sweatpants, exposing part of his buttocks. Both Epstein and Maxwell repeatedly fondled each other in front of Annie, trying to normalize sexual behavior to Annie, a child. + +61. In the movie theater in New Mexico, Epstein caressed and petted various parts of Annie's body against her will. Annie was incredibly scared, and did not know how to escape because she was a child alone with Epstein and Maxwell. Annie did not have a phone or any other means of communication without Epstein or Maxwell knowing. + +62. Epstein, Maxwell, and Annie returned to Epstein's ranch. Upon returning from the movie, Maxwell repeatedly told Annie that she wanted to give her a massage. Annie was very uncomfortable with the idea of Maxwell touching her, but realized that she was completely alone with Epstein and Maxwell. Annie feared what would happen if she did not comply with their demands. Annie said that she had never had a massage and tried to avoid having Maxwell touch her body, but Maxwell continued to pressure her. Maxwell directed Annie to take off all of her clothes and lay on the massage table. Annie was extremely scared to be naked in front of Epstein and Maxwell. + +63. Maxwell left the door open so that Epstein could view Annie's naked body during the massage. + +64. Maxwell touched intimate parts of Annie's body against her will for the sexual benefit of Maxwell and Epstein. + +65. Maxwell exposed Annie's breasts and groped her. + +66. Annie was extremely distressed and afraid. She was a child in a massive ranch in New Mexico, away from her family in Arizona, and isolated from any source of help. She was alone with Epstein and Maxwell. She had no way to access a phone or other method of communication without Epstein or Maxwell knowing. She had no way of leaving. + +67. Annie woke up the next morning to find Epstein entering her room. He climbed into the bed with her and announced, "I want to cuddle." Without her consent, Epstein got into the bed with Annie, physically restrained her with his arms and proceeded to press his body (including his genitals) against Annie. Annie was frozen in fear. She was sixteen years old. + +68. Annie knew she had no way of escaping Epstein's massive estate, and attempted to escape by saying she needed to use the restroom. She was in shock, and frightened by what she was experiencing. She feared for her safety, knowing she was alone in Epstein's ranch in another state and that Maxwell and Epstein were closely monitoring her activity. + +69. Annie escaped to Epstein's bathroom. She was in extreme fear and emotional distress, not knowing how to escape Epstein's ranch in New Mexico, where these two adults were groping her, a child, against her will. + +70. Epstein and Maxwell eventually allowed Annie to fly back home to Arizona and they returned to New York. Out of fear of what could happen to her and her family because of Epstein and Maxwell's great power, wealth, and connections that they had displayed to her, Annie did not tell anyone about Epstein and Maxwell touching her against her will. + +71. Devastatingly, Annie was not the only family member that Epstein and Maxwell sexually abused. During that summer, Maria was lured into an "artist in residence" position by Epstein at billionaire Les Wexner's Ohio estate on which Epstein owned a guest house. There, Epstein and Maxwell both sexually assaulted Maria. Wexner's security personnel did not allow Maria to exit his estate, even after she pleaded with them and told them about her assault. There was only one entrance with a guard house to Wexner's estate. + +72. After Maria's sexual assault in Ohio, Maxwell called on behalf of Epstein and threatened Maria in order to keep her quiet: "We're going to burn all your art. And I just want you to know that anything you ever make will be burned. Your career is burned." + +73. Instead of letting Maxwell's words silence her, Maria reported her assault to the Sixth Precinct of the New York City Police Department ("NYPD"). The NYPD referred Maria to the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). Maria followed the instruction and called the FBI to make a report of the abuse. To the extreme detriment of Maria and Annie—and also countless other victims who came after them—authorities ignored Maria's reporting efforts and took no action. + +74. Maria also called Annie, who was overseas studying at an educational seminar for high performing high school students. During the call, Annie shared with Maria her own assaults in New York and New Mexico, as well as her false imprisonment at Epstein's New Mexico ranch. + +75. Frustrated that authorities did not appear to be taking any action and in the hopes of exposing the crimes that Maxwell and Epstein were committing, Annie and Maria decided to share their stories with Vanity Fair magazine. Tragically for Annie and Maria, Epstein threatened and intimidated the magazine and Vanity Fair bent to those threats and ultimately published a profile of Epstein without mentioning the sisters or their allegations. + +76. Once Maxwell and Epstein learned that Maria had revealed the abuse to Vanity Fair, they embarked on a campaign to destroy Maria's reputation and art career. Afraid for her safety, having informed the NYPD, FBI, and media to no avail, Maria left New York and Annie moved + +to Alaska. Annie and Maria's fear of Epstein's power was exacerbated by the fact that state and federal authorities, as well as the media, were not taking action against Epstein. + +77. Annie was deeply affected by her harrowing experiences at the hands of Epstein and Maxwell as a child. She suffers severe emotional distress from an experience that has affected her for her entire life. + +78. The Defendants' sexual assault, battery, and false imprisonment of Annie continue to cause her significant distress and harm. + +# FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION + +# (Battery) + +79. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations stated above in paragraphs 1-78 as if fully set forth herein. + +80. Epstein and Maxwell intentionally committed battery by sexually assaulting Plaintiff when she was a young girl. As described above, on multiple occasions Epstein and Maxwell intentionally touched Plaintiff in an offensive and sexual manner without her consent. + +81. Epstein and Maxwell's actions constitute sexual offenses as defined in New York Penal Law Article 130, including but not limited to forcible touching as defined in Article 130.52, inasmuch as Epstein and Maxwell intentionally and forcibly touched sexual and intimate parts of Plaintiff's body for their own sexual gratification on multiple occasions. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214g. + +82. A criminal action against Epstein with respect to the same sex trafficking enterprise from which Plaintiff's first cause of action arises was terminated on August 29, 2019, less than one year prior to the filing of this Complaint. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(8Xa). + +83. As a direct and proximate result of Epstein's and Maxwell's criminal acts, Plaintiff has in the past and will in the future continue to suffer extreme emotional distress, humiliation, fear, psychological trauma, loss of dignity and self-esteem, and invasion of her privacy. + +# SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION + +# (False Imprisonment) + +84. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations stated above in paragraphs 1-78 as if fully set forth herein. + +85. As a direct result of these allegations as stated, Defendants falsely imprisoned Plaintiff at Epstein's New Mexico residence while Plaintiff was a young girl for the purpose of degrading her, abusing her, or gratifying their sexual desires. + +86. Epstein and Maxwell brought Plaintiff to Epstein's New Mexico Ranch with the intent to confine her in that location so that they could sexually abuse her. Plaintiff was conscious of her confinement and did not consent that confinement. Epstein and Maxwell prevented Plaintiff, a child with no way to communicate with anyone other than Epstein and Maxwell and with no access to a car or other means of transportation, from leaving the premises, Epstein's remote 10,000 acre Zorro Ranch in New Mexico. + +87. A criminal action against Epstein with respect to the same sex trafficking enterprise from which Plaintiff's second cause of action arises was terminated on August 29,2019, less than one year prior to the filing of this Complaint. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(8Xa). + +88. As a direct and proximate result of Epstein and Maxwell's criminal acts, Plaintiff has in the past and will in the future continue to suffer extreme emotional distress, humiliation, fear, psychological trauma, loss of dignity and self-esteem, and invasion of her privacy. + +# THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION + +### (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress) + +89. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations stated above in paragraphs 1-78 as if fully set forth herein. + +90. As a direct result of these allegations as stated, Defendants committed intentional infliction of emotional distress against Plaintiff. + +91. Defendants' actions, described above, constitute extreme and outrageous conduct that shocks the conscience. Epstein and Maxwell's plan to recruit, entice, and assault Plaintiff, a sixteen-year-old child, on multiple occasions, goes beyond all possible bounds of decency and is intolerable in a civilized community. + +92. Defendants knew or disregarded the substantial likelihood that these actions would cause Plaintiff severe emotional distress. + +93. A criminal action against Epstein with respect to the same sex trafficking enterprise from which Plaintiff's third cause of action arises was terminated on August 29, 2019, less than one year prior to the filing of this Complaint. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(8Xa). + +94. As a direct and proximate result of Epstein and Maxwell's criminal acts, Plaintiff has in the past and will in the future continue to suffer extreme emotional distress, humiliation, fear, psychological trauma, loss of dignity and self-esteem, and invasion of her privacy. + +# PRAYER FOR RELIEF + +WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests judgment against Defendants, awarding compensatory, consequential, exemplary, and punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial; costs of suit; attorneys' fees; and such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper. + +### JURY DEMAND + +Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury on all causes of action asserted within this pleading. + +Dated: November 12, 2019. + +Is/ Joshua I. Schiller + +David Boies BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP 333 Main Street Armonk, NY 10504 (914) 749-8200 + +Joshua I. Schiller BOSS SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP 55 Hudson Yards New York, NY 10001 (212) 446-2300 + +Sigrid McCawley (Pro Hac Vice Pending) BOWS SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP 401 E. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1200 Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301 (954) 356-0011 + +CASREF,ECF + +**U.S. District Court** +**Southern District of New York (Foley Square)** +**CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF** + +[REDACTED] v. Indyke et al +Assigned to: Judge Lorna G. Schofield +Referred to: Magistrate Judge Debra C. Freeman +Cause: 28:1332 Diversity Action + +Date Filed: 11/12/2019 +Jury Demand: Plaintiff +Nature of Suit: 360 P.I.: Other +Jurisdiction: Diversity + +**Plaintiff** + +[REDACTED] + +represented by **David Boies , II** +Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP (Armonk) +333 Main Street +Armonk, NY 10504 +(914)-749-8200 +Fax: (914)-749-8300 +Email: dboies@bsfllp.com +*LEAD ATTORNEY* + +**Sigrid S. McCawley** +Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP +401 East Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1200 +Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 +954-356-0011 +Fax: 954-356-0022 +Email: smccawley@bsfllp.com +*LEAD ATTORNEY* + +**Joshua Schiller** +Boies Schiller Flexner LLP +New York, NY 10001 +212-446-2300 +Email: jischiller@bsfllp.com + +V. + +**Defendant** + +**Darren K. Indyke** +*in his capacity as executor of the Estate of* +*Jeffrey Edward Epstein* + +represented by **Bennet Jerome Moskowitz** +Troutman Sanders LLP (NYC) +875 Third Avenue +New York, NY 10022 +(212)-704-6087 +Fax: (212)-704-6288 + +bennet.moskowitz®troutmansanders.com + +ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED + +### Defendant + +Richard D. Kahn represented by Bennet Jerome Moskowitz + +in his capacity as executor of the Estate of (See above for address) Jeffrey Edward Epstein ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED + +### Defendant + +Ghislaine Maxwell + +| Date Filed | # | Docket Text | +| ------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| 11/12/2019 | 1 | COMPLAINT a ainst Darren K. Indyke, Richard D. Kahn, Ghislaine Maxwell. Document | +| | | filed by (Attachments: # 1. Exhibit A)(Schiller, Joshua) (Entered: | +| 11/12/2019 | 2 | CIVIL COVER SHEET filed. (Schiller, Joshua) (Entered: 11/12/2019) | +| 11/12/2019 | 1 | REQUEST FOR ISSUANCE OF SUMMONS as to Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. | +| | | Kahn, re: 1 Complaint. Document filed by (Schiller, Joshua) (Entered: | +| 11/12/2019 | 4 | REQUEST FOR ISSUANCE OF SUMMONS as to Ghislaine Maxwell, re: 1 Complaint. | +| | | Document filed by (Schiller, Joshua) (Entered: 11/12/2019) | +| 11/13/2019 | | CASE OPENING INITIAL ASSIGNMENT NOTICE: The above-entitled action is | +| 11/13/2019 | | Magistrate Judge James L. Cott is so designated. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(c) and | +| 11/13/2019 | | Case Designated ECF. (pc) (Entered: 11/13/2019) | +| 11/13/2019 | 1 | ELECTRONIC SUMMONS ISSUED as to Darren K. Indyke, Richard D. Kahn. (pc) | +| 11/13/2019 | ¢ ELECTRONIC SUMMONS ISSUED as to Ghislaine Maxwell. (pc) (Entered: 11/13/2019) | | +| 11/18/2019 | | Magistrate Judge Debra C. Freeman is so redesignated. (wb) (Entered: 11/18/2019) | +| 11/18/2019 | | ***DELETED DOCUMENT. Deleted document number I Order. The document was | +| 11/18/2019 | 1 | ORDER: Initial Conference set for 1/9/2020 at 10:40 AM in Courtroom 1106, Thurgood | +| 11/20/2019 | a NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by David Boies, II on behalf of | (Boies, | + +| 11/21/2019 | 9 | MOTION for Sigrid S. McCawley to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee \$ 200.00, receipt number ANYSDC-18120672. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. Document filed by [REDACTED]. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Sigrid S. McCawley, # 2 Certificate of Good Standing, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(McCawley, Sigrid) (Entered: 11/21/2019) | +| ------------ | ----------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| 11/22/2019 | | >>> NOTICE REGARDING PRO HAC VICE MOTION. Regarding Document No. 9 MOTION for Sigrid S. McCawley to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee \$ 200.00, receipt number ANYSDC-18120672. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff.. The document has been reviewed and there are no deficiencies. (vba) (Entered: 11/22/2019) | +| 11/27/2019 | 10 | WAIVER OF SERVICE RETURNED EXECUTED. Darren K. Indyke waiver sent on 11/25/2019, answer due 1/24/2020; Richard D. Kahn waiver sent on 11/25/2019, answer due 1/24/2020. Document filed by [REDACTED]. (Schiller, Joshua) (Entered: 11/27/2019) | +| 12/03/2019 | 11 | ORDER granting 9 Motion for Sigrid S. McCawley to Appear Pro Hac Vice (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (jcs) (Entered: 12/03/2019) | +| 01/02/2020 | 12 | LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Bennet J. Moskowitz dated January 2, 2020 re: Request to refer action to Magistrate Judge Debra C. Freeman. Document filed by Darren K. Indyke, Richard D. Kahn.(Moskowitz, Bennet) (Entered: 01/02/2020) | +| 01/02/2020 | 13 | MEMO ENDORSEMENT on re: 12 Letter filed by Darren K. Indyke, Richard D. Kahn ENDORSEMENT: Application GRANTED. A referral order will issue separately. The initial pretrial conference, scheduled for January 9, 2020, is canceled. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 1/2/2020) (cf) Modified on 1/2/2020 (cf). (Entered: 01/02/2020) | +| 01/02/2020 | 14 | ORDER REFERRING CASE TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE. Order that case be referred to the Clerk of Court for assignment to a Magistrate Judge for General Pretrial (includes scheduling, discovery, non-dispositive pretrial motions, and settlement). Referred to Magistrate Judge Debra C. Freeman. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 1/2/2020) (cf) (Entered: 01/02/2020) | +| 01/10/2020 | 15 | JOINT LETTER addressed to Magistrate Judge Debra C. Freeman from Joshua I. Schiller and Bennet J. Moskowitz dated January 10, 2020 re: Status Update. Document filed by [REDACTED].(Schiller, Joshua) (Entered: 01/10/2020) | +| 01/14/2020 | 16 | ORDER, It is hereby ORDERED that: 1. In each of the above-referenced cases in which the parties have not yet submitted a jointly proposed discovery plan pursuant to Rule 26(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties are directed to submit a proposed discovery schedule for this Court's review no later than February 6, 2020. This submission should address all of the matters set out in Rule 26(f)(3), and should specifically include proposed deadlines for: as further set forth herein. As to each of the above-referenced cases, this Court will hold a pretrial conference pursuant to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on February 11, 2020, at 10:00 a.m., in Courtroom 17A at the United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007. The parties should be aware, however, that the mere fact that this Court will be holding a single, joint case-management conference does not necessarily mean that this Court will set an identical discovery schedule in each case. At the conference, counsel should be prepared to address whether there are reasons why these cases should be treated differently for scheduling purposes. SO ORDERED. (Initial Conference set for 2/11/2020 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 17A, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007 before Magistrate Judge Debra C. Freeman.) (Signed by Magistrate Judge Debra C. Freeman on 1/14/2020) Copies to All counsel in the above-referenced cases (via ECF). (kv) (Entered: 01/14/2020) | +| 01/24/2020 | 17 | LETTER MOTION for Conference /Pre-Motion Conference Re: Defendants Motion to | + +| | | Dismiss addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Bennet J. Moskowitz dated January 24, 2020. Document filed by Darren K. Indyke, Richard D. Kahn.(Moskowitz, Bennet) (Entered: 01/24/2020) | +| ------------ | ----------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| 01/27/2020 | 18 | MOTION to Approve Alternate Service Pursuant to FRCP 4(e)(1) . Document filed by [REDACTED].(Schiller, Joshua) (Entered: 01/27/2020) | +| 01/27/2020 | 19 | MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 18 MOTION to Approve Alternate Service Pursuant to FRCP 4(e)(1) . . Document filed by [REDACTED] . (Schiller, Joshua) (Entered: 01/27/2020) | +| 01/27/2020 | 20 | DECLARATION of Sabina Mariella in Support re: 18 MOTION to Approve Alternate Service Pursuant to FRCP 4(e)(1) .. Document filed by [REDACTED] . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Schiller, Joshua) (Entered: 01/27/2020) | +| 01/28/2020 | 21 | ORDER with respect to 17 LETTER MOTION for Conference /Pre-Motion Conference Re: Defendants Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff shall file a letter response by January 31, 2020. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 1/28/2020) (jca) (Entered: 01/28/2020) | +| 01/28/2020 | | Set/Reset Deadlines: Responses due by 1/31/2020 (jca) (Entered: 01/28/2020) | +| 01/31/2020 | 22 | LETTER RESPONSE to Motion addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Joshua I. Schiller dated January 31, 2020 re: 17 LETTER MOTION for Conference /Pre-Motion Conference Re: Defendants Motion to Dismiss addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Bennet J. Moskowitz dated January 24, 2020. . Document filed by [REDACTED] .. (Schiller, Joshua) (Entered: 01/31/2020) | +| 02/04/2020 | 23 | ORDER granting 17 Letter Motion for Conference. It is hereby ORDERED that a pre-motion conference will be held on February 13, 2020, at 10:40 a.m. The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to close the motion at Dkt. No. 17. Pre-Motion Conference set for 2/13/2020 at 10:40 AM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 2/4/2020) (kv) (Entered: 02/04/2020) | +| 02/06/2020 | 24 | LETTER MOTION to Adjourn Conference addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Sigrid S. McCawley dated February 6, 2020. Document filed by [REDACTED] .. (McCawley, Sigrid) (Entered: 02/06/2020) | +| 02/06/2020 | 25 | RULE 26(f) DISCOVERY PLAN REPORT.Document filed by [REDACTED] .. (McCawley, Sigrid) (Entered: 02/06/2020) | +| 02/07/2020 | 26 | ORDER granting 24 Letter Motion to Adjourn Conference. APPLICATION GRANTED. The pre-motion conference set for February 13, 2020, at 10:40 A.M. is adjourned to March 5, 2020, at 10:40 A.M. (Pre-Motion Conference set for 3/5/2020 at 10:40 AM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 2/7/2020) (rro) (Entered: 02/07/2020) | +| 02/11/2020 | | Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Debra C. Freeman: Initial Pretrial Conference held on 2/11/2020, ( Joint Status Report due by 4/30/2020). (aba) (Entered: 02/11/2020) | +| 02/12/2020 | 27 | ORDER granting 18 Motion to Approve Alternate Service on Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell ("Maxwell"). Plaintiff's motion is unopposed, and, based on her representations regarding her inability to locate a current address for Maxwell despite diligent efforts, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately demonstrated that personal service would be impracticable. See [REDACTED] v. Epstein, No. 17cv616 (JGK), 2018 WL 637421, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2018). This Court further finds that Plaintiff's provision of a copy of the Summons and Complaint by email to Maxwell's counsel of record in another action before the Court ([REDACTED] v. Maxwell, 15cv7433 (LAP)(S.D.N.Y.)), as well as to an email address publicly associated with Maxwell (see Plaintiff's Memorandum (Dkt. 19), at 3), was | + +reasonably calculated to place Maxwell on notice of this suit and to constitute sufficient service under the circumstances. No later than 2/14/20, Plaintiff is directed to serve Maxwell with a copy of this Text Order by the same means (i.e., by email to Maxwell's counsel of record in the case and to the email address publicly associated with Maxwell), and to file proof of such service on the Docket of this action. Maxwell may then have until 3/6/20 to move, answer, or otherwise respond to the Complaint. (HEREBY ORDERED by Magistrate Judge Debra Freeman)(Text Only Order) (Freeman, Debra) (Entered: 02/12/2020) + +| PACER | | PACER Service Center Transaction Receipt 02/12/2020 10:37:10 | | +| ----------------------- | --------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------ | +| Login: | BSFNYCAP | Client Code: | 01559.0001 sm | +| Description: Billable | Docket Report | Search Criteria: | 1:19-cv-10475-LGS DCF | +| Pages: | 4 | Cost: | 0.40 | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777784/EFTA02777784.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777784/EFTA02777784.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6bcb0d1d89216510d022998e2556f904f1b7c651 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777784/EFTA02777784.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -19885, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777784", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 81, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.empty-image\", \"builtin.table-boundary-padding\", \"epstein_legal.flight-log-tables.normalize\", \"epstein_legal.redaction-normalization.block-characters\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]", + "idempotent": false, + "input_sha256": "a60fd19c8baa9f689c9756d3533ebc755437beb40fad5244c950e46b19e17abe", + "output_sha256": "2e2c0eacee3217b12057ade71b88b510ea6e2852fc8c88d4ccee2c65ae03dd9f", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777812/EFTA02777812.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777812/EFTA02777812.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..169ba0340bf97d0cb28ffcc3200ea97705db3acc --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777812/EFTA02777812.md @@ -0,0 +1,492 @@ +# Exhibit B + +**Sent:** Wednesday, February 12, 2020 10:57 AM +**To:** jpagliuca@hmflaw.com; lmenninger@hmflaw.com; tgee@hmflaw.com +**Cc:** Sigrid McCawley; Josh Schiller +**Subject:** RE: Complaint Against Ghislaine Maxwell +**Attachments:** [006] 2019.11.13 (19-cv-10474) ELECTRONIC SUMMONS ISSUED as to Maxwell.pdf; [001-00] 2019.11.12 (19-cv-10474) [REDACTED] Complaint.pdf; [REDACTED] v. Indyke, et al., 19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF.pdf + +Mr. Pagliuca, Ms. Menninger, and Mr. Gee, + +Please see the below text order granting our motion to approve alternate service on Ghislaine Maxwell in [REDACTED] v. *Indyke, et al.*, 19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF, which is docket entry number 27 on the attached docket. I am also reattaching a copy of the summons and complaint for your reference. + +| 02/12/2020 | 27 | ORDER granting 11 Motion to Approve Alternate Service on Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell ("Maxwell"). Plaintiff's motion is unopposed, and, based on her representations regarding her authority to locate a current address for Maxwell despite disgust offers, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately demonstrated that personal service would be impracticable. See [REDACTED] v. Eponia, No. 17cv016 (ORC), 2018 WL 637421, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2018). This Court further finds that Plaintiff's provision of a copy of the Summons and Complaint by email to Maxwell's counsel of record in another action before the Court [REDACTED] v. Maxwell, 13cv7433 (LAP)(S.D.N.Y.), as well as to an email address publicly associated with Maxwell (see Plaintiff's Memorandum (Dkt. 19), at 3), was reasonably called in place Maxwell on source of this suit and to constitute sufficient service under the circumstances. No later than 2/14/20, Plaintiff is directed to serve Maxwell with a copy of this Text Order by the same memo (i.e., by email to Maxwell's counsel of record in the [REDACTED] asse and to the email address publicly associated with Maxwell), and to file proof of such service on the Docket of this action. Maxwell may then have until 3/6/20 to move, answer, or otherwise respond to the Complaint. (REREBY ORDERED by Magistrate Judge Levine Freeman)(Text Only Order) (Freeman, Defens) (Eased: 02/12/2020) | +| ------------ | ---- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| ------------ | ---- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | + +Sabina Mariella + +--- + +**Sent:** Monday, December 16, 2019 10:32 AM +**To:** 'jpagliuca@hmflaw.com' ; 'lmenninger@hmflaw.com' ; 'tgee@hmflaw.com' +**Cc:** Sigrid McCawley ; Josh Schiller +**Subject:** RE: Complaint Against Ghislaine Maxwell + +Mr. Pagliuca, Ms. Menninger, and Mr. Gee, + +I am writing to follow up on my December 6 email regarding accepting service on behalf of your client, Ghislaine Maxwell. We understand that you still actively represent her in [REDACTED] v. *Maxwell*, 15-cv-7433, but please let me know if I am mistaken. I am attaching [REDACTED] complaint and the summons to Ms. Maxwell for your convenience. + +Sabina Mariella + +--- + +**Sent:** Friday, December 6, 2019 12:35 PM +**To:** 'jpagliuca@hmflaw.com' ; 'lmenninger@hmflaw.com' ; 'tgee@hmflaw.com' +**Subject:** Complaint Against Ghislaine Maxwell + +We represent a victim of Jeffrey Epstein, who has recently filed a lawsuit against your client, Ghislaine Maxwell, in the Southern District of New York (Docket No. 19-cv-10475). lam writing today to ask whether you will accept service of our complaint. Please let me know your position. + + +Sabina Mariana + +Associate + +BOLES SCI-TILLER FLEXNER LLP + +55 Ilud.con Yards New York. NY 10001 (t)+1 212 754 4541 (m) www.bsfilo.com + +# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT + +for the + +Southern District of New York + +![](_page_3_Picture_134.jpeg) + +*Plaintiff(s)* + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE, RICHARD D. KAHN, +in their capacities as the executors of the +ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, +and GHISLAINE MAXWELL + +*Defendant(s)* + + +Civil Action No. + +## SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION + +To: *(Defendant's name and address)* Ghislaine Maxwell +116 East 65th Street +New York, NY 10065 + +A lawsuit has been filed against you. + +Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) — or 60 days if you are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (a)(2) or (3) — you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney, whose name and address are: + +Joshua Schiller +Boies Schiller Flexner LLP +55 Hudson Yards +New York, NY 10001 +(212) 446-2300 +jischiller@bsfllp.com + +If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint. You also must file your answer or motion with the court. + +CLERK OF COURT + +Date: 11/13/2019 + +/s/ P. Canales + +*Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk* + +Civil Action No. + +### PROOF OF SERVICE + +(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (1)) + +This summons for (name of-individual and title. if any) was received by me on (date) + +O I personally served the summons on the individual at (place) On (date) ; Or + +O I left the summons at the individual's residence or usual place of abode with (name) , a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there, on (date) , and mailed a copy to the individual's last known address; or + +O I served the summons on (name of individual) designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of (name of organization) on (date) ; or , who is + +O I returned the summons unexecuted because ; or + +O Other (specify): + +My fees are \$ for travel and for services, for a total of 0.00 + +I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true. + +Date: Server's signature + +Printed name and title + +Server's address + +Additional information regarding attempted service, etc: + +# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Plaintiff, CASE NO: + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, + +Defendants. + +# COMPLAINT + +BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP + +Plaintiff by her attorneys Boies Schiller Flexner LLP, for her Complaint against Defendants, Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn in their capacities as the executors of the Estate of Jeffrey Edward Epstein ("Epstein") and Ghislaine Maxwell ("Maxwell") (collectively, "Defendants"), avers upon personal knowledge as to her own acts and status and upon information and belief and to all other matters as follows: + +# NATURE OF THE ACTION + +- I. This suit arises out of Defendants' sexual abuse of Plaintiff beginning when Plaintiff was 16 years old. +- 2. When Plaintiff was 16, she was sexually trafficked by Defendants as part of Epstein and Maxwell's organized ring of procuring young women and girls for sex. +- 3. Epstein's trafficking scheme involved recruiting young women and girls by making false promises and using his wealth, power and threats to intimidate the females into submission to his demands. This same pattern was repeated numerous times with numerous young women and girls. +- 4. As United States District Judge Kenneth Marra found, "From between about 1999 and 2007, Jeffrey Epstein sexually abused more than 30 minor girls . . . at his mansion in Palm Beach, Florida, and elsewhere in the United States and overseas. . . . In addition to his own sexual abuse of the victims, Epstein directed other persons to abuse the girls sexually. Epstein used paid employees to find and bring minor girls to him. Epstein worked in concert with others to obtain minors not only for his own sexual gratification, but also for the sexual gratification of others." Doe 1 v. United States, 359 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1204 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (internal citations omitted). + +5. Epstein organized this sex trafficking network to obtain hundreds of young girls for himself for sex, and also lent these girls out to other powerful and wealthy individuals to be sexually abused. + +6. Despite his significant criminal activity, in 2008 Epstein received a shockingly minimal charge pleading guilty to a single Florida state law charge of procuring a minor for prostitution and a non-prosecution agreement (a "NPA") with the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida. Unknown to the public and the victims at the time, Epstein's lawyers were pressuring the Government to commit to the NPA without informing the victims. Epstein's multiple victims were kept in the dark and told to be "patient" while Epstein's lawyers worked to protect him and other potential co-conspirators from prosecution. Epstein served one year in jail, but was afforded the privilege of being able to leave the jail to go to work for twelve hours per day, six days per week. + +7. The NPA allowed Epstein to escape proportionate punishment for his actions and to continue operating his sex trafficking enterprise with liberty. + +8. A few years later, Epstein flippantly referred to his sexual abuse of multiple young women and girls, and the slap on the wrist he had received for it, in a 2011 interview with the New York Post: "Billionaire pervert Jeffrey Epstein is back in New York City — and making wisecracks about his just-ended jail stint for having sex with an underage girl. 'I am not a sexual predator, I'm an offender,' the financier told The Post yesterday. 'It's the difference between a murderer and a person who steals a bagel,' said Epstein." Amber Sutherland, Billionaire Jetty Epstein: I'm a Sex Offender Not a Predator, N.Y. Post (Feb. 25, 2011), https://nypost.com/20 I 1/02/25/billionaire-jeffrey-epstein-im-a-sex-offender-not-a-predatort + +9. In August 2018, just one year before his death, Epstein told a New York Times reporter "that criminalizing sex with teenage girls was a cultural aberration and that at times in history it was perfectly acceptable." James B. Stewart, The Day Jeffrey Epstein Told Me He Had Dirt on Powerful People, N.Y. Times (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/12/business/jeffrey-epstein-interview.html. + +10. Maxwell spent years overseeing and managing Epstein's sex trafficking network, and actively recruited underage girls to provide to Epstein and others for sex. + +II. Epstein and Maxwell conspired with friends and hired staff to maintain and keep secret this network of sexual abuse for years, which sprawled throughout Epstein's residences in New York, Florida, New Mexico, the United States Virgin Islands, and Paris. Epstein's preference was to have three different girls a day for his sexual pleasure and Maxwell was in charge of recruiting the girls. + +12. Maxwell facilitated Epstein's sexual trafficking ring by activities including, but not limited to: (1) identifying and recruiting girls, including several minors, for Epstein's sexual pleasure and that of his co-conspirators, including herself; (2) identifying and hiring individuals to recruit underage girls; (3) scheduling appointments between the trafficked girls, many of whom were minors, and Epstein; (4) administering Epstein's sex trafficking organization and hiding it from criminal repercussions; and (5) intimidating girls, many of whom were minors, who attempted to escape or report Epstein's sex trafficking operation. + +13. Epstein and Maxwell committed sexual assault and battery upon Plaintiff when she was 16 years old. As such, the Defendants are responsible for battery, unlawful imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress pursuant to New York common law. The damage to Plaintiff has been severe and lasting. + +14. This action has been timely filed pursuant to the Child Victims Act, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-g. The actions described herein constitute sexual offenses by Defendants under New York Penal Law Article 130, and were committed against Plaintiff when she was a child less than eighteen years of age, for which she suffered physical, psychological, and other injuries as a result. + +15. This action has been timely filed pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(8)(a), which provides that a plaintiff shall have at least one year from the termination of a criminal action against the same defendant to commence an action with respect to the event or occurrence from which the criminal action arose. A criminal action against Epstein with respect to the same sex trafficking enterprise from which Plaintiff's claims arise was terminated on August 29, 2019. + +16. Any statute of limitations applicable to Plaintiff's claims, if any, is tolled due to the continuous and active deception, duress, threats of retaliation, and other forms of misconduct that Defendants used to silence their many victims, including Plaintiff. Defendants' actions deprived Plaintiff of the opportunity to commence this lawsuit before Epstein's death. Until his death, Plaintiff feared that Epstein and his co-conspirators, including Maxwell, would harm her or her family, or ruin her life, if she came forward. + +17. Defendants are equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense. Allowing Defendants to do so would be unjust. Defendants intimidated each of their victims into silence by threatening their lives and their livelihoods. They therefore prevented Plaintiff from commencing this lawsuit before Epstein's death. By using threats, along with his wealth and power, Epstein was able to escape punishment for his intolerable and brutal crimes against countless young women and underage girls for the duration of his life. + +# PARTIES + +- 18. Plaintiff is a citizen and resident of Texas. +- 19. Defendant Darren K. Indyke is sued in his capacity as an appointed executor of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein. +- 20. Defendant Richard D. Kahn is sued in his capacity as an appointed executor of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein. +- 21. Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell is a New York citizen and is domiciled in the Southern District of New York. + +# JURISDICTION AND VENUE + +- 22. Jeffrey Epstein was a citizen of the United States domiciled in the U.S. Virgin Islands at the time of his death. Jeffrey Epstein maintained a residence in the Southern District of New York. As the legal representatives of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn are deemed citizens of the U.S. Virgin Islands. +- 23. Defendant Maxwell is a citizen of both the United States and the United Kingdom and is domiciled in the Southern District of New York. +- 24. The amount in controversy in this action exceeds the sum or value of \$75,000.00 excluding interests and costs and is between citizens of different states. Accordingly, jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. +- 25. Venue is proper in this Court as the sexual abuse of Plaintiff by Defendants Epstein and Maxwell began and occurred in New York, New York, where they recruited her at the age of 16, physically molested her, and began grooming her for sex in their organized sex trafficking ring. + +26. Many of the events giving rise to these causes of action occurred in the Southern District of New York, where a substantial amount of Epstein's property is located. Thus, venue in this district is proper. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(bX2). + +# FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS + +# A. Epstein's Sex Tratfickine Enterprise + +27. Jeffrey Epstein was widely renowned as a billionaire who used his vast connections to powerful individuals, and seemingly unlimited wealth and resources, to create a web of transcontinental sex trafficking that served himself, his coconspirators, and some of the most powerful people in the world. + +28. Epstein owned multiple residences and frequently travelled between them, including at 9 East 71' Street, New York, New York 10021, and at 49 Zorro Ranch Road, Stanley, New Mexico 87056, where the illegal sexual crimes against Plaintiff occurred. Epstein conservatively valued his New York townhome at \$55,931,000.00. Epstein conservatively valued his New Mexico ranch at \$17,246,208.00. In addition, Epstein owned residences in the Virgin Islands, Florida, France, and even on his own island, Great St. James Island, where his transcontinental sex trafficking of hundreds of young girls servicing him, his co-conspirators, and wealthy and powerful individuals around the world occurred. + +29. The allegations herein concern Epstein's and Maxwell's tortious acts against Plaintiff while in New York, where Epstein was staying at his 71' Street mansion, and at his ranch in New Mexico. + +30. At all times material to this cause of action, Jeffrey Epstein utilized his seemingly unlimited power, wealth, and resources, as well as his deep connections to powerful and politically connected individuals to intimidate and manipulate his victims of sexual abuse. 31. Epstein and Maxwell had perfected a scheme for manipulation and abuse of young females. As part of the scheme, Maxwell or another female would approach a young female and strike up a conversation in an effort to quickly learn about the young female's background and any vulnerabilities they could expose. Maxwell would then manipulate the young female into coming back to one of Epstein's residences by offering the young female something she needed. At times Maxwell's lure would be a modeling opportunity, money for education, help for the young female's family, and a whole host of other related offers depending on their target's situation. Once in the residence, Maxwell and Epstein would work in concert to impress and intimidate the young female with displays of vast wealth, including having employees that were butlers and maids formally dressed around the house. They would also strategically place photographs of very powerful political and social figures amongst photographs and art displaying nude females in an effort to normalize the sexual abuse. They would also normalize the sexual abuse by placing a massage table and spa related products around the massage area in an effort to legitimize the area where the abuse was set to occur. Once abused, Epstein and Maxwell continued to manipulate the victims, using their financial power, promises, and threats to ensure that the victim returned as directed and remained compliant with their demands. + +# B. The Arrest, Prosecution, and Death of Epstein + +32. The sexual trafficking ring described herein started at least as early as 1995 and continued up until at least July 2, 2019, when the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York ("SDNY") charged Epstein with sex trafficking conspiracy and sex trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591. He was arrested on July 8, 2019, pursuant to the SDNY's Sealed Two Count Indictment, which is attached as Exhibit A. + +33. The Indictment described Epstein's conduct and his abuse and trafficking of females in the same trafficking operation he used to abuse and traffic Plaintiff. + +34. Epstein's last will and testament (the "Will") was executed on August 8, 2019, at the Metropolitan Correctional Center. The witnesses were Martel Colon Mir6 and Gulnora Tali. The Will included affidavits from Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in which they swear an "Oath of Willingness to Serve as Executor and Appointment of Local Counsel." + +35. Epstein was found dead in his cell at the Metropolitan Correctional Center on August 10, 2019. + +36. Epstein's last will and testament was filed on August 15, 2019, in the Probate Division of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands. + +37. Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn filed a Certificate of Trust in the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands for Epstein's 1953 Trust on August 26, 2019. See Certificate of Trust, In the Matter of the Estate ofJeffrey E. Epstein, Probate No. ST-19-PB-80 (Super. Ct. V.I. Aug. 26, 2019). + +38. Epstein's will was entered into probate on September 6, 2019, and the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands accordingly authorized Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn to administer Epstein's estate. See Order for Probate, In the Matter of the Estate ofJeffrey E. Epstein, Probate No. ST-19-PB-80 (Super. Ct. V.I. Sept. 6, 2019); Letters Testamentary, In the Matter of the Estate of Jeffity E. Epstein, Probate No. ST-19-PB-80 (Super. Ct. V.I. Sept. 6, 2019). + +39. The Will's first article directs Epstein's executors "to pay from my estate all expenses of my last illness, my funeral and burial expenses, the administration expenses of my estate and all of my debts duly proven and allowed against my estate." The Will further directs that "after the + +payments and distributions provided in Article FIRST," Epstein "give[s] all of my property, real and personal, wherever situated ... to the then acting Trustees of The 1953 Trust." + +40. Following Epstein's death, SDNY submitted a proposed nolle prosequi order in the criminal matter against him because it was required by law to do so after Epstein was deceased. On August 29, 2019, U.S. District Judge Richard Berman formally dismissed SDNY's indictment against Epstein, terminating the criminal action against him. + +C. + +• was born on July 2, 1979. parents divorced when she was young, and her mother struggled financially to support Annie and her siblings. + +42. In 1995 and 1996, Annie was a high school student at Xavier College Preparatory in Phoenix, Arizona. She was a top performing student with the goal of going to college. + +43. In approximately 1995, Annie's sister, . was an artist and a graduate student in New York. She met Epstein and Maxwell at an art show. Epstein noticed her artwork. Epstein offered to help her in her art career if she sold Epstein some of her artwork. + +44. Epstein asked Maria if she had a father. He also asked her personal questions about her family situation, including about her younger sister, Annie. Maria explained that her parents were divorced, and that she and her family were financially struggling. + +45. Maria accepted a job offer from Epstein to purchase art for him. + +46. Her role later included keeping records of people who entered Epstein's New York mansion. Maria observed that Defendant Maxwell was regularly bringing over school-aged girls to the New York mansion. Ma \ %%ell told Maria that these girls were interviewing for Victoria's Secret modeling positions. + +47. Maxwell described her role to Maria as recruiting Victoria's Secret models for Epstein. Maria witnessed Maxwell spotting girls and talking to them outside of the mansion, which Maxwell claimed was for recruiting purposes. Maxwell would leave the mansion claiming she had "to go get girls for Jeffrey." + +48. At the time, Maria was unaware of the sex trafficking conspiracy and believed the girls were being recruited for modeling positions. + +49. Annie understood her older sister, Maria, to be working for a billionaire in New York. + +50. Epstein began taking an interest in Annie. He asked Maria questions about her younger sister in Arizona. He presented this interest to Maria in a friendly and fatherly manner. Maria was very proud of Annie's strong academic record, and supported Annie's goal of going to a good college after high school. + +51. Epstein offered Maria ideas on how he could help Annie get into college. He used this as a ruse to get Annie to come to New York so that he could abuse her. Epstein purchased Annie's plane tickets, and she flew to New York. + +52. Epstein gave Maria money to buy Annie a dress. He paid for a limousine to pick up the sisters and take them to Epstein's townhome. He talked to Annie about going to college and potential schools before sending them to see a Broadway show. + +53. During Annie's stay in New York, Epstein asked Annie and Maria to go to the movie theater with him. This is where he began initiating non-consensual physical contact with Annie in an attempt to groom Annie for sexual activity and normalize sexual behavior with him. + +54. At the movie, Epstein intentionally positioned himself between the sisters to ensure they were separated, and to prevent Maria from seeing that he was touching Annie. Epstein began caressing and petting Annie on various parts of her body against her will. He would repeatedly touch Annie only when Maria was unaware and looking away. Annie was distressed, frightened, and confused. + +55. Annie then left to go back home to Arizona. + +56. Epstein began calling Annie and her mother from New York under the false pretense of discussing Annie's education and plans for college. He offered to send Annie on an international trip to help with her college applications. + +57. As part of his plan to recruit Annie for sexual purposes, Epstein explained to Annie's mother that he sponsored educational trips for high school students, and was sponsoring an event in New Mexico at his ranch called Zorro Ranch. He invited Annie. He explained that Maxwell would be a host or chaperone for Annie at the event. Under these false pretenses, Annie's mother agreed to send Annie to Epstein's program for high school students. + +58. Epstein and Maxwell, who were in New York at the time, arranged and paid for Annie to fly to New Mexico in the spring of 1996. Epstein mailed her airline tickets from New York to her mother in Arizona. When Annie arrived in New Mexico, Epstein had a driver take her to his ranch. Epstein's Zorro Ranch sits on over 10,000 acres and is very remote. Upon arriving at the ranch, Annie learned that Epstein had not invited any other students. She was the only person at the massive ranch in a different state, away from her family in Arizona, her sister in New York, and anyone she knew. She was alone with Maxwell and Epstein. + +59. Maxwell appeared charming and friendly to Annie. Upon arriving, Maxwell and Epstein took Annie shopping and lavished her with gifts, including beauty products and a pair of brand new cowboy boots. After returning to the ranch, Maxwell began pressuring Annie to touch Epstein and give him a foot massage. Annie was very scared and did not want to touch Epstein, but Maxwell was relentless and demanded that Annie massage Epstein. Both adults explained to Annie that it was just a massage, and attempted to normalize this sexual behavior with an adult to her. + +60. Epstein and Maxwell took Annie to a movie theater. While in line for the movie, Maxwell pulled down Epstein's sweatpants, exposing part of his buttocks. Both Epstein and Maxwell repeatedly fondled each other in front of Annie, trying to normalize sexual behavior to Annie, a child. + +61. In the movie theater in New Mexico, Epstein caressed and petted various parts of Annie's body against her will. Annie was incredibly scared, and did not know how to escape because she was a child alone with Epstein and Maxwell. Annie did not have a phone or any other means of communication without Epstein or Maxwell knowing. + +62. Epstein, Maxwell, and Annie returned to Epstein's ranch. Upon returning from the movie, Maxwell repeatedly told Annie that she wanted to give her a massage. Annie was very uncomfortable with the idea of Maxwell touching her, but realized that she was completely alone with Epstein and Maxwell. Annie feared what would happen if she did not comply with their demands. Annie said that she had never had a massage and tried to avoid having Maxwell touch her body, but Maxwell continued to pressure her. Maxwell directed Annie to take off all of her clothes and lay on the massage table. Annie was extremely scared to be naked in front of Epstein and Maxwell. + +63. Maxwell left the door open so that Epstein could view Annie's naked body during the massage. + +64. Maxwell touched intimate parts of Annie's body against her will for the sexual benefit of Maxwell and Epstein. + +65. Maxwell exposed Annie's breasts and groped her. + +66. Annie was extremely distressed and afraid. She was a child in a massive ranch in New Mexico, away from her family in Arizona, and isolated from any source of help. She was alone with Epstein and Maxwell. She had no way to access a phone or other method of communication without Epstein or Maxwell knowing. She had no way of leaving. + +67. Annie woke up the next morning to fmd Epstein entering her room. He climbed into the bed with her and announced, "I want to cuddle." Without her consent, Epstein got into the bed with Annie, physically restrained her with his arms and proceeded to press his body (including his genitals) against Annie. Annie was frozen in fear. She was sixteen years old. + +68. Annie knew she had no way of escaping Epstein's massive estate, and attempted to escape by saying she needed to use the restroom. She was in shock, and frightened by what she was experiencing. She feared for her safety, knowing she was alone in Epstein's ranch in another state and that Maxwell and Epstein were closely monitoring her activity. + +69. Annie escaped to Epstein's bathroom. She was in extreme fear and emotional distress, not knowing how to escape Epstein's ranch in New Mexico, where these two adults were groping her, a child, against her will. + +70. Epstein and Maxwell eventually allowed Annie to fly back home to Arizona and they returned to New York. Out of fear of what could happen to her and her family because of Epstein and Maxwell's great power, wealth, and connections that they had displayed to her, Annie did not tell anyone about Epstein and Maxwell touching her against her will. + +71. Devastatingly, Annie was not the only family member that Epstein and Maxwell sexually abused. During that summer, Maria was lured into an "artist in residence" position by Epstein at billionaire Les Wexner's Ohio estate on which Epstein owned a guest house. There, Epstein and Maxwell both sexually assaulted Maria. Wexner's security personnel did not allow Maria to exit his estate, even after she pleaded with them and told them about her assault. There was only one entrance with a guard house to Wexner's estate. + +72. After Maria's sexual assault in Ohio, Maxwell called on behalf of Epstein and threatened Maria in order to keep her quiet: "We're going to burn all your art. And I just want you to know that anything you ever make will be burned. Your career is burned." + +73. Instead of letting Maxwell's words silence her, Maria reported her assault to the Sixth Precinct of the New York City Police Department ("NYPD"). The NYPD referred Maria to the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). Maria followed the instruction and called the FBI to make a report of the abuse. To the extreme detriment of Maria and Annie—and also countless other victims who came after them—authorities ignored Maria's reporting efforts and took no action. + +74. Maria also called Annie, who was overseas studying at an educational seminar for high performing high school students. During the call, Annie shared with Maria her own assaults in New York and New Mexico, as well as her false imprisonment at Epstein's New Mexico ranch. + +75. Frustrated that authorities did not appear to be taking any action and in the hopes of exposing the crimes that Maxwell and Epstein were committing, Annie and Maria decided to share their stories with Vanity Fair magazine. Tragically for Annie and Maria, Epstein threatened and intimidated the magazine and Vanity Fair bent to those threats and ultimately published a profile of Epstein without mentioning the sisters or their allegations. + +76. Once Maxwell and Epstein learned that Maria had revealed the abuse to Vanity Fair, they embarked on a campaign to destroy Maria's reputation and art career. Afraid for her safety, having informed the NYPD, FBI, and media to no avail, Maria left New York and Annie moved + +to Alaska. Annie and Maria's fear of Epstein's power was exacerbated by the fact that state and federal authorities, as well as the media, were not taking action against Epstein. + +77. Annie was deeply affected by her harrowing experiences at the hands of Epstein and Maxwell as a child. She suffers severe emotional distress from an experience that has affected her for her entire life. + +78. The Defendants' sexual assault, battery, and false imprisonment of Annie continue to cause her significant distress and harm. + +# FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION + +# (Battery) + +79. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations stated above in paragraphs 1-78 as if fully set forth herein. + +80. Epstein and Maxwell intentionally committed battery by sexually assaulting Plaintiff when she was a young girl. As described above, on multiple occasions Epstein and Maxwell intentionally touched Plaintiff in an offensive and sexual manner without her consent. + +81. Epstein and Maxwell's actions constitute sexual offenses as defined in New York Penal Law Article 130, including but not limited to forcible touching as defined in Article 130.52, inasmuch as Epstein and Maxwell intentionally and forcibly touched sexual and intimate parts of Plaintiff's body for their own sexual gratification on multiple occasions. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214g. + +82. A criminal action against Epstein with respect to the same sex trafficking enterprise from which Plaintiff's first cause of action arises was terminated on August 29, 2019, less than one year prior to the filing of this Complaint. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(8Xa). + +83. As a direct and proximate result of Epstein's and Maxwell's criminal acts, Plaintiff has in the past and will in the future continue to suffer extreme emotional distress, humiliation, fear, psychological trauma, loss of dignity and self-esteem, and invasion of her privacy. + +# SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION + +# (False Imprisonments + +84. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations stated above in paragraphs 1-78 as if fully set forth herein. + +85. As a direct result of these allegations as stated, Defendants falsely imprisoned Plaintiff at Epstein's New Mexico residence while Plaintiff was a young girl for the purpose of degrading her, abusing her, or gratifying their sexual desires. + +86. Epstein and Maxwell brought Plaintiff to Epstein's New Mexico Ranch with the intent to confine her in that location so that they could sexually abuse her. Plaintiff was conscious of her confinement and did not consent that confinement. Epstein and Maxwell prevented Plaintiff, a child with no way to communicate with anyone other than Epstein and Maxwell and with no access to a car or other means of transportation, from leaving the premises, Epstein's remote 10,000 acre Zorro Ranch in New Mexico. + +87. A criminal action against Epstein with respect to the same sex trafficking enterprise from which Plaintiff's second cause of action arises was terminated on August 29, 2019, less than one year prior to the filing of this Complaint. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(8Xa). + +88. As a direct and proximate result of Epstein and Maxwell's criminal acts, Plaintiff has in the past and will in the future continue to suffer extreme emotional distress, humiliation, fear, psychological trauma, loss of dignity and self-esteem, and invasion of her privacy. + +# THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION + +# (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distressi + +89. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations stated above in paragraphs 1-78 as if fully set forth herein. + +90. As a direct result of these allegations as stated, Defendants committed intentional infliction of emotional distress against Plaintiff. + +91. Defendants' actions, described above, constitute extreme and outrageous conduct that shocks the conscience. Epstein and Maxwell's plan to recruit, entice, and assault Plaintiff, a sixteen-year-old child, on multiple occasions, goes beyond all possible bounds of decency and is intolerable in a civilized community. + +92. Defendants knew or disregarded the substantial likelihood that these actions would cause Plaintiff severe emotional distress. + +93. A criminal action against Epstein with respect to the same sex trafficking enterprise from which Plaintiff's third cause of action arises was terminated on August 29, 2019, less than one year prior to the filing of this Complaint. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(8Xa). + +94. As a direct and proximate result of Epstein and Maxwell's criminal acts, Plaintiff has in the past and will in the future continue to suffer extreme emotional distress, humiliation, fear, psychological trauma, loss of dignity and self-esteem, and invasion of her privacy. + +# PRAYER FOR RELIEF + +WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests judgment against Defendants, awarding compensatory, consequential, exemplary, and punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial; costs of suit; attorneys' fees; and such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper. + +# JURY DEMAND + +Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury on all causes of action asserted within this pleading. + +Dated: November 12, 2019. + +Is/ Joshua I. Schiller + +David Boies BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP 333 Main Street Armonk, NY 10504 (914) 749-8200 + +Joshua I. Schiller BOWS SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP 55 Hudson Yards New York, NY 10001 (212) 446-2300 + +Sigrid McCawley (Pro Hac Vice Pending) BOWS SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP 401 E. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1200 Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301 (954) 356-0011 + +CASREF,ECF + +**U.S. District Court** +**Southern District of New York (Foley Square)** +**CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF** + +[REDACTED] v. Indyke et al +Assigned to: Judge Lorna G. Schofield +Referred to: Magistrate Judge Debra C. Freeman +Cause: 28:1332 Diversity Action + +Date Filed: 11/12/2019 +Jury Demand: Plaintiff +Nature of Suit: 360 P.I.: Other +Jurisdiction: Diversity + +**Plaintiff** + +[REDACTED] + +represented by **David Boies , II** +Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP (Armonk) +333 Main Street +Armonk, NY 10504 +(914)-749-8200 +Fax: (914)-749-8300 +Email: dboies@bsfllp.com +*LEAD ATTORNEY* + +**Sigrid S. McCawley** +Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP +401 East Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1200 +Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 +954-356-0011 +Fax: 954-356-0022 +Email: smccawley@bsfllp.com +*LEAD ATTORNEY* + +**Joshua Schiller** +Boies Schiller Flexner LLP +55 Hudson Yards +New York, NY 10001 +212-446-2300 +Email: jischiller@bsfllp.com + +V. + +**Defendant** + +**Darren K. Indyke** +*in his capacity as executor of the Estate of* +*Jeffrey Edward Epstein* + +represented by **Bennet Jerome Moskowitz** +Troutman Sanders LLP (NYC) +875 Third Avenue +New York, NY 10022 +(212)-704-6087 +Fax: (212)-704-6288 + +bennet.moskowitz®troutmansanders.com + +ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED + +# Defendant + +Richard D. Kahn represented by Bennet Jerome Moskowitz + +in his capacity as executor of the Estate of (See above for address) Jeffrey Edward Epstein ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED + +## Defendant + +Ghislaine Maxwell + +| Date Filed | # | Docket Text | +| ------------ | ---------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| 11/12/2019 | 1 | COMPLAINT against Darren K. Indyke, Richard D. Kahn, Ghislaine Maxwell. Document filed by [REDACTED]. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Schiller, Joshua) (Entered: 11/12/2019) | +| 11/12/2019 | 2 | CIVIL COVER SHEET filed. (Schiller, Joshua) (Entered: 11/12/2019) | +| 11/12/2019 | 3 | REQUEST FOR ISSUANCE OF SUMMONS as to Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, re: 1 Complaint. Document filed by [REDACTED]. (Schiller, Joshua) (Entered: 11/12/2019) | +| 11/12/2019 | 4 | REQUEST FOR ISSUANCE OF SUMMONS as to Ghislaine Maxwell, re: 1 Complaint. Document filed by [REDACTED]. (Schiller, Joshua) (Entered: 11/12/2019) | +| 11/13/2019 | | CASE OPENING INITIAL ASSIGNMENT NOTICE: The above-entitled action is assigned to Judge Lorna G. Schofield. Please download and review the Individual Practices of the assigned District Judge, located at http://nysd.uscourts.gov/judges/District . Attorneys are responsible for providing courtesy copies to judges where their Individual Practices require such. Please download and review the ECF Rules and Instructions, located at http://nysd.uscourts.gov/ecf_filing.php . (pc) (Entered: 11/13/2019) | +| 11/13/2019 | | Magistrate Judge James L. Cott is so designated. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(b)(1) parties are notified that they may consent to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge. Parties who wish to consent may access the necessary form at the following link: http://nysd.uscourts.gov/forms.php . (pc) (Entered: 11/13/2019) | +| 11/13/2019 | | Case Designated ECF. (pc) (Entered: 11/13/2019) | +| 11/13/2019 | 5 | ELECTRONIC SUMMONS ISSUED as to Darren K. Indyke, Richard D. Kahn. (pc) (Entered: 11/13/2019) | +| 11/13/2019 | 6 | ELECTRONIC SUMMONS ISSUED as to Ghislaine Maxwell. (pc) (Entered: 11/13/2019) | +| 11/18/2019 | | Magistrate Judge Debra C. Freeman is so redesignated. (wb) (Entered: 11/18/2019) | +| 11/18/2019 | | ***DELETED DOCUMENT. Deleted document number 7 Order. The document was incorrectly filed in this case. (cf) (Entered: 11/18/2019) | +| 11/18/2019 | 7 | ORDER: Initial Conference set for 1/9/2020 at 10:40 AM in Courtroom 1106, Thurgood Marshal Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, New York, NY 10007 before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. (As further set forth in this Order.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 11/18/2019) (cf) (Entered: 11/18/2019) | +| 11/20/2019 | 8 | NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by David Boies, II on behalf of [REDACTED]. (Boies, David) (Entered: 11/20/2019) | + +| 11/21/2019 | 9 | MOTION for Sigrid S. McCawley to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee \$ 200.00, receipt number ANYSDC-18120672. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff. Document filed by [REDACTED]. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Sigrid S. McCawley, # 2 Certificate of Good Standing, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(McCawley, Sigrid) (Entered: 11/21/2019) | +| ------------ | ----------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| 11/22/2019 | | >>> NOTICE REGARDING PRO HAC VICE MOTION. Regarding Document No. 9 MOTION for Sigrid S. McCawley to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee \$ 200.00, receipt number ANYSDC-18120672. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's Office staff.. The document has been reviewed and there are no deficiencies. (vba) (Entered: 11/22/2019) | +| 11/27/2019 | 10 | WAIVER OF SERVICE RETURNED EXECUTED. Darren K. Indyke waiver sent on 11/25/2019, answer due 1/24/2020; Richard D. Kahn waiver sent on 11/25/2019, answer due 1/24/2020. Document filed by [REDACTED]. (Schiller, Joshua) (Entered: 11/27/2019) | +| 12/03/2019 | 11 | ORDER granting 9 Motion for Sigrid S. McCawley to Appear Pro Hac Vice (HEREBY ORDERED by Judge Lorna G. Schofield)(Text Only Order) (jcs) (Entered: 12/03/2019) | +| 01/02/2020 | 12 | LETTER addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Bennet J. Moskowitz dated January 2, 2020 re: Request to refer action to Magistrate Judge Debra C. Freeman. Document filed by Darren K. Indyke, Richard D. Kahn.(Moskowitz, Bennet) (Entered: 01/02/2020) | +| 01/02/2020 | 13 | MEMO ENDORSEMENT on re: 12 Letter filed by Darren K. Indyke, Richard D. Kahn ENDORSEMENT: Application GRANTED. A referral order will issue separately. The initial pretrial conference, scheduled for January 9, 2020, is canceled. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 1/2/2020) (cf) Modified on 1/2/2020 (cf). (Entered: 01/02/2020) | +| 01/02/2020 | 14 | ORDER REFERRING CASE TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE. Order that case be referred to the Clerk of Court for assignment to a Magistrate Judge for General Pretrial (includes scheduling, discovery, non-dispositive pretrial motions, and settlement). Referred to Magistrate Judge Debra C. Freeman. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 1/2/2020) (cf) (Entered: 01/02/2020) | +| 01/10/2020 | 15 | JOINT LETTER addressed to Magistrate Judge Debra C. Freeman from Joshua I. Schiller and Bennet J. Moskowitz dated January 10, 2020 re: Status Update. Document filed by [REDACTED].(Schiller, Joshua) (Entered: 01/10/2020) | +| 01/14/2020 | 16 | ORDER, It is hereby ORDERED that: 1. In each of the above-referenced cases in which the parties have not yet submitted a jointly proposed discovery plan pursuant to Rule 26(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties are directed to submit a proposed discovery schedule for this Court's review no later than February 6, 2020. This submission should address all of the matters set out in Rule 26(f)(3), and should specifically include proposed deadlines for: as further set forth herein. As to each of the above-referenced cases, this Court will hold a pretrial conference pursuant to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on February 11, 2020, at 10:00 a.m., in Courtroom 17A at the United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007. The parties should be aware, however, that the mere fact that this Court will be holding a single, joint case-management conference does not necessarily mean that this Court will set an identical discovery schedule in each case. At the conference, counsel should be prepared to address whether there are reasons why these cases should be treated differently for scheduling purposes. SO ORDERED. (Initial Conference set for 2/11/2020 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 17A, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007 before Magistrate Judge Debra C. Freeman.) (Signed by Magistrate Judge Debra C. Freeman on 1/14/2020) Copies to All counsel in the above-referenced cases (via ECF). (kv) (Entered: 01/14/2020) | +| 01/24/2020 | 17 | LETTER MOTION for Conference /Pre-Motion Conference Re: Defendants Motion to | + +| | | Dismiss addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Bennet J. Moskowitz dated January 24, 2020. Document filed by Darren K. Indyke, Richard D. Kahn.(Moskowitz, Bennet) (Entered: 01/24/2020) | +| ------------ | ----------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| 01/27/2020 | 18 | MOTION to Approve Alternate Service Pursuant to FRCP 4(e)(1) . Document filed by [REDACTED].(Schiller, Joshua) (Entered: 01/27/2020) | +| 01/27/2020 | 19 | MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 18 MOTION to Approve Alternate Service Pursuant to FRCP 4(e)(1) . . Document filed by [REDACTED] . (Schiller, Joshua) (Entered: 01/27/2020) | +| 01/27/2020 | 20 | DECLARATION of Sabina Mariella in Support re: 18 MOTION to Approve Alternate Service Pursuant to FRCP 4(e)(1) .. Document filed by [REDACTED] . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Schiller, Joshua) (Entered: 01/27/2020) | +| 01/28/2020 | 21 | ORDER with respect to 17 LETTER MOTION for Conference /Pre-Motion Conference Re: Defendants Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff shall file a letter response by January 31, 2020. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 1/28/2020) (jca) (Entered: 01/28/2020) | +| 01/28/2020 | | Set/Reset Deadlines: Responses due by 1/31/2020 (jca) (Entered: 01/28/2020) | +| 01/31/2020 | 22 | LETTER RESPONSE to Motion addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Joshua I. Schiller dated January 31, 2020 re: 17 LETTER MOTION for Conference /Pre-Motion Conference Re: Defendants Motion to Dismiss addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Bennet J. Moskowitz dated January 24, 2020. . Document filed by [REDACTED] .. (Schiller, Joshua) (Entered: 01/31/2020) | +| 02/04/2020 | 23 | ORDER granting 17 Letter Motion for Conference. It is hereby ORDERED that a pre-motion conference will be held on February 13, 2020, at 10:40 a.m. The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to close the motion at Dkt. No. 17. Pre-Motion Conference set for 2/13/2020 at 10:40 AM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 2/4/2020) (kv) (Entered: 02/04/2020) | +| 02/06/2020 | 24 | LETTER MOTION to Adjourn Conference addressed to Judge Lorna G. Schofield from Sigrid S. McCawley dated February 6, 2020. Document filed by [REDACTED] .. (McCawley, Sigrid) (Entered: 02/06/2020) | +| 02/06/2020 | 25 | RULE 26(f) DISCOVERY PLAN REPORT.Document filed by [REDACTED] .. (McCawley, Sigrid) (Entered: 02/06/2020) | +| 02/07/2020 | 26 | ORDER granting 24 Letter Motion to Adjourn Conference. APPLICATION GRANTED. The pre-motion conference set for February 13, 2020, at 10:40 A.M. is adjourned to March 5, 2020, at 10:40 A.M. (Pre-Motion Conference set for 3/5/2020 at 10:40 AM before Judge Lorna G. Schofield.) (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 2/7/2020) (rro) (Entered: 02/07/2020) | +| 02/11/2020 | | Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Debra C. Freeman: Initial Pretrial Conference held on 2/11/2020, ( Joint Status Report due by 4/30/2020). (aba) (Entered: 02/11/2020) | +| 02/12/2020 | 27 | ORDER granting 18 Motion to Approve Alternate Service on Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell ("Maxwell"). Plaintiff's motion is unopposed, and, based on her representations regarding her inability to locate a current address for Maxwell despite diligent efforts, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately demonstrated that personal service would be impracticable. See [REDACTED] v. Epstein, No. 17cv616 (JGK), 2018 WL 637421, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2018). This Court further finds that Plaintiff's provision of a copy of the Summons and Complaint by email to Maxwell's counsel of record in another action before the Court ([REDACTED] v. Maxwell, 15cv7433 (LAP)(S.D.N.Y.)), as well as to an email address publicly associated with Maxwell (see Plaintiff's Memorandum (Dkt. 19), at 3), was | + +reasonably calculated to place Maxwell on notice of this suit and to constitute sufficient service under the circumstances. No later than 2/14/20, Plaintiff is directed to serve Maxwell with a copy of this Text Order by the same means (i.e., by email to Maxwell's counsel of record in the case and to the email address publicly associated with Maxwell), and to file proof of such service on the Docket of this action. Maxwell may then have until 3/6/20 to move, answer, or otherwise respond to the Complaint. (HEREBY ORDERED by Magistrate Judge Debra Freeman)(Text Only Order) (Freeman, Debra) (Entered: 02/12/2020) + +| PACER | | PACER Service Center Transaction Receipt 02/12/2020 10:37:10 | | +| ----------------------- | --------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------ | +| Login: | BSFNYCAP | Client Code: | 01559.0001 sm | +| Description: Billable | Docket Report | Search Criteria: | 1:19-cv-10475-LGS DCF | +| Pages: | 4 | Cost: | 0.40 | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777812/EFTA02777812.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777812/EFTA02777812.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..611bcaad2a107e01d59f107770fd7ee46e47b5b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777812/EFTA02777812.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -24341, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777812", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 69, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.empty-image\", \"builtin.table-boundary-padding\", \"epstein_legal.flight-log-tables.normalize\", \"epstein_legal.redaction-normalization.block-characters\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "b9a40e1215ccb4149c030ed5bcf84734c894b191fc79ef17d3aa23cbb1e08cd9", + "output_sha256": "b5d5a796c836444cb6952dca2c17185adb03d16e58b0893c44459cf3cc02f670", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777841/EFTA02777841.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777841/EFTA02777841.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0956575832348810f5fcb50ac1d637b1e75976fd --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777841/EFTA02777841.md @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Plaintiff, CASE NO: 19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, + +Defendants. + +## DECLARATION OF SABINA MARIELLA + +SABINA MARIELLA, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, declares under penalty of perjury that the following is true and correct: + +- 1. I am an associate at the law firm Boies Schiller Flexner LLP and am duly licensed to practice law in the State of New York and before this Court. I represent Plaintiffin this matter. +- 2. I respectfully submit this Declaration pursuant to the Court's February 12, 2020, Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion to Approve Alternate Service on Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell (the "Order) (ECF No. 27). +- 3. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of an email that I sent to gmax@ellmax.com on February 12, 2020. Pursuant to the Order, the email included an image of the Order and attached a copy of the docket. The email also attached a copy of the Complaint in this matter (ECF No. I) and the summons as to Ghislaine Maxwell (ECF No. 6). + +4. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of an email that I sent Ghislaine Maxwell's attorneys, Jeffrey S. Pagliuca, Laura A. Menninger, and Ty Gee of Haddon, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], P.C., on February 12, 2020. Pursuant to the Order, the email included an image of the Order and attached a copy of the docket. The email also attached a copy of the Complaint in this matter (ECF No. 1) and the summons as to Ghislaine Maxwell (ECF No. 6). + +Dated: February 14, 2020 +New York, New York + diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777841/EFTA02777841.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777841/EFTA02777841.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0221c4e134c9f521fe6161a9ab556a325420ac2a --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777841/EFTA02777841.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -5, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777841", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.empty-image\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "f82fb28ba6dec1942126040e92d94a93d6f9f2f10c047d8b7297193e6be8e3a6", + "output_sha256": "1f346c657dd92a4301c6be1aa1fd62935a1275e9d9d96df46e25b3e965bca7bb", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777843/EFTA02777843.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777843/EFTA02777843.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..44874ee7d1225da7935cdd02ca13b325965c3c85 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777843/EFTA02777843.md @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Plaintiff, v. DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, and GHISLAINE MAXWELL Defendants. X X USDC SDNY DOCUMENT ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOC #: DATE FILED: + +Index No. 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF + +## ORDER FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE + +The motion of Mary "Molly" S. DiRago for admission to practice Pro Hac Vice in the above captioned action is granted. + +Applicant has declared that she is a member in good standing of the bar(s) of the state(s) of Illinois; and that her contact information is as follows: + +Mary "Molly" S. DiRago Troutman Sanders LLP One North Wacker Drive, Suite 2905 Chicago, 60606 (312) 759-1926 (312) 759-1939 (Fax) molly.dirago@troutman.com + +Applicant having requested admission Pro Hac Vice to appear for all purposes as counsel for Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (together, the "Co-Executors"), in the above entitled action; + +IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Applicant is admitted to practice Pro Hac Vice in the above captioned case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. All attorneys appearing before this Court are subject to the Local Rules of this Court, including the Rules governing discipline of attorneys. + +Dated: .2-//7724 2-O JAI 41 + +United States District/Magistrate Judge + +DEBRA FREEMAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777843/EFTA02777843.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777843/EFTA02777843.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ae4c3234845822747714d43fe23f71672a0d9bc0 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777843/EFTA02777843.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777843", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "06d21542ce9acc953f5acf4e61302586b8c502dee18f56a82d89c39bece5d5ff", + "output_sha256": "06d21542ce9acc953f5acf4e61302586b8c502dee18f56a82d89c39bece5d5ff", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777845/EFTA02777845.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777845/EFTA02777845.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..392ce783e9915dae6f65ee8cee4c9c5c757e0ac6 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777845/EFTA02777845.md @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +X Plaintiff, v. DARREN INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, Defendants. X + +19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF + +## NOTICE OF APPEARANCE + +PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned attorney, Laura A. Menninger, who is a member in good standing of the bar of this Court, hereby appears as counsel for Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell in the above-captioned proceeding. + +Dated: Denver, Colorado March 4, 2020. + +Respectfully submitted, + +/s/ Laura A. Menninger + +Laura A. Met.itin er (LM-1374) + +HADDON, AND P.C. + +150 East 10 Avenue + +Denver, CO 80203 + +Phone: 303.831.7364 + +Fax: 303.832.2628 + +lmenninger@hmflaw.com + +Attorney for Ghislaine Maxwell \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777845/EFTA02777845.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777845/EFTA02777845.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0dbdd3b7c55d44f10296ed96716f1fc6534d9ae7 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777845/EFTA02777845.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777845", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "5b3a84e7287a305b6f8ea4f74a4ef9b5e12807542daa79c1cabbee21028bc9dc", + "output_sha256": "5b3a84e7287a305b6f8ea4f74a4ef9b5e12807542daa79c1cabbee21028bc9dc", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777846/EFTA02777846.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777846/EFTA02777846.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4ac6afe313017690748089b591afcd91e0181d2b --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777846/EFTA02777846.md @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +March 4, 2020 + +Via ECF + +Hon. Lorna G. Schofield United States District Judge Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse 40 Foley Square New York, New York 10007 + +> Re: 19-cv-10475 (LGS-DCF), Request for Extension of Time v. Darren K. lndyke, et at, + +Dear Judge Schofield: + +Haddon, and Laura A. Menninger + +150 East 10th Avenue Denver, Colorado 80203 PH 303.831.7364 rx 303.832.2628 www.hmflaw.com Imenninger@hmflaw.com + +On behalf of defendant Ghislaine Maxwell, I write to request a thirty-day extension of time to answer or otherwise respond in the above-captioned case, from March 6, 2020 to April 6, 2020. There have been no previous requests for extension of time. Counsel for Plaintiff objects, as described below; counsel for the Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey Epstein consent to Ms. Maxwell's request. + +On February 12, 2020, Magistrate Judge Debra Freeman authorized alternative service on Ms. Maxwell by provision of a copy of the Summons and Complaint by email to undersigned counsel, who serves as counsel of record in v. Maxwell, 15-cv-7433 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y.), as well as to an outdated email address of our client.' (ECF # 27) Plaintiff's counsel thereafter sent the required documents by email to undersigned counsel. Magistrate Freeman ordered that Ms. Maxwell answer or respond by March 6, 2020. + +Undersigned counsel was retained today to represent Ms. Maxwell in this matter. Although involved on Ms. Maxwell's behalf in the case from its inception in 2015 until its settlement in 2017, counsel's recent role has been to handle + +I Undersigned counsel was not served with a copy of Plaintiff's request for the alternate service when it was filed on January 27, 2020, and therefore did not participate in any hearing on the topic. Had undersigned counsel participated, we could have corrected inaccurate statements made to the court respecting Ms. Maxwell. + +Hon. Lorna G. Schofield March 4, 2020 Page 2 issues regarding the potential disclosure of documents on remand following the Second Circuit's decision in v. Maxwell, Case No. 18-2868. Our law firm is a small trial-based practice with numerous pre-existing deadlines and court appearances scheduled in the month of March 2020. The Complaint alleges conduct occurring as far back as 1995, under the legally-untested CVA, CPLR § 2I4-g. An appropriate answer or response will require research, investigation and analysis. Pursuant to this Court's Practice Standard 2, Ms. McCawley requested to have her position included as follows: "Plaintiff does not consent, as Maxwell has intentionally evaded service for months while having actual notice of the allegations in the Complaint, which were emailed to her. During this time, Maxwell was actively represented by (and has been in contact with) the same counsel who now claims to have been retained only today in this matter. Allowing 30 additional days to answer would unnecessarily delay proceedings and effectively reward Maxwell's evasion of service, particularly in a case where we have an upcoming discovery deadline of June 10, 2020." Ms. McCawley's representations regarding Ms. Maxwell and her counsel are demonstrably false and unsupported by any evidence and accordingly violate New York Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3 and Florida Rule of Professional Conduct 4-3.3, among others. Undersigned counsel was retained today, Ms. Maxwell has not actively evaded service, the email address referenced by Plaintiff's counsel was rendered inactive following its public release by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in August 2019 and subsequent hacking by third parties, and the additional thirty days to respond to a complaint (which purportedly could have been filed decades ago, but was not) is reasonable and customary for her newly hired counsel to appropriately respond to these old — and false — allegations. + +Therefore, on behalf of Ms. Maxwell, we request that the Court extend the time to respond to the Complaint in this matter until 30 days from March 6, 2020 until April 6, 2020. + +Respectfully Submitted, + +Laura A. Menninger + +C: Counsel of Record via ECF \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777846/EFTA02777846.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777846/EFTA02777846.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..37ff59abb228443b62d84684dbefc3a3215d0bac --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777846/EFTA02777846.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777846", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "2295c5b283d9986b09bfa8a4fe238b16b67d6848061b3a85d681694ee19ce1f5", + "output_sha256": "2295c5b283d9986b09bfa8a4fe238b16b67d6848061b3a85d681694ee19ce1f5", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777848/EFTA02777848.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777848/EFTA02777848.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a06a0dd74a2102c8d9ddf2055c2a1a9f2d9be004 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777848/EFTA02777848.md @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +-against-DARREN INDYKE, et al., X Plaintiff, : Defendants. : ---------- ----------------X + +USDC SDNY DOCUMENT ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOC #: DATE FILED:03/05/202o + +19 Civ. 10475 (LGS) + +ORDER + +LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, District Judge: + +WHEREAS, a pre-motion conference was held on March 5, 2020. As discussed at conference, it is hereby + +ORDERED that, by March 19, 2020, Plaintiff shall file a letter informing the Court of Plaintiff's position regarding the availability of punitive damages in this action. + +Dated: March 5, 2020 New York, New York + +• + +Lo A G. SCHOFIEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777848/EFTA02777848.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777848/EFTA02777848.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..eb38ed78cf36a7c03d6fb3daef01b4a87a37b8d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777848/EFTA02777848.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777848", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "d89553626fe1d90589330abb478a558a1ea3d848adbb0a10547c61392c0f0392", + "output_sha256": "d89553626fe1d90589330abb478a558a1ea3d848adbb0a10547c61392c0f0392", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777849/EFTA02777849.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777849/EFTA02777849.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6a673b755260b0abbcebf7e31f776bd8a8c47cc9 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777849/EFTA02777849.md @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Plaintiff, + +vs. + +DARREN I. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, + +Defendants. + +Case No. 1:19-cv- 10475 (LGS) + +## NOTICE OF APPEARANCE + +PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned attorney, Andrew Villacastin, who is a member in good standing of the bar of this Court, hereby appears as counsel for Plaintiff in the above-captioned proceeding. + +Dated: New York, New York March 6, 2020 + +BOLES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP + +By: /s/ Andrew Villacastin Andrew Villacastin 55 Hudson Yards Telephone: (212) 446-2300 Fax: (212) 446-2350 avillacastin@bsfllp.com + +Attorney for Plaintiff Annie Farmer \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777849/EFTA02777849.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777849/EFTA02777849.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..35a939c72fb5620fd4b7a1841df7b1b6a96ead13 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777849/EFTA02777849.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777849", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "41eaa94682487872d0f6c273eebb787cae7a626368ff204ca51678b5fe122059", + "output_sha256": "41eaa94682487872d0f6c273eebb787cae7a626368ff204ca51678b5fe122059", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777850/EFTA02777850.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777850/EFTA02777850.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a5709bc2d35aa411094c258e45d9f73e86bb09c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777850/EFTA02777850.md @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Plaintiff, + +vs. + +DARREN I. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, and GH1SLAINE MAXWELL, + +Defendants. + +Case No. 1:19-cv- 10475 (LGS) + +## NOTICE OF APPEARANCE + +PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned attorney, Sabina Mariella, who is a member in good standing of the bar of this Court, hereby appears as counsel for Plaintiff in the above-captioned proceeding. + +Dated: New York, New York March 6, 2020 + +BOLES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP + +By: /s/ Sabina Mariella Sabina Mariella 55 Hudson Yards Telephone: (212) 446-2300 Fax: (212) 446-2350 smariella®bsfllp.com + +Attorney for Plaintiff== \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777850/EFTA02777850.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777850/EFTA02777850.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d7eb225d0ebdf362417757b90242c740e4ff7107 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777850/EFTA02777850.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777850", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "1727630c7dc5d41ae19adbeaa2015a201e0491aba57a474b8eee39a381f42ae0", + "output_sha256": "1727630c7dc5d41ae19adbeaa2015a201e0491aba57a474b8eee39a381f42ae0", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777851/EFTA02777851.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777851/EFTA02777851.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..031687af5c8a4bdb71cc5f0b3b517c9a4c22c3ca --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777851/EFTA02777851.md @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Case No. 19-cv-10475-LGS + +Plaintiff, + +-against- + +lndyke, et al. Defendant. + +## NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS + +TO: ATTORNEY SERVICES CLERK AND ALL OTHER PARTIES + +I have cases pending 1 have no cases pending + +Pursuant to Local Rule 1.3 of this Court, please take notice of the following attorney information change (s) for: + +Sabina Mariella + +FILL. IN ATTORNEY NAME + +My SDNY Bar Number is:\_SM0926 My State Bar Number is 5530570\_\_\_ + +I am, + +An attorney + +A Government Agency attorney + +A Pro Hac Vice attorney + +FIRM INFORMATION (Include full name of firm (OLD AND NEW), address, telephone number and fax number): + +OLD FIRM: FIRM NAME: & Cromwell LLP + +FIRM ADDRESS: la\_toppaes&New York. NY 10094 + +FIRM TELEPHONE NUMBER: (2i2) 558-CQ. + +FIRM FAX NUMBER: (212) WAN& + +NEW FIRM: FIRM NAME: BoiessphillerFlexnerLLP + +FIRM ADDRESS:\_50\_-InIspn Yards New York NY WEN + +FIRM TELEPHONE NUMBER: (21,1446.-23QQ + +FIRM FAX NUMBER:\_(212) 446-2350 + +❑ 1 will continue to be counsel of record on the above-entitled case at my new firm/agency. + +I am no longer counsel of record on the above-entitled case. An order withdrawing my appearance was entered on by Judge + +Dated: March 9, 2020 + +EY'S SIGNATURE \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777851/EFTA02777851.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777851/EFTA02777851.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..142b6c4932a52c66ab045d54103127ca2a27e361 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777851/EFTA02777851.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777851", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "0606afef3b33aeb7fe3c7b574523b1737175ee2e3ff354fc4553cada22cdfaac", + "output_sha256": "0606afef3b33aeb7fe3c7b574523b1737175ee2e3ff354fc4553cada22cdfaac", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777852/EFTA02777852.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777852/EFTA02777852.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..997260a198554eb32f6e80c6a412624af947de77 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777852/EFTA02777852.md @@ -0,0 +1,229 @@ +UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK x + +4 + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +, + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE, ET AL., + +Defendants. + +Before: + +x + +19 CV 10475 (LGS) + +New York, N.Y. March 5, 2020 11:20 a.m. + +HON. LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, + +District Judge + +## APPEARANCES + +BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP + +Attorneys for Plaintiff + +BY: SIGRID S. MCCAWLEY + +SABINA NARIELLA + +TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP (NYC) + +Attorneys for Defendants Indyke/Kahn + +BY: BENNET J. MOSKOWITZ + +4 5 6 Sigrid McCawley. I am here on behalf of the plaintiff, I am with the law firm of Boies Schiller Flexner. I have here with me my colleague, Sabina Nariella. + +7 THE COURT: OK. Good morning. + +8 MS. NARIELLA: Good morning. + +9 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Good morning, your Honor. + +10 11 12 Bennett Moskowitz, from Troutman Sanders. I represent Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, and both sectors of the estate of Jeffrey Epstein. + +13 THE COURT: Good morning. You may be seated. + +14 15 16 17 I understand that Ghislaine Maxwell appeared yesterday through counsel but that was yesterday and so, she is not represented here, but I'd like to proceed with the conference in any event. + +18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 So, we're here for a premotion conference on a motion to dismiss. Just as a little background, I referred the case for pretrial supervision to Judge Freeman. There are many other cases involving Mr. Epstein's estate that are also before Judge Freeman but the dispositive motions have not been referred and I understand that defendants would like to bring a motion to dismiss. As I understand it, the principle argument is the statute of limitations argument. + +(Case called) + +MS. MCCAWLEY: Good morning, your Honor. + +4 5 6 7 8 I guess what I'm trying to figure out is what is to be gained by filing it now? The reason I say that is because even if the claims are untimely -- and I don't know if they are the doctrines of equitable estoppel and equitable tolling could, nevertheless, save the claims and make them timely and that is very fact specific, or early in the case I presumed there will be factual issues around those questions and so, why get into a motion to dismiss now? + +9 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Thank you, your Honor. + +10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 so, of course, anticipating the argument which you just referenced and was one of many made in response to our premotion letter that, well, hold on. We're alleging that there are equitable estoppel and therefore, you have to at least have discovery. Well, I've researched the issue and it's not always the case and it's not the case here. There are plenty of cases which I've briefed before other judges who are handling some of these other cases, including one of Boies Schiller's cases, a plain decision where the Court said, no, I've read the complaint. + +20 21 22 23 24 25 The case law is very clear here. These are not mild doctrines. They require very compelling, exceptional circumstances. Here, they are not even alleged. And, actually, here as opposed to some of the others where I have to stop there and say they didn't allege that, I want to say the opposite. They allege that -- and I know as a matter of + +4 5 6 7 8 9 10 judicial notice, the article they're talking about is a 2003 Vanity Fair article. They allege that back in 2003 the plaintiff went and told her story to Vanity Fair. Well, if she had the wherewith all to do that, I don't see how she could plausible claim now that she wasn't aware of her rights. She was sleeping on them, et cetera. It's certainly nothing that would toll them for the nearly two decades now that we're here dealing with. So, I do think this is a different kind of case, not the garden variety, II, we have to see what happened here, equitable estoppel. So, that's, one thing. + +11 12 13 14 15 I am also very concerned about the scope of discovery as opposed to other counsel have taken a different track in these cases. I understand Boies Schiller has a somewhat different view that there could be, what I view is rather extensive discovery, and I'd like to take the opportunity + +16 17 THE COURT: Let's not get into discovery just yet, if you don't mind. + +18 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Sure. + +19 20 THE COURT: Let me hear from the plaintiff on the equitable estoppel issue. + +21 MS. MCCAWLEY: Thank you, your Honor. + +22 23 24 25 Yes, if there were ever a case for equitable estoppel, it is this case. As you've probably learned from looking at the complaint, Jeffrey Epstein was a monster who perpetrated crimes for over 20 years against young females. Those crimes, + +4 + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +as we've alleged in the complaint, included death threats, intimidation, harassment, all of which go toward our claim that they should be equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defenses. + +The Carelock case which we cite in our letter goes directly to this issue. It is this circumstance where equitable estoppel is most appropriate. And you are correct that discovery will bear on these issues, and at that later point -- + +THE COURT: -- specifically, what you will uncover in discovery or what the defendant will uncover in discovery that will inform the motion? + +MS. MCCAWLEY: Well, as you may not know because I know you are new to this case, but in the past when Jeffrey Epstein was alive he asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege. So, in any of those cases that have proceeded there was not discovery directly from the defendant. He can no longer avail himself of that privilege. So, we are now going to be embarking and finally getting the documents that would show his internal communications, whether they be with Maxwell, the other defendant, their collaborative scheme to intimidate and harass not only but her sister, , as well with these death threats back from 1995 on. So, this was an ongoing scheme to keep them quiet to make sure that they didn't talk, to make sure that they didn't bring claims, et + +4 cetera. So, it's only now that these claims are timely, now that these women feel comfortable enough to be able to come forward to the Court. He's gone. He can't hurt them at this point and that's why we're here now. + +5 6 7 8 9 10 THE COURT: OK. So, what I'm going to do is I am going to ask you to hold off on the motion to dismiss. I can't tell you not to file it but I would suggest that you hold off. If you do file it, I'm not going to decide it any time soon. I don't think it would be useful for you to file it in that case. So, I'd ask you just wait. + +11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 The one thing that I would like to discuss briefly is the issue of punitive damages. The defendant says that, first of all, it is quite early in the case to be talking about punitive damages. But the defendant says that as a matter of law, neither New Mexico, nor New York permits punitive damages against a tort feasor's estate. What I'd like the plaintiffs to do is just to take a look at the law. And if it seems as though that is quite clear, then just amend your complaint so that or even just write a letter at this point. You don't have to formally amend it because I don't want to revive the whole answer/motion process again. But just write a letter and file it saying what your position is with respect to punitive damages. And if you could do that within two weeks, that would be great. + +25 MS. MCCAWLEY: Of course, your Honor. + +Thank you. + +THE COURT: And with respect to the discovery, that's 4 really all Judge Freeman's bailiwick. So, I'm not going to address that. + +5 6 Is there anything else that is appropriate to address before me? No. + +7 OK. Thank you. We are adjourned. + +a (Adjourned) + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777852/EFTA02777852.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777852/EFTA02777852.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1a3c79e633bd15f99f3bbc68b2f7d047207321bc --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777852/EFTA02777852.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777852", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "6715a96c277a76bce25dd621f42e1a488a809223602d987c7510a37aa5d37b22", + "output_sha256": "6715a96c277a76bce25dd621f42e1a488a809223602d987c7510a37aa5d37b22", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777859/EFTA02777859.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777859/EFTA02777859.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b5236f62ae4f595be48dea8e6df633da0b2e6174 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777859/EFTA02777859.md @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +USA / Plaintiff(s) + +Case No.: 19CV10475 + +DARREN K. INDYKE, ET + +Defendant(s) + +## NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT + +Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a )NFEREN( held on has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above-captioned matter. + +3/5/2020 + +Redaction responsibilities apply to the attorneys of record or pro se parties, even if the person requesting the transcript is a judge or a member of the public or media. + +The parties have seven (7) calendar days from the date of filing of this NOTICE to file with the court any NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION of this transcript. A copy of said NOTICE must also be served on the court reporter. If no such NOTICE is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after ninety (90) calendar days. + +This process may only be used to redact the following personal data identifiers: Social Security numbers; dates of birth; minors' names; and financial account numbers. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2, and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 49.1. Parties wishing to request redaction of other information may proceed by motion. + +I (we) certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the aboveentitled matter. + +/s SONYA KETT + +( 'OuI t Reporter/Transcriber Date \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777859/EFTA02777859.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777859/EFTA02777859.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7aecf4231921cd3c80c5dc662b5a9ab0426715a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777859/EFTA02777859.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777859", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "ea23bf19d0ea9b64b694c4301689a29276ee3e3365a75d4fba5b6a5ee5d9f68b", + "output_sha256": "ea23bf19d0ea9b64b694c4301689a29276ee3e3365a75d4fba5b6a5ee5d9f68b", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777860/EFTA02777860.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777860/EFTA02777860.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1cbc122696814f6ac78a1a71f3aedc2699a6e6d9 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777860/EFTA02777860.md @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +March 19, 2020 + +## VIA ECF + +The Honorable Lorna G. Schofield United States District Court Southern District of New York 40 Foley Square New York, NY 10007 + +Re: v. Darren K. Indyke et al., 19-10475-LGS-DCF + +Dear Judge Schofield, + +Pursuant to the Court's instructions at the March 5, 2020, premotion conference, Plaintiff writes to state her position on the availability of punitive damages against the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (the "Estate") in this case. As a preliminary matter, the Estate's proposed motion to dismiss punitive damages is procedurally premature. See, e.g., Weyant v. Phia Grp. LLP, No. 17 CIV. 8230 (LGS), 2018 WL 4387557, at \*11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2018) (Schofield, J.). In any event, Plaintiff will be able to recover punitive damages against the Estate.' + +First, the law of the U.S. Virgin Islands ("USVI") applies to the issue of punitive damages. "In the context of tort law, New York utilizes interest analysis to determine which of two competing jurisdictions has the greater interest in having its law applied in the litigation." Padula v. Lilarn Prop. Corp., 644 N.E.2d 1001, 1002 (N.Y. 1994). "[U]nder New York law—for punitive damages in particular—a court must consider the object or purpose of the wrongdoing to be punished and give controlling weight to the law of the jurisdiction with the strongest interest in the resolution of the particular issue presented." Nat ?Jewish Democratic Council v. Adelson, No. 18 Civ. 8787 (JPO), 2019 WL 4805719, at \*6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2019). "[T]he choice-of-law inquiry for punitive damages provisions is necessarily `defendant-focused."' Id. + +In this case, the USVI has a stronger interest in the issue of whether punitive damages are available. Epstein was domiciled in the USVI, not New York, and had private islands in the USVI. Compl. 22, 28. Defendants also chose to probate Epstein's Estate in and under the laws of the USVI. Id.1 36. Having availed themselves of all of the benefits that USVI probate and estate law have to offer, Defendants cannot also seek to escape its drawbacks. As such, New York's choice-of-law rules dictate the application of USVI law to the issue of punitive damages.2 + +This letter applies to the availability of punitive damages against only the Estate. Plaintiff can unquestionably obtain punitive damages against the living Defendant in this case, Ghislaine Maxwell, under both New York and USVI law. See, e.g., Nicholas v. Wyndham Intl, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 2d 407, 410 (D.V.I. 2002) ("[P]unitive damages may be awarded for conduct that i us, because of defendant's evil motive or [her] reckless indifference to the rights of others."); v. Knack, 170 A.D.3d 667, 670 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019) (punitive damages appropriate in sexual assault case because "the defendant's acts were particularly heinous"). + +{sup}`2` Under the doctrine of depecage, the interest analysis only applies to punitive damages, and New York law still applies to the underlying claims and compensatory damages. See Adelson, 2019 WL 4805719, at \*6. + +Second, USVI law would allow for an award of punitive damages against the Estate in this case. When determining how best to apply common law, USVI courts apply what is known as the Banks analysis. See Banks v. Intl Rental & Leasing Corp., 55 V.I. 967, 979 (2011). "[I]nstead of mechanistically following the Restatements, courts should consider three non-dispositive factors to determine Virgin Islands common law: (1) whether any Virgin Islands courts have previously adopted a particular rule; (2) the position taken by a majority of courts from other jurisdictions; and (3) most important/ which approach represents the soundest rule for the Virgin Islands." ov't of the V.I. v. 60 V.I. 597, 600, 602 (2016). + +The first Banks factor is neutral because USVI courts have not adopted a rule as to whether a plaintiff can pursue punitive damages against the estate of a deceased tortfeasor. As to the second factor, numerous courts have held that plaintiffs may recover punitive damages against the estate of a deceased tortfeasor. See, e.g., Haralson v. Fisher Sun., Inc., 31 P.3d 114, 117 (Ariz. 2001); Tillett v. Lippert, 909 P.2d 1158, 1162 (Mont. 1996); v. Melton, 299 S.E.2d 8, 12 (W. Va. 1982). Those courts have reasoned that punitive damages do not only serve to punish wrongdoers, but also to "motivate others not to engage in similar action in the future." Kaopuiki v. Kealoha, 87 P.3d 910, 928 (Haw. Ct. App. 2003).3 And even courts that generally do not allow for punitive damages against a deceased tortfeasor's estate have acknowledged that punitive damages might be available where the deceased tortfeasor takes his own life "as an escape from punitive damages." Crabtree ex. Rel. Kemp v. Estate of Crabtree, 837 N.E.2d 135. 139 (Ind. 2005). Epstein abused countless young females and subsequently used power, wealth. and intimidation to avoid proportionate punishment for his countless crimes. See, e.g., Compl. in 6, 7, 16, 17, 31, 75. Once he was finally imprisoned in New York, he signed his will and almost immediately caused his own demise. See id. 11 34, 35. Given these unique facts and the need to deter others from committing such heinous crimes and then using power to avoid the consequences, the second Banks factor weighs heavily in favor of allowing for punitive damages. + +Although none of the three Banks factors is dispositive, the third factor—"which approach represents the soundest rule for the Virgin Islands"—is the most important. See , 60 V.I. at 600. The soundest rule for the USVI is to allow for punitive damages against an estate in these extraordinary circumstances. Again, Epstein spent his life avoiding punishment, used wealth, power, intimidation, and threats to prevent his victims from seeking justice, and then caused his own demise once he was about to face real punishment for his countless crimes. Allowing for punitive damages in this case would be in line with the general deterrence principle behind punitive damages because it would deter others from manipulating the justice system and silencing victims of sexual abuse to avoid punishment. The absence of any USVI law to the contrary, and the extraordinary nature of Epstein's sex-trafficking enterprise, counsel in favor of such a rule. + +For the foregoing reasons, punitive damages are available against all Defendants in this case. + +{sup}`3` See also, wed s v. Zack, 546 F.2d 643, 64445 (5th Cir. 1977) (Alabama law); Estate of Farrell ex reL Bennett v. , 770 A.2d 517, 521-22 (Del. 2001); Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470, 474 (Tex. 1984). + +![](_page_2_Picture_4.jpeg) + +Sincerely, + +/s/ Sigrid S. McCawley + +David Boies, Esq. + +Sigrid S. McCawley, Esq. + +Joshua I. Schiller, Esq. + +cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777860/EFTA02777860.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777860/EFTA02777860.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..32513952ba93cbbd5b0f8805cf17f2ff0747156e --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777860/EFTA02777860.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -8, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777860", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "55e6504c640f42a867c60c3ce6635eada4bb0fd8e7239b025f7d974710b022b0", + "output_sha256": "f1dcd169d2ca531fa1c792d3fd3d2956cde8e1e4f9dd394ff4dcf5ebede298d7", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777863/EFTA02777863.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777863/EFTA02777863.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..364346b121a21e83b1b4b77ab5186556806d1274 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777863/EFTA02777863.md @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +X , + +v. + +Plaintiff, + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, and GHISLAINE MAXWELL + +Defendants. + +! Index No. I:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF + + +## JOINT STIPULATION FOR ORDER SETTING DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO COMPLAINT + +Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey Edward Epstein (together, the "Co-Executors"), jointly with Plaintiff ("Plaintiff'), through counsel for the Co-Executors, respectfully submit this stipulation together with the attached Proposed Order setting the deadline for the Co-Executors to answer or otherwise respond to Plaintiff's Complaint [ECF No. I] to March 27, 2020. The parties respectfully request the Court enter the Proposed Order. + +Dated: New York, New York + +March 20, 2020 Respectfully submitted, + +TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 875 Third Avenue New York, New York 10022 + +By: Is/ Bennet J. Moskowitz Bennet J. Moskowitz + +Attorneys for Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn. Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein + +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, and GHISLAINE MAXWELL + +Defendants. + + +Index No. 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF + +## ORDER SETTING DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO COMPLAINT + +IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, shall have up to and including March 27, 2020 to answer or otherwise respond to Plaintiff's Complaint. + +SO ORDERED. + +Date: + +New York, New York Hon. Debra Freeman United States Magistrate Judge Southern District of New York \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777863/EFTA02777863.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777863/EFTA02777863.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..506c1704a8bde8ac9945e3d872fd431ac01a6b32 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777863/EFTA02777863.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -6, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777863", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.running-headers\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "805d883ab948d2f049a73192d155a8a515bc7f1657f511ee05eecca4bb633e54", + "output_sha256": "da5cd954192d82fa111fc200af73fdbaa34a8d533c9a5a75fb7a690c536e245d", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777866/EFTA02777866.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777866/EFTA02777866.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..88c556a81e5935bf22011fecdd07d8f13c62a54b --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777866/EFTA02777866.md @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Case No. 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF + +Plaintiff, + +-against-DARREN I INDYKE and RICHARD D KAHN, in dew capacities as executors ot Una Estate oi Jeffrey Edward Easton. and Gni:Jane Mansell Defendant. + +## NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS + +TO: ATTORNEY SERVICES CLERK AND ALL OTHER PARTIES + +I have cases pending I have no cases pending + +Pursuant to Local Rule 1.3 of this Court, please take notice of the following attorney information change (s) for: + +Mary "Molly' S. DiRago + +FILL IN ATTORNEY NAME + +My SDNY Bar Number is: My State Bar Number is 6282757 + +I am. + +An attorney + +A Government Agency attorney + +A Pro Hac Vicc attorney + +FIRM INFORMATION (Include full name of firm (OLD AND NEW), address, telephone number and fax number): + +OLD FIRM: FIRM NAME: TROUTMAN SANDERS UP + +FIRM ADDRESS:One North Wacker Drive. Suite 2905 Chicago. IL 60606 + +FIRM TELEPHONE NUMBER: atatissugg + +FIRM FAX NUMBER: awn. + +NEW FIRM: FIRM NAME: TROUTMAN SANDERSLLe + +FIRM ADDRESS: 227 street.luite\_asoo, Chicago, it. 60606 + +FIRM TELEPHONE NUMBER:\_istp\_rss {sup}`1926` + +FIRM FAX NUMBER: 1312)7591939 + +I will continue to be counsel of record on the above-entitled cast at my new firm/agency. + +I am no longer counsel of record on the above-entitled case. An order withdrawing my appearance was entered on by Judge + +Dated: 03/20/2020 /s/ Mary \*Molly" S. DiRago + +ATTORNEY'S SIGNATURE \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777866/EFTA02777866.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777866/EFTA02777866.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1ef1c43609b8a80d838a5bea7a19cc99691f742c --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777866/EFTA02777866.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -4, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777866", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "4038c2e8b475d9b66f92872bd2440ef420e63685e5faae2b0d2b57ca6b7784b9", + "output_sha256": "1ccfd20c27002134c5fb4e119ae73c1099f40480f3c602f3a5711c3d84951161", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777867/EFTA02777867.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777867/EFTA02777867.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..10ffb15c7fbd4001ef0bd922b731dcc3de125809 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777867/EFTA02777867.md @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +Bennet J. Moskowitz + +D: 212-704-6000 + +bennet.moskowitz@troulman.corn + +## VIA ELECTRONIC COURT FILING + +Hon. Lorna G. Schofield Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse 40 Foley Square New York, NY 10007 + +Re: v. Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as the executors of the Estate of Jeffrey Edward Epstein, et al.. 19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF + +March 26, 2020 + +Dear Judge Schofield: + +We represent Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (together, the "Co-Executors"), in the above-referenced action. We write in response to Plaintiffs March 19, 2020 letter regarding her claim for punitive damages. In addition to being contrary to law, permitting Plaintiff to maintain her punitive damages claim would impede settlement discussions by enabling her to use the (legally baseless) prospect of obtaining punitive damages as (misplaced) leverage. There is no sound reason for it to stand. + +First, Judges in this District regularly dismiss and strike punitive damages claims at the pleadings stage. See, e.g., The Cookware Co. (USA), LLC v. Austin, No. 15 Civ. 5796, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177691, at \*17 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2016) (Batts, J.) (granting motion to dismiss claim for punitive damages without leave to replead because allegations regarding defendant's bad-faith conduct were conclusory and did not rise to the required level of malice); SJB v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 03 Civ. 6653, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13227, at \*25-26 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2004) (Buchwald, J.) (granting motion to dismiss statutorily unavailable punitive damages claims); Kunica v. St. Jean Fin., 97 Civ. 3804, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11867, at \*26 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1998) (Sweet, J.) (granting motion to dismiss claim for punitive damages because, even if conduct alleged in complaint was true, it did not rise to the level necessary to award punitive damages). See also In re Merrill Auction Rate Sec. Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 512, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (granting motion to strike sections of complaint asserting punitive damages); Nash v. Coram Healthcare Corp., No. 96 Civ. 0298 (LMM), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9101, at \*15 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 1996) ("The motion to strike the punitive damages prayer from the Complaint is Granted."). + +Second Plaintiff cites no authority justifying a departure from black-letter law establishing that the place of a tort (here, New Mexico and New York) governs punitive damages. When determining what state's law applies, courts look to the choice of law rules of the forum state. Simons v. Marriott Corp., 92 Civ. 3762 (SWK), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14365, at \*15 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 1993). Under New York law, the law of the state where a tort occurs generally applies to punitive damages. Starr Indem. & Liab. Co. v. Am. Claims Mgmt., No. 14-cv-0463-JMF, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60272, \*7 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2015) ("Because punitive damages are conductregulating, 'the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred will generally apply.'") (quoting Deutsch v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 723 F. Supp. 2d 521, 524 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); Guidi v. Inter-Continental Hotels Corp., No. 95-CV-9006, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6390, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2003)); AHW Inv. P'ship, MFS, Inc. v. Citigroup Inc., 661 F. App'x 2, 5 (2d Cir. 2016) ("[I]t is the place of the allegedly wrongful conduct that generally has superior 'interests in protecting the reasonable expectations of the parties who relied on the laws of that place to govern their primary conduct and in the admonitory effect that applying its law will have on similar conduct in the future."). + +Here, Plaintiff alleges torts occurring in New York and New Mexico. (Compl. ¶¶ 25, 29, 51-54, 56, 58-69.) She also (i) chose to sue in New York, (ii) which is only possible per a New York statute, EPTL § 11-3.2, (iii) for violations of New York law, and (iv) relies on another New York law (CPLR § 215) to assert claims that are otherwise time-barred. Plaintiff argues that, because Decedent was domiciled in the USVI and owned real property there, and because his estate is being probated there decades after the alleged torts occurred, USVI law should apply to punitive damages. However, Plaintiff cites no legal authority holding that such factors justify a departure from the choice-of-law principle requiring application of the laws of the locations of alleged torts. + +Padula v. Lilam Properties Corp., 84 N.Y.2d 519 (1994), which Plaintiff cites, supports the Co-Executors' position. In Padula, a New York domiciliary sued another New York domiciliary for torts in Massachusetts. Id. at 521-22. The court held Massachusetts law applied, finding that when the law at issue involves the appropriate standards of conduct, "the law of the place of the tort 'will usually have a predominant, if not exclusive, concern.'" Id. Plaintiff reliance on Nat'l Jewish Democratic Council v. Adelson, No. 18-CV-8787 (JPO), 2019 WL 6895435 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2019), is also misplaced. In Adelson, "New York's interest [was] relatively attenuated" because "[fits sole connection to th[e] suit [was] that the suit was filed here." Id. at \*15. + +Under the reasoning set forth in Padula and Adelson, New Mexico and New York law should apply to Plaintiff's punitive damages claim. The USVI has no interest in applying its laws on punitive damages to alleged torts occurring in New York and New Mexico. The sole connection to the USVI is that the Decedent's Estate is being probated there, decades after the alleged tortious conduct took place—i.e., a connection much weaker than the one deemed "tenuous" in Adelson. + +Third, USVI law bars Plaintiffs recovery of punitive damages in any event. To determine common law, USVI courts apply a three factor "Banks" analysis: (1) whether USVI courts adopted a rule pre-Banks; (2) the position taken by a majority of otairisdictions; and (3) which approach is the soundest for the USVI. Gov't of Virgin Islands v. , No. S. CT. CIV. 2013-0095, 2014 WL 702639, at \*1 (V.I. Feb. 24, 2014). These factors favor the Co-Executors: (1) pre-Banks, USVI courts expressed approval for Restat. § 908 (see v. Dowson Holding Co., 51 V.I. 619, 628 (D.V.I. 2009) (considering the inverse issue)); (2) a majority of other jurisdictions preclude punitive damages against a tortfeasor's estate (2 Linda L. Schlueter, Punitive Damages § 20.4 (7th ed. 2015)); and (3) post-Banks, USVI courts have held § 908 is the soundest rule (Powell v. Chi-Co's Distrib., ST-13-TOR-14, 2014 V.I. LEXIS 21, at \*5 n.13 (U.S.V.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2014) (Restat. §908(2) "reflects the common law of this jurisdiction"). + +cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF) + +Respectfully submitted, + +s/Bennet J. Moskowitz Bennet J. Moskowitz \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777867/EFTA02777867.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777867/EFTA02777867.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d62c8f12120ac9d79f8a8095a759b1db23fc1cf4 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777867/EFTA02777867.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777867", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "a7fd1f7bc3225d99b6fc5438ad3762226cb9bfc03964e32ca45d974b609215c3", + "output_sha256": "a7fd1f7bc3225d99b6fc5438ad3762226cb9bfc03964e32ca45d974b609215c3", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777870/EFTA02777870.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777870/EFTA02777870.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f8dd5f50752eb41cb936daa94e61540f885fc1aa --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777870/EFTA02777870.md @@ -0,0 +1,249 @@ +#### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Plaintiff, CASE NO.: 1:19-cv-10475 (LGS) (DCF) + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, + +Defendants. + +### DEFENDANTS DARREN K. INDYKE AND RICHARD D. KAHN'S, AS CO-EXECUTORS OF THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT + +Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (the "Co-Executors") through their undersigned counsel, hereby respond to the numbered paragraphs of Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF Doc. I) as follows: + +1. Insofar as the reference to "Defendants" in paragraph I of the Complaint includes the Co-Executors, the Co-Executors deny the allegations in paragraph I of the Complaint. To the extent the reference to "Defendants" does not include the Co-Executors, the Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph I of the Complaint. + +2. Insofar as the reference to "Defendants" in paragraph 2 of the Complaint includes the Co-Executors, the Co-Executors deny the allegations in paragraph 2 of the Complaint. To the extent the reference to "Defendants" does not include the Co-Executors, the Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 2 of the Complaint. + +3. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 3 of the Complaint. + +4. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 4 of the Complaint, except admit the existence of the referenced court decision and refer thereto for the full text, terms and meaning thereof. + +5. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 5 of the Complaint. + +6. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 6 of the Complaint, except admit: (i) the existence of the referenced non-prosecution agreement and refer thereto for the full text, terms and meaning thereof; and (ii) that Jeffrey E. Epstein, now deceased ("Decedent") served a jail sentence pursuant to a 2008 plea agreement, and refer thereto for the full text, terms and meaning thereof. + +7. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 7 of the Complaint, except admit the existence of the referenced non-prosecution agreement and refer thereto for the full text, terms and meaning thereof. + +8. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 8 of the Complaint, except admit the existence of the referenced article and refer thereto for the full text, terms and meaning thereof. + +9. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 9 of the Complaint, except admit the existence of the referenced article and refer thereto for the full text, terms and meaning thereof. + +10. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 10 of the Complaint. + +II. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 11 of the Complaint. + +12. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 12 of the Complaint. + +13. Paragraph 13 of the Complaint states legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 13 of the Complaint. + +14. Paragraph 14 of the Complaint states legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required and the reference to "Defendants" includes the Co-Executors, the Co-Executors deny the allegations in paragraph 16 of the Complaint. To the extent a response is required and the reference to "Defendants" does not include the Co-Executors, the Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 14 of the Complaint. + +15. Paragraph 15 of the Complaint states legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint, but deny that CPLR § 2 I5(8Xa) is applicable to this action. + +16. Paragraph 16 of the Complaint states a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required and the references to "Defendants" include the Co-Executors, the Co-Executors deny the allegations in paragraph 16 of the Complaint. To the extent a response is required and the references to "Defendants" do not include the Co-Executors, the CoExecutors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 16 of the Complaint, but deny that such allegations toll any or all applicable statutes of limitations. + +17. Paragraph 17 of the Complaint states a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required and the references to "Defendants" include the Co-Executors, the Co-Executors deny the allegations in paragraph 17 of the Complaint. To the extent a response is required and the references to "Defendants" do not include the Co-Executors, the Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 17 of the Complaint, but deny that they are estopped from asserting any or all applicable statutes of limitations. + +# PARTIES + +18. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 18 of the Complaint. + +19. The Co-Executors admit the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint. + +20. The Co-Executors admit the allegations in paragraph 20 of the Complaint. + +21. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 21 of the Complaint. + +## JURISDICTION AND VENUE + +22. The Co-Executors admit the allegations in the first sentence of paragraph 22 of the Complaint. The second sentence of paragraph 22 of the Complaint states a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in the second sentence of paragraph 22 of the Complaint, except admit that, at the time of his death, Decedent beneficially owned entities which held interests in real property in the Southern District of New + +York. The third sentence of paragraph 22 of the Complaint states a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the Co-Executors deny the allegations in the third sentence of paragraph 22 of the Complaint insofar as they purport to characterize 28 USC § 1332, and refer thereto for the full text, terms and meaning thereof. + +23. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 23 of the Complaint. + +24. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in the first sentence of paragraph 24 of the Complaint. The second sentence of paragraph 24 of the Complaint states a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the Co-Executors deny the allegations in the second sentence of paragraph 24 of the Complaint insofar as they purport to apply 28 USC § 1332, and refer thereto for the full text, terms and meaning thereof. + +25. Paragraph 25 of the Complaint states a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 25 of the Complaint. + +26. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in the first sentence of paragraph 26 of the Complaint. The second sentence of paragraph 26 of the Complaint states a legal conclusion to which no response is required. + +# FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS + +27. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 27 of the Complaint. + +28. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 28 of the Complaint, except admit that, at the time of his death, Decedent beneficially owned interests in entities that held real property located at the New York and New Mexico addresses listed as well as in the U.S. Virgin Islands, Florida and France. + +29. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 29 of the Complaint. + +30. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 30 of the Complaint. + +11. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 31 of the Complaint. + +32. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 32 of the Complaint except admit: (i) that Decedent was arrested on July 6, 2019; and (ii) the existence of the indictment attached to Plaintiff's Complaint (the "Indictment") and refer thereto for the full text, terms and meaning thereof. + +33. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 33 of the Complaint and refer to the Indictment for the full text, terms and meaning thereof. + +34. The Co-Executors deny the allegations of paragraph 34 of the Complaint to the extent they purport to interpret legal documents, except admit the existence of the Last Will and Testament of Decedent, dated August 8, 2019, and the referenced Oaths of Willingness To Serve As Executor And Appointment Of Local Counsel, and refer thereto for the full text, terms and meanings thereof. + +35. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 35 of the Complaint, except admit that Decedent died on August 10, 2019. + +36. The Co-Executors deny the allegations in paragraph 36 of the Complaint except admit that, on August 15, 2019, a petition for probate and for letters testamentary In the Matter of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein was filed in the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands Division of St. and St. John; and the Co-Executors refer thereto for the full text, terms and meaning thereof. + +37. The Co-Executors deny the allegations in paragraph 37 of the Complaint, except admit the existence of the cited court filing and refer thereto for the full text, terms and meaning thereof. + +38. The Co-Executors deny the allegations in paragraph 38 of the Complaint, except admit the existence of the cited court order and letters testamentary and refer thereto for the full text, terms and meanings thereof. + +39. The Co-Executors deny the allegations in paragraph 39 of the Complaint, except admit the existence of Decedent's Last Will and Testament and refer thereto for the full text, terms and meaning thereof. + +40. Paragraph 40 of the Complaint states legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the Co-Executors deny the allegations in paragraph 40 of the Complaint except admit that, on August 19, 2019, a none prosequi was filed in U.S v. Jeffrey Epstein, 1:19-cr-00490-RMB (S.D.N.Y. (ECF Doc. 47-1)), which the court entered on August 29, 2019 (see id. at ECF Doc. 52); and the Co-Executors refer to the foregoing court filings for the full text, terms and meanings thereof. + +41. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 41 of the Complaint. + +42. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 42 of the Complaint. + +43. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 43 of the Complaint. + +44. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 44 of the Complaint. + +45. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 45 of the Complaint. + +46. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 46 of the Complaint. + +47. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 47 of the Complaint. + +48. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 48 of the Complaint. + +49. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 49 of the Complaint. + +50. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 50 of the Complaint. + +51. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 51 of the Complaint. + +52. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 52 of the Complaint. + +53. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 53 of the Complaint. + +54. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 54 of the Complaint. + +55. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the tr uth of the allegations in paragraph 55 of the Complaint. + +56. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 56 of the Complaint. + +57. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 57 of the Complaint. + +58. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 58 of the Complaint. + +59. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 59 of the Complaint. + +60. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 60 of the Complaint. + +61. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 61 of the Complaint. + +62. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 62 of the Complaint. + +63. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 63 of the Complaint. + +64. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 64 of the Complaint. + +65. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 65 of the Complaint. + +66. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the ttuth of the allegations in paragraph 66 of the Complaint. + +67. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 67 of the Complaint. + +68. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 68 of the Complaint. + +69. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 69 of the Complaint. + +70. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 70 of the Complaint. + +71. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 71 of the Complaint. + +72. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 72 of the Complaint. + +73. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 73 of the Complaint. + +74. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 74 of the Complaint. + +75. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 75 of the Complaint. + +76. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 76 of the Complaint. + +77. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 77 of the Complaint. + +78. The Co-Executors deny the allegations of paragraph 78 of the Complaint insofar as the reference to "Defendants" includes them. To the extent the reference to "Defendants" does not include the Co-Executors, the Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 78 of the Complaint. + +## FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION (Batten) + +79. The Co-Executors incorporate their answers to paragraphs 1-78 of the Complaint as if set forth fully herein. + +80. Paragraph 80 of the Complaint states legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 80 of the Complaint. + +81. Paragraph 81 of the Complaint states legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 81 of the Complaint. The Co-Executors further state that, to the extent the allegations in paragraph 81 of the Complaint characterize the referenced statutes, the statutes speak for themselves. The Co-Executors refer to the referenced statutes for the full text, terms and meanings thereof. + +82. Paragraph 82 of the Complaint states a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 82 of the Complaint, but deny that CPLR § 215(8Xa) is applicable to this action. + +83. Paragraph 83 of the Complaint states a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 83 of the Complaint. + +### SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION (False Imprisonment? + +84. The Co-Executors incorporate their answers to paragraphs 1-78 of the Complaint as if set forth fully herein. + +85. Paragraph 85 of the Complaint states a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required and the reference to "Defendants" in paragraph 85 of the Complaint includes the Co-Executors, the Co-Executors deny the allegations in paragraph 85 of the Complaint. To the extent a response is required and the reference to "Defendants" in paragraph 85 of the Complaint does not include the Co-Executors, the Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 85 of the Complaint. + +86. The Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 86 of the Complaint. + +87. Paragraph 87 of the Complaint states a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 87 of the Complaint, but deny that CPLR § 215(8Xa) is applicable to this action. + +88. Paragraph 88 of the Complaint states a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 88 of the Complaint. + +#### THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress) + +89. The Co-Executors incorporate their answers to paragraphs 1-78 of the Complaint as if set forth fully herein. + +90. Paragraph 90 of the Complaint states a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required and the reference to "Defendants" in paragraph 90 of the Complaint includes the Co-Executors, the Co-Executors deny the allegations in paragraph 90 of the Complaint. To the extent a response is required and the reference to "Defendants" does not include the Co-Executors, the Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 90 of the Complaint. + +91. Paragraph 91 of the Complaint states a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required and the reference to "Defendants" in paragraph 91 of the Complaint includes the Co-Executors, the Co-Executors deny the allegations in paragraph 91 of the Complaint. To the extent a response is required and the reference to "Defendants" does not include the Co-Executors, the Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 91 of the Complaint. + +92. Insofar as the reference to "Defendants" in paragraph 92 of the Complaint includes the Co-Executors, the Co-Executors deny the allegations in paragraph 92 of the Complaint. Insofar as the reference to "Defendants" does not include the Co-Executors, the Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 92 of the Complaint + +93. Paragraph 93 of the Complaint states a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 93 of the Complaint, but deny that CPLR § 2 I5(8Xa) is applicable to this action. + +94. Paragraph 94 of the Complaint states a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the Co-Executors lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 94 of the Complaint. + +The "PRAYER FOR RELIEF', "WHEREFORE" paragraph and "JURY DEMAND" following paragraph 94 of the Complaint purport to state Plaintiff's prayer for relief and jury demand, respectively, to which no response is required. To the extent that a response is required, the Co-Executors, based on lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of Plaintiff's allegations, deny that Plaintiff is entitled to any of the relief described therein, or to any relief whatsoever. + +The Co-Executors deny any and all allegations in the Complaint not expressly admitted herein. + +### AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES + +The Co-Executors, to the extent required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c), assert the following affirmative defenses. By pleading these defenses, the Co-Executors do not assume the burden of proving any fact, issue, or element of a cause of action where such burden belongs to Plaintiff. Moreover, nothing stated herein is intended to or shall be construed as a concession that any particular issue or subject matter is relevant to Plaintiff's allegations. + +- 1. Plaintiff's Complaint fails, in whole or in part, to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. +- 2. Plaintiff's claims are barred to the extent Plaintiff has not suffered any damages; alternatively, Plaintiffs claims are barred to the extent Plaintiff has not been damaged to the extent alleged, and failed to mitigate any damages she may have suffered. +- 3. Contributory Negligence. If Plaintiff suffered or sustained any loss, injury, damage or detriment, and the same was directly and proximately caused and contributed to by the conduct, acts, omissions, activities, carelessness, negligence, and/or intentional misconduct of Plaintiff, Plaintiff's recovery herein is partially or completely barred. +- 4. Assumption of Risk. Plaintiffs claims are barred to the extent that, at the time and place of the incidents alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint, Plaintiff knew of and fully understood the danger and risks incident to their undertaking; but despite such knowledge, Plaintiff freely and voluntarily assumed and exposed herself to all risks of harm and the consequential injuries and resultant damages, if any. +- 5. Comparative Fault of Third Parties. If and to the extent that the Co-Executors are subjected to any liability to Plaintiff due, in whole or in part, to the acts, omissions, activities, carelessness, recklessness, negligence, and intentional misconduct of persons or entities other than + +Decedent, any recovery obtained by Plaintiff against the Co-Executors should be reduced in proportion to the respective negligence and fault and legal responsibility of all such other persons and entities, and their agents, servants and employees who contributed to or caused any such injury or damages, in accordance with the law of comparative negligence; the liability of the Co-Executors, if any, is limited in direct proportion to the percentage of fault actually attributed to Decedent. + +6. Statute of Limitations. The Complaint, and each and every cause of action contained therein, is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, including without limitation because: (i) the New York Child Victims' Act, including without limitation CPLR 214-g, violates the New York Constitution and the U.S. Constitution; (ii) CPLR § 215(8)(a) is inapplicable to this action; (iii) the doctrines of equitable tolling and estoppel are unavailable to Plaintiff and otherwise inapplicable to this action; and (iv) Decedent's alleged conduct did not constitute an offense under New York Penal Law § 130, including without limitation because such alleged conduct occurred outside of New York. + +7. Intervening/Superseding Causes. To the extent the injuries and damages which Plaintiff alleges were proximately caused by, or contributed to by, the acts of persons or entities other than Decedent, and said acts were intervening or superseding causes of the injuries and damages, if any, which Plaintiff alleges, Plaintiff is barred from any recovery against the Co-Executors. + +8. Plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrines of waiver, estoppel and !aches. + +9. To the extent Plaintiff seeks damages that are punitive in nature, they are barred including without limitation pursuant to N.Y. E.P.T.L. § 11-3.2. + +10. Plaintiff's claims are barred to the extent she is simultaneously prosecuting her claims in the Southern District of New York and the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands Division of St. and St. John. + +The Co-Executors have not knowingly or intentionally waived any applicable affirmative defenses and reserve the right to assert and rely upon such affirmative defenses as may become available or apparent during discovery. The Co-Executors further reserve the right to amend their Answer accordingly. + +Dated: New York, New York March 27, 2020 + +By: /s/ Bennet J. Moskowitz Bennet J. Moskowitz TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 875 Third Avenue New York, New York 10022 + +> Attorneys for Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777870/EFTA02777870.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777870/EFTA02777870.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6fa2a1a89b06eca33fa4fa8e8c3c899979f6a3bf --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777870/EFTA02777870.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777870", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "7f3f6011333e72952d23414f0e07ee3b8bc1d33a8df51d2bde1529956dc1bba4", + "output_sha256": "7f3f6011333e72952d23414f0e07ee3b8bc1d33a8df51d2bde1529956dc1bba4", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777887/EFTA02777887.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777887/EFTA02777887.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2647fe90436039db0d582b64e67281cf90b2099e --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777887/EFTA02777887.md @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +March 27, 2020 + +VIA ECF + +Hon. Lorna G. Schofield United States District Judge Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse 40 Foley Square New York, New York 10007 + +> Re: 19-cv-10475 (LGS-DCF), v. Darren K. Indyke, et at + +Dear Judge Schofield: + +Haddon, and v c Laura A. Menninger + +150 Eost 101h Avenue Denver, Colorado 80203 PH 303.831.7364 rx 303.832.2628 www.hmfIcAv.com Imenningerehmflow.com + +I write under Rule 111(C)(2) of your practice standards to alert you to Ghislaine Maxwell's intended motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and 12, to request a premotion conference, and to suggest a briefing schedule. Because plaintiff's complaint contains so many deficiencies, Ms. Maxwell asks for leave to file a 4-page letter. + +Plaintiff's "personal knowledge" allegations against Ms. Maxwell are limited: (1) Ms. Maxwell (together with Mr. Epstein), who were "in New York at the time, arranged and paid for plaintiff to fly to New Mexico in the spring of 1996," (158), and (2) once in New Mexico, Ms. Maxwell allegedly held plaintiff against her will, took her shopping, pressured her into giving a foot massage to Mr. Epstein, and later during a massage without Mr. Epstein present, "touched [plaintiffs] intimate parts .. . against her will," "exposed [her] breasts and groped her." (11159-65). The rest of plaintiff's claims are upon "information and belief' and impermissibly lump the allegations against Ms. Maxwell with those against Mr. Epstein. + +### I. Rule 8 Requires Fair Notice to Ms. Maxwell, Not Lumping + +Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 requires, at a minimum, that a complaint give each defendant "fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the ground upon which it rests." Ferro v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d 847, 851 (2d Cir. 1961); see also v. Abruuo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995). Here, whenever plaintiff has no facts to allege against Ms. Maxwell, she deceptively claims that "Epstein and Maxwell": "committed" (1 13), "recruited" (125), "perfected" (131), "arranged" (158), "allowed" (1 70), "intentionally committed" (1 80), "intentionally and forcibly touched" (1 81), "falsely imprisoned" (1 85), "brought" and "prevented" (186), committed "criminal acts" (Ill 88, 94), and had a plan to "recruit, entice and assault" + +Hon. Lorna G. Schofield March 27, 2020 Page 2 + +(191). The impermissible lumping occurs in key areas of the complaint regarding personal jurisdiction and venue, the purported nexus between New York and the alleged acts, and in each claim for relief. The conflation of Ms. Maxwell with Mr. Epstein deprives Ms. Maxwell of the ability to raise jurisdictional issues and plead affirmative defenses, and it does not provide fair notice of the claims or the factual grounds on which the claims rest. + +### II. Paragraphs 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 of the Complaint Should Be Stricken under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) as to Ms. Maxwell + +Rule 12(t) provides that a Court "may order stricken from any pleading ... any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." The complaint includes hearsay statements allegedly made by Judge Marra in an action in which neither Mr. Epstein nor Ms. Maxwell was a party (14); conclusory and argumentative statements about Mr. Epstein's 2008 Florida prosecution (in which plaintiff was not alleged to be a victim and in which Ms. Maxwell was neither a suspect nor a witness) (TI 6,7); and allegations about Mr. Epstein's statements to the media ell 8, 9). Each are barred by Rule 12(0. + +# III. This Court Is the Improper Venue + +The Southern District of New York is not the proper venue for plaintiff's claims against Ms. Maxwell. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3). Section 1391(b)(1) of Title 28 does not authorize venue here because not all the defendants are residents of New York. Plaintiff asserts that Ms. Maxwell "is domiciled in the Southern District of New York," 23), yet her counsel earlier informed this Court of the opposite (Doc. 19 at 3) ("extensive public records searches" revealed "properties that Maxwell sold in recent years, such as her New York City home on 65'h Street"); see also v. Maxwell, 15-cv-7433 (Doc. 388 at 2-3) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2016) (Boies, Schiller reporting Maxwell sold her NY residence in April 2016). Indeed, it appears that none of the defendants is a resident of New York. + +Section 1391(6)(2) also does not authorize venue here because the claims against Ms. Maxwell all allegedly occurred in New Mexico. Paragraph 25 summarily claims the alleged sexual abuse "began and occurred in New York" where plaintiff was "recruited . . . at the age of 16, physically molested ..., and [groomed] for sex," but the detailed paragraphs make the opposite claim, that the alleged assault by Ms. Maxwell (11 58-70) occurred in New Mexico. + +# IV. Plaintiff's Claims against Ms. Maxwell Are Untimely + +Whether under New Mexico or New York law, plaintiff's claims are timebarred. Plaintiff alleges Ms. Maxwell committed a singular act in New York: from New York, she and Mr. Epstein allegedly "arranged and paid for [plaintiff] to fly to New Mexico in the spring of 1996" (158). Even if true, which it is not, plaintiff's + +Hon. Lorna G. Schofield March 27, 2020 Page 3 + +claims are barred by a statute of limitations. + +Plaintiff's claims against Maxwell are untimely under New Mexico law. New York's borrowing statute, CPLR § 202, permits a resident of another state (here, Texas) to sue in New York for a tort occurring outside of New York (here, New Mexico) only if the complaint is timely under the laws of New York and the state in which the tort occurred (again, New Mexico). New Mexico has a three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, N.M. Stat. § 37-1-8, and minors have one year from reaching the age of majority to commence such an action, N.M. Stat. § 37-1-10. Thus, at the latest, plaintiff's claims expired sometime in 1999. Plaintiff's claims are time-barred under New Mexico law and, as a result, they are time-barred under CPLR § 202. + +Plaintiff's claims also are untimely under New York law. Even if New York law were to control the statute of limitations, which it should not, under CPLR § 215(3), a plaintiff alleging battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress must commence her action within one year of the claim's accrual. Neither basis for revival cited by plaintiff would survive a motion to dismiss. + +CPLR § 215(8)(a) does not apply to claims against Ms. Maxwell. Under that provision, "Whenever it is shown that a criminal action against the same defendant has been commenced with respect to the event or occurrence from which a [battery or false imprisonment] claim ... arises," the plaintiff has at least one year from "[t]he termination of the criminal action" to file her otherwise time-barred claim against the "same defendant." The government indicted only Mr. Epstein, hence Ms. Maxwell is not the "same defendant" against whom there was a "criminal action." And the indictment against Mr. Epstein did not concern the "event or occurrence" from which plaintiff's claims against Ms. Maxwell arise. The indictment charged conduct by Mr. Epstein between 2002 and 2005 in New York and Florida. Plaintiff's complaint concerns conduct allegedly occurring in 1995/1996 in New Mexico. + +CPLR § 214-g cannot revive plaintiff's untimely claims. CPLR § 214-g purports to revive otherwise time-barred claims for injuries "suffered as a result of conduct which would constitute" a sexual offense under New York law. Plaintiff invokes CPLR § 214-g to save claims that expired more than twenty years ago. The attempt fails because CPLR § 214-g, if it even applies,' is unconstitutional. A claimrevival statute like CPLR § 214-g satisfies due process only if "if it was enacted as a reasonable response in order to remedy an injustice." In re World Trade Or. Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig., 89 N.E.3d 1227, 1243 (N.Y. 2017). Plaintiff admits she had no difficulty reporting her allegations years ago to Vanity Fair Magazine, her + +II CPLR § 214-g does not apply to Ms. Maxwell because, among other reasons, the conduct alleged against her occurred in New Mexico, outside of New York, and therefore "would [not] constitute" a sexual offense under New York Penal Law § 130. + +Hon. Lorna G. Schofield March 27, 2020 Page 4 sister, the NYPD, and the FBI. IN 73-75. That those organizations did not respond as plaintiff wished is all the more reason she should have filed this lawsuit years ago. Additionally, plaintiff's false imprisonment claim is not based on "conduct which would constitute a sexual offense" wherever it were committed, and as a result, CPLR § 214-g cannot save it from being time-barred. Plaintiff has not and cannot plausibly plead equitable tolling or equitable estoppel. Equitable tolling is unavailable in New York for state claims. Jang Hoi Choi v. Beautri Realty Corp., 135 A.D.3d 451, 452 (N.Y. App. 1st Dep't. 2016). Moreover, tolling and estoppel require "extraordinary" factors that make it "unjust" to allow a defendant to assert a statute of limitations defense. See id. (equitable tolling requires poof that a plaintiff was "prevented in some extraordinary way" from exercising her rights). As explained above, plaintiff's own complaint proves that there was no impediment to her filing this action within a timely fashion. "Plaintiff had sufficient knowledge of the facts and of a basis for a cause of action within the limitations period, and yet Is lhe failed to bring a timely suit." Id. As in Zumpano v. Quinn, in which the plaintiff tried to revive untimely allegations of sexual assault against members of the clergy, "plaintiff was aware of the sexual abuse ... she [allegedly] suffered at the hands of [Ms. Maxwell] .... Certainly [she] had sufficient knowledge to bring an intentional tort cause of action...." 849 N.E.2d 926, 929 (N.Y. 2006). The complaint points to absolutely nothing Ms. Maxwell allegedly didin the year before its filing or any other time—that prevented plaintiff from filing the lawsuit. + +This Court has wondered about resolving these issues through a motion to dismiss. Respectfully, it is proper to address these issues now, as have other courts, because plaintiff's complaint fails as a matter of law. See Geiss, Geiss v. Weinstein Co. Holdings LLC, 383 F. Supp. 3d 156, 172-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (addressing equitable tolling/estoppel argument and granting a motion to dismiss). + +# V. Briefing Schedule + +Plaintiff's complaint raises, at a minimum, those issues identified above. I suggest that Ms. Maxwell file her motion by April 17, that plaintiff respond by May I, and that Ms. Maxwell reply by May 8. + +Respectfully Submitted, + +Laura A. Menninger + +CC: Counsel of Record via ECF \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777887/EFTA02777887.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777887/EFTA02777887.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c58d81883b9e8c302bc6628c9e1ff7cd6478c782 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777887/EFTA02777887.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777887", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "de725a52476eb464156dcdafe01ce31980a7b05550044d6c14d8bc1dc127d2ba", + "output_sha256": "de725a52476eb464156dcdafe01ce31980a7b05550044d6c14d8bc1dc127d2ba", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777891/EFTA02777891.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777891/EFTA02777891.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cdb09abf8e2e8e292eadc1a94ef1349330f84bcd --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777891/EFTA02777891.md @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +So Ordered. + +Dated: March 30, 2020 New York, New York + +March 27, 2020 + +VIA ECF + +Hon. Lorna G. Schofield United States District Judge Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse 40 Foley Square New York, New York 10007 + +> Re: 19-cv-10475 (LGS-DCF), v. Darren K. Indyke, et at + +Dear Judge Schofield: + +LO AG. SCHOFIE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE + +I write under Rule III(C)(2) of your practice standards to alert you to Ghislaine Maxwell's intended motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. a and 12, to request a premotion conference, and to suggest a briefing schedule. Because plaintiff's complaint contains so many deficiencies, Ms. Maxwell asks for leave to file a 4-page letter. + +Plaintiff's "personal knowledge" allegations against Ms. Maxwell are limited: (1) Ms. Maxwell (together with Mr. Epstein), who were "in New York at the time, arranged and paid for plaintiff to fly to New Mexico in the spring of 1996," (158), and (2) once in New Mexico, Ms. Maxwell allegedly held plaintiff against her will, took her shopping, pressured her into giving a foot massage to Mr. Epstein, and later during a massage without Mr. Epstein present, "touched [plaintiff's] intimate parts .. . against her will," "exposed [her] breasts and groped her." (9¶ 59-65). The rest of plaintiff's claims are upon "information and belief' and impermissibly lump the allegations against Ms. Maxwell with those against Mr. Epstein. + +### I. Rule 8 Requires Fair Notice to Ms. Maxwell, Not Lumping + +Fed. R. Civ. P. R requires, at a minimum, that a complaint give each defendant "fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the ground upon which it rests." Ferro v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d 847.851 (2d Cir. 1961); see also v. Abruzzo, 49 F.ld 83 8( (2d Cir. 1995). Here, whenever plaintiff has no facts to allege against Ms. Maxwell, she deceptively claims that "Epstein and Maxwell": "committed" (1 13), "recruited" (125), "perfected" (131), "arranged" (158), "allowed" (91 70), "intentionally committed" (1 80), "intentionally and forcibly touched" (1 81), "falsely imprisoned" (1 85), "brought" and "prevented" (1 86), committed "criminal acts" (911 88, 94), and had a plan to "recruit, entice and assault" + +Hon. Lorna G. Schofield March 27, 2020 Page 2 + +(i 91). The impermissible lumping occurs in key areas of the complaint regarding personal jurisdiction and venue, the purported nexus between New York and the alleged acts, and in each claim for relief. The conflation of Ms. Maxwell with Mr. Epstein deprives Ms. Maxwell of the ability to raise jurisdictional issues and plead affirmative defenses, and it does not provide fair notice of the claims or the factual grounds on which the claims rest. + +### H. Paragraphs 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 of the Complaint Should Be Stricken under Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.2a1as to Ms. Maxwell + +Rule 12(t) provides that a Court "may order stricken from any pleading ... any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." The complaint includes hearsay statements allegedly made by Judge Marra in an action in which neither Mr. Epstein nor Ms. Maxwell was a party ('J 4); conclusory and argumentative statements about Mr. Epstein's 2008 Florida prosecution (in which plaintiff was not alleged to be a victim and in which Ms. Maxwell was neither a suspect nor a witness) (TI 6,7); and allegations about Mr. Epstein's statements to the media (11 8, 9). Each are barred by Rule 12(0. + +# III. This Court Is the Improper Venue + +The Southern District of New York is not the proper venue for plaintiff's claims against Ms. Maxwell. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3). Section 1391(b)(1) of Title 28 does not authorize venue here because not all the defendants are residents of New York. Plaintiff asserts that Ms. Maxwell "is domiciled in the Southern District of New York," (¶ 23), yet her counsel earlier informed this Court of the opposite (floc,, 19 at 3)("extensive public records searches" revealed "properties that Maxwell sold in recent years, such as her New York City home on 65'h Street"); see also v. Maxwell, 15-cv-7433 (Doc. 3RR at 2-1) (S D N Y Aug. 22, 2016) (Boies, Schiller reporting Maxwell sold her NY residence in April 2016). Indeed, it appears that none of the defendants is a resident of New York. + +Section 1391(6)(2) also does not authorize venue here because the claims against Ms. Maxwell all allegedly occurred in New Mexico. Paragraph 25 summarily claims the alleged sexual abuse "began and occurred in New York" where plaintiff was "recruited . . . at the age of 16, physically molested ..., and [groomed] for sex," but the detailed paragraphs make the opposite claim, that the alleged assault by Ms. Maxwell (11 58-70) occurred in New Mexico. + +# IV. Plaintiff's Claims against Ms. Maxwell Are Untimely + +Whether under New Mexico or New York law, plaintiff's claims are timebarred. Plaintiff alleges Ms. Maxwell committed a singular act in New York: from New York, she and Mr. Epstein allegedly "arranged and paid for [plaintiff] to fly to New Mexico in the spring of 1996" (¶ 58). Even if true, which it is not, plaintiff's + +Hon. Lorna G. Schofield March 27, 2020 Page 3 + +claims are barred by a statute of limitations. + +Plaintiff's daims against Maxwell are untimely under New Mexico law. New York's borrowing statute, CPLR § 202, permits a resident of another state (here, Texas) to sue in New York for a tort occurring outside of New York (here, New Mexico) only if the complaint is timely under the laws of New York and the state in which the tort occurred (again, New Mexico). New Mexico has a three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, N.M. Stat. § 37-1-8, and minors have one year from reaching the age of majority to commence such an action, N.M. Stat. § 37-1-10. Thus, at the latest, plaintiff's claims expired sometime in 1999. Plaintiff's claims are time-barred under New Mexico law and, as a result, they are time-barred under CPLR § 202. + +Plaintiff's claims also are untimely under New York law. Even if New York law were to control the statute of limitations, which it should not, under CPLR § 215(3), a plaintiff alleging battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress must commence her action within one year of the claim's accrual. Neither basis for revival cited by plaintiff would survive a motion to dismiss. + +CPLR § 215(8)(a) does not apply to claims against Ms. Maxwell. Under that provision, "Whenever it is shown that a criminal action against the same defendant has been commenced with respect to the event or occurrence from which a [battery or false imprisonment] claim ... arises," the plaintiff has at least one year from "[t]he termination of the criminal action" to file her otherwise time-barred claim against the "same defendant." The government indicted only Mr. Epstein, hence Ms. Maxwell is not the "same defendant" against whom there was a "criminal action." And the indictment against Mr. Epstein did not concern the "event or occurrence" from which plaintiff's claims against Ms. Maxwell arise. The indictment charged conduct by Mr. Epstein between 2002 and 2005 in New York and Florida. Plaintiff's complaint concerns conduct allegedly occurring in 1995/1996 in New Mexico. + +CPLR § 214-g cannot revive plaintiff's untimely claims. CPLR § 214-g purports to revive otherwise time-barred claims for injuries "suffered as a result of conduct which would constitute" a sexual offense under New York law. Plaintiff invokes CPLR § 214-g to save claims that expired more than twenty years ago. The attempt fails because CPLR § 214-g, if it even applies,' is unconstitutional. A claimrevival statute like CPLR § 214-g satisfies due process only if "if it was enacted as a reasonable response in order to remedy an injustice." In re World Trade Or. Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig., 89 N F 1(1 1977 1941 (N.Y. 2017). Plaintiff admits she had no difficulty reporting her allegations years ago to Vanity Fair Magazine, her + +I I CPLR § 214-g does not apply to Ms. Maxwell because, among other reasons, the conduct alleged against her occurred in New Mexico, outside of New York, and therefore "would [not] constitute" a sexual offense under New York Penal Law § 130. + +Hon. Lorna G. Schofield March 27, 2020 Page 4 sister, the NYPD, and the FBI. yy 73-75. That those organizations did not respond as plaintiff wished is all the more reason she should have filed this lawsuit years ago. Additionally, plaintiffs false imprisonment claim is not based on "conduct which would constitute a sexual offense" wherever it were committed, and as a result, CPLR § 214-g cannot save it from being time-barred. Plaintiff has not and cannot plausibly plead equitable tolling or equitable estoppel. Equitable tolling is unavailable in New York for state claims. fang Hoi Choi v. Beautri Realty Corp. 135 A D 3d 451.45?(N.Y. App. 1st Dep't. 2016). Moreover, tolling and estoppel require "extraordinary" factors that make it "unjust" to allow a defendant to assert a statute of limitations defense. See id. (equitable tolling requires poof that a plaintiff was "prevented in some extraordinary way" from exercising her rights). As explained above, plaintiff's own complaint proves that there was no impediment to her filing this action within a timely fashion. "Plaintiff had sufficient knowledge of the facts and of a basis for a cause of action within the limitations period, and yet Is lhe failed to bring a timely suit." Id. As in Zumpano v. Quinn, in which the plaintiff tried to revive untimely allegations of sexual assault against members of the clergy, "plaintiff was aware of the sexual abuse ... she [allegedly] suffered at the hands of [Ms. Maxwell] .. Certainly [she] had sufficient knowledge to bring an intentional tort cause of action...." 849 N.E.2d 926. 929 (N.Y. 2006). The complaint points to absolutely nothing Ms. Maxwell allegedly didin the year before its filing or any other time—that prevented plaintiff from filing the lawsuit. + +This Court has wondered about resolving these issues through a motion to dismiss. Respectfully, it is proper to address these issues now, as have other courts, because plaintiff's complaint fails as a matter of law. See Geiss, Geiss v. Weinstein Co. Holdings LLC, 383 F. Cupp. 3d 156 179-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (addressing equitable tolling/estoppel argument and granting a motion to dismiss). + +# V. Briefing Schedule + +Plaintiff's complaint raises, at a minimum, those issues identified above. I suggest that Ms. Maxwell file her motion by April 17, that plaintiff respond by May I, and that Ms. Maxwell reply by May 8. + +Respectfully Submitted, + +a Laura A. Menninger + +CC: Counsel of Record via ECF \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777891/EFTA02777891.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777891/EFTA02777891.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..45a1b0cb838a29d9f5f609fdec1d974153fe7a3c --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777891/EFTA02777891.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777891", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "9e1c4c9d84ee6fecceff0bd53db228a73dd8ed4595143a0362458ffe14643b07", + "output_sha256": "9e1c4c9d84ee6fecceff0bd53db228a73dd8ed4595143a0362458ffe14643b07", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777895/EFTA02777895.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777895/EFTA02777895.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f137f12810fc4970c0098206bab03c66afceb1cb --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777895/EFTA02777895.md @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +April 3, 2020 + +## VIA ECF + +The Honorable Lorna G. Schofield United States District Court Southern District of New York 40 Foley Square New York, NY 10007 + +Telephone: (954) 356-001I Email: sinccawley@bsfilp.com + +Re: v. Darren K. Indvke et al., 19- I II-175- I A ;S-I )(' I: + +Dear Judge Schofield, + +Pursuant to Individual Rules III.A.1 and III.C.2, Plaintiff hereby responds to Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell's request for a pre-motion conference in connection with her anticipated motion to dismiss. Dkt. 46. + +The Court has already held a hearing on an anticipated motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint. Maxwell's co-Defendants, the executors of Jeffrey Epstein's estate, filed a pre-motion letter on January 24, 2020, raising many of the same arguments that Maxwell does here. Dkt. 17. At a hearing on March 5, 2020, the Court discouraged the Estate from filing its motion because it would have raised numerous factual issues inappropriate for resolution at the pleading stage. See Dkt. 39 at 6:5-6 ("So, what I'm going to do is I am going to ask you to hold off on the motion to dismiss."). The Estate complied, and filed its Answer on March 27, 2020. Dkt. 45. + +Despite the fact that Maxwell's counsel has had Plaintiff's Complaint since December 6, 2019, see Dkts, 20, 20-2, and had already appeared and filed a motion before the March 5 premotion conference took place, see Dkts. 32, 33, they inexplicably chose not to attend that hearing, and instead now force Plaintiff and the Court to repeat the process for what are essentially the same legal arguments. As explained below, the Court should deny Maxwell's motion in its entirety.' + +## I. Plaintiff's Complaint Satisfies Rule 8 + +Maxwell first contends that the Complaint does not satisfy Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. But the Complaint specifically describes the sexual assault and false imprisonment that Maxwell committed against Plaintiff when she was a child. Comp'. 11 62-69 (alleging that Maxwell forced Plaintiff, a child, to let her massage Plaintiff's naked body and groped her breasts, and Plaintiff had no way of escaping). Such allegations easily meet Rule 8's threshold, which requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1). They also render Plaintiff's claims against Maxwell plausible. See Ashcroft v. lqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (holding that "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face"). + +The mere fact that some allegations attribute conduct to both Epstein and Maxwell does not render the Complaint insufficient under Rule 8. Any allegations that refer to both Epstein and + +If the Court allows Maxwell to file a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff requests 30 days from the date of the motion to file an opposition, with Maxwell's reply brief due 10 days thereafter. + +Maxwell do so because Epstein and Maxwell worked together to facilitate the sex trafficking and assault of Plaintiff and other girls. See, e.g., Comp1.1 11 (Maxwell was in charge of recruiting girls); id. 1146-47 (Maxwell brought young girls to Epstein's home); id.1 57 (Epstein convinced Plaintiffs mother to send Plaintiff to Epstein's ranch by promising that Maxwell would chaperone); id.1 59 (Maxwell asked Plaintiff to massage Epstein). Maxwell's assertion that these allegations somehow do "not provide fair notice of the claims or the factual grounds on which the claims rest," Dkt. 46 at 2, is without merit.2 + +## H. Venue Is Proper + +Maxwell next asserts that the Southern District of New York is an improper venue. But venue is proper in any "judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(bX2). As alleged in the Complaint, venue is proper because Epstein and Maxwell operated a sex-trafficking ring out of Epstein's New York City home, Epstein and Maxwell flew Plaintiff to New York City to groom and abuse her, and Epstein and Maxwell arranged to fly Plaintiff to Epstein's ranch from New York City. Compl. 911 I I, 29, 46, 51, 53, 58. + +Because a substantial part of the events giving rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred in the Southern District of New York, Maxwell's current residence is irrelevant. But even if it were relevant, Plaintiff properly alleged that "Ghislaine Maxwell is a New York citizen and is domiciled in the Southern District of New York," Compl. 1 21, based on the limited information available concerning Maxwell's whereabouts.3 + +Maxwell implies that she is no longer a resident of New York, but does not disclose where she resides or otherwise indicate where venue would be proper. Dkt. 46 at 2. Maxwell cannot escape this lawsuit by hiding her current location. If Maxwell seeks to challenge venue on the grounds that she does not currently live in New York, the Court should require her to provide the factual basis for that argument by testifying at an evidentiary hearing. + +## III. Plaintiff's Claims Are Timely + +Maxwell's statute of limitations arguments are equally meritless. As noted above, the Court has already considered the same statute of limitations arguments that Maxwell raises now. Specifically, the Court recognized that the doctrines of equitable estoppel and equitable tolling are "very fact specific," and accordingly asked the Estate to refrain from filing a motion to dismiss + +{sup}`2`Maxwell also asks the Court to strike certain allegations from the Complaint under Rule 12(1), but does not specify why those allegations are "redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous," see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(t), or cite a single authority supporting her position. The allegations that Maxwell asks the Court to strike quote public documents that explain the scheme that caused Plaintiffs injuries. If Maxwell wants to challenge the factual accuracy of those allegations, she may do so at trial. + +{sup}`3`Plaintiff's counsel never "informed this Court" that Maxwell was not domiciled in New York. Dkt. 46 at 2. Rather, in a previous filing Plaintiffs counsel merely noted that Maxwell sold her New York home in 2016 to demonstrate why Maxwell could not be located for the purpose of serving her with process. Dkt. 19 at 3. + +prior to discovery. Dkt. 39 at 3:4-8 ("[T]he doctrines of equitable estoppel and equitable tolling could, nevertheless, save the claims and make them timely and that is very fact specific . ."). There is no reason to treat Maxwell's arguments any differently than those of the Estate. + +Plaintiff's allegations concerning Maxwell's conduct easily provide the requisite extraordinary circumstances for equitable tolling. Maxwell intimidated girls "who attempted to escape or report Epstein's sex trafficking operation"; manipulated victims using "financial power, promises, and threats to ensure that the victim returned as directed and remained compliant with their demands"; and repeatedly threatened Plaintiff's sister to try to prevent she and Plaintiff from reporting the crimes against them. Compl. 12, 16, 17, 31, 70, 72, 76. + +Plaintiff's claims are also timely under the Child Victims Act ("CVA"), C.P.L.R. § 214-g, which provides that civil claims for injuries suffered as a result of conduct that would constitute a sexual offense as defined in Article 130 of the Penal Law committed against a child "is hereby revived, and action thereon may be commenced . . . not later than one year and six months after the effective date of this section." The Complaint alleges that Epstein and Maxwell's actions constitute sexual offenses under Article 130, and that those actions were committed against Plaintiff when she was 16 years old. Compl. 11 14, 80, 81. + +Maxwell's argument that the CVA is "unconstitutional" is wrong." The CVA was enacted to "finally allow justice for past and future survivors of child sexual abuse, help the public identify hidden child predators through civil litigation discovery, and shift the significant and lasting costs of child sexual abuse to the responsible parties." N.Y. Comm. Rep., 2019 N.Y. S.B. No. 2440, 242nd Legis. Sess. (Jan. 26, 2019). It therefore satisfies due process because "it was enacted as a reasonable response in order to remedy an injustice." In re World Trade Ctr. Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig., 89 N.E.3d 1227, 1243 (N.Y. 2017).5 + +Finally, New York's borrowing statute, C.P.L.R. § 202, does not apply to this action, as the CVA provides for a revival window of civil claims "[n]otwithstanding any provision of law which imposes a period of limitation to the contrary." C.P.L.R. § 214-g. + +Respectfully submitted, + +/s/ Sigrid S. McCawley + +David Boies, Esq. Sigrid S. McCawley, Esq. + +{sup}`4`Contrary to Maxwell's suggestion, the CVA's text does not limit its application to sexual offenses that occurred in New York. Regardless, the Complaint alleges that Maxwell committed sexual offenses in both New York and New Mexico by sexually assaulting Plaintiff and facilitating Epstein's sexual assault of Plaintiff. Comp1.11 10-13, 29. 54. 57-65, 68, 70. + +The Estate and Maxwell both point out that the sisters had reported their conduct. Dkt. 17 at 3; Dkt. 46 at 3-4. But Defendantslae the fact that after Epstein and Maxwell learned of this, they threatened Vanity Fair and the sisters to keep them silent. Compl. IN 75-76. + +![](_page_3_Picture_4.jpeg) + +Joshua I. Schiller, Esq. + +cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777895/EFTA02777895.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777895/EFTA02777895.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d159826bdcee0013bc3f52d01574cd578c5bdbbb --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777895/EFTA02777895.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -12, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777895", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "f5acfeabcfd5c193cadcb0f01b46e05e48257c6f263a66713b36d9faf0ea53d7", + "output_sha256": "e5608868cab6154b4f0e5cc276d5ae80a3f15bd3aded1a299b0878a390c901cf", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777899/EFTA02777899.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777899/EFTA02777899.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a915a524d7d6549a3bf4241b46780e2398e3f51c --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777899/EFTA02777899.md @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +X Plaintiff, : 19 Civ. 10475 (LGS) -against-DARREN INDYKE, et al., Defendants. : X ORDER + +LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, District Judge: + +WHEREAS, on March 19, 2020, Plaintiff filed a letter pursuant to this Court's order further addressing the availability of punitive damages against Defendants Indyke and Kahn, in their capacity as executors of the Estate of Jeffrey Epstein (Dkt. No 41); + +WHEREAS, on March 26, 2020, Defendants Indyke and Kahn filed a letter response (Dkt. No. 44); + +WHEREAS, on March 27, 2020, Defendant Maxwell filed a letter motion for conference regarding her proposed motion to dismiss (Dkt. No 46); + +WHEREAS, on April 3, 2020, Plaintiff filed a letter responding to Defendant Maxwell's letter motion for conference (Dkt. No 48); it is hereby + +ORDERED that a telephonic conference will be held on April 16, 2020, at 10:40 a.m. The Court will call the parties once the conference is ready to begin. The parties shall file a joint letter by April 14, 2020, providing the Court with one telephone call-in number for a conference call and, to the extent necessary, a passcode. The parties shall ensure they are all dialed into the conference call by the appointed conference time. + +The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to close the motion at Dkt. No. 46. + +Dated: April 6, 2020 New York, New York + +UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777899/EFTA02777899.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777899/EFTA02777899.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c3783d26b8cfc572d4fdca1b2fbdc48b24c214a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777899/EFTA02777899.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777899", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "60a90ef2790f4d6b57d90f59031efa20377b1eab4109518f0886d869732f04c8", + "output_sha256": "60a90ef2790f4d6b57d90f59031efa20377b1eab4109518f0886d869732f04c8", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777900/EFTA02777900.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777900/EFTA02777900.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..466e805e791da70dc4c45fe6d6b07538e046fbc6 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777900/EFTA02777900.md @@ -0,0 +1,219 @@ +UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK x + +4 + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +, + +Plaintiff, + +v. 19 CV 10475 (LGS) + +DARREN K. INDYKE, ET AL., + +Defendants. + +Before: + +x + +New York, N.Y. March 5, 2020 11:20 a.m. + +HON. LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, + +District Judge + +## APPEARANCES + +BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP Attorneys for Plaintiff BY: SIGRID S. MCCAWLEY SABINA NARIELLA + +TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP (NYC) Attorneys for Defendants Indyke/Kahn BY: BENNET J. MOSKOWITZ + +> SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 + +4 5 6 Sigrid McCawley. I am here on behalf of the plaintiff, I am with the law firm of Boies Schiller Flexner. I have here with me my colleague, Sabina Nariella. + +7 THE COURT: OK. Good morning. + +8 MS. NARIELLA: Good morning. + +9 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Good morning, your Honor. + +10 11 12 Bennett Moskowitz, from Troutman Sanders. I represent Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, and both sectors of the estate of Jeffrey Epstein. + +13 THE COURT: Good morning. You may be seated. + +14 15 16 17 I understand that Ghislaine Maxwell appeared yesterday through counsel but that was yesterday and so, she is not represented here, but I'd like to proceed with the conference in any event. + +18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 So, we're here for a premotion conference on a motion to dismiss. Just as a little background, I referred the case for pretrial supervision to Judge Freeman. There are many other cases involving Mr. Epstein's estate that are also before Judge Freeman but the dispositive motions have not been referred and I understand that defendants would like to bring a motion to dismiss. As I understand it, the principle argument is the statute of limitations argument. + +(Case called) + +MS. MCCAWLEY: Good morning, your Honor. + +4 5 6 7 8 I guess what I'm trying to figure out is what is to be gained by filing it now? The reason I say that is because even if the claims are untimely -- and I don't know if they are the doctrines of equitable estoppel and equitable tolling could, nevertheless, save the claims and make them timely and that is very fact specific, or early in the case I presumed there will be factual issues around those questions and so, why get into a motion to dismiss now? + +9 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Thank you, your Honor. + +10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 so, of course, anticipating the argument which you just referenced and was one of many made in response to our premotion letter that, well, hold on. We're alleging that there are equitable estoppel and therefore, you have to at least have discovery. Well, I've researched the issue and it's not always the case and it's not the case here. There are plenty of cases which I've briefed before other judges who are handling some of these other cases, including one of Boies Schiller's cases, a plain decision where the Court said, no, I've read the complaint. + +20 21 22 23 24 25 The case law is very clear here. These are not mild doctrines. They require very compelling, exceptional circumstances. Here, they are not even alleged. And, actually, here as opposed to some of the others where I have to stop there and say they didn't allege that, I want to say the opposite. They allege that -- and I know as a matter of + +4 5 6 7 8 9 10 judicial notice, the article they're talking about is a 2003 Vanity Fair article. They allege that back in 2003 the plaintiff went and told her story to Vanity Fair. Well, if she had the wherewith all to do that, I don't see how she could plausible claim now that she wasn't aware of her rights. She was sleeping on them, et cetera. It's certainly nothing that would toll them for the nearly two decades now that we're here dealing with. So, I do think this is a different kind of case, not the garden variety, II, we have to see what happened here, equitable estoppel. So, that's, one thing. + +11 12 13 14 15 I am also very concerned about the scope of discovery as opposed to other counsel have taken a different track in these cases. I understand Boies Schiller has a somewhat different view that there could be, what I view is rather extensive discovery, and I'd like to take the opportunity + +16 17 THE COURT: Let's not get into discovery just yet, if you don't mind. + +18 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Sure. + +19 20 THE COURT: Let me hear from the plaintiff on the equitable estoppel issue. + +21 MS. MCCAWLEY: Thank you, your Honor. + +22 23 24 25 Yes, if there were ever a case for equitable estoppel, it is this case. As you've probably learned from looking at the complaint, Jeffrey Epstein was a monster who perpetrated crimes for over 20 years against young females. Those crimes, + +4 + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +as we've alleged in the complaint, included death threats, intimidation, harassment, all of which go toward our claim that they should be equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defenses. + +The Carelock case which we cite in our letter goes directly to this issue. It is this circumstance where equitable estoppel is most appropriate. And you are correct that discovery will bear on these issues, and at that later point -- + +THE COURT: -- specifically, what you will uncover in discovery or what the defendant will uncover in discovery that will inform the motion? + +MS. MCCAWLEY: Well, as you may not know because I know you are new to this case, but in the past when Jeffrey Epstein was alive he asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege. So, in any of those cases that have proceeded there was not discovery directly from the defendant. He can no longer avail himself of that privilege. So, we are now going to be embarking and finally getting the documents that would show his internal communications, whether they be with Maxwell, the other defendant, their collaborative scheme to intimidate and harass not only but her sister, , as well with these death threats back from 1995 on. So, this was an ongoing scheme to keep them quiet to make sure that they didn't talk, to make sure that they didn't bring claims, et + +4 cetera. So, it's only now that these claims are timely, now that these women feel comfortable enough to be able to come forward to the Court. He's gone. He can't hurt them at this point and that's why we're here now. + +5 6 7 8 9 10 THE COURT: OK. So, what I'm going to do is I am going to ask you to hold off on the motion to dismiss. I can't tell you not to file it but I would suggest that you hold off. If you do file it, I'm not going to decide it any time soon. I don't think it would be useful for you to file it in that case. So, I'd ask you just wait. + +11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 The one thing that I would like to discuss briefly is the issue of punitive damages. The defendant says that, first of all, it is quite early in the case to be talking about punitive damages. But the defendant says that as a matter of law, neither New Mexico, nor New York permits punitive damages against a tort feasor's estate. What I'd like the plaintiffs to do is just to take a look at the law. And if it seems as though that is quite clear, then just amend your complaint so that or even just write a letter at this point. You don't have to formally amend it because I don't want to revive the whole answer/motion process again. But just write a letter and file it saying what your position is with respect to punitive damages. And if you could do that within two weeks, that would be great. + +25 MS. MCCAWLEY: Of course, your Honor. + +Thank you. + +THE COURT: And with respect to the discovery, that's 4 really all Judge Freeman's bailiwick. So, I'm not going to address that. + +5 6 Is there anything else that is appropriate to address before me? No. + +7 OK. Thank you. We are adjourned. + +a (Adjourned) + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777900/EFTA02777900.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777900/EFTA02777900.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3403b294004afb5fe5acf7d0eee31fd1b8a165b9 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777900/EFTA02777900.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777900", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "4f9b58b280b86a18411e53a50d8616b850502468e18b2eae2faa2b0dc3867bab", + "output_sha256": "4f9b58b280b86a18411e53a50d8616b850502468e18b2eae2faa2b0dc3867bab", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777907/EFTA02777907.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777907/EFTA02777907.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3f86cd39693d439880fd93a08b65825d1046d47b --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777907/EFTA02777907.md @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +USA / Plaintiff(s) + +Case No.: 19CV10475 + +DARREN K. INDYKE, ET + +Defendant(s) + +## NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT + +Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a)NFEREN( held on has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above-captioned matter. + +3/5/2020 + +Redaction responsibilities apply to the attorneys of record or pro se parties, even if the person requesting the transcript is a judge or a member of the public or media. + +The parties have seven (7) calendar days from the date of filing of this NOTICE to file with the court any NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION of this transcript. A copy of said NOTICE must also be served on the court reporter. If no such NOTICE is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after ninety (90) calendar days. + +This process may only be used to redact the following personal data identifiers: Social Security numbers; dates of birth; minors' names; and financial account numbers. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2, and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 49.1. Parties wishing to request redaction of other information may proceed by motion. + +I (we) certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the aboveentitled matter. + +/s SONYA KETT + +Court Reporter/Transcriber Date \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777907/EFTA02777907.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777907/EFTA02777907.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..00e188c14dc09af94b8881fe50d72a94b820d158 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777907/EFTA02777907.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777907", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "7c15ea6bd17db18a20c1674bab7909ed9076f398c274a2f641026af53796bc3c", + "output_sha256": "7c15ea6bd17db18a20c1674bab7909ed9076f398c274a2f641026af53796bc3c", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777908/EFTA02777908.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777908/EFTA02777908.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f682e772f0e123f21198afb4115451cac2feedd6 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777908/EFTA02777908.md @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +## In the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York + +Case No. 19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF + +Plaintiff, v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN and GHISLAINE MAXWELL + +Defendants. + +## NOTICE + +Pursuant to the Court's April 6, 2020 Order, DE #49, the parties hereby provide notice of the following dial-in number for the telephone conference on April 16, 2020 at 10:40 a.m. EST: + +> US TOLL FREE: 1-800-240-1720 PASSCODE: 51629058 # + +Dated: April 14, 2020. + +Respectfully submitted, + +/s/ Laura A. Menninger + +Laura A. Menninger (LMS -B + +HADDON, AND P.C. + +150 East 10th Avenue + +Denver, CO 80203 + +Phone: 303.831.7364 + +Fax: 303.832.2628 + +Imenninger@hinflaw.com + +Attorney for Ghislaine Maxwell + +## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE + +I hereby certify that on April 14, 2020, I electronically served the foregoing with the clerk of the court using the CM/ ECF system which will send notification to all counsel of record including the following: + +Sigrid McCawley BOWS SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP 401 E. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1200 Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301 SMcCawley@bsfilp.com + +Joshua I. Schiller Andrew Villavastin Sabina Mariella BOWS SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP 55 Hudson Yards New York, NY 10001 jischiller@bsfllp.com avillavastin@bsfllp.com smariella@bsfllp.com + +Bennet J. Moskowitz TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 875 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022 bennet.moskowitz@troutman.com + +Molly S. DiRago TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 227 W. Monroe Street, Suite 3900 Chicago, IL 60606 Molly.dirago@troutman.com + +s/ Nicole \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777908/EFTA02777908.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777908/EFTA02777908.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b05db5742b972f591025ddcc61bc9c8a181f5794 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777908/EFTA02777908.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777908", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "689c9afd89a1844752e74c3a868880f160f7ca329c2fd1ac97df3cf60592b927", + "output_sha256": "689c9afd89a1844752e74c3a868880f160f7ca329c2fd1ac97df3cf60592b927", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777910/EFTA02777910.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777910/EFTA02777910.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9aa3dc0f664d6aee0fa6066b36a625830c696d69 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777910/EFTA02777910.md @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +X Plaintiff, : 19 Civ. 10475 (LGS) -against-DARREN INDYKE, et al., Defendants. : X ORDER + +LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, District Judge: + +WHEREAS, a telephonic conference was held on April 16, 2020. As discussed at conference, it is hereby + +ORDERED that, by April 23, 2020, Defendant Maxwell shall file a letter to inform the Court whether she intends to move to dismiss the Complaint, or whether she intends to file an answer. The letter shall include a proposed filing date for the answer, or a joint proposed briefing schedule for the motion. + +Dated: April 16, 2020 New York, New York UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777910/EFTA02777910.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777910/EFTA02777910.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..03cbe72b29efb31d94aec8e5fb58edaa8bc54428 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777910/EFTA02777910.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777910", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "6292381e99eb5d3f641482fa2e2ca81105b176b45e287f372d2afc1db0a9652b", + "output_sha256": "6292381e99eb5d3f641482fa2e2ca81105b176b45e287f372d2afc1db0a9652b", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777911/EFTA02777911.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777911/EFTA02777911.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7390f66843f8d3ae7630492fef4c1a83e8eec07a --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777911/EFTA02777911.md @@ -0,0 +1,249 @@ +UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK x + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +Plaintiff, New York, N.Y. v. 19 CV 10475 (LGS) + +DARREN K. INDYKE, RICHARD D. KAHN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, + +Defendants. x Teleconference April 16, 2020 11:30 a.m. + +Before: HON. LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, District Judge + +## APPEARANCES + +BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER, LLP Attorneys for Plaintiff BY: SIGRID S. McCAWLEY SABINA MARIELLA TROUTMAN SANDERS, LLP Attorneys for Defendants Indyke and Kahn BY: BENNET J. MOSKOWITZ MOLLY S. DiRAGO + +HADDON, , P.C. Attorneys for Defendant Maxwell BY: LAURA A. MENNINGER + +> SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 + +4 5 THE DEPUTY CLERK: This is in the matter of 19 CV 10475, v. Indyke, et al. + +6 7 8 Before we begin, I'd like to remind the parties of several rules and restrictions that are in effect due to the novel coronavirus. + +9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 First, while members of the public and the press, which I know we have both of here, have a presumptive access to proceed either live or telephonically, recording or broadcasting of this proceeding is still prohibited by the policy of the Judicial Conference of the United States. Violation of these prohibitions may result in sanctions, including removal of court-issued media credentials, restricted entry to future hearings, denial of entry to future hearings, or any other sanction deemed necessary by the Court. + +18 19 20 Second, as we have a court reporter present, I am going to ask counsel to please state your name before you speak each time you speak. + +21 We're here before the Honorable Lorna G. Schofield. + +22 23 THE COURT: Good morning. So, give me just one second. I want to look at something. + +24 Who will be speaking for plaintiff? + +25 MS. McCAWLEY: Good morning, your Honor. This is + +THE COURT: Good morning, counsel. + +MS. McCAWLEY: Good morning, your Honor. + +MS. MENNINGER: Good morning. + +4 THE COURT: Thank you. Ms. Menninger, I presume you'll be speaking on behalf of Ms. Maxwell? + +5 MS. MENNINGER: Good morning. Yes, that is correct. + +6 7 8 9 THE COURT: And I don't anticipate that I'll need to hear from the other two defendants. But, I know that Ms. DiRago and Mr. Moskowitz are also on phone and prepared to speak if necessary. Is that right? + +10 11 12 MR MOSKOWITZ: Yes. Good morning, your Honor. Bennet Moskowitz here. I'll be speaking on behalf of defendants Indyke and Kahn as co-executors. + +13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 THE COURT: Thank you. We're here with respect to a premotion letter that was filed by defendant Maxwell. She was not represented and present at the last conference we had to discuss the proposed motion to dismiss by the other defendants. And as you all know, I suggested that I didn't think it would be a very good use of anyone's time to pursue that motion. And the defendants, taking my suggestion, have filed an answer, of course without prejudice to their filing a motion to dismiss on the pleadings at some point if it becomes necessary to do that. + +22 23 24 25 So I've reviewed the letter from defendant Maxwell's counsel, and this particular motion doesn't strike me as any more meritorious. Just quickly, the suggestion that there's lumping going on is not like the cases that I have seen where + +Sigrid McCawley from Boies, Schiller & Flexner, and I'll be speaking on behalf of + +4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Plaintiff has clarified that the allegations here, first of all, there are individual allegations against Ms. Maxwell. There are allegations against Ms. Maxwell and Mr. Epstein both, in instances where both of them are alleged to have taken some action. And the complaint doesn't strike me as being guilty of the plaintiff lumping that usually results in an order to be more specific. + +11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 As for the argument about striking allegations, I'm always puzzled when I see something like that, because, frankly, apart from any answer or motion, those allegations will never see the light of day again. I don't give the complaint to the jury. The point of the complaint is really to apprise the defendants of what the nature of the claims are. These periodicals or statements that are referenced may not likely -- will not be admissible at any trial. As for the truth of the underlying statements, if there is some way to get in those assertions, that obviously is a question of proof and evidence, and we would cross that bridge when we come to it. I don't think there is anything to be gained by striking allegations. + +24 25 In terms of venue, it seems to me that the matters alleged are alleged to be in the Southern District of New York + +there is true lumping, and that is that every allegation has as the subject of the sentence "the defendant" without making any distinction between them. + +or at least in the State of New York as well as in New Mexico. And on that basis, without regard to Ms. Maxwell's residence, it seems to me that venue is proper. + +4 5 6 7 And with respect to the statute of limitations, as I said in the last conference, it strikes me that that question raises a host of factual issues, and it would be better resolved after some discovery. + +8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 This is not a ruling. This is just my impression of the motion. It seems to me, given that, that it's not, as I said, a good use of anybody's time for us to pursue this motion. Having said that, I can't prohibit you from filing such a motion. I would think, though, that it would serve your client's interest if you have affirmative defenses to get them on file so that, in the course of discovery, you can get information that relate to your affirmative defenses. + +16 17 18 19 20 So, those are my thoughts. You don't have to respond to it. You can certainly think about what you'd like to do. But, what I would like is an answer. I'd like you to file a letter -- well, let me just back up. I'd like you to file a letter or an answer. + +21 22 If you were to file an answer, when would you be prepared to do that? + +23 24 25 MS. MENNINGER: Your Honor, this is Laura Menninger on behalf of Ms. Maxwell. And if the Court is willing, I would like to impress upon the Court a couple of differences as + +4 + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +between a motion to dismiss brought by the Estate versus by Ms. Maxwell. + +But to answer your question, your Honor, I believe plaintiff's deadline to amend their complaint is April 30. So I would ask for two weeks after their amended complaint to file an answer, if there is one. If not, I could file one shortly after that deadline has passed. + +THE COURT: Okay. + +MS. MENNINGER: If I wasn't going to file a motion to dismiss. + +But, your Honor, I would still -- I do believe that there are very good grounds to file one on behalf of Ms. Maxwell that are different from what the Court has already elaborated on with regard to Mr. Epstein's motion to dismiss. + +THE COURT: Okay. I'll hear you. + +MS. MENNINGER: Your Honor, with all due respect, the allegations concerning Ms. Maxwell are very different in the complaint from those concerning Mr. Epstein. In the first place, the plaintiff alleges she never even met Ms. Maxwell until she was in New Mexico. And in New York, a cause of action as to Ms. Maxwell accrued outside of New York. New York's definition on accrual is very specific, and it calls for where the injury occurred or where the damages occurred. Here, according to the complaint, that was in New Mexico, with respect to Ms. Maxwell. + +Because plaintiff is not a New York resident, and she has a cause of action that accrued, she claims, outside of New York, under the New York State borrowing statute she has to abide by the shorter of two statutes of limitations. Either, that in New Mexico, or the New York statute. So -- + +4 + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +THE COURT: Ms. Menninger, I'm sorry, I am going to interrupt you only because I have a conference after this one that was scheduled for some time ago. And I know that's not your fault because I got to this conference a little bit late. The conferences are all taking a little longer. + +But, what I perceive is that you are telling me the arguments that were in your letter, which I read, and I take seriously. My view, though, is that I'm not prejudging this in the sense that if a motion were filed, I would obviously read the motion papers and decide on the motion papers. But I am telling you my reaction to your arguments, having read your letter as well as having read the plaintiff's letter. + +So, if you don't mind, I'm sorry to be rude and interrupt you, but I am going to do that just in the interest of time. + +So, what I would like then is I would like for you to give me a letter within a week telling me whether or not you have determined to answer or whether you will pursue the filing of your motion. And if you have determined to answer, then make an application for when your answer would be due, since + +4 5 6 MR MOSKOWITZ: Your Honor, this is Bennet Moskowitz. Sorry, go ahead. I apologize. I wasn't clear if the Court was addressing everyone. Go ahead, Ms. Menninger. + +7 8 9 10 11 12 MS. MENNINGER: Your Honor, this is Laura Menninger again for Ms. Maxwell. Would it be possible for me to provide that letter to your Honor after the plaintiff has amended their complaint on April 30? Or to know in advance whether they intend to amend the complaint? Because it strikes me as difficult to ascertain. + +13 14 THE COURT: Do the plaintiffs know whether they plan to amend? + +15 16 17 MS. McCAWLEY: Your Honor, this is Sigrid McCawley on behalf of . At this point we don't intend to amend our complaint. + +18 THE COURT: Okay. So can we rely on that? + +19 MS. McCAWLEY: Yes, your Honor. + +20 21 22 23 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. So, given that, why don't you just let me know, Ms. Menninger, when you would like to answer in your letter, letting me know whether you're answering or filing a motion. + +24 MS. MENNINGER: Thank you, your Honor. + +25 THE COURT: Thank you, everyone. Be well and be safe. + +you already filed your premotion letter, and then we'll take it from there. + +Is there anything else we need to discuss? \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777911/EFTA02777911.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777911/EFTA02777911.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1c266f04b351cf053954f2010fe8e90b292753d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777911/EFTA02777911.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777911", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "25a15f8db1d4f500fee788d76ca649155b2054431380651e1851ee899639cc29", + "output_sha256": "25a15f8db1d4f500fee788d76ca649155b2054431380651e1851ee899639cc29", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777919/EFTA02777919.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777919/EFTA02777919.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..739ff0c24cdc447c7eb14cc7fd1dc98d1e27d0d7 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777919/EFTA02777919.md @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT +FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +[REDACTED], +USA / Plaintiff(s) + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE +Defendant(s) + + +Case No.: 19 CV 10475 + +NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT + +)NFERENC held on 4/16/20 + +Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above-captioned matter. + +Redaction responsibilities apply to the attorneys of record or pro se parties, even if the person requesting the transcript is a judge or a member of the public or media. + +The parties have seven (7) calendar days from the date of filing of this NOTICE to file with the court any NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION of this transcript. A copy of said NOTICE must also be served on the court reporter. If no such NOTICE is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after ninety (90) calendar days. + +This process may only be used to redact the following personal data identifiers: Social Security numbers; dates of birth; minors' names; and financial account numbers. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2, and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 49.1. Parties wishing to request redaction of other information may proceed by motion. + +I (we) certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter. + +REBECCA FORI + +Court Reporter/Transcriber + +\_\_\_\_\_ +Date \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777919/EFTA02777919.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777919/EFTA02777919.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a9b3181ee0b37738f3135bf33167eb9116d0104a --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777919/EFTA02777919.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -42, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777919", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.running-headers\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "1d67b14bad54f2789c3cec87cd583e9b1072985af091b12c013c276ebb9d0c8d", + "output_sha256": "011044b929eaccbea0a06d79c26acacfbf2078a4c21ad0e1868168ad631d0beb", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777920/EFTA02777920.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777920/EFTA02777920.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..15a3c6224c9505d7df21837088dbcc90bcefb7cd --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777920/EFTA02777920.md @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +April 23, 2020 + +VIA ECF + +Hon. Lorna G. Schofield United States District Judge Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse 40 Foley Square New York, New York 10007 + +> Re: 19-cv-10475 (LGS-DCF), v. Darren. Indyke, et at + +Haddon, and e c Laura A. Menninger + +150 Eost 10th Avenue Denver. Colorado 80203 PH 303.831.7364 DC 303.832.2628 www.hmflow.com Imenningerehmflow.com + +Dear Judge Schofield: + +Pursuant to this Court's directive at the conference held on April 16, 2020, I write to advise the Court that Ms. Maxwell intends to file a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12. + +While the defenses we intend to raise by pm-answer motion may be asserted and preserved in an answer, we respectfully submit that it promotes efficiency and conserves the parties' resources for Ms. Maxwell to assert some defenses now, e.g., meritorious arguments that one or more claims are legally deficient or venue is improper. + +Counsel respectfully suggests a briefing schedule wherein the Motion is filed by May 14, plaintiff responds by June 4, and the reply is due June 18. + +Respectfully Submitted, + +C. Laura A. Menninger + +CC: Counsel of Record via ECF \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777920/EFTA02777920.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777920/EFTA02777920.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a7a7332d21d6f43683d4376a42e08bd89704c0e4 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777920/EFTA02777920.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777920", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "cec109fc98b2e8b59183eafaddf3ffc3ce3b37efa7c258060dd5a70fdf3df4ae", + "output_sha256": "cec109fc98b2e8b59183eafaddf3ffc3ce3b37efa7c258060dd5a70fdf3df4ae", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777921/EFTA02777921.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777921/EFTA02777921.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..907ae77648f81e71e6d9d6234bb0a474b3e41fd5 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777921/EFTA02777921.md @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +April 23, 2020 + +VIA ECF + +Plaintiffs shall file a letter by April 28, 2020, consenting to or proposing any suggested amendments to Defendant Maxwell's proposed briefing schedule. + +Dated: April 24, 2020 New York, New York + +Hon. Lorna G. Schofield United States District Judge Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse 40 Foley Square New York, New York 10007 + +> Re: 19-cv-10475 (LGS-DCF), v. Darren. Indyke, et at + +LORI A G. SCHORE UNITED STATES DISTIUCT JUDGE + +Dear Judge Schofield: + +Pursuant to this Court's directive at the conference held on April 16, 2020, I write to advise the Court that Ms. Maxwell intends to file a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17. + +While the defenses we intend to raise by pm-answer motion may be asserted and preserved in an answer, we respectfully submit that it promotes efficiency and conserves the parties' resources for Ms. Maxwell to assert some defenses now, e.g., meritorious arguments that one or more claims are legally deficient or venue is improper. + +Counsel respectfully suggests a briefing schedule wherein the Motion is filed by May 14, plaintiff responds by June 4, and the reply is due June 18. + +Respectfully Submitted, + +C. Laura A. Menninger + +CC: Counsel of Record via ECF \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777921/EFTA02777921.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777921/EFTA02777921.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..aa6ca7e800a0ef125c35cf3eda86b3829e34c46b --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777921/EFTA02777921.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777921", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "5e1f24794bd31592eab0fd624d003508d7c9b22e362fa18c2a34285242fe00ec", + "output_sha256": "5e1f24794bd31592eab0fd624d003508d7c9b22e362fa18c2a34285242fe00ec", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777922/EFTA02777922.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777922/EFTA02777922.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..846b444fa23c0282ebc923ded7d42c5b17420117 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777922/EFTA02777922.md @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +April 28. 2020 + +## VIA ECF + +The Honorable Lorna G. Schofield District Court Judge United States District Court Southern District of New York 40 Foley Square New York, NY 10007 + +> Re: v. Indyke, a at, Case No. 19 Civ. 10475 (LGSI + +Dear Judge Schofield, + +I write on behalf of Plaintiff in response to the Court's April 24, 2020, order. Dkt. 57. Plaintiff respectfully requests 30 days after the filing of Maxwell's anticipated motion to dismiss to file her opposition. Using Maxwell's proposed May 14, 2020, date for filing her motion, Plaintiff requests that her opposition be due on June 15, 2020, and that any reply be due on June 29, 2020. + +Sincerely, + +/s/ Sigrid McCawley + +Sigrid S. McCawley, Esq. + +cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777922/EFTA02777922.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777922/EFTA02777922.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..717ccd36ba7574d1fbf7104f26d6d26c5b0c80d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777922/EFTA02777922.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777922", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "70794fac00a0eba7b3a679642b0355cc8111ff4dd1728cec45a51d7b5a8d5fdb", + "output_sha256": "70794fac00a0eba7b3a679642b0355cc8111ff4dd1728cec45a51d7b5a8d5fdb", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777923/EFTA02777923.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777923/EFTA02777923.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e2317a1c23e8582ffba56f76d151ec66d5e0a7ae --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777923/EFTA02777923.md @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +#### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +MARY DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +-v- + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, as Executors of the Estate ofiefrey E. Epstein, and I + +Defendants. + +19 Civ. 10758 (PAE) + +#### OPINION & ORDER + +PAUL A. ENGELMAYER, District Judge: + +In this diversity action, plaintiff Mary Doe' brings tort claims under New York law against, inter alia, Dan-en K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, the executors of the estate of Jeffrey Epstein ("Indyke and Kahn" or "the executor defendants"). The executor defendants now move to dismiss Doe's claim against them for punitive damages, on the grounds that, as a matter of New York law, such damages are categorically unavailable in a personal injury action against the personal representative of an estate.2 For the reasons that follow, the Court grants that motion. + +### I. Background + +### A. Doe's Complaint + +Doe's Complaint, filed on November 20, 2019, alleges a horrific course of sexual and psychological abuse at Epstein's hands during 2004 and 2005. Cmplt. ¶¶ 1-15 (summary account); id. 11 38-106 (detailed account). It alleges that Doe came to the United States with her + +Doe has been granted leave to proceed pseudonymously. Dkt. 21. + +{sup}`2` Doe also sues who is alleged to have served as Epstein's scheduler and assistant. See Dkt. 1 (Complaint, or "Cmplt.") ¶ 19. Doe's bid for punitive damages against is not implicated by this motion. + +parents as a young refugee from a war-tom country, and was working in pursuit of a promising career as a model when, in 2004, at age 16, she met Epstein through another model. Id. ¶ 2. + +Epstein made clear to Doe how important and powerful he was and promised to help her with her modeling career and college admissions. Id. ¶ 3. Doe, in turn, "believed she could trust him" and "that he could change her life." Id. ¶ 4. Epstein, however, "used his power over Mary to sexually abuse her, viciously and repeatedly." Id. ¶ 5. Aided by defendant Epstein's scheduler and assistant, Epstein "would summon Mary to his Manhattan townhouse, order her to give him massages, and then subject her to sexual acts, the severity of which increased over time." Id.; see also id. ¶ 19. The Complaint graphically chronicles Epstein's acts of sexual abuse in the townhouse, which included forcing Doe to perform oral sex on him and later raping her. Id. ¶¶ 7-9; 56-105. + +In late 2005, the Complaint alleges, Doe—as a result of an incident at the townhouse— "suddenly saw the truth: she was not even a human being to Epstein, she was an object," and Epstein was treating her as a prostitute, "one of many girls he treated as sexual objects." Id. ¶ 11. Doe had a breakdown, almost immediately thereafter left New York City, returned to her parents' home across the country, and never saw Epstein again. Id. ¶ 12. Epstein's abuse caused Doe to abandon her modeling career and left her humiliated, angry, and suicidal, with debilitating panic attacks and "dramatic psychological scars." Id. ¶¶ 13-14. Epstein's arrest in July 2019 gave Doe "briefl] hope that he might finally face consequences," but his death in August 2019 at a federal jail in Manhattan "left Mary with the desolate sense that he has evaded justice yet again." Id. ¶ 15. + +In this action, Doe brings claims, under New York law, of battery, id. ¶¶ 108-13, assault, id. ¶¶ 114-19, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress, id. ¶¶ 120-27, against Indyke + +and Kahn, solely in their capacities as executors of Epstein's estate, id. 1 18, and against M, for her "integral role in operating Epstein's operation of sex trafficking Mary and other girls," id. 1 19. As its basis for personal jurisdiction over the executors, it alleges that "Epstein was subject to personal jurisdiction at the time of his death," id. 122, "because the tortious acts giving rise to Plaintiff's claims took place in New York State," id. 123. The Complaint seeks, in addition to compensatory damages and attorneys' fees and costs, "punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial." Id. p. 19. + +## B. The Executors' Partial Motion to Dismiss + +On January 21, 2020, the executor defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss, Dkt. 17, and a supporting memorandum of law, Dkt. 18 ("Def. Mem."). It sought dismissal of the prayer for punitive damages on the ground that such damages cannot, as a matter of New York law, be sought against the personal representatives of an estate. On March 3, 2020, Doe filed a memorandum of law in opposition, Dkt. 28 ("Doe Opp'n"), and a supporting declaration by Daniel Mullkoff, Esq., Dkt. 29 ("Mullkoff Decl."), which attached Epstein's will. On March 20, 2020, the executor defendants filed a reply. Dkt. 33 ("Def. Reply"). + +# II. Applicable Legal Standards Under Rule I .2( bX6) + +To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell AIL Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim will only have "facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. lqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint is properly dismissed where, as a matter of law, "the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558. When resolving a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Steginsky v. Xcelera Inc., 741 F.3d 365, 368 (2d Cir. 2014). That tenet, however, "is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Pleadings that offer only "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. + +#### III. Discussion + +In moving to dismiss Doe's prayer for punitive damages against them, the executor defendants argue that New York law applies to this personal injury action and categorically prohibits an award of punitive damages against the personal representatives of an estate. Specifically, they note, § 11-3.2(a)(1) of New York's Estates, Powers and Trusts Law ("EPTL") provides: + +No cause of action for injury to person or property is lost because of the death of the person liable for the injury. For any injury, an action may be brought or continued against the personal representative of the decedent, but punitive damages shall not be awarded nor penalties adjudged in any such action brought to recover damages for personal injury. + +EPTL § 11-3.2(a)(1) (emphasis added). + +Applying this statute, courts have held punitive damages unavailable in personal injury actions against executors or administrators of estates. These include federal courts determining the damages available for constitutional-tort claims under New York law, see, e.g., Graham v. , 224 F.R.D. 59, 63 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) (precluding, based on EPTL § 11-3.2(a)(1), punitive damages claims in § 1983 action against estate administrators, and noting that New York law is "very clear" on this point); Blissett v. Eisensmidt, 940 F. Supp. 449, 457 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (overturning, based on EPTL § 11-3.2(a)(1), jury's punitive damages award in § 1983 case against estate, and noting "strong policy against the assessment of punitive damages against an estate on account of wrongful conduct of the decedent"), and state courts in personal injury actions governed by New York law, see, e.g., v. Nathan, 352 N.Y.S.2d 464, 464 + +(1st Dep't. 1974) (affirming dismissal of punitive damages claim because, under EPTL § 11-3.2(a)(1), defendant's death precluded recovery of punitive damages from personal representatives of estate); cf. Flaum v. Birnbaum, 582 N.Y.S.2d 853, 857 (4th Dep't. 1992) (affirming denial of punitive damages in case against deceased executor; citing EPTL § 11-3.2(a)(1) and the "strong policy against the assessment of punitive damages against an estate on account of the wrongful conduct of the decedent"). + +The law of a majority of states is in accord with EPTL § I I-3.2(a)(1), as reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 cmt. a (1979) ("Punitive damages are not awarded against the representatives of a deceased tortfeasor[.]"); see also Doe Opp'n at 12 (acknowledging that "a majority of states do not permit punitive damages against estates"). This majority rule aligns with "[t]he general rule under federal common law," that "an action survives the death of a party insofar as it is remedial[,] and not penal[,] in nature." See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Exeter Holdings, Ltd. v. Mittman, No. 13 Civ. 5475 (JS) (AICT), 2017 WL 9485707, at \*7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2017) (collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 3981299 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2017). + +The justification commonly given for precluding punitive damage awards against estates is that punishment and deterrence—the recognized bases for imposing punitive damages on a tortfeasor—are not advanced by imposing punitive damages on his or her estate. As the New Mexico Supreme Court explained in adopting the majority rule: "[P]unishment and deterrence are not accomplished by enabling recovery of punitive damages from the estate of deceased tortfeasors"; "[w]hen the tortfeasor cannot be punished for his culpable behavior, punitive damages no longer have the desired effect and, therefore, the victim loses the legal entitlement to recover those damages." Jaramillo v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 871 P.2d 1343, 1351 (N.M. 1994) (canvassing laws of other states). + +Doe does not dispute that EPTL § 11-3.2(aX1) precludes punitive damages in a personal injury action under New York law. Instead, Doe makes three arguments: (1) that defendants' motion is premature, Doe Mem. at 4; (2) that defendants' motion is improperly styled as a motion to dismiss, id. at 3; and (3) that the law of the United States Virgin Islands ("USVI"), not New York law, applies, and permits punitive damages against an estate, id. at 4-13. + +Doe's first argument is quickly dispatched. Doe cites cases where courts have declined to resolve motions to dismiss aimed at prayers for relief, finding such motions premature. See id. at 4 (citations omitted). But a review of these cases reflects that the motions in those cases were not based on categorical preclusions of punitive damages. In contrast, where punitive damages have been unavailable as a matter of law, courts have not hesitated to dismiss prayers for such damages at the threshold. See. e.g., Murtha v. N.Y. State Gaming Comm 'n, No. 17 Civ. 10040 (NSR), 2019 WL 4450687, at \*19 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2019) (dismissing demand for punitive damages under the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL") because it "does not provide for punitive damages"); v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 18 Civ. 6670 (AT), 2019 WL 4039958, at \*9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2019) (granting motion to dismiss demand for punitive damages under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the New York City Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL") where neither statute permitted a plaintiff to recover punitive damages); Talarico v. Port Auth. ofN.Y. & N.J., 367 F. Supp. 3d 161, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (dismissing demand for punitive damages against Port Authority where "the Third Circuit and the overwhelming majority of district courts within this Circuit have held that punitive damages are not available against" that defendant (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Canete + +v. Metro. Transp. Auth., No. 17 Civ. 3961 (PAE), 2018 WL 4538897, at \*9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2018) (dismissing demand for punitive damages where such relief was "precluded as a matter of law"); Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Cm v. Gen. Reins. Corp., No. 16 Civ. 2063 (CM), 2016 WL 5793996, at \*6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2016) ("In this case, the circumstances surrounding the denial of the insurance indemnification claim do not warrant the rare exception provided for punitive damages under a breach of contract claim. For this reason, the Court grants Defendant's motion to dismiss the punitive damages claim."); SIB ex rel. Berkhout v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 03 Civ. 6653 (NRB), 2004 WL 1586500, at \*8 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2004) (dismissing punitive damages claim because such damages are unavailable in § 1983 actions against municipalities). Provided that New York law applies to this action, this case, too, involves a categorical preclusion of such damages, under EPTL § 11-3.2(a)(1), that can be adjudicated at the threshold. + +Doe's second argument is that the defendant-executors' challenge is improperly brought as a motion to dismiss. Doe Mem. at 3 & n.3. There is divided case authority on this point. Courts, including in the cases cited above, have granted motions to dismiss prayers for such relief. But others have declined to entertain such motions, stating that, "[b]ecause punitive damages are a form of damages, not an independent cause of action, a motion to dismiss a prayer for relief in the form of punitive damages is 'procedurally premature.' Farina v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 409 F. Supp. 3d 173, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting Hunter v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC, No. 16 Civ. 8779 (ER), 2017 WL 5513636, at \*9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2017)); see also, e.g., Wiederman v. Spark Energy, Inc., No. 19 Civ. 4564 (PGG), 2020 WL 1862319, at \*9-10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2020); v. City of New York, No. 18 Civ. 1937 (VSB), 2020 WL 1644009, at \*17 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2020); Range v. 535 Broadway Grp. LLC, No. 17 Civ. 423 (WHP), + +2019 WL 4182966, at \*7 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2017); Okyere v. Palisades Collection, LLC, 961 F. Supp. 2d 522, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). + +The Court has no occasion to resolve this conceptual debate, because the executors' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) alternatively can be treated as a motion to strike under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(0. See C. & A. =, 5C Federal Practice and Procedure § 1380 (3d ed.) ("[T]he technical name given to a motion challenging a pleading is of little importance inasmuch as prejudice to the nonmoving party hardly can result from treating a motion that has been inaccurately denominated a motion to strike as a motion to dismiss the complaint."). And under Rule 12(0, on a motion or sua sponte, a court may strike from a pleading an "insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Although motions to strike under Rule 12(f) are generally "disfavored and granted only if there is a strong reason to do so," News, L.L.C. v. Am. Media, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 2227 (PAC), 2013 WL 1746062, at \*3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Roe v. City of New York, 151 F. Supp. 2d 495, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)); see also Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp., 551 F.2d 887, 893 (2d Cir. 1976)), ample authority permits striking prayers for punitive damages where such relief is unavailable as a matter of law. See, e.g., In re Merrill Auction Rate Sec. Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 512, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (granting motion to strike sections of complaint asserting punitive damages, because pleadings did not meet high bar for punitive damages in non-fraud case of breach of fiduciary duty), aff'd sub nom. La. Pac. Corp. v. Merrill & Co., 571 F. App'x 8 (2d Cir. 2014); Cerveceria Modelo, S.A. de C.V. v. USPA Accessories LLC, No. 07 Civ. 7998 (HB), 2008 WL 1710910, at \*5-9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2008) (granting motion to strike prayer for punitive damages for failure to allege level of high moral culpability + +necessary to sustain punitive damages award in case involving fraud and deceit); Ladenburg Thalmann & Co. v. Imaging Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 176 F. Supp. 2d 199, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (granting motion to strike punitive damages because complaint did not allege, inter alit', egregious conduct sufficient to sustain such an award); Brady v. Port. Auth. ofN.Y. & No. 93 Civ. 1679 (NG) (CLP), 1998 WL 724061, at \*2-3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 1998) (granting motion to strike punitive damages claims on grounds that Port Authority was immune from such damages); Nash v. Comm Healthcare Corp., No. 96 Civ. 0298 (LMM), 1996 WL 363166, at \*4 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 1996) (granting motion to strike prayer for punitive damages because complaint did not allege facts sufficient to support such damages in breach of contract case). + +Here, there is practical wisdom in treating defendant's motion as one to strike, if doing so is necessary to enable the Court to resolve at the jump the viability of Doe's prayer for punitive damages. With numerous personal injury actions pending against the Epstein estate as a result of the recent enactment of the New York Child Victims Act, there is value in clarifying—for the parties and settlors—the damages available in actions where the law permits a sure answer on this point. + +Doe's final argument is that USVI, not New York, law governs whether punitive damages are available. Because this Court sits in New York, it applies a New York choice of law analysis to that question. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941); Md. Cas. Co. v. Conti Cas. Co., 332 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2003) ("A federal court sitting in diversity applies the choice-of-law rules of the forum state."). "Where, as here, the claims sound in tort, New York courts apply an `interest analysis' to determine choice-of-law issues." Golden v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 2841 (JS), 2013 WL 4500879, at \*1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2013). Under that analysis, punitive damages are considered to be conduct-regulating, and "the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred will generally apply." See, e.g., Starr Indem. & Liab. Co. v. Am. Claims Mgmt, Inc., No. 14 Civ. 0463 (JMF), 2015 WL 2152816, \*3 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2015) (quoting Guidi v. Inter-Conti Hotels Corp., No. 95 Civ. 9006 (LAP), 2003 WL 1907901, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16,2003)); Bauta v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., No. 14 Civ. 3725 (RER), 2019 WL 8060183, at \*10 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2019). Here, the tons alleged occurred entirely in New York. The personal injury claims which Doe's Complaint brings arise from sexual assaults and related conduct that, as alleged, occurred exclusively within New York City—in and around Epstein's Manhattan townhouse. + +Doe counters by noting that, while this rule applies as a general matter, it may be overcome if there is good reason not to apply it. Doe Mem. at 5 (citing Nat'lJewish Democratic Council v. Adelson, 417 F. Supp. 3d 416, 424-25 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)). In arguing that there is reason not to apply New York law to the punitive damages question here, Doe relies on the doctrine of depecage, under which courts may treat the choice of law analysis for one (or more) issues in a case—in this instance, the availability of punitive damages—as distinct from the rest of its analysis, here the applicability of New York law to Doe's tort claims for compensatory damages. Id.; see also 2002 R. Buchalter Alaska Tr. v. Phila. Fin. Life Assurance Co., 96 F. Supp. 3d 182, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. Ally Fin. Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7010 (DLC), 2012 WL 6616061, at \*5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2012). + +Doe argues that, although New York may have the greater interest in resolving issues relating to compensatory damages, the USVI, where the executors are domiciled and where Epstein's will is to be probated, has the greater interest as to punitive damages, which, unlike compensatory damages, are defendant-focused. Doe Mem. at 7—8. Doe does not argue that the executor-defendants themselves merit punishment or are in need of deterrence. Instead, Doe + +argues that Epstein's decision to alter his will shortly before his suicide to provide that it would be probated in the USVI was strategically motivated. She argues that his executors "should not be permitted to selectively avail themselves of certain benefits of USVI law but avoid those aspects of USVI law that they do not like." Id. at 7. + +The Court is unpersuaded. Whatever benefits Epstein envisioned for his estate by virtue of probating his will in the USVI, Doe does not articulate any relevant to this litigation. Other than conclusorily, Doe does not argue that the decision to probate Epstein's will in the USVI will have any adverse bearing on a personal injury action brought against the estate in New York that involves tortious conduct in New York. Doe does not argue, for example, that the probating of Epstein's will in the USVI stands to insulate his assets from recovery from such a plaintiff, or otherwise impede her or others victimized in New York from recovering on meritorious claims. Doe's point that the estate may prosper from being probated in the USVI is disconnected from her claims.3 + +More fundamentally, Doe does not articulate any concrete interest that the USVI has in either vindicating the rights of a victim sexually abused in a Manhattan townhouse in 2004 and 2005 or, specially relevant to punitive damages, in assuring that the perpetrator of that abuse is adequately punished and deterred. In contrast, the Second Circuit has noted the strong interest that New York has with respect to "conduct-regulating" rules, including regarding damages, with respect to unlawful behavior within its borders: + +"If conflicting conduct-regulating laws are at issue, the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred will generally apply because that jurisdiction has the greatest interest in regulating behavior within its borders." Cooney v. Osgood + +{sup}`3` If anything, the probating of the estate in the USVI may stand to benefit the estate's creditors, and thereby potentially Doe, to the extent that an estate probated in the USVI may avoid the high estate-tax rates imposed by New York State. + +Mach., Inc., 81 N.Y.2d 66, 72 (1993). In Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank SAL[,] ... we observed that, under New York law, when the jurisdictions of the conduct and injury are distinct, "it is the place of the allegedly wrongful conduct that generally has superior 'interests in protecting the reasonable expectations of the parties who relied on the laws of that place to govern their primary conduct and in the admonitory effect that applying its law will have on similar conduct in the future.' [739 F.3d 45, 50-51 (2d Cir. 2013)] (quoting [v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 189, 198 (1985)]) (alterations omitted). Here, the allegedly wrongful conduct .. . took place in New York .... We therefore conclude that New York's rules on fraud damages and negligent misrepresentation apply. + +AHW Inv. P'ship, MFS v. Citigroup, Inc., 661 F. App'x 2, 5 (2d Cir. 2016). New York's interest is also reinforced by the fact that Doe's suit is timely only by virtue of the state's recent enactment of the New York Child Victims Act, which temporarily revived time-barred suits. See Cmplt.1 107. + +That New York law governs the availability of punitive damages is further reinforced by Doe's having sued the executor defendants under EPTL § 11-3.2(a)(1). It is problematic for her to cherrypick within that provision, invoking the part that authorizes a personal injury suit against an executor while disclaiming the balance, which delimits the recovery available in such a suit.4 See Nissen, 940 F. Supp. at 457 ("[I]t would be an anomalous situation indeed if plaintiff were allowed to proceed with this [§] 1983 action against the estate of because of [§] I l-3.2(aX1), while at the same time he was allowed to recover relief in the form of punitive damages, which clearly is beyond the scope of relief which that statute authorizes."). Such a result is also inconsistent with the doctrine of depecage, where one forum's law is "applied to regulate certain issues arising from a given transaction or occurrence, while those of another system regulate the other issues." v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 492 F. Supp. 2d 308, 328 + +{sup}`4` Doe's claims undisputedly all qualify as personal injury claims. See N.Y. Gen. Constr. Law § 37-a. (defining "personal injury" as including "an assault, battery, false imprisonment, or other actionable injury to the person either of the plaintiff, or of another"). Doe does not argue otherwise. + +n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (emphasis added), aff'd sub nom. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 539 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2008). Here, Doe, in selectively drawing upon EPTL § 11-3.2(aX1), seeks to invoke depecage to apply two different sets of laws to a single issue. The doctrine does not invite such a result. + +Finally, Adelson, on which Doe relies in claiming that USVI law governs punitive damages, is inapposite. Adelson had brought an earlier action in this District for defamation, in breach of Nevada law, against the National Jewish Democratic Council and its chair (together, "NJDC"). Adelson, 417 F. Supp. 3d at 420-21. That action had been dismissed pursuant to Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute. NJDC then sued Adelson, seeking punitive damages under that same Nevada statute. Id. On Adelson's motion to dismiss the punitive damages prayer, Judge Oetken held that Nevada's interest was stronger than New York's as to punitive damages, because Adelson had brought the initial suit under Nevada law and because it had been dismissed under the Nevada SLAPP statute on which the NJDC now pursued punitive damages. He reasoned that "because the litigant has attempted to use Nevada's defamation law to chill First Amendment rights, Nevada has a corresponding interest in punishing the litigant for maliciously invoking Nevada law and in deterring future litigants from doing the same." Adelson, 417 F. Supp. 3d at 426 (citing =, 65 N.Y.2d at 198). Noting that "[p]unitive damages are designed to punish the defendant, not to compensate the plaintiff," Judge Oetken explained that "the choice-of-law inquiry for punitive damages provisions is necessarily defendant-focused" in this way. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Golden, 2013 WL 4500879, at \*3). By contrast, Judge Oetken concluded that New York's interest in the dispute was "relatively attenuated" and effectively limited to the fact that the suit was filed in federal district court in Manhattan where, notably, the claims were brought under Nevada + +defamation law. "After all, New York lacks a particularized interest either in protecting defendants from liability under Nevada defamation law or in controlling the behavior of litigants who file in the federal courts. And where the locus jurisdiction has a merely fortuitous relationship with the case, that jurisdiction's interest in the case is minimal." Id. at 426-27 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Doe's case in this District, in contrast to Adelson, does not build on a prior litigation in, or based on the law of, the USVI. + +In any event, the choice of law debate here appears academic. That is because, while the USVI does not have a statute on point and USVI courts have not squarely resolved the issue, it is likely that USVI common law would not permit an award of punitive damages against an estate. In 2011, the USVI Supreme Court instructed courts to apply what it terms a "Banks analysis" to determine USVI common law. This entails consideration of "three non-dispositive factors": (1) whether any USVI court has previously adopted a particular rule; (2) the position taken by a majority of courts of other jurisdictions; and (3) most importantly, which rule represents the soundest rule for the USVI. See Gov't of Virgin Islands v. M, 60 V.I. 597, 600 (2014); Matthew v. Herman, 56 V.I. 674, 680 (2012); Banks v. Intl Rental & Leasing Corp., 55 V.I. 967, 979 (2011). The parties differ as to how these factors apply, but the executors' assessment is the more persuasive. + +As to the first Banks factor, USVI courts have repeatedly cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 favorably. Twice, albeit in dicta, they have expressly quoted the language in comment (a) to § 908 that bars an award of punitive damages against the estate of a decedent tortfeasor. See v. Dowson Holding Co., 51 V.I. 619, 628 (D.V.I. 2009) ("Punitive damages are not awarded against the representatives of a deceased tortfeasor nor, ordinarily, in an action under a death statute." (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 cmt. a (1979)) + +(citing v. Atlas Motor Inn, Inc., 16 V.I. 367, 368-69 (D.V.I. 1979) (interpreting the Virgin Island's wrongful death statue, 5 V.I.C. § 76, to preclude punitive damages)); Booth v. Bowen, Civ. No. 2006-217 (CVG), 2008 WL 220067, at \*5 (D.V.1. Jan. 10, 2008) (same)5; see also Pappas v. Hotel on the Cay Time-Sharing Ass 'n, 69 V.I. 3, 15 n.8 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2015) (applying Banks analysis to hold that USVI courts would adopt Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908, and citing five USVI cases in accord); Powell v. Chi-Co's Distrib. Inc., No. ST-13-TOR-14, 2014 WL 1394183, at \*2 n.13 (V.1. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2014) ("Applying a Banks analysis, the Court finds that Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908(2) reflects the common law of this jurisdiction .... [C]onsidering the longstanding application of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908(2) in this jurisdiction and the apparent widespread application of this rule in a majority of jurisdictions, the Court finds that the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908(2) represents the soundest rule for the Virgin Islands, and is in accord with local public policy."). Doe has not cited any contrary authority. + +As to the second Banks factor, the parties agree that, consistent with the Restatement, most U.S. jurisdictions do not permit an award of punitive damages against a tortfeasor's estate. See, e.g., Crabtree a rel. Kemp v. Estate of Crabtree, 837 N.E.2d 135, 138 (hid. 2005) ("[t]he majority view denies punitive damages" from a deceased tortfeasor's estate); Jay Zitter, Annotation, Claim for punitive damages in ton action as surviving death of tortfeasor or person wronged, 30 A.L.R. 4th 707 (2020); 1 Punitive Damages: Law and Prac. 2d § 9:8 (2019 ed.) ("The prevailing view appears to be that punitive damages may not be recovered against the estate of a deceased wrongdoer."). Doe notes that some jurisdictions (like New York) have adopted this result by + +{sup}`5` The decisions in and Booth were dicta on this point, because the executor in each case was the plaintiff, not the defendant. + +statute while others have done so by court decision. Doe Mem. at 12. This distinction, however, does not appear germane to the Banks inquiry. + +As to the third Banks factor, the parties have not cited any evidence—beyond USVI courts having repeatedly cited Restatement § 908 with favor, including in the course of a Banks analysis—as to which rule would most soundly fit the USVI's interests. Beyond recognizing that USVI courts appear comfortable with the majority rule, the Court therefore cannot assign significant independent weight to this factor. Doe notes that the USVI's attorney general, in a separate lawsuit, is pursuing punitive damages against the Epstein estate based on alleged predations by Epstein in the USVI. See Mullkoff Decl. Ex. B ¶¶ 307-10. Doe further argues that because the only heir listed in Epstein's will—his brother Mark Epstein—allegedly knew or had constructive knowledge of Epstein's pattern of sexual abuse, it is just to deny him recovery from the estate by exposing the estate to punitive damages awards in cases such as hers. Doe Mem. at 11. But the decision by a government lawyer to attempt to obtain such damages in a high-profile case involving allegations of extreme conduct, or the alleged guilty knowledge of an heir in this case, do not speak to the question that the third Banks factor assays: which rule of law best durably serves the USVI's interests. The Court therefore has no basis to treats this Banks factor as countervailing, let alone outweighing, the first two. + +## CONCLUSION + +For the reasons above, the Court grants the defendant-executors' motion to dismiss the prayer for punitive damages against them. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion pending at docket 17. + +SO ORDERED. + +Dated: April 28, 2020 New York, New York + +PDAte A. Paul A. Engelmaye United States District Judge \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777923/EFTA02777923.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777923/EFTA02777923.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a53b3c266be8fc1cb3831be525f32602dd792c79 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777923/EFTA02777923.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -16, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777923", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "a520f86711774fdf2a8871291aad528934f77b06213cb598d33d33694f3e20b3", + "output_sha256": "523e19fb9c4f8bd0b9547a582059000a7df9d16520dbe707d6572970cf8091d0", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777940/EFTA02777940.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777940/EFTA02777940.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..58c687a745837ae44b9c953dc2a9614b5edb4b13 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777940/EFTA02777940.md @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +Troutman Sanders LLP 875 Third Avenue New York, New York 10022 + +troutman.com + +Bennet J. Moskowitz bennet.moskowitz@troutman.com + +April 28, 2020 + +Via ECF + +Hon. Lorna G. Schofield Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse 40 Foley Square New York, NY 10007 + +Re: 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF + +![](_page_0_Picture_3.jpeg) + +Dear Judge Schofield: + +We represent Defendants Darren'. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (together, the "Co-Executors"), in the above-referenced action. We write to supplement our submission dated March 26, 2020 (ECF Doc. 44) with the enclosed copy of the Opinion & Order entered today by The Hon. Paul A. Engelmayer in another personal injury action against the Co-Executors (Mary Doe v. Darren Ind ke and Richard D. Kahn, as executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, and , 19-civ-10758 (PAE) (DCF)). In His Honor's Opinion & Order, Judge Engelmayer grants the Co-Executors' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's punitive damages claim against them as a matter of law on grounds applicable to Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages in this action. + +Respectfully submitted, + +s/Bennet J Moskowitz Bennet J. Moskowitz + +cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777940/EFTA02777940.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777940/EFTA02777940.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a4e81bc7def3a9d73fec59628afb13ca412dfa90 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777940/EFTA02777940.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777940", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "7a9ce10a5789828a8349f85ca19875abace9255dc7b6e4a3eef378bd08cfc7cc", + "output_sha256": "7a9ce10a5789828a8349f85ca19875abace9255dc7b6e4a3eef378bd08cfc7cc", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777941/EFTA02777941.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777941/EFTA02777941.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d7c0b423d14df33ce2f9ee90ab1b5be2aa7936f2 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777941/EFTA02777941.md @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +Defendant Maxwell shall file any motion to dismiss, not to exceed twenty pages, by May 14, 2020. Plaintiff shall file any opposition, not to exceed twenty pages, by June 12, 2020. Defendant Maxwell shall file any reply, not to exceed eight pages, by June 26, 2020. + +The parties shall otherwise comply with the Court's Individual Rules in filing their motion papers. + +So Ordered. + +Dated: April 29, 2020 New York, New York UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE + +Re: I 9-cv- 10475 (LGS-DCF), v. Darren.. hzdyke, eta(. + +Dear Judge Schofield: + +Pursuant to this Court's directive at the conference held on April 16, 2020, I write to advise the Court that Ms. Maxwell intends to file a motion to dismiss under Fed R. Civ P. 12. + +While the defenses we intend to raise by pre-answer motion may be asserted and preserved in an answer, we respectfully submit that it promotes efficiency and conserves the parties' resources for Ms. Maxwell to assert some defenses now, e.g., meritorious arguments that one or more claims are legally deficient or venue is improper. + +Counsel respectfully suggests a briefing schedule wherein the Motion is filed by May 14, plaintiff responds by June 4, and the reply is due June 18. + +Respectfully Submitted. + +C Laura A. Menninger + +CC: Counsel of Record via ECF \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777941/EFTA02777941.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777941/EFTA02777941.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5d6da32425a9004f643cec7bfd067606ea75603c --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777941/EFTA02777941.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777941", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "fdbf54248d8aac24ceee9af73851686198fc39b795e37e9a5eea04bf7d18e2da", + "output_sha256": "fdbf54248d8aac24ceee9af73851686198fc39b795e37e9a5eea04bf7d18e2da", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777942/EFTA02777942.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777942/EFTA02777942.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3b1f10ece06a2c006a68e01af06663c70c5d43b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777942/EFTA02777942.md @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE 15, + +Plaintiff, + +-v- + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, as Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, + +Defendants. + +19 Civ. 10653 (PAE) + +## ORDER + +PAUL A. ENGELMAYER, District Judge: + +In this diversity action, plaintiff Jane Doe 15 ("Doe")' brings claims of battery, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as co-executors of the estate of Jeffrey Epstein. These claims arise from Doe's allegations of sexual trafficking and abuse perpetrated against her by Epstein in 2004, when she was age 15. Doe alleges that Doe visited Epstein's Manhattan townhouse in New York City, where Epstein's secretary photographed her and groomed her for future sexual exploitation; on Epstein's behalf, the secretary later invited Doe to visit Epstein at his ranch in New Mexico, and arranged Doe's visit. See Dkt. 1 ("Cmplt.")¶¶ 2-4,25-26,30-37. Epstein's sexual abuse of Doe occurred during the visit to the New Mexico ranch that ensued. Id. 5-6,41-69. + +The defendants have filed a partial motion to dismiss, directed solely at Doe's prayer for punitive damages. They argue that New Mexico law governs Doe's claims, and that under New Mexico law, punitive damages are unavailable in a personal injury action against the personal + +I Doe has been granted leave to proceed pseudonymously. Dkt. 22. + +representative of an estate. See Dkt. 18 (motion); Dkt. 19 (memorandum of law in support); Dkt. 34 (reply). Doe opposes that motion. Dkt. 29 (memorandum of law in opposition). + +The Court grants defendants' motion. The Court's analysis substantially tracks the analysis in a memorandum and opinion it issued earlier this week granting a motion seeking the same relief in another case in which a plaintiff has brought the same personal injury claims against the executors arising from sexual abuse Epstein allegedly perpetrated on her. See Mary Doe v. Indyke and Kahn, 19 Civ. 10758 (PAE) ("Mary Doe"); see id. Dkt. 38 ("Mary Doe Op.") (issued April 28, 2020). The Court here incorporates that decision by reference. + +In Mary Doe, Epstein's abuse was alleged to have occurred in his Manhattan townhouse. The Court noted that the New York statute that authorizes personal injury actions against the personal representative of the decedent precludes punitive damages in such actions, see Mary Doe Op. at 4 (citing New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law ("EPTL") § 11-3.2(a)(1)), and required dismissal of Mary Doe's prayer for such damages, id. at 4-6. The Court rejected Mary Doe's counter-arguments: that defendants' motion was premature, id. at 6-7, and improperly styled as a motion to dismiss, id. at 7-9, and that the law of the United States Virgin Islands ("USVI"), where Epstein's estate is being probated, applies, and permits punitive damages against an estate in such an action, id. at 9-16. As to the final argument, the Court noted that under New York choice-of-law rules, the substantive law of the location of the tortious conduct occurred generally applies as to punitive damages, and that there was no reason to depart from that rule here, id. at 9-14. In any event, the Court held, it is likely that, as a matter of common law, the USVI—like New York, the majority of states, and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908—would not allow imposition of punitive damages on a tortfeasor's estate, id. at 14-16. + +The parties in this case are represented by the same counsel as in Mary Doe, and make substantially the same arguments for and against dismissal. The one variation is that, because Epstein's abuse is alleged to have occurred at the New Mexico ranch, defendants argue that New Mexico law applies. See Dkt. 19 at 2-6; Dkt. 34 at 5—8. But that, defendants argue, does not change the result, because New Mexico common law as announced by the state supreme court, like EPTL § I I-3.2(a)(1), bars punitive damages in a personal injury action against a tortfeasor's estate. See Jaramillo v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 871 P.2d 1343, 1351-52 (N.M. 1994) (canvassing laws; noting that "punishment and deterrence are not accomplished by enabling recovery of punitive damages from the estate of deceased tortfeasors"; and adopting majority rule that "[w]hen the tortfeasor cannot be punished for his culpable behavior, punitive damages no longer have the desired effect and, therefore, the victim loses the legal entitlement to recover those damages"); see also Barbara R. as next friend of S.R. v. No. 03 Civ. 1225 (MCA) (WDS), 2006 WL 8443923, at \*28 (D.N.M. Sept. 30, 2006) (citing Jaramillo and noting that "[t]he rationale behind this rule is that 'to punish the estate ignores the central purpose of punitive damages, which is to punish the tortfeasor and to deter him from repeating the wrongful act"). Doe, for her part, does not dispute that New Mexico law mirrors New York law. Instead, in opposing dismissal, she makes the same three arguments as in Mary Doe. + +The Court again finds punitive damages unavailable as a matter of law and plaintiffs' counter-arguments unavailing. As to the third argument, relating to choice of law, unlike in Mary Doe, there is indeed room for debate about which jurisdiction's law applies. But the debate is between New York (where the grooming process began) and New Mexico (where the sexual abuse occurred). And under either state's law, imposition of punitive damages on the + +Epstein estate is squarely prohibited. Doe does not have any stronger argument than did Mary Doe that USVI law applies in her case, or, if it did, that it would permit such damages. + +The Court, accordingly, grants defendants' motion to dismiss the prayer for punitive damages. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion pending at Dkt. 18. + +SO ORDERED. + +Dated: April 30, 2020 New York, New York pa A. Paul A. Engelmaye United States District Judge \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777942/EFTA02777942.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777942/EFTA02777942.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4150a7f7b4e2edbb2033499d4f59f575402ecf07 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777942/EFTA02777942.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777942", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "85d16cde83ac2f848b9c99895834270ad8b11cc37d367817ac9525202544e7f6", + "output_sha256": "85d16cde83ac2f848b9c99895834270ad8b11cc37d367817ac9525202544e7f6", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777946/EFTA02777946.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777946/EFTA02777946.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2136c5935e571fa1c413226edb03edb5a2c1a382 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777946/EFTA02777946.md @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +Bennet J. Moskowitz bennet.moskowitz@troutman.com + +April 30, 2020 + +## VIA ELECTRONIC COURT FILING + +Hon. Lorna G. Schofield Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse 40 Foley Square New York, NY 10007 + +Re: =MB 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF + +Dear Judge Schofield: + +We represent Defendants Darren'. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (together, the "Co-Executors'), in the above-referenced action. We write to further supplement our submission dated March 26, 2020 (ECF Doc. 44) with the enclosed copy of the Opinion & Order entered today by The Hon. Paul A. Engelmayer in another personal injury action against the Co-Executors (Jane Doe 15 v. Darren.. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, as executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, 19-civ-10653 (PAE) (DCF)). In His Honor's Opinion & Order, Judge Engelmayer grants the Co-Executors' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs punitive damages claim against them as a matter of law on grounds applicable to Plaintiffs claim for punitive damages in this action. + +Respectfully submitted, + +s/Bennet J. Moskowitz Bennet J. Moskowitz + +cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777946/EFTA02777946.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777946/EFTA02777946.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f0ca7626502e6bd945f6c717c5e57357fd68a786 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777946/EFTA02777946.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777946", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "9596eea42d40f3d53c3b4473816c02545af8d3998e37e0b112415833173ae813", + "output_sha256": "9596eea42d40f3d53c3b4473816c02545af8d3998e37e0b112415833173ae813", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777947/EFTA02777947.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777947/EFTA02777947.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3a7ee68f255843422b645c789abac25d05e9fc52 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777947/EFTA02777947.md @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +April 30, 2020 + +## VIA ECF + +The Honorable Debra C. Freeman District Court Judge United States District Court Southern District of New York 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007 + +> Re: Annie Farmer v. Darren K. Indyke, et al., Case No. 19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF + +Dear Judge Freeman, + +I represent Plaintiff in the above-referenced action against Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (together, the "Co-Executors") and Ghislaine Maxwell (together with the Co-Executors, "Defendants," and Defendants together with Plaintiff, the "Parties"). In light of the ongoing pandemic and the various difficulties it has presented for all parties, I write with the consent of Defendants to request that the Court extend the remaining deadlines in the above-referenced action, as set by this Court's Order dated February II, 2020, by thirty (30) days, as follows: + +- the deadline for Plaintiff to file any motion to amend the pleadings or to join any additional parties be extended from April 30, 2020 to June 1, 2020; +- the deadline for the Parties to submit joint status reports to the Court, regarding discovery and the progress of settlement discussions, be extended from April 30, 2020 to June 1, 2020; +- the deadline for the completion of fact discovery be extended from June 10, 2020 to July 10,2020; +- the deadline for service of Plaintiffs expert reports be extended from June 10, 2020 to July 10, 2020; +- the deadline for service of the Defendants' rebuttal reports be extended from July 10, 2020 to August 10, 2020; and +- the deadline for the completion of expert discovery be extended from July 31, 2020 to August 31, 2020. + +Maxwell's position is as follows: + +"Ms. Maxwell has no objection to the 30 day extension proposed by the other parties. However, counsel for Ms. Maxwell submits that more than thirty (30) additional days will be necessary to complete discovery in this case. Ms. Maxwell is filing a Motion to Dismiss the claims against her on May 14, 2020 and intends to file a Motion to Stay Discovery for that and other reasons. Plaintiff has indicated a desire to schedule ten depositions and has disclosed a number of other witnesses which will require a number of depositions to be taken by the Defendants. Given the current shelter-in-place orders in New York and across the country, the associated travel difficulties, and scheduling complications for the witnesses and counsel, it is highly unlikely that such depositions can be completed by July 10, 2020." + +Plaintiff does not consent to more than a thirty-day extension of deadlines at this time, as the Parties can work to meet the proposed July 10 fact discovery deadline. If more time is necessary to complete depositions, the Parties may request another extension of deadlines in the beginning of July, which request could describe what discovery remains to be completed as of the date of that request. + +This is the first request for an extension of these deadlines. + +Sincerely, + +/s/ Sigrid McCawley + +Sigrid S. McCawley, Esq. + +cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777947/EFTA02777947.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777947/EFTA02777947.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3d9896df2f5eb78a05fd3e575d5883ebbd0bebd9 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777947/EFTA02777947.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777947", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "810ec2c220c5ccda878e09a71b11aafbcb04f2f62f813710d14c5c7498ace186", + "output_sha256": "810ec2c220c5ccda878e09a71b11aafbcb04f2f62f813710d14c5c7498ace186", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777949/EFTA02777949.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777949/EFTA02777949.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..54e601aa1698989f09c80c30310a2f5ebe3e160c --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777949/EFTA02777949.md @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +The parties are advised that the Court does not expect to deal with this issue imminently. The parties shall direct any motions to bifurcate discovery to Judge Freeman. + +So Ordered. + +Dated: May 1, 2020 New York, New York + +April 30, 2020 + +## VIA ELECTRONIC COURT FILING + +Hon. Lorna G. Schofield Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse 40 Foley Square New York, NY 10007 + +Re: , 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF + +UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE + +Dear Judge Schofield: + +We represent Defendants Darren'. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (together, the "Co-Executors'), in the above-referenced action. We write to further supplement our submission dated March 26, 2020 (ECF Doc. 44) with the enclosed copy of the Opinion & Order entered today by The Hon. Paul A. Engelmayer in another personal injury action against the Co-Executors (Jane Doe 15 v. Darren.. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, as executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, 19-civ-10653 (PAE) (DCF)). In His Honor's Opinion & Order Judge Engelmayer grants the Co-Executors' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs punitive damages claim against them as a matter of law on grounds applicable to Plaintiffs claim for punitive damages in this action. + +Respectfully submitted, + +s/Bennet J. Moskowitz Bennet J. Moskowitz + +cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777949/EFTA02777949.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777949/EFTA02777949.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..83b8b4b4bed24568e7033ef896329b38ed80a5d7 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777949/EFTA02777949.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777949", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "84cfdbbe0db10613ebd762c2abde16a238614764219764d19da536c7bc4deaa3", + "output_sha256": "84cfdbbe0db10613ebd762c2abde16a238614764219764d19da536c7bc4deaa3", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777950/EFTA02777950.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777950/EFTA02777950.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cf681fa377965f610498ed1c340dc83356632857 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777950/EFTA02777950.md @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +DARREN I. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, + +Defendants. + +CASE NO. 1:19-CV-10577-LJL-DCF + +## NOTICE OF APPEARANCE + +PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned attorney hereby appears as counsel for defendants Darren,. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as the Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, in the captioned action. I certify that I am admitted to practice in this Court. All notices given or required to be given in this case shall be served upon the undersigned. + +Dated: New York, New York. May 8, 2020 + +By: /s/Matthew J. Aaronson + +Matthew J. Aaronson TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 875 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022 212.704.6000 Matthew.Aaronson@troutman.com + +Attorneys or Defendants + +Darren. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as the Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein + +To: All Counsel of Record (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777950/EFTA02777950.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777950/EFTA02777950.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ca9251db6201f0cb90f4b072ac33fe5c2c3f7161 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777950/EFTA02777950.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777950", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "b76be44b7b7429989e40218b6bca3f1864d3faa5f4c253e6f18a2c02f0ccaf51", + "output_sha256": "b76be44b7b7429989e40218b6bca3f1864d3faa5f4c253e6f18a2c02f0ccaf51", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777951/EFTA02777951.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777951/EFTA02777951.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8a3955757bde6e6d08e03b07f089a4dd585195d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777951/EFTA02777951.md @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +DARREN I. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, + +Defendants. + +CASE NO. 1:19-CV-10475-LJL-DCF + +## NOTICE OF APPEARANCE + +PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned attorney hereby appears as counsel for defendants Darren,. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as the Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, in the captioned action. I certify that I am admitted to practice in this Court. All notices given or required to be given in this case shall be served upon the undersigned. + +Dated: New York, New York. May 8, 2020 + +By: /s/Charles L Glover + +Charles L. Glover TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 875 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022 212.704.6000 Charles.Glover@troutman.com + +Attorne s or Defendants + +Darren lndyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as the Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein + +To: All Counsel of Record (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777951/EFTA02777951.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777951/EFTA02777951.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..895681d58ecc3f7c7930d4127ddbf0ea026fce0c --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777951/EFTA02777951.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777951", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "707485ef628b77e935c0921ac71dc64dfed7e18ff39a84ac18f1c5857143c264", + "output_sha256": "707485ef628b77e935c0921ac71dc64dfed7e18ff39a84ac18f1c5857143c264", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777952/EFTA02777952.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777952/EFTA02777952.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..30c6eafdefbb3cdd7cf41366ad8b8797a0670557 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777952/EFTA02777952.md @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +DARREN I. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, + +Defendants. + +CASE NO. 1:19-CV-10475-LJL-DCF + +## NOTICE OF APPEARANCE + +PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned attorney hereby appears as counsel for defendants Darren I. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as the Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, in the captioned action. I certify that I am admitted to practice in this Court. All notices given or required to be given in this case shall be served upon the undersigned. + +Dated: New York, New York. May 8, 2020 + +By: /s/Valerie Sirota + +Valerie Sirota TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 875 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022 212.704.6000 Valerie.Sirota@troutman.com + +Attorneys or Defendants + +Darren. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as the Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein + +To: All Counsel of Record (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777952/EFTA02777952.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777952/EFTA02777952.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..88e1f75a4b91f887691558045677b23a9be82d6c --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777952/EFTA02777952.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777952", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "286d41e9be18d921bc37479de5559b4c18319378a206ccedba6ef632a59e35f7", + "output_sha256": "286d41e9be18d921bc37479de5559b4c18319378a206ccedba6ef632a59e35f7", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777953/EFTA02777953.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777953/EFTA02777953.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d13ad02d8404d78998a2f2e1a344e0a1fda5d4f6 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777953/EFTA02777953.md @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +May 13, 2020 + +VIA ECF + +Hon. Debra Freeman United States Magistrate Judge Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007-1312 + +> Re: 19-cv- 10475 (LGS-DCF), v. Darren K. Indyke, et al. + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +Haddon, and P.0 Laura A. Henninger + +150 East 10th Avenue Denver, Colorado 80203 Pti 303.831.7364 Fir 303.832.2628 www.hmflaw.com Imenningenthmflaw.com + +On behalf of defendant Ghislaine Maxwell, I write under Judge Schofield's Individual Rules and Procedures for Civil Cases III(A)(1) and this Court's Practices II(A) to request a pre-motion conference concerning our anticipated Motion to Stay Discovery under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c)(1). Counsel conferred in good faith with both Plaintiff and Defendant Co-Executors of the Estate. Plaintiff does not consent to a stay as indicated on a telephonic conferral conference on April 28. The Co-Executors of the Estate consent to the requested stay. + +Three separate and independent grounds justify a protective order staying discovery in this matter. + +First, Plaintiff intends to participate in the Voluntary Claims Resolution Program in the U.S. Virgin Islands (the "Program"), under which the Estate will make compensatory payments to alleged victims of Jeffrey Epstein. Plaintiffs who participate in the Program and accept payment will be required to release all former employees or potential indemnitees of the Estate, including Ms. Maxwell, from any and all claims or causes of action that concern acts of sexual abuse by Mr. Epstein. We understand that, if the Program is approved, it may begin making payments as early as August 2020. Hence, Plaintiff's participation in the Program, if successful, will render this lawsuit moot and will result in its dismissal with prejudice in a few short months. If unsuccessful, Plaintiff will be able to resume this litigation at that time. Other similarly situated plaintiffs, including Plaintiff's own sister represented by the same counsel, have agreed to stay their matters to preserve the parties' and the Court's judicial resources. According to the Complaint, Plaintiff's sister is a central witness to her claims. Plaintiff, however, who claims a + +May 13, 2020 + +Page 2 + +single encounter with Ms. Maxwell in 1996 in New Mexico, has asserted her plan to undertake a vast, broad course of discovery encompassing not just the 1996 allegation, but all documents spanning the past 24 years, deposing witnesses who have never met her and unearthing documents related to Epstein that do not touch on her claims. This course of discovery will impose undue burden and expense on ■ **well be wholly unnecessary in just a few months.** + +**Second, the U.S. Attorney's Office in the Southern District of New York has publicly and repeatedly announced its "ongoing" criminal investigation into alleged Epstein "co-conspirators" on the same topic as Plaintiff alleges in this case. Kashi v. Gratsos, 790 F.2d 1050, 1057 (2d Cir.1986) (citing SEC v. Dresser Industries, 628 F.2d 1368, 1375 (D.C.Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 993 (1980)) (holding that although "the Constitution ... does not ordinarily require a stay of civil proceedings pending the outcome of criminal proceedings ... a court may decide in its discretion to stay civil proceedings"). Denial of** a stay, particularly a stay of Ms. Maxwell's deposition, pending outcome of the criminal investigation could impair her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, extend criminal discovery beyond the limits set forth in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure I6(b), expose the defense's theory to the prosecution in advance of trial, or otherwise prejudice the criminal case. See In re Par Pharmaceutical, Inc., 133 F.R.D. 12, 13 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (citing Dresser, 628 F.2d at 1376). + +Third, Ms. Maxwell's Motion to Dismiss the claims against her is strong and warrants a stay of discovery pending its resolution. The claims against Ms. Maxwell are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Under New Mexico law, there is no revival of claims. N.M. Stat. §§ 37-1-8, 37-1-10. Even under New York law (which should not apply), unlike Mr. Epstein, Ms. Maxwell has not been charged with any criminal offense. There is neither an automatic revival of Plaintiff's claims under CPLR § 215(8) or CPLR § 214(g), nor any grounds for equitable estoppel, available to Plaintiff who had every opportunity over twenty-four years to relay her allegations to a Vanity Fair journalist, the police, the FBI, and her own therapist. Finally, because the entire allegation against Ms. Maxwell purportedly occurred in New Mexico, and no party to this lawsuit is a resident of New York, venue is improper in New York, requiring dismissal. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). + +At a minimum, for the above reasons, Ms. Maxwell intends to request that the Court stay her deposition and to bifurcate discovery related to the statute of limitations from the liability discovery. + +Ms. Maxwell believes that full briefing on these matters is appropriate and respectfully suggests a briefing schedule that encompasses one week for the filing of the Motion for Stay, one week for any response, and one week for a reply. + +Hon. Debra Freeman May 13, 2020 Page 3 Respectfully Submitted, + +-• Q Laura A. Menninger + +CC: Counsel of Record via ECF \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777953/EFTA02777953.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777953/EFTA02777953.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d1b9037b22a478f5d35817b06f7f6acd2edc4ae0 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777953/EFTA02777953.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777953", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "a13d50618d4554285d1a96da8e57aac2d68262f142616d87f3995358bbb5768a", + "output_sha256": "a13d50618d4554285d1a96da8e57aac2d68262f142616d87f3995358bbb5768a", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777956/EFTA02777956.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777956/EFTA02777956.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b61577a9ecc8e73dd0ea0d84039261f9e8394a0d --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777956/EFTA02777956.md @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +X + +Plaintiff, v. + +19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, + +Defendants. + +X + +## DEFENDANT GHISLAINE MAXWELL'S NOTICE OF MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT OR TO TRANSFER + +PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that upon the accompanying Memorandum of Law dated May 14, 2020, Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell will move this Court for an Order dismissing this case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 or in the alternative for an Order transferring the case against her to the District of New Mexico under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1406(a), 1404(a). + +Dated: May 14, 2020. + +Respectfully submitted, + +/s/ Laura A. Menninger Laura A. Mem.ir (LM-1374) HADDON, AND P.C. 150 East 10 Avenue Denver, CO 80203 Phone: 303.831.7364 Fax: 303.832.2628 lmenninger@hmflaw.com + +Attorney for Ghislaine Maxwell + +## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE + +I certify that on May 14, 2020, I filed Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell's Notice of Motion to Dismiss the Complaint or to Transfer with the Clerk of Court through CM/ECF, which will send notice of the filing to all parties of record. + +/s/ Nicole \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777956/EFTA02777956.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777956/EFTA02777956.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..74050e8e858ea6d90e1f4b962f10de907d3c8ac0 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777956/EFTA02777956.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777956", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "5a11759ca0a11150c8af6de22d67e0445684d58de375edfd185a46e70de15d90", + "output_sha256": "5a11759ca0a11150c8af6de22d67e0445684d58de375edfd185a46e70de15d90", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777958/EFTA02777958.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777958/EFTA02777958.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..970ccba07b15c527ae18d367ca3f0b3de38c79c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777958/EFTA02777958.md @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ +#### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +X + +Plaintiff, v. + +19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, + +Defendants. + +X + +MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT GHISLAINE MAXWELL'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR TO TRANSFER + +## Table of Contents + +| Table of Contents | ii | +| ------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ----- | +| Table of Authorities | iii | +| Introduction | 1 | +| Background | 1 | +| Argument | 4 | +| of limitations. | 4 | +| A. Standard of review | 5 | +| B. The complaint is untimely under both New Mexico and New York law | 5 | +| C. Plaintiff's claims cannot be revived under New York law. | 7 | +| i. CPLR § 215(8)(a) does not revive Plaintiff's untimely claims | 7 | +| ii.CPLR § 214-g does not and cannot revive Plaintiff's untimely claims | 8 | +| New Mexico. | 24 | +| Conclusion | 26 | +| Certificate of Service | 27 | + +## Table of Authorities + +## Cases + +| Am. Transit Ins. Co. v. Sartor, 814 N.E.2d 1189 (N.Y. 2004) | 9 | +| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------- | +| Ashcroft v. lqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) | 5 | +| Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) | 5 | +| Doe v. Hanford Roman Catholic Diocese Corp., 119 A.3d 462 (Conn. 2015) | 15 | +| In re London Silver Fixing, Ltd., Antitrust Litig., 332 F. Supp. 3d 885 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) | 5 | +| 2014) | 19, 20 | +| Jang Hoi Choi v. Beautri Realty Corp., 22 N.Y.S.3d 431 (N.Y. App. 1st Dept. 2016) | 22, 23 | +| Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920) | 16 | +| Lubonty v. U.S. Bank Nat? Ass'n, 139 N.E.3d 1222 (N.Y. 2019) | 14 | +| Majewski v. Broadalbin-Perth Cent. Sch. Dist, 6% N.E.2d 978 (N.Y. 1998) | 9 | +| Dennis v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., F. Supp. 3d | No. 16-CV-6496 (LAK), 2020 WL | +| 729789 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2020) | 5, | +| v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 877 N.E.2d 281 (N.Y. 2007) | 13, | +| Gallewski v. Heitz & Co., 93 N.E.2d 620 (N.Y. 1950) | 15, 16, 17, 19, | +| Geiss v. Weinstein Co. Holdings LLC, 383 F. Supp. 3d 156 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) | 7, 15, 22, | +| Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989) | 15, 17, 18, 19, | + +# Statutes + +| N.Y. CoNsT. art. 1, § 6 | 15 | +| ------------------------------------ | --------------- | +| N.Y. Educ. Law § 6509(1)(5)(a) | 10 | +| N.Y. Educ. Law § 6530(9)(a) | 10, 11 | +| N.Y. Exec. Law § 298-a | 12 | +| N.Y. Judiciary Law § 90(4)(a), (e) | I I | +| N.Y. Penal Law § 130 | 9, 10, 12. 13 | +| N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 230(12)(b) | 10. 1 1 | +| N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 3510(1)(m) | I 1 | + +# Rules + +| Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3)..... | 24, 25 | +| ------------------------------- | -------- | +| Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)..... | 5 | + +Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell, through counsel, moves this Court for an order dismissing this case or transferring the case against Ms. Maxwell to the District of New Mexico. As grounds for this request, Ms. Maxwell states as follows: + +# INTRODUCTION + +Plaintiff's complaint is years too late, lacks the required specificity, and is filed in the wrong court. It describes events that allegedly occurred nearly three decades ago, and it details alleged conduct by Mr. Epstein while referring to Ms. Maxwell as an afterthought. When the complaint does allege conduct by Ms. Maxwell, it alleges conduct that occurred in New Mexico, not New York. This Court, therefore, should dismiss the complaint or transfer the case against Ms. Maxwell to the District of New Mexico. + +# BACKGROUND + +Plaintiff claims that when she was either fifteen or sixteen years old, in 1995 or 1996. Mr. Epstein lured her to New York based on a promise of helping her get into college. Comp/. TR 41. 51. With no alleged involvement of Ms. Maxwell, Mr. Epstein bought Plaintiff a plane ticket from Arizona to New York. Id. 1 51. Plaintiff's sister, was at the time purportedly working for Mr. Epstein as a purchaser of art. Id. 946. + +Plaintiff claims that in New York, Mr. Epstein took her and her sister to a movie. Id. 1153-54. With no involvement or participation of Ms. Maxwell, Mr. Epstein allegedly groped Plaintiff during the movie. Id. 1 54. Plaintiff returned to Arizona shortly after. Id. 1 55. + +Sometime later, in the spring of 1996, Mr. Epstein called Plaintiff's mother in Arizona and proposed to sponsor a trip for Plaintiff to his ranch in New Mexico. Id.1 57. Mr. Epstein told Plaintiff's mother that his ranch was the site of an educational program for high school students. Id. 99 56-57. According to the complaint, Mr. Epstein represented that Ms. Maxwell would be Plaintiff's chaperone. Id. 1 57. Mr. Epstein again bought a plane ticket for Plaintiff, mailing it to + +her mother in Arizona. Id. 1 58. The complaint does not allege that Ms. Maxwell contacted Plaintiff or her mother or arranged for Plaintiff's travel. + +When Plaintiff arrived at the ranch, she claims she was the only student there. The complaint alleges that at the ranch, Ms. Maxwell pressured Plaintiff to give Mr. Epstein foot massages.' Id. 1 59. It also alleges that Mr. Epstein and Ms. Maxwell took her to see a movie, during which Mr. Epstein touched her body against her will. Id. I 60-61. The complaint does not allege that Ms. Maxwell touched Plaintiff during the movie or even that she knew of Mr. Epstein's alleged touching. + +Upon returning to the ranch, Plaintiff claims that Ms. Maxwell persuaded her to remove all her clothes so Ms. Maxwell could give Plaintiff a massage. Id. 1 62. Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Maxwell massaged Plaintiff and touched her intimate parts "against her will for the sexual benefit of Maxwell and Epstein." Id.1 63-64. Plaintiff claims that Ms. Maxwell "exposed [her] breasts and groped her." Id.1 65. + +The following morning, Mr. Epstein allegedly got into bed with Plaintiff to "cuddle" and, without her consent, "physically restrained her with his arms and proceeded to press his body (including his genitals) against" her. Id. 1 67. The complaint does not allege that Ms. Maxwell was involved or participated in this incident or had knowledge of it. + +Plaintiff then returned to Arizona. Id. 1 70. + +Plaintiff's complaint next devotes several paragraphs to describing the alleged sexual assault of her sister, at an Epstein property in Ohio. Id. 1 71-76. According to the complaint, after the assault Ms. Maxwell threatened on behalf of Mr. Epstein, + +{sup}`&#`x27; To be clear, Ms. Maxwell denies that she had any involvement in any of the activity alleged in the Complaint. + +telling her "We're going to burn all your art. And I just want you to know that anything you ever make will be burned. Your career is burned." Id. 1 72. This allegation is demonstrably false. Speaking for herself in 1996, apparently told police that Mr. Epstein "call[ed] her and stated he was going to burn [her] painting and send her poloroids (sic) of the burnt paintings." There was no mention in the police report of Ms. Maxwell. See Ex. 1 (Aug. 29, 1996 Police Report by . In any event, the complaint is devoid of any allegation that Ms. Maxwell ever threatened Plaintiff. + +The complaint alleges that reported the Ohio incident to both the NYPD's Sixth Precinct and to the FBI, neither of which took any action. Id. 173.2 At that point, spoke with Plaintiff, who allegedly told Maria of the events in New York and New Mexico. Id. II 73-74. The sisters claim they took their story to Vanity Fair Magazine, which Plaintiff says declined to publish a story only after Mr. Epstein (but not Ms. Maxwell) "threatened and intimidated the magazine and Vanity Fair bent to those threats." Id.1 75. + +Plaintiff never claims she herself had contact with either Mr. Epstein or Ms. Maxwell after returning to Arizona from New Mexico, and she does not allege that Mr. Epstein or Ms. Maxwell ever threatened her or coerced her not to report her allegations. Nevertheless, Plaintiff claims that "[o]ut of fear of what could happen to her and her family because of Epstein and Maxwell's great power, wealth, and connections that they had displayed to her, [she] did not tell anyone [other than her sister] about Epstein and Maxwell touching her against her will." Id. I 70. Plaintiff's failure, for nearly thirty years, to file this lawsuit, was allegedly a product of "the fact + +{sup}`2` Curiously, Sixth Precinct report makes no mention of any alleged assaults by Jeffrey Epstein or Ms. Maxwell. Ex. 1. + +that state and federal authorities, as well as the media, were not taking action against Epstein." Id.1 76. + +Plaintiff finally filed this lawsuit on November 12, 2019. Doc. 1. It alleges battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. + +## ARGUMENT + +### I. THE COMPLAINT, FILED NEARLY THREE DECADES AFTER THE EVENTS IT ALLEGES, IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. + +Plaintiff's complaint is years too late. The complaint limits its allegations of tortious conduct by Ms. Maxwell to conduct allegedly occurring in New Mexico nearly three decades ago: Ms. Maxwell allegedly committed battery against Plaintiff in New Mexico in the spring of 1996 by touching her intimate parts against her will during a massage at Mr. Epstein's ranch; Ms. Maxwell falsely imprisoned Plaintiff at the New Mexico ranch; and together, this conduct inflicted emotional distress. + +The complaint does not allege that Ms. Maxwell was involved or participated in Mr. Epstein's "recruitment" of Plaintiff to New York in late 1995/early 1996 or the alleged groping of Plaintiff at a New York movie theater. + +Nor does the complaint allege that Ms. Maxwell ever threatened or coerced Plaintiff into not filing a complaint. In fact, the complaint does not allege that Ms. Maxwell or Mr. Epstein ever contacted her in the nearly three decades since she was in New Mexico. The complaint therefore is untimely and should be dismissed. + +#### A. Standard of review. + +In assessing a motion to dismiss, this Court need only assume the truth of the wellpleaded factual contentions in Plaintiff's complaint. In re London Silver Fixing, Ltd., Antitrust Litig., 332 F. Supp. 3d 885, 895 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (dismissing conspiracy and antitrust claims as implausible). It should disregard Plaintiff's conclusory allegations as well as those that improperly lump together Ms. Maxwell with Mr. Epstein. See Ashcroft v. lqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (conclusory allegations cannot state a claim for relief); Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) ("[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the `grounds' of his `entitle[ment) to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions." (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2))). + +Dismissal is appropriate when, as here. the complaint fails to allege timely claims for relief that are plausible on their face. See Dennis v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., F. Supp. 3d No. 16-CV-6496 (LAK), 2020 WL 729789, at \*5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2020) (to survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must plausibly allege that it is timely). + +#### B. The complaint is untimely under both New Mexico and New York law. + +The complaint alleges that Ms. Maxwell committed three torts against Plaintiff in New Mexico. While New York's "borrowing statute" allows non-residents like Plaintiff to sue in New York courts for torts occurring outside of New York, the claims must be timely under both New York law the law in the state where the tort allegedly occurred for the suit to proceed. Because all three causes of action are untimely under New Mexico and New York law, the complaint must be dismissed + +When, as here, "jurisdiction rests upon diversity of citizenship, a federal court sitting in New York must apply the New York choice-of-law rules and statutes of limitations." Stuart v. + +Am. Cyanamid Co., 158 F.3d 622, 626 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1945)). "New York courts generally apply New York's statutes of limitations, even when the injury giving rise to the action occurred outside New York." Id. (citing Stafford v. International Harvester Co., 668 F.2d 142, 147 (2d Cir. 1981)). + +"This general rule, however, is subject to a traditional statutory exception, New York's 'borrowing' statute, C.P.L.R. § 202." Id. New York's borrowing statute permits a resident of another state (here, Texas)3 to sue in New York for tons occurring outside New York (here, New Mexico) only if the complaint is timely under the laws of New York and the state in which the tort occurred (again, New Mexico). The purpose of CPLR § 202 is to prevent "forum shopping by plaintiffs seeking the holy grail of the longer period." Stuart, 158 F.3d at 627. + +The borrowing statute says: + +An action based upon a cause of action accruing without the state cannot be commenced after the expiration of the time limited by the laws of either the state or the place without the state where the cause of action accrued, except that where the cause of action accrued in favor of a resident of the state the time limited by the laws of the state shall apply. + +CPLR § 202. + +New Mexico has a three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, N.M. Stat. § 37-1-8, and minors have one year from reaching the age of majority to begin such an action, N.M. Stat. § 37-1-10. Thus, at the latest, Plaintiff's claims expired sometime in 1999. Plaintiff's claims are time-barred under New Mexico law and, as a result, they are time-barred under CPLR § 202. + +Similarly, under New York law, a plaintiff alleging battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress must commence her action within one year of the + +{sup}`3` Plaintiff says she is a resident of Texas. Compl. 1 8. + +claim's accrual. CPLR § 215(3); Geiss v. Weinstein Co. Holdings LLC, 383 F. Supp. 3d 156, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). The complaint here was filed nearly three decades after Plaintiff's claims accrued. Thus, unless New York law revives Plaintiff's untimely claims or tolls the statute of limitations, dismissal is required. + +### C. Plaintiff's claims cannot be revived under New York law. + +In response to Ms. Maxwell's pre-motion letter to this Court identifying this problem, Plaintiff did not deny that her claims are untimely under New Mexico Law. Doc. 48, at 3. Instead, Plaintiff contends that CPLR § 202 does not apply because New York's Child Victims Act (CVA), CPLR § 214-g, "provides for a revival window of civil claims `[n]otwithstanding any provision of law which imposes a period of limitation to the contrary." Id.' Plaintiff's complaint also points to CPLR § 215(8)(a). As explained below, however, neither provision saves Plaintiff's untimely complaint. + +## i. CPLR § 215(8Xa) does not Ms C Plaintill's tint iinch claims. + +As one basis for reviving Plaintiff's stale claims, the complaint points to CPLR § 215(8)(a), which in some cases allows a plaintiff to pursue otherwise untimely claims if she files them within one year of the termination of a criminal action against the defendant. Compl. if 82, 87, 93. But that provision does not apply to the claims against Ms. Maxwell. + +Under CPLR § 215(8)(a), "Whenever it is shown that a criminal action against the same defendant has been commenced with respect to the event or occurrence from which a [battery or false imprisonment] claim ... arises," the plaintiff has at least one year from "[t]he termination of the criminal action" to file her otherwise time-barred claim against the "same defendant." (Emphases added). + +' Plaintiff has not claimed that New Mexico has a revival statute.

Here, the government indicted only Mr. Epstein, and so Ms. Maxwell is not the "same defendant" against whom there was a "criminal action." And the indictment against Mr. Epstein did not concern the "event or occurrence" from which Plaintiff's claims against Ms. Maxwell arise. The indictment charged conduct by Mr. Epstein between 2002 and 2005 in New York and Florida. Compl. Ex. A. Plaintiff's complaint against Ms. Maxwell concerns conduct allegedly occurring in 1995/1996 in New Mexico. Compl. 57-70. CPLR § 215(8)(a) does not help Plaintiff.

Plaintiff does not appear to dispute any of this. Instead, although her complaint cites CPLR § 215(8)(a), in response to Ms. Maxwell's pre-motion letter to this Court Plaintiff invoked only CPLR § 214-g and equitable tolling/estoppel.

As explained below, however, Plaintiff's invocation of that provision and those doctrines fail.

ii. CPLR § 214-g does not and cannot revive Plaint ill's untimely claims.

The CVA, CPLR § 2I4-g, purports to revive otherwise time-barred claims for injuries "suffered as a result of conduct which would constitute" a sexual offense under New York penal law. Plaintiff invokes CPLR § 214-g to save claims that expired nearly thirty years ago. The attempt fails because: (1) CPLR § 214-g does not apply to the claims against Ms. Maxwell; (2) CPLR § 214-g does not trump New York's borrowing statute, CPLR § 202, under which Plaintiff must prove her claims are timely under New Mexico law (which they concededly are not); and (3) even if CPLR § 214-g does apply, its application to Maxwell is unconstitutional.

a. CPLR § 214-g by its terms does not apply to Ms. Maxwell.

CPLR § 214-g by its terms does not apply to Ms. Maxwell because the conduct alleged against her occurred in New Mexico, outside New York, and therefore "would [not] constitute" a sexual offense under New York Penal Law § 130. CPLR § 214-g says:

Notwithstanding any provision of law which imposes a period of limitation to the contrary . . . every civil claim or cause of action brought against any party alleging intentional or negligent acts or omissions by a person for physical, psychological, or other injury or condition suffered as a result of conduct which would constitute a sexual offense as defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law [N.Y. Penal Law § 130] committed against a child less than eighteen years of age .. . is hereby revived, and action thereon may be commenced not earlier than six months after, and not later than one year and six months after the effective date of this section.

CPLR § 214-g.

"It is fundamental that a court, in interpreting a statute, should attempt to effectuate the intent of the Legislature." Majewski v. Broadalbin-Perth Cent. Sch. Dist, 696 N.E.2d 978, 980 (N.Y. 1998). "As the clearest indicator of legislative intent is the statutory text, the starting point in any case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain meaning thereof " Id. The court must give a statute is plain and natural meaning. Am. Transit Ins. Co. v. Sartor, 814 N.E.2d 1189, 1192 (N.Y. 2004). "A court cannot amend a statute by adding words that are not there." Id.

The plain and unambiguous language of CPLR § 214-g shows it does not apply to Plaintiff's untimely complaint. For it to apply, Plaintiff's claims against Ms. Maxwell must arise from "conduct which would constitute a sexual offense as defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law [N.Y. Penal Law § 130]."

Under the plain language of this provision, however, Ms. Maxwell's alleged conduct would "constitute a sexual offense as defined in [N.Y. Penal Law § 130]" only if it were

committed in New York. See People v. McLaughlin, 606 N.E.2d 1357, 1359 (N.Y. 1992) ("Because the State only has power to enact and enforce criminal laws within its territorial borders, there can be no criminal offense unless it has territorial jurisdiction."). Because the complaint concerns conduct allegedly committed in New Mexico, Ms. Maxwell's purported conduct "would [not] constitute a sexual offense as defined in [N.Y. Penal Law § 130]."

Had the New York State Assembly intended otherwise—that is, had the State Assembly intended to revive claims for conduct occurring outside New York that, if committed within this state, would have constituted as defined in penal law N.Y. Penal Law § 130—it knew how to do so. In fact, the State Assembly could have done what it routinely does: include language making clear an intent that the statute apply to conduct occurring outside New York.

Take New York law defining professional misconduct by physicians. It provides that it is professional misconduct to be

  • 9.(a) ... convicted of committing an act constituting a crime under:
  • (i) New York state law or,
  • (ii) federal law or,
  • (iii) the law of another jurisdiction and which, if committed within this state, would have constituted a crime under New York state law.

N.Y. Educ. Law § 6530(9)(a) (emphasis added). This language makes clear that conduct occurring outside New York can constitute professional misconduct within New York.

The examples abound. E.g., N.Y. Educ. law § 6509(1)(5)(a) (defining as professional misconduct "[b]eing convicted of committing an act constituting a crime under: (i) New York State law or, (ii) Federal law or, (iii) The law of another jurisdiction and which, if committed within this state, would have constituted a crime under New York State law" (emphasis added)); N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 230(12)(b) ("When a licensee has pleaded or been found guilty or

convicted of committing an act constituting a felony under New York state law or federal law, or the law of another jurisdiction which, if committed within this state, would have constituted a felony under New York state law ..." (emphasis added)); N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 3510(1)(m) (authorizing suspension of a license if the licensee "is convicted of certain crimes and the ... conviction [is] under (i) New York state law; (ii) federal law; or (iii) the law of another jurisdiction which, if committed within this state, would have constituted professional misconduct under New York state law" (emphasis added)).

The State Assembly's choice not to use the conditional perfect tense ("would have") is dispositive of its intent. As the above examples show, when the State Assembly intends a law to apply to conduct occurring out of state which, "if committed within this state, would have constituted a crime under New York state law," it says so expressly. See Touche & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 572 (1979) ("Obviously, then, when Congress wished to provide a private damage remedy, it knew how to do so and did so expressly."); see, e.g., N.Y. Educ. Law § 6530(9)(a); N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 230(12)(6); N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 3510(1)(m). And the State Assembly easily could have done so in CPLR § 214-g, by saying that the statute revived otherwise time-barred claims based on "conduct which would constitute a sexual offense as defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law or, if committed within this state, would have constituted a sexual offense as defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law." See CPLR § 214-g? The legislature intentionally decided not to include this language.

5 If CPLR § 214-g had been written in the present tense, the State Assembly likewise could have shown an intent for it to apply to conduct occurring outside New York. It has done so countless other times. E.g., N.Y. Judiciary Law § 90(4)(a), (e) (providing that "any person being an attorney and counsellor-at-law who shall be convicted of a felony as defined in paragraph e of this subdivision, shall upon such conviction, cease to be an attorney and counsellor-at-law, or to be competent to practice law as such," and defining a "felony" as "any criminal offense classified as a felony under the laws of this state or any criminal offense committed in any other

Unlike these examples, CPLR § 214-g talks only of conduct "which would constitute a sexual offense as defined in article [N.Y. Penal Law § 130]." It does not speak to conduct which, if committed within New York, would have constituted a sexual offense as defined in article N.Y. Penal Law § 130. And absent that specific language—readily available to the State Assembly and routinely used—Ms. Maxwell's alleged conduct "would [not] constitute" a sexual offense under New York Penal Law § 130 because it occurred outside New York and in New Mexico. New York penal law does not reach New Mexico. See McLaughlin, 606 N.E.2d at 1359. Interpreting CPLR § 214-g to revive Plaintiff's claims would require this Court to add language to the statute, which this Court cannot do. See Am. Transit, 814 N.E.2d at 1192 ("A court cannot amend a statute by adding words that are not there."). The CVA, § 214-g, thus does not apply to the case against Ms. Maxwell and cannot revive Plaintiff's time-barred claims.6

b. CPLR § 214-g does not trump New York's borrowing statute, CPLR § 202.

In response to Ms. Maxwell's pm-motion letter to this Court, Plaintiff argued that CPLR § 214-g trumps New York's borrowing statute, CPLR § 202, because the former statute says it

state, district, or territory of the United States and classified as a felony therein which if' committed within this state, would constitute a felony in this state' (emphasis added)); N.Y. Exec. Law § 298-a (providing that New York's human rights law "shall apply as hereinafter provided to an act committed outside this state against a resident of this state or against a corporation organized under the laws of this state or authorized to do business in this state, if such act would constitute an unlawful discriminatory practice if committed within this state (emphasis added)); N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 3(12-b) (providing that "felony" under New York's Alcohol Beverage Control Law "shall mean any criminal offense classified as a felony under the laws of this state or any criminal offense committed in any other state, district, or territory of the United States and classified as a felony therein which if committed within this state, would constitute a felony in this state" (emphases added)).

6 In no case can CPLR § 214-g revive Plaintiff's false imprisonment claim, because false imprisonment is not a "sexual offense" under New York Penal Law § 130. See CPLR § 214-g (purporting to revive civil claims based on conduct that would constitute a "sexual offense as defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law" (emphasis added)).

applies "[n]otwithstanding any provision of law which imposes a period of limitation to the contrary." CPLR § 214-g; Doc. 48, at 3. This argument is misplaced.

CPLR § 214-g and CPLR § 202 can be read together to give effect to both. See v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 877 N.E.2d 281, 286-87 (N.Y. 2007) ("[W]here possible, courts should harmonize all parts of a statute with each other . . . and give effect and meaning ... to the entire statute and every part and word thereof." (cleaned up)). Recall that when 'jurisdiction rests upon diversity of citizenship, a federal court sitting in New York must apply the New York choice-of-law rules and statutes of limitations," including New York's borrowing statute, CPLR § 202. Stuart, 158 F.3d at 626. New York's borrowing statute requires a complaint to be timely under both the laws of New York and the state in which the tort occurred (here, New Mexico).

When CPLR § 214-g revives claims based upon conduct that "would constitute a sexual offense as defined in" N.Y. Penal Law § 130 "[n]otwithstanding any provision of law which imposes a period of limitation to the contrary," CPLR § 214-g is referring to any provision of New York law that imposes a period of limitation to the contrary. CPLR § 214-g is a New York statute enacted by the New York legislature, which applies to and revives claims based on conduct that would violate New York penal law that would otherwise be untimely under New York statutes of limitations.

Here, as described above, CPLR § 215(3) required Plaintiff to commence her battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims within one year of their accrual. CPLR § 215(3); Geiss, 383 F. Supp. 3d at 171. The effect of CPLR § 214-g in this case, then, is to excuse Plaintiff from failing to comply with CPLR § 215(3). It revives Plaintiff's

claims only insofar as CPLR § 215(3) barred them. By contrast, the effect of CPLR § 214-g is not to revive Plaintiff's claims insofar as New Mexico law bars them.

But New York's borrowing statute, CPLR § 202, requires Plaintiff's claims to be timely under both New York law and New Mexico law. At best, CPLR § 214-g solves half of Plaintiff's problem—it might render her claims timely under New York law when they would otherwise be untimely under CPLR § 215(3). But CPLR § 214-g cannot solve the other half of Plaintiff's problem—it cannot render her claims timely under New Mexico law.

In this way, CPLR § 202 and CPLR § 214-g can be harmonized. , 877 N.E.2d at 286-87. The latter revives claims that a New York statute of limitations would render untimely, while the former still requires that when suing in New York for a tort committed in another state, the lawsuit must be timely under the law of the state in which the tort occurred.

Plaintiff's argument that CPLR § 214-g trumps CPLR § 202 would lead to forum shopping, which is the absurd result CPLR § 202 seeks to avoid. Stuart, 158 F.3d at 627 (CPLR § 202 prevents "forum shopping by plaintiffs seeking the holy grail of the longer period"); Lubonty v. U.S. Bank Nat? Ass 'n, 139 N.E.3d 1222, 1225 (N.Y. 2019) (courts must "interpret a statute so as to avoid an unreasonable or absurd application of the law"). If Plaintiff is right, courts in New York can expect to see a flood of lawsuits concerning conduct occurring in other states having little or no connection to New York. Plaintiffs will know that even if they could not bring a lawsuit in the state in which the conduct occurred, they can file suit in New York so long as there is personal jurisdiction over the defendant. But there's no reason to think that the New York State Assembly intended to override the decisions of other state legislatures that have concluded, in their considered judgment, not to revive expired claims based on conduct occurring within their borders.

Accordingly, when read together, CPLR § 214-g and CPLR § 202 still require Plaintiff to show that her claims are timely under New Mexico law, since they are based on conduct occurring in New Mexico. Plaintiff has not disputed that her claims are untimely under New Mexico law, Doc. 48, at 3, and, as a result, they must be dismissed.

c. Applying CPLR § 214-g to Ms. Maxwell would violate due process.

Disregarding CPLR § 202, and applying § 214-g notwithstanding the claims' untimeliness under New Mexico law, violates Ms. Maxwell's right to due process.

The New York Constitution guarantees due process of law. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."). This guarantee constrains the State Assembly's ability to enact "revival statutes," which are an "extreme exercise of legislative power." v. Lincoln Trust Co., 135 N.E. 267, 267 (N.Y. 1922) (Cardozo, J.). In New York, due process requires a "functionalist approach" to revival statutes, one that "weighs the defendant's interests in the availability of a statute of limitations defense with the need to correct an injustice." /n re World Trade Or. Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig., 89 N.E.3d 1227, 1239 (N.Y. 2017).

The New York Court of Appeals recently reaffirmed that "a claim-revival statute will satisfy the Due Process Clause of the State Constitution if it was enacted as a reasonable response in order to remedy an injustice." /d. at 1243. The injustice subject to this extraordinary remedy is limited to when a "plaintiff could not have brought an action in a timely manner." Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocese Corp., 119 A.3d 462, 512 n.58 (Conn. 2015) (discussing New York law); see also Hytnowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989); Gallewski v. Hentz & Co., 93 N.E.2d 620 (N.Y. 1950); v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 144

N.E. 579 (N.Y. 1924); Matter of McCann v. Walsh Constr. Co., 123 N.Y.S.2d 509 (N.Y. App. 3rd Dept. 1953), aff'd without op., 306 N.Y. 904 (1954).

In v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the constitutionality of a statute that revived the wrongful death actions of spouses of deceased workers. 144 N.E. at 579. There, the wife of a deceased worker began collecting worker's compensation following her husband's work-related death; this was her exclusive legal remedy at the time. Id. at 579—80. More than two years later, the U.S. Supreme Court declared New York's workers' compensation law to be unconstitutional, which ended the wife's worker's compensation benefit. See Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920). By that time, however, the wife's wrongful death action was time-barred under New York law. See , 144 N.E. at 580. A claim by the wife for her husband's wrongful death also was not cognizable at any time during the applicable limitations period, because for that entire time worker's compensation was the exclusive remedy for the husband's work-related death. The legislature enacted a provision to address this catch-22, creating a one-year period for plaintiffs to begin a negligence action, even if it were otherwise time-barred, to seek compensation that was formerly available exclusively under the then-defunct worker's compensation law. Id. at 580-82. Because the spouses of deceased workers could not have brought a timely claim for wrongful death based on a work-related injury before the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Knickerbocker Ice, the legislature revived such claims for a one-year period. See id. at 582. The Court of Appeals affirmed the propriety of the revival statute. Id. at 579.

The Court of Appeals' decision in Gallewski v. Hentz & Co. similarly addressed reviving formerly time-barred causes of action that claimants were effectively prevented from asserting in a timely manner. In Gallewski, the Court of Appeals held that a statute enacted to retroactively

toll the statute of limitations for individuals residing in Axis-occupied countries during World War II comported with due process. Gallewski, 93 N.E.2d at 622-25. The Court noted that "the citizens and residents of occupied territory were, during such occupation, under a practical and total inability to commence action in the courts of this State to protect and effectuate their rights." Id. at 625. Because these plaintiffs were unable to assert timely claims under the applicable limitations period, the Court of Appeals in Gallewski concluded that the legislature's retroactive tolling of the otherwise applicable limitations period comported with due process. Id. ("To permit the Statute of Limitations to run against [plaintiffs'] claims during the continuance of such inability [to sue] would not accord with elementary notions of justice and fairness.").

Likewise, in both Matter of McCann v. Walsh Constr. Co. and Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., claims-revival provisions were held to comport with due process when they addressed claims that could not have been timely asserted. Both cases presented claims by plaintiffs who were afflicted by latent diseases where symptoms did not typically appear until after the applicable limitations period expired. Matter of McCann, 301 N.Y. at 511 (cassion disease is "of a slow-starting or insidious nature" and "very often ... more than twelve months elapse[s] after the contraction of the disease before its presence [is] known or apparent"); Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1072 (the exposure to the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES) by pregnant mothers causes a latent injury in utero and "many claims [are] barred by the Statute of Limitations before the injury [is] discovered"). In both instances, the legislature changed the rule regarding the timing of a claim's accrual, so that the limitations period did not start until the claimant was aware of the disease. At the same time, the legislature also revived, for a one-year period, all formerly time-barred causes of action predicated on such late manifesting diseases. The Court of Appeals emphasized, again, that the formerly applicable rule—the "exposure rule" for determining when

a cause of action accrued—"prevented the bringing of timely claims for recovery." Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1079; see also Sweener v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., No. 1:17- CV-0532, 2019 WL 748742, at \*8 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2018) (citing Hymowitz and Matter of McCann as addressing claims-revival provisions for "latent personal injuries" in holding that CPLR § 214-g comported with due process because the claims-revival provision there allowed those "who suffer[ed] latent injuries stemming from environmental contamination() to pursue claims that would otherwise be time-barred simply because a defendant's tortious conduct was unknown").

The New York Court of Appeals already has decided that numerous claimants asserting allegations of sexual abuse were not prevented from asserting their claims in a timely manner under the formerly applicable limitations period. See Zumpano v. Quinn, 849 N.E.2d 926 (N.Y. 2006). In Zumpano, the Court addressed two actions, one brought by an individual plaintiff and the other by 42 plaintiffs. Id. at 927-28. Both complaints alleged clergy sexual abuse for which the statute of limitations had long expired, but the plaintiffs sought equitable tolling of their limitations periods and asserted equitable estoppel against defendants. Defendants moved to dismiss. While the Court of Appeals observed that the alleged conduct was "reprehensible," it rejected plaintiffs' arguments. Id. at 931. The Court held that all plaintiffs in both the individual and the 42-person action "failed to satisfy th[eir] burden" of "establish[ing] that subsequent and specific actions by defendants somehow kept them from timely bringing suit." Id. at 929. The Court ruled, at the motion to dismiss stage, that the plaintiffs had the practical ability to timely sue their individual abusers and the entities that employed them because each plaintiff was aware of the allegedly abusive conduct:

[E]ach plaintiff was aware of the sexual abuse he or she suffered at the hands of defendant priests. Certainly they had sufficient

knowledge to bring an intentional tort cause of action against the individual priests. Plaintiffs were likewise aware that the priests were employees of the dioceses and could have brought actions against the dioceses, or at least investigated whether a basis for such actions existed.

Id.; see also id. at 930 (noting that "plaintiffs were fully aware that they had been abused"). The Court thus affirmed the dismissal of both actions as time-barred.

The federal district court decision in World Trade Center also is instructive. While that decision was ultimately vacated based only on a threshold standing issue (not presented here), the court there invalidated a claims-revival provision under the New York State Constitution's Due Process Clause on the same basis asserted by Ms. Maxwell here. The statute at issue in that case revived otherwise time-barred claims by disaster-relief workers who were injured during the cleanup and rescue efforts following the September 11, 2011 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center. After canvassing the Court of Appeals' case law on the issue, the district court held that this claims-revival provision did not fit within the "narrow exception for revival statutes, and is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the New York State Constitution." In re World Trade Ctr. Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 466, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), vacated on other grounds, 892 F.3d 108 (24 Cir. 2018). The district court reasoned that, unlike in the Court of Appeals' precedent addressing this issue discussed above (Gallewski, , Mauer of McCann, and Hymowitz), the plaintiffs in World Trade Center were protected by a rule that the limitations period on their claims did not begin to run until they had discovered their injuries. See id. at 475-76. They thus did not face a "practical and total inability" to begin a timely lawsuit, as in Gallewski and and the other cases in which claim revival has been allowed. See id. at 474-75. And, indeed, the district court noted that many plaintiffs had filed timely lawsuits. Id. at 476.

The claims-revival provision in the CVA is, in material respects, like the one at issue in World Trade Center. In both instances, the legislature purported to revive claims by plaintiffs who were not prevented from asserting them in a timely fashion. In World Trade Center, the district court noted that the legislature had given as its justification, among other things, that certain claimants were given incorrect information about their work conditions and did not know the applicable limitations periods. See id. at 475. But the district court determined those were impermissible grounds for enacting a claims-revival provision because "[tjhese rationales do not amount to the 'exceptional circumstances' justifying the `extreme exercise of legislative power' that a revival statute entails." Id. "Here, those who wished to sue were not barred from doing so." Id. at 476.

Here, the legislature's attempt through CPLR § 214-g to revive, for a one-year period, formerly time-barred claims based on certain alleged sexual abuse does not comport with the New York State Constitution's Due Process Clause, at least as applied to Ms. Maxwell. Unlike all of the previous situations in which the Court of Appeals has ruled that the "extreme" measure of reviving claims survived due process scrutiny, Plaintiff here was not prevented from asserting timely claims.

To the contrary, Plaintiff admits she had no difficulty reporting her allegations years ago to Vanity Fair Magazine and that her sister had no problem reporting her allegations to the NYPD and the FBI. Compl. In 73-75. That those organizations did not respond as Plaintiff wished is all the more reason she should have filed this lawsuit years ago.

Moreover, unlike in Touc, Plaintiff's claims were not barred by law in 1995/1996. Nor was Plaintiff geographically and practically prevented from filing a lawsuit, like the plaintiffs who were unable to return to the U.S. during a world war as in Gallewski. And unlike as in

Matter of McCann and Hymowitz, it is not as if Plaintiff's injuries did not manifest during the applicable limitations period; Plaintiff claims to have been injured immediately.

Plaintiff's conclusory and bare assertion that she was prevented from filing her claim lolut of fear of what could happen to her and her family because of Epstein and Maxwell's great power, wealth, and connections that they had displayed to her" is not plausible. Compl. 1 70; see Dennis v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 2020 WL 729789, at \*5 (to survive a motion to dismiss, complaint must plausibly allege that it is timely). Plaintiff admits that upon leaving the ranch in New Mexico, she never again had contact with either Mr. Epstein or Ms. Maxwell. And she does not allege that either Mr. Epstein or Ms. Maxwell ever threatened her or coerced her into not filing a timely lawsuit. The complaint is devoid of any plausible allegation that Plaintiff could not have sued Ms. Maxwell in a timely fashion over a twenty-four (24) year period. And for that reason, under New York law, it would violate due process to allow CPLR § 214-g to revive Plaintiff's untimely claims against Ms. Maxwell.

To allow CPLR § 214-g to revive Plaintiff's claims would undermine the integrity of the judicial system and deny Ms. Maxwell her constitutional right to defend herself. Ms. Maxwell would have to rebut allegations of an individual who claims she was assaulted nearly thirty years ago. Ms. Maxwell would also be called to answer the for conduct of Mr. Epstein, who is dead. "[W]eighing the defendant's interest in the availability of statute of limitations defense with the need to correct an injustice," Matter of World Trade Ctr., 89 N.E.3d at 1239, underscores the due process limitation that constrained the legislature's authority here.

Finally, there are strong, actual, not merely hypothetical, reliance interests at issue on the statutes of limitations that have existed for many years. Moreover, Mr. Epstein's estate has established a compensation fund for alleged victims, the Voluntary Claims Resolution Program

in the U.S. Virgin Island. Plaintiff's sister, is already participating in the Program, and Plaintiff apparently intends to as well. So have other alleged victims of Mr. Epstein. It undermines the integrity of the judicial system for some individuals to participate in this compensation fund while others attempt to revive long-expired claims in court.

For these reasons, applying CPLR § 214-g to revive Plaintiff's time-barred claims violates Ms. Maxwell's constitutional right to due process.

ill. Plaintiff has not and cannot plausibly plead equitable tolling or equitable estoppel.

Plaintiff points to two other bases for the timeliness of her complaint: equitable tolling and equitable estoppel. Compl. yy 16-17. Neither doctrine saves Plaintiff's complaint.

Equitable tolling is unavailable in New York for state claims. Jang Hoi Choi v. Beautri Realty Corp., 22 N.Y.S.3d 431, 432 (N.Y. App. 1st Dept. 2016) ("[T]he doctrine of equitable tolling is not available in state causes of action in New York."). Even if it were available, Plaintiff's invocation of the doctrine would fail for the same reasons her reliance on equitable estoppel fails.

These equitable doctrines require "extraordinary" factors that make it "unjust" to allow a defendant to assert a statute of limitations defense. See id. (equitable tolling requires proof that a plaintiff was "prevented in some extraordinary way" from exercising her rights); Zumpano, 849 N.E.2d at 929 (equitable estoppel requires proof that it would "would be unjust to allow a defendant to assert a statute of limitations defense"). The doctrines should be "invoked sparingly and only under exceptional circumstances." Geiss, 383 F. Supp. at 172.

As explained above, Plaintiff's own complaint proves that there was no impediment to her filing this action within a timely fashion. "Plaintiff had sufficient knowledge of the facts and of a basis for a cause of action within the limitations period, and yet [s]he failed to bring a timely

suit." Jang Ho Choi, 135 A.D.3d at 452. As in Zumpano v. Quinn, "plaintiff was aware of the sexual abuse ... she [allegedly] suffered at the hands of [Ms. Maxwell] .... Certainly [she] had sufficient knowledge to bring an intentional tort cause of action...."

Plaintiff's conclusory allegations to the contrary cannot survive a motion to dismiss.7 Plaintiff does not allege that Ms. Maxwell or Mr. Epstein threatened or coerced her into not filing a lawsuit, or that she was misled as to the applicable statute of limitations. In fact, Plaintiff does not even allege any contact between herself and Ms. Maxwell or Mr. Epstein after 1996.8 The complaint points to nothing that actually or effectively prevented Plaintiff from filing her lawsuit for more than twenty years.

What is ultimately dispositive, though, is that the complaint points to nothing Ms. Maxwell allegedly did in the year before its filing that prevented Plaintiff from filing the lawsuit.

7 Plaintiff's conclusory assertion of fear of retaliation or harm to reputation cannot support equitable tolling or estoppel. "New York law strongly disfavors equitable tolling based on fear of retaliation, except where duress is an element of the cause of action." Geiss, 383 F. Supp. 3d at 173. And "[f]ear of harm to a plaintiff's career cannot justify equitably estopping a defendant from asserting a time limitation period." Id. (quoting Netzer v. Continuity Graphic Assocs., Inc., 963 F. Supp. 1308, 1318 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires, at a minimum, that a complaint give each defendant "fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the ground upon which it rests." Ferro v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d 847, 851 (2d Cir. 1961); see also v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995). Here, when Plaintiff has no facts to allege against Ms. Maxwell, she deceptively claims that "Epstein and Maxwell": "committed" (Compl. 13), "recruited" (id.1 25), "perfected" (id.1 31), "arranged" (id.1 58), "allowed" (id.1 70), "intentionally committed" (id. 1 80), "intentionally and forcibly touched" (id.1 81), "falsely imprisoned" (id.1 85), "brought" and "prevented" (id.1 86), committed "criminal acts" (id. ¶¶ 88, 94), and had a plan to "recruit, entice and assault" (id.1 91). This Court should disregard the allegations that merely lump together Ms. Maxwell with Mr. Epstein. See Ochre LLC v. Rockwell Architecture Planning Design, P.C., No. 12 CIV. 2837 KBF, 2012 WL 6082387, at \*6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2012), aff'd, 530 F. App'x 19 (2d Cir. 2013) (explaining that "[w]here a complaint names multiple defendants, that complaint must provide a plausible factual basis to distinguish the conduct of each of the defendants" and holding that the "failure to isolate the key allegations against each defendant supports dismissal under the standards set forth in Twombly and lqbal"). Lumping aside, there is nothing in the complaint to show that Ms. Maxwell ever did or said anything to prevent, mislead, or discourage Plaintiff from filing the complaint in a timely manner.

Assuming tolling could apply (which it can't), that period of tolling ended well before November 2, 2018, one year before the complaint was filed. And because the relevant statute of limitations in New York is one year, CPLR § 215(3), even tolling cannot save Plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff cannot plausibly allege that the statute of limitations was tolled for nearly thirty years, when she doesn't even allege that she had contact with Ms. Maxwell ever again once she left the New Mexico ranch in 1996. Tolling doctrines are not never ending.9

II. IF NOT DISMISSED, THE CASE AGAINST MS. MAXWELL SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO.

The Southern District of New York is not the proper venue for Plaintiff's claims against Ms. Maxwell. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(6)(3) (authorizing a motion to dismiss for "improper venue").

Section 1391 of Title 18 provides:

(b) Venue in general. -- A civil action may be brought in --

(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located;

(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated.

9 The result is the same if New Mexico law applies to Plaintiff's assertion of equitable tolling and estoppel. See Slusser v. Vantage Builders, Inc., 306 P.3d 524, 531 (N.M. App. 2013) ("Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way."); id. at 533 ("Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the party estopped from asserting a statute of limitations must have (I) made a statement or action that amounted to a false representation or concealment of material facts, or intended to convey facts that are inconsistent with those a party subsequently attempts to assert, with (2) the intent to deceive the other party, and (3) knowledge of the real facts other than conveyed. The party arguing estoppel must (1) not know the real facts, and (2) change his or her position in reliance on the estopped party's representations."). Plaintiff has not and cannot make the required showings for either doctrine to apply.

Subsection (b)(1) does not authorize venue here because Ms. Maxwell is not a resident of New York, nor apparently is the Estate of Mr. Epstein. And subsection (b)(2) also does not authorize venue here because the allegations against Ms. Maxwell concern conduct occurring exclusively in New Mexico and not New York: Ms. Maxwell allegedly sexually assaulted plaintiff in New Mexico (battery) and held plaintiff against her will in New Mexico (false imprisonment), thereby intentionally inflicting emotional distress. Because Ms. Maxwell's allegedly tortious conduct occurred in New Mexico, venue is improper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(6)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), this Court should dismiss the complaint against Ms. Maxwell. At the very least, the case against her should be transferred to the District of New Mexico. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) ("The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought."); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) ("For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought. .. .").

Alternatively, Plaintiff's claims against Ms. Maxwell should be severed from the claims against Mr. Epstein's estate. Ms. Maxwell will be prejudiced otherwise, given the allegations against Mr. Epstein and the inability of Ms. Maxwell to effectively defend herself now that Mr. Epstein is dead. Even if venue is proper here in the case against Mr. Epstein's estate (which is doubtful, since Mr. Epstein's estate is apparently a resident of the U.S. Virgin Islands), it is improper in the case against Ms. Maxwell. The case against Ms. Maxwell should proceed, if at all, in New Mexico.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, this Court should dismiss the case or transfer the case against Ms.

Maxwell to the District of New Mexico.

Dated: May 14, 2020.

Respectfully submitted.

/s/ Laura A. Menninger

Laura A. Mekaier (Lisa)

HADDON, AND P.C.

150 East 10 Avenue

Denver, CO 80203

Phone: 303.831.7364

Fax: 303.832.2628

lmenninger@hmflaw.com

Attorney for Ghislaine Maxwell

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on May 14, 2020, I filed this Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell's Motion to Dismiss with the Clerk of Court through CMJECF, which will send notice of the filing to all parties of record.

/s/ Nicole

+ + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777958/EFTA02777958.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777958/EFTA02777958.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..656de5256a328aa6398df854adad890a13f12746 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777958/EFTA02777958.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -3042, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777958", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 75, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.table-boundary-padding\", \"epstein_legal.flight-log-tables.normalize\", \"swarm-unicode-norm.html-named-entities\", \"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "199f43fb0d920220a33af9fa9627ee5d2a44a17a2984dbf2dbb3a7551ce4c6ee", + "output_sha256": "21905fcf84e9672999976a97fa9db1d504c80b969cf01586932b6167ce3b8ecd", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777990/EFTA02777990.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777990/EFTA02777990.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f67d1fc8f0f102f82f4bceb4c5297a6e4b848168 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777990/EFTA02777990.md @@ -0,0 +1,222 @@ +## EXHIBIT 1 + +![](_page_1_Picture_17.jpeg) + +| Report Cmd: 006 | Jurisdiction: N.Y. POLICE DEPT | ICAD#: | Record Status: No Status | Complaint #: 1996-006-007241 | No Other Legacy Blue Versions | No Other Complaint Revisions | +| ----------------- | -------------------------------- | -------- | -------------------------- | ------------------------------ | ------------------------------- | ------------------------------ | +| ----------------- | -------------------------------- | -------- | -------------------------- | ------------------------------ | ------------------------------- | ------------------------------ | + +| **Occurrence 114** +**Location: STREET** +Name Of Premise: +Premises Type: COMMERCIAL BUILDING +Location Within Premise: OFFICE AREA +Visible By Patrol?: NO | **NYC** Dept. Property +Did this offense occur on NYC Dept. Property? +Command: +NYC Dept. Property Name: | Preclinct: 006 +Sector: H +Beat: 11 +Post: 32 | +| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------- | +| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------- | + +| **Occurrence From: 1996-07-11 12:00:00 THURSDAY** +Occurrence thru: 1996-07-17 00:00:00 +Reported: 1996-08-29 18:20:09 +Complaint Received: WALK-IN | Aided # +Accident # +O.C.C.B. # | +| -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------- | +| -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------- | + +| **Classification: AGG HARRASSMENT 2M** +Attempted/Completed: COMPLETED +Most Serious Offense Is: N/A +PD Code: 639 AGGRAVATED HARASSMENT 2 +PL Section: 24030 +Keycode: 381 OFF. AGNST PUB ORD SENSBLTY & | **Case Status: CLOSED** +Unit Referred To: PATROL +Clearance Code: +LogiCase #: 0 +Clearance Arrest Id: +Clearance AO Cmd: +File #: +Prints Requested? NO | +| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | + +| Is This Related To Stop And Frisk Report NO | SQF Number: 0000-000-00000 | Was The Victim's Personal Information Taken Or Possessed? | Was The Victim's Personal Information Used To Commit A Crime? | +| --------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------- | +| --------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------- | + +| Gang Related? | Detective Borough Wheel Log #: | Name Of Gang: | Child Abuse Suspected? | +| --------------- | -------------------------------- | --------------- | ------------------------ | +| --------------- | -------------------------------- | --------------- | ------------------------ | + +| DIR Required? NO | Child in Common? | Intimate Relationship? | Officer Body Worn Camera: | +| ------------------ | ------------------ | ------------------------ | --------------------------- | +| ------------------ | ------------------ | ------------------------ | --------------------------- | + +| **If Burglary:** +Forced Entry? +Structure: +Entry Method: +Entry Location: | **Alarm:** +Bypassed? +Comp Responded?: +Company Name/Phone: +Crime Prevention Survey Requested?: +Complaint/Reporter Present?: | **If Arson:** +Structure: +Occupied?: +Damage by: | **Taxi Robbery:** +Partition Present: +Amber Stress Light Activated: +Method of Conveyance: +Location of Pickup: | +| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------ | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------ | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | + +| Supervisor On Scene - Rank / Name / Command | Canvas Conducted: | Translator(if used): | +| --------------------------------------------- | ------------------- | ---------------------- | +| --------------------------------------------- | ------------------- | ---------------------- | + +**NARRATIVE:** + WITNESS STATES @ TIP/O THE ABOVE MENTIONED PERSON DID CALL HER AND STATED HE WAS GOING TO BURN VICTIM'S PAINTING AND SEND HER POLOROIDS OF THE BURNT PAINTINGS. THE ABOVE MENTIONED PERSON HAS KEYS TO VICTIM'S APARTMENT. + +**No NYC TRANSIT Data for Complaint # 1996-006-007241** + +| Total Victims: 1 | Total Witnesses: 1 | Total Reporters: 0 | Total Wanted: 1 | +| ------------------ | -------------------- | -------------------- | ----------------- | +| ------------------ | -------------------- | -------------------- | ----------------- | + +| **VICTIM: # 1 of 1** | Name: [REDACTED] K | Complaint#: 1996-006-007241 | +| ------------------------- | -------------------- | ----------------------------- | +| ------------------------- | -------------------- | ----------------------------- | + +| Nick/AKA/Maiden: +UMOS: +Sex/Type: FEMALE +Race: [REDACTED] +Age: 26 +Date Of Birth: 1969-11-28 +Disabled? NO + +Is this person not Proficient in English?: +If Yes, Indicate Language: +N.Y.C.H.A Resident? +Is Victim fearful for their safety / life? +Escalating violence / abuse by suspect? +Were prior DIR's prepared for C/V? | Gang/Crew Affiliation: + +Will View Photo: NO +Will Prosecute: NO +Notified Of Crime Victim Comp. Law: NO | +| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | + +| LOCATION ADDRESS CITY STATE/COUNTRY ZIP APT/ROOM | +| ----------------------------------------------------------- | +| HOME-PERMANENT 52 BARROW STREET NYC NEW YORK 100140000 4B | + +| Phone #: HOME: 212-243-8033 | | +| ----------------------------- | -------------------------------------- | +| Action against Victim: | Actions Of Victim Prior To Incident: | +| Victim Of Similar Incident: | If Yes, When And Where | + +| **WITNESS : # 1 of 1** | Name: REGAN,ANNE | Complaint #: 1996-006-007241 | +| --------------------------- | ------------------ | ------------------------------ | +| --------------------------- | ------------------ | ------------------------------ | + +| Nick/AKA/Maiden: +Sex/Type: FEMALE +Race: [REDACTED] +Age: 025 +Date Of Birth: 1971-02-07 + +Is this person not Proficient in English?: NO | Gang/Crew Affiliation: NO + +Relationship To Victim: | +| -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | + +Nick/AKA/Malden: Height: **6FT 0IN** + Sex: **MALE** Weight: **200** + Race: **[REDACTED]** Eye Color: **BLUE** + Age: **45** Hair Color: **GRAY** + Date Of Birth: -- Hair Length: **SHORT** + U.S. Citizen: Hair Style: + Place Of Birth: Skin Tone: + Is this person not Proficient in English?: Complexion: + If Yes, Indicate Language: Accent: S.S. #: , + +Order Of Protection: + Issuing Court: + Docket #: + Expiration Date: + Order of Protection Violated? + Does Suspect abuse Drugs / Alcohol? + Suspect threatened /attempted suicide? + Is the suspect Parole / Probation? + Relation to Victim: + Living together: + Can be Identified: + +Gang/Crew Affiliation: + +| LOCATION | ADDRESS | CITY | STATE/COUNTRY | ZIP | APT/ROOM | HOW LONG? | RES. PCT | +| ---------------- | ---------------------- | ---------- | --------------- | ----- | ---------- | ----------- | ---------- | +| HOME-PERMANENT | 9 EAST 71 STREET NYC | NEW YORK | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | + +Phone #: + N.Y.C.H.A. Resident: N.Y.C. Housing Employee: On Duty: + Development: N.Y.C. Transit Employee: + +Physical Force: + Used Transit System: + Station Entered: + Time Entered: + Metro Card Type: + Metro Card Used/Poses: + Card #: + +**CRIME DATA DETAILS** + +| CLOTHING | ACCESSORIES --UNKNOWN COLOR | +| ---------- | ----------------------------- | +| CLOTHING | FOOTWEAR --UNKNOWN COLOR | +| CLOTHING | HEADGEAR --UNKNOWN COLOR | +| CLOTHING | OUTERWEAR --UNKNOWN COLOR | + +**EVIDENCE:** Complaint #: **1996-006-007241** + +| Evidence Collected?: | Evidence Collection Team/Crime Scene Requested?: | ECT Responded?: | ECT Run?: | Crime Scene Responded?: | Crime Scene Number: | +| ---------------------- | -------------------------------------------------- | ----------------- | ----------- | ------------------------- | --------------------- | +| Evidence Invice #: | | | | | | + +**No IMEI Data for Complaint # 1996-006-007241** + +| Reporting/Investigating M.O.S. Name: +**PO [REDACTED] DOLOE** | Tax #: +**903605** | Command: +**006 PCT** | Rep.Agency: +**NYPD** | +| -------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------- | ---------------------------- | ---------------------------- | +| Supervisor Approving Name: +**SGT ZULCH** | Tax #: +**877156** | Command: +**006 PCT** | Rep.Agency: +**NYPD** | +| Complaint Report Entered By: +**PAA MARSALA, MARGAR** | Tax #: +**329587** | Command: +**006 PCT** | Rep.Agency: +**NYPD** | +| Signoff Supervisor Name: | Tax #: +**000000** | Command: | Rep.Agency: | + +END OF COMPLAINT REPORT + # 1996-006-007241 + +Print this Report \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777990/EFTA02777990.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777990/EFTA02777990.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9165b39a1b4954255e1a4c093d15ddfb5d71a8e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777990/EFTA02777990.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -510, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777990", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 29, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.table-boundary-padding\", \"epstein_legal.flight-log-tables.normalize\", \"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "ef08aad46bac697616541c52fb698f77cb26e97559dc61d4ab3a46c7a6ddd70d", + "output_sha256": "557292b66d4988ecf529a2354483e79e76da5cfb8cf214cc7c5c394d0c35a49b", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777993/EFTA02777993.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777993/EFTA02777993.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..50d1f7ca855127ca58f35bbdc8988a0fc47b855f --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777993/EFTA02777993.md @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +X Plaintiff, v. DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, Defendants. X + +19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF + +## DECLARATION OF LAURA A. MENNINGER IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT GHISLAINE MAXWELL'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT OR TO TRANSFER + +I, Laura A. Menninger, declare as follows: + +1. I am an attorney at law duly licensed in the State of New York and admitted to practice in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. I am a member of the law firm Haddon, and P.C., counsel of record for Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell ("Maxwell") in this action. I respectfully submit this declaration in support of Maxwell's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint or to Transfer filed in this action by Plaintiff + +2. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of a New York Police Department Report dated August 29, 1996 concerning Jeffrey Epstein, produced by Plaintiff in this matter. + +Dated: May 14, 2020 + +By: /s/ Laura A. Menninger Laura A. Menninger + +## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE + +I certify that on May 14, 2020,1 filed this Declaration of Laura A. Menninger In Support Of Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell's Motion to Dismiss with the Clerk of Court through CM/ECF, which will send notice of the filing to all parties of record. + +/s/ Nicole \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777993/EFTA02777993.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777993/EFTA02777993.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c86e521cce0be1ce1033b0ab9fe16f0e96cbee7c --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777993/EFTA02777993.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777993", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "954c3506f401b1aa61db0eea62720721337cc535f83c0d40f28836fc36df25be", + "output_sha256": "954c3506f401b1aa61db0eea62720721337cc535f83c0d40f28836fc36df25be", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777995/EFTA02777995.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777995/EFTA02777995.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5335b426f35daaad96f103c736fa36003c7f1c7b --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777995/EFTA02777995.md @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +## VIA ECF + + +The Honorable Debra C. Freeman Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007-1312 + +David Boies Telephone: (914) 749-8200 Email: dboies@bsfllp.com + +Re: v. Darren K Indyke, Richard D. Kahn, & Ghislaine Maxwell, 19-10475-LGS-DCF + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +Pursuant to Individual Rule I.D, Plaintiff hereby responds to Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell's request for a pre-motion conference in connection with her anticipated motion to stay discovery in this matter. The Court should deny Maxwell's motion for a pre-motion conference and deny her anticipated motion in its entirety because, as explained below, each of Maxwell's reasons for staying discovery is meritless and the motion is simply another attempt to unjustifiably delay this litigation. + +First, a pending criminal investigation of Maxwell does not justify a stay of discovery. "[A] stay of a civil case to permit conclusion of a related criminal prosecution has been characterized as an extraordinary remedy." Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 98 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this Circuit, courts balance the following six factors when considering whether to stay a civil case pending related criminal proceedings: + +- I) the extent to which the issues in the criminal case overlap with those presented in the civil case; 2) the status of the case, including whether the defendants have been indicted; 3) the private interests of the plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously weighed against the prejudice to plaintiffs caused by the delay; 4) the private interests of and burden on the defendants; 5) the interests of the courts; and 6) the public interest. + +Id. at 99. And according to the very case Maxwell cites in support of staying this action pending a criminal investigation: "The weight of authority in this Circuit indicates that courts will stay a civil proceeding when the criminal investigation has ripened into an indictment, but will deny a stay of the civil proceeding where no indictment has issued." In re Par Pharm., Inc. Sec. Litig., 133 F.R.D. 12, 13-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). The Court should deny Maxwell's motion for a stay without prejudice to her ability to renew her application if she is arrested. Until that happens, however, there are no grounds for a stay. + + +Page 2 + +Further, Maxwell has provided no information about the subject matter of the criminal investigation into Epstein's co-conspirators, the status of the investigation, or even disclosed whether she herself is a target of the Southern District's investigation. When Plaintiff's counsel asked Maxwell's counsel for information about the criminal investigation during their meet and confer, Maxwell's counsel refused to provide any details. "A civil defendant urging such a stay [pending a parallel criminal prosecution) bears the burden of establishing its need." Rex & Roberta Ling Living Tr. v. B Commc ins Ltd., 346 F. Supp. 3d 389, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). Maxwell therefore cannot use the existence of a criminal investigation to dodge her discovery obligations in this matter, particularly while at the same time refusing to provide any details or reasons as to why the investigation is a reason to stay the action under the law of this Circuit.' + +Second, the potential claims resolution program does not justify a stay of discovery. As this Court knows, the program cannot go forward due to the current criminal activity lien on Jeffrey Epstein's Estate in the U.S. Virgin Islands ("USVI"). See Tr. of Feb. 11, 2020 Conf. at 36:15-18 ("[T]he two cases where discover), has been stayed, in light of what's happening in the Virgin Islands, they may end up unstayed."). But even if the lien were lifted and the program could go forward tomorrow, both Epstein's Estate (Maxwell's co-defendant) and this Court have recognized that victims would still not be required to stay discovery in their cases in order to participate in the program. Tr. of Feb 11, 2020 Conf. at 6:10-18 (Estate explaining that staying litigation is not required in order to participate in the program); Tr. of Feb 11, 2020 Conf. at 17:2-3 (Court recognizing that Defendants cannot ask victims to stay their cases in order to participate in the program); Tr. of Nov. 21, 2019 Conf. at 26:10-11 ("The default in this Court is that it does not stay discovery."). Accordingly, this Court has not stayed any other action against Jeffrey Epstein's Estate in light of a potential claims administration program unless all the parties agreed to such a stay, and there is no reason to treat this case differently merely because Maxwell is named as a Defendant in addition to the Estate. Further, this Court has recognized that some discovery might, in fact, be necessary to inform the claims resolution program. Tr. of Nov. 21, 2019 Conf. at 27:8-11 ("[I]t may be that you need discovery in the litigation to have in hand certain discovery before you can figure out the right settlement for a particular case."). + +Maxwell also contends that if the program moves forward and Plaintiff chooses to participate, Maxwell will be released from liability for sexually assaulting Plaintiff when she was a child. But, again, the contours of the program have not been finalized. Even if the program moves forward and even if Plaintiff chooses to participate, it is not clear that Maxwell would be released for her torts against Plaintiff. In fact, the scope of the release that participants in the program would be required to sign is the very issue, and the sole issue, that the USVI Attorney General and Epstein's Estate are still negotiating. See Co-Executors' Corrections to Attorney + +The pending criminal investigation did not inhibit Maxwell from filing her own lawsuit against the Estate for indemnification, even though her criminal conduct would be directly at issue in that case, and the case would require discovery concerning such conduct. Maxwell v. Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, a al., ST-20-CV-155 (V.I. Super. Ct.); Willie v. Amerada Hess Corp., 66 V.I. 23, 92 (Super. Ct. 2017) (common law indemnification is only available "where an innocent party is held vicariously liable for the actions of the true tortfeasor" (emphases in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). + + +Page 3 + +General's Status Report on Voluntary Compensation Program, Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Probate No. ST-19-PB-80 (Apr. 14, 2020, V.I. Super. Ct.); Notice of Joinder of Motion for Status Conference Regarding Victim Compensation Fund, Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Probate No. ST- I9-PB-80 (Apr. 29, 2020, V.I. Super. Ct.). The claims resolution program is therefore not a valid basis to stay this action without Plaintiff's consent.2 + +Third, Maxwell contends that her motion to dismiss is "strong and warrants a stay of discovery pending its resolution." Plaintiff has already addressed the merits of Maxwell's motion to dismiss in her response to Maxwell's letter requesting a pre-motion conference on that motion. ECF No. 48. Judge Schofield's words at the pre-motion conference—in which she suggested that Maxwell's counsel not file a motion to dismiss—speak for themselves, and demonstrate that Maxwell's motion to dismiss is anything but "strong": "I've reviewed the letter from defendant Maxwell's counsel, and this particular motion doesn't strike me as any more meritorious" than the one previously contemplated by the Estate, which eventually filed an Answer in lieu of a motion to dismiss after a similar pre-motion conference before Judge Schofield. Tr. of Apr. 16, 2020 Conf. at 3:22-24. Further, this Court has explicitly stated that the default in this Court is that dispositive motions do not stay discovery, which is also consistent with Judge Schofield's individual rules. Tr. of Nov. 21, 2019 Conf. at 26:10-12; Judge Schofield's Individual Rule III.C.2. ("Absent extraordinary circumstances, the Court does not stay discovery or any other case management deadlines during the pendency of a motion to dismiss."). Maxwell's anticipated motion to dismiss should not stay discovery in this matter, just as the Estate's motions to dismiss have not stayed discovery in any other matter against it in this District. + +The Court should deny Maxwell's motion for a pre-motion conference, and deny her anticipated motion to stay discovery in this matter in its entirety. Nor is full briefing necessary to address the above issues—the anticipated motion to stay borders on frivolous in light of this Court's clear statements about staying cases against Epstein's Estate and Judge Schofield's advice to Maxwell to refrain from filing a motion to dismiss. Maxwell has already failed to comply with her discovery obligations in this matter, in effect granting herself a de facto stay, and providing for a full, three-week briefing schedule on her anticipated motion to stay will only give her another incentive to continue to delay. Fact discovery in this matter ends in less than two months, and we respectfully submit that her delay tactics should end now. + +Respectfully submitted, + +/s/ David Boies + +David Boies, Esq. + +cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF) + +{sup}`2`Maxwell also argues that the fact that Plaintiff's sister (and a few other victims) have voluntarily stayed their cases in light of a potential claims resolution program warrants a ruling that Plaintiff must stay her case as well. This makes no sense. Plaintiff and her sister filed separate actions and are separate litigants. Plaintiffs sister's decisions do not bind Plaintiff, nor do any other victims' decisions. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777995/EFTA02777995.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777995/EFTA02777995.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..641e012c0c3994c89b97b76b8169c9d202cc3590 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777995/EFTA02777995.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -43, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777995", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 2, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "9b34b5473aa44fb5200379398acd61ee6146a6f0c7241f233e5908911122b847", + "output_sha256": "ff7321b9ff0d72c3d7d648a02a0b2064f4ec6d130c2622ad67e72a1fbda084e1", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777998/EFTA02777998.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777998/EFTA02777998.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e40f35059fc55016cd0c00d8d46f15a9c2796be6 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777998/EFTA02777998.md @@ -0,0 +1,352 @@ +# EXHIBIT A + +## FILED + +hpu: 14, 0 + +TAM \ RN HARLES + +#### CLERK OF THE COURT IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVISION OF ST. AND ST. JOHN \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* \*\*\*\* \*\*\*\*\*\* \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* + +IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, Deceased. PROBATE NO. ST-19-PB-80 ACTION FOR TESTATE ADMINISTRATION + +#### CO-EXECUTORS' CORRECTIONS TO ATTORNEY GENERAL'S STATUS REPORT ON VOLUNTARY COMPENSATION PROGRAM AND RENEWED REOUEST FOR RULING + +On March 24, 2020, the Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (the "Estate"), DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, asked the Court to grant their Expedited Motion for Establishment of a Voluntary Claims Resolution Program, filed November 14, 2019, and allow the Co-Executors to move forward with that Program as carefully constructed in consultation with claimants' counsel and leading independent claims program experts. + +The Co-Executors hereby renew their request. Because the Attorney General of the Virgin Islands has no standing in this Court to seek to re-shape the Program to suit her whims demanding changes that go against the considered views of the Co-Executors, recommendations of nationally recognized experts in the field, and endorsement by multiple claimants' counsel the Court should reject her continued efforts to undermine the Program. As detailed below, the Attorney General's most recent Status Report (filed April 7, 2020) substantially misrepresents the actual state of affairs regarding the Program, and requires correction. + +#### 1. The Attorney General Misrepresents Claimants' Position Regarding the Proeram's Third-Party Release + +The Attorney General informs the Court that she and claimants' counsel are aligned on rejecting the third-party release (the "Release") that those claimants who elect to receive + +compensation under the Program would execute. (See 4/7/2020 AG Status Report at 2-3.)' That is false. On the very day that the Attorney General made that (mis)representation to the Court, the two most active claimants' counsel — together, representing by far the largest number of claimants — informed the Co-Executors and the Attorney General that they are prepared to proceed with the Program without change to the existing Release. + +The evidence on this point is undisputed. On the morning of April 7, 2020, David Boies of Boies Schiller Flexner LLP (counsel for at least five prospective claimants) informed the Co-Executors that the existing Release was acceptable as written: + +"I spoke with [counsel for the Co-Executors] this morning. I am now in agreement that we should move forward with the claims process without trying to further modify the fRJelease. + +I am influenced by the desirability of getting the [P]rograrn underway so that our clients can begin getting compensation; by the fact that the [R]elease will be limited to persons who provided services to Epstein, with the [Re]lease signed by individual victims who accept an award having a space to make clear that certain individuals . . . are not released, and by the fact that the release of Epstein's employees/service providers will be taken into account by the [Program] Administrator in setting the amount of the award. And, of course, this is a voluntary process where our clients get to decide whether to be bound after learning the amount of the proposed award." + +(See email from David Boies dated April 7, 2020 to and counsel for the Co-Executors, copy attached here as Exhibit B; emphasis supplied.) + +Claimants' counsels' intent to proceed with the Program including the Release as written was known to the Attorney General before she informed the Court otherwise. On April 6, 2020 — the day before the Attorney General filed her most recent Status Report — lead counsel for some two dozen other prospective claimants told her exactly that. Writing to Mr. Boies, + +{sup}`1.` A copy of the Release, provided on March 16, 2020 by the Co-Executors to the Attorney General and claimants' counsel, is attached hereto as Exhibit A. + +explained his agreement to accept the Release as written, and noted that he had the day before told the Attorney General of that fact: + +"We are now both on the same page. I would like, with your permission to forward that email Mr. Boies' email quoted infra, approving the Release as written] to the AG, as I voiced a very sins liar position to her yesterday." + +(See email from dated April 7, 2020 to David Boies and counsel for the Co-Executors; copy attached as Exhibit C).2 + +It is one thing for the Attorney General, who has no experience or expertise with mass tort compensation programs, to inveigh against the Program. It is quite another for her to misrepresent to the Court that claimants' counsel join in her criticism of the Release. They do not. + +#### 2. The Attorney General Misrepresents the Scope of the Release, Which is Designed to Prevent "Double Dipping" by Claimants + +The Attorney General also misrepresents the scope of the Release, asserting that the Estate seeks the release of "any party" who themselves participated in wrongdoing, including "individuals for whom the Estate has no liability." (See 4/7/2020 AG Status Report at 3.) Again, that is false. + +The Release is closely modeled on releases employed in multiple voluntary compensation programs administered by the Program Administrator and Designers, including the sexual abuse scandals currently faced by the Catholic Church. Contrary to the Attorney General's claim, it does not include "any party" who committed wrongdoing, nor have the Co-Executors ever proposed + +{sup}`2.` Both Mr. Boles and the Co-Executors immediately consented to Mr. request Mr. Boies' email with the Attorney General, who thus had both Mr. Boies' and Mr. statements accepting the Release as written before she filed her misleading Status Report with the Court. + +that it would.3 Rather, as the Co-Executors have explained several times to the Attorney General, the Release is aimed at protecting the assets of the Estate by ensuring that an individual claimant does not "double dip" — i.e., she cannot both elect to (1) receive full compensation from the Estate through the Program, and also (2) sue individuals affiliated with the Estate who may well implead the Estate under doctrines of contribution, indemnification, respondeat superior or otherwise.' The Co-Executors' duties under Virgin Islands law require them to protect the Estate's assets, including for the benefit of its creditors and claimants. The Release is indispensable in achieving that result. + +Nor should the Court accept the Attorney General's straw-man formulation that, "[a]ssuming a fairly bargained transaction, the Estate would have to offer increased compensation to victims to secure the third-party release to satisfy claims for which it has no legal responsibility." (4/7/2020 AG Status Report at 4.) As explained above, the Release is not aimed at claims for + +"The Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (the 'Epstein Estate'), the Co-Trustees of The 1953 Trust, the Epstein Estate, any entities owned or controlled in whole or part by the Estate (the 'Epstein Entities') and their respective current and former principals, officers, directors, stockholders, managers, members, partners, limited partners, trustees, beneficiaries, administrators, agents, employees, attorneys, predecessors, successors, assigns and affiliates, and any entities or individuals who are or have ever been engaged by (whether as independent contractors or otherwise), employed by, worked in any capacity for, or provided any services to Mr. Epstein, the Epstein Entities or the Epstein Estate." (Ex. A at 1-2.) + +The Release specifically provides that it will not release third parties unaffiliated with the Epstein Entities, including individuals specified by the claimant. (Id. at 4.) + +{sup}`3.` The subjects of the Release are limited to the individuals or entities affiliated with or who provided services to Mr. Epstein, as follows: + +{sup}`4.` This is no theoretical risk. On March 12, 2020, one of the primary individuals alleged to have worked as a "recruiter" of young women for Mr. Epstein brought suit in the Virgin Islands against the Estate and the Co-Executors, demanding indemnification. Ghislaine Maxwell v. Estate of Jeffrey E. et at, Civil Case No ST-20-CV-155 (Superior Court of the Virgin Islands, Division of St. and St. John). + +which the Estate "has no legal responsibility". Rather, its function is exactly the opposite: the Release's acknowledged purpose is to avoid having the Estate pulled into litigation by individuals who claim that the Estate is legally responsible for their actions. And, as claimants' counsel Mr. Boies recognized, the Program will properly offer compensation to legitimate claimants that reflects their release of any third parties who are affiliated with Mr. Epstein or the Estate. + +Consistent with their fiduciary duties, the Co-Executors determined that the benefits of including within the Release those individuals who Maxwell has already done) that the Estate bears financial responsibility for the claims against them, substantially outweighs the downside of not requiring a release of those persons. Those downsides include that the Co-Executors would be forced to (1) litigate against the very claimants the Estate will have compensated through the Program and thereby sought to both avoid being adverse to those claimants and incurring the financial costs of litigating against them; (2) litigate alongside persons for harms caused by their alleged conduct for which the Estate has already paid the plaintiff; and (3) pay twice for any harm caused by Mr. Epstein if the damages awarded in that litigation focus not just on the conduct of the released person but also Mr. Epstein's conduct.' + +#### 3. The Attorney General Lacks Standing to Re-Shape the Program Developed by the Co-Executors and Experts in the Field + +More than two months ago — but five months after the Co-Executors and the independent claims program experts began working arduously to establish the Program — the Attorney General sought to intervene in this probate proceeding in order to oppose the Co-Executors' + +{sup}`5.` The Court should not credit the Attorney General's bizarre complaint that some claimants "may not even know the identity of their abusers," and thus could not specify them in the liability carve-out of the Release. (4/7/2020 AG Status Report at 3.) None of the 32 claimants who have filed lawsuits to date has been unable to identify her claimed abuser. Moreover, any claimant who cannot identify a purported abuser would not succeed in litigation against that person, since one cannot enforce a money judgment against an unnamed, unknown party. + +implementation of the Program.6 At the hearing on February 4, 2020, during which the Attorney General displayed her disregard for probate procedures and the Court's statutory authority, the Court expressly denied the Attorney General's motion. (February 4, 2020 Hearing Tr. at 98:8-12.) Accordingly, the Attorney General has no standing to demand that the Court re-shape the Program to suit her preferences or priorities. That includes her most recent demand that the Court ignore the Co-Executors, claimants' counsel and acknowledged experts in the field in order to rewrite the text of the Release. + +Just as the Attorney General sought to position herself as a substitute for the Court in reviewing and approving the Co-Executors' regular administration of the Estate, she now seeks to assume the mantle of Program overseer: demanding that her own hand-picked choice (Marci be placed on the Program's payroll; requiring that S25 million from the Estate be made unavailable to pay legitimate claimants through the Program;' and rewriting the scope of the Release when everyone but her — including claimants' counsel, whose clients (unlike the Attorney General) would sign the Release — has accepted that Release as written. That is improper. + +The Attorney General has no right to inject herself into the Program, dictating its policies, procedures and administration. To allow her to do so would rob the Program of its independence, one of its most critical attributes. And the Attorney General has no business forcing the Court to act as umpire on each of her dissatisfactions with the Program; as the Court indicated on more than one occasion, it is up to the Co-Executors — acting as duly appointed extensions of the Court — + +{sup}`6.` See Attorney General's Motion to Intervene, filed January 23, 2020 (attaching Government's Opposition to Estate's Motion for Establishment of a Voluntary Claims Program). + +{sup}`7.` The Attorney General's separate CICO action would, if successful, remove an additional approximately \$150 million from the Estate's assets. Her public pronouncements notwithstanding, the Attorney General has never offered to make a penny of those Funds available to victims of sexual abuse. + +Estate obljrey E. Epstein Probate No. ST-19-PB-80 Co-Executors' Corrections to AG's Status Report & Renewed Request for Ruling Page 7 + +to fulfill their fiduciary duties to the Estate. As designed and to be implemented by nationally recognized experts, and as approved by virtually every claimants' counsel, the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program accomplishes that precise goal, + +As in their March 24, 2020 application, the Co-Executors again ask the Court to allow them to continue to perform their fiduciary duties, and — for the benefit of all stakeholders in the Estate, including those women who seek to participate in the Program — grant their motion to establish the Program as originally conceived and presented to the Court on November 14, 2019. + +Respectfully, + +Dated: April 10, 2020 Is/ Kroblin, Esq. KROBLIN, ESQ. + +ANDREW W. HEYMANN, ESQ. + +WILLIAM L. BLUM, ESQ. + +SHARI N. D'ANDRADE, ESQ. + +MARJORIE WHALEN, ESQ. + +V.I. Bar Nos. 966, 266, 136, 1221 & R2019 + +alms Pities Building + +HALS KROBLIN PLLC + + .tS. 1•02 Estate• + +9053 Suite 101 + +Tele! ce: (340) 779-2564 + +Facsimile: (888) 316-9269 + +Email: ckroblin@kellfencom + +aheymann@solblum.com + +wblum@solblum.com + +sdandrado@kellfercom + +mwhalen@kellfer.com + +Mr. Boles' co-counsel, Kevin D'Amour, echoed the statements of numerous claimants' counsel at the February 4, 2020 hearing: "I think if we go forward with this program we arc going to see great results and I think we are going to have a much better outcome if we can go forward with this program as soon as possible." (February 4, 2020 Hearing Tr. at 88:15-19.) The Court summarized the view of those present at that hearing, noting as follows: "I think we agreed that everybody believes this program is a great program..." (Id. at 113:24-25.) + +Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein Probate No. ST- 19-PB-80 Co-Executors' Corrections to AG's Status Report & Renewed Request for Ruling Page 8 + +#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE + +I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 10th day of April 2020,1 caused a true and exact copy of the foregoing Co-Executors' Corrections to Attorney General's Status Report on Voluntary Compensation Program and Renewed Request for Ruling to be served via electronic mail upon: + +John H. Benham, Esq. Law Office of John H. Benham, P.C. P.O. Box 11720 St. MK VI 00801 john@benhamlawvi.com + +Douglas B. Chanco, Esq. ChancoSchiffer P.C. 3355 Lenox Road, Suite 750 Atlanta, GA 30326 doug@csfirm.com + +Richard Bourne-Vanneck, Esq. Law Offices of Richard Bourne-Vanneck 9800 Buccaneer Mall Suite #9 St. M, VI 00802 richard@,r)pvblawoffices.com + +John K. Dema Law Offices of John K. Dema 1236 Strand Street, Suite 103 St. Croix, VI jdema@demalaw.com + +Denise N. Esq. Attorney General April M. M, Esq. Chief, Civil Division Virgin Islands Department of Justice 34-38 Krondprinsdens Gade GERS Complex, 2nd Floor St. Virgin Islands 00804 + +A. Jeffrey Weiss, Esq. A.J. Weiss & Associates 6934 Vessup Lane St. M, VI 00802 jejfiveiss@weisslaw-vi.net + +Sean Marjorie Rawls P.C. P.O. Box 6347 St. M, V100804 sean@madorierobertspc.com + +Kevin F. D'Amour Gaylin Vogel, Esq. 5143 Palm Passage, 18b & 19b St. , VI 00802 kevin.damour@comcast.net gaylin.vogel@comcast.net + +Melody D. Westfall, Esq. Westfall Law PLLC 5032 Anchor Way, Suite 8 Christiansted, St. Croix 00820 mwestfall@westfalllaw.com + +Is/ Kroblin + +![](_page_9_Picture_3.jpeg) + +Marjorie whalen cmwhaien@kelifer.com> + +## FW: EVCP - General Release + + +Weiner, Daniel H. cdaniel.weinerahugheshubbard.com> Fri, Apr 10, 2020 at 11:58 AM To: l'cicroblin©kellfer.com" , Shari D'Andrade , Marjorie Whalen + +Daniel H. Weiner I Partner + +Hughes Hubbard & LLP + +One Battery Park Plaza. 15th floor I New York. NY 10004-1482 Office +1 (212) 837-6874 Cell +1 (917) 574-3407 Fax .1 (212) 299-6874 daniel.wener(ittnugh.eshubbard.com I bo + +This message contains confidential information and is intended only for the individual named. If you are not the named addressee you should not disseminate, distribute or copy this e-mall. Please notify the sender immediately by e-mail if you have received this e-mail by mistake and delete this e-mail from your system. E-mall transmission cannot be guaranteed to be secure or error-free as information could he Intercepted, corrupted, lost, destroyed, arrive late or incomplete, or contain viruses. The sender therefore does not accept liability for any errors or omissions In the contents of this message, which arise as a result of e-mail transmission. II verification is required please request a hard-copy version. + +From: Weiner, Daniel H. + +Sent: Monday, March 16, 2020 10:03 PM + +To: Linda' + +Cc: < >.' amela.tepper vi. ovtcpamelatepper@vi.gov>; + +>; 'Brad : + +Prittany@eplIc.com. dirittany©eplic.com>; Tombacic, Andrew' ; Chris Kroblin ckroblin@kellfercomn icscott@motleyrice.comicscott@motleyrice.com> + +Subject: EVCP - General Release + +Linda - + +As requested, we attach a proposed release to be executed by those claimants who elect to accept compensation through the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program. + +Best, + +Dan + +![](_page_9_Picture_23.jpeg) + +![](_page_9_Picture_26.jpeg) + +## EPSTEIN VICTIMS' COMPENSATION PROGRAM ("EVCP") + +## GENERAL RELEASE + +This General Release is made this day of 20 . + +WHEREAS, (the "Claimant"), submitted a claim for compensation to the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program ("EVCP") asserting that she is a victim of sexual abuse by Jeffrey E. Epstein; and + +WHEREAS, the EVCP Program Administrator (the "Administrator") determined pursuant to the EVCP Protocol that Claimant is eligible to participate in the EVCP; and + +WHEREAS, after reviewing Claimant's submissions and after careful consideration of documentation and proof, and after due deliberation, the Administrator issued a compensation determination to Claimant ("Compensation Offer"); and + +WHEREAS, several jurisdictions within the United States have enacted claims revival statutes concerning the timeliness of claims of sexual abuse; and + +WHEREAS, Claimant is aware that, by accepting this Compensation Offer from the EVCP, Claimant waives and releases certain individuals and entities from any and all claims or causes of action arising from Mr. Epstein's conduct, whether pursuant to claims revival statutes or otherwise; and + +WHEREAS, after careful consideration of the proposed Compensation Offer, including consultation with her legal counsel regarding the Compensation Offer, Claimant informed the Administrator that Claimant has decided to accept the Compensation Offer. + +### NOW THEREFORE, + +Claimant, , for and on behalf of herself and her heirs, devisees, legatees, distributees, executors, administrators, trustees, personal representatives, successors and assigns (collectively, "Releasor"), for and in consideration of Dollars (\$ ) (the Compensation Offer) to be received from the EVCP, the adequacy and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, hereby releases and forever discharges the Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (the "Epstein Estate"), the Co-Trustees of The 1953 Trust, the Epstein Estate, any entities owned or controlled in whole or part by the Epstein Estate (the + +"Epstein Entities") and their respective current and former principals, officers, directors, stockholders, managers, members, partners, limited partners, trustees, beneficiaries, administrators, agents, employees, attorneys, predecessors, successors, assigns and affiliates, and any entities or individuals who are or have ever been engaged by (whether as independent contractors or otherwise), employed by, worked in any capacity for, or provided any services to Mr. Epstein, the Epstein Entities or the Epstein Estate (jointly and severally, the "Releasees"), from any and all claims, demands, actions, causes of action, suits, debts, dues, sums of money, accounts, variances, trespasses, damages and judgments, whether sounding in equity, tort, common law, contract, statute, regulation or otherwise and whether now existing, hereafter existing or revived in the future whatsoever in law, admiralty, equity or otherwise, including without limitation any and all claims or causes of action that arise or may arise from or which otherwise concern acts of sexual abuse by Mr. Epstein (the "Claims") which against the Releasees, Releasor ever had, now have or hereafter can, shall or may have, for, upon, or by reason of any matter, cause or thing whatsoever from the beginning of the world through the date of this General Release. + +This General Release is a broad release of any and all Claims of Releasor against any and all Releasees, including without limitation any and all causes of action, lawsuits, claims, demands, damages and liability whatsoever, and also including without limitation to the extent of their respective liability for the same, any and all such claims against any and all Releasees for contribution as to any other person or persons who may be determined to have been joint tortfeasors arising out of or in any way related to any and all known and unknown personal injuries, and also including without limitation any derivative claims for loss of consortium, under any federal, state or local law, without limitation. This General Release is all-encompassing and is specifically made and given on the premise that any and all Claims by Releasor are hereby released and extinguished, whether said Claims arose in Florida, New Mexico, New York, the United States Virgin Islands, France or any other country, state, territory, possession or jurisdiction, or otherwise. + +This General Release extends to released Claims that Releasor does not know or suspect to exist in her favor, which, if known by Releasor, would have materially affected her decision to enter into this General Release, and Releasor understands and agrees that she is releasing any and all such unknown or unsuspected Claims in Releasor's favor. Releasor acknowledges that she is familiar with Section 1542 of the California Civil Code, which provides as follows: + +A GENERAL RELEASE DOES NOT EXTEND TO CLAIMS THAT THE CREDITOR OR RELEASING PARTY DOES NOT KNOW OR SUSPECT TO EXIST IN HIS OR HER FAVOR AT THE TIME OF EXECUTING THE RELEASE AND THAT, IF KNOWN BY HIM OR HER, WOULD HAVE MATERIALLY AFFECTED HIS OR HER SETTLEMENT WITH THE DEBTOR OR RELEASED PARTY. + +Releasor expressly waives and relinquishes any right or benefit that Releasor has or may have under Section 1542 of the California Civil Code and under any other statute or legal principle with similar effect. In connection with such waiver and relinquishment Releasor acknowledges that she is aware that, after executing this General Release, Releasor or Releasor's attorneys or agents may discover released Claims or facts in addition to, or different from, those which they now know or believe to exist with respect to the subject matter of this General Release, but that it is Releasor's intent hereby to fully, finally and forever settle and release all of the Claims, whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, which now exist, may exist, or heretofore may have existed. In furtherance of this intent, this General Release shall be, and remain in effect as, a full and complete release of the Claims notwithstanding the discovery or existence of any such additional or different Claims or facts. + +The Administrator of the EVCP has retained to confirm that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS") and Medicaid will not assert any reimbursement claim or lien with respect to compensation awarded to any participating claimant under the EVCP; provided, however, that if either entity does assert any such interest, is hereby authorized to act on behalf of the EVCP to verify and resolve such lien or reimbursement claim. Releasor agrees to allow the Administrator to provide to certain information as to Releasor, including: (1) first name, last name and middle initial, (2) Social Security number; (3) date of birth, (4) gender and (5) basic information regarding the nature of Releasor's Claims, and hereby authorizes the Administrator and to use, exchange and report this information to Medicare, if necessary, for purposes of ensuring compliance with the Medicare Secondary Payer Act 42 U.S.C. § 1395(y)(b), and its accompanying regulations. + +Releasor represents and acknowledges that she is voluntarily and freely granting this General Release in exchange for payment of the Compensation Offer, and that she is legally competent to execute and deliver this General Release. Releasor further represents that she is represented by legal counsel and has received legal advice prior to entering into this General Release and that she has been advised by said attorney regarding the terms and conditions of this General Release, which she has completely read and fully understands, including that accepting the Compensation Offer and signing + +this General Release is a full and final compromise, adjustment and resolution of any and all Claims that Releasor may now have or ever will have against Releasees. + +Pursuant to the EVCP Protocol, the Administrator will maintain the confidentiality of all information and documentation relating to claimants who participate in the EVCP Program. This General Release does not require participating claimants to maintain such confidentiality and Releasor may — at Releasor's voluntary and sole option — disclose such information regarding the claims process and/or the Compensation Offer and any other information pertaining to her claim. + +This General Release specifically does not include as a Releasee or released party under this Agreement, and all parties expressly acknowledge, agree and understand that any and all claims that Releasor has or may have against are expressly preserved. + +Releasor represents and warrants that she has not assigned any Claims released pursuant to this General Release. + +As soon as is reasonably practicable after payment of the Compensation Offer is made, and in no event later than three (3) business days from the date thereof, Releasor will dismiss with prejudice any legal actions — whether lawsuits, probate claims or otherwise - that Releasor has filed against any of Releasees, with each party to bear her, his or its own costs and attorneys fees. + +This General Release contains the entire understanding of the Releasor and the Co-Executors of the Epstein Estate. Any modification of any of the provisions of this General Release shall be effective only if made in writing and executed by Releasor and the Co-Executors of the Epstein Estate with the same formality as this General Release. + +IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Claimant has executed this General Release on the date below her signature. + +(Signature: Claimant) + +(Date) + +STATE OF + +ss: + +COUNTY OF + +On , 20\_, before me personally came to me known, who, by me duly sworn, did depose and say that deponent is the Releasor who executed the foregoing General Release. + +Notary Public + +Reviewed and approved: + +Type (or print) Name of Claimant + +Attorney for Releasor: + +Type (or print) Name of Attorney: + +Signature: + +![](_page_16_Picture_3.jpeg) + +## FW: Where we are + + +Weiner, Daniel H. Fri, Apr 10, 2020 at 12:00 PM + +To: "ckroblin@kellfer.com" , Shari D'Andrade , Marjorie Whalen + +Daniel H. Weiner l Partner + +Hughes Hubbard &MLLP + +One Battery Park Plaza, 15th Boor I New York, NY 10004-1482 + +Office +1 (212) 837-6874 I Cell +1 (917) 574.3407' I Fax +1 (212) 299-6874 + +rl weinerahugheshubbare.comlbio + +This message contains confidential information and is intended only for the individual named. If you are not the named addressee you should not disseminate, distribute or copy this e-mall. Please notify the sender Immediately by e-mail If you have received this e-mail by mistake and delete this e-mail from your system. E-mail transmission cannot be guaranteed to be secure or error-free as Information could be Intercepted, corrupted, lost, destroyed, arrive late or incomplete, or contain viruses. The sender therefore does not accept liability for any errors or omissions in the •FiC . arise as a result Of e-mail transmission. If venfication is required please request a hard-coDy version. + +—Original Message— + +From: David Boies + +Sent: Tuiliaril 7, 2020 10:48 AM + +To: Brad cbradigeplIc.com> + +Cc: Weiner, nI n H. + +Subject: Where we are + +CAUTION: This email was sent by someone outside of the Firm. + +I spoke with Dan and Andy (whom I am copying) this morning. I am now in agreement that we should move forward with the claims process without trying to further modify the release. I am influenced by the desirability of getting the program underway so that our clients can begin getting compensation; by the fact that the release will be limited to persons who provided services to Epstein, with the lease signed by individual victims who accept an award having a space to make clear that certain individuals (e.g., Prince Andrew or others to whom our clients were trafficked) are not released; and by the fact that the release of Epstein's employees/service providers will be taken into account by the Administrator in setting the amount of the award. And, of course, this is a voluntary process where our clients get to decide whether to be bound after learning the amount of the proposed award. + +![](_page_16_Picture_24.jpeg) + +![](_page_17_Picture_3.jpeg) + +## FW: Where we are + + +Marjorie whalen + +Weiner, Daniel H. Fri, Apr 10, 2020 at 12:02 PM + +To: "ckroblin@kelifercom" . Shari D'Andrade . Marjorie Whalen + +Daniel H. Weiner Partner + +Hughes Hubbard &MLLP + +One Battery Park Plaza. 15th floor I New York, NY 10004-1482 Office 1 (212)837-6874 I Cell +1 (917) 574-3407 Fax +1 (212) 299-6874 daniel.weiner hugheshubbard.com I bio + +This message contains confidential information and is intended only for the individual named. If you are not the named addressee you should not disseminate, distribute or copy this e-mail. Please notify the sender immediately by e-mail if you have received this e-mail by mistake and delete this e-mail from your system. E-mail transmission cannot be guaranteed to be secure or error-free as Information could be intercepted, corrupted, lost, destroyed, arrive late or incomplete, or contain viruses. The sender therefore does not accept liability for any errors or omissions In the contents of this message, which arise as a result of e-mail transmission. If verification is required please request a hard-copy version. + +—Original + +From: Brad + +Sent: Tuesday, April 7, 2020 11:00 AM + +To: David Boles + +Cc: Weiner. Daniel H. ; Andrew Tomback + +Subject: Re: Where we are + +CAUTION: This email was sent by someone outside of the Firm. + +We are now both on the same page. I would like, with your permission, to forward that email to the AG, as I voiced a very similar position to her yesterday. + +Sent from my iPhone + +> On Apr 7, 2020, at 10:48 AM, David Boies wrote: + +> I spoke with Dan and Andy (whom I am copying) this morning. I ant now in agreement that we should move forward with the claims process Without trying to further modify the release. I am influenced by the desirability of getting the program underway so that our clients can begin getting compensation; by the fact that the release will be limited to persons who provided services to Epstein, with the lease signed by individual victims who accept an award having a space to make clear that certain individuals (e.g., Prince Andrew or others to whom our clients were trafficked) are not released; and by the fact that the release of Epstein's employees/service providers will be taken into account by the Administrator in setting the amount of the award. And, of course, this is a voluntary process where our dents get to decide whether to be bound after learning the amount of the proposed award. + +![](_page_17_Picture_25.jpeg) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777998/EFTA02777998.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777998/EFTA02777998.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a3efffb30505b6a9ada0075cf20a585ba8e63926 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02777998/EFTA02777998.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -58, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02777998", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 2, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "0bf3b3aebee3a8c662cfbcdb117ab0358e5e3511ef7d21a4e38dc3c4c4b1789c", + "output_sha256": "86fcd4555e11baca059ae0ecf76bce902c61ec86ab537ef9c9ce20f6e967947c", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778016/EFTA02778016.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778016/EFTA02778016.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c9cde417607db41bc140761551eb733c50cdaa9f --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778016/EFTA02778016.md @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +Haddon, and r.c Laura A. Menninger + +150 East 10th Avenue Denver, Colorado 80203 PH 303.831.7364 FX 303.832.2628 www.hmflaw.com Imenningeahmflaw.com + + +VIA ECF + +Hon. Debra Freeman United States Magistrate Judge Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007-1312 + +Re: 19-cv- 10475 (LGS-DCF), v. Darren K. lndyke, et al. + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +I write to reply in further support of Ms. Ghislaine Maxwell's request for a pm-motion conference to discuss a Motion to Stay Discovery in this matter. + +Plaintiff's ad hominem attacks notwithstanding, this Court has the power pursuant to Rule 26(c) to stay discovery "for good cause shown," regardless of whether the opposing party consents to the stay or whether a claims program requires that she do so. Spencer Trask Software & Info. Servs., LLC v. RPost Intl Ltd., 206 F.R.D. 367, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Good cause in this case exists for three independent reasons, balanced against the expansive discovery Plaintiff seeks against Ms. Maxwell (and the other Defendants). + +First, Plaintiff's intended imminent participation in the U.S.V.I. Voluntary Claims Program likely will, contrary to her counsel's claim, render this lawsuit moot. Plaintiff's counsel asserts "it is not clear that Maxwell would be released for her torts against Plaintiff" (Resp. at 2); in fact, Mr. Boies approved the release covering all Epstein employees (including Ms. Maxwell) for legal actions such as Plaintiff's which falsely accuse Ms. Maxwell of sexual assault. See Co-Executors' Corrections to Attorney General's Status Report on Voluntary Compensation Program and Renewed Request for Ruling at 2 & Ex. B, Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Probate No. ST-19-PB-80 (Apr. 14, 2020, V.I. Super. Ct) (attached as Exhibit A). Plaintiff concededly intends to participate in the Program; she recently asked the U.S.V.I. Probate Court for a status conference to help launch the Program. According to reports, the Program is expected to make its payments at the early part of August, so any stay likely would be brief. + + +Page 2 + +That the Program does not itself require participants to stay their litigation does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction to do so for good cause. Each dollar that the Estate spends on discovery in this and other cases by Plaintiff's counsel is one less dollar available through the fund for any of Mr. Epstein's other accusers. It would seem an inherent conflict of interest for one accuser represented by the same counsel ( ) to voluntarily stay her case "to conserve resources" of the Court and parties only to have another accuser (her sister, Plaintiff) with the same counsel drive up litigation costs with expansive discovery requests and dozens of depositions. + +Second, the ongoing criminal investigation, despite Plaintiff's feigned ignorance of its existence' and despite Ms. Maxwell not having been arrested or charged, further justifies a stay. This Circuit's six factors all support a stay, regardless of whether in most cases a mere investigation is insufficient to warrant one. + +It is the height of irony that Plaintiff's counsel demands Ms. Maxwell provide the "subject matter" and "status" of any criminal investigation. It is Plaintiff's counsel themselves who have attempted to foment such a prosecution against Ms. Maxwell, including through extrajudicial commentary well beyond the bounds of Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6. See, e.g., Kevin G.., "Ghislaine Maxwell says she was Epstein's employee not his madam," Miami Herald (Mar. 18, 2020) (quoting Sigrid McCawley, "It is absolutely appalling that Ghislaine Maxwell, who committed crimes with Epstein against these victims, is seeking to drain funds from the very estate that should be paying the Epstein victims' claims...We view her actions as unconscionable but this is an individual who lost sight of right from wrong a very long time ago."). And it is Plaintiff's counsel who claim (to the press at least) to be behind the prosecution. E.g., Andrew Denney and Bruce Golding, "Jeffrey Epstein's no-bail ruling may encourage more accusers to come forward," NY Post (July 18, 2019 ("McCawley wouldn't identify her new clients but said she encouraged them to report their alleged abuse to the FBI. McCawley declined to say if any had been interviewed by the feds, but Manhattan federal prosecutor Alex Rossmiller on Monday told Berman that the case against Epstein was 'getting stronger every day."). + +The reasons for a stay pending resolution of a criminal investigation are obvious. Ms. Maxwell should be afforded the presumption of innocence, and the other constitutional protections, inherent in a criminal case. While Plaintiff makes veiled threats about Ms. Maxwell's eventual "arrest", she does nothing to dispute the fact that she intends to depose Ms. Maxwell in short order and will thus force her into the Hobbesian choice of whether to testify or reserve a decision on testifying until + +See. e.g.. Daniel M, "Prince Andrew ignores three formal requests to be interviewed under oath about his friendship with paedophile Jeffrey Epstein," Daily Mail (May 3, 2020) ("Mr. Boies said he was confident prosecutors would persist. 'I've got quite a bit of confidence that they will not let this drop,' he added.") (littpsdAntay.dailyttiaitco.ukInews/article-8281419/Prince-Andrew-ignores-threefonnal-reguests-interviewed.him0 + + +Page 3 + +appropriately determined in any criminal prosecution, or until the U.S. Attorney's Office clears Ms. Maxwell from any involvement in alleged sexual abuse. + +Finally, contrary to Plaintiff's assertion, the strength of Ms. Maxwell's Motion to Dismiss should be judged by its content, not by a pre-motion conference request letter nor by motions to dismiss filed by other defendants in other actions. As is clear from her now-filed Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 70), the claims against Ms. Maxwell are barred by the applicable statute of limitations and venue is improper in New York. + +Good cause for a stay may be shown where a party (1) has filed a dispositive motion, (2) the stay is for a short period of time, and (3) the opposing party will not be prejudiced by the stay. Additional factors include the breadth of discovery sought and the burden of responding to it. Spencer Trask Software, supra, 206 F.R.D. at 368. Here, it would be hard to over-state the breadth of discovery requests posed by Plaintiff. Thus far, Plaintiff has interposed — and Ms. Maxwell has objected but responded to — 63 Requests for Production and 33 Interrogatories. Plaintiff contends the "relevant period" for discovery dates from 1996 until today and has sought for those 24 years, inter alia, all "calendars", all "address books," all purchase history for any Amazon.com account ever used, all funding for Ms. Maxwell's char organization, and all documents "produced by You or Epstein in discovery in v. Maxwell." Discovery requests propounded by the same Plaintiff's counsel similar to those propounded here gave rise tosyr1 1,000 docket entries, almost exclusive) discovery disputes, in v. Maxwell See generally, Docket, v. Maxwell, Case No. 15-cv-07433 (S.D.N.Y.). + +Plaintiff contends there is no reason to treat Ms. Maxwell differently than the Estate. To the contrary, Ms. Maxwell is facing one lawsuit — not 16. Unlike the Estate, she is not a multi-millionaire and must self-fund her defense against the extensive discovery sought by Plaintiff.2 Ms. Maxwell's defenses are significantly different than Mr. Epstein's; indeed, she absolutely denies that she participated in this or any other sexual abuse or trafficking or assault, and no court, judge or jury has ever determined that she has. + +There are a number of intermediate options available under Rule 26, including a bifurcation of discovery on the statute of limitations first, limitations to just paper discovery for the period of stay (which is de facto the case during the Covid crisis in any event) or a stay on Ms. Maxwell's deposition until the other matters have been resolved. A full briefing on these matters is appropriate. + +{sup}`2`The fact that Ms. Maxwell is simultaneously pursuing indemnification from the Estate for legal fees incurred as a result of her employment with Mr. Epstein twenty or more years ago has no bearing on the request for a stay. As Mr. Epstein himself wrote before his death, Ms. Maxwell has done nothing wrong, and she has every right to be indemnified for litigation against her that resulted from her employment by Mr. Epstein. + +Hon. Debra Freeman May 19, 2020 Page 4 Respectfully Submitted, + +C Laura A. Menninger + +CC: Counsel of Record via ECF \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778016/EFTA02778016.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778016/EFTA02778016.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..217bcdd46a91d26b4271db20fb1d293c0d49bf0f --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778016/EFTA02778016.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -43, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778016", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 2, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "aa22605b9dde80fa2d14ad1e047281e5fc343c329a15ba7e8e7476d4eab9e58b", + "output_sha256": "3c52c3dbc7da196b0ef44878b5bd7ce8e5a8308b6cc5171aaf3385ddb5d2770c", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778020/EFTA02778020.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778020/EFTA02778020.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9361860c7266092d1103bb2659e19a3a1364f762 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778020/EFTA02778020.md @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +May 20, 2020 + +Via ECF + +Hon. Lorna G. Schofield United States District Judge Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse 40 Foley Square New York, New York 10007 + +> Re: 19-cv-10475 (LGS-DCF), v. Darren. Indyke, et at. + +Haddon, and P.0 Laura A. Menninger + +150 East 10th Avenue Denver, Colorado 80203 PH 303.831.7364 FX 303.832.2628 www.hmflaw.com Imenningerfthmflaw.com + +Dear Judge Schofield: + +I write on behalf of Ghislaine Maxwell to request leave to file the accompanying Corrected Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion to Dismiss or Transfer. + +The original memorandum filed on May 14, 2020, was twenty-five pages long, consistent with Your Honor's practice standards. That filing, however, mistakenly overlooked your April 29, 2020 order, Doc. 60, limiting the memorandum to twenty pages. The Corrected Memorandum filed herewith is twenty-pages long. + +For these reasons, Ms. Maxwell requests leave to file the accompanying corrected document. + +Plaintiff has informed undersigned counsel that she requests thirty days from today to file the response. + +Respectfully Submitted, + +C: Counsel of Record via ECF + +Laura A. Menninger ?c• \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778020/EFTA02778020.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778020/EFTA02778020.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..78a02cc16110b5685242739b113d7062c2e6c1f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778020/EFTA02778020.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778020", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "ace06ef211b19a0390bece3c0cb4a055fff4f6755ac64540908dae40d2f555d7", + "output_sha256": "ace06ef211b19a0390bece3c0cb4a055fff4f6755ac64540908dae40d2f555d7", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778021/EFTA02778021.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778021/EFTA02778021.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..34a30e6d492f463c60b3762473662df454ca5419 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778021/EFTA02778021.md @@ -0,0 +1,290 @@ +#### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +X + +Plaintiff, v. + +19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, + +Defendants. + +X + +CORRECTED MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT GHISLAINE MAXWELL'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR TO TRANSFER + +## Table of Contents + +| Table of Contents | ii | +| ----------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Table of Authorities | iii | +| Introduction | 1 | +| Background | 1 | +| Argument | 3 | +| I. | The complaint, filed nearly three decades after the events it alleges, is barred by the statute | +| of limitations. | 3 | +| A. Standard of review. | 4 | +| B. The complaint is untimely under New Mexico and New York law. | 4 | +| C. Plaintiff's claims cannot be revived under New York law. | 6 | +| i. CPLR § 215(8Xa) does not revive Plaintiff's untimely claims | 6 | +| ii. CPLR § 2141 does not and cannot revive Plaintiff's claims. | 6 | +| iii. Plaintiff has not plausibly plead equitable tolling or estoppel. | 18 | +| II. | If not dismissed, the case against Ms. Maxwell should be transferred to the District of New | +| Mexico. | 20 | +| Conclusion | 21 | +| Certificate of Service | 22 | + +## Table of Authorities + +# Cases + +| Am. Transit Ins. Co. v. Sartor, 814 N.E.2d 1189 (N.Y. 2004) | 7 | +| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------- | +| Ashcroft v. lqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) | 4 | +| Bell All. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) | 4 | +| In re London Silver Fixing, Ltd., Antitrust Litig., 332 F. Supp. 3d 885 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) | 4 | +| 2014) | 15 | +| In re World Trade Ctr. Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig., 89 N.E.3d 1227 (N.Y. 2017) | 12, | +| Jang Hoi Choi v. Beautri Realty Corp., 22 N.Y.S.3d 431 (N.Y. App. 1st Dept. 2016) | 18 | +| Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920) | 13 | +| Lubonty v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 139 N.E.3d 1222 (N.Y. 2019) | 11 | +| Majewski v. Broadalbin-Perth Cent. Sch. Dist, 696 N.E.2d 978 (N.Y. 1998) | 7 | +| Dennis v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., F. Supp. 3d | No. 16-CV-6496 (LAK), 2020 WL | +| 729789 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2020) | 4, | +| Gallewski v. Hentz & Co., 93 N.E.2d 620 (N.Y. 1950) | 13, 14, | +| Geiss v. Weinstein Co. Holdings LLC, 383 F. Supp. 3d 156 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) | 5, 11, 18, | +| Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989) | 13, 14, | + +| Matter of McCann v. Walsh Constr. Co., | 123 N.Y.S.2d 509 (N.Y. App. 3rd Dept. 1953)... 13, 14, | | +| ------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------- | +| Ochre LLC v. Rockwell Architecture Planning & Design, P.C., | | No. 12 CIV. 2837 KBF, 2012 | +| WL 6082387 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2012) | | 19 | +| People v. McLaughlin, | 606 N.E.2d 1357 (N.Y. 1992) | 7 | +| v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., | 144 N.E. 579 (N.Y. 1924) | 13, 16 | +| v. Abruzzo, | 49 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 1995) | 19 | +| Slusser v. Vantage Builders, Inc., 306 | P.3d 524 (N.M. App. 2013) | 20 | +| Stafford v. International Harvester Co., 668 | F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1981) | 5 | +| Stuan v. Aim Cyanamid Co., | 158 F.3d 622 (2d Cir. 1998) | 5, 11 | +| Sweener v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., | No. 1:17-CV-0532, 2019 WL 748742 | | +| (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2018) | | 14 | +| Touche & Co. v. Redington, | 442 U.S. 560 (1979) | 9 | +| Zwnpano v. Quinn, | 849 N.E.2d 926 (N.Y. 2006) | 15, 18 | + +## Statutes + +| 28 U.S.C. 1391(b) | 20 | +| -------------------------------- | -------- | +| 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) | 20 | +| 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) | 20 | +| CPLR § 202 | passim | +| CVA § 214-g | 10 | +| N.M. Stat. § 37-1-8 | 5 | +| N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 | 12 | +| N.Y. Educ. Law § 6509(1)(5)(a) | 8 | +| N.Y. Educ. Law § 6530(9)(a) | 8, 9 | +| N.Y. Exec. Law § 298-a | 9 | + +| N.Y. Penal Law § 130 | 7, 8, 10, 11 | +| ---------------------------------- | -------------- | +| N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 230(12Xb) | 8, 9 | +| N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 3510(1Xm) | 9 | +| New York Penal Law § 130 | 7, 10 | +| Fed. R. Civ. P. I2(b)(3) | 20 | + +Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell moves this Court for an order dismissing this case or transferring the case against her to the District of New Mexico. + +## INTRODUCTION + +Plaintiff's complaint is years too late, lacks the required specificity, and is filed in the wrong court. It describes events that allegedly occurred nearly three decades ago, and it details alleged conduct by Mr. Epstein while referring to Ms. Maxwell as an afterthought. When it does allege conduct by Ms. Maxwell, it alleges conduct that occurred in New Mexico, not New York. This Court should dismiss or transfer the case against Ms. Maxwell to New Mexico. + +## BACKGROUND + +Plaintiff claims that when she was either fifteen or sixteen years old, in 1995 or 1996, Mr. Epstein lured her to New York based on a promise of helping her get into college. Compl.fi 4!, 51. With no alleged involvement of Ms. Maxwell, Mr. Epstein bought Plaintiff a plane ticket from Arizona to New York. Id.1 51. Plaintiffs sister, was at the time purportedly working for Mr. Epstein as a purchaser of art. Id.1 46. + +Plaintiff claims that in New York, Mr. Epstein took her and her sister to a movie. Id. II 53-54. With no involvement or participation of Ms. Maxwell, Mr. Epstein allegedly groped Plaintiff during the movie. 54. Plaintiff returned to Arizona shortly after. Id. J 55. + +Sometime later, in the spring of 19%, Mr. Epstein called Plaintiff's mother in Arizona and proposed to sponsor a trip for Plaintiff to his ranch in New Mexico. Id.1 57. Mr. Epstein told Plaintiff's mother that his ranch was the site of an educational program for high school students. Id. 56-57. According to the complaint, Mr. Epstein represented that Ms. Maxwell would be Plaintiff's chaperone. Id. 91 57. Mr. Epstein again bought a plane ticket for Plaintiff, mailing it to her mother in Arizona. Id. 58. The complaint does not allege that Ms. Maxwell contacted Plaintiff or her mother or arranged for Plaintiff's travel. See id. 56-58. + +When Plaintiff arrived at the ranch, she claims she was the only student there. The complaint alleges that at the ranch, Ms. Maxwell pressured Plaintiff to give Mr. Epstein foot massages. Id.1 59. It also alleges that Mr. Epstein and Ms. Maxwell took her to see a movie, during which Mr. Epstein touched her body against her will. Id.1 60-61. The complaint does not allege that Ms. Maxwell touched Plaintiff or that she knew of Mr. Epstein's alleged touching. + +Upon returning to the ranch, Plaintiff claims that Ms. Maxwell persuaded her to remove all her clothes so Ms. Maxwell could give Plaintiff a massage. Id.1 62. Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Maxwell massaged Plaintiff and touched her intimate parts "against her will for the sexual benefit of Maxwell and Epstein." Id. 63-64, 65. + +The following morning, Mr. Epstein allegedly got into bed with Plaintiff to "cuddle" and "physically restrained her with his arms and proceeded to press his body (including his genitals) against" her. Id.1 67. The complaint does not allege that Ms. Maxwell was involved or participated in this incident or knew of it. See id. Plaintiff then returned to Arizona. Id. 1 70. + +Plaintiff's complaint next devotes several paragraphs to describing the alleged sexual assault of her sister, • at an Epstein property in Ohio. Id. ¶ 71-76. According to the complaint, after the assault Ms. Maxwell threatened on behalf of Mr. Epstein, telling her: "We're going to burn all your art. And I just want you to know that anything you ever make will be burned. Your career is burned." Id.1 72. This allegation is demonstrably false. Speaking for herself in 1996, apparently told police that Mr. Epstein "call[ed] her and stated he was going to burn [her] painting and send her poloroids (sic) of the burnt paintings." There was no mention in the police report of Ms. Maxwell. See Ex. 1 (Aug. 29, 1996 Police Report by . In any event, the complaint is devoid of any allegation that Ms. Maxwell ever threatened Plaintiff. + +The complaint alleges that reported the Ohio incident to both the NYPD's Sixth Precinct and to the FBI, neither of which took any action. Id. 1 73.' At that point, spoke with Plaintiff, who allegedly told Maria of the events in New York and New Mexico. Id. fl 73-74. The sisters claim they took their story to Vanity Fair Magazine, which Plaintiff says declined to publish a story only after Mr. Epstein (but not Ms. Maxwell) "threatened and intimidated the magazine and Vanity Fair bent to those threats." Id.175. + +Plaintiff never claims she had contact with either Mr. Epstein or Ms. Maxwell after returning to Arizona from New Mexico, and she does not allege that Mr. Epstein or Ms. Maxwell ever threatened her or coerced her not to report her allegations. Yet, Plaintiff claims that "[o]ut of fear of what could happen to her and her family because of Epstein and Maxwell's great power, wealth, and connections that they had displayed to her, [she] did not tell anyone [other than her sister] about Epstein and Maxwell touching her against her will." Id. 11[ 70. Plaintiff's failure, for nearly thirty years, to file this lawsuit, was allegedly a product of "the fact that state and federal authorities, as well as the media, were not taking action against Epstein." Id.1 76. + +Plaintiff finally filed this lawsuit on November 12, 2019. Doc. 1. It alleges battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. + +# ARGUMENT + +### I. THE COMPLAINT, FILED NEARLY THREE DECADES AFTER THE EVENTS IT ALLEGES, IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. + +Plaintiff's complaint is years too late. The complaint limits its allegations of tortious conduct by Ms. Maxwell to conduct allegedly occurring in New Mexico nearly three decades ago: Ms. Maxwell allegedly committed battery against Plaintiff in New Mexico in the spring of + +Curiously, Sixth Precinct report makes no mention of any alleged assaults by Mr. Epstein or Ms. Maxwell. Ex. 1. + +1996 by touching her intimate parts against her will during a massage at Mr. Epstein's ranch; Ms. Maxwell falsely imprisoned Plaintiff at the New Mexico ranch; and together, this conduct inflicted emotional distress. + +The complaint does not allege that Ms. Maxwell was involved or participated in Mr. Epstein's "recruitment" of Plaintiff to New York in late 1995/early 1996 or the alleged groping of Plaintiff at a New York movie theater. Nor does the complaint allege that Ms. Maxwell ever threatened or coerced Plaintiff into not filing a complaint. In fact, Plaintiff does not allege that Ms. Maxwell ever contacted her in the nearly three decades since she was in New Mexico. + +## A. Standard of review. + +In assessing a motion to dismiss, this Court need only assume the truth of the wellpleaded factual contentions in Plaintiff's complaint. In re London Silver Fixing, Ltd., Antitrust 332 F. Supp. 3d 885, 895 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (dismissing conspiracy and antitrust claims as implausible). It should disregard Plaintiff's conclusory allegations as well as those that improperly lump together Ms. Maxwell with Mr. Epstein. See Ashcroft v. lqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Dismissal is appropriate when, as here, the complaint fails to allege timely claims for relief that are plausible on their face. See Dennis v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., F. Supp. 3d \_, No. 16-CV-6496 (LAK), 2020 WL 729789, at \*5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2020) (complaint must plausibly allege that it is timely to survive a motion to dismiss). + +# B. The complaint is tintimel:s Under New Mexico and New York law. + +The complaint alleges that Ms. Maxwell committed three torts against Plaintiff in New Mexico. While New York's "borrowing statute" allows non-residents like Plaintiff to sue in New York courts for torts occurring outside New York, the claims must be timely under both New + +York law the law in the state where the tort allegedly occurred. Because all three causes of action are untimely under New Mexico and New York law, the complaint must be dismissed. + +When, as here, "jurisdiction rests upon diversity of citizenship, a federal court sitting in New York must apply the New York choice-of-law rules and statutes of limitations." Smart v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 158 F.3d 622, 626 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1945)). "New York courts generally apply New York's statutes of limitations, even when the injury giving rise to the action occurred outside New York." Id. (citing Stafford v. International Harvester Co., 668 F.2d 142, 147 (2d Cir. 1981)). + +"This general rule, however, is subject to a traditional statutory exception, New York's 'borrowing' statute, C.P.L.R. § 202." Id. New York's borrowing statute permits a resident of another state (here, Texas)2 to sue in New York for torts occurring outside New York (here, New Mexico) if the complaint is timely under the laws of New York and the state in which the tort occurred (again, New Mexico). CPLR § 202. The purpose of CPLR § 202 is to prevent "forum shopping by plaintiffs seeking the holy grail of the longer period." Stuart, 158 F.3d at 627. + +New Mexico has a three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, N.M. Stat. § 37-1-8, and minors have one year from reaching the age of majority to begin such an action, N.M. Stat. § 37-1-10. At the latest, Plaintiff's claims expired sometime in 1999. Plaintiff's claims are untimely under New Mexico law and, thus, they are time-barred under CPLR § 202. + +Similarly, under New York law, a plaintiff alleging battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress must commence her action within one year of the claim's accrual. CPLR § 215(3); Geiss v. Weinstein Co. Holdings LLC, 383 F. Supp. 3d 156, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). The complaint here was filed nearly three decades after Plaintiff's claims + +{sup}`2` Plaintiff says she is a resident of Texas. Comp1. 1 8. + +accrued. Thus, unless New York law revives Plaintiff's untimely claims or tolls the statute of limitations, dismissal is required. + +# C. Plaintiff's claims cannot be revived under New York law. + +Plaintiff, in her pm-motion response, did not deny that her claims are untimely under New Mexico Law. Doc. 48, at 3. Instead, Plaintiff contends that CPLR § 202 does not apply because New York's Child Victims Act (CVA), CPLR § 2I4-g, "provides for a revival window of civil claims '(n]otwithstanding any provision of law which imposes a period of limitation to the contrary.'" /d.3 Plaintiff's complaint also points to CPLR § 215(8Xa). As explained below, however, neither provision saves Plaintiff's untimely complaint. + +## i. CPLR § 215(8Xa) does not revive Plaintiff's untimely claims. + +Plaintiff's complaint points to CPLR § 215(8)(a), which in some cases allows a plaintiff to pursue otherwise untimely claims if she files them within one year of the termination of a criminal action against the defendant, if the criminal action concerned the same "event or occurrence" as the civil complaint. Compl. fl 82, 87, 93. But that provision does not apply here because Ms. Maxwell was never indicted, only Mr. Epstein was, and because the Epstein indictment did not concern the "event or occurrence" from which this civil complaint arises.4 + +# ff. CPLR § 214-g does not and cannot revive Plaintiff's claims. + +The CVA, CPLR § 214-g, purports to revive otherwise time-barred claims for injuries "suffered as a result of conduct which would constitute" a sexual offense under New York penal law. Plaintiff invokes CPLR § 214-g to save claims that expired nearly thirty years ago. The attempt fails because: (1) CPLR § 214-g does not apply to the claims against Ms. Maxwell; (2) + +{sup}`3` Plaintiff has not claimed that New Mexico has a revival statute. + +{sup}`&#`x27;The indictment charged conduct by Mr. Epstein between 2002 and 2005 in New York and Florida. Compl. Ex. A. Plaintiff's complaint against Ms. Maxwell concerns conduct allegedly occurring in 1995/1996 in New Mexico. Compl. 11 57-70. + +CPLR § 214-g does not trump New York's borrowing statute, CPLR § 202, under which Plaintiff must prove her claims are timely under New Mexico law (which concededly they are not); and (3) even if CPLR § 214-g does apply, its application to Maxwell is unconstitutional. + +## a. CPLR § 214-g does not apply to Ms. Maxwell. + +CPLR § 214-g by its terms does not apply to Ms. Maxwell because the conduct alleged against her occurred in New Mexico, outside New York, and therefore "would [not] constitute" a sexual offense under New York Penal Law § 130. CPLR § 214-g says: + +> Notwithstanding any provision of law which imposes a period of limitation to the contrary . . . every civil claim or cause of action brought against any party . . . as a result of conduct which would constitute a sexual offense as defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law [N.Y. Penal Law § 130] committed against a child less than eighteen years of age . . . is hereby revived, and action thereon may be commenced not earlier than six months after, and not later than one year and six months after the effective date of this section. + +"It is fundamental that a court, in interpreting a statute, should attempt to effectuate the intent of the Legislature." Majewski v. Broadalbin-Perth Cent. Sch. Dist, 696 N.E.2d 978, 980 (N.Y. 1998). "As the clearest indicator of legislative intent is the statutory text, the starting point in any case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain meaning thereof." Id. "A court cannot amend a statute by adding words that are not there." Am. Transit Ins. Co. v. Sartor, 814 N.E.2d 1189, 1192 (N.Y. 2004). + +The plain and unambiguous language of CPLR § 214-g shows it does not apply to Plaintiff's untimely complaint. For it to apply, Plaintiff's claims against Ms. Maxwell must arise from "conduct which would constitute a sexual offense as defined in" N.Y. Penal Law § 130. + +Ms. Maxwell's alleged conduct, however, would "constitute a sexual offense as defined in" N.Y. Penal Law § 130 only if it were committed in New York. See People v. McLaughlin, 606 N.E.2d 1357, 1359 (N.Y. 1992) ("Because the State only has power to enact and enforce + +criminal laws within its territorial borders, there can be no criminal offense unless it has territorial jurisdiction."). Because the complaint concerns conduct allegedly committed in New Mexico, Ms. Maxwell's purported conduct "would [not] constitute a sexual offense as defined in" N.Y. Penal Law § 130. + +Had the New York State Assembly intended otherwise—that is, had the State Assembly intended to revive claims for conduct occurring outside New York that, if committed within this state, would have constituted as defined in penal law N.Y. Penal Law § 130—it knew how to do so. In fact, the State Assembly could have done what it routinely does: include language making clear an intent for the statute to apply to conduct occurring outside New York. + +Take New York law defining professional misconduct by physicians. It provides that it is professional misconduct to be + +- 9.(a) ... convicted of committing an act constituting a crime under: +- (i) New York state law or, +- (ii) federal law or, +- (iii) the law of another jurisdiction and which, if committed within this state, would have constituted a crime under New York state law. + +N.Y. Educ. Law § 6530(9)(a) (emphasis added). This language makes clear that conduct occurring outside New York can constitute professional misconduct within New York. + +The examples abound. E.g., N.Y. Educ. Law § 6509(l)(5)(a) (defining as professional misconduct "[b]eing convicted of committing an act constituting a crime under: (i) New York State law or, (ii) Federal law or, (iii) The law of another jurisdiction and which, if committed within this state, would have constituted a crime under New York State law" (emphasis added)); N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 230(12)(b) ("When a licensee has pleaded or been found guilty or convicted of committing an act constituting a felony under New York state law or federal law, or + +the law of another jurisdiction which, if committed within this state, would have constituted a felony under New York state law . . ." (emphasis added)); N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 3510(1)(m) (authorizing suspension of a license if the licensee "is convicted of certain crimes and the ... conviction [is] under (i) New York state law; (ii) federal law; or (iii) the law of another jurisdiction which, if committed within this state, would have constituted professional misconduct under New York state law" (emphasis added)). + +The State Assembly's choice not to use the conditional perfect tense ("would have") is dispositive of its intent. As the above examples show, when the State Assembly intends a law to apply to conduct occurring out of state which, "if committed within this state, would have constituted a crime under New York state law," it says so expressly. See Touche & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 572 (1979) ("Obviously, then, when Congress wished to provide a private damage remedy, it knew how to do so and did so expressly."); see, e.g., N.Y. Educ. Law § 6530(9)(a); N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 230(12)(b); N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 3510(1)(m). And the State Assembly easily could have done so in CPLR § 214-g, by saying that the statute revived otherwise time-barred claims based on "conduct which would constitute a sexual offense as defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law or, if committed within this state, would have constituted a sexual offense as defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law." See CPLR § 214-g. The legislature intentionally decided not to include this language.5 + +{sup}`5` If CPLR § 214-g had been written in the present tense, the State Assembly likewise could have shown an intent for it to apply to conduct occurring outside New York. It has done so countless other times. E.g., N.Y. Exec. Law § 298-a (providing that New York's human rights law "shall apply as hereinafter provided to an act committed outside this state against a resident of this state or against a corporation organized under the laws of this state or authorized to do business in this state, if such act would constitute an unlawful discriminatory practice if committed within this state (emphasis added)). + +Unlike these examples, CPLR § 214-g talks only of conduct "which would constitute a sexual offense as defined in" N.Y. Penal Law § 130. It does not speak to conduct which, if committed within New York, would have constituted a sexual offense as defined in article N.Y. Penal Law § 130. And absent that specific language—readily available to the State Assembly and routinely used—Ms. Maxwell's alleged conduct "would [not] constitute" a sexual offense under New York Penal Law § 130 because it occurred outside New York and in New Mexico. Interpreting CPLR § 214-g to revive Plaintiff's claims would require this Court to add language to the statute, which this Court cannot do. See Am. Transit, 814 N.E.2d at 1192 ("A court cannot amend a statute by adding words that are not there."). The CVA, § 214-g, thus does not apply to the case against Ms. Maxwell and cannot revive Plaintiff's time-barred claims.' + +### b. CPLR § 214-g does not trump New York's borrowing statute, CPLR § 202. + +In response to Ms. Maxwell's pre-motion letter to this Court, Plaintiff argued that CPLR § 214-g trumps New York's borrowing statute, CPLR § 202, because the former statute says it applies "[n]otwithstanding any provision of law which imposes a period of limitation to the contrary." CPLR § 214-g; Doc. 48, at 3. This argument is misplaced. + +CPLR § 214-g and CPLR § 202 can be read together to give effect to both. See v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 877 N.E.2d 281, 286-87 (N.Y. 2007) ("[W]here possible, courts should harmonize all parts of a statute with each other . . . and give effect and meaning ... to the entire statute and every part and word thereof." (cleaned up)). Recall that when "jurisdiction rests upon diversity of citizenship, a federal court sitting in New York must apply the New York choice-of-law rules and statutes of limitations," including New York's borrowing + +{sup}`6` In no case can CPLR § 214-g revive Plaintiff's false imprisonment claim, because false imprisonment is not a "sexual offense" under New York Penal Law § 130. + +statute, CPLR § 202. Stuart, 158 F.3d at 626. CPLR § 202 requires a complaint to be timely under both the laws of New York and the state in which the tort occurred (here, New Mexico). + +When CPLR § 214-g revives claims based upon conduct that "would constitute a sexual offense as defined in" N.Y. Penal Law § 130 "[n]otwithstanding any provision of law which imposes a period of limitation to the contrary," CPLR § 214-g is referring to any provision of New York law that imposes a period of limitation to the contrary. CPLR § 214-g is a New York statute enacted by the New York legislature, which applies to and revives claims based on conduct that would violate New York penal law that would otherwise be untimely under New York statutes of limitations. + +Here, as described above, CPLR § 215(3) required Plaintiff to commence her battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims within one year of their accrual. CPLR § 215(3); Geiss, 383 F. Supp. 3d at 171. As best, the effect of CPLR § 214-g in this case, then, is to excuse Plaintiff from complying with CPLR § 215(3). It revives Plaintiff's claims only insofar as CPLR § 215(3) barred them. By contrast, the effect of CPLR § 214-g is not to revive Plaintiff's claims insofar as New Mexico law bars them. + +But New York's borrowing statute, CPLR § 202, requires Plaintiffs claims to be timely under both New York law and New Mexico law. Thus, at best, CPLR § 214-g solves half of Plaintiff's problem—it might render her claims timely under New York law when they would otherwise be untimely under CPLR § 215(3). But CPLR § 214-g cannot solve the other half of Plaintiff's problem—it cannot render her claims timely under New Mexico law. + +Plaintiff's argument that CPLR § 214-g trumps CPLR § 202 would lead to forum shopping, which is the absurd result CPLR § 202 seeks to avoid. See Stuart, 158 F.3d at 627; see also Lubonly v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 139 N.E.3d 1222, 1225 (N.Y. 2019) (courts "interpret [] + +statute[s] so as to avoid an unreasonable or absurd application of the law"). If Plaintiff is right, courts in New York can expect to see a flood of lawsuits concerning conduct occurring in other states having little or no connection to New York. Plaintiffs will know that even if they could not bring a lawsuit in the state in which the conduct occurred, they can file suit in New York so long as there is personal jurisdiction over the defendant. But there's no reason to think that the New York State Assembly intended to override the decisions of other state legislatures that have opted not to revive expired claims based on conduct occurring within their own borders. + +Accordingly, when read together, CPLR § 214-g and CPLR § 202 still require Plaintiff to show that her claims are timely under New Mexico law, since they are based on conduct occurring in New Mexico. Plaintiff has not disputed that her claims are untimely under New Mexico law, Doc. 48, at 3, and, as a result, they must be dismissed. + +#### c. Applying CPLR § 214-g to Ms. Maxwell would violate due process. + +Disregarding CPLR § 202, and applying § 214-g notwithstanding the claims' untimeliness under New Mexico law, violates Ms. Maxwell's right to due process. + +The New York Constitution guarantees due process of law. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This guarantee constrains the State Assembly's ability to enact "revival statutes," which are an "extreme exercise of legislative power." v. Lincoln Trust Co., 135 N.E. 267, 267 (N.Y. 1922) (Cardozo, J.). In New York, due process requires a "weigh[ing] [of] the defendant's interests in the availability of a statute of limitations defense with the need to correct an injustice." In re World Trade Ctr., 89 N.E.3d 1227, 1239 (N.Y. 2017). + +The New York Court of Appeals recently reaffirmed that "a claim-revival statute will satisfy the Due Process Clause of the State Constitution if it was enacted as a reasonable response in order to remedy an injustice." Id. at 1243. The injustice subject to this extraordinary + +remedy is limited to when a "plaintiff could not have brought an action in a timely manner." Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocese Corp., 119 A.3d 462, 512 n.58 (Conn. 2015) (discussing New York law); see also Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989); Gallewski v. Hentz & Co., 93 N.E.2d 620 (N.Y. 1950); v. Robins Thy Dock & Repair Co., 144 N.E. 579 (N.Y. 1924); Matter of McCann v. Walsh Constr. Co., 123 N.Y.S.2d 509 (N.Y. App. 3rd Dept. 1953), aff'd without op., 306 N.Y. 904 (1954). + +In v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the constitutionality of a statute that revived the wrongful death actions of spouses of deceased workers. 144 N.E. at 579. There, the wife of a deceased worker began collecting worker's compensation following her husband's work-related death; this was her exclusive legal remedy at the time. Id. at 579—80. More than two years later, the U.S. Supreme Court declared New York's workers' compensation law to be unconstitutional, which ended the wife's worker's compensation benefit. See Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920). By that time, however, the wife's wrongful death action was time-barred under New York law. See 144 N.E. at 580. A claim by the wife for her husband's wrongful death also was not cognizable at any time during the applicable limitations period, because for that entire time worker's compensation was the exclusive remedy for the husband's work-related death. Because the spouses of deceased workers could not have brought a timely claim for wrongful death based on a work-related injury before the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Knickerbocker Ice, the Court of Appeals affirmed the propriety of the revival statute. Id. at 579, 582. + +The Court of Appeals' decision in Gallewski v. Hentz & Co. similarly addressed reviving formerly time-barred causes of action that claimants were effectively prevented from asserting in a timely manner. In Gallewski, the Court of Appeals held that a statute enacted to retroactively + +toll the statute of limitations for individuals residing in Axis-occupied countries during World War II comported with due process. Gallewski, 93 N.E.2d at 622-25. The Court noted that "the citizens and residents of occupied territory were, during such occupation, under a practical and total inability to commence action in the courts of this State to protect and effectuate their rights." id. at 625. Because these plaintiffs were unable to assert timely claims under the applicable limitations period, the Court of Appeals in Gallewski concluded that the legislature's retroactive tolling of the otherwise applicable limitations period comported with due process. Id. + +Likewise, in both Matter of McCann v. Walsh Constr. Co. and Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., claims-revival provisions were held to comport with due process when they addressed claims that could not have been timely asserted. Both cases presented claims by plaintiffs who were afflicted by latent diseases where symptoms did not typically appear until after the applicable limitations period expired. Matter of McCann, 301 N.Y. at 511 (cassion disease is "of a slow-starting or insidious nature" and "very often ... more than twelve months elapse[s] after the contraction of the disease before its presence [is] known or apparent"); Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1072 (the exposure to the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES) by pregnant mothers causes a latent injury in utero and "many claims [are] barred by the Statute of Limitations before the injury (is] discovered"). See Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1079; see also Sweener v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., No. 1:17-CV-0532, 2019 WL 748742, at \*8 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2018) (citing Hymowitz and Matter of McCann in holding that CPLR § 214-g comported with due process because the claims-revival provision there allowed those "who suffer[ed) latent injuries stemming from environmental contamination() to pursue claims that would otherwise be time-barred simply because a defendant's tortious conduct was unknown"). + +The New York Court of Appeals already has decided that numerous claimants asserting allegations of sexual abuse were not prevented from asserting their claims in a timely manner under the formerly applicable limitations period. See Zumpano v. Quinn, 849 N.E.2d 926 (N.Y. 2006). In Zumpano, the Court addressed actions alleging clergy sexual abuse for which the statute of limitations had long expired, but the plaintiffs sought equitable tolling of their limitations periods and asserted equitable estoppel against defendants. Id. at 927-28. The Court held, at the motion to dismiss stage, that all plaintiffs in both the individual and the 42-person action "failed to satisfy th[eir] burden" of "establish[ing] that subsequent and specific actions by defendants somehow kept them from timely bringing suit." Id. at 929. Concluded the Court: + +> [E]ach plaintiff was aware of the sexual abuse he or she suffered at the hands of defendant priests. Certainly they had sufficient knowledge to bring an intentional tort cause of action against the individual priests. Plaintiffs were likewise aware that the priests were employees of the dioceses and could have brought actions against the dioceses, or at least investigated whether a basis for such actions existed. + +Id. The Court thus affirmed the dismissal of both actions as time-barred. + +The federal district court decision in World Trade Center also is instructive. While that decision was ultimately vacated based only on a threshold standing issue (not presented here), the court there invalidated a claims-revival provision under the New York State Constitution's Due Process Clause on the same basis asserted by Ms. Maxwell here. The statute at issue in that case revived otherwise time-barred claims by disaster-relief workers who were injured during the cleanup and rescue efforts following the September 11, 2011 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center. After canvassing the Court of Appeals' case law on the issue, the district court held that this claims-revival provision did not fit within the "narrow exception for revival statutes, and is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the New York State Constitution." In re World Trade Ctr. Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 466, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), + +vacated on other grounds, 892 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2018). The district court reasoned that, unlike in the Court of Appeals' precedent addressing this issue discussed above (Gallewski, Matter of McCann, and Hyinowitz), the plaintiffs in World Trade Center were protected by a rule that the limitations period on their claims did not begin to run until they had discovered their injuries. Id. at 475-76. They thus did not face a "practical and total inability" to begin a timely lawsuit, as in Gallewski, and other cases in which claim revival has been allowed. Id. at 474-75. The district court also noted that many plaintiffs had filed timely lawsuits. Id. at 476. + +The claims-revival provision in the CVA is, in material respects, like the one at issue in World Trade Center. In both instances, the legislature purported to revive claims by plaintiffs who were not prevented from asserting them in a timely fashion. In World Trade Center, the district court noted that the legislature had given as its justification, among other things, that certain claimants were given incorrect information about their work conditions and did not know the applicable limitations periods. See id. at 475. But the court determined those were not grounds for enacting a claims-revival provision because "[t]hese rationales do not amount to the `exceptional circumstances' justifying the `extreme exercise of legislative power' that a revival statute entails." Id. "[T]hose who wished to sue were not barred from doing so." Id. at 476. + +Here, the legislature's attempt through CPLR § 214-g to revive formerly time-barred claims based on certain alleged sexual abuse does not comport with the New York State Constitution's Due Process Clause, at least as applied to Ms. Maxwell. Unlike all of the previous situations in which the Court of Appeals has ruled that the "extreme" measure of reviving claims survived due process scrutiny, Plaintiff here was not prevented from asserting timely claims and they were not barred by law in 1995/1996. + +To the contrary, Plaintiff admits she had no difficulty reporting her allegations years ago to her sister and Vanity Fair Magazine and that her sister had no problem reporting her allegations to the NYPD and the FBI. Compl. 11 73-75. That those organizations did not respond as Plaintiff wished is all the more reason she should have filed this lawsuit years ago. + +Plaintiff's conclusory and bare assertion that she was prevented from filing her claim "[o]ut of fear of what could happen to her and her family because of Epstein and Maxwell's great power, wealth, and connections that they had displayed to her" is not plausible. Compl. 1 70; see Dennis, 2020 WL 729789, at \*5 (to survive a motion to dismiss, complaint must plausibly allege that it is timely). Plaintiff admits that upon leaving the ranch in New Mexico, she never again had contact with either Mr. Epstein or Ms. Maxwell. And she does not allege that either Mr. Epstein or Ms. Maxwell ever threatened her or coerced her into not filing a timely lawsuit. The complaint is devoid of any plausible allegation that Plaintiff could not have sued Ms. Maxwell in a timely fashion over a twenty-four (24) year period. Thus, under New York law, it would violate due process to allow CPLR § 214-g to revive Plaintiff's untimely claims. + +To allow CPLR § 214-g to revive Plaintiff's claims would undermine the integrity of the judicial system and deny Ms. Maxwell her constitutional right to defend herself. Ms. Maxwell would have to rebut allegations of an individual who claims she was assaulted nearly thirty years ago. Ms. Maxwell would also be called to answer the for conduct of Mr. Epstein, who is dead. "[Wjeighing the defendant's interest in the availability of statute of limitations defense with the need to correct an injustice," Matter of World Trade Ctr., 89 N.E.3d at 1239, underscores the due process limitation that constrained the legislature's authority here. + +Finally, there are strong, actual, not merely hypothetical, reliance interests at issue on the statutes of limitations that have existed for many years. Moreover, Mr. Epstein's estate has + +established a compensation fund for alleged victims, the Voluntary Claims Resolution Program in the U.S. Virgin Islands. Plaintiff and her sister, have publicly provided notice of their intent to participate in the Program. So have other alleged victims of Mr. Epstein. It undermines the integrity of the judicial system for some individuals to participate in this compensation fund while others attempt to revive long-expired claims in court. + +## iii. Plaintiff has not plausibly plead equitable tolling or estoppel. + +Plaintiff points to two other bases for the timeliness of her complaint: equitable tolling and equitable estoppel. Comp/. 11 16-17. Neither doctrine saves Plaintiff's complaint. + +Equitable tolling is unavailable in New York for state claims. Jang Hoi Choi v. Beautri Realty Corp., 22 N.Y.S.3d 431, 432 (N.Y. App. 1st Dept. 2016) ("[T]he doctrine of equitable tolling is not available in state causes of action in New York."). In any event, Plaintiff's invocation of the doctrine would fail for the same reasons her reliance on equitable estoppel fails. + +These equitable doctrines require "extraordinary" factors that make it "unjust" to allow a defendant to assert a statute of limitations defense. See id. (equitable tolling requires proof that a plaintiff was "prevented in some extraordinary way" from exercising her rights); Zumpano, 849 N.E.2d at 929 (equitable estoppel requires proof that it would "would be unjust to allow a defendant to assert a statute of limitations defense"). The doctrines should be "invoked sparingly and only under exceptional circumstances." Geiss, 383 F. Supp. at 172. + +As explained above, Plaintiff's own complaint proves that there was no impediment to her filing this action within a timely fashion. "Plaintiff had sufficient knowledge of the facts and of a basis for a cause of action within the limitations period, and yet [s]he failed to bring a timely suit." Jang Ho Choi, 135 A.D.3d at 452. As in Zumpano v. Quinn, "plaintiff was aware of the sexual abuse ... she [allegedly] suffered at the hands of [Ms. Maxwell] .... Certainly [she] had sufficient knowledge to bring an intentional tort cause of action...." + +Plaintiff's conclusory allegations to the contrary cannot survive a motion to dismiss? Plaintiff does not allege that Ms. Maxwell or Mr. Epstein threatened or coerced her into not filing a lawsuit, or that she was misled as to the applicable statute of limitations. In fact, Plaintiff does not even allege any contact between herself and Ms. Maxwell or Mr. Epstein after 1996. The complaint points to nothing that actually or effectively prevented Plaintiff from filing her lawsuit for more than twenty years. {sup}`8` + +What is ultimately dispositive, though, is that the complaint points to nothing Ms. Maxwell allegedly did in the year before its filing that prevented Plaintiff from filing the lawsuit. Assuming tolling could apply (which it can't), that period of tolling ended well before November 2, 2018, one year before the complaint was filed. And because the relevant statute of limitations in New York is one year, CPLR § 215(3), even tolling cannot save Plaintiffs complaint. Plaintiff + +&#x27; Plaintiff's conclusory assertion of fear of retaliation or harm to reputation cannot support equitable tolling or estoppel. "New York law strongly disfavors equitable tolling based on fear of retaliation, except where duress is an element of the cause of action." Geiss, 383 F. Supp. 3d at 173. And "[gear of harm to a plaintiff's career cannot justify equitably estopping a defendant from asserting a time limitation period." Id. (quotation omitted).

8 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires, at a minimum, that a complaint give each defendant "fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the ground upon which it rests." Ferro v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d 847, 851 (2d Cir. 1961); see also v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995). Here, when Plaintiff has no facts to allege against Ms. Maxwell, she deceptively claims that "Epstein and Maxwell": "committed" (Compl. ¶ 13), "recruited" (id. ¶ 25), "perfected" (id.1 31), "arranged" (id.1 58), "allowed" (id.1 70), "intentionally committed" (id. ¶ 80), "intentionally and forcibly touched" (id.1 81), "falsely imprisoned" (id.1 85), "brought" and "prevented" (id.1 86), committed "criminal acts" (id. ¶¶ 88, 94), and had a plan to "recruit, entice and assault" (WI 91). This Court should disregard the allegations that merely lump together Ms. Maxwell with Mr. Epstein. See Ochre LW v. Rockwell Architecture Planning & Design, P.C., No. 12 CIV. 2837 KBF, 2012 WL 6082387, at \*6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2012), aff'd, 530 F. App'x 19 (2d Cir. 2013) (explaining that "[w]here a complaint names multiple defendants, that complaint must provide a plausible factual basis to distinguish the conduct of each of the defendants" and holding that the "failure to isolate the key allegations against each defendant supports dismissal under the standards set forth in Twombly and lqbar). Lumping aside, there is nothing in the complaint to show that Ms. Maxwell ever did or said anything to prevent, mislead, or discourage Plaintiff from filing the complaint in a timely manner.

cannot plausibly allege that the statute of limitations was tolled for nearly thirty years, when she doesn't even allege contact with Ms. Maxwell after leaving the New Mexico ranch in 1996.9

II. IF NOT DISMISSED, THE CASE AGAINST MS. MAXWELL SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO.

The Southern District of New York is not the proper venue for Plaintiff's claims against Ms. Maxwell. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(6)(3) (authorizing a motion to dismiss for "improper venue"). Title 28, subsection 1391(bX1) does not authorize venue here because Ms. Maxwell is not a resident of New York, nor apparently is the Estate of Mr. Epstein. And subsection (b)(2) also does not authorize venue here because the allegations against Ms. Maxwell concern conduct occurring exclusively in New Mexico and not New York: Ms. Maxwell allegedly sexually assaulted plaintiff in New Mexico (battery) and held plaintiff against her will in New Mexico (false imprisonment), thereby inflicting emotional distress. Because Ms. Maxwell's alleged conduct occurred in New Mexico, venue is improper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Thus, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(6)(3) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1406(a) and 1404(a), this Court should dismiss the complaint or transfer the case against her to the District of New Mexico.

Alternatively, Plaintiff's claims against Ms. Maxwell should be severed from the claims against Mr. Epstein's estate. Ms. Maxwell will be prejudiced otherwise, given the allegations against Mr. Epstein and the inability of Ms. Maxwell to effectively defend herself now that Mr. Epstein is dead. Even if venue is proper here against Mr. Epstein's estate (which is doubtful, since the estate is apparently a resident of the U.S. Virgin Islands), it is improper in the case against Ms. Maxwell. The case against Ms. Maxwell should proceed, if at all, in New Mexico.

The result is the same if New Mexico law applies to Plaintiff's assertion of equitable tolling and estoppel. See Slusser v. Vantage Builders, Inc., 306 P.3d 524, 531, 533 (N.M. App. 2013) (describing burden of equitable tolling and estoppel under New Mexico law).

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, this Court should dismiss the case or transfer the case against Ms.

Maxwell to the District of New Mexico.

Dated: May 20, 2020.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Laura A. Menninger

Laura A. Menninger (Us,.

HADDON, AND P.C.

150 East 10 Avenue

Denver, CO 80203

Phone: 303.831.7364

Fax: 303.832.2628

lmenninger@hmflaw.com

Attorney for Ghislaine Maxwell

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on May 20, 2020, I filed this Corrected Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell's Motion to Dismiss with the Clerk of Court through CM/ECF, which will send notice of the filing to all parties of record.

/s/ Nicole

+ + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778021/EFTA02778021.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778021/EFTA02778021.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8c4e34645c29057542f12f0a74d049abd51dbf99 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778021/EFTA02778021.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -4454, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778021", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 123, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.table-boundary-padding\", \"epstein_legal.flight-log-tables.normalize\", \"swarm-unicode-norm.html-named-entities\", \"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "399d22e1c76573b4fd573fa570b8a60bb997851298c7c3884d7781fcc87fc6fd", + "output_sha256": "435c67d67f9fcf5827e974c8e3d0d6a3d15e09776bd37f427071bef8222d2d78", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778048/EFTA02778048.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778048/EFTA02778048.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..23478ad95f84377ab9af98ad8fdf1915f028b07b --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778048/EFTA02778048.md @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +Application GRANTED. The Court will consider Defendant Maxwell's corrected memorandum of law, filed at Dkt. No. 75, in ruling on the motion to dismiss. + +Plaintiff shall file any opposition, not to exceed twenty pages, by **June 19, 2020**. Defendant Maxwell shall file any reply, not to exceed eight pages, by **July 3, 2020**. + +The parties shall otherwise comply with the Courts Individual Rules in filing their motion papers. + +So Ordered. + +Dated: May 21, 2020 +New York, New York + +Re: 19-cv-10475 (LGS-DCF), [REDACTED] v. *Darren* [REDACTED] *Indyke, et al.* + +Dear Judge Schofield: + +I write on behalf of Ghislaine Maxwell to request leave to file the accompanying Corrected Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion to Dismiss or Transfer. + +The original memorandum filed on May 14, 2020, was twenty-five pages long, consistent with Your Honor's practice standards. That filing, however, mistakenly overlooked your April 29, 2020 order, Doc. 60, limiting the memorandum to twenty pages. The Corrected Memorandum filed herewith is twenty-pages long. + +For these reasons, Ms. Maxwell requests leave to file the accompanying corrected document. + +Plaintiff has informed undersigned counsel that she requests thirty days from today to file the response. + +Respectfully Submitted, + +C: Counsel of Record via ECF \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778048/EFTA02778048.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778048/EFTA02778048.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c6725b9b0f4b760532cd589adc35955b3b72dfa3 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778048/EFTA02778048.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -10, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778048", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 2, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.empty-image\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "013a073a4ecc8413e7313e2192e4bb198cb9851cf7540458a602fc53cd9196a7", + "output_sha256": "7fb4824ee491b8f187c423bdb474f9cb2a4cdeb08f87416d49f1c2250da352dd", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778049/EFTA02778049.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778049/EFTA02778049.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cfb093168e7bcde910dc4d9cb3ce0f52665a022c --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778049/EFTA02778049.md @@ -0,0 +1,959 @@ +#### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +In re: + +Docket #19cv10475 , et al., : 1:19-cv-10475-LGD-DCF + +- against - + +INDYKE, et al., + +Plaintiffs, + +New York, New York Defendants. : May 22, 2020 + +: TELEPHONE CONFERENCE + +#### PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE DEBRA C. FREEMAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MAGISTRATE JUDGE + +#### APPEARANCES: + +For Plaintiffs: BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP + +BY: SIGRID S. MCCAWLEY, ESQ. + +SABINA MARIELLA, ESQ. + +ANDREW VILLACASTIN, ESQ. + +401 East Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1200 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 + +For Defendants - TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP + +Darren K. Indyke and BY: BENNET MOSKOWITZ, ESQ. + +Richard D. Kahn: MATTHEW AARONSON, ESQ. + +VALERIE SIROTA, ESQ. + +875 Third Avenue New York, New York 10022 + +Transcription Service: Carole Ludwig, Transcription Services 155 East Fourth Street #3C New York, New York 10009 Phone: (212) 420-0771 Email: Transcription420@aol.com + +Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording; Transcript produced by transcription service. + +For Defendant - Ghislaine Maxwell: HADDON, ANRE BY: LAURA MENNINGER, ESQ. 150 East Tenth Avenue Denver, Colorado 80203 + +COURT REPORTER PRESENT + +## INDEX + +## EXAMINATIONS + +Re- Re-Witness Direct Cross Direct Cross Court + +None + +## EXHIBITS + +Exhibit Voir Number Description ID In Dire + +None + +2 THE COURT: All right, so this is Judge 3 Freeman and this is a conference in four of the cases 4 against the Jeffrey Epstein estate, versus 5 Indyke, 19cv10475, versus Indyke, 19cv10476, 6 versus Indyke, 19cv10479 and Doe 1000 versus 7 Indyke, 19cv10577. If you are here for some other 8 case or you think I got those numbers wrong, please 9 make sure I know about it. But I'm going to ask for 10 your appearances, we have quite a number of people on 11 the line, may I have appearances first by plaintiffs' 12 counsel in these cases. + +13 MS. SIGRID MCCAWLEY: Yes, Your Honor, good 14 morning, this is Sigrid McCawley from the law firm of 15 Boies, Schiller & Flexner, and I'm representing the 16 plaintiffs in the actions that you listed. Along with 17 me I have my colleagues, Sabina Mariella and Andrew 18 Villacastin. We also have a few of our summer 19 associates who had joined the line, as well. + +20 THE COURT: All right, do I have a court 21 reporter on the line? + +22 COURT REPORTER: Yes, good morning, Judge, 23 this is Kristen Carinonte (phonetic), may I ask the 24 parties who are not speaking to mute until they're 25 needed to speak, please. + +2 THE COURT: Yes, and also I'm going to ask + +3 anyone who is giving appearances for the record to + +4 please spell your names. Ms. McCawley, if you could + +5 please spell your name and the names of your + +6 colleagues? + +7 MS. MCCAWLEY: Of course, Sigrid McCawley, + +8 which is spelled S-IG-R-I-D, and the last name is + +9 McCawley, M-little C-big C-A-W-L-E-Y. I also have + +10 with me Sabina Mariella, which is S-A-B-I-N-A + +11 Mariella, M-A-R-I-E-L-L-A, and Andrew Villicastin, and + +12 that's A-N-D-R-E-W, and Villicastin is V-I-L-L-I-C-A- + +13 S-T-I-N. + +14 THE COURT: And you're counsel in all of the + +15 cases that are on for today? + +16 MS. MCCAWLEY: Correct. Correct, Your Honor. + +17 THE COURT: Can I have defendants' counsel, + +18 please. + +19 MR. BENNET MOSKOWITZ: Hi, Your Honor, again, + +20 this is Bennet Moskowitz, B-E-N-N-E-T, last name M-0- + +21 S-K-O-W-I-T-Z, at Troutman Sanders, for the co- + +22 executors in each of these cases. My colleagues who + +23 handle the day to day discovery, Matthew Aaronson and + +24 Valerie Sirota are on, that's Matthew is M-A-T-T-H-E- + +25 N, last name is A-A-R-O-N-S-O-N, and Valerie, V-A-L-E- + +2 R-I-E, last name Sirota, S-I-R-O-T-A, and we're 3 counsel for the co-executors in each of these cases. + +4 THE COURT: All right, do I have any other 5 attorneys who are on who are representing plaintiffs 6 in any of the other cases that are pending before the 7 Court? No, all right. + +8 MS. LAURA MENNINGER: Your Honor? + +9 THE COURT: Yes? + +10 MS. MENNINGER: Sorry, this is defendant's 11 counsel for Ms. Maxwell, Laura Menninger, I'm in the 12 10475 case. + +13 THE COURT: Can you spell your name, please? + +14 MS. MENNINGER: Yes, it's L-A-U-R-A M-E-N-N-I-15 N-G-E-R. + +16 THE COURT: Okay. And again, are there any 17 other attorneys on the line in any of the cases? All 18 right, I'm going to assume then that anyone else on 19 the phone is public or press and just ask you to 20 please keep your lines muted. Sometimes on these 21 calls we hear beeps which suggests that someone else 22 may have joined in the call, it can also suggest that 23 someone may have dropped off the call, and because of 24 that I'll probably interrupt anyone who is speaking 25 just to try to make sure that we didn't lose anybody + +2 or we didn't gain anyone we should know about. It's 3 not a courtroom where I can see people coming and 4 going so I just like to make sure we didn't 5 accidentally lose one of the counsel who's supposed to 6 be present, and I apologize in advance for the 7 interruptions. Do I have + +8 : Yes, Judge, I'm here. + +9 THE COURT: Okay, that's one of my law clerks, 10 just so you know. All right, so I have letters in 11 these cases, they've come in clusters of letter and 12 response and reply in the three, the three cases where 13 Ms. Maxwell is not a party and then there are letters 14 relating to her in the case where she is a party. Let 15 me start with the other cases where she is not the 16 party and deal with those letters first. Can I have 17 from Ms. McCawley just a status update from you where 18 things stand with your current requests, with your 19 understanding about potential settlements? + +20 MS. MCCAWLEY: Yes, Your Honor. So with 21 respect to the requests, we've presented to the Court 22 a main threshold issue which has been unresolved at 23 this point by the parties, and that is the issue of 24 the time period within which the defendants of the 25 estate will produce documents. That issue remains + +2 unresolved. It is the plaintiffs' position that 3 documents for the entire relevant time period for each 4 plaintiff would run from the date of their abuse that 5 year to the present are responsive and relevant to 6 discovery in the case. That goes to the evidence with 7 respect to any of the conduct that Epstein was 8 engaging in over those years that would prove the 9 abuse, not simply as in a car crash case, you don't 10 just get the evidence of the date of the car crash, 11 you get all evidence relating to anything that's 12 relevant and could be used potentially at trial. 13 Similarly here, the defendants have attempted to limit 14 their production to simply the year of the abuse or 15 'years of the abuse if it happened in more than one 16 year. It's our position that all evidence relating to 17 the 20, over 20 year span of Epstein's abuse of not 18 only our clients, but other clients that are similarly 19 situated, other women that are similarly situated, is 20 highly relevant to the discovery in this matter. + +21 And, of course, as Your Honor knows, the 22 plaintiff has the burden of proving her case in each 23 of these instances and the estate has taken the 24 position of attempting to prove Epstein's innocence, 25 therefore making all of this information highly + +2 relevant to the entire time period. This is similar 3 to other cases that have come before in the Southern 4 District of New York, for example, Judge Sweet in his 5 case with one of the victims allowed discovery for the 6 entire time period from 2000 to the present, and that 7 is again because under 415 evidence of other abuse can 8 be admissible at trial. So we believe that the entire 9 time period is highly relevant and those documents 10 need to be produced. + +11 The status of this, as of the date of filing 12 our letters no documents have been produced in the 13 last couple of days. In case and in the 14 Jane Doe 1000 case there has been one document 15 produced by the defendants. In the case of 16 there have been three documents produced, one 17 of which was clawed back. And in the case of Juliet 18 , there have been 90 documents produced, and 19 that is on their side. So we are still in a position 20 where we have not received any substantial document 21 production in this case. + +22 The Court will remember that back on January 23 28th, the cases were filed in November, back on January 24 28O1 we sent, after your hearing that you had in 25 December asking them to preserve documents, we sent a + +1 2 3 10 + +document preservation letter that outlined in very specific detail the email accounts which we were aware 4 of that Mr. Epstein had utilized. You are going to 5 hear today, and you saw it in the filings from the 6 defendant about their claims of burden, they have not 7 justified burden at this point, they have thrown 8 around a number of 700,000 documents. I will tell you 9 that we've already gone through 600,000 documents in 10 just Annie's case alone for our production. They have 11 not produced a hit list to show burden or otherwise 12 establish why our request would be so burdensome. So 13 with respect to, and that is only, now they are only 14 still responding for the time period that is the one 15 or two year window, depending on the particular 16 plaintiff. + +17 So at this stage we do not have, that is still 18 the threshold issue that we're asking this Court to 19 resolve. We need that issue resolved before we can 20 undertake depositions or get this case moving because 23. we at this point have no documents of any substance 22 from the other side. So that is the key issue that 23 we've put before the Court for resolution. They have 24 produce supplemental interrogatory responses. Again, 25 those are still limited to the time period that they + +2 have set forth. They have not agreed to produce +3 information for the entire time period at this point. +4 So that is the key issue that we've put before the +5 Court that we need resolution on it in order to be +6 able to move these cases forward at this point. + +7 THE COURT: All right, before I ask some +8 questions about that, let me just ask about potential +9 for settlement of these cases, what's plaintiffs' +10 understanding? + +11 MS. MCCAWLEY: Potential for settlement in +12 these cases, as Your Honor knows, there was the +13 proposal of a potential claims administration program +14 that came about in the fall of this past year. That +15 program has been through a series of back and forth +16 between the US Virgin Islands AG and the estate with +17 input from various plaintiffs' attorneys, as well. +18 That program has not yet been approved, it's made +19 headway but it has not yet been approved to move +20 forward. There are still issues with respect to a +21 release and other matters, so that has not gotten off +22 the ground at all. So there have been no substantive +23 settlement discussions of any kind in these cases. +24 And again -- + +25 THE COURT: If the program gets off the + +2 ground, the program as you understand it to be 3 fashioned, would these plaintiffs be likely to 4 participate in it? + +5 MS. MCCAWLEY: We still have to have those 6 final conversations with the clients pending what the 7 final outcome of the program is, but they have all 8 been interested in trying to participate in a program 9 if it does go forward. Our concern, of course, is that 10 that program has been delayed and has not moved 11 forward, so we have had the need to press forward with 12 our case. Of course, in that program, too, any offer 13 that could be made could be very substandard where our 14 clients would want to proceed with the merits of their 15 action, which is why we are here before the Court 16 trying to seek resolution of our clients' claims, 17 because there is no guarantee with respect to that 18 program, whatsoever. + +19 So we are in a position where we need to and 20 want to move forward with discovery without further 21 delay to be able to get to the merits of our clients' 22 claims. Any discovery that we receive in these 23 matters would be relevant anyway to those discussions 24 with our presenting claims to the claims 25 administrator. So we see that as coinciding and being + +2 relevant and responsive to us being able to establish 3 our claims, again, before the claims administrator. + +4 THE COURT: All right, and going back to your 5 request to compel discovery from defendants, you say 6 that the timeframe is the issue. The way the letter 7 was presented it appeared to say in general you hadn't 8 gotten discovery responses to document requests or 9 interrogatories and then you highlighted this issue. 10 Is this really the key issue or the only issue or are 11 there other issues with respect to just not getting 12 responses? + +13 MS. MCCAWLEY: Well you're correct, Your 14 Honor, at the time we wrote the initial letters, the 15 responses were, there were not responses, there were 16 just objections. They have since supplemented their 17 responses but, again, limiting it only to the 18 timeframe. So we still may have issues with those 19 responses because at this point we only can see them 20 as to the time period within which they're saying the 21 abuse victims, that time period where they were 22 abused. So we don't believe that they're fulsome at 23 this point, but if the Court could resolve the 24 threshold issue of whether or not they have to produce 25 for the entire time period, they would then + +2 supplement, our assumption is that they would +3 supplement their responses both to interrogatories and +4 to the request for production, and then we could +5 evaluate that point if it appears that there is +6 anything missing. + +7 THE COURT: And why would it not be the case +8 that document request by document request or +9 interrogatory by interrogatory the inquiry might be +10 different as to what timeframe would be appropriate to +11 look at? There might be some, depending upon how the +12 request is framed, where it would be appropriate to +13 look at a longer timeframe, and there may be some +14 based on the nature of the request where that would +15 not make sense to look at a longer timeframe, why +16 should I be doing this on a global basis? + +17 MS. MCCAWLEY: Well that's a very fair +18 question, Your Honor. So the requests, for example, +19 seek information related, like the request number one +20 is information related to the plaintiff including +21 diaries -- diaries, journals, calendars, any +22 information, travel itineraries, that relate to that +23 plaintiff. And that could be in any time period. For +24 example, if Epstein last year was talking about one of +25 our clients and had information that he had recorded + +2 in an email about one of our clients, that would be 3 responsive. + +4 So the time period does pertain, in my view, 5 to all of the requests. They have not come to us and 6 said a particular request only applies for these 7 reasons to one particular year. In my view, the 8 requests, for example, for flight logs, if there 9 aren't flight logs in a certain year they would only 10 produce what they have, obviously, but if they have 11 flight logs for the entire time period, we would want 12 those. So it is, Your Honor is correct that there can 13 be some request specific issues, but they haven't 14 agreed to produce anything outside of the year of the 15 abuse at this point. + +16 THE COURT: Are there some requests that 17 relate to people other than your clients? + +18 MS. MCCAWLEY: Yes. + +19 THE COURT: Are there -- + +20 MS. MCCAWLEY: So, for example, yes. So, as I 21 said before, it's our position that with respect to 22 our clients' claims in each of the cases, information 23 relating to Epstein's abuse of other victims is highly 24 relevant under 415, particularly to establish that 25 this pattern of luring in young girls in the same way, + +for example, saying you're interviewing for a modeling job, or saying they're coming for an assistant interview, the pattern of how he lured girls in then abused them is relevant to our clients presenting their claims to the jury to prove the truth of the fact that they were, as well, abused in a similar manner. + +So we firmly believe that that information is highly relevant to the case. Again, the estate has taken the position, and you've seen it in their filings, that Epstein is innocent and we have to prove the truth of that, as well as with respect to all of these cases. So we are in a position where we are having to fight to get discovery from the estate. I was certainly hoping it would not be this kind of a battle, I was hoping that now that he is no longer taking his Fifth Amendment privileges, no longer with us, that we would be able to get substantive discovery in a more streamlined manner, but that is not the case. And this threshold issue is very important because it implicates our clients' ability to be able to present their case and to be able to substantively depose witnesses. + +As Your Honor knows, our discovery deadline is + +2 looming in early July. We need to be able to take the 3 depositions of various people who either interacted 4 with our clients who are witnesses to the abuse that 5 occurred in Epstein's various homes, and we need the 6 information and the documents from his files that 7 establish and relate to the abuse. And those are the 8 requests that we've put forward. + +9 THE COURT: All right, I have some thoughts on 10 this but let me hear from defendants first. + +11 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Hi, Your Honor, Bennet 12 Moskowitz, if I may, I'd like to address the program 13 issue first, which I think is much quicker than the 14 discovery, my colleague, Matt Aaronson, will address 15 the discovery issues, if that's okay? + +16 THE COURT: Okay. + +17 MR. MOSKOWITZ: So I am very, very surprised 18 to hear Ms. McCawley give a presentation that seems 19 like her clients are lukewarm on the program. She is 20 on the emails from this week where Brad , who 21 represents five plaintiffs, and we understand the vast 22 majority of claimants, all of whom want to participate 23 in the program according to him, announced to us on 24 the estate side that he was able to get the attorney 25 general to finally step aside and let the program move + +2 forward. So my first surprise is hearing that Ms. + +3 McCawley thinks that the program is still in some vast 4 limbo, it is not, for all the reasons that I discussed 5 this morning and which Ms. McCawley is aware of. + +6 THE COURT: Hold on a second. We had two 7 separate conferences, one was at 10:00 and this one is 8 at 11:00. So when you say that we discussed this 9 morning, Ms. McCawley, unless you didn't announce 10 yourself, was not on that call and doesn't know what 11 you said on that conference. + +12 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Sure, I'm happy -- + +13 MS. MCCAWLEY: No, Your Honor -- + +14 THE COURT: I'm sorry? + +15 MS. MCCAWLEY: I'm sorry, this is Sigrid 16 McCawley, I didn't, I was not aware of a 10:00 17 conference call, I'm sorry. + +18 THE COURT: We had a conference call in 19 certain of the other cases with different plaintiffs' 20 counsel where there were somewhat different issues 21 raised. I'm trying to cluster these so that we don't 22 have to have a marathon session with all cases at 23 once. + +24 MR. MOSKOWITZ: I'm happy to concisely, as 25 best I can, go through the same points, and I will say + +2 now that I know Ms. McCawley knows all of the + +3 following with perhaps one exception, which I'll + +4 explain. Ms. McCawley knows that around 69 individual + +5 claimants, including her clients, have publicly come + +6 forward to voice overwhelming support for the program, + +7 including to the USVI probate court. We know that + +8 that's the vast majority of known claimants. We're + +9 aware of only one claimant who is a state court + +10 plaintiff, who has publicly said that she is not + +11 participating and that was through her counsel, and I + +12 don't even know if that's that person's current + +13 position. + +14 Ms. McCawley also knows that seven plaintiffs + +15 in the SDNY actions, including one of her clients, + +16 , most recently, stayed their actions in + +17 favor of the program, and it bears mentioning that + +18 , you know, the stipulation in that + +19 regard goes contrary to everything Ms. McCawley just + +20 said. Your Honor entered that order, so I don't think + +21 I need to repeat it verbatim, but mentioned in there + +22 was the notion of conserving resources. And in that + +23 regard, as a side note it bears mentioning that Boies + +24 Schiller has been the biggest culprit in driving up + +25 the estate's litigation costs, money that will never + +2 be available for their clients or other alleged 3 victims in the program, we don't understand that. We 4 were staffed very leanly until recently, just me and 5 an associate, five attorneys on their side, including 6 three partners. I had to add lawyers, my colleagues 7 who are on now, to the team more recently because 8 Boies Schiller takes the most unreasonable positions 9 on discovery, grossly overbroad view, again, Mr. 10 Aaronson will get to that, and they make the most 11 constant threat to motion practice, notwithstanding 12 their clients participating in the program. + +13 Ms. McCawley also knows that the protocol for 14 the program, which was done in close consultation 15 between the administrator and designers and claimants' 16 counsel, including hers, her firm, and with input from 17 the co-executors, is nearly finalized. And Ms. 18 McCawley also knows the only reason things haven't 19 gone forward until now was because of the USVI 20 Attorney General who, again, Mr. announced a 21 couple of days ago in an email that Ms. McCawley is 22 on, that that last, quote, "lingering issue," as Mr. 23 put it, is now resolved. And again, there are 24 a few less contentious matters to iron out, but it is 25 our firm's expectation that by sometime next week that + +2 resolution in principle will be formalized. + +3 The sole thing that not be 4 aware of is that if something unexpected happens and 5 that resolution in principle is not finalized, well 6 then by June 15th our current intent on the estate's 7 side is to move forward with the program absent the 8 probate court entering an order directing us not to or 9 otherwise impeding that. And I don't think that's 10 going to happen because another person who has voiced 11 support for the program is the probate judge, who on 12 February 4th at a hearing that Ms. McCawley attended, 13 as did David Boies, the probate judge said the 14 following, quote, "I think we agreed that everybody 15 believes this program is a great program." + +16 So I will say that I don't understand why we 17 get one display of overwhelming support from Boies 18 Schiller and others when we are not before Your Honor, 19 and then we come before Your Honor and I hear a 20 different story. The program is going to go forward 21 very soon, I am confident of that, and I am confident 22 that per Ms. McCawley's own statements, all of her 23 clients, not just the one who stayed her action 24 already, are going to participate. So again, every 25 dollar we're spending on meantime is money that will + +2 never be available for that program. That's all I 3 have to say on the program aspect, unless Your Honor 4 has questions I'll refer to my colleague, Mr. 5 Aaronson, to address the discovery issues. + +6 7 issues. THE COURT: Let me hear on the discovery + +8 MR. MATTHEW AARONSON: Good morning, Your 9 Honor, Matthew Aaronson. I want to correct a couple of 10 misstatements that Ms. McCawley made, it is not the 11 estate's position that documents that relate to the 12 claims asserted by the plaintiff will not be produced. 13 And, in fact, all of our discovery responses have 14 identified that to the extent the request seeks 15 information about plaintiffs, it will be produced. + +16 We also identified, Your Honor, in the letter 17 that we sent to you -- + +18 THE COURT: Hold on, let me interrupt you, 19 without regard to timeframe or only within a specific 20 timeframe? + +21 MR. AARONSON: I was about to clarify that. 22 We said in our letter to Your Honor, without regard to 23 timeframe, with respect to the plaintiff. And, in 24 fact, that is something that, Your Honor, the problem 25 we have here is we were still under the impression we + +2 were meeting and conferring with plaintiffs' counsel 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 on these issues. And we put that in our letter, and before we could even, you know, we told them we would consider their positions, and before we could even conclude that they filed the letter with the Court. And I think you're aware we, our initial letter to the Court said that we were sort of surprised by that and saying it was premature. We still think these issues are premature, but the simple fact is, Your Honor, our position is we are producing any documents that reference or relate to the plaintiffs. And, in fact, we have searched documents for that, so there is no dispute there, there's no issue there. We're not saying that the time period for documents relating to plaintiff is limited in that way, shape or form. + +17 18 situations, 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 one day in 2002, proportional to ask for What we did say was these are events, in some incidents that happened on and we're not saying it's not our client, the estate, to search for documents relating to a 20, I guess it would be an 18 year period, Your Honor, relating people who may have worked at a property that Mr. Epstein owned, and, in fact, property that doesn't allege she ever visited. You know, it's a + +2 scope issue but, again, to the extent that there is an 3 allegation that , I'm sorry, if there's a 4 document that references we've agreed to 5 produce it. We've searched for those documents and 6 the same applies for all the plaintiffs. So I want to 7 make it very clear that that was a misstatement of 8 what our position is. + +9 You know, again, the scope here is just so 10 overbroad, beyond the plaintiff, that we think it's 11 not proportional to the case. We disagree completely 12 with Ms. McCawley's statement that any of that 13 discovery is necessary for her to prove her claims. 14 Her claims in the case are a simple claim of battery, 15 that's the claim in this case. That's her burden to 16 prove and that is it. And we have agreed to provide 17 documents that relate to her claims, if she said she 18 was at a property at a certain date, we've identified 19 to the best of our ability people who may have been at 20 that property at that date. + +21 You know, I'm not sure what more we're 22 obligated to do, Your Honor, and this is part of the 23 problem. If they have complaints about search terms, 24 they didn't engage with us to talk about search terms. 25 Before we could even finish the process they ran to court. + +2 We're open to a dialog. We've been always open to a dialog 3 to try to resolve these issues. As we've told you, they 4 prematurely went to court to try to, you know, to try to get 5 before Your Honor before we could even finish that. 6 And there's a lot of requests in here, Your Honor, 7 that are just completely unrelated to these cases, I 8 don't think it's appropriate now to go through each 9 one right now, but I just wanted to clarify that this 10 concept that it's a, we're not agreeing to produce 11 documents about the plaintiff, it's wholly untrue, and 12 I just wanted to make that very clear. + +13 THE COURT: Okay. So let me go back on 14 plaintiffs' side, I'm not going to make any blanket 15 rulings and I'm not persuaded that you've conferred 16 fully in good faith before bringing the motion, in 17 part because you've already said that some of it is 18 moot because, in fact, when you got responses, you no 19 longer had a complete absence of information, and now 20 you're really just focused on the timeframe issue. 21 That tells me that when you wrote the initial letter, 22 you hadn't conferred fully in good faith to see what 23 really had to be put before the Court. + +24 With respect to the timeframe issue, it sounds 25 like defendant is prepared to and planning to produce + +2 documents without regard to timeframe that refer to 3 your clients or relate to your clients, and it also 4 sounds like defendant are willing to confer with 5 respect to other requests. As far as those other 6 requests go, the test for relevance is not whether 7 something is relevant to a general subject matter of a 8 case, it's whether it's relevant to a claim or defense 9 asserted in the case. It may be with respect to some 10 of the requests where timeframe is at issue, that the 11 documents sought are, in fact, highly relevant to a 12 defense that's been asserted in the case, for example. 13 It may be that they are tangentially relevant. It may 14 be the burden is great, it may be the burden is 15 modest. + +16 It may be that -- let me just make sure I 17 didn't lose counsel, do I still have plaintiffs' 18 counsel? + +19 MS. MCCAWLEY: Yes, Your Honor. + +20 THE COURT: Do I still have defendants' 21 counsel? + +22 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Yes, Your Honor. + +23 THE COURT: All right, if anyone joined from 24 the public or press I'll please ask you to mute your 25 phone. Did anyone join who is an attorney in one of + +2 the cases in front of me? No. + +3 All right, I've lost the thread a little bit 4 of what I was saying, but the point is that if this is 5 in front of me with particularized disputes, I'm going 6 to have to look at each document request at issue or 7 each interrogatory at issue, hear from the parties 8 about the particular relevance to a claim or defense, 9 hear from the defendant about the particular arguable 10 lack of relevance or burden, and make item by item 11 determinations. I'm not going to do it in a blanket 12 fashion and you're going to have to confer on that 13 kind of level to get it focused for me, if it comes 14 back to me, so that I understand just what the 15 documents are that are being sought, just what the 16 claim of relevance is, just what the purported burden 17 is, just what the proportionality is so that I can 18 make that assessment balancing relevance factors. + +19 Now, the other issue that we have is resources 20 and settlements, and whether the dollars that are 21 spent by defendant in litigating the case and 22 responding to discovery requests might be better spent 23 by being put into a fund if plaintiffs are planning to 24 participate in that, and whether it is a consideration 25 that I should take into account whether we should have + +2 any kind of extended period of time for the responses so that you can see if you're going to participate in the program if the kinks are worked out. + +3 4 + +5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 In the earlier conference we had today what I did was allow the parties to have a bit of a hiatus in their cases to conserve resources, asking for a status letter by June 19th with the understanding that the estate was planning to move forward with the program no later than June 15th, absent something that they thought would be extraordinary to stop it from doing so. + +13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 So on plaintiffs' side whether you think it makes sense to give it a window of time before there are increased attorneys' fees spent to see if, in fact, that program is moving forward and you might be participating in it. And in any event, let me hear what you have to say about my view that perhaps you should be conferring further in good faith about these timeframe issues on a request by request basis. + +21 22 23 24 25 MS. MCCAWLEY: Of course, Your Honor, this is Sigrid McCawley for the plaintiff. With respect to the issue of a hiatus, my concern there would be that we, as you know, back in November talked about this program. And while Mr. Moskowitz has made + +2 representations on this call, you'll understand that 3 those were the same representations that he was making 4 back in December and January, and for a number of 5 reasons that program has just not moved forward. Now 6 I'm hearing for the first time this June 15th date, but 7 I have not heard before. + +8 The problem I see with any kind of hiatus, and 9 to be clear, we don't want to, of course, expend 10 unnecessary estate resources, the issue that I have 11 with that is the continued delay and the part of the 12 disadvantage to my clients, and that they don't have 13 information, all the information they need relevant to 14 their claims because they haven't received, even 15 though we've tried diligently, they have not received 16 substantial production in the case of any kind. + +17 So with respect to a hiatus, my concern would 18 be that right now our discovery deadline is set for 19 early July. We were hoping to get documents in order 20 to be able to take, start taking some of the necessary 21 depositions to get information for our case to be able 22 to move it forward. And I believe that is something 23 that we would be entitled to. I think that my concern 24 is that, again, it would be a July 15th date, then it 25 would be, I'm sorry, a June 15th date, then a July 15th + +2 date, and it would continue without us being able to 3 move the case forward. + +4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Also, as you know, the claims program is voluntary. So to the extent that a client does participate in that and gets, we don't know what that claims administration program is going to ultimately prove to be, so to the extent that a client and it's offered something or not offered anything, their case should be moving forward so that they're able to go to trial on the merits of their claims if they need to against the estate. So that would be my concern with making any change at this point. participates + +15 16 17 18 19 20 23. 22 23 Again, the discovery in my view has moved very, very slowly so to pull back and not have them continue to engage with us on discovery in my view would be problematic because it would just further delay the case. So those are my concerns generally with respect to that. And again, I'm hearing from the other side this June 15th date but I have no confidence that that is something that will necessarily move forward because we don't have anything in writing with 24 respect to that or any statement from the court in the 25 USVI that they've approved that, or anything of that + +2 nature. So that would be my concern there. + +3 With respect to the issue before the Court, we 4 are in a position where the timeframe issue is 5 significantly problematic to us for the reasons that 6 I've outlined. While they are representing to the 7 Court today that they will produce documents related 8 to the plaintiff, you'll remember -- + +9 THE COURT: Well what do they say in their 10 responses that you got in? Did they say these 11 documents will be produced or is it just they're 12 saying this for the first time to the Court today? + +13 MS. MCCAWLEY: With respect to the plaintiff, 14 they represented they would run the name of the 15 plaintiff in their discovery searches and produce with 16 respect to the plaintiff, yes, that they did. But the 17 problem with that -- + +18 THE COURT: Why did you tell me earlier on in 19 the call that they were refusing to produce any 20 documents for the later timeframe, even with regard to 21 the plaintiff? + +22 MS. MCCAWLEY: That is my understanding of 23 their position, Your Honor. I'm hearing now that 24 they're saying, first of all, they've only produced 25 one document for case, one document for + +2 Jane Doe's case -- + +3 THE COURT: Wait a minute. Wait a minute. + +4 This is a complete lack of meaningful dialog between 5 the parties, because I'm hearing opposite things from 6 the parties about what defendants' position is. + +7 Defendant, as I understand it from this call, has said 8 they will and have told you that they will produce 9 documents, regardless of timeframe, if they refer or 10 relate to the plaintiff. And that they're doing that, 11 in fact, in all cases and have not taken a position 12 that they would not. And you're saying that is Your 13 Honor understanding of their position, that they will 14 not. How can that be if you've had a good conference 15 between you? + +16 MS. MCCAWLEY: Your Honor, as we set forth in 17 our letter, we did have a two-hour conference where we 18 asked them about the timeframe issue and made sure to 19 get the full position on that because that was our 20 biggest concern. And that is what we discretely 21 presented to the Court because that was the concern we 22 had, that they were not going to be producing anything 23 beyond the time period of the abuse. + +24 THE COURT: No, that is not what you 25 discreetly presented to the Court, you presented to + +2 the Court in your opening letter that there was a 3 complete failure to respond to any of the requests. + +4 And now you tell me on the call that since then there 5 has been a response. And so what is now being 6 discreetly presented on this telephone call is what 7 you say is the remaining issue, which seems like it's 8 only a remaining issue in part. Because it seems like 9 if there are documents specifically relating or 10 referring to the plaintiff, defendants have agreed to 11 produce it, and according to defendants have told you 12 they've agreed to produce it in their responses that 13 you have since gotten. + +14 Now I haven't seen those responses, if they 15 have, if they've been put before me, I'm sorry, I have 16 not reviewed them. I don't think I have them. For that 17 matter, I'm not sure I have all of their requests, I'm 18 not sure I have an item by item explanation of 19 relevance, and I'm not sure that your discussion has 20 been adequate between the lawyers. + +21 MS. MCCAWLEY: Your Honor, this is Sigrid 22 McCawley for the plaintiff. I appreciate that, I am 23 hearing Your Honor, we will go back and address these 24 issues again with the defendants in the hopes of being 25 able to resolve them and not hopefully have to come + +2 before the Court with respect to them. We are, again, 3 hopeful to be able to get discovery in this case. We 4 do not believe that has been the situation that we're 5 in presently and that's why we presented to the Court, 6 but I understand your point, Your Honor, and we will 7 make sure to engage further in the hopes of being able + +10 defendants' side, by when do you plan to produce, assuming 11 we have no stay of discovery here or no hiatus, how, by when + +14 MR. MOSKOWITZ: We've already started that 15 Your Honor, Bennet Moskowitz, excuse me. And, in 16 fact, I apologize, let me let Mr. Aaronson address 17 that question, then if I can I'd like to just very 18 quickly respond to something Ms. McCawley said about + +23 Aaronson. We have already started the production, we 24 made a production I believe on Wednesday of documents, 25 and I think, in particular, , there was over + +2 100 documents. So the process is underway, and again, 3 I think, Your Honor, you've gotten this correct, we 4 have told them, you know, that we will produce and 5 search for, search for and produce documents that 6 refer or relate to their clients. To the extent that 7 they think we need to additional search terms, we've 8 searched their, you know, the individual plaintiffs' names, 9 if there are additional search terms we are open to a dialog 10 to discuss that, if there are additional terms, as in every 11 case, you know, whether or not we can reach agreements on 12 those terms. + +13 You know, the thing -- + +14 THE COURT: I'd like to put a deadline on 15 getting the production complete with respect to any 16 documents that in any way refer or relate to the 17 plaintiff after you've had some further discussion 18 perhaps on search terms, if necessary. But I'd like to 19 have a firm date when, you know, you're not just 20 producing a few documents, a few documents and say 21 it's underway, that that actually gets produced. 22 What's your response? + +23 MR. AARONSON: That's fair, Your Honor, I 24 think the, you know, part of that goes back to the 25 same issue you raised earlier about, you know, the + +2 expenditure of time and money on discovery issues versus, you know, putting it towards the program. You know, so to the extent the Court is not inclined to issue a pause or some sort of temporary, you know, issue on that, you know, it's hard to say. The problem we have is that, you know, it's difficult to search all of our files given the pandemic, some files have not been able to be collected yet. So I can tell you that of the electronic documents that we have collected, I think we can complete that probably, you know, within 30 days, you know, of what we've collected already. But I will tell you, we've done an initial pass through that and we have made those productions. As I said, Juliet , there was a significant number of documents, for some of the other plaintiffs there were not. + +So, you know, again, we do believe that it would be appropriate to maybe pause some of this, but you said the Court is not inclined to do that. You know, I think 30 days for what we have, but to be clear, Your Honor, I don't know that we have collected every, you know, source at this time given our inability to collect documents due to the pandemic. + +THE COURT: How has the pandemic affected your + +2 ability to collect documents specifically? + +3 MR. AARONSON: Well, and I'll let Mr. + +4 Moskowitz speak to that, but my understanding is that, 5 you know, we haven't been able to access certain, 6 people are not traveling to different locations. So we 7 have collected electronic documents, I'm not, and 8 again, I'm deferring to Mr. Moskowitz on that, whether 9 or not additional documents are still out there. + +10 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Yeah -- + +11 MR. AARONSON: Go ahead. + +12 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Bennet Moskowitz, happy to 13 clarify that point, Your Honor. There are two, let me 14 take a step back, yes, it is true that we have 15 collected over 700-and-I think-40,000 documents, and 16 we did search them for the plaintiffs' names and we 17 did produce what we found that wasn't privileged. And 18 we will go back and make sure that that's complete. 19 But the fact that we located many documents for Juliet 20 as, which were dated to as late as I believe 21 last year, they've already been produced, so I don't 22 understand Ms. McCawley's confusion about the 23 timeframe issue. But in any event, the fact that we 24 found those but didn't find such documents for the 25 other cases, just evidences a lack of documents, not + +1 2 3 + +38 + +something wrong with the search process. + +In terms of the pandemic difficulties, my 4 problem with making a 30 day blanket representation is 5 that there are at least some hard copy files that I 6 would like certain people to look through. And while I 7 have no reason one way or the other to respect that 8 responsive materials are there, I'd like that to 9 happen before such deadline and I'm not 100 percent 10 certain that it can because at least some of the 11 documents are in places that are still under lockdown 12 or there are still health concerns. + +13 In addition to that, this is somewhat subject 14 to the disputes about the scope of discovery. If Ms. 15 McCawley is, let's say, correct, in these cases 16 anything related to any allegedly bad thing Mr. 17 Epstein ever did is relevant in each action, well, 18 then it could take me, you know, six months or a year 19 to finish looking for every piece of paper in every 20 property Mr. Epstein owned. So again, it's with the 23. context of just the searching for names, Mr. 22 Aaronson's correct, that could be done in the next 30 23 days with the exception of anything that we can't 24 actually access to look through. And again + +25 THE COURT: If you already have the documents + +2 electronically, at least certain of the documents, 3 most of the documents -- + +4 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Yes. + +5 THE COURT: And you have already gone through 6 them and you've already made some production, why 7 would you need another 30 days before you can get to 8 the end of that particular road? + +9 MR. MOSKOWITZ: We may not, it really depends 10 on the rest of the meet and confer process which never 11 completed. It depends on the search terms that are 12 proposed, whether there are any additional search 13 terms proposed. For example, what we wanted to happen 14 during the full meet and confer process, which is what 15 we strive to do in every case, and what we're actually 16 doing in other actions against the estate that Boies 17 Schiller is not involved with, is suggest search terms 18 to us that you think would satisfy your view of what a 19 particular request entails, let us run the report. If the 20 hit report comes back and says 500 documents or even 21 1,000, we may deem that reasonable for that request. 22 If it goes back 10,000, we may not deem that 23 reasonable. So this is part of what an ongoing 24 discussion, I hope, would have entailed, which gives 25 me pause to again say blanket yes, we can get it all + +2 done in 30 days. + +3 4 5 6 As to searching for things that mention the plaintiffs, in what we've already collected, to the extent we didn't complete that, no, we don't need 30 days, but I don't know that that will satisfy Ms. 7 McCawley. + +8 THE COURT: Okay. If this case goes all the 9 'way forward in litigation and goes to trial, you're 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 23. 22 23 24 25 going to try this case, you're not going to try every other case before this Court or any other Court at the same trial. That doesn't mean that evidence regarding others who are claiming to have been victims of Mr. Epstein might not have relevance to some claim or defense that's being raised. And I understand that it may, you know, some documents may have relevance, but you are going to have to get on plaintiff's side a lot more focused with what you want and why you want it. And if you are going to come back and make a renewed application to me, that application is going to have to be more focused on what kind of documents you're talking about, what claim or defense they're relevant to, why they're relevant to that claim or defense, giving me an example of some case law that shows how it could be relevant, and I will make a decision on a + +2 request by request basis about what appropriate + +3 timeframes should be used. And with respect to search + +4 terms, in the first instance, you need to talk to each other + +5 about that because you don't want the Court coming up + +6 with search terms or trying to make judgment calls on that + +7 if it's not necessary. You know, you are much better + +8 off trying to figure it out between you, getting an + +9 agreed protocol, an agreed list of custodians, an + +10 agreed list of search terms and then go from there as + +11 generally happens in cases where there might be a lot of + +12 documents that are kept electronically. + +13 So I expect you to go through that process as + +14 you would in any other case. I am open to kicking out + +15 your deadlines a bit to give you time to talk this + +16 through and to see if we can get some progress. I'm + +17 going to ask defendants, to the extent you already a + +18 known universe of documents, if there are any you have + +19 not yet produced, bet them produced within two weeks. + +20 If there are additional search terms you'll talk with + +21 each other in good faith about a timeframe for running + +22 any additional searches and getting additional + +23 documents produced. And if plaintiff wants to come + +24 back to me on a renewed motion that's more + +25 specifically laid out on particular categories of + +2 documents or responsive to particular interrogatories, + +3 you'll do that after you have tried to work these + +4 thing through with an eye toward what is reasonable. + +5 You know, plaintiff may reasonably need more than + +6 defendants want to give. Defendants may have a + +7 reasonable point about conserving resources for the + +8 sake of a settlement program, which should be taken + +9 seriously because it seems that very serious efforts + +10 are underway to try to get that program off the + +11 ground. + +12 I'm going to ask for a status letter by June + +13 19th which is the date that I gave in other cases. It's + +14 geared to Mr. Moskowitz's representation that this + +15 program should launch he thinks by June 15th. So it + +16 seems to me by June 19th you'll have a better idea and + +17 you'll also have a better idea of where you are with + +18 respect to these discovery issues. I'm going to + +19 caution plaintiffs' counsel, in the future please do + +20 not send me something without being sure you're at the + +21 end of the road in talking to your adversary. I don't + +22 want to get a response that says it's premature, we + +23 haven't really talked. Make sure you are clear on a + +24 point by point basis that you have talked about + +25 specific relevance, that you've talked about specific + +2 burden issues, that you've talked about specific 3 4 5 6 search terms, at least you have tried to engage in that kind of dialog. If you're stymied, you're stymied, and I will hear from you, but I don't think you're at that point. + +7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 23. And I think that's it with respect to those disputes and I should probably turn to the dispute regarding Ms. Maxwell. What I'm going to do is I'm going to, I don't know if the letters were framed as a motion for a conference or a motion to compel. If they were framed as a motion for a conference I'll say granted, we had a conference. As to the underlying issue about compelling, you know, go talk, or if it's actually framed as a motion I'll say denied without prejudice to renew. And I'm going to ask for a status letter by June 19th. Anybody want to say anything else on that before I turn to Ms. Maxwell's issue? No, okay, I'm hearing no, or I'm hearing nothing. Hopefully I haven't lost everybody on the entire call. I'm hearing a laugh, so hopefully that means not. + +22 23 24 25 All right, let me turn to Ms. Menninger's issue, and one thing I want to understand, because there was some reference to potential criminal prosecution which, of course, can impact whether there + +2 'should be a stay as to a defendant who is being 3 criminally prosecuted. Currently, if I'm understanding 4 correctly, be the target of an 5 investigation, or you may be concerned she's the 6 7 target of investigation but there are not actual criminal charges pending, is that right? + +8 9 MS. MENNINGER: Yes, that's correct, Your Honor, we do not have any criminal charges pending 10 anywhere, but we have a number of public statements by 11 the US Attorney's Office in the Southern District, as 12 well as statements made by plaintiffs' counsel to the 13 (press that suggest that those, that that investigation 14 is underway and that it would encompass Ms. Maxwell, 15 and so that is our concern. But it is correct to say 16 that there is no active criminal charges that I'm 17 aware of. + +18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE COURT: All right, so if there were active criminal charges filed, or if that should happen, that might influence the thinking about whether or not there should be a stay because, of course, if defendant ends up taking the Fifth that could have consequences in a civil case and defendant may feel there is little choice but to do that if the person is under criminal indictment or a complaint has been + +2 filed. + +3 So I just want to just note that if that 4 circumstance changed, if that circumstance changes, 5 you know, let me know, if it affects any ruling I make 6 let me know because I may need to revisit a ruling. 7 Let me hear what, given the last subject where there 8 seem to be some changed landscapes since the 9 application was initially made, let me make sure I am 10 aware of the current circumstance. Let me just hear 11 from Ms. Maxwell's counsel first on this. + +12 MS. MENNINGER: Thank you, Your Honor, Ms. 13 Menninger here on behalf of Ms. Maxwell. The 14 landscape has not changed since our letters. We have 15 filed a motion to dismiss the claims which we believe 16 are distinct and different from any, for example, that 17 the estate might have, and we believe that they are 18 strong grounds for dismissal. The case, the 19 allegations against Ms. Maxwell in this case involve 20 an allegation of battery that occurred one time in 21 1996 in New Mexico. And the statute of limitations and 22 venue issues, you know, New York versus New Mexico, 23 are very different for Ms. Maxwell than perhaps for 24 the estate and we think provide the grounds for 25 dismissal. + +2 + +The other two bases that we raised for a stay are the claims program that Your Honor has already spent some time discussing on this call and the earlier call today. We believe, you know, we don't have any independent information, we were not party to the calls in the Virgin Islands as were counsel for plaintiff and for the estate, but I have heard on the call today the representations made by the estate that they believe that the program will be getting off the ground in a matter of a few weeks, June 15{sup}`th`, so three weeks or so from today. + +13 + +Given that plaintiff has indicated an intent to participate in that program, at least in filings in the Virgin Islands, and the fact that that program would, if she participates and is successful, would render this entire lawsuit moot. I think we believe balancing that fact against the extremely broad discovery demands that Your Honor has heard something about, although not with respect to Ms. Maxwell yet, would counsel in favor of at least a short stay, similar to the one that other plaintiffs' counsel have agreed to promoted or even stipulated to in other cases pending before Your Honor. + +25 + +We have received extensive discovery demands, + +we have been advised that plaintiffs' counsel intends to take a number of depositions, including, around the country, including for people that plaintiff in our case never met and had no dealings with. And, Your Honor, I can speak from personal experience with that same type of discovery happening with the same plaintiff's counsel in the [REDACTED] versus Maxwell action that I was counsel for in front of Judge Sweet, we had a number of significant discovery disputes in that case and we had depositions that occurred not only across the country from California to New York and Florida and many places in between, but also abroad in that case, and the litigation costs were in the hundreds of thousands easily in that case. + +And so looking at the pattern of discovery that I believe plaintiff intends to pursue here, balancing the costs of those to someone like my client who is not a multimillionaire, and then viewing the claims program as something that could be successful in resolving this case in a short period of time, we would ask Your Honor to consider putting a stay on discovery in the [REDACTED] case that I am party to or I am counsel for a party to. + +I think I can second or third some of the + +2 things that have already been said earlier, so I don't +3 want to waste the Court's time with those, but we have +4 concerns that any money spent on this litigation is +5 going to reduce the amount of money that would be +6 available to any of the accusers in the Virgin +7 Islands, and we don't think it makes sense to expend +8 the money on these broad discovery requests if we can +9 get the case resolved shortly. + +10 I think the only objection that I heard from +11 plaintiffs' counsel to something like a hiatus was +12 that there is a pending discovery cutoff of early July +13 and it seems to me reasonable that, you know, of +14 course if the claims program gets off the ground in a +15 few weeks, that discovery cutoff could be set out to +16 see if it's successful or not. And so it's sort of a +17 false premise to say that the discovery cutoff in July +18 is the reason we should be forging ahead full steam +19 with this extensive discovery, rather than just taking +20 the more logical approach to me, which would be to at +21 least put it on hold to see if the claims program is +22 successful in the first instance. And if not, then the +23 cases can proceed with the Court's blessing, you know, +24 pick back up where we left off. + +25 In this particular case I think it also bears + +2 noting that the claim allegedly occurred in 1996, so 3 it has been some 24 years since the allegation 4 supposedly happened. And so I don't see that waiting 1 5 or 2 or 3 months balanced against 24 years is, it's 6 not as though we think, you know, documents will go 7 missing in those three months that were already 8 somehow lost to the winds of time over the last 24 9 years, Your Honor. + +10 THE COURT: So you are, I'll just note, by the 11 way, that in your initial letter you asked for an 12 opportunity to do full briefing, but there's a fair amount 13 laid out in the letters, so let me just get some 14 clarification on that. What more briefing would you be 15 looking to do beyond what's in these letters? I mean you 16 have case citations in these letters, at least some, and 17 you lay out the bases for a stay, what would you be 18 looking to do when you are trying to conserve resources, 19 do you really need full briefing? + +20 MS. MENNINGER: I think it could be an 21 abbreviated briefing, but, yes, there are more cases in 22 support of the requests that we're making, there are more 23 cases in terms of the criminal investigation versus active 24 prosecution. And then there's certainly a fair amount of 25 exhibits that I could tender to Your Honor to display + +the breadth of discovery that is part of the +traditional balancing test when looking at a motion to +stay or a good cause, a grounds for good cause is +balanced against the breadth of discovery. + +THE COURT: You know, I don't remember if at +the beginning of this call I asked if my law clerk, +[REDACTED] was on, [REDACTED], are you there? + +[REDACTED]: Yes, I'm here, Judge. + +THE COURT: Okay, well for the court reporter, +it's [REDACTED], H-A-N-N-A. And [REDACTED] and I were +conferring before this conference about some case law +about criminal prosecution as opposed to criminal +investigation, and we weren't finding, at least on +initial look, cases where the Courts tended to stay +civil proceedings when there was an investigation +proceeding. You have cases that say the opposite. + +MS. MENNINGER: Your Honor, I have some, they +are not in the Southern District, so there are some -- + +THE COURT: Okay. + +MS. MENNINGER: (continuing) -- in various +federal and state cases across the country. + +THE COURT: And you're looking for a stay of +the entire case, not just as to proceedings against +your client? + +MS. MENNINGER: Your Honor, it seems to make sense to me to stay the case, but I would be amenable to a stay just in regards to my client or, as I said sort of towards the end of my letter, there are other 6 alternatives that, you know, I think I would view as 7 intermediate steps. For example, bifurcation of 8 discovery on the statute of limitations issue, for 9 example, if that were something the Court felt were 10 appropriate, or a stay on party depositions until 11 later in the discovery process to see where the claims 12 program and the criminal investigation end up. And 13 certainly with regard to the motion to dismiss, that 14 should be, I would think, decided at some point. + +15 THE COURT: I might consider, because there's 16 a lot to do in this case, I might consider putting a 17 hold on Ms. Maxwell having to make statements. So 18 either responding to (indiscernible) interrogatories 19 or being deposed because of Fifth Amendment issues. 20 Because it may be that she ends up the subjection of 23. prosecution, even if she's not yet, and because there 22 are other things that can meanwhile be going forward. 23 If we put her deposition further down the pike, maybe 24 we'll have greater clarity on that before that issue 25 actually comes to the floor. + +2 I'm also thinking that there are other + +3 + +4 + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +23. + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +interests besides hers in this case, there's + +plaintiffs' interests, and I'm sure that although your + +point is well taken that it's not that likely that + +documents will now not be preserved within these few + +months as opposed to not having been preserved over + +the years, I'm sure plaintiff doesn't want to hear + +that after all of these years she must wait more time + +in order to have what she considers to be serious + +wrongs redressed. So, you know, the factors can cut + +in more than one direction. + +So right now I'm not inclined to stay the + +whole case but I am inclined to keep one eye on + +settlement, to keep one eye, I'm not sure how many + +eyes I have, to keep an eye on any criminal + +investigation. I'm asking to have updates if there are + +charges filed. And maybe put some things, you know, + +more at the front end of the discovery period and some + +things more at the back end of the discovery period. + +And I am willing to move the dates out some to + +accommodate the parties, if the parties are engaged in + +good faith discussions, if there's a desire to + +conserve resources because it looks like the claims + +program is, in fact, going forward. I'm willing to do + +2 that, I've done that in other cases, I've stayed other 3 cases, I've extended deadlines in other cases, I don't 4 really want to see, you know, resources going to 5 litigation if it's not necessary, but right now I'm 6 not inclined to have a complete stay of everything. + +7 Ms. Menninger, what would be your reaction to 8 saying hold off on anything that could be in the 9 category of affirmative statements made by Ms. Maxwell 10 for now and having other discovery go forward. + +11 MS. MENNINGER: It does address, this is Ms. 12 Menninger, Laura Menninger, it does address many of my 13 concerns. I would say, you know, the costs related to 14 the broad discovery demands that were propounded, 15 written discovery requests and the like are still of a 16 concern to me. As I mentioned, we've been asked for 17 every calendar she's had for the last 24 years, and 18 every Amazon account she's ever used for the last 24 19 years. So, you know -- + +20 THE COURT: That sounds to me, that sounds to 21 me, again, like you need to have a discussion with 22 plaintiffs' counsel, and plaintiffs' counsel, it 23 sounds like you need to have a discussion with Ms. 24 Menninger about what you really need, why you really 25 need it, how it can be done in a way that's + +2 manageable, with no absolute yes's and no absolute 3 no's with respect to those sorts of requests. You 4 know, it may be that there's something about Amazon 5 accounts that's really critical, and you can explain 6 that. Maybe there's something else that's not really 7 critical and you can, you know, bend a bit on it, you 8 know. So you need to have that kind of discussion to 9 keep, you know, to keep discovery tailored to the case 10 and proportionate to the needs of the case. That has 11 to do with timeframe, that has to do with the scope of 12 what's being claimed in a particular case, and to some 13 extent, it has to do with Mr. Epstein's accused 14 conduct over time. So you're going to have to try to 15 have that conversation and try to balance it, and if 16 you can't, then I will. + +17 MS. MENNINGER: I appreciate that -- + +18 MS. MCCAWLEY: Your Honor, this is -- + +19 THE COURT: Yes? + +20 MS. MCCAWLEY: Sorry, this is Ms. McCawley, 21 can I address what's been raised? + +22 THE COURT: Absolutely. + +23 MS. MCCAWLEY: Thank you. + +24 THE COURT: Absolutely, go ahead. + +25 MS. MCCAWLEY: So with respect to the motion + +2 to stay that Ms. Maxwell's proposing, one of the bases 3 is that she's filed a motion to dismiss. Judge 4 Schofield held a pre-motion conference with respect to 5 that -- + +6 THE COURT: Hold on. Hold on one moment, 7 please. + +8 MS. MCCAWLEY: Sure. + +9 THE COURT: Do I still have, I know I still 10 have Ms. McCawley, do I still have Ms. Menninger? + +11 MS. MENNINGER: Yes, Your Honor. + +12 THE COURT: Do I still have Mr. Moskowitz? + +13 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Yes, Your Honor. + +14 THE COURT: Did anyone join us who's another 15 attorney? Okay, hopefully we didn't lose anybody, if 16 anybody joined from the public or press, welcome, 17 please keep your phone on mute. Okay, go ahead, you 18 were saying, Ms. McCawley? + +19 MS. MCCAWLEY: Yes, so we did hold a, in front 20 of Judge Schofield, a pre-motion conference on Ms. 21 Maxwell's motion to dismiss. As Judge Schofield did 22 with the estate, she discouraged Ms. Maxwell from 23 filing the motion to dismiss, giving her preliminary 24 views that they, the arguments that she was putting 25 forth were not meritorious. Ms. Maxwell insisted on + +2 filing the motion to dismiss and has done that now, 3 just this week. So in my view that is both against any 4 sort of stay based on the motion to dismiss because 5 the district judge has set forth her views with 6 respect to that, at least as an initial matter. + +7 With respect to the case law, Your Honor is 8 correct, the case law in New York is clear that unless 9 there's an indictment put forward, which there has not 10 been, it doesn't allow somebody in a civil case to 11 stay the case on the basis of a possible 12 investigation. With respect to Your Honor's 13 statements about the investigation and potentially 14 allowing Ms. Maxwell to not have to make statements in 15 the civil action, the concern I have there is that we 16 have no indication of any timeframe with respect to 17 the Southern District of New York, how long the 18 investigation could go on or will go on, or anything 19 of that nature. + +20 So the concern for me is Ms. Maxwell, as we 21 have alleged, worked in concert with Epstein to abuse 22 my client. We brought those claims under the Child 23 Victims Act as we're allowed to do because she was a 24 minor, and to not be able to get discovery and ask Ms. 25 Maxwell questions, and get responses, and keep the + +2 3 4 case moving forward puts us in handcuffs with respect to being able to establish our claims. Because as Your Honor has seen from the complaint, the 5 allegations are that they worked together hand in hand 6 with respect to the abuse of . So I would 7 have concerns about some form of that kind of a path 8 for defendant Maxwell in the case at this time until 9 there is a criminal indictment on this (indiscernible) 10 forward. + +11 THE COURT: All right, let me just say a few 12 things about that. First of all, if the investigation 13 is going on here in New York or, for that matter, 14 wherever it may be going on, because what we have in 15 New York is not only in New York with respect to 16 Covid-19, the grand jury process is understandably 17 delayed because it's very difficult to have jurors 18 convene. And so there may be additional time before 19 any cases being investigated is indicted. And so we 20 just have to recognize that we're in somewhat unusual 23. circumstances. + +22 The second thing is that any stay that I might 23 put in place with respect to any aspect of the claims 24 against Ms. Maxwell would be temporary and would be 25 revisited. I would not allow it to drag on + +2 indefinitely but in a case where some things can be 3 done to move the case forward and the case is not 4 completely stalled, I don't see any harm in putting 5 some things a little bit further down the road. + +6 The third thing I'll say, and this is also an 7 unusual circumstance, because of the potential of this 8 claims process in which plaintiff may well participate 9 and which may well get off the ground soon, and if it 10 does, I'm not sure whether it would moot claims 11 against Ms. Maxwell or not, but it might. And as you 12 balance the factors, you have this situation where we 13 may know in the relatively near future whether 14 plaintiff is actively participating in a claims 15 process, whether it looks like it is going to resolve 16 the claims, and we may never have to get to the point 17 where we jeopardize, potentially jeopardize somebody's 18 Fifth Amendment rights. + +19 And so I might be inclined to do this, to say, 20 look, you're going to carry on with discovery in the 21 case after conference on all kinds of things to try to 22 keep costs under control and try to focus on what's 23 most important. I'll extend deadlines out if you would 24 like, if you're feeling pressure from that. We'll 25 hold off on, not on production of documents from Ms. + +2 Maxwell, but on statements that she makes, whether 3 sworn statements and interrogatories or in deposition, 4 we'll put that a little bit further down. You'll give 5 me a status report regarding the prospect of 6 settlement and we'll take . And with respect to 7 holding off on interrogatory responses or depositions 8 by Ms. Maxwell, that will not be a permanent 9 situation, that will be revisited, and if time is 10 stretching out too far and if there is no indictment, 11 then I make take further briefing on the subject and 12 I'll make a decision as to whether, in fact, that part 13 of the case should also go forward. But i will not let 14 it drag out indefinitely. That's my current thinking, 15 what say both of you on that? + +16 MS. MENNINGER: Your Honor, this is Laura 17 Menninger, that would be, we would welcome that 18 ruling, Your Honor. + +19 THE COURT: Plaintiff's side? + +20 MS. MCCAWLEY: Yes, Your Honor, obviously we 21 disagree with that because we believe that it's 22 important to have Ms. Maxwell's participation in this 23 case, we had noticed her for deposition already and 24 that got moved because she, you know, the issues with 25 being able to be in person and things of that nature + +2 we were trying to accommodate. So we are concerned + +3 about there being extended delay and are concerned + +4 about not being able to get information from her + +5 through her testimony. We respect the Court's + +6 concerns about her Fifth Amendment privilege but, + +7 again, we would ask that if you going to be inclined + +8 to do something like this, you tie it to a date like + +9 the June 15th date or something along those lines so + +10 that we're not in a position where she is able to take + +11 depositions of all of our people and we are, you know, + +12 handcuffed with respect to any discovery with respect + +13 to Ms. Maxwell. + +14 THE COURT: Like I said, I have no desire to + +15 have this drag out. You know, if all things, if we + +16 didn't have this potential claim process out there, + +17 with a fairly soon, seemingly likely start date, + +18 according to defendants, then I think the balance + +19 would be different. Because I don't think the case law + +20 in this circuit would generally support the stay when + +21 there is no prosecution pending yet. But, + +22 nonetheless, there are a number of factors that one + +23 might look at on that and whether or not an indictment + +24 is pending is only one of the factors. There are + +25 several factors that could be relevant, including, and + +2 I'm going to refer you to the Louis Vuitton Malletier 3 case, for the court reporter, L-O-U-I-S V-U-I-T-T-O-N 4 M-A-L-L-E-T-I-E-R, versus Ly USA, L-Y U-S-A, Inc. and 5 the case number is 676 F.3d 83 (2011). So the Second 6 Circuit noted that Courts often take a look at a 7 number of factors in deciding whether there should be 8 a stay, including the extent to which the issues in 9 the criminal case overlap with those presented in the 10 civil case. Here there would be, I assume, a very 11 strong overlap to the status of the case, including 12 whether the defendants have been indicted. So that's 13 a factor. Three, the private interests of the 14 plaintiff in proceeding expeditiously weighed against 15 the prejudice to plaintiffs caused by the delay. Here 16 I'm looking at the potential settlement process and 17 that, to me, is an unusual factor that suggests that, 18 you know, the plaintiff's interests may be divided 19 here in proceeding fast with this case when there is 20 potential settlement within the next few months 21 potentially available to plaintiff, and plaintiff may 22 go for that. + +23 Another factor is the private interests of and 24 burden on the defendants. We do have an individual 25 here, we're not talking about the estate. And there + +2 is somewhat more burden for discovery, there's the 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 interests of the Courts, the interest Court is not to have unnecessary litigation of the matters can be resolved amicably and not to have it stretch out forever, that's also in the interest of the Court. We also have this strange overlay of Covid-19 which affects the ability for criminal prosecutors to take matters to a grand jury. + +10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 The public interest, I think the public interest would be well served by the claims process. If you look at this case in terms of there being a number of claimed victims, and that is something that I definitely am looking at and is weighing into my consideration as to how any and all of these cases should be litigated. And in several of the cases, which claims that are no more recent than the claims here, a lot of plaintiffs' counsel have agreed to stays or partial stays or holding off on certain things to conserve resources and allow that process to play out a bit. And I think that those are factors that are unusual in this case, this is a case by case specific analysis that has to be made as to whether there should be a stay. + +25 So in this particular case at this particular + +2 time with these particular circumstances, it seems to 3 me to make sense not to stay the case in the entirety, 4 to send counsel off to have the kind of good faith 5 conference you should have had before contacting me in 6 the first place, and that you should always have about 7 anything and everything as you try to work through 8 discovery issues. But to hold off on the most serious 9 of the issue with respect to Ms. Maxwell, which are 10 her constitutional rights and not forever, but at 11 least long enough to let us know whether the claims 12 process is likely to go forward, and I will revisit 13 it. And I will revisit it at intervals that are 14 reasonable and that does not put you in limbo where 15 you will never be able to get discovery from Ms. 16 Maxwell if this case proceeds. + +17 All right, so let me ask straight out, are you 18 looking, under the circumstances I've described and 19 the way in which I would envision this, which is some 20 discovery going forward, good faith conference, report 21 to me by June 19 about the status, are you looking to 22 have me move out the discovery schedule at all and, if 23 so, by how long? + +24 MS. MCCAWLEY: Your Honor, this is Sigrid 25 McCawley, would I be possible to have some time to + +2 3 consider that? Right now the discovery deadline is set for July 10th I believe and I, of course, had 4 anticipated taking depositions throughout June and 5 into earlier July. So if I could have some time to 6 consider what that would look like and confer with the 7 other side, then if we can agree, maybe present 8 something to the Court with the timing of that. + +9 THE COURT: Yes, I mean I'm not usually in the 10 habit of suggesting extensions, but I think here, 11 rather than be crunched with depositions and panicking 12 at the end of June or beginning of July, you know, 13 putting the thirty days on it to give you time to talk 14 through your issues, and for me to have fuller 15 briefing on the issue of a stay, should it come to 16 that, it might make sense to at least give you another 17 thirty. + +18 MS. MCCAWLEY: That would be fine, Your Honor. + +19 THE COURT: Mr. Moskowitz, do you want to say 20 anything? + +23. MR. MOSKOWITZ: Yeah, just very quickly, Your 22 Honor, I mean that thirty day initial extension and 23 further discussion makes perfect sense to us. I would 24 say you laid out, Your Honor laid out very compelling 25 reasons, one of which is unique to this action, but + +2 the other is equally applied to the other actions that 3 we're here now before you on. So I would hope that we 4 can also discuss with Ms. McCawley, you know, keeping 5 the extensions in line for each case with those other 6 considerations in mind. That's something we'll 7 discuss. + +8 And the only other thing I wanted to mention 9 is, which I didn't get a chance to mention earlier, is 10 that Ms. McCawley, you know, mentioned various 11 concerns about the program, that could be more 12 convincing from someone but for the fact that they 13 already stayed one of their client's actions in favor 14 of the program. So I just don't, it doesn't square 15 with us that those concerns are such that they can't 16 take the same reasoned approach in the other actions 17 when they found it reasonable for one of them already. 18 But other than that, I have nothing to add, Your 19 Honor. + +20 THE COURT: Okay, so I'm going to ask for a 21 status report by June 19th. In that status report, I 22 not only want to hear about how discovery is going and 23 how settlement prospects are looking, I also want to 24 hear about further discussions with counsel for Ms. 25 Maxwell and the sort of mapping out of how the parties + +2 would anticipate things moving further from that 3 point. And, you know, Ms. Maxwell, I'm permitting not 4 to respond to interrogatories and not to have her 5 deposition until the parties have had that chance to 6 confer, until I've had that status report, June 19", 7 until I hear again from counsel as to the next logical 8 way to proceed with that. And I'll kick out discovery 9 deadlines thirty days, which is modest, others I think 10 are going to be kicked out longer, you can do whatever 11 planning you do for depositions to be happening a 12 little bit farther down the road in July, and you'll 13 get back to me. And if need be, we'll have another 14 conference and we'll take in the next piece, okay? 15 All right, everybody? + +16 MS. MCCAWLEY: Thank you, Your Honor. + +17 THE COURT: Anything else before we end this 18 call? All right, let me just say one last thing, 19 which is I did record this call through the AT&T 20 conference system, but you also have a court reporter 21 on the call. You don't need to have a transcript made 22 from the telephone recording, and just be aware that 23 if there are two transcripts made, one through the 24 AT&T and one from the court reporter and there is any 25 discrepancy, the court reporter's transcript will be + +2 the official transcript and will control, okay? + +MS. MCCAWLEY: Thank you, Your Honor. + +MR. MOSKOWITZ: Thank you, Your Honor. + +THE COURT: All right, thank you, all. Take 6 care, everybody. + +(Whereupon the matter is adjourned.) + +# 3 CERTIFICATE + +5 I, Carole Ludwig, certify that the foregoing 6 transcript of proceedings in the United States District 7 Court, Southern District of New York, et al. 8 versus Indyke, et al., Docket #19cv10475, was prepared using 9 PC-based transcription software and is a true and accurate 10 record of the proceedings. + +13 Signature ea44.4 Zazde-or + +14 Carole Ludwig + +15 Date: May 29, 2020 \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778049/EFTA02778049.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778049/EFTA02778049.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cc088530ff3714728e7c8daf1050c3b8c9914710 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778049/EFTA02778049.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -4, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778049", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "967f4dbbe23c23cca240a971e5efc49a8c20593f166de39da010c52eb3274729", + "output_sha256": "6e6ebac30ed729dd69860e951c36c43eceec974dc6f479107515f7f76821ef1d", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778117/EFTA02778117.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778117/EFTA02778117.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..89b3bc5cd265c420fd52af312614106d21d25c85 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778117/EFTA02778117.md @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +INDYKE et al.. + +, et al., + +USA / Plaintiff(s) + +v. + +Defendant(s) + +) ) ) ) + +) Case No.: 19cv10475 ) ) ) ) ) ) + +## NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT + +Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a TELEPHONE CONFERENCE held on 6/1/2020 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above-captioned matter. + +Redaction responsibilities apply to the attorneys of record or pro se parties, even if the person requesting the transcript is a judge or a member of the public or media. + +The parties have seven (7) calendar days from the date of filing of this NOTICE to file with the court any NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION of this transcript. A copy of said NOTICE must also be served on the court reporter. If no such NOTICE is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after ninety (90) calendar days. + +This process may only be used to redact the following personal data identifiers: Social-Security numbers; dates of birth; minors' names; and financial account numbers. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2, and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 49.1. Parties wishing to request redaction of other information may proceed by motion. + +> Carole Ludwig Court Reporter + +Date: 6/1/2020 \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778117/EFTA02778117.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778117/EFTA02778117.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..49dc4dc8dc36fe2fd7c530dd328879c59047ac86 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778117/EFTA02778117.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778117", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "a9af73b72341e6aa7a1aa878fd849460e21fd0010336e8c306ac77edd7fb41f3", + "output_sha256": "a9af73b72341e6aa7a1aa878fd849460e21fd0010336e8c306ac77edd7fb41f3", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778118/EFTA02778118.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778118/EFTA02778118.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e85edcf2b338d01a0703449bceef8a1b529ea9ca --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778118/EFTA02778118.md @@ -0,0 +1,1537 @@ +UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + + +4 + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +, + +Plaintiff, New York, N.Y. + +v. 19 CV 10475 (LGS) + +DARREN K. INDYKE, in his Teleconference capacity as executor of the + +Estate of Jeffrey Edward May 22, 2020 + +Epstein; RICHARD D. KAHN, in 11:00 a.m. + +his capacity as executor of the Estate of Jeffrey Edward + +Epstein; and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, + + + +. 19 CV 10476 (PGG) + + +Plaintiff, + +DARREN K. INDYKE, in his capacity as executor of the + +Estate of Jeffrey Edward + +Epstein and RICHARD D. KAHN, in + +his capacity as executor of + +the Estate of Jeffrey Edward Epstein, + + + + +' + +19 CV 10479 (ALC) + +Plaintiff, + +DARREN K. INDYKE, in his capacity as executor of the + +Estate of Jeffrey Edward + +Epstein and RICHARD D. KAHN, in + +his capacity as executor of the Estate of Jeffrey Edward + +Epstein, + + + +x JANE DOE 1000, 19 CV 10577(LJL) + +Plaintiffs, + + +4 5 6 7 DARREN K. INDYKE, in his capacity as executor of the Estate of Jeffrey Edward Epstein and RICHARD D. KAHN, in his capacity as executor of the Estate of Jeffrey Edward Epstein, + +8 Defendants. x + +9 + +10 11 Before: + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +HON. DEBRA C. FREEMAN, + +Magistrate Judge + +APPEARANCES + +BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER, LLP + +Attorneys for Plaintiff + +BY: SIGRID S. McCAWLEY + +SABINA MARIELLA + +ANDREW VILLACASTIN + +TROUTMAN SANDERS, LLP + +Attorneys for Defendants Indyke and Kahn + +BY: BENNET J. MOSKOWITZ + +MATTHEW J. AARONSON + +VALERIE SIROTA + +HADDON, & , P.C. + +Attorneys for Defendant Maxwell + +BY: LAURA A. MENNINGER + +4 5 6 7 8 All right. So this is Judge Freeman, and this is a conference in four of the cases against the Jeffrey Epstein estate: v. Indyke, 19 Civ. 10475; v. Indyke, 19 Civ. 10476; v. Indyke, 19 Civ. 10479; and Doe 1000 v. Indyke, 19 Civ. 10577. + +9 10 If you are here for some other case or you think I got those numbers wrong, please make sure I know about it. + +11 12 13 But I'm going to ask for your appearances. We have quite a number of people on the line. Let me have the appearance first by plaintiff's counsel in these cases. + +14 15 16 17 18 19 MS. McCAWLEY: Yes, your Honor. Good morning. This is Sigrid McCawley from the law firm of Boies, Schiller & Flexner, and I'm representing the plaintiffs in the actions that you listed. Along with me, I have my colleague Sabina Mariella and Andrew Villacastin. We also have a few of our summer associates who have joined the line as well. + +20 THE COURT: All right. + +21 Do I have a court reporter on the line? + +22 23 THE COURT REPORTER: Yes. Good morning, Judge. This is Kristen Carannante. + +24 25 THE COURT: I'm going to ask anyone who is giving appearances for the record to please spell your name. So, + +THE COURT: This is Judge Freeman. We might have a court reporter, but I'm going to record this call anyway, so hold on while I set that up. + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +Ms. McCawley, if you could please spell your name and the names of your colleagues. + +MS. McCAWLEY: Of course. Sigrid McCawley, which is spelled S-I-G-R-I-D, and the last name is McCawley, M-c-C-A-W-L-E-Y. I also have with me Sabina Mariella, which is S-A-B-I-N-A M-A-R-I-E-L-L-A and Andrew Villacastin, and that's A-N-D-R-E-W and Villacastin is V-I-L-L-A-C-A-S-T-I-N. + +THE COURT: You are counsel in all of the cases that are on for today? + +MS. McCAWLEY: Correct. Correct, your Honor. + +THE COURT: Can I have defendants' counsel, please? + +MR. MOSKOWITZ: Hi, your Honor. Again, this is Bennet Moskowitz, B-E-N-N-E-T, last name M-O-S-K-O-W-I-T-Z, at Troutman Sanders, for the co-executors in each of these cases. + +My colleagues who handle the day-to-day discovery, Matthew Aaronson and Valerie Sirota, are on. That's Matthew is M-A-T-T-H-E-W, last name is Aaronson, A-A-R-O-N-S-O-N; and Valerie, V-A-L-E-R-I-E, last name Sirota, S-I-R-O-T-A, and we are counsel for the co-executors in each of these cases. + +THE COURT: All right. + +Do I have any other attorneys who are on or representing plaintiffs in any of the other cases that are pending before the court? No. All right. + +MS. MENNINGER: Your Honor -- + +THE COURT: Yes. + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +MS. MENNINGER: Sorry. This is a defendant's counsel for Ms. Maxwell, Laura Menninger. + +THE COURT: + +II. MENNINGER: I am in the 10475 case. + +THE COURT: Can you spell your name, please? + +MS. MENNINGER: Yes. It is L-A-U-R-A + +M-E-N-N-I-N-G-E-R. + +THE COURT: Okay. And, again, are there any other attorneys on the line in any of the cases? + +All right. I'm going to assume, then, that anyone else on the phone is public or press and just ask you to please keep your lines muted. + +Sometimes on these calls we hear beeps which suggest that someone else may have joined in the call. It can also suggest that someone may have dropped off the call. And because of that, I will probably interrupt anyone who is speaking just to try to make sure that we didn't lose anybody or we didn't gain anyone we should know about. It is not a courtroom where I can see people coming and going, so I just like to make sure we didn't accidentally lose one of the counsel who is supposed to be present. And I apologize in advance for the interruptions. + +Do I have + +: Yes, Judge, I'm here. + +THE COURT: Okay. That's one of my law clerks, just + +4 5 All right. So I have letters in these cases. They have come in clusters of letter and response and reply in the three cases where Ms. Maxwell is not a party, and then there are letters relating to her in the case where she is a party. + +6 7 Let me start with the other cases where she is not the party and deal with those letters first. + +8 9 10 Can I have, from Ms. McCawley, just a status update from you where things stand with your current request, with your understanding about potential settlements? + +11 MS. McCAWLEY: Yes, your Honor. + +12 13 14 15 16 So with respect to the requests, we have presented to the court a main threshold issue which has been unresolved at this point by the parties, and that is the issue of the time period within which the defendants, the estate, will produce documents. That issue remains unresolved. + +17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 It is the plaintiffs' position that documents for the entire relevant time period for each plaintiff, which runs from the date of their abuse, that year, to the present, are responsive and relevant to discovery in the case. That goes to the evidence with respect to any of the conduct that Epstein was engaging in over those years that would prove the abuse, not simply, as in a car crash case, you don't just get the evidence of the date of the car crash, you get all evidence relating to anything that's relevant and could be used + +so you know. + +potentially at trial. Similarly, here, the defendants have 4 5 6 7 8 attempted to limit the production to simply the year of the abuse or years of the abuse, if it happened in more than one year. It is our position that all evidence relating to the over 20-year span of Epstein's abuse of not only our clients but other clients that are similarly situated, other women that are similarly situated, is highly relevant to the discovery in this matter. + +9 10 11 12 13 And of course, as your Honor knows, the plaintiff has the burden of proving her case in each of these instances, and the estate has taken the position of attempting to prove Epstein's innocence, therefore making all of this information highly relevant for the entire time period. + +14 15 16 17 18 19 20 This is similar to other cases that have come before in the Southern District of New York. For example, Judge Sweet, in his case with one of the victims, allowed discovery for the entire time period from 2000 to the present; and that is, again, because, under 415, evidence of other abuse can be admissible at trial. So we believe that the entire time period is highly relevant, and those documents need to be produced. + +21 22 23 24 25 The status of this, as of the date of filing our letters, no documents have been produced. In the last couple of days, in case and in the Jane Doe 1000 case, there has been one document produced by the defendants. in the case of there have been three documents produced, + +4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 So we are still in a position where we have not received any substantial document production in this case. The court will remember that, back on January 28 -- the cases were filed in November. Back on January 28 we sent -- after your hearing that you had in December asking them to preserve documents, we sent a document preservation letter that outlined in very specific detail the e-mail accounts for which we were aware of that Mr. Epstein had utilized. + +12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 You are going to hear today, and you saw in the filings from the defendant about their claims of burdens, they have not justified burden at this point. They have thrown around a number of 700,000 documents. I will tell you that we have already gone through 600,000 documents in just Annie's case alone for our production. They have not produced a hit list to show burden or otherwise establish why our request would be so burdensome. + +20 21 22 23 24 25 So with respect to -- and that is only -- now, they are only still responding to the time period that is the oneor two-year window, depending on the particular plaintiff. So at this stage we do not have -- that is still the threshold issue that we are asking this court to resolve. We need that issue resolved before we can undertake depositions or get this + +one of which was clawed back. And in the case of there have been 90 documents produced, and that is on their side. + +4 5 6 7 They have produced supplemental interrogatory responses. Again, those are still limited to the time period that they have set forth. They have not agreed to produce information for the entire time period at this point. + +8 9 10 So that is the key issue that we put before the court that we need resolution on it in order to be able to move these cases forward at this point. + +11 12 13 THE COURT: All right. Before I ask some questions about that, let me just ask about potential for settlement of these cases. What is plaintiffs' understanding? + +14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MS. McCAWLEY: Potential for settlement in these cases, as your Honor knows, there was the proposal of a potential claims administration program that came about in the fall of this past year. That program has been through a series of back-and-forth between the U.S. Virgin Islands' A.G. and the estate, with input from the various plaintiffs' attorneys, as well. The program has not yet been approved. It has made headway, but it has not yet been approved to move forward. There are still issues with respect to a release and other matters, so that has not gotten off the ground at all. So there have been no substantive settlement discussions of any kind in these cases. + +case moving, because we at this point have no documents of any substance from the other side. So that is the key issue that we have put before the court for resolution. + +And, again, if -- + +4 5 6 THE COURT: If the program gets off the ground, the program as you understand it to be fashioned, would these plaintiffs be likely to participate in it? + +7 8 9 10 MS. McCAWLEY: We would still have to have those final conversations with the clients pending what the final outcome of the program is, but they have all been interested in trying to participate in a program if it does go forward. + +11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Our concern, of course, is that that program has been delayed and has not moved forward, so we have had the need to press forward with our case. Of course, in that program, too, any offer that could be made could be very substandard, where our clients would want to proceed with the merits of their action, which is why we are here before the court trying to seek resolution of our clients' claims, because there is no guarantee with respect to that program whatsoever. So we are in a position where we need to and want to move forward with discovery without further delay to be able to get to the merits of our clients' claims. + +22 23 24 25 Any discovery they would receive in these matters would be relevant anyway to those discussions with our presenting claims to the claims administrator. So we see that as coinciding and being relevant and responsive to Epstein + +THE COURT: If the program -- + +MS. McCAWLEY: Sorry. + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +being able to establish our claim, again, before the claims administrator. + +THE COURT: All right. And going back to your request to compel discovery from defendant, you say that the time frame is the issue. I believe the letter was presented, it appeared to say in general you hadn't gotten discovery responses to document requests or interrogatories, and then you highlighted this issue. Is this really the key issue or the only issue or are there other issues with respect to just not getting responses? + +MS. McCAWLEY: Well, you are correct, your Honor. At the time we wrote the initial letter, the responses were there were not responses, there were just objections. They have since supplemented their responses but, again, limiting it only to the time frame. So we still may have issues with those responses, because at this point we only can see them as to the time period within which they are saying the abuse victims - that time period where they were abused, so we don't believe that they are fulsome at this point. But if the court could resolve the threshold issue of whether or not they have to produce for the entire time period, they would then supplement, or our assumption is that they would supplement their responses both to interrogatories and to the requests for production, and then we could evaluate at that point if it appears there is anything missing. + +THE COURT: And why would it not be the case that, 4 5 6 7 8 9 document request by document request or interrogatory by interrogatory, the inquiry might be different as to what time frame would be appropriate to look at? There might be some, depending upon how the request is framed, where it would be appropriate to look at a longer time frame; and there may be some, based on the nature of the request, where that would not make sense to look at a longer time frame. Why should I be doing this on a global basis? + +10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 MS. McCAWLEY: Well, that's a very fair question, your Honor. So the requests, for example, seek information related -- like the request number one is information related to the plaintiff including diary, diaries, journals, calendars, any information, travel itineraries that relate to that plaintiff, and that could be in any time period. For example, if Epstein's last year was talking about one of our client's and had information that he had recorded in an e-mail about one of our clients, that would be responsive. + +19 20 21 22 23 24 25 So the time period does pertain, in my view, to all of the requests. We have not -- they have not come to us and said a particular request only applies for these reasons to one particular year. In my view, the request, for example, for flight logs, if there are not flight logs in a certain year, they would only produce what they have, obviously. But if they have flight logs for the entire time period, we would want + +4 those. So it is -- your Honor is correct that there can be some request-specific issues, but they haven't agreed to produce anything outside of the year of the abuse at this point. + +5 6 THE COURT: Are there some requests that relate to people other than your clients? + +7 MS. McCAWLEY: Yes. + +8 THE COURT: Other than -- + +9 MS. McCAWLEY: For example -- yes. + +10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 So as I said before, it is our position that, with respect to our clients' claims in each of the cases, information relating to Epstein's abuse of other victims is highly relevant under 415, particularly to establish that this pattern of luring in young girls in the same way, for example, with saying they are interviewing for a modeling job or saying they are coming for an assistant's interview, the pattern of how he lured girls in, then abused them is relevant to our clients presenting their claims to the jury to prove the truth of the fact that they have before, as well, abused in a similar manner. So we firmly believe that that information is highly relevant to the case. + +22 23 24 25 Again, the estate has taken the position, and you have seen it in our filings, that Epstein is innocent, and we have to prove the truth of that, as well as with respect to all of these cases. So we are in a position where we are having to + +4 5 6 fight to get discovery from the estate. I would was certainly hoping it would not be this kind of a battle. I was hoping that now that he is no longer taking his Fifth Amendment privileges, no longer with us, that we would be able to get substantive discovery in a more streamlined manner, but that is not the case. + +7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 And any threshold issue is very important because it implicates our clients' ability to be able to present their case and to be able to substantively be able to depose witness. As your Honor knows our discovery deadline is looming in early July. We need to be able to take the depositions of various people who either interacted with our clients or who were witnesses to the abuses that occurred in Epstein's various homes, and we need the information and the documents from his files that establish and relate to the abuse, and those are the requests that we have put forward. + +17 18 THE COURT: All right. I have some thoughts on this, but let me hear from defendants first. + +19 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Hi, your Honor. Bennet Moskowitz. + +20 21 22 23 If I may, I would like to address the program issue first, which I think is much quicker than the discovery. My colleague, Matt Aaronson, will discuss the discovery issues, if that's okay. + +24 THE COURT: Okay. + +25 MS. McCAWLEY: So I am very, very surprised to hear + +4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Ms. McCawley give a presentation that seems like her clients are lukewarm on the program. She is on the e-mails from this week where Brad , who represents five plaintiffs and we understand the vast majority of claimants all of whom want to participate in the program according to him, announced to us on the estate side that he was able to get the Attorney General to finally step aside and let the program move forward. So my first surprise is hearing that Ms. McCawley thinks that the program is still in some vast limbo. It is not for all of the reasons that I discussed this morning, which Ms. McCawley is aware of. + +12 13 14 15 16 THE COURT: Hold on a second. We have two separate conferences. One was at 10:00 and this one is 11:00. So when you say that we discussed this morning, Ms. McCawley, unless she didn't announce herself, was not on that call and doesn't know what you said at that conference. + +17 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Sure. + +18 MS. McCAWLEY: (Inaudible). + +19 THE COURT: I'm sorry? + +20 MS. McCAWLEY: I'm sorry. This is Sigrid McCawley. + +21 22 I was unaware of the 10:00 conference call. I'm sorry. + +23 24 25 THE COURT: We had a conference call in certain of the other cases with different plaintiffs' counsel where there were somewhat different issues raised. + +4 5 6 7 MR. MOSKOWITZ: I am happy to concisely, as best I can, go through the same points, and I will say now that I know Ms. McCawley knows all of the following with perhaps one exception, which I will explain. + +8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Ms. McCawley knows that around 69 individual claimants, including her clients, have publicly come forward to voice overwhelming support for the program, including to the USVI probate court. We know that is the vast majority of known claimants. We are aware of only one claimant who is a state court plaintiff who has publicly said that she is not participating, and that was through her counsel, and I don't even know if that's that person's current position. + +16 17 18 19 20 21 Ms. McCawley also knows that seven plaintiffs in the SDNY action, including one of her clients, , most recently stayed their actions in favor of the program. It bears mentioning that -- you know, the stipulation in that regard goes contrary to everything Ms. McCawley just said. + +22 23 24 25 Your Honor entered that order, so I don't think I need to repeat it verbatim. But mentioned in there was the notion of conserving resources, and in that regard, as a side note, it bears mentioning that Boies Schiller has been the biggest + +MR. MOSKOWITZ: Sure. And I am trying -- + +THE COURT: I'm trying to cluster these so we don't have to have a marathon session with all cases at once. + +4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 culprit in driving up the estate's litigation cost, money that will never be available for their clients or other alleged victims in the program. We don't understand that. We were staffed very leanly until recently, just me and an associate. Five attorneys on their side, including three partners. I have lawyers, my colleagues are on now for the team more recently, because Boies Schiller takes the most unreasonable positions on discovery, grossly overbroad view -- again, Mr. Aaronson will get to that -- and they make the most constant threat to motion practice notwithstanding their clients participating in the program. + +12 13 14 15 16 Ms. McCawley also knows that the protocol for the program, which was done in close consultation between the administrator and designers and claimants' counsel, including hers, her firm, and with -- in between co-executors is nearly finalized. + +17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 And Ms. McCawley also knows the only reason this hasn't gone forward until now was because of the USVI Attorney General. But again, Mr. announced a couple of days ago in an email that Ms. McCawley is on that that last, quote, lingering issue, as Mr. put it, is now resolved. And, again, there are a few less contentious matters to iron out, but it is our firm expectation that by sometime next week that resolution in principle will be formalized. + +25 The sole thing that not be aware of + +4 5 6 7 8 9 10 is that if something unexpected happens and that resolution in principle is not finalized, then by June 15, our current intent on the estate side is to move forward with the program absent the probate court entering an order directing us not to or otherwise impeding that, and I don't think that's going to happen because another person who has voiced support for the program is the probate judge who, on February 4, at a hearing that Ms. McCawley attended, as did David Boies, the probate judge said the following: "I think we agreed that everybody believes this program is a great program." + +11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 So I will say that I don't understand why we get one display of overwhelming support from Boies Schiller and others when we are not before your Honor, and then we come before your Honor and I hear a different story. The program is going to go forward very soon. I am confident of that. And I'm confident that, per Ms. McCawley's own statements, all of her clients, not just the one who stayed her action already, are going to participate. So, again, every dollar we are spending in the meantime is money that will never be available for that program. + +21 22 23 That's all I have to say on the program aspect. Unless your Honor has questions, I will refer to my colleague, Mr. Aaronson, to address the discovery issues. + +24 THE COURT: Let me hear the discovery issues. + +25 MR. AARONSON: Good morning, your Honor. Matthew + +Aaronson. + +4 5 6 7 8 It is not the estate's position that documents that relate to the claims asserted by the plaintiffs will not be produced. In fact, all of our discovery responses have identified that to the extent the request seeks information about plaintiffs, they will be produced. + +9 10 We also identified to your Honor in the letter that we sent to you -- + +11 12 THE COURT: Hold on. Let me interrupt you. Without regard to time frame or only within a specific time frame? + +13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 MR. AARONSON: I was about to clarify that. We said in our letter to your Honor without regard to time frame with respect to the plaintiffs. And in fact, that is something that, your Honor, the problem we have here is, we were still under the impression we were meeting and conferring with plaintiffs' counsel on these issues, and we put that in our letter. And before we could even -- you know, we told them we would consider their positions, and before we could even conclude that, they filed a letter with the court. I think you are aware, our initial letter to the court said that we were sort of surprised by that and we are saying it is premature. We still think these issues are premature. + +25 But the simple fact is, your Honor, our position is we + +I want to correct a couple of misstatements that Ms. McCawley made. + +are producing any documents that reference orally to the plaintiffs. And in fact we have searched documents for that. So there is no dispute there, there is no issue there. + +4 + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +We are not saying that the time period for documents relating to plaintiff is limited in that way, shape, or form. What we did say was, these are events in some situations, , incidents that happened on one day in 2002, and we are saying it is not proportional to ask for our client, the estate, to search for documents relating to a 20 -- I guess it would be a 19-year period, your Honor, relating to people who may have worked at a property that Mr. Epstein owned and in fact property that Mr. Epstein -- doesn't allege she ever visited. You know, it's a scope issue. + +But, again, to the extent there is an allegation that -- I'm sorry, there is a document that references we have agreed to produce it. We searched for those documents. And the same applies for all of the plaintiffs. + +So I want to make it very clear that that is a misstatement of what our position is. + +You know, again, the scope here is just so overbroad, beyond plaintiff, that we think it is not proportional to the case. We disagree completely with Ms. McCawley's statement that any of that discovery is necessary for her to prove her claims. Her claims in this case are a simple claim of battery. That's the claim in this case. That's her burden to prove and + +4 that is it. And we have agreed to provide documents that relate to her claims. If she says she was at a property on a certain date, we have identified to the best of our ability people who may have been at that property that date. + +5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 You know, I'm not sure what more we are obligated to do, your Honor. And this is a part of the problem. If they have complaints about search terms, then meet with us to talk about search terms. Before we could finish the process, they ran into court. We are open to a dialogue. We have always been open to a dialogue to try to resolve these issues. But, as we told you, they prematurely went to court to try to -- you know, to try to get in front of your Honor before we could even finish that. + +14 15 16 17 18 19 We have a lot of requests, your Honor, that are just completely unrelated to these cases. I don't think it's appropriate now to go through each one right now. But I just wanted to clarify that this concept that it is a -- we are not agreeing to produce documents about the plaintiffs is wholly untrue, and I just wanted to make that very clear. + +20 21 22 23 24 25 THE COURT: Okay. So let me go back on plaintiffs' side. I'm not going to make any blanket ruling, and I'm not persuaded that you have conferred fully in good faith before bringing the motion, in part, because you have already said that some of it is moot because in fact when you got responses, you no longer had a complete absence of information, and now + +4 you are really just focused on the time frame issue. That tells me that when you wrote the initial letter you hadn't conferred fully in good faith to see what really had to be put before the court. + +5 6 7 8 9 With respect to the time frame issue, it sounds like defendant is prepared to and planning to produce documents without regard to time frame that refer to your clients or relate to your clients, and it also sounds like defendants are willing to confer with respect to other requests. + +10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 As far as those other requests go, the test for relevance is not whether something is relevant to a general subject matter of a case, it's whether it is relevant to a claim or defense asserted in the case. It may be with respect to some of the requests where time frame is at issue that the documents sought are in fact highly relevant to a defense that's been asserted in the case, for example. It may be that they are tangentially relevant. It may be the burden is great. It may be the burden is modest. It may be that let me just make sure I didn't lose counsel. + +20 Do I still have plaintiffs' counsel? + +21 MS. McCAWLEY: Yes, your Honor. + +22 THE COURT: Do I still have defendants' counsel? + +23 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Yes, your Honor. + +24 25 THE COURT: Okay. If anyone joined from the public or press, I will please ask you to mute your phone. + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +Did anyone join who is an attorney in one of the cases in front of me? No. All right. + +I lost the thread a little bit of what I was saying, but the point is that if this is in front of me with particularized disputes, I'm going to have to look at each document request at issue or each interrogatory at issue, hear from the parties about the particular relevance to a claim or a defense, hear from the defendant about the particular arguable lack of relevance or burden, and make item-by-item determinations. I'm not going to do it in a blanket fashion, and you are going to have to confer on that kind of level to get it focused for me, if it comes back to me, so that I understand just what the documents are that are being sought, just what the claim of relevance is, just what the purported burden is, just what the proportionality is so that I can make that assessment balancing relevant factors. + +Now, the other issue that we have is resources and settlement and whether the dollars that are spent by defendants in litigating the case and responding to discovery requests might be better spent by being put into a fund if plaintiffs are planning to participate in that and whether it is a consideration that I should take into account, whether we should have any kind of extended period of time for the responses so that you can see if you are going to participate in the program if the kinks are worked out. + +4 5 6 In the earlier conference we had today, what I did was allow the parties to have a bit of a hiatus in their cases, to conserve resources, asking for a status letter by June 19 with the understanding that the estate was planning to move forward with the program no later than June 15 absent something they thought would be extraordinary to stop it from doing so. + +7 8 9 10 So on plaintiffs' side, let me hear whether you think it makes sense to give it a window of time before there is increased attorney's fees spent to see if in fact that program is moving forward and you might be participating in it. + +11 12 13 14 And in any event, let me hear what you have to say about my view that perhaps you should be conferring further in good faith about these time frame issues on a request-by-request basis. + +15 16 MS. McCAWLEY: Of course, your Honor. This is Sigrid McCawley for the plaintiff. + +17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 With respect to the issue of a hiatus, my concern there would be that we, as you know, back in November, talked about this program, and while Mr. Moskowitz has made representations on this call, you will understand that those were the same representations that he was making back in December and January and, for a number of reasons, that program has just not moved forward. Now I'm hearing for the first time this June 15 date that I have not heard before. + +25 The problem I see with any kind of hiatus and, to + +4 5 6 7 be clear, we don't want to, of course, expend unnecessary estate resources. The issue that I have with that is it is the continued delay and the part of the disadvantage to my clients in that they don't have information, all of the information they need relevant to their claims because they haven't received even though we have tried diligently, they have not received substantial production in the case of any kind. + +8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 So with respect to a hiatus, my concern would be that right now our discovery deadline is set for early July. We were hoping to get documents in order to be able to start taking some of the necessary depositions to get information for our case to be able to move it forward, and I believe that is something that we would be entitled to. I think that my concern is that, again, it would be a July 15 date, then it would be -- I'm sorry, a June 15 date, then a July 15 date, and it would continue without us being able to move the case forward. + +18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Also, as you know, the claims program is voluntary So to the extent that a client does participate in that and gets paused, we don't know what that claims administration program is going to ultimately prove to be. So to the extent that a client participates and is offered something or not offered anything, their case should be moving forward so that they are able to go to trial on the merits of their claims, if they need to, against the estate. So that would be my concern + +4 5 Again, we are not -- the discovery, in my view, has moved very, very slowly. So just to pull back and not have them continue to engage with us on discovery, in my view, would be problematic, because it would just further delay the case. + +6 7 So those are my concerns generally with respect to that. + +8 9 10 11 12 13 And, again, I'm hearing from the other side this June 15 date that I have no confidence that that is something that will necessarily move forward because we don't have anything in writing with respect to that or any statement from the court in the USVI that they have approved that or anything of that nature. So that was my concern there. + +14 15 16 17 18 19 With respect to the issue before the court, we are in a position where the time frame issue is significantly problematic to us for the reasons that I have outlined. While they are representing to the court today that they will produce documents related to the plaintiff, you will remember that we have -- + +20 21 22 23 THE COURT: What did they say in their responses that you got in? Did they say these documents will be produced or is it just they are saying this for the first time to the court today? + +24 25 MS. McCAWLEY: With respect to the plaintiff, they represented they would run the name of the plaintiff in their + +with making any change at this point. + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +discovery searches and produce with respect to the plaintiff, yes, that they did. + +THE COURT: Why -- + +MS.McCAWLEY: But the problem -- + +THE COURT: Why did you tell me earlier on in the call that they were refusing to produce any documents for the later time frame even with regard to the plaintiff? + +MS.McCAWLEY: That is my understanding of their position, your Honor. I am hearing now that they are saying well, first of all, they have only produced one document for case, one document for Jane Doe's case. + +THE COURT: Wait a minute, wait a minute. This is complete lack of meaningful dialogue between the parties, because I'm hearing opposite things from the parties about what defendants' position is. Defendant, as I understand it from this call, has said that they will, and have told you that they will, produce documents regardless of time frame if they refer or relate to the plaintiff, and that they are doing that in fact in all cases and have not taken a position that they would not. And you are saying that is your understanding of their position, that they will not. + +How can that be if you have had a good conference between you? + +MS. McCAWLEY: Your Honor, as we set forth in our letter, we did have a two-hour conference where we asked them + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +about the time frame issues and made sure to get the full position on that because that was our biggest concern. And that is what we discretely presented to the court because that was the concern we have, that they were not going to be producing anything beyond the time period of the abuse. + +(Indiscernible crosstalk) + +THE COURT: -- discretely presented to the court. You presented to the court in your opening letter that there was a complete failure to respond to any of the requests, and now you tell me on the call that since then there has been a response, and so what is now being discretely presented on this telephone call is what you say is a remaining issue, which seems like it is only a remaining issue in part because it seemed like if there are documents specifically relating or referring to the plaintiff, defendants have agreed to produce it and according to defendants have told you they have agreed to produce it in their responses that you have since gotten. Now, I haven't seen those responses. If they have been put before me, I'm sorry, I have not reviewed them. I don't think I have them. For that matter, I'm not sure I have all of the requests, I'm not sure I have an item-by-item explanation of relevance, and I'm not sure that your discussion has been adequate between the lawyers. + +MS. McCAWLEY: Your Honor, this is Sigrid McCawley for the plaintiff. + +4 5 6 7 8 9 I appreciate that. I am hearing your Honor. We will go back and address these issues again with the defendants in the hopes of being able to resolve them and not hopefully have to come before the court with respect to them. We are, again, hopeful to be able to get discovery in this case. We do not believe that has been the situation that we are in presently, and that's why we have presented it to the court. But I understand your point, your Honor, and we will make sure to engage further in the hopes of being able to resolve this. + +10 11 12 13 THE COURT: All right. Let me ask, on defendants' side, by when do you plan to produce -- assuming we have no stay of discovery here and no hiatus, by when do you plan to produce the documents referring or relating to plaintiff? + +14 15 16 17 18 MR. MOSKOWITZ: We have already started that, your Honor. Bennet Moskowitz, excuse me. And in fact, I apologize. Let me let Mr. Aaronson address that question. And then, if I can, I would like to just very quickly respond to something Ms. McCawley said about the program. + +19 THE COURT: Let me hear first about the documents -- + +20 MR. AARONSON: Yes -- + +21 THE COURT: -- regarding the production. + +22 MR. AARONSON: Yes, your Honor. Matthew Aaronson. + +23 24 25 We have already started the production. We made a production I believe on Wednesday of documents, and I think in particular it was over 100 documents. + +4 5 6 7 8 9 10 So with the process underway -- and, again, I think, your Honor, you have gotten this correct, is that we have told them that we will produce and search for -- search for and produce documents that relate to their clients. To the extent that they think we need to add additional search terms, we searched the individual plaintiffs' names. If there are additional search terms, we are open to a dialogue to discuss that. If there are additional terms, as in every case, whether or not we can reach agreements on those terms. You know, the thing -- + +11 12 13 14 15 16 17 THE COURT: I would like to put a deadline on getting the production complete with respect to any documents that in any way refer or relate to the plaintiffs after you have had some further discussion perhaps on search terms, if necessary. But I would like to have a firm date when you are not just producing a few documents and a few documents and say it is underway, that that actually gets produced. Once -- + +18 19 20 21 MR. AARONSON: That's fair, your Honor. Part of that goes back to the same issue you raised earlier about the expenditure of time and money on discovery issues versus putting it towards the program. + +22 23 24 25 So to the extent the court is not inclined to issue a pause or some sort of temporary issue on that, it's hard to say. The problem we have is that, you know, it is difficult to search all of our files, given the pandemic. Some files have + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +not been able to be collected yet. So I can tell you that, of the electronic documents that we have collected, I think we can keep that probably within 30 days of what we have collected already. + +But I will tell you, we have done the initial pass of that, and we have made those productions. As I said, there was a significant number of documents. Presumably other plaintiffs there were not. So, again, we do believe that it would be appropriate (unintelligible) some of this, but to the extent the court is not inclined to do that, you know, I think 30 days for what we have. But to be clear, your Honor, I don't know that we have collected every, you know, source at this point in time, given our inability to collect documents dues to the pandemic. + +THE COURT: How has the pandemic affected your ability to collect documents specifically? + +MR. AARONSON: I will let Mr. Moskowitz speak to that, but my understanding is, you know, that we have not been able to access and people are not traveling to different locations. So we have collected electronic documents. I'm not again, I'm deferring to Mr. Moskowitz on that, whether or not the additional documents are still out there. + +MR. MOSKOWITZ: Yes. Bennet Moskowitz. Happy to clarify that point, your Honor. + +There are two -- let me take a step back. Yes. It is + +4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 true that we have collected over 700 and I think 40,000 documents, and we did search them for the plaintiffs' names. And we did produce what we found that wasn't privileged, and we will go back and make sure that that is complete. But the fact that we located many documents for , which were dated to as late as I believe last year and have already been produced, so I don't understand Ms. McCawley's confusion about the time frame issue. But in any event, the fact that we found those but didn't find such documents for the other cases just evidences a lack of documents, not something wrong with the search process. + +12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 In terms of the pandemic difficulties, my problem with making a 30-day blanket representation is that there are at least some hard copy files that I would like certain people to look through, and while I have no reason one way or the other to expect their responsive materials are there, I would like that to happen before such deadline, and I'm not 100 percent certain that it can, because at least some of the documents are in places that are still under lockdown or there are still health concerns. + +21 22 23 24 25 In addition to that, this is somewhat subject to the disputes about the scope of the discovery. If Ms. McCawley is, let's say, correct and these cases -- everything related to any allegedly bad thing Mr. Epstein ever did is relevant in each action, well, then, it could take me, you know, six months or a 4 5 year to finish looking for every piece of paper and every property Mr. Epstein owned. So, again, it's with the context of just searching for names. Mr. Aaronson is correct, that can be done in the next 30 days, with the exception of anything that we can't actually access to look through. + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +And again I have -- + +THE COURT: You have already -- + +MR. MOSKOWITZ: Yes. + +THE COURT: You already have the documents electronically, at least certain of the documents, most of the documents. + +MR. MOSKOWITZ: Yes. + +THE COURT: And you have already gone through them and you have already made some production. Why would you need another 30 days before you can get to the end of that particular road? + +MR. MOSKOWITZ: We may not. It really depends on the rest of the meet-and-confer process which never completed. It depends on the search terms that are proposed, whether there are any additional search terms proposed. For example, what we wanted to happen during a full meet-and-confer process, which is what we strive to do in every case, and what we are actually doing in other actions against the estate, that Boies Schiller is not involved with, is suggest search terms to us that you think would satisfy your view of what a particular request + +entails, let us run the report. If the report comes back and 4 says 500 documents or even a thousand, we may deem that reasonable for that request. If it comes back at 10,000, we may not deem that reasonable. + +5 6 7 8 9 10 11 So this is part of what an ongoing discussion, I hope, would have entailed, which gives me pause to, again, say a blanket yes, we will get it all done in 30 days. As to searching for things, I mentioned the plaintiffs in what we have already collected, to the extent we didn't complete that, you know, we don't need 30 days. But I don't know that that will satisfy Ms. McCawley. + +12 THE COURT: Okay. + +13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 If this case goes all the way forward in litigation and goes to trial, you are going to try this case. You are not going to try ever case that is before this court or any other court at the same trial. That doesn't mean that evidence regarding others who are claiming to have been victims of Mr. Epstein might not have relevance to some claim or defenses being raised, and I understand that it may, in some documents, may have relevance. + +21 22 23 24 25 But you are going to have to get, on plaintiffs' side, a lot more focused with what you want and why you want it. And if you are going to come back and make a renewed application to me, that application is going to have to be more focused on what kind of documents you are talking about, what claim or + +4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 defense they are relevant to, why they are relevant to that claim or defense, giving me an example of some case law that shows how it could be relevant, and I will make a decision on a request-by-request basis about what appropriate time frames should be used. And with respect to search terms, in the first instance you need to talk to each other about that because you don't want the court coming up with search terms or trying to make judgment calls on that if it's not necessary. You know, you are much better off trying to figure it out between you, getting an agreed protocol, an agreed list of custodians, an agreed list of search terms, and then go from there, as generally happens in cases where there might be a lot of documents that are kept electronically. So I expect you to go through that process as you would in any other case. + +15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 I am open to kicking out your deadlines a bit to give you time to talk this through and to see if we can get some progress. I'm going to ask defendants, to the extent you already have a known universe of documents, if there are any you have not yet produced, get them produced within two weeks. If there are additional search terms, you will talk with each other in good faith about time frame for running any additional searches and getting any additional documents produced. And if plaintiff wanted to come back to me on a renewed motion that's more specifically laid out on particular categories of documents or responses to interrogatories, you will do that + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +after you have tried to work these things through with an eye toward what is what is reasonable. Plaintiff may reasonably need more than defendants want to give. Defendants may have a reasonable point about conserving resources for the sake of a settlement program which should be taken seriously because it seems that very serious efforts are underway to try to get that program off the ground. + +I'm going to ask for a status letter by June 19, which is the date that I gave in other cases. It is geared to Mr. Moskowitz's representation that this program should launch, he thinks, by June 15. So it seems to me by June 19 you will have a better idea and you will also have a better idea of where you are with respect to these discovery issues. + +I'm going to caution plaintiffs' counsel in the future, please do not send me something without being sure you are at the end of the road in talking to your adversary. I don't want to get a response that says it is premature, we haven't really talked. Make sure you are clear on a point-by-point basis that you have talked about specific relevance, that you have talked about specific burden issues, that you have talked about specific search terms, at least you have try to engage in that kind of dialogue. If you are stymied, you are stymied, and I will hear from you. But I don't think you are at that point. + +And I think that's it with respect to those disputes, + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +and I should probably turn to the dispute regarding + +Ms. Maxwell. What I am going to do is I am going to -- I don't know if the letters were framed as a motion for a conference or a motion to compel. If they were framed as a motion for a conference, I will say granted. We had a conference. As to the underlying issue about compelling, go talk or in if actually framed as a motion, I will say denied without prejudice to renew, and I'm going to ask for a status letter by June 19. + +Anybody want to say anything else on that before I turn to Ms. Maxwell's issue? + +No? Okay. I'm hearing no, or I am hearing nothing. Hopefully I haven't lost everybody on the entire call. I'm hearing laughs, so hopefully that means not. + +Let me turn to Ms. Menninger's issue. One thing I want to understand, because there was a reference to a potential criminal prosecution which of course could impact whether there should be a stay as to a defendant who is being criminally correctly, or you may prosecuted. Currently, if I'm understanding be the target of an investigation, be concerned she is the target of an investigation but there are no actual criminal charges pending, is that right? + +MS. MENNINGER: Yes, that's correct, your Honor. We do not have any criminal charges pending anywhere, but we have + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +a number of public statements by the U.S. Attorney's office in the Southern District, as well as statements made by plaintiffs' counsel to the press that suggest that those - that that investigation is underway and that it would encompass Ms. Maxwell, and so that is our concern. But it is correct to say that there is no active criminal charges that I am aware of. + +THE COURT: All right. So if there were active criminal charges filed or if that should happen, that might influence the thinking about whether or not there should be a stay, because of course if a defendant ends up taking the Fifth, that could have consequences in a civil case and defendant may feel there is little choice but to do that if the person is under a criminal indictment or if plaintiffs have filed. + +So I just want to just note that if that circumstance change -- if that circumstance changes, let me know. If it affects any ruling I make, let me know, because I may need to revisit a ruling. + +Let me hear what -- given the last conference, the last subject, where there seem to be some changed landscapes since the application was initially made, let me make sure that I am aware of the current circumstance. + +Let me just hear from Ms. Maxwell's counsel first on this. + +MS. MENNINGER: Thank you, your Honor, Ms. Menninger here on behalf of Ms. Maxwell. + +4 + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +The landscape has not changed since our letters. We + +have filed a motion to dismiss the claims which we believe are + +distinct and different from any sort of example that the estate + +may have, and we believe that they are strong grounds for + +dismissal. The case -- the allegations against Ms. Maxwell in + +this case involve an allegation of battery that occurred one + +time in 1996 in New Mexico, and the statute of limitations and + +venue issues, you know, in New York versus New Mexico are very + +different for Maxwell than perhaps for the estate and we think + +provide the grounds for dismissal. + +The other two bases that we raise for a stay are the claims program that your Honor has already spent some time discussing on this call and the earlier call today. We believe -- we don't have any independent information. We were not party to the calls in the Virgin Islands, as were counsel for plaintiffs and for the estate. But I have heard on the call today the representations made by the estate that they believe that the program will be getting off the ground in a matter of a few weeks, June 15, or three weeks or so from today. + +Given that plaintiff has indicated an intent to participate in that program, at least in filings in the Virgin Islands, and the fact that that program would -- if she + +participates and it is successful, would render this entire lawsuit moot, we think we believe balancing that fact against 4 5 6 7 the extremely broad discovery demands that something about, although not with respect would counsel in favor of at least a short your Honor has heard to Ms. Maxwell yet, stay similar to the ones that other plaintiffs' counsel have agreed to, promoted, or even stipulated to in other cases pending before your Honor. + +8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 We have received extensive discovery demands. been advised that plaintiffs' counsel intends to take a of depositions, including around the country, including We have number for people that plaintiff in our case never met and had no dealings with. And, your Honor, I can speak from personal experience with that same type of discovery happening with the same plaintiffs' counsel in the v. Maxwell action that I was counsel for significant depositions in front of Judge Sweet. We had a number of discovery disputes in that case and we had that occurred not only across the country, from California to New York and Florida and many places in between, but also abroad in that case, and the litigation costs were in the hundreds of thousands easily in that case. And so looking at the pattern of discovery that I believe plaintiff intends to pursue here, balancing the costs of those to someone like my client, who is claims program resolving this not a multimillionaire, and then viewing the as something that could be successful in case in a short period of time, we would ask + +your Honor to consider putting a stay on discovery in the case that I am party to, or I am counsel for a party to. + +4 5 6 7 8 9 10 I think I can second or third some of the things that have already been said earlier, so I don't want to waste the court's time with those. But we have concerns that any money spent on this litigation is going to reduce the amount of money that would be available to any of the accusers in the Virgin Islands, and we don't think it makes sense to spend the money on these broad discovery requests if we can get the case resolved shortly. + +11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 I think the only objection that I heard from plaintiffs' counsel to something like a hiatus was that there's a pending discovery cutoff of early July, and it seems to me reasonable that of course if the claims program gets off the ground in a few weeks, that discovery cutoff could be set out to see if it is successful or not. And so it is sort of a false premise to say that the discovery cutoff in July is the reason we should be forging ahead full steam with this expensive discovery, rather than just taking the more logical approach, to me, which would be to at least put it on hold to see if the claims program is successful in the first instance; and, if not, then the cases can proceed with the court's blessing, pick back up where we left off. + +24 25 In this particular case, I think it also bears noting that the claim allegedly occurred in 1996, so it has been some + +24 years since the allegations supposedly happened, and so I 4 5 6 don't see that waiting one or two or three months balanced against 24 years is -- it's not as though we think documents will go missing in those three months that weren't already somehow lost to the winds of time over the last 24 years, your Honor. + +7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 THE COURT: So you are -- I will just note, by the way, that in your initial letter you ask for an opportunity to do full briefing, but it is all laid out in the letters. So let me just get some clarification on that. What more briefing would you be looking to do beyond what's in these letters? You have case citations in these letters and you lay out the bases for a stay. What would you be looking to do when you are trying to conserve resources? Do you really need full briefing. + +16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 MS. MENNINGER: I think it could be abbreviated briefing; but, yes, there are more cases in support of the request that we are making. There are more cases in terms of the criminal investigation versus active prosecution, and then there is certainly a fair amount of exhibits that I could tender to your Honor to display the breadth of discovery that is part of the traditional balancing test when looking at a motion to stay -- or good cause -- of grounds for good cause as balanced against the breadth of discovery. + +25 THE COURT: I don't remember if at the beginning of + +this call I asked if my law clerk was on. are you there? + +4 5 THE COURT: Okay. Well, for the court reporter, it is , H-A-N-N-A. + +6 7 8 9 10 11 And and I were conferring before this conference about some case law about some criminal prosecution as opposed to criminal investigation, and we weren't finding, at least on an initial look, cases where the courts tended to stay civil proceedings when there was an investigation proceeding. You have cases that say the opposite? + +12 13 MS. MENNINGER: Your Honor, I have some. They are not in the Southern District, so there are -- + +14 THE COURT: Okay. + +15 16 MS. MENNINGER: -- cases that have occurred in various federal and state cases across the country. + +17 18 THE COURT: And you are looking for a stay of the entire case, not just as to proceedings against your client? + +19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MS. MENNINGER: Your Honor, it seems to me best to stay the case, but I would be amenable just in regards to my client or, as I said towards the end of my letter, there are other alternatives that, you know, I think I would view as intermediate steps, for example, bifurcation of discovery on the statute of limitations issue, for example, if that were something the court thought were appropriate or a stay on party + +: Yes, I'm here, Judge. + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +depositions until later in the discovery process to see where the claims program and the criminal investigation end up, and certainly with regard to the motion to dismiss, that should be, I would think, decided at some point. + +THE COURT: I might consider, because there is a lot to do in this case, I might consider putting a hold on Ms. Maxwell having to make statements, so either responding to substantive interrogatories or being deposed because of Fifth Amendment issues, because it may be that she ends up the subject of prosecution even if she is not yet and because there are other things that can meanwhile be going forward. If we put her deposition further down the pike, maybe we will have greater clarity on that before that issue actually comes to the fore. + +I'm also thinking that there are other interests besides hers in this case. There are plaintiffs' interests and I'm sure that although your point is well taken that it's not that likely that documents will now not be preserved within these few months as opposed to not being preserved over the years, I'm sure plaintiff does not want to hear that after all of these years she must wait more time in order to have what she considers to be serious wrongs redressed. So the factors can cut in more than one direction. + +So right now I'm not inclined to stay the whole case, but I am inclined to keep one eye on settlement, to keep one + +4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 eye -- I'm not sure how many eyes I have -- to keep an eye on the -- any criminal investigation and ask to have updates if there are charges filed, and maybe put some things more at the front end of the discovery period, some things more at the back end of the discovery period. And I am willing to move the dates out some to accommodate the parties if the parties are engaged in good-faith discussions, if there is a desire to conserve resources because it looks like the claims program is in fact going forward. I am willing to do that. I have done that another cases. I have stayed other cases. I have extended deadlines in other cases. I don't really want to see resources going to litigation if it's not necessary. But right now I'm not inclined to have a complete stay of everything. + +14 15 16 17 Ms. Menninger, what would be your reaction to saying hold off on anything that could be in the category of affirmative statements made by Ms. Maxwell for now and having other discovery going forward? + +18 19 MS. MENNINGER: It does address -- this is Ms. Menninger, again, Laura Menninger. + +20 21 22 23 24 25 It does address many of my concerns. I would say, you know, the costs related to the broad discovery demands that were propounded, written discovery requests and the like, are still of concern to me. As I mentioned, we have been asked for every calendar she has had for the last 24 years and every Amazon account she has ever used for the last 24 years. So + +4 5 6 7 8 THE COURT: That sounds to me, again, like you need to have a discussion with plaintiffs' counsel and, plaintiffs' counsel, it sounds like you need to have a discussion with Ms. Menninger about what you really need, why you really need it, how it can be done in a way that's manageable with no absolute yeses and no absolute nos with respect to those sorts of requests. + +9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 It may be that there is something about Amazon accounts that's really critical, and you can explain that. And maybe there is something else that's not really critical, and you can, you know, bend a bit on it. So you need to have that kind of discussion to keep, you know -- you know, to keep discovery tailored to the case and proportionate to the needs of the case. That has to do with time frame, that has to do with the scope of what's being claimed in a particular case, and to some extent it has to do with Mr. Epstein's accused conduct over time. So you are going to have to try to have that conversation and try to balance it. And if you can't, then I will. + +21 MS. MENNINGER: I appreciate that, your Honor. + +22 MS. McCAWLEY: Your Honor, this is + +23 THE COURT: Yes. + +24 25 MS. McCAWLEY: I'm sorry. This is Ms. McCawley. Can I address -- + +THE COURT: Absolutely. + +MS. McCAWLEY: Thank you. + +4 5 6 7 MS. McCAWLEY: With respect to the motion to stay that Ms. Maxwell is proposing, one of the bases that she has filed motion to dismiss, Judge Schofield held a premotion conference with respect to that -- + +8 9 10 THE COURT: Hold on a moment, please. Do I still have -- do I still have -- I know I still have Ms. McCawley. Do I still have Ms. Menninger? + +11 MS. MENNINGER: Yes, your Honor. + +12 THE COURT: Do I still have Mr. Moskowitz? + +13 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Yes, your Honor. + +14 15 16 17 THE COURT: Did anyone join us who is another attorney? Okay. Hopefully we didn't lose anybody. If anyone joined from the public or press, welcome. Please keep your phone on mute. + +18 Okay. Go ahead. You were saying, Ms. McCawley? + +19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MS. McCAWLEY: Yes. So we did hold in front of Judge Schofield a premotion conference on Ms. Maxwell's motion to dismiss. As Judge Schofield did with the estate, she discouraged Ms. Maxwell from filing a motion to dismiss, giving her preliminary views that they -- the arguments that she was putting forth were not meritorious. Ms. Maxwell insisted on filing a motion to dismiss and has done that now, just this + +THE COURT: Please go ahead. + +4 week. So in my view, that is -- bodes against any sort of stay based on the motion to dismiss because the district judge has set forth her views with respect to that at least as an initial matter. + +5 6 7 8 9 With respect to the case law, your Honor is correct, the case law in New York is clear that unless there is an indictment put forward, which there has not been, it doesn't allow somebody in a civil case to stay the case on the basis of a possible investigation. + +10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 With respect to your Honor's statements about the investigation and potentially allowing Ms. Maxwell to not have to make statements in this civil action, the concern I have there is that we have no indication of any time frame with respect to the Southern District of New York, how long that investigation could go on or will go on or anything of that nature. So the concern, for me, is Ms. Maxwell, as we have alleged, worked in concert with Mr. Epstein to abuse my client. We brought those claims under the Child Victims Act, as we are allowed to do, because she was a minor, and to not be able to get a discovery and ask Ms. Maxwell questions and get responses and keep the case moving forward puts us in handcuffs with respect to being able to establish our claims because, as your Honor has seen from the complaint, the allegations are that they worked together hand in hand with respect to the abuse of . So I would have concerns about some form of that + +kind of a path for defendant Maxwell in the case at this time until there is a criminal indictment that's put forward. + +4 THE COURT: All right. Let me just say a few things about that. + +5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 First of all, if the investigation is going on here in New York, or for that matter wherever it may be going on, because what we have in New York is not only in New York with respect to COVID-19, the grand jury process is understandably delayed because it is very difficult to have jurors convene. So there may be additional time before any case that is being investigated is indicted, and so we just have to recognize that we are in somewhat unusual circumstances. + +13 14 15 16 17 18 19 The second thing is that any stay that I might put in place with respect to any aspect of the claims against Ms. Maxwell would be temporary and would be revisited. I would not allow it to drag on indefinitely. But in a case where some things can be done to move the case forward and the case is not completely stalled, I don't see any harm in putting some things a little bit further down the road. + +20 21 22 23 24 25 The third thing I will say is this is also an unusual circumstance because of the potential of this claims process in which plaintiff may well participate and which may well get off the ground soon; and, if it does, I'm not sure whether it would moot claims against Ms. Maxwell or not, but it might. And as you balance those factors, you have this situation where we may + +4 5 know in the relatively near future whether plaintiff is actively participating in the claims process, whether it looks like it is going to resolve her claims, and we may never have to get to the point where we jeopardize, potentially jeopardize somebody's Fifth Amendment rights. + +6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 So I might be inclined to do this, to say, look, you can carry on with discovery in the case after a conference on all kinds of things, to try to keep costs under control and try to focus on what's most important. I will extend deadlines out if you would like if you are feeling pressure from that. We will hold off on -- not on production of documents from Ms. Maxwell but on the statements that she makes, whether sworn statements or interrogatories or deposition, we will put that a little bit further down. You will give me status report regarding the process of settlement, and we will take + +16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 And with respect to holding off on interrogatory responses or deposition by Ms. Maxwell, that will not be a permanent situation, that will be revisited. And if time is stretching out too far and if there is no indictment, then I may take further briefing on the subject and I will make a decision as to whether in fact that part of the case should also go forward. But I will not let it drag out indefinitely. That is my current thinking. + +24 What say both of you on that? + +25 MS. MENNINGER: Your Honor, this is Laura Menninger. + +4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 MS. McCAWLEY: Your Honor, obviously we disagree with that because we believe that it's important to have Ms. Maxwell's participation in this case. We have noticed her for a deposition already and that got moved because she -- you know, the issue of just being able to be in person, things of that nature. We were trying to accommodate. So we are concerned about there being extended delay and are concerned about not being able to get information from her through her testimony. + +12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 We respect the court's concerns about a Fifth Amendment privilege but, again, we would ask that if you are going to be inclined to do something like this, you tie it to a date like the June 15 date, or something along those lines, so that we are not in a position where she is able to take depositions of all of our people and we are, you know, handcuffed with respect to any discovery with respect to Ms. Maxwell. + +20 21 22 23 24 25 THE COURT: Like I said, I have no desire to have this drag out. If all things -- if we didn't have this potential claim process out there with a fairly soon, seemingly likely, start date, according to defendants, then I think the balance would be different. Because I don't think the case law in this circuit would generally support the stay when there is no + +That would be -- we would welcome that ruling, your Honor. + +THE COURT: Plaintiff? + +4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 But nonetheless, there are a number of factors one might look at on that, and whether or not an indictment is pending is only one of the factors. There are several factors that could be relevant, including, and I'm going to refer you to the Louis Vuitton Malletier case. For the court reporter, L-O-U-I-S V-U-I-T-T-O-N M-A-L-L-E-T-I-E-R v. Ly, L-Y, U.S.A., Inc., and the case number is 676 F.3d 83 from 2011. So the Second Circuit noted that courts often take a look at a number of factors in deciding whether there should be a stay, including the extent to which the issues in the criminal case overlap with those presented in the civil case. Here, there would be, I assume, a very strong overlap to the status of the case, including whether the defendants have been indicted. So that's a factor. + +16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Three, the private interests of the plaintiff in proceeding expeditiously weighed against the prejudice to plaintiffs caused by the delay. Here I'm looking at the potential settlement process and that, to me, is an unusual factor that suggests that the plaintiffs' interests may be divided here in proceeding fast with this case when there is a potential settlement within the next few months potentially available to plaintiffs and plaintiff may go for that. + +24 25 Another factor is the private interest of and burden on the defendants. We do have an individual here. We are not + +prosecution pending yet. + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +talking about the estate, and there is somewhat more burden for discovery. + +There are the interests of the courts. The interest of the court is not to have unnecessary litigation if the matters can be resolved amicably, and not to have it stretch out forever. That's also an interest of the court. + +We also have this strange overlay of COVID-19 which affects the ability for criminal prosecutors to take matters to a grand jury. + +The public interest, I think the public interest is would be well served by a claims process. If you look at this case in terms of there being a number of claim victims, and that is something that I definitely am looking at and is weighing into my consideration as to how any and all of these cases should be litigated. And in several of the cases, which claims that are no more recent than the claims here, a lot of plaintiffs' counsel have agreed to stays or partial stays or are holding off on certain things to conserve resources and allow that process to play out a bit, and I think that those are factors that are unusual in this case. This is a case-by-case, specific analysis that has to be made as to whether there should be a stay. + +So in this particular case, at this particular time, with these particular circumstances, it seems to me to make sense not to stay the case in its entirety, to send counsel + +4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 off to have the kind of good-faith conference you should have had before contacting me in the first place and that you should always have about anything and everything as you try to work through discovery issues, but to hold off on the most serious of the issues with respect to Ms. Maxwell, which are her constitutional rights, and not forever, but at least long enough to let us know whether the claims process is likely to go forward. And I will revisit it, and I will revisit it at intervals that are reasonable and that does not put you in limbo where you will never be able to get discovery from Ms. Maxwell if this case proceeds. All right? + +12 13 14 15 16 17 So let me ask straight out, are you, under the circumstances I have described and the way in which I would envision this, which is some discovery going forward, good-faith conference, report to me by June 19 about the status, are you looking to have me move out the discovery schedules at all and, if so, by how long? + +18 MS. McCAWLEY: Your Honor, this is Sigrid McCawley. + +19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Would it be possible to have some time to consider that? Right now the discovery deadline is set for July 10, I believe, and I of course have anticipated taking depositions throughout June and into early July. So if I could have some time to consider what that would look like and confer with the other side, then if we can't agree, then maybe present something to the court with the timing of that? + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +THE COURT: Yeah. I mean, I'm not usually in the habit of suggesting extensions, but I think here, rather than be crunched with depositions and panicking at the end of June and beginning of July, putting another 30 days on it to give you time to talk through your issues and for me to have fuller briefing on the issue of a stay, should it come to that, it might make sense to at least give you another 30. + +MS. McCAWLEY: That would be fine, your Honor. + +THE COURT: Mr. Moskowitz, do you want to say anything? + +MS. McCAWLEY: Just very quickly, your Honor. + +That 30-day initial extension for the further discussion makes perfect sense to us. I would say you laid out -- your Honor laid out very compelling reasons, one of which is unique to this action, but the others equally apply to the other actions that we are here now before you on, so I would hope that we could also discuss with Ms. McCawley keeping the extensions in line for each case with those other considerations in mind. It's something we will discuss. + +The only other thing I wanted to mention is -- which I didn't get a chance to mention earlier is that Ms. McCawley mentioned various concerns about the program. That could be more convincing from someone but for the fact that they already stayed one of their clients' actions in favor of the program. So I just don't -- it doesn't square with us that those + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +concerns are such that they can't take the same reasoned approach in the other actions when they found it reasonable for one of them already. + +But other than that, I have nothing to add, your Honor. + +THE COURT: Okay. So I'm going to ask for a status report by June 19. In that status report, I not only want to hear about how discovery is going and how settlement prospects are looking. I also want to hear about further discussions with counsel for Ms. Maxwell and mapping out of how the parties would anticipate things moving further from that point, and, you know, Ms. Maxwell permitting not to respond to interrogatories and not to have her deposition until the parties have had a chance to confer, until I have had that status report June 19, until I hear again from counsel as to the next logical way to proceed with that, and I will kick out discovery deadlines 30 days, which is modest. Others, I think, are going to be kicked out longer. You can do whatever planning you do for depositions to be happening a little further down the road in July, and you will get back to me. As need be, we will have another conference and we will take in the next piece. Okay? + +MS. McCAWLEY: Thank you, your Honor. + +THE COURT: All right. Anything else + +MS. MENNINGER: Thank you, your Honor. + +4 5 6 7 a 9 All right. Let me just say one last thing, which is, I did record this call into the conferencing system, but you also have a court reporter on the call. You don't need to have a transcript made from the telephone recording. And just be aware that if there are two transcripts made -- one from AT&T and one from the court reporter -- and there is any discrepancy, the court reporter's transcript will be the official transcript and will control. Okay? + +10 MS. McCAWLEY: Thank you, your Honor. + +11 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Thank you, your Honor. + +THE COURT: -- before we end this call? + +12 THE COURT: All right. Thank you all. Take care, 13 everybody. + +14 oOo + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778118/EFTA02778118.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778118/EFTA02778118.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5fe02e74f145962e2f374a04e2fdf6e899c436c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778118/EFTA02778118.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -53, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778118", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.running-headers\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "2902abb8734c673fd21cec27311cefbd9ed0df40f2459c889366c4b5866c33ea", + "output_sha256": "4f97ba851ac0b9fa523ac0f85b4ceaa8337970a72d092b68dd854b2a4150f48a", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778175/EFTA02778175.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778175/EFTA02778175.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d7f88d9c165755c573654eeace497ada583e1ba8 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778175/EFTA02778175.md @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +USA / Plaintiff(s) + +Case No.: 19cv10475 + +DARREN K. I NDYKE + +Defendant(s) + +## NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT + +Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a conferenceheld on 5/22/2020 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above-captioned matter. + +Redaction responsibilities apply to the attorneys of record or pro se parties, even if the person requesting the transcript is a judge or a member of the public or media. + +The parties have seven (7) calendar days from the date of filing of this NOTICE to file with the court any NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION of this transcript. A copy of said NOTICE must also be served on the court reporter. If no such NOTICE is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after ninety (90) calendar days. + +This process may only be used to redact the following personal data identifiers: Social Security numbers; dates of birth; minors' names; and financial account numbers. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2, and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 49.1. Parties wishing to request redaction of other information may proceed by motion. + +I (we) certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the aboveentitled matter. + +/S Kristen Carrar + +('cult Reporter/Transcriber Date \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778175/EFTA02778175.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778175/EFTA02778175.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2d7641665bc0e5b83e56eb23e3716a0807399d74 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778175/EFTA02778175.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778175", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "d6134bb65b8719317d480917ed9b4ac3eccf1f2d48e865c279d355c0f281be79", + "output_sha256": "d6134bb65b8719317d480917ed9b4ac3eccf1f2d48e865c279d355c0f281be79", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778176/EFTA02778176.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778176/EFTA02778176.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..98cdfcad39b3aff3a85a681109fae62f919b11fd --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778176/EFTA02778176.md @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +# EXHIBIT + +# IN THE SUPERIOR COURT TH VIRGIN ISLANDS District of St. /St. John + +In the Matter of the Estate of JEFFREY E. Case Number: ST-2019-PB-00080 EPSTEIN, deceased. Action: Administration of Testamentary Estates + +# NOTICE of ENTRY of ORDER + +To: MIME=Kroblin, Esq. + +John H. Benham, Esq. Douglas B. Chanco, Esq. Richard P. Bourne-Vanneck, Esq. John K. Dema Esq. Denise N. {sup}`E` {sup}`l` Esq. Melody D. West all, Esq. Sean E al, Esq. Gaylin Vog , Esq. A. Jeffrey Weiss, Esq. + +Arid M. Esq. + +Kevin F. D'amour, Esq. Kevin Boyle, Esq. Robert Glassman, Esq. + +Please take notice that on June 3, 2020 + +#### a(n) ORDER + +dated June 2, 2020 was entered by the Clerk in the above-titled matter. + +Dated: June 03, 2020 Tamara Charles + +By: + +Clerk of the Court + +44114 + +Edotcia =Frlodge Court C erk + +## IN THE SUPERIOR COURT VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVISION OF ST. AND ST. JOHN + +IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: + +JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, + +PROBATE NO. ST-19-PB-80 + +ACTION FOR TESTATE deceased. ADMINISTRATION + +### ORDER + +THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Co-Executors' Status Report on Voluntary Compensation Program and Presentation of Program Protocol filed on June 1, 2020, wherein, in pertinent part, the Co-Executor notify that all interested parties have finalized and are in support of the protocol for the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program (hereinafter "the Program")) The Court having received testimony concerning the Program at the hearing held on February 4, 2020, and having reviewed said Status Report, it is hereby + +ORDERED that the Expedited Motion for Establishment of a Voluntary Claims Resolution Program filed on November 14, 2019, is GRANTED; and it is further + +ORDERED that the Co-Executors are AUTHORIZED to commence the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program on or about June 15, 2020. + +Dated: June , 2020 + +Magistrate ROLVN P. HER ON- ERCELL dge off e Superid Court of the Virgin Islands + +## ATTEST: + +TAMARA CHARLES CERTIFIE TR E COPY Clerk of the Court DATE 0 100A0 BY TAMARA CLERK AW= CHARLES + +By: A EDOTCIA T MAS-HODGE Court Clerk Supervisor 6, / 3 tn, COURT CLERK + +{sup}`&#`x27;At the hearing held on February 4. 2020, while the Court did not allow the Attorney General of the U.S. Virgin Islands to intervene, the Court did request the Co-Executors and the Attorney General to resolve their differences concerning the proposed compensation program. which has garnered the support of all interested parties, including claimants' counsel, The Co-Executors now inform that lb)ecause the need for the Program has grown increasingly urgent, and with the support of claimants' counsel and the USVI Attorney General - and because the remaining impediments have been resolved and the interested parties have consented to the Protocol.- they and the Attorney General have reached an agreement in which the latter will promptly lift previously imposed liens to pay amounts owed for the Program and to begin funding the Program's active operations, including payment of compensation determinations to eligible claimants. Co-Executors' Status Report on Voluntary Compensation Program and Presentation of Program Protocol, at 6. June 1. 2020. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778176/EFTA02778176.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778176/EFTA02778176.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..12b932851254401a1c88163602324e23c7125583 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778176/EFTA02778176.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -12, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778176", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "4c3a44bd100443e1e46b10a772976fd80c8b19923aed37a41cb1c0026c4fd5cf", + "output_sha256": "27dfe802b77525b0c7802be490e1c4d57042efe1ea445896c5af71c6f6d34621", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778179/EFTA02778179.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778179/EFTA02778179.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f8d4562d8dbfa8944cb966960db713d43811efd3 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778179/EFTA02778179.md @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +Troutman Sanders LLP 875 Third Avenue New York, New York 10022 + +troutman.com + +Bennet J. Moskowitz bennet.moskowitz@troutman.com + +June 3, 2020 + +## VIA ECF + +Hon. Debra Freeman Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007 + +![](_page_0_Picture_3.jpeg) + +Re: Katlyn Doe, 1:19-cv-07771-PKC-DCF; Priscilla Doe, 1:19-cv-07772-ALC-DCF; Lisa Doe. 1:19-cv-07773 ER-DCF: VE. 1:19-cv-07625-AJN-DCF; ithzt Doe, 1:19-cv-08673-KPF-D . 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF; 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF: 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF; Jane Doe 1000, 1:19-cv-10577-LGS-D F- Jane Doe 15, 1:19-cv-10653-PAE-DCF; Mary Doe, 1:19-cv-10758-PAE-DCF; 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF; Anastasia Doe, 1:19-cv-11869-AJN-DCF; Jane Doe, 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +We represent Defendants Darren,. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (together, the "Co-Executors"), in the above-referenced actions. We are pleased to inform the Court that, today, the Superior Court of the United States Virgin Islands entered an order granting the Co-Executors' Motion to establish the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program. A copy of the Order is attached hereto. + +Respectfully submitted, + +/s/ Bennet J. Moskowitz Bennet J. Moskowitz + +cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778179/EFTA02778179.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778179/EFTA02778179.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4f880941804e5270d7957193f3814d597934b8b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778179/EFTA02778179.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778179", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "dfd908d99881521c864eff8058c6635b3dea8de6d77fe956a4c80ac2641ab09c", + "output_sha256": "dfd908d99881521c864eff8058c6635b3dea8de6d77fe956a4c80ac2641ab09c", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778180/EFTA02778180.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778180/EFTA02778180.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1b7c64b033082a601cfb874920f0d60879c705cd --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778180/EFTA02778180.md @@ -0,0 +1,259 @@ +#### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Plaintiff; + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, + +Defendants. + +Case No. 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF + +#### PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO GHISLAINE MAXWELL'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR TO TRANSFER + +### TABLE OF CONTENTS + +| PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 | +| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ---- | +| STATEMENT OF FACTS | 2 | +| ARGUMENT | 4 | +| I. Maxwell Has Not Met Her Burden of Proving that Plaintiff's Claims Are Untimely. | 4 | +| A. The Child Victims Act Revived Plaintiff's Claims Against Maxwell | 5 | +| I. The Child Victims Act Applies to Plaintiff's Claims Against Maxwell. | 5 | +| a. Maxwell Committed a Sexual Offense Under the Penal Law. | 5 | +| b. The CVA is Not Limited to Acts Occurring in New York | 6 | +| 2. The Child Victims Act is Constitutional | 9 | +| B. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 202 Does Not Apply to Plaintiff's Claims. | 13 | +| I. The Child Victims Act Precludes the Application of C.P.L.R. 202. | 13 | +| 2. Plaintiff's Claims Did Not Accrue "Without the State" of New York. | 14 | +| Estoppel | 15 | +| H. Venue is Proper in this District | 17 | +| CONCLUSION | 20 | + +#### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES + +## Cases + +| 2138747 Ontario, Inc. v. Samsung C&T Corp., 144 A.D.3d 122 (1st Dep't 2016) Ashcroft v. lqbal, | 14 | +| --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------- | +| 556 U.S. 662 (2009) Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, | 4 | +| 550 U.S. 544 (2007) Brass v. Am. Film Techs., Inc., | 12 | +| 987 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1993) Cartier v. Micha, Inc., | 12 | +| No. Civ. 4699 (DC), 2007 WL 1187188 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2007) Childers v. New York & Presbyterian Hosp., | 18 | +| 36 F. Supp. 3d 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) CutCo Indus. v. Naughton, | 4, 17 | +| 806 F.2d 361 (2d Cir. 1986) Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocese Corp., | 18 | +| 119 A.3d 462 (Conn. 2015) Espinal v. Lee, | 9, 11, 12 | +| No. 13 Civ. 8692, 2014 WL 5643418 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2014) Funk v. Belneftekhim, | 8 | +| No. 14-CV-0376 (BMC), 2019 WL 3035124 (E.D.N.Y. July 11, 2019) Gen. Stencils, Inc. v. Chiappa, | 16 | +| 219 N.E.2d 169 (N.Y. 1966) v. Dershowitz, | 16 | +| No. 19 Civ. 3377, 2020 WL 2123214 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2020) Glob. Fin. Corp. v. Triarc Corp., | 5, 9 | +| 715 N.E.2d 482 (N.Y. 1999) Godin v. Lederman, | 15 | +| No. 05-CV-1899 (ILG), 2006 WL 1154817 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2006) Gulf Ins. Co. v. Glasbrenner, | 17 | +| 417 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 2005) | 18, 19 | + +| *Harris v. City of New York* , +186 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1999)..... | 4 | +| -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------- | +| *HVT, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J.* , +15 Civ. 5867 (MKB), 2018 WL 3134414 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2018)..... | 11 | +| *In Re World Trade Ctr. Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig.* , +66 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)..... | 10 | +| *Kashef v. BNP Paribas S.A.* , +925 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019)..... | 4 | +| *Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Assocs., P.C.* , +274 F.3d 706 (2d Cir. 2001)..... | 17 | +| *Matter of World Trade Ctr. Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig.* , +89 N.E.3d 1227 (N.Y. 2017)..... | 10, 12 | +| *Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Madison Cty.* , +665 F.3d 408 (2d Cir. 2011)..... | 11 | +| *People v. Carvajal* , +845 N.E.2d 1225 (N.Y. 2005)..... | 7, 8 | +| *People v. Margulies* , +121 A.D.3d 461 (1st Dep't 2014) ..... | 8 | +| *People v. McLaughlin* , +606 N.E.2d 1357 (N.Y. 1992)..... | 7 | +| *Persh v. Petersen* , +No. 15 CIV. 1414 LGS, 2015 WL 5326173 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2015) ..... | 18, 19 | +| ■■■■■ v. Audio Active Ltd., +494 F.3d 378 (2d Cir. 2007)..... | 18 | +| *Sanderson v. Horse Cave Theatre 76* , +881 F. Supp. 2d 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)..... | 19 | +| *Torrey v. Portville Cent. Sch.* , +66 Misc. 3d 1225(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020) ..... | 11 | +| **Statutes** | | +| 18 U.S.C. § 1391..... | 18, 19 | +| CPL 20.20 ..... | 8, 9 | +| N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-g ..... | 5, 6, 13 | + +| N.Y. C.P.L.R. 202 | 13, 15 | +| ----------------------------- | --------- | +| N.Y. Penal Law § 130 | 5, 6, 9 | +| N.Y. Penal Law § 20.00 | 9 | +| N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 230 | 7 | +| N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 3510 | 7 | +| N.Y. Stat. Law § 76 | 14 | + +# Other Authorities + +## Rules + +Plaintiff by and through her undersigned attorneys, respectfully submits this Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell's Motion to Dismiss or to Transfer. ECF No. 69. + +#### PRELIMINARY STATEMENT + +Maxwell claims that she is being "called to answer ... for the conduct of Mr. Epstein, who is dead." Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell's Motion to Dismiss or to Transfer ("Maxwell Mem.") at 17, ECF. No. 60. That is false. This action seeks relief from Maxwell for her own criminal conduct against Plaintiff, and her attempts to characterize herself as a present-but-innocent bystander in Epstein's sex-trafficking conspiracy paint a false picture. For decades, Ghislaine Maxwell recruited countless young women and children for Jeffrey Epstein, forced them to massage both her and Epstein, and those massages later escalated into sexual assaults. was one of Maxwell's and Epstein's minor victims. Epstein and Maxwell offered to help Annie get into college, but instead sexually trafficked and assaulted her. + +Annie's claims are timely both under explicit provisions of New York law, as well as the doctrine of equitable estoppel through the Complaint's allegations about the methods that Epstein, Maxwell, and their co-conspirators used to silence their victims (including Annie) for decades. Maxwell contends that Annie's claims are untimely, but ignores the plain language of several New York statutes, while simultaneously drawing comparisons to irrelevant issues in an attempt to mask her flawed arguments. Nevertheless, Maxwell wholly ignores her burden to prove her statute of limitations affirmative defense at this stage of the litigation, and her arguments are meritless. First, the Child Victims Act ("CVA") revived Annie's claims against Maxwell. Second, New York's borrowing statute is no bather to Annie's claims against Maxwell—the CVA precludes the borrowing statute's application here, and even if it did not, the borrowing statute is inapplicable to Annie's claims. Third, Maxwell has failed to meet her burden of showing that Annie is unable to + +invoke equitable estoppel, a highly factual doctrine. Finally, Maxwell's argument that venue is improper is meritless given her and this action's connections to this District. The Court should deny Maxwell's motion in its entirety. + +When was an underage teenager, her sister, Maria, met Jeffrey Epstein and Ghislaine Maxwell at an art show and accepted a job offer to purchase art for Epstein. ECF No. 1 ("Compl.") ¶¶ 42, 43, 45, 46. Maria also worked in Epstein's New York mansion, and noticed that Maxwell regularly brought school-aged girls to the home purportedly to "interview" for Victoria's Secret modeling positions. Id. ¶¶ 46-47. Maxwell also told Maria that she needed "to go get girls for Jeffrey." Id. ¶ 47. + +#### STATEMENT OF FACTS + +Eventually, Epstein began taking an interest in Annie and asked Maria questions about Annie. Id. ¶ 50. Epstein offered to help get Annie into college, and flew her to New York. Id. ¶ 51. During Annie's trip to New York, Epstein spoiled Annie and Maria, giving Annie money to buy a dress and having them driven around in a limousine. Id. ¶ 52. Later in the trip, Epstein took Annie and Maria to a movie theater, sat in between the two sisters, and caressed various parts of Annie's body against her will when Maria was not looking. Id. ¶¶ 53-54. + +After Annie's trip to New York, Epstein began calling Annie's mother to discuss Annie's education, and convinced her to send Annie to an event for high school students at Epstein's ranch in New Mexico. Id. ¶ 57. In describing the event, he explained that Maxwell would be on the ranch with the students, too. Id. Epstein and Maxwell then arranged and paid for Annie's travel to New Mexico. Id. ¶ 58. When Annie arrived in New Mexico, Epstein's driver picked her up from the airport and brought her to Epstein's 10,000-acre, remote ranch. Id. Annie quickly realized that she was the only student at the "event," and was completely alone with Epstein and Maxwell. Id. On the trip, Epstein and Maxwell attempted to make Annie feel comfortable by + +buying her gifts, being friendly and charming, and taking her to the movies. Id. 111159-60. Epstein and Maxwell attempted to normalize sexual behavior for Annie by fondling each other in front of Annie, pressuring Annie to give Epstein a foot massage, and again caressing and petting Annie in a movie theater. Id. + +At Epstein's ranch, and after taking Annie to the movies, Maxwell pressured Annie into letting her give Annie a massage. Id. ¶ 62. Maxwell directed Annie to take off her clothes and lay on a massage table, touched intimate parts of Annie's body with the door open so that Epstein could watch, and exposed and groped Annie's breasts. Id. ¶¶ 62-65. Annie was terrified, but felt trapped at Epstein's massive ranch with no way of leaving or contacting her family. Id. ¶ 66. To make matters worse, the next morning, Epstein got into Annie's bed to "cuddle" and pressed his genitals against her. Id. ¶ 67. + +When Annie resumed home, she did not tell anyone about the sexual assaults out of fear of Epstein and Maxwell's power, wealth, and connections. Id. ¶ 70. But, eventually, Annie learned that Epstein and Maxwell had also assaulted her sister Maria, that they called Maria and threatened to burn all of her art, and that Maria attempted to report Epstein and Maxwell to the NYPD but was ignored. Id. 111171-74. In an effort to stop the abuse, Annie and Maria then attempted to share their stories with Vanity Fair, but Epstein threatened and silenced the magazine. Id. ¶ 75. Epstein and Maxwell continued to threaten Maria after they learned about the communications to Vanity Fair. Id. ¶ 76. Annie and Maria thereafter lived in fear of Epstein and Maxwell due to their clear power and ability to silence them, the media, and law enforcement. Id. ¶ 76. + +After Epstein's death, Annie filed this lawsuit against Epstein and Maxwell on November 12, 2019. ECF No. 1. Maxwell's counsel refused to accept service on her behalf for months despite actively litigating on her behalf in another case in this District. See ECF Nos. 18, 19, 20. + +Eventually, on March 4, 2020, four months after Annie filed the Complaint, Maxwell's counsel entered an appearance. ECF No. 32. Maxwell filed the present motion to dismiss on May 20, 2020, despite the Court's suggestion that the motion would likely not be meritorious. Tr. of Apr. 16, 2020 Pre-Motion Conf. at 3:22-24, ECF No. 54. + +### ARGUMENT + +Maxwell's motion to dismiss or to transfer her should be denied. "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. . . . A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court must "accept[] all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw[] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor." Kashef v. BNP Paribas S.A., 925 F.3d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 2019). + +Drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor, Maxwell has failed to meet her burden of proving that Plaintiff's claims are untimely. Further, Maxwell's arguments that venue is not proper in this District are meritless. + +### I. Maxwell Has Not Met Her Burden of Proving that Plaintiff's Claims Are Untimely. + +Because the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, Maxwell bears the burden of proving that Plaintiff's claims are untimely. See Childers v. New York & Presbyterian Hosp., 36 F. Supp. 3d 292, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). "[A] complaint does not need to anticipate potential affirmative defenses, such as the statute of limitations, and to affirmatively plead facts in avoidance of such defenses." Id. at 315 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, "dismissal is appropriate only if a complaint clearly shows the claim is out of time." Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243, 250 (2d Cir. 1999). In this case, Plaintiff's factual allegations demonstrate that + +(A) her claims are timely under the Child Victims Act, (B) C.P.L.R. 202 does not apply to her claims, and (C) Maxwell is equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense. + +### A. The Child Victims Act Revived Plaintiff's Claims Against Maxwell. + +The CVA squarely applies to Maxwell's conduct against Plaintiff and therefore revives Plaintiff's claims against Maxwell. The CVA created a one-year window, starting on August 14, 2019, for victims of childhood sexual abuse to bring otherwise time-barred claims for conduct "which would constitute a sexual offense as defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law." C.P.L.R. 214-g. In enacting the CVA, the New York State Legislature sought to curtail restrictive statutes of limitation and allow survivors of child sexual abuse "to sue or press charges against their abusers, who remain hidden from law enforcement and pose a persistent threat to public safety." N.Y. Comm. Rep., 2019 S.B. 2440, 242nd Legis. Sess. (Jan. 26, 2019). For the following reasons, the CVA both (1) applies to Plaintiff's claims against Maxwell and (2) is constitutional on its face and as applied to Maxwell. + +### I. The Child Victims Act Applies to Plaintiff's Claims Against Maxwell. + +The CVA was designed to revive claims such as Plaintiff's claims that Maxwell sexually assaulted her when she was 16 years old. Maxwell's argument that the CVA does not apply to her has no foundation in law or reality—her conduct against Plaintiff falls squarely within the language of the CVA. + +## a. Maxwell Committed a Sexual Offense Under the Penal Law. + +First, Maxwell's conduct against Plaintiff as alleged in the Complaint amounts to one or more sexual offense for purposes of applying the CVA. The CVA uses Article 130 of New York's Penal Law as a guidepost in defining sexual offenses. C.P.L.R. 214-g; v. Dershowitz, No. 19 Civ. 3377, 2020 WL 2123214, at •2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2020) ("Mhe CVA's incorporation of the language from the Penal Code is merely a guidepost for determining which claims may be + +revived."). Because Plaintiff alleges that Maxwell's conduct constituted a sexual offense under Article 130 when Plaintiff was a child and that she suffered injury as a result of that offense, the CVA revives her claims. Compl. ¶¶ 14, 81. In addition to directly alleging that Maxwell's conduct violated one or more sections of Article 130, the Complaint also includes factual allegations sufficient to give rise to the inference that Maxwell committed such sexual offenses against Plaintiff. Compare id.1 64 ("Maxwell touched intimate parts of Annie's body against her will for the sexual benefit of Maxwell and Epstein."), and id.1 65 ("Maxwell exposed Annie's breasts and groped her."), wit!: N.Y. Penal Law § 130.52 (defining forcible touching as when a defendant "forcibly touches the sexual or other intimate parts of another person for the purpose of degrading or abusing such person, or for the purpose of gratifying the actor's sexual desire"), and id. § 130.55 (defining sexual abuse in the third degree as when a defendant "subjects another person to sexual contact without the latter's consent. . . ."). Maxwell's conduct therefore amounts to one or more sexual offenses, and the CVA applies to revive Plaintiff's claims against her. + +## b. The CVA is Not Limited to Acts Occurring in New York. + +Second, the text of the CVA does not limit the conduct that it covers to sexual offenses that physically occurred in New York. The plain language of the CVA requires only four things: (1) an allegation of an intentional or negligent act or omission; (2) for "physical, psychological, or other injury or condition;" (3) "suffered as a result of conduct which would constitute a sexual offense as defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law;" (4) "committed against a child less than eighteen years of age." C.P.L.R. 214-g. If the Legislature intended to cover only conduct that physically occurred in New York, it would have included such language. + +Despite the CVA's clear language containing no requirement that the conduct constituting a sexual offense physically occurred in New York, Maxwell argues that she could not have committed a sexual offense against Plaintiff within the meaning of the CVA because Plaintiff alleges that she sexually assaulted her in New Mexico. Maxwell Mem. at 7-8. She bases this argument on a contention that New York Penal Law only jurisdictionally reaches acts physically committed in New York, and her conduct therefore could not have constituted a sexual offense as defined in the Penal Law. Id. But Maxwell's argument—cited without any relevant, substantive support—is wrong. + +Maxwell cites to a host of inapplicable statutes' and one case—People v. McLaughlin—to argue that "[b]ecause the State only has the power to enact and enforce criminal laws within its territorial borders, there can be no criminal offense unless it has territorial jurisdiction." 606 N.E.2d 1357, 1359 (N.Y. 1992). Notably missing from her argument, however, is the New York Criminal Procedure Law that sets the territorial jurisdiction of New York Penal Law. "CPL 20.20 has codified the general principle that, for New York to exercise criminal jurisdiction, some alleged conduct or consequence of that conduct must have occurred in the state." People v. Carvajal, 845 N.E.2d 1225, 1230-33 (N.Y. 2005) (emphasis added) (finding that New York criminal law extended to a defendant arrested in California who was involved in a trans-continental drug trafficking ring because the "defendant conspired in New York with his New York cohorts to bring cocaine to New York"); see also McLaughlin, 606 N.E.2d at 1359 ("The general rule in New York + +Maxwell provides a list of statutes in an attempt to show that if the New York Legislature wanted to revive claims for conduct occurring outside of New York, it could have done so more explicitly. Maxwell Mem. at 8-10. Ranging from the suspension of certain licenses for radiologic technologists, N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 3510, to issues concerning a state board for professional misconduct, N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 230, those statutes are irrelevant. The cited statutes merely provide that if a person is convicted of a certain crime, she can be subject to certain license revocations and disciplinary measures. The reference to non-New York law and whether conduct would be a crime if committed in New York is simply to prevent conduct occurring outside of New York and that is not a crime under New York law from leading to license revocations and disciplinary measures. Regardless, this entire argument is irrelevant because New York Penal Law does extend to conduct that occurs outside of New York. + +is that, for the State to have criminal jurisdiction, either the alleged conduct or some consequence of it must of occurred within the State." (emphasis added) (citing CPL 20.20)). + +In relevant part, CPL 20.20(1)(c) provides that a person may be convicted in a New York criminal court under New York Penal Law if the person conspired to commit an offense in New York. Cantata!, 845 N.E.2d at 1230 ("Plainly, jurisdiction over an offense exists based on a conspiracy occurring in New York to commit that offense."); see also Espinal v. Lee, No. 13 Civ. 8692, 2014 WL 5643418, at \*11 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2014) (finding that although the murder at issue occurred out of state, petitioner was subject to New York criminal jurisdiction because his "conversations that took place in New York were sufficient to establish a conspiracy to commit the murder-for-hire"); People v. Margulies, 121 A.D.3d 461, 462 (1st Dep't 2014) ("The evidence established the geographic jurisdiction of New York State and New York County over each of the offenses, based on defendant's acts and those of his accomplice, notwithstanding that defendant was physically located in Ohio during most of the events in question."). + +Here, the Complaint contains facts sufficient to give rise to the inference that Maxwell began planning and conspiring with Epstein to assault Plaintiff in New York. New York was the epicenter of Epstein and Maxwell's sex-trafficking operation. Compl. ¶¶ 31, 46, 47. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Maxwell and Epstein ran a sex-trafficking network out of Epstein's home in New York for years, in furtherance of which Maxwell would "go get girls for Jeffrey," as she told Plaintiff's sister. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 5, 10-14, 27. Maxwell and Epstein learned about Plaintiff in New York, and Plaintiff traveled there at Epstein's direction. Id. ¶¶ 50-51, 57-58. While in New York, Epstein told Plaintiff's mother that Maxwell would chaperone her in New Mexico. Id. ¶ 57. Once Plaintiff's mother agreed, "Epstein and Maxwell, who were in New York at the time, arranged and + +paid for Annie to fly to New Mexico in the spring of 1996" so that she could be abused by Maxwell and Epstein in the solitude of Epstein's massive ranch. Id. 1 58. + +Further, N.Y. Penal Law § 20.00 provides that when one "solicits, requests, commands, importunes, or intentionally aids" someone else in violating a provision of the Penal Law, that person is criminally liable for the underlying crime. In addition to containing sufficient facts to give rise to the inference that Maxwell began conspiring to sexually assault Plaintiff while Maxwell was in New York, the Complaint also contains facts sufficient to show that Maxwell aided Epstein when he sexually assaulted Plaintiff in New York. Compl. y¶ 10-12, 53-54, 81. Under § 20.00, Maxwell therefore could have been held criminally liable for any forcible touching under Article 130 that Epstein committed against Plaintiff in New York. + +Maxwell's argument that her crimes in New Mexico are outside the jurisdictional reach of New York Penal law is meritless under both CPL 20.20 and N.Y. Penal Law § 20.00. Her conduct in this case therefore constituted one or more sexual offenses under Article 130, and the CVA applies to Plaintiffs claims. + +## 2. The Child Victims Act is Constitutional. + +Maxwell's challenge to the CVA's constitutionality is equally meritless. Maxwell contends that the CVA violates her due process rights because claim-revival statutes are an "exceptional remedy" valid only when a "plaintiff could not have brought an action in a timely manner." Maxwell Mem. at 13 (citing Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocese Corp., 119 A.3d 462, 512 n.58 (Conn. 2015)). This argument is incorrect, misleading. and relies on outdated law. In the past, "New York courts have looked upon claim-revival provisions skeptically, only upholding them in circumstances where a given plaintiff could not have brought an action in a timely manner." , 2020 WL 2123214, at \*2. But, unfortunately for Maxwell, "the New York Courts' historical skepticism of claim-revival provisions appears to be just that: historical." Id. + +As Maxwell herself contends, the New York Court of Appeals recently held that a claim-revival statute will "not run afoul of New York's due process clause if it merely 'was a reasonable measure to address an injustice.'" Id. (citing Matter of World Trade Ctr. Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig., 89 N.E.3d 1227, 1243 (N.Y. 2017)); see also Maxwell Mem. at 12-13. Maxwell's argument that claim-revival provisions are constitutional only in "exceptional circumstances" is therefore not the law. Maxwell Mem. at 16. The New York Court of Appeals explicitly rejected the higher "exceptional" circumstances standard for constitutionality used by the district court in the case Maxwell cites as authoritative, In Re World Trade Ctr. Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 466, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), and instead adopted a "reasonableness" standard. Matter of World Trade Ctr. Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig., 89 N.E.3d at 1243. + +The CVA's revival window easily meets such a reasonableness standard. In passing the CVA, the New York Legislature highlighted that "New York is one of the worst states in the nation for survivors of child sexual abuse," and that "thousands of survivors are unable to sue or press charges against their abusers" because of New York's "restrictive" statute of limitations. N.Y. Comm. Rep., 2019 S.B. 2440. Having identified the grave injustices faced by victims of child abuse, New York revived previously expired claims. As to reasonableness, the legislature stressed that the age at which most survivors report or come to terms with their abuse "has been estimated to be as high as 52 years old on average," and also the "persistent threat to public safety" from child abusers. Id. Thus, given the time it takes child victims to come to terms with their abuse, the CVA was a reasonable measure to address an injustice and is constitutional. + +In fact, one New York state court recently upheld the constitutionality of the CVA, ruling that the CVA properly revived a plaintiff's claims against her former school district for sexual abuse by one of her teachers. See Torrey v. Portville Cent. Sch., 66 Misc. 3d 1225(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020). The court held that because the CVA was "a reasonable response to remedy an injustice," it did "not violate [defendant's] right to due process" and was thereby valid under the New York State Constitution. Id. New York courts have interpreted due process, enshrined in Article I, § 6 of the New York Constitution, to be coextensive with its federal counterpart. HVT, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 15 Civ. 5867 (MICB), 2018 WL 3134414, at •2 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2018) (citing Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Madison Cty., 665 F.3d 408, 427 (2d Cir. 2011)). Consequently, if the CVA does not violate Maxwell's due process rights under the New York Constitution, it does not violate her rights under the United States Constitution. See HVT, 2018 WL 3134414, at \*2 n.2. + +Other states, including Connecticut, have also specifically upheld claim-revival statutes for victims of childhood sexual abuse, including in a case that Maxwell incorrectly cites as supporting her proposition that claim-revival statutes are only constitutional if a "plaintiff could not have brought an action in a timely manner." Maxwell Mem. at 13 (citing Hartford Roman Catholic Diocese Corp., 119 A.3d at 512 n.58). In that case, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that children who are victims of sexual abuse cannot bring claims in a timely manner because child abuse can take years for a victim to come to terms with, and therefore the revival of otherwise time-barred claims was a "rational response by the legislature to the exceptional circumstances and potential for injustice faced by adults who fall victim to sexual abuse as a child." Hartford Roman Catholic Diocese Corp., 119 A.3d at 496. Because the CVA was a "reasonable response" to the injustice faced by child victims of sexual abuse, such as Plaintiff, the statute is constitutional. See Matter of World Trade Or. Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig., 89 N.E.3d at 1243. + +Maxwell makes several additional arguments that have no basis in law. She asserts that Plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to demonstrate that her claims are timely, and therefore that allowing a revival of her claims under the CVA would be unconstitutional. Maxwell Mem. at 17. But this argument is entirely circular: Plaintiff did plausibly allege that her claims are timely by citing the CVA, which revives claims that would otherwise be untimely. Plaintiff was not required to also plead that the CVA is constitutional; to survive a motion to dismiss, a Plaintiff need only allege "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). + +Maxwell next points to Epstein's death as somehow bearing on the constitutionality of the CVA because Maxwell would be "called to answer for the conduct of Mr. Epstein, who is dead." Maxwell Mem. at 17. To state the obvious, Maxwell and the Estate are separate parties in this matter, and Plaintiff has brought a claim against Maxwell because of Maxwell's own conduct against her when she was a minor. Compl. 11 10-12, 29, 31, 57-58. Maxwell is fully capable of answering for her own conduct, and the timing of this action has no discernable, constitutional bearing on her ability to do so. + +Finally, Maxwell points to several facts about a voluntary claims administration program that go beyond the four corners of Plaintiff's Complaint as evidence that this lawsuit "undermines the integrity of the judicial system." Maxwell Mem. at 17-18. Citing those facts in briefing the present motion to dismiss is wholly inappropriate. See Brass v. Am. Film Techs., Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir. 1993) ("When determining the sufficiency of plaintiff's claim for Rule 12(bX6) purposes, consideration is limited to the factual allegations in plaintiff's [pleading]."). Moreover, the voluntary program that Maxwell cites is just that: voluntary. Plaintiff's potential participation in a voluntary claims administration program would not undermine the "integrity of the judicial system." Rather, it is Maxwell's suggestion that the courthouse doors must be closed to Plaintiff due to the existence of a voluntary program that would undermine judicial integrity. For the foregoing reasons, Maxwell's argument that the application of the CVA is unconstitutional as applied in this case and on its face is meritless. + +## B. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 202 Does Not Apply to Plaintiff's Claims. + +Maxwell also argues that Plaintiff's claims are time-barred under New York's borrowing statute. But New York's borrowing statute, C.P.L.R. 202 does not apply to or bar Plaintiff's claims. C.P.L.R. 202 provides that when a plaintiff was a non-New York resident when her cause of action accrued and her cause of action accrued "without the state" of New York, New York "borrows" the statute of limitations of the jurisdiction where the claim arose if shorter than New York's. But that statute is inapplicable here for two independent reasons: (1) the CVA explicitly revives Plaintiff's claims and precludes the application of any other statute of limitation, and (2) Plaintiff's claims did not accrue "without the state" of New York. + +## I. The Child Victims Act Precludes the Application of C.P.L.R. 202. + +Under principles of statutory interpretation, the borrowing statute does not apply to this case, which is governed by the CVA. The New York Legislature included language in the CVA that explicitly precludes the borrowing statute's application by providing for a revival window of civil claims "[n]otwithstanding any provision of law which imposes a period of limitation to the contrary." C.P.L.R. 214-g (emphasis added). + +Because the borrowing statute is a provision of law that imposes a period of limitation contrary to the CVA's revival window, it falls squarely within the CVA's "notwithstanding" clause and its application is precluded in this case. See 2138747 Ontario, Inc. v. Samsung C&T Corp., + +144 A.D.3d 122, 127 (1st Dep't 2016) ("The borrowing statute is itself a part of New York's procedural law and is a statute of limitations in its own right .. ."). The Court need go no further to find that the CVA precludes the application of the borrowing statute. See N.Y. Stat. Law § 76 ("Where words of a statute are free from ambiguity and express plainly, clearly and distinctly the legislative intent, resort may not be had to other means of interpretation."). The legislative history of the CVA also supports such a reading. For example, the New York Senate Report on the CVA explained that the CVA would allow "for time-barred actions in which [childhood sexual abuse] is alleged to be revived, and not be barred by any statute of limitation ... otherwise existing in law." N.Y. Comm. Rep., 2019 N.Y. S.B. 2440 (emphases added). + +Maxwell's contention that the CVA's "notwithstanding" clause refers only to "any provision of New York law that imposes a period of limitation to the contrary" is unsupported. Maxwell Mem. at 11. As Maxwell herself argues in her brief, the Court cannot add language to a statute, id. at 9-10, yet that is what Maxwell is asking the Court to do here. But even if Maxwell's insertion of the phrase "New York" into the CVA's "notwithstanding" clause was appropriate, the borrowing statute is a provision of New York law that imposes a period of limitation contrary to the CVA's clear language. See 2138747 Ontario, Inc., 144 A.D.3d at 127. The "notwithstanding" language of the CVA therefore expressly encompasses New York's borrowing statute and precludes its application in this case. + +## 2. Plaintiff's Claims Did Not Accrue "Without the State" of New York. + +Second, the borrowing statute does not apply to this case because it only applies to claims "accruing without the state [of New York]." Plaintiff's claims did not "accrue without the state." Maxwell's contention that the borrowing statute applies because Maxwell's committed torts against Plaintiff in New Mexico is an oversimplification of the facts of this case. Maxwell Mem. at 5. Construing the facts alleged in the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the + +crimes that Maxwell committed against Plaintiff are not limited to an isolated sexual assault in New Mexico. As described in Section supra, Maxwell and Epstein planned and initiated the trafficking of Plaintiff that resulted in numerous instances of abuse in New York, Compl. ¶¶ 10-12, 29, 31, 57-58, which also served as the epicenter of Epstein and Maxwell's sextrafficking conspiracy, id. ¶l 29, 46, 51, 53, 56-58.; Compl., Ex. A ¶¶ 1-2, 8-13. Plaintiff's own sister witnessed Maxwell recruiting numerous school-aged girls in New York before Plaintiff was flown to New York. Compl. ¶¶ 46-47. + +A cause of action accrues at "the time when, and the place where, the plaintiff first had the right to bring the cause of action." Glob. Fin. Corp. v. Triarc Corp., 715 N.E.2d 482, 484 (N.Y. 1999). Maxwell began forming an intent and plan to batter, groom, abuse, and inflict emotional distress on Annie in New York long before Plaintiff arrived in New Mexico. Plaintiff's claims against Maxwell therefore did not accrue "without the state" of New York; New York is where her story began. + +## C. Maxwell Has Not Met Her Burden of Proving that Plaintiff Cannot Invoke Equitable Estoppel. + +Even if the Court were to hold that the CVA does not apply to Plaintiff's claims, or that C.P.L.R. 202 does, it should hold that they are still timely under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.2 Maxwell contends that "equitable doctrines require `extraordinary' factors that make it 'unjust' to allow a defendant to assert a statute of limitations defense." Maxwell Mem. at 18. But this case is extraordinary, and "courts have long had the power, both at law and equity, to bar the assertion of the affirmative defense of the Statute of Limitations where it is the defendant's affirmative + +{sup}`2`To the extent the doctrine of equitable tolling is unavailable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has sufficiently plead conduct to equitably estop the defendants from asserting a statute of limitations defense in this matter. + +wrongdoing—a carefully concealed crime here—which produced the long delay between the accrual of the cause of action and the institution of the legal proceeding." Gen. Stencils, Inc. v. Chiappa, 219 N.E.2d 169, 171 (N.Y. 1966). A defendant is therefore equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense if the defendant "wrongfully induced the plaintiff to refrain from timely commencing an action by deception, concealment, threats or other misconduct." Funk v. Belneftekhim, No. 14-CV-0376 (BMC), 2019 WL 3035124, at \*2 (E.D.N.Y. July 11, 2019) (internal citation omitted). + +Assuming the truth of the allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint and drawing all inferences in her favor, Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded misconduct that equitably estops Maxwell from asserting a statute of limitations defense. Maxwell oversaw Epstein's massive sex-trafficking network and procured a plethora of underage girls for his abuse. Compl. 1110-12. Plaintiff was one of those underage girls, and after she escaped Maxwell and Epstein, the two made sure that she could not speak out. Maxwell and Epstein's display of great power, wealth, and connections was purposefully designed to instill fear in their victims and caused Plaintiff to initially not tell anyone what had happened at Epstein's New York home and New Mexico ranch. Id. ¶ 70. Eventually, Plaintiff told her sister what happened, and the two tried to share their stories with law enforcement and a magazine; however, Epstein threatened and intimated the magazine into not reporting Plaintiff's allegations. Id. ¶ 75. Maxwell and Epstein then embarked on a campaign of threats against Plaintiff's sister, which instilled even more fear in Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 76. Plaintiff's fear was further exacerbated by the unwillingness of state and federal authorities, as well as the media, to take any action against Epstein. Id. + +Plaintiff's allegations are therefore more than sufficient to allow her claims to proceed under an equitable estoppel theory at this early stage of the litigation. And even if they were not, Plaintiff was not required to "affirmatively plead facts in avoidance of Maxwell's statute of limitations defense. Childers, 36 F. Supp. 3d at 315 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, "[w]hether equitable estoppel applies in a given case is ultimately a question of fact." Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Assocs., P.C., 274 F.3d 706, 725 (2d Cir. 2001). Courts applying New York law have therefore reserved the highly factual issue of equitable estoppel for after discovery. See, e.g., Gotlin v. Lederman, No. 05-CV-1899 (ILG), 2006 WL 1154817, at \*13 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2006) ("A vast majority of the cases on equitable estoppel permit plaintiffs to defeat a motion to dismiss on the pleadings, deferring the question until some discovery can be had."). + +In fact, this Court has already recognized that the doctrines of equitable estoppel and equitable tolling are "very fact specific" and accordingly asked both Epstein's Estate and Maxwell to refrain from filing a motion to dismiss prior to discovery. Tr. of Mar. 5, 2020 Pre-Motion Conf. at 3:4-8, ECF No. 39; Tr. of Apr. 16, 2020 Pre-Motion Conf. at 5:4-7, ECF No. 54 ("And with respect to the statute of limitations, as I said in the last conference, it strikes me that that question raises a host of factual issues, and it would be better resolved after some discovery."). Maxwell has therefore failed to meet her burden of proving that Plaintiff cannot invoke equitable estoppel in this litigation. + +## II. Venue is Proper in this District. + +Venue is proper in this judicial district, which served as the hub of Maxwell and Epstein's crimes against Plaintiff and the countless others that they abused and trafficked. Venue is proper in "a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred." 18 U.S.C. § 1391(6)(2). On a motion to dismiss for improper venue pursuant to Rule 12(bX3), if the Court does not hold an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of proper venue. Gulf Ins. Co. v. Glasbrenner, 417 F.3d 353, 355 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing CutCo Indus. v. Naughton, 806 F.2d 361, 364-65 (2d Cir. 1986)). "In analyzing whether the plaintiff has made the requisite prima fade showing that venue is proper, [the Court must] view all the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff." v. Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 384 (2d Cir. 2007). Here, viewing the facts alleged in the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has made a prima facie showing that venue is proper in the Southern District of New York because a substantial part of the events underlying Plaintiff's claims occurred there. + +Maxwell's contention that this District is an improper venue because Plaintiff's allegations "concern conduct occurring exclusively in New Mexico" is incorrect and ignores key facts alleged in the Complaint. Maxwell Mem. at 20. "Determining whether events are sufficiently substantial to support venue is not achieved by simply adding up the number of contacts. Rather, the putatively substantial acts must bear a close nexus to the claims in issue." Carder v. Micha, Inc., No. Civ. 4699 (DC), 2007 WL 1187188, at \*3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Further, venue may be proper in multiple districts "as long as 'a substantial part' of the underlying events took place in those districts." Gulf Ins. Co., 417 F.3d at 356. Accordingly, this Court has found a close nexus and thereby proper venue when the idea and plan for the actions that gave rise to the complaint originated in New York, even if the plan was executed elsewhere. See Penh v. Petersen, No. 15 CIV. 1414 LGS, 2015 WL 5326173, at \*4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2015) (Schofield, J.) (holding that venue was proper in a breach contract action because the "terms of [the contract] were negotiated and discussed in substantial part in New York," and the details were finalized there). + +As alleged in the Complaint, Maxwell and Epstein operated a sex-trafficking ring out of Epstein's New York City home, where Maxwell recruited young girls for Epstein. Comp/. ¶¶ II, 12, 31, 47-48, 57-58. Maxwell and Epstein learned about Plaintiff through her sister in New York + +City. Id. ¶¶ 50, 58. Epstein then, through the ruse of wanting to help her get into college, flew Plaintiff to New York City, where during her stay he first engaged in non-consensual physical contact with her. Id. ¶¶ 51-54. Following Plaintiff's visit, Maxwell and Epstein conspired in New York City to lure Plaintiff to Epstein's ranch in New Mexico so that they could abuse her further. See id. ¶¶ 56-58. Epstein called Plaintiff's mother from New York City and told her that Maxwell would chaperone her in New Mexico. Id. ¶ 57. Once Plaintiff's mother assented, "Epstein and Maxwell, who were in New York at the time, arranged and paid for Annie to fly to New Mexico in the spring of 1996" where she was isolated at Epstein's massive ranch and abused by both adults. Id. ¶ 58. This District thus has a "close nexus" to Plaintiff's claims because the idea and plan to assault Plaintiff were developed here. See Persh, 2015 WL 5326173 at •4. Venue is thus proper under § 1391(1)(2) because a "substantial part of the underlying events" took place in New York City. Gulf Ins. Co., 417 F.3d at 355; see also Tr. of Apr. 16, 2020 Pre-Motion Conf. at 4:24-5:3, ECF No. 54 ("Mt seems to me that the matters alleged are alleged to be in the Southern District of New York . . . as well as in New Mexico."). + +Plaintiff also alleges that Maxwell is a New York citizen domiciled in the Southern District of New York, Compl. ¶ 21, and therefore venue is additionally proper under 28 U.S.C. § 139/ (b)( I ) because all Defendants are residents of New York. In Maxwell's brief, she states that she does not, in fact, reside in New York, but does not submit any documentary evidence to support that contention, nor does she state where she resides or when she stopped residing in New York. Maxwell Mem. at 20. Such a conclusory statement in an unworn legal brief is not enough to rebut Plaintiff's prima facie showing that Maxwell is a resident of New York and that venue is proper in this District. See Gulf Ins. Co., 417 F.3d at 355; Sanderson v. Horse Cave Theatre 76, 881 F. Supp. 2d 493, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ("On a motion to dismiss for improper venue .. . [t]he court + +must take all allegations in the complaint as true, unless contradicted by defendants' affidavits.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Venue is therefore proper in this District under both § 1391(bX1) and § 1391(b)(2). + +#### CONCLUSION + +For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell's Motion to Dismiss or to Transfer. + +Dated: June 19, 2020 Respectfully Submitted, + +/s/ Sigrid S. McCawley + +David Boies BOILS SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP 333 Main Street Armonk, NY 10504 (914) 749-8200 + +Sigrid S. McCawley (Pro Hac Vice) BOILS SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP 401 E. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1200 Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301 (954) 356-0011 + +Joshua I. Schiller Andrew Villacastin Sabina Marietta Bows SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP 55 Hudson Yards New York, NY 10001 (212) 446-2300 + +Counsel for Plainta= \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778180/EFTA02778180.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778180/EFTA02778180.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c8f2725c48e49b2359c4d54f543ee6c03c4afb27 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778180/EFTA02778180.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -2355, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778180", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 98, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.table-boundary-padding\", \"epstein_legal.flight-log-tables.normalize\", \"swarm-unicode-norm.html-named-entities\", \"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "99ea574c2749f06083d6ef60471d2614e48d83f9e89618f8d6f8e5a254d2266d", + "output_sha256": "b0283f51d4393b102b38a3e5e85f286dd945577a2cceff664894f0e2086bc490", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778205/EFTA02778205.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778205/EFTA02778205.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..99730a7b225b52385ebb4229cdbc31eb4c3051c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778205/EFTA02778205.md @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Plaintiff; v. DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, Defendants. + +Case No. 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF + +## IPROPOSEDI ORDER STAYING ACTION + +WHEREAS independent claims administration experts have designed and are implementing the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program (the "Program") to resolve sexual abuse claims against decedent Jeffrey E. Epstein ("Decedent") in a non-adversarial alternative to litigation; and + +WHEREAS Plaintiff ("Plaintiff," and together with Defendants, Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, the "Participating Parties"),seeks to participate in the Program; and + +WHEREAS the Participating Parties and Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell ("Maxwell") seek to preserve their resources and judicial economy by staying this action for sixty (60) days while Plaintiff participates in the Program; and + +WHEREAS should Plaintiff resolve her claims against Decedent and Maxwell via the Program, Plaintiff will promptly discontinue this action with prejudice. + +IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED, by and between the undersigned counsel for the Participating Parties and Maxwell, that: + +- I. The captioned action is hereby stayed, both as to discovery and to the resolution of any pending motions, for sixty (60) days from the date of entry of this Order. +- 2. After expiration of the stay, if any, the parties will confer on a schedule for the remaining discovery in this action and a briefing schedule on Maxwell's Motion to Dismiss or to Transfer (ECF No. 75). + +SO ORDERED: + +Date: , 2020 + +New York, New York HON. DEBRA C. FREEMAN United States Magistrate Judge \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778205/EFTA02778205.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778205/EFTA02778205.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b99eb9151746bebd294c6fbb32099e13918bd6b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778205/EFTA02778205.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778205", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "b302288b27a6dc85586d3d9e541079b97acbc7c16cba9f75def10f15741e347b", + "output_sha256": "b302288b27a6dc85586d3d9e541079b97acbc7c16cba9f75def10f15741e347b", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778207/EFTA02778207.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778207/EFTA02778207.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d37faf211832da2f91d6bb5f76f10f8f5541890f --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778207/EFTA02778207.md @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Plaintiff; v. DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, Defendants. + +Case No. 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF + +## JOINT STIPULATION AND FPROPOSED1 ORDER STAYING ACTION + +WHEREAS independent claims administration experts have designed and are implementing the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program (the "Program") to resolve sexual abuse claims against decedent Jeffrey E. Epstein ("Decedent") and any employee or party related to Decedent in a non-adversarial alternative to litigation; and + +WHEREAS Plaintiff ("Plaintiff,") together with Defendants, Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, seeks to participate in the Program; and + +WHEREAS the Parties seek to preserve their resources and promote judicial economy by staying this action for sixty (60) days while Plaintiff participates in the Program; and + +WHEREAS Plaintiff and her Counsel stipulate that successful participation in the Program will resolve all claims against Decedent and Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell ("Maxwell"); + +WHEREAS successful participation in the Program means that Plaintiff will sign a release that includes Maxwell and will promptly dismiss this action with prejudice prior to the receipt of any compensation from the Program; + +WHEREAS Maxwell contests that Plaintiff is entitled to receive any compensation from the Program based on her claims against Maxwell; + +WHEREAS Maxwell reserves all rights to seek indemnification for her legal fees and costs from Decedent's Estate incurred during the course of defending this lawsuit, regardless of whether Plaintiff voluntarily dismisses this action; + +IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED, by and between the undersigned counsel for the Parties, that: + +- I. The captioned action is hereby stayed, both as to discovery and to the resolution of any pending motions, for sixty (60) days from the date of entry of this Order. +- 2. After expiration the stay, if any, Plaintiff wil be entitled to one additional week to submit her opposition to Maxwell's Motion to Dismiss or Transfer (ECF No. 75) and the Parties will confer on a schedule for the remaining discovery in this action, if any. + +Dated: June 11, 2020 Respectfully submitted, New York, New York + +BOLES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP + +By: Sigrid McCawley 401 E. Las Olas Blvd. Suite 1200 Fort Lauderdale, FL, 33301 (954) 377 4223 smccawley@bsfllp.com + +Attorneys for Plaintiff TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP + +By: Bennet J. Moskowitz 875 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022 (212) 704-6000 bennet.moskowitz@troutman.com + +Attorneys for Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein + +Date: 2020 + +HADDON, AND P.C. + +By: Laura A. Menninger 150 East Tenth Avenue Denver, CO 80203 (3030) 832-2628 Imenninger@hmflaw.com + +Attorneys for Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell + +New York, New York HON. DEBRA C. FREEMAN United States Magistrate Judge \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778207/EFTA02778207.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778207/EFTA02778207.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..40929ec79c15fa52b7fd87ac21cb3b7b9cce5604 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778207/EFTA02778207.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778207", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "d1d73425dd7422f55a3aed58c4627e33fec56b8338de6f70327dba281031385b", + "output_sha256": "d1d73425dd7422f55a3aed58c4627e33fec56b8338de6f70327dba281031385b", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778210/EFTA02778210.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778210/EFTA02778210.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5a41b0a69a0d402ee58370bc945c814666eb72e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778210/EFTA02778210.md @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +## VIA ECF + +The Honorable Debra Freeman Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007-1312 + +> Re: v. Darren K. lndyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as executors of the Estate of Jeffrey Edward Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell, I9-10475-LGS-DCF + +June 19, 2020 + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +Pursuant to the Court's May 22, 2020 order (ECF No. 77) Plaintiff and Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell jointly submit this letter to provide the Court with an update as to the progress of discussions regarding both discovery and settlement. + +## Plaintiff Position + +On June 2, 2020, the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands granted the Co-Executors' Expedited Motion for the Establishment of a Voluntary Claims Resolution Program. After it became clear that the Program would finally move forward, Plaintiff informed Defendants that, in the interest of preserving resources and not unnecessarily burdening the Court, she would be willing to stay this litigation for sixty days while she participates in the Program. Plaintiff and the Estate have agreed on the language of a joint stipulation staying this action, which was filed and so-ordered by this Court in other cases in which the plaintiffs are esented by Plaintiff's counsel. See Jane Doe 1000 v. Indyke, et at, 19-cv-10577, ECF No. 63; v. lndyke, et at, 19-cv-10476, ECF No. 52; v. Indyke, et al., 19-cv-10479, ECF No. 44. Defendant Maxwell has refused to enter the proposed stipulation that has been agreed to and entered in other cases, and has instead proposed a number of changes that are inconsistent with the Program's Protocol. + +The Court should enter the proposed order attached hereto as Exhibit A, staying this case on the same terms to which Plaintiff and the Estate have already agreed and which are consistent with the Program's Protocol. If the Court declines to stay the case at this time, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court lift its stay of Maxwell's deposition, as the Court previously indicated that its stay of Maxwell's deposition would be revisited. See ECF No. 77. Plaintiff is unaware of any recent developments in any criminal investigation concerning Maxwell, and the Court previously noted that a stay of Maxwell's discovery obligations due to concerns of self-incrimination, absent an indictment, would not be indefinite. Maxwell's insistence that this case go forward despite moving for a stay a month ago (ECF No. 68), and despite her refusal to produce any substantive + +discovery thus far, is inappropriate. This case should be stayed, or it should go forward with full discovery. Maxwell cannot have it both ways. + +## Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn's Position + +In order to avoid the waste of judicial and party resources, the Co-Executors join in Plaintiff's request that this action be stayed pending her participation in the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program. + +## Defendant Ghisiaine Maxwell's Position + +Ms. Maxwell does not oppose a stay of this action so long as Plaintiff acknowledges that successful participation in the Voluntary Claims Resolution Program ("Program") will result in a release as against any of Plaintiff's claims concerning Ms. Maxwell. Despite repeated requests, Plaintiff's counsel and Counsel for the Estate did not provide a copy of the form of release that will be signed by Plaintiff in the event that she agrees to accept compensation through the Program until 5:36 p.m. EST, today, June 19, 2020. Counsel have not had time to review the form release or provide it to Ms. Maxwell. If Ms. Maxwell is included as a released individual, either expressly or by confirmation of the Plaintiff, it is likely that she will consent to a stay. Attached is the form of Stipulation that Ms. Maxwell has proposed and that Plaintiff has refused. + +The assertion that the proposed stipulation has been agreed to in other cases is not persuasive. The "other cases" certainly did not involve Ms. Maxwell and did not involve any Defendants other than the Estate. + +As the Court may well recall, during the May 22, 2020 Conference, Ms. McCawley represented to the Court that "There are still issues with respect to a release and other matters, so that has not gotten off the ground at all." (Tr. at 9:22) And in his letter to the Court on this topic, Mr. Boies represented, in arguing that the program "does not justify a stay of discovery," that: "Even if the program moves forward and even if Plaintiff chooses to participate, it is not clear that Maxwell would be released for her torts against Plaintiff. In fact, the scope of the release that participants in the program would be required to sign is the very issue, and the sole issue, that the USVI Attorney General and Epstein's Estate are still negotiating." (ECF No. 72 at 2). Either Plaintiff can represent to this Court that her successful participation in the Program will release her claims concerning Ms. Maxwell or not. She cannot have it both ways. + +The Court specifically requested that the Parties report on "how discovery is going." (May 22 Conf. Tr. 56:8-10). Currently, the Court has set the fact-discovery cut-off as Au ust 10, 2020. Plaintiff has not yet agreed to a date for her deposition, nor for her sister, whose allegations are contained in her Complaint. Since the May 22 Conference, Plaintiff has submitted woefully inadequate discovery responses. By way of example, when asked to identify the "threats" that she claims Ms. Maxwell made against her to justify her twenty-four year delay in bringing this suit, Plaintiff responded conclusorily that Ms. Maxwell threatened her "numerous times" without providing the content, date, or any other information identifying any such "threat." There were none. Despite telling the press that she has a journal detailing Ms. Maxwell's alleged assault, she instead only has produced journal pages that do not mention Ms. Maxwell at all. Likewise, a + +third-party subpoena served on resulted in not a single responsive document, although she has brought her own case and is represented by the same counsel and included her allegations in this Complaint. Because of the need to continue good-faith conferrals, these issues are not ripe for judicial review, but they may shed light on Plaintiff's newfound desire to stay this case. + +Ms. Maxwell disputes Plaintiff's characterization of the Court's Order regarding Ms. Maxwell's deposition. This Court ruled that any deposition of Ms. Maxwell and interrogatory responses would be put off and re-visited at regular intervals that are reasonable, dependent on the potential criminal investigation and the Program update. In early June 2020, SDNY US Attorney Geoffrey Berman indicated that his investigation into those surrounding Mr. Epstein continues. See Alan Feuer, "Prince Andrew and U.S. Prosecutor in Nasty Dispute Over Epstein, Case," NY Times (June 8, 2020). Thus, Plaintiff is incorrect in asserting she is "unaware of any recent developments in any criminal investigation." Unless there is a stay, pursuant to this Court's Order, the case should proceed with other depositions and discovery and the Court should revisit the issue of Ms. Maxwell's deposition when and if necessary further in the discovery period. Of course, Plaintiff's "request" to "lift its stay of Maxwell's deposition" is completely inappropriate as a part of a status report and contrary to this Court's rules and procedures concerning the parties' motion practice. Should Plaintiff seek a reconsideration of the Court's ruling, she should follow the appropriate rules and procedures, not toss it into a status report. + +Respectfully submitted, + +/s/ Sigrid S. McCawley + +Sigrid S. McCawley, Esq. Boies Schiller Flexner LLP + +/s/ Bennet J. Moskowitz + +Bennet J. Moskowitz, Esq. Troutman Sanders LLP + +/s/ Laura Menninger + +Laura Mai, Esci Haddon, and , P.C. + +cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778210/EFTA02778210.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778210/EFTA02778210.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..85f9db867359e0984dc857351a44921292910801 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778210/EFTA02778210.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778210", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "fc45b016c0dfeb51e60fa5c25004b72407994580e7920adfb23f26ddbee1cd0d", + "output_sha256": "fc45b016c0dfeb51e60fa5c25004b72407994580e7920adfb23f26ddbee1cd0d", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778213/EFTA02778213.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778213/EFTA02778213.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..865a402f28cc5e685baa3a20bc7496903617b047 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778213/EFTA02778213.md @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +X Plaintiff, : 19 Civ. 10475 (LGS) -against-DARREN g INDYKE, et al., Defendants. : X ORDER + +LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, District Judge: + +WHEREAS, on June 22, 2020, Judge Freeman issued an order staying the case for sixty (60) days (Dkt. No. 85). It is hereby + +ORDERED, for clarity, that the briefing of Defendant Maxwell's motion to dismiss is also STAYED, pursuant to Judge Freeman's order. + +Dated: June 22, 2020 New York, New York + +UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778213/EFTA02778213.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778213/EFTA02778213.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4860ab5526a9079173a8d3a3180ad4698ef7c5e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778213/EFTA02778213.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778213", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "acd923e7a09d5388d97895f33f9f20f07ed7c36b98631198709242d89d22a622", + "output_sha256": "acd923e7a09d5388d97895f33f9f20f07ed7c36b98631198709242d89d22a622", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778214/EFTA02778214.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778214/EFTA02778214.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..31010fe86bbc8743689e6694a22e94e06285d23f --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778214/EFTA02778214.md @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Case No. 19-CV-10475 + +Plaintiff, + +-against- + +DARREN I. INDYKE and RICHARD + +D. KAHN, et al., Defendant. + +## NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS + +TO. ATTORNEY SERVICES CLERK AND ALL OTHER PARTIES + +I have cases pending I have no cases pending + +Pursuant to Local Rule 1.3 of this Court, please take notice of the following attorney information change (s) for: + +Bennet J. Moskowitz + +FILL IN ATTORNEY NAME + +My SDNY Bar Number is: 6M1024 My State Bar Number is 4693842 + +I am, + +An attorney + +A Government Agency attorney + +A Pro Hac Vice attorney + +FIRM INFORMATION (Include full name of firm (OLD AND NEW), address, telephone number and fax number): + +OLD FIRM: FIRM NAME: Troutman Sanders LLP + +FIRM ADDRESS: 875 Third Avenue. New York. NY 10022 + +FIRM TELEPHONE NUMBER: (212) 704-6000 + +FIRM FAX NUMBER: (212) 704.6288 + +NEW FIRM: FIRM NAME: Troutman Pepper MI Sanders LLP + +0 + +FIRM ADDRESS: 875 Third Avenue. New York. NY 10022 + +FIRM TELEPHONE NUMBER: 12121704.6000 + +FIRM FAX NUMBER: (212) 704-6288 + +I will continue to be counsel of record on the above-entitled case at my new firm/agency. + +I am no longer counsel of record on the above-entitled case. An order withdrawing my appearance was entered on by Judge + +Dated: July 9, 2020 sit:Sonnet J. Moskowitz + +ATTORNEY'S SIGNATURE \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778214/EFTA02778214.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778214/EFTA02778214.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..bef51dfe3859df330ac04db18d52c0c7c7175802 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778214/EFTA02778214.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778214", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "c09a0c85198492606b3c97805dac16b939643bab2cf2a81d4fe6dc45f70087a4", + "output_sha256": "c09a0c85198492606b3c97805dac16b939643bab2cf2a81d4fe6dc45f70087a4", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778215/EFTA02778215.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778215/EFTA02778215.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..08c3a88ed4fb0a52f982a7564a414bf45f13c865 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778215/EFTA02778215.md @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Case No. 19-CV-10475 + +Plaintiff, + +-against- + +DARREN I. INDYKE and RICHARD + +D. KAHN, et al., Defendant. + +## NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS + +TO. ATTORNEY SERVICES CLERK AND ALL OTHER PARTIES + +I have cases pending I have no cases pending + +Pursuant to Local Rule 1.3 of this Court, please take notice of the following attorney information change (s) for: + +Mary "Molly" S. Dirago + +FILL IN ATTORNEY NAME + +My SDNY Bar Number is: My State Bar Number is + +I am, + +An attorney + +A Government Agency attorney + +A Pro Hac Vice attorney + +FIRM INFORMATION (Include full name of finn (OLD AND NEW), address, telephone number and fax number): + +OLD FIRM: FIRM NAME: Troutman Sanders LLP FIRM ADDRESS: 227 W. Monroe Street. Suite 3900. Chicago. IL 60606 FIRM TELEPHONE NUMBER: (312) 759-1920 FIRM FAX NUMBER: (312) 759-1939 + +NEW FIRM: FIRM NAME: Troutman Pepper Sanders LLP FIRM ADDRESS: 227 W. Monroe Street. Suite 3900. Chicago, IL 60606 FIRM TELEPHONE NUMBER: 1312) 759.1920 FIRM FAX NUMBER: (312) 759-1939 + +I will continue to be counsel of record on the above-entitled case at my new firm/agency. + +I am no longer counsel of record on the above-entitled case. An order withdrawing my appearance was entered on by Judge + +Dated: July 9.2020 s/Mary 'Molly" S. Dirago ATTORNEY'S SIGNATURE \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778215/EFTA02778215.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778215/EFTA02778215.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d99839d3e4371399cf311fdac692781baf83add2 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778215/EFTA02778215.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778215", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "6752f84cacca9309a323b78f23ab99e3b68c0b46dd22b180c1106947e60e44df", + "output_sha256": "6752f84cacca9309a323b78f23ab99e3b68c0b46dd22b180c1106947e60e44df", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778216/EFTA02778216.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778216/EFTA02778216.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e7e3a7fa56e1bb40a11a5e7ccce2dc7d28d9793f --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778216/EFTA02778216.md @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Case No. 19.CV-10475 + +Plaintiff, + +-against- + +DARREN I. INDYKE and RICHARD + +D. KAHN, et al., Defendant. + +## NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS + +TO. ATTORNEY SERVICES CLERK AND ALL OTHER PARTIES + +I have cases pending I have no cases pending + +Pursuant to Local Rule 1.3 of this Court, please take notice of the following attorney information change (s) for: + +## Charles L. Glover + +My SDNY Bar Number is: CG0117 My State Bar Number is 5329909 + +I am, + +## FILL IN ATTORNEY NAME + +An attorney + +A Government Agency attorney + +A Pro Hac Vice attorney + +FIRM INFORMATION (Include full name of firm (OLD AND NEW), address, telephone number and fax number): + +OLD FIRM: FIRM NAME: Troutman Sanders LLP + +FIRM ADDRESS: 875 Third Avenue. New York. NY 10022 + +FIRM TELEPHONE NUMBER: (212) 704-6000 + +FIRM FAX NUMBER: (212) 704.6288 + +NEW FIRM: FIRM NAME: Troutman Pepper Sanders LLP + +FIRM ADDRESS: 875 Third Avenue. New York. NY 10022 + +FIRM TELEPHONE NUMBER: 1212) 704.6000 + +FIRM FAX NUMBER: (212) 704-6288 + +I will continue to be counsel of record on the above-entitled case at my new firm/agency. + +I am no longer counsel of record on the above-entitled case. An order withdrawing my appearance was entered on by Judge + +Dated: July 9, 2020 s/Charles L. Glover ATTORNEY'S SIGNATURE \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778216/EFTA02778216.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778216/EFTA02778216.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..026b9f02ff43f5fa8ebb23cb5d762e5ad1abc068 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778216/EFTA02778216.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778216", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "eb3e2ceda4cf42feffdb48f088c2716f44fd9c7a845497a396fd1c6395960762", + "output_sha256": "eb3e2ceda4cf42feffdb48f088c2716f44fd9c7a845497a396fd1c6395960762", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778217/EFTA02778217.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778217/EFTA02778217.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fbaf8914961c54656c68195a50201a9428105eb0 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778217/EFTA02778217.md @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Case No. 1:19•cv10475 + +Plaintiff, + +-against- + +DARREN I INDYKE and RICHARD + +D. KAHN, et al., Defendant. + +## NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS + +TO. ATTORNEY SERVICES CLERK AND ALL OTHER PARTIES + +I have cases pending I have no cases pending + +Pursuant to Local Rule 1.3 of this Court, please take notice of the following attorney information change (s) for: + +## Valerie Sirota + +## FILL IN ATTORNEY NAME + +My SDNY Bar Number is: V56041 My State Bar Number is 4916599 + +I am, + +An attorney + +A Government Agency attorney + +A Pro Hac Vice attorney + +FIRM INFORMATION (Include full name of firm (OLD AND NEW), address, telephone number and fax number): + +OLD FIRM: FIRM NAME: Troutman Sanders LLP + +FIRM ADDRESS: 875 Third Avenue. New York. NY 10022 + +FIRM TELEPHONE NUMBER: (212) 704-6000 + +FIRM FAX NUMBER: (212) 704.6288 + +NEW FIRM: FIRM NAME: Troutman Pepper Sanders LLP + +FIRM ADDRESS: 875 Third Avenue. New York. NY 10022 + +FIRM TELEPHONE NUMBER: 1212) 704.6000 + +FIRM FAX NUMBER: (212) 704-6288 + +I will continue to be counsel of record on the above-entitled case at my new firm/agency. + +I am no longer counsel of record on the above-entitled case. An order withdrawing my appearance was entered on by Judge + +Dated: July 10, 2020 sNalerie Sirota + +ATTORNEY'S SIGNATURE \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778217/EFTA02778217.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778217/EFTA02778217.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9e210d49868b4269ca2ab052e5c0a4fcb8fb93c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778217/EFTA02778217.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778217", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "c98b32c6a8bec7e1e4d2e5d48100c4c5696f182b69913342dba3c8df72214dae", + "output_sha256": "c98b32c6a8bec7e1e4d2e5d48100c4c5696f182b69913342dba3c8df72214dae", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778218/EFTA02778218.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778218/EFTA02778218.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..21c173d192983074f19cf0c7fd612b2ef745455c --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778218/EFTA02778218.md @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Case No. 1:19-cv-10475 + +Plaintiff, + +-against- + +DARREN I INDYKE and RICHARD + +D. KAHN, et al., Defendant. + +## NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS + +TO. ATTORNEY SERVICES CLERK AND ALL OTHER PARTIES + +I have cases pending I have no cases pending + +Pursuant to Local Rule 1.3 of this Court, please take notice of the following attorney information change (s) for: + +## Matthew J. Aaronson + +## FILL IN ATTORNEY NAME + +My SDNY Bar Number is: MA2092 My State Bar Number is 3951100 + +lam, + +An attorney + +A Government Agency attorney + +A Pro Hac Vice attorney + +FIRM INFORMATION (Include full name of firm (OLD AND NEW), address, telephone number and fax number): + +OLD FIRM: FIRM NAME: Troutman Sanders LLP + +FIRM ADDRESS: 875 Third Avenue. New York, NY 10022 + +FIRM TELEPHONE NUMBER: (212) 704-6000 + +FIRM FAX NUMBER: (212) 704.6288 + +NEW FIRM: FIRM NAME: Troutman Pepper Sanders LLP + +FIRM ADDRESS: 875 Third Avenue. New Yonc. NY 10022 + +FIRM TELEPHONE NUMBER: 1212) 704.6000 + +FIRM FAX NUMBER: (212) 704-6288 + +![](_page_0_Picture_37.jpeg) + +I will continue to be counsel of record on the above-entitled case at my new firm/agency. + +![](_page_0_Picture_39.jpeg) + +I am no longer counsel of record on the above-entitled case. An order withdrawing my appearance was entered on by Judge + +Dated: July 10, 2020 s/Matthew J. Aaronson ATTORNEY'S SIGNATURE \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778218/EFTA02778218.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778218/EFTA02778218.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3b229e38f80ab1890986e5d81e8c1c4c1a0deae3 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778218/EFTA02778218.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778218", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "d69074b8053cd8351f5b8fbbd8bd45551748f0387e66d4df6819a2e42a3747a7", + "output_sha256": "d69074b8053cd8351f5b8fbbd8bd45551748f0387e66d4df6819a2e42a3747a7", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778219/EFTA02778219.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778219/EFTA02778219.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..188e7b66aec672bda64f48247405c4d2763ff66d --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778219/EFTA02778219.md @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +## VIA ECF + +The Honorable Debra Freeman Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007-1312 + +> Re: v. Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as executors of the Estate of Jeffrey Edward Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell, 19-10475-LGS-DCF + +August 14, 2020 + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +Pursuant to the Court's June 22, 2020, Order (ECF No. 85) Plaintiff and Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell jointly submit this status report. + +Plaintiff submitted her claim to the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program on June 26, 2020, and has actively participated in the program since. Based on communications with the program's Administrator, Plaintiff expects to receive an eligibility and/or compensation determination in the coming weeks. + +To preserve the parties' resources and in the interests of judicial economy, the parties respectfully request an extension of forty-five (45) additional days to the current stay of discovery (and the resolution of any pending motions) in this case. + +Respectfully submitted, + +/s/Sigrid S. McCawley + +Sigrid S. McCawley, Esq. Boies Schiller Flexner LLP + +/s/Bennet J. Moskowitz + +Bennet J. Moskowitz, Esq. Troutman Sanders LLP + +![](_page_1_Picture_4.jpeg) + +/s/Laura Menninger + +Laura Mennen Esq Haddon, and . P.C. + +cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778219/EFTA02778219.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778219/EFTA02778219.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..19c06949a24e95b05e7c3d6f8b8785946a3a7a5d --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778219/EFTA02778219.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778219", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "78586e483d7934445c001cfd8b5f0e63919d07382fecb391c41aa12cc427309a", + "output_sha256": "78586e483d7934445c001cfd8b5f0e63919d07382fecb391c41aa12cc427309a", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778221/EFTA02778221.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778221/EFTA02778221.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..24239a427a723a81e127daefba676b0f644924ae --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778221/EFTA02778221.md @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +The Clerk of Court of the Southern District of New York is directed to docket the within ORDER in each of the following actions: + +> VE v. Nine East 71st Street et at, No. 1:19-cv-07625 (MN) (DF) Doe I a at v. Indyke a at, No. 1:19-cv-7675 (GBD) (DF) Kadyn Doe v. Indyke et at, No. 1:19-cv-0777 I (PKC) (DF) Priscilla Doe v. Indyke et at, No. 1:19-cv-07772 (ALC) (DF) Lisa Doe v. Indyke et at, No. I :19-cv-07773 (ER) (DF) Jane Doe v. Indyke et at, No. 1:19-cv-08673 (KPF) (DF) Doe 17 v. Indyke et at, No. 1:19-cv-09610 (PAE) (DF) 11v. Indyke a at, No. 1:19-cv-10475 (LOS) (DF) v. Indyke a at, No. 1:19-cv- 10476 (PGG) (DF) v. Indyke a at, No. 1:19-cv-10479 (ALC) (DF) Jane Doe 1000 v. Indyke a at, No. 1:19-cv-10577 (LOS) (DF) Jane Doe IS v. Indyke et at, No. 1:19-cv-10653 (PAE) (DF) Mae v. Indyke et at, No. 1:19-cv-10758 (PAE) (DF) v. Indyke et at, No. 1:19-cv-10788 (GEM) (DF) Anastasia Doe v. Indyke a at, No. 1:19-cv-11869 (MN) (DF) Doe v. hulyke et al., No. 1:20-cv-02365 (LIL) (DF) Doe v. Indyke a at, No. 1:20-cv-2365 (LJL) (DF) + +## DEBRA FREEMAN, United States Magistrate Judge: + +This Court, at the joint request of the parties in each of the above-referenced cases, having issued stays of the proceedings in those cases so that the plaintiffs may pursue the potential settlement of their claims through the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program, it is hereby ORDERED that the parties to each of the referenced cases shall provide this Court with a status report by October 1, 2020, and then, if the matter remains unresolved, by the first day of each month thereafter (or, if the first of the month falls on a weekend or Court holiday, then by the next business day). + +Dated: New York, New York September 4, 2020 + +SO ORDERED + +oar an DEBRA FREEMAN United States Magistrate Judge + +Copies to: All counsel in the above-referenced cases (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778221/EFTA02778221.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778221/EFTA02778221.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ab904fdf0f11f49bd26d6dd5ecdf5ced4b97d7c8 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778221/EFTA02778221.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778221", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "152dc5abfbd6e1de71c1f7416d53afac7f4b0791807c82d90aa9f1b405bdb9d5", + "output_sha256": "152dc5abfbd6e1de71c1f7416d53afac7f4b0791807c82d90aa9f1b405bdb9d5", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778222/EFTA02778222.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778222/EFTA02778222.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..474fb710fdd2a1687393399a29d61f51e0ca2464 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778222/EFTA02778222.md @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +## VIA WE + +The Honorable Debra Freeman Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007-1312 + +> Re: v. Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as executors of the Estate of Jeffrey Edward Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell, 19-10475-LGS-DCF + +August 14, 2020 + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +Pursuant to the Court's June 22, 2020, Order (ECF No. 85) Plaintiff and Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell jointly submit this status report. + +Plaintiff submitted her claim to the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program on June 26, 2020, and has actively participated in the program since. Based on communications with the program's Administrator, Plaintiff expects to receive an eligibility and/or compensation determination in the coming weeks. + +To preserve the parties' resources and in the interests of judicial economy, the parties respectfully request an extension of forty-five (45) additional days to the current stay of discovery (and the resolution of any pending motions) in this case. + +The requested extension of the stay is granted. + +Dated: 09/11/2020 + +SO ORDERED + +DEBRA FREEMAN United States Magistrate Judge Respectfully submitted, + +/s/Sigrid S. McCawley + +Sigrid S. McCawley, Esq. Boies Schiller Flexner LLP + +/s/Bennet J. Moskowitz + +Bennet J. Moskowitz, Esq. Troutman Sanders LLP + +BSF + +/s/Laura Menninger + +Laura Menninger, Esq. +Haddon, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], P.C. + +cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778222/EFTA02778222.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778222/EFTA02778222.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ff7556112ea96c09c86848af377d61ef49e9a0f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778222/EFTA02778222.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778222", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "953770b1b5b0a070fa9f3890a5d21268b2e8509830814c0eda9dbb6e10b16048", + "output_sha256": "953770b1b5b0a070fa9f3890a5d21268b2e8509830814c0eda9dbb6e10b16048", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778224/EFTA02778224.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778224/EFTA02778224.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..baaac22781686ad3aecb5ffd338abc27488c533b --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778224/EFTA02778224.md @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +## VIA ECF + +The Honorable Debra Freeman Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007-1312 + +> Re: v. Darren. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as executors of the Estate of Jeffrey Edward Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell, I9-CV- I0475-LGS-DCF + +October 1, 2020 + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +Pursuant to the Court's September 4, 2020, order (ECF No. 93) Plaintiff and Defendants Darren Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, jointly submit this status report. Plaintiff submitted her claim to the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program on June 26, 2020, and has since been actively participating in the Program. Plaintiff expects that her participation in the Program will conclude in the coming weeks. + +Ms. Maxwell has not been provided any information about the progress of Plaintiff's participation in the claims program and therefore takes no position regarding the status at this time. + +Respectfully submitted, + +/s/ Sigrid. S. McCawley + +Sigrid S. McCawley, Esq. Boies Schiller Flexner LLP + +Is/ Bennet J. Moskowitz + +Bennet J. Moskowitz, Esq. Troutman Pepper LLP + +Is/ Laura Menninger + +Laura Mem.", Eseri Haddon, and P.C. + +cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778224/EFTA02778224.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778224/EFTA02778224.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..345ecfcbcecec60a22656bd3754eccc645e78809 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778224/EFTA02778224.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778224", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "7b76a4d72eb4502ef872d58175c7f7437ecbf94fea9c0a0d2dd0d70d79b758fc", + "output_sha256": "7b76a4d72eb4502ef872d58175c7f7437ecbf94fea9c0a0d2dd0d70d79b758fc", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778225/EFTA02778225.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778225/EFTA02778225.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3bfd69e6593445700c21c3ff07223e5ccb231889 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778225/EFTA02778225.md @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +## VIA ECF + +The Honorable Debra Freeman Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007-1312 + +> Re: v. Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as executors of the Estate of Jeffrey Edward Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell, 19-CV-10475-LGS-DCF + +November 2, 2020 + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +Pursuant to the Court's September 4, 2020, order (ECF No. 93) Plaintiff and Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell, jointly submit this status report. Plaintiff submitted her claim to the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program on June 26, 2020, and has since been actively participating in the Program. Plaintiff expects that her participation in the Program will conclude in the coming weeks. + +Ms. Maxwell has not been provided any information about the progress of Plaintiff's participation in the claims program and therefore takes no position regarding the status at this time. + +Respectfully submitted, + +/s/ Sigrid S. McCawley + +Sigrid S. McCawley, Esq. Boies Schiller Flexner LLP + +/s/ Bennet J. Moskowitz + +Bennet J. Moskowitz, Troutman Pepper Sanders LLP + +Is/ Laura Meninger + +Laura Mermin Esc= Haddon, and P.C. + +cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778225/EFTA02778225.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778225/EFTA02778225.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..31e07d77be8ffd53a502537a0009b1a755a4cb42 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778225/EFTA02778225.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778225", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "618973fd5acc053e3750f7f0904ef875b27b11600576e6520b1040fbf33fa68a", + "output_sha256": "618973fd5acc053e3750f7f0904ef875b27b11600576e6520b1040fbf33fa68a", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778226/EFTA02778226.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778226/EFTA02778226.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6f80e4a72aa272f711feeb36109c4921c5c1e247 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778226/EFTA02778226.md @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +## VIA ECF + +The Honorable Lorna G. Schofield District Court Judge United States District Court Southern District of New York 40 Foley Square New York, NY 10007 + +> Re: v. Darren K. Indyke, Richard D. Kahn, & Ghislaine Maxwell 19-10475-LGS-DCF + +Sigrid S. McCawley Telephone: (954) 377-4223 Email: smccawleyQbsfilp.com + +November 17, 2020 + +Dear Judge Schofield: + +Pursuant to Individual Rule III.A.1, Plaintiff requests a pre-motion conference on her request to dismiss this action with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2). Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, the executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (the "Estate"), consent to dismissing this action with re'udice with each party to bear its own fees and costs. Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell opposes request. + +On June 22, 2020 Ma istrate Judge Freeman stayed this case at and the Estate's request so that could participate in the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program (the "Program") and conserve the parties' and the Court's resources while doing so. The Program, the terms of which counsel for the Estate, the victims, and the Attorney General of the U.S. Virgin Islands negotiated at length over the course of several months, "is a voluntary, independent Program that has been established to compensate and resolve the claims of victimssurvivors of sexual abuse by Jeffrey Epstein." Independent Epstein Victims' Compensation Program Protocol at 1 (May 29, 2020), available at https://ww'anvcp.comidocuments/4. Nationally recognized claims administration expert Jordana H. is the Administrator of the Program. Id. + +Prior to agreeing to participate in the Program, victims (including were ensured that the Program would "in no way be administered, controlled or overseen by the Estate" and that decisions pursuant to the Program would not be "subject to review or modification in any way by the Estate or any other party or entity." Id. at I. Further, all compensation offers and any information submitted to the Program are confidential. Id. at 6, 8. In order to receive payment, however, a victim must first (1) execute a form release waiving all of the victim's rights to assert claims against the Estate, any entities owned or controlled by the Estate, and any employees of the Estate, Mr. Epstein, or any entities owned or controlled by the Estate, among others and (2) dismiss with prejudice any existing lawsuits against the Estate or related entities and individuals. Id. at 3, 7. + +On June 26, 2020, [REDACTED] submitted a claim to the Program. On August 27, 2020, [REDACTED] with an offer of compensation, which [REDACTED] accepted on October 5, 2020. [REDACTED] also executed a form release, releasing the Estate, any entities owned or controlled by the Estate, and any employees of the Estate, Mr. Epstein, or any entities owned or controlled by the Estate, among others, in exchange for her offer of compensation. On October 14, 2020, [REDACTED] informed the Estate and Maxwell that she had accepted an offer of compensation and asked the Defendants to stipulate to a dismissal of this action with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) with each party to bear its own fees and costs. + +The Estate agreed to the stipulation, but Maxwell refused because she insists on obtaining an "executed copy of the actual release" that [REDACTED] signed before agreeing to the stipulation of dismissal. Although Maxwell was provided with a copy of the form release nearly five months ago, she was not provided a copy of [REDACTED] executed release because it contains confidential information as to the amount of compensation that [REDACTED] has accepted. And although the form release contains a provision that would allow [REDACTED] to propose the carve out of an individual from the release subject to [REDACTED] counsel has already informed Maxwell's counsel that [REDACTED] executed release *does not* carve out Maxwell. Maxwell is not entitled to any further information about [REDACTED] participation in the Program—[REDACTED] cannot be required to waive the confidentiality that she was promised when she decided to participate in the Program. + +Maxwell asserts that she cannot agree to dismiss [REDACTED] claims against her (with prejudice) because, according to her, she may be entitled to fees and costs because she believes [REDACTED] claims against her are without merit. The Court rejected this notion, however, at the pre-motion conference held for Maxwell's anticipated motion to dismiss [REDACTED] complaint. At that conference, the Court observed that Maxwell's motion to dismiss did not "strike [the Court] as . . . meritorious," and noted that it would not be "a good use of anybody's time for us to pursue [the] motion." Tr. of April 16, 2020 Teleconference at 3:23-24, 5:10-11. Maxwell ignored the Court's guidance, however, and filed her motion anyway, thus deciding for herself to incur unnecessary expenses. Her contention that she might somehow be entitled to request fees and costs for her own frivolous motion practice is simply not tenable. *See Colombrito v. Kelly*, 764 F.2d 122, 133-34 (2d Cir. 1985) ("attorney's fees have almost never been awarded" when a lawsuit is voluntarily dismissed with prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2)). + +Rule 41(a)(2) provides that "an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff's request only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper." Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). In light of [REDACTED] successful participation in the Program, dismissing this case with each party bearing its own fees and costs is proper. There are no counterclaims, and Maxwell should not be allowed to prevent [REDACTED] from finalizing her successful participation in the Program, which was the sole reason that Judge Freeman stayed discovery in this case. Dismissal of this case also preserves the resources of the parties and the Court, as [REDACTED] has expressed a clear desire to resolve this matter through the Program and not through continued litigation. + +For the foregoing reasons, respectfully requests that the Court enter an order dismissing this case with prejudice, with each party to bear its own fees and costs. + +Respectfully submitted, + +/s/ Sigrid McCawley + +Sigrid S. McCawley, Esq. + +cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778226/EFTA02778226.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778226/EFTA02778226.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d770cad8f3d7e26fefa009b39b55da77d76a8154 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778226/EFTA02778226.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778226", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "57e73df36e944f3a9dadc075418f9c9a622c3cf772067d9a02815664da3a35e2", + "output_sha256": "57e73df36e944f3a9dadc075418f9c9a622c3cf772067d9a02815664da3a35e2", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778229/EFTA02778229.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778229/EFTA02778229.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..74c9f927e9cf7b2ae5243b32573585923801afb1 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778229/EFTA02778229.md @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +## VIA ECF + +The Honorable Lorna G. Schofield District Court Judge United States District Court Southern District of New York 40 Foley Square New York, NY 10007 + +> Re: v. Darren K. Indyke, Richard D. Kahn, & Ghislaine Maxwell 19-10475-LGS-DCF + +Sigrid S. McCawley Telephone: (954) 377-4223 Email: smccawley(4bsfIlp.com + +Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell shall file a responsive letter by November 23, 2020. + +So Ordered. + +Dated: November 18, 2020 New York, New York C. + +UPIMM STATES DISTRICT JUDG1 + +Dear Judge Schofield: + +Pursuant to Individual Rule III.A.1, Plaintiff requests a pre-motion conference on her request to dismiss this action with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2). Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, the executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (the "Estate"), consent to dismissing this action with re'udice with each party to bear its own fees and costs. Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell opposes request. + +On June 22, 2020 Ma istrate Judge Freeman stayed this case at and the Estate's request so that could participate in the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program (the "Program") and conserve the parties' and the Court's resources while doing so. The Program, the terms of which counsel for the Estate, the victims, and the Attorney General of the U.S. Virgin Islands negotiated at length over the course of several months, "is a voluntary, independent Program that has been established to compensate and resolve the claims of victimssurvivors of sexual abuse by Jeffrey Epstein." Independent Epstein Victims' Compensation Program Protocol at I (May 29, 2020), available at https://ww'anvcp.comidocuments/4. Nationally recognized claims administration expert Jordana H. is the Administrator of the Program. Id. + +Prior to agreeing to participate in the Program, victims (including were ensured that the Program would "in no way be administered, controlled or overseen by the Estate" and that decisions pursuant to the Program would not be "subject to review or modification in any way by the Estate or any other party or entity." Id. at I. Further, all compensation offers and any information submitted to the Program are confidential. Id. at 6, 8. In order to receive payment, however, a victim must first (1) execute a form release waiving all of the victim's rights to assert claims against the Estate, any entities owned or controlled by the Estate, and any employees of the Estate, Mr. Epstein, or any entities owned or controlled by the Estate, among others and (2) dismiss with prejudice any existing lawsuits against the Estate or related entities and individuals. Id. at 3, 7. + +On June 26, 2020, [REDACTED] submitted a claim to the Program. On August 27, 2020, [REDACTED] with an offer of compensation, which [REDACTED] accepted on October 5, 2020. [REDACTED] also executed a form release, releasing the Estate, any entities owned or controlled by the Estate, and any employees of the Estate, Mr. Epstein, or any entities owned or controlled by the Estate, among others, in exchange for her offer of compensation. On October 14, 2020, [REDACTED] informed the Estate and Maxwell that she had accepted an offer of compensation and asked the Defendants to stipulate to a dismissal of this action with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) with each party to bear its own fees and costs. + +The Estate agreed to the stipulation, but Maxwell refused because she insists on obtaining an "executed copy of the actual release" that [REDACTED] signed before agreeing to the stipulation of dismissal. Although Maxwell was provided with a copy of the form release nearly five months ago, she was not provided a copy of [REDACTED] executed release because it contains confidential information as to the amount of compensation that [REDACTED] has accepted. And although the form release contains a provision that would allow [REDACTED] to propose the carve out of an individual from the release subject to [REDACTED] counsel has already informed Maxwell's counsel that [REDACTED] executed release *does not* carve out Maxwell. Maxwell is not entitled to any further information about [REDACTED] participation in the Program—[REDACTED] cannot be required to waive the confidentiality that she was promised when she decided to participate in the Program. + +Maxwell asserts that she cannot agree to dismiss [REDACTED] claims against her (with prejudice) because, according to her, she may be entitled to fees and costs because she believes [REDACTED] claims against her are without merit. The Court rejected this notion, however, at the pre-motion conference held for Maxwell's anticipated motion to dismiss [REDACTED] complaint. At that conference, the Court observed that Maxwell's motion to dismiss did not "strike [the Court] as . . . meritorious," and noted that it would not be "a good use of anybody's time for us to pursue [the] motion." Tr. of April 16, 2020 Teleconference at 3:23-24, 5:10-11. Maxwell ignored the Court's guidance, however, and filed her motion anyway, thus deciding for herself to incur unnecessary expenses. Her contention that she might somehow be entitled to request fees and costs for her own frivolous motion practice is simply not tenable. *See Colombrito v. Kelly*, 764 F.2d 122, 133-34 (2d Cir. 1985) ("attorney's fees have almost never been awarded" when a lawsuit is voluntarily dismissed with prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2)). + +Rule 41(a)(2) provides that "an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff's request only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper." Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). In light of [REDACTED] successful participation in the Program, dismissing this case with each party bearing its own fees and costs is proper. There are no counterclaims, and Maxwell should not be allowed to prevent [REDACTED] from finalizing her successful participation in the Program, which was the sole reason that Judge Freeman stayed discovery in this case. Dismissal of this case also preserves the resources of the parties and the Court, as [REDACTED] has expressed a clear desire to resolve this matter through the Program and not through continued litigation. + +For the foregoing reasons, respectfully requests that the Court enter an order dismissine this case with prejudice. with each natty to bear its own fees and costs. + +Respectfully submitted, + +/s/ Sigrid McCawley + +Sigrid S. McCawley, Esq. + +cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778229/EFTA02778229.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778229/EFTA02778229.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3ce62956f957c56c323b35040a554ed835378c60 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778229/EFTA02778229.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778229", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "678a74c1ebc5cd08049eca701910464943d1f00e0df00bc517f179fa587befc5", + "output_sha256": "678a74c1ebc5cd08049eca701910464943d1f00e0df00bc517f179fa587befc5", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778232/EFTA02778232.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778232/EFTA02778232.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d66b5ed3d17f6f8e4bb465163e2d795b628c1a8f --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778232/EFTA02778232.md @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +November 23, 2020 + +VIA ECF + +Hon. Lorna G. Schofield United States District Judge Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse 40 Foley Square New York, New York 10007 + +> Re: 19-cv-10475 (LGS-DCF), v. Darren K. Indyke, et at + +Haddon, and c Laura A. Menninger + +150 East 10th Avenue Denver. Colorado 80203 PH 303.831.7364 DC 303.832.2628 www.hmflaw.com Imenningerehmflaw.corn + +Dear Judge Schofield: + +On behalf of defendant Ghislaine Maxwell, I write in response to plaintiff's request for a pre-motion conference to discuss her anticipated motion to dismiss this action with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2). As explained during counsel's conferral call, Ms. Maxwell does not "oppose" the request to dismiss per se. Rather, Ms. Maxwell simply requests that the dismissal include two standard terms to ensure the enforceability of the dismissal with prejudice as contemplated by the Rule and to preserve Ms. Maxwell's rights in a pre-existing indemnification lawsuit. + +First, Ms. Maxwell requests her counsel be provided a copy of plaintiff's signed and executed release. In the event plaintiff attempts to sue her again in any forum at some unknown time in the future, Ms. Maxwell needs a signed and executed release so that she has a legally enforceable document to seek dismissal of any such claim. Plaintiff's counsel's representations in correspondence that she is releasing Ms. Maxwell are insufficient. Ms. Maxwell has had no role in negotiating the terms of the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program. She is neither a signatory to any of its terms nor contractually bound by them. Whatever plaintiff was assured by the Program in terms of confidentiality apparently did not take into account the needs of third-party beneficiaries of her agreement to release "any employees of the Estate, Mr. Epstein, or any entities owned or controlled by the Estate." Counsel is unaware of any legal support for refusing to provide a copy of a release to the released party; plaintiff's pre-motion letter cites none. + +Second, Ms. Maxwell also seeks to ensure that the dismissal is without prejudice to her ability to seek indemnification from Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, the executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (the "Estate") for fees and + +Hon. Lorna G. Schofield +November 23, 2020 +Page 2 + +costs incurred in defending against this action. Her request for indemnification is presently subject to pending litigation in the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands District of St. [REDACTED] & St. John, Case Number ST-20-CV-155 (the "Indemnification Litigation"). In her proposed stipulation of dismissal under Rule 41(a)(i)(A)(ii), plaintiff included the following language: "this action shall be dismissed with prejudice, with each party to bear its own attorneys' fees and costs." The broad language contained in plaintiff's proposed stipulation could arguably act to waive Ms. Maxwell's ability to recover fees and costs incurred during litigation of *this* case in the Indemnification Litigation. If, plaintiff moves under Rule 41(a)(2) for dismissal, Ms. Maxwell requests that the court include a term of dismissal that expressly preserves Ms. Maxwell's rights to seek fees and costs in the Indemnification Litigation against the Estate. + +F.R.C.P. 41(a)(2) provides "an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff's request only by court order, *on terms that the court considers proper.*" (emphasis supplied). Terms and conditions are generally imposed by the district court under Rule 41(a)(2) to protect the defendant from prejudice. 9 [REDACTED] & [REDACTED], *Federal Practice and Procedure*, § 2366 (3d ed.2008). "Courts have imposed a variety of terms and conditions, including the imposition of costs or attorneys' fees *or requirements that the plaintiff produce documents* or agree to allow discovery to be used in any subsequent action." *In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litigation*, 268 F.R.D. 539, 543-44 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (emphasis supplied) (citing 9 [REDACTED] & [REDACTED], *Federal Practice and Procedure*, § 2366). + +For the foregoing reasons, should plaintiff move this Court to for a dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2), Ms. Maxwell respectfully requests that any order entered by the Court pursuant to 41(a)(2) include the following terms: + +1. i. Plaintiff shall provide to counsel for Ms. Maxwell a copy of the executed General Release entered in connection with the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program (the "Program") within two (2) business days of this Order; and +2. ii. Plaintiff and Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn shall pay their own fees and costs associated with this matter. Defendant Maxwell shall not seek fees or costs associated with the matter from Plaintiff, unless Rule 41(d) is implicated by a future suit. Nothing herein shall be construed to preclude Ms. Maxwell from seeking fees or costs related to this matter from the Estate Of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Darren K. Indyke, in his capacity as Executor of the Estate Of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Richard D. Kahn, in his capacity as Executor of the Estate Of Jeffrey E. Epstein, or NES, LLC, a New York Limited Liability Company, or release any such claims as between the Defendants. + +Hon. Lorna G. Schofield November 23, 2020 Page 3 + +Respectfully Submitted, + +a. Laura A. Menninger + +CC: Counsel of Record via ECF \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778232/EFTA02778232.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778232/EFTA02778232.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a00c7e87c5522594c4b496db9e00bd08532491bf --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778232/EFTA02778232.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778232", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "9ec889818c8e211085f95d9bf578290b69e2eac75218cb7729d5bba73baf9b58", + "output_sha256": "9ec889818c8e211085f95d9bf578290b69e2eac75218cb7729d5bba73baf9b58", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778235/EFTA02778235.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778235/EFTA02778235.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1d13cf4783c619897537000aa1a6f311d73f1814 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778235/EFTA02778235.md @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +| USDC SDNY | +| -------------------------------------- | +| DOCUMENT | +| ELECTRONICALLY FILED | +| #: _____ | +| DATE FILED: November 24, 2020 | + +UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT +SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +-----X + [REDACTED] + : + : + : + : + Plaintiff(s), : 19 Civ. 10475 (LGS) + -against- : AMENDED + DAREN [REDACTED]. INDYKE, et al. : ORDER OF REFERENCE + : : TO A + : : MAGISTRATE JUDGE + : + Defendant(s).: : + -----X + +LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, District Judge: + +The above entitled action is referred to the Hon. Debra Freeman +United States Magistrate Judge, for the following purpose(s): + +✓ GENERAL PRE-TRIAL (includes +scheduling, discovery, non-dispositive pre-trial +motions and settlement) + +\_\_\_\_\_ GENERAL PRE-TRIAL & +DISPOSITIVE MOTION (all purposes except +trial) + +Plaintiff's pre-motion letter at Dkt. No. 97 + +X DISPOSITIVE MOTION (i.e., a motion +requiring a Report & Recommendation) + +\_\_\_\_\_ SPECIFIC NON-DISPOSITIVE +MOTION / DISPUTE (including discovery +dispute) \* + +\_\_\_\_\_ HABEAS CORPUS + +\_\_\_\_\_ INQUEST AFTER DEFAULT / +DAMAGES HEARING + +\_\_\_\_\_ SOCIAL SECURITY + +\_\_\_\_\_ SETTLEMENT + +\_\_\_\_\_ CONSENT UNDER 28 U.S.C. 636(c) +FOR ALL PURPOSES (including trial) + +\_\_\_\_\_ CONSENT UNDER 28 U.S.C. 636(c) +FOR LIMITED PURPOSE OF + +\_\_\_\_\_ JURY SELECTION + +SO ORDERED. +Dated: November 24, 2020 +New York, New York + +\* Do not check if already referred for General Pre-Trial. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778235/EFTA02778235.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778235/EFTA02778235.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2679b260d723174eecb7c833fdb2089fd74001af --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778235/EFTA02778235.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -102, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778235", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 6, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.empty-image\", \"builtin.table-boundary-padding\", \"epstein_legal.flight-log-tables.normalize\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "0b61037835ca1e33f2e882d7637a97e37c81379d35b2500ca6926761dbd1c5d0", + "output_sha256": "18d0c76be1e62c5ce75bcd6eb0c70fa878f0ecec50ce160ec19d35ab9bd8cd9c", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778236/EFTA02778236.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778236/EFTA02778236.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..80d08b0913c6cc8d13b7c755ff7b585cb90b9822 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778236/EFTA02778236.md @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +## VIA ECF + +The Honorable Debra Freeman Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007-1312 + +> Re: v. Darren K. lndyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as executors of the Estate of Jeffrey Edward Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell, 19-CV-10475-LGS-DCF + +December I. 2020 + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +Pursuant to the Court's September 4, 2020, order (ECF No. 93) Plaintiff and Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell, jointly submit this status report. Plaintiff submitted her claim to the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program on June 26, 2020, and accepted an offer of compensation on October 5, 2020. Plaintiff and the Estate stipulated to a dismissal of this action with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) with each party to bear its own fees and costs. Defendant Maxwell did not agree to a stipulated dismissal unless she is provided with a release by Plaintiff and is assured by defendant Estate that any dismissal is without prejudice to her current indemnification lawsuit against the Estate. Accordingly, Plaintiff filed a letter on November 17, 2020, requesting a pre-motion conference on her request to dismiss this action with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(aX2). ECF No. 97. Defendant Maxwell filed a response on November 23, 2020. ECF No. 99. Today, the Court ordered the parties to continue to meet and confer and to provide the Court with a joint submission on December 8, 2020. ECF No. 101. + +Respectfully submitted, + +Is/ Sigrid S. McCawley + +Sigrid S. McCawley, Esq. Boies Schiller Flexner LLP + +/s/ Bennet J. Moskowitz + +Bennet J. Moskowitz. Troutman Pepper Sanders LLP + +Is/ Laura Menninger + +Laura Meni.ier, Es Haddon, and P.C. + +cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778236/EFTA02778236.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778236/EFTA02778236.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8f412ecc52b2611ada398ccc16583e2e3cc55224 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778236/EFTA02778236.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778236", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "b4bf66b712f94efe7f23f64d877a3134c783b5ed4912e86a6080b2f244891f04", + "output_sha256": "b4bf66b712f94efe7f23f64d877a3134c783b5ed4912e86a6080b2f244891f04", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778238/EFTA02778238.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778238/EFTA02778238.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2ef6d7de8ac008efa02bce7d5cf40024ea8c7b0d --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778238/EFTA02778238.md @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +December 8, 2020 + +## VIA ECF + +The Honorable Debra Freeman Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007-1312 + +Sigrid S. McCawley Telephone: (954) 3774223 Email: smccawley@bsfllp.com + +Re: t. Darren K. Indyke, Richard I). Kahn, X Ghislaine Maxwell 19-10475-1,GS-DCF + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +Pursuant to the Court's order dated December I, 2020 (ECF No. 101), Plaintiff and Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell, jointly write to update the Court as to their discussions relating to the voluntary dismissal of this lawsuit. + +## Position of Plaintiff + +This Court has numerous times stressed the importance of settlement discussions to resolve this case, and has encouraged to participate in the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program ("Victims' Compensation Program") as a means to resolve the matter without continued litigation. See Tr. of Nov. 21, 2019 Hearing at 24:1-23 ("I think that settlement is an important track."); 50:16-19 ("These are serious claims. . . . Let's see if we can get them on a settlement track that everybody is comfortable with."). complied and this Court stayed the action to allow her to participate in the Victims' Compensation Program. ECF No. 85. She has concluded that process and requested that Defendant Maxwell stipulate to the dismissal of this action with prejudice, as is required by the Victims' Compensation Program. As the Court knows, a dismissal with prejudice would prevent from being able to ever bring these claims again against Defendant Maxwell. Despite that fact, Defendant Maxwell has refused to stipulate to dismissal with prejudice and this Court directed the parties to further confer. + +During the parties' meet and confer prior to request for a pre-motion conference on her anticipated motion to dismiss this action with prejudice (ECF No. 97), Ms. Maxwell's position was that she needed an executed copy of the Victims' Compensation Program General Release that signed before she would agree to dismissal of this lawsuit with each party bearing its own fees and costs. But the Victims' Compensation Program was established as a confidential process. Accordingly, on December 7, 2020, offered to provide Ms. Maxwell with a copy of that executed General Release with only one piece of information redacted—the confidential amount of compensation that has been offered by the Victims' Compensation Program. Ms. Maxwell's counsel rejected that compromise with + +no explanation. [REDACTED] then proposed that both parties sign a mutual release whereby both [REDACTED] Maxwell would agree to release any claims against one another. Ms. Maxwell's counsel rejected that proposal with no explanation and with no counterproposal. + +Ms. Maxwell's refusal to agree to dismissal of this lawsuit is perplexing. She is not a party to the Victims' Compensation Program and has not been asked to compensate [REDACTED] in any way for her injuries. She now has the opportunity to conclude this lawsuit and is refusing to do so without imposing conditions on [REDACTED] never agreed to when she decided to participate in the Victims' Compensation Program. Ms. Maxwell's refusal to accept a copy of the General Release that [REDACTED] signed with the compensation determination redacted is indefensible. Her justification for requiring a copy of the General Release in her prior letter to the Court was that: "In the event plaintiff attempts to sue her again in any forum at some unknown time in the future, Ms. Maxwell needs a signed and executed release so that she has a legally enforceable document to seek dismissal of any such claim." ECF No. 99 at 1. Not only did [REDACTED] offer to provide her that legally enforceable, signed, and executed General Release, but Ms. Maxwell would be able to point to the dismissal of this action with prejudice *itself* if [REDACTED] ever decided to sue Ms. Maxwell again. Maxwell's position is thus illogical and a clear attempt to stall [REDACTED] ability to receive the compensation that she has been offered through the Victims' Compensation Program. + +Accordingly, [REDACTED] respectfully requests that the Court enter an order dismissing this case with prejudice, with each party to bear its own fees and costs. + +**Position of Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell** + +Plaintiff argues that "a dismissal with prejudice would prevent [REDACTED] from being able to ever bring these claims again against Defendant Maxwell." Yet, without justification, she declines to provide either (a) the proof that Ms. Maxwell requested -- an unredacted and signed copy of the release that purportedly says as much and which would be admissible in a court of law, nor (b) as this Court suggested (Doc. # 101), a "written release of Plaintiff's claims against Ms. Maxwell." Ms. Maxwell has previously explained that she requires a copy of the signed and executed release "so that she has a legally enforceable document to seek dismissal" in "the event plaintiff attempts to sue her again in any forum at some unknown time in the future." (Doc. # 99 at 1). Plaintiff has not offered an explanation as to the need to redact the signed and executed release. Both plaintiff and the Estate have a copy. Plaintiff offers no legal support for her desire to hide the release from one of the purportedly released parties. Certainly, Ms. Maxwell has no objection to keeping such document confidential unless and until it is deemed relevant and admissible by a court of law. + +Plaintiff likewise not explained why she refused, despite this Court's suggestion and Ms. Maxwell's request during conferral, to provide a separate "written release of Plaintiff's claims against Ms. Maxwell." Instead, plaintiff only offered to sign a written release of Ms. Maxwell if she mutually releases plaintiff. Plaintiff offered no justification whatsoever as to why Ms. Maxwell would release plaintiff from any and all claims against her now, and counsel for Ms. Maxwell is unaware of any such justification. + +It appears that plaintiff is playing coy. Previously she argued to this Court that "[e]ven if the [claims] program moves forward and even if Plaintiff chooses to participate, it is not clear that + +Maxwell would be released for her torts against Plaintiff." (Doc. # 72 at 2). Now she wants Ms. Maxwell and the court to accept without proof that she has released Ms. Maxwell from any and all claims and without proof of the consideration she has received in exchange for such a release. + +Pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2), Ms. Maxwell respectfully requests that this Court order plaintiff provide to Ms. Maxwell an unredacted copy of the signed and executed release from the claims program that she asserts covers a release of Ms. Maxwell. If the Court deems it necessary, Ms. Maxwell will certainly abide by a confidentiality restriction that the release cannot be used for any purpose other than as necessary and admissible in a court of law. Ms. Maxwell also agrees to the language proposed by the defendant executors concerning her right to seek indemnification from the Estate. + +## Position of Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein + +The Co-Executors have no desire to impede discontinuation of this action. To that end, and consistent with the Court's direction, on December 3, 2020, counsel for the Co-Executors emailed counsel for the other parties, as follows: + +ifi raknow, the Estate has no desire to impede the discontinuation of lawsuit. Accordingly, and consistent with Judge Freeman's December 1, 2020 Order, the Estate is amenable to revising the discontinuance stipulation so that it includes Ms. Maxwell's requested reservation of rights, as follows but with additional language inserted by us (underlined): "Nothing herein shall be construed to preclude Ms. Maxwell from seeking fees or costs related to this matter from the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Darren K. Indyke, in his capacity as Executor of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Richard D. Kahn, in his capacity as Executor of the Estate ofJeffrey E. Epstein, or NES, LLC, a New York Limited Liability Company, or release any such claims as between the Defendants. Nor does anything herein prejudice the Estate Of Jeffrey E. Epstein. Darren K. Indyke, in his capacity as Executor of the Estate Of Jeffrey E. Epstein. Richard D. Kahn. in his capacity as Executor of the Estate Of Jeffrey E. Epstein or NES LLC's rights and legal positions with respect to Ms. Maxwell's seeking of fees or costs related to this matter, all of which rights and legal positions are hereby expressly preserved."). + +Both Plaintiff and Defendant Maxwell responded by indicating they had no objection to the Co-Executors' proposal. + +Respectfully submitted, + +/s/ Sigrid S. McCawley + +Sigrid S. McCawley, Esq. Boies Schiller Flexner LLP + +/s/ Bennet J. Moskowitz + +Bennet J. Moskowitz, . Troutman Pepper Sanders LLP + +/s/ Laura Mennineer + +Laura MentSt:er, Es Haddon, and P.C. + +cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778238/EFTA02778238.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778238/EFTA02778238.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7ccfdfe3b62b7fe2830e54fe584725896458de1d --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778238/EFTA02778238.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778238", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "57856474d37f7aa8876af55296010ac31eb2b713d950edeb35e657a7eebaee62", + "output_sha256": "57856474d37f7aa8876af55296010ac31eb2b713d950edeb35e657a7eebaee62", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778242/EFTA02778242.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778242/EFTA02778242.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7b0eaf8df7b4cddb51737f049b48663cba33c610 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778242/EFTA02778242.md @@ -0,0 +1,425 @@ +UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK x + +4 + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +I + +Plaintiff, + +v. 19 Civ. 10475 (LGS) (DCF) + +DARREN K. INDYKE, in his capacity as executor of the Estate of Jeffrey Edward Epstein; RICHARD D. KAHN, in his capacity as executor of the Estate of Jeffrey Edward Epstein; GHISLAINE MAXWELL, + +Defendants. + +Before: + +x + +Teleconference + +New York, N.Y. December 16, 2020 3:00 p.m. + +HON. DEBRA C. FREEMAN, + +Magistrate Judge + +APPEARANCES + +BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP + +Attorneys for Plaintiff + +BY: SIGRID S. MCCAWLEY ANDREW VILLACASTIN SABINE MARIELLA + +MOTLEY RICE + +Attorneys for U.S. Virgin Islands + +BY: LINDA CARMEN S. SCOTT + +APPEARANCES Cont'd + +TROUTMAN PEPPER SANDERS LLP + +Attorney for Defendant Executors BY: BENNETT JEROME MOSKOWITZ + +HADDON, AND P.0 Attorney for Defendant Maxwell BY: LAURA A. MENNINGER + +4 5 This is Judge Freeman. This is v. Indyke. 19CV1475. + +6 7 Counsel, could I have your appearance for the record, starting with plaintiff's counsel? + +8 MS. McCAWLEY: Yes, your Honor. + +9 10 11 12 13 14 This is plaintiff's counsel, Sigrid McCawley, for , with the law firm of Boies, Schiller & Flexner. I have with me Andrew Villacastin, my colleague; and Sabina Mariella, my other colleague. Along with us is the Chief Deputy Attorney General from U.S. Virgin Islands, ; as well as the USVI counsel, Linda + +15 16 THE COURT: Okay. Don't know that everybody is needed, but welcome. + +17 Who do I have representing the estate? + +18 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Good afternoon, your Honor. + +19 20 This is Bennett Moskowitz, Troutman Pepper, counsel for the executors. + +21 22 THE COURT: All right. And who do I have for Ms. Maxwell? + +23 MS. MENNINGER: Good afternoon, your Honor. + +24 Laura Menninger, on behalf of Ghislaine Maxwell. + +25 THE COURT: So there are more people on the line, + +THE COURT: This is Judge Freeman. + +Hold on a second while I hit a key that lets us record this conference. + +4 MS. McCAWLEY: Your Honor, this is the plaintiff. + +5 6 We typically do have a court reporter, so I'm not sure if that was my office that called in or somebody else's. + +7 8 9 THE COURT: Okay. Do I have anyone else who is an attorney, either on this case or on any of the other cases involving the Epstein estate? + +10 MS. SCOTT: Your Honor, good afternoon. + +11 12 This is Carmen Scott, with the law firm of Motley Rice, outside counsel for the government of the Virgin Islands. + +13 14 THE COURT: II. I think I already had you identified, no? + +15 16 MS. SCOTT: My colleague, Linda , was previously identified. + +17 THE COURT: Okay. Fine. + +18 Anyone else? Any other attorneys? + +19 Do I have my law clerk on? + +20 LAW CLERK: Yes, Judge, I'm here. + +21 THE COURT: Do I have any intern students on? No? + +22 23 Okay. Do I have any members of the press on, just so that we know who's here? Do I have anyone? + +24 25 MR. : Yes. Good afternoon, this is James from ABC News, in listen-only mode. + +based on what I understood when I joined in. I understood that someone wanted to arrange for a court reporter; is that right? + +Is that right; is that not right? + +4 5 THE COURT: Okay. All right. This is essentially a courtroom. It's open to the public. This is not a confidential proceeding. I don't consider this a settlement conference, and so there's no reason why it can't be a public proceeding. + +6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 I'll also note that I just saw come in an application that looks like it could be rather similar to what's going on here in another one of the cases, 20 Civ. 484; different plaintiff, different plaintiff's counsel. Apparently an agreement has been reached through the compensation program, and that case also has Ms. Maxwell as a defendant. So I'm assuming whatever happens here will be relevant to that case. And I'll just ask plaintiff's counsel -- or the defendant's counsel, for that matter -- to please be in touch with plaintiff's counsel in that other case. Somebody should be in touch with them to let them know what's going on here, since it seems similar. + +18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 So it seems to me there's only one issue here, and this has to do with the release. Seems like you've agreed on language for a stipulation discontinuance, and the only question is whether Ms. Maxwell does or does not get a full and redacted copy of the settlement agreement that was reached through the program or mutual releases. I'm finding it hard to understand why we have any kind of complicated issue here. If what Ms. Maxwell is looking for is assurance that she's being + +4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 released from claims and therefore the plaintiffs cannot sue her again because she's been released from claims, and, in fact, if plaintiff has executed such a release in connection with the settlement through the compensation program, then I don't see why she can't just copy and paste that into a new document called "release" and give it to Ms. Maxwell and sign it, and Ms. Maxwell will have her release. I don't understand why Ms. Maxwell is looking for -- or why plaintiff would be looking for mutual releases. You didn't seem to be demanding that coming in the door when you asked to have this case resolved -- you know, terminated. And I don't understand why Ms. Maxwell needs to know the amount of the compensation through the program. Seems like that would not be relevant to her estated issue, which is that she wants to have a release. + +15 16 So why can't she just get a release, period? Somebody explain to me why this is an issue. + +17 18 MS. MCCAWLEY: Sure, your Honor. This is Sigrid McCawley, for the plaintiff, + +19 20 21 22 23 24 25 You're absolutely correct that the parties participated -- not Ms. Maxwell, but we participated in the Epstein compensation program, as your Honor encouraged us to do back in the summertime to explore that opportunity in order to get rid of pending litigation if that was possible. So we went through that process. And as you know, that process has very defined rules in how it moves forward, and that was all + +4 negotiated in advance of the program starting. And we went through that process. And as part of that process, you know, as you've said, we have to provide a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice in order to complete that program. + +5 6 7 8 9 10 11 So we went through that program. We signed the settlement release that's required by that program, and that is an exchange for the compensation. And we then submitted to you the dismissal with prejudice request after we proposed it to opposing counsel. The estate agreed. The estate also agreed that Ms. Maxwell could raise her fee issue with them, that that was not precluded. And the only issue -- + +12 THE COURT: Let me just ask for a clarification point. + +13 MS. McCAWLEY: Sure. + +14 15 16 THE COURT: The release that's required in connection with the compensation program, does it include a release of Ms. Maxwell, and not just the estate? + +17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MS. MCCAWLEY: Yes. So the language in the release, which is why they demanded it, has release of anybody who has been employed by the estate, which includes Ms. Maxwell. So it does cover her, so that's why there is no -- I think the Court -- we're getting ahead of ourselves a little bit. What we're giving her -- by giving her a copy of the general release and dismissing our case with prejudice under Rule 41(2), we cannot bring those claims again. So she has what she needs. She has the release that has the language that we've already signed + +with the estate. The only thing in that that would be redacted is the amount. And she has a dismissal with prejudice such 4 that would not be able to bring these claims against her. So -- + +5 6 7 8 THE COURT: I'm still having a lot of trouble seeing what the problem is here. Maybe Ms. Maxwell's counsel can explain to me what the problem is if you have a copy of the signed release and it covers your client, what is the holdup? + +9 10 MS. MENNINGER: Your Honor, this is Laura Menninger, on behalf of Ms. Maxwell. + +11 12 13 14 I do not have a copy of the signed release. The only people who have a copy of the signed release are the estate and plaintiff's counsel. One has not been provided to me, redacted or otherwise. + +15 16 17 18 THE COURT: Well, okay. So let's assume the release is provided to you and the only thing that's redacted from the document is the amount of the compensation being received in exchange for the release. + +19 20 What is the problem with that? That's been offered to you. What would be the problem with that? + +21 22 23 MS. MENNINGER: Your Honor, we believe that having an authentic copy of the release is important for at least two reasons: One -- + +24 25 THE COURT: And you think something redacted would not be authentic? + +MS. MENNINGER: It would be altered in some way. + +4 5 6 7 8 9 10 THE COURT: Okay. Well, then, how about what I said in the first place, which is, on plaintiff's side, take the release language exactly as it appears in the agreement that you already have. You're not doing anything other than what you've already agreed to do, put it on a new piece of paper, put the date on it, put a signature line, put an original signature on it, and give it to Ms. Maxwell. She has an document that's an authentic release, unaltered, exactly the document we're giving you. We're giving you a release. + +11 What would be wrong with that? + +12 13 MS. McCAWLEY: Your Honor, this is Sigrid McCawley, for the plaintiff. + +14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 You know, that is not something we agreed to obviously in the course of the program. So we agreed to the general release in exchange for the compensation we're getting from the estate. So this would be requiring Maxwell some separate document, which I assume there would have to be some negotiation over, and Ms. Maxwell's not giving anything in exchange. So that's why we propose when your Honor raised the issue -- + +22 23 24 25 THE COURT: Why not a document then that recites: Whereas, plaintiff has participated in the program and whereas has reached an agreement which is confidential -- or in exchange for which she will be getting some compensation for a + +4 5 6 7 8 9 10 I mean, why is there no way around this? This seems ridiculous. If plaintiff is willing to release, Ms. Maxwell should not have to provide the amount of the compensation. I agree with that. Ms. Maxwell should have a document she can go to court with that says: Here's the release. She wants a document that doesn't have a redaction in it. Give her a clean document that doesn't have a redaction in it. + +11 12 13 14 15 MS. MENNINGER: Your Honor, one of the other reasons that we do think having the original release is important will be, it is going to be relevant in our lawsuit that is currently pending against the estate for indemnification in the Virgin Islands. + +16 17 18 19 20 21 22 THE COURT: So give them a copy of the redacted agreement together with a statement from plaintiff that says, you know, plaintiff agrees that, you know, in the future should this release be raised in any lawsuit against plaintiff, plaintiff will not object to the release on the ground that it has been redacted -- the amount has been redacted. We'll waive a right to -- would that be acceptable? + +23 24 25 MS. MCCAWLEY: Yes, your Honor. We could agree to send a letter saying that we have signed the release, including a copy in redacted form and attesting to the fact that we've + +release, and whereas that agreement contains the terms of the release, which are recited below, and whereas plaintiff has agreed to those terms, signed document? + +4 + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +signed that and she can use it to the extent necessary in another litigation. You know, we're only dismissing with prejudice, so we can't -- Annie will not be able to sue her again for these claims. + +THE COURT: Right. Right. + +MS. McCAWLEY: So, I mean, I don't know we have to write additional documents that -- + +THE COURT: Wait a minute. If we talk simultaneously, no one will ever be able to make a transcript of this, either the court reporter you retained or anyone using this recording. + +So all I'm saying is, you're capable counsel. This seems like a ridiculous problem. There's no issue here, right. Plaintiff has resolved the claims. As part of the resolution of the claims, she's willing to give a release to Ms. Maxwell. It's part of the condition of the program; she's willing to do it. Ms. Maxwell wants to have a copy of the release that she can use. She should be entitled to have a copy of the release she can use. + +If you're worried that if I go to court and I have a copy of the document that's redacted and they'll make some stink and say this isn't authentic, so write a piece of paper that she says we won't object on that ground. And I think the point is well taken; if the case is dismissed with prejudice, it's dismissed with prejudice, it cannot be brought again. + +So you're not particularly at risk here, Ms. Maxwell's + +4 + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +side, right? But if plaintiff is willing to give you a letter or some kind of signed statement that says, we won't object to you using this in the future on the ground that it's redacted and a copy, you know, signing here, that we won't object on that basis, there really ought to be some way that's not -- you don't need me to think of, to make this go smoothly. It seems to me it's making a mountain out of a mole + +II. MENNINGER: Your Honor, I don't disagree with you. I don't think it should be a mountain. I think it should be a molehill. I have not heard -- one of the reasons that we believe it will be relevant and admissible in future proceedings is because we do have ongoing litigation against the estate related to indemnification for this and other legal matters. And the actual copy of the release, the fact that was paid out moneys, some of which under the claims program, as I understand it, would be additional money based on her claims against Ms. Maxwell that are separate and apart from those against the estate will be relevant to that indemnification proceeding. If your Honor would prefer that we just have a redacted copy now with some language that says no one's going to contest the authenticity of that document when and if it's relevant in future proceedings, that's fine, and in the indemnification case, we may have to ask under discovery rules for a copy of it there for whatever purposes might be relevant in that proceeding. + +4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 I'm not trying to make this substantial. When I went to plaintiff's counsel and tried to discuss what your Honor suggested, they would only give us a release if Ms. Maxwell was releasing , which, of course, there's no basis for that request. And in the past, plaintiff's counsel have said they don't even know if Ms. Maxwell is covered by these releases. So I am simply trying to make sure that if what counsel is representing to be true, that Ms. Maxwell is fully released from all came claims by and that I have a copy of the document that I can use in future proceedings, it should be the molehill that your Honor has described. + +12 13 14 THE COURT: Are you saying that you need assurance from the estate that the estate will not contest the document based on its being redacted or being a copy? + +15 16 17 18 19 MS. MENNINGER: Since both the estate and plaintiff's counsel have a copy, I would assume whatever I get, neither party -- either party would be willing to tell me is an authentic copy, or they won't contest it, if it's relevant in future proceedings. + +20 21 22 THE COURT: So what you're saying is you're contemplating potential future proceedings involving the estate -- or potentially against the estate. + +23 Am I -- + +24 25 MS. MENNINGER: We already have -- that's pending, your Honor. + +4 + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +THE COURT: Is what you can anticipate -- assurance from the estate as opposed to assurance from the plaintiff, that it will not contest your use of the document based on its being redacted or being a copy. + +MS. MENNINGER: My preference would be to have an unredacted copy. And I -- + +THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to order that you get a copy that chose the compensation. I don't think you need that for what you're describing at this time. And I don't think you need a mutual release either. I'll direct that to plaintiff's counsel. I think all you need is confirmation that you have the release that plaintiff and defense estate both say you have. You need a copy of the release that you can use in the future and rely on and nobody will contest it's authentic; that's all it comes down to. So it seems to me you folks should be able to figure that out because it seems like a simple problem. There's a willingness to give the release, there's a desire to get the release. It's just a question of what it looks like. If it's a separate piece of paper with - fine. If it's a redacted copy, fine, as long as Ms. Maxwell, through counsel, has the assurance that nobody will later contest it on the ground that the copy is redacted, or the copy is a copy. It's not -- it doesn't seem like it's that hard. All right? + +So can you please figure this out -- + +4 5 6 7 8 Maybe the easiest at this point is just to provide the redacted copy and have, you know, a signed letter from counsel for both plaintiff and counsel for the estate saying that there won't be an objection on the ground that it's redacted or a duplicate as long as been everybody knows what's being referred to? + +9 10 MS. MENNINGER: I'm so sorry, your Honor. I didn't mean to interrupt you. + +11 12 13 THE COURT: It seems to me you should be able to come up with some language in some manner that settles this issue, puts this issue to bed and get this case resolved. + +14 15 MS. MCCAWLEY: Yes, your Honor. And we're happy to do that. My only concern is that the timing of this. + +16 17 18 Is it possible if some other issue comes up, that we're able to get a conference with you? Because obviously Annie can't complete the program until this issue is resolved. + +19 20 21 THE COURT: Yes. I'll make myself available for another conference if you need it. I'm really hoping you don't. + +22 MS. MCCAWLEY: I agree. + +23 24 25 THE COURT: I mean, you work this out. You resolved this. There was an amount of money that was acceptable and was accepted. You know, Ms. Maxwell should be thrilled that, + +MS. MENNINGER: Yes, your Honor. + +THE COURT: -- in some way that resolves this? + +4 5 6 without doing anything, she got included in a release. You all should be quite pleased with the outcome here and move along. So I don't mean to be like giving you -- I don't mean to sound like I'm giving you such a hard time, but it's sort of beyond me how you can't work this out. It seems like so much of a non-issue. + +7 8 9 10 And for anyone who's listening in from the press and hearing me talk about this, this is a non-issue here you're listening in to. So, you know, welcome to a conference on which should be a non-issue. + +11 12 13 You know, if anything, it's good that the claims compensation program successfully resulted in what seems to be a resolution of a claim. That's it. All right? + +14 MS. MENNINGER: Thank you, your Honor. + +15 MS. MCCAWLEY: Thank you, your Honor. + +16 17 18 19 THE COURT: I'll make myself available if you still need me. Go figure it out. And I'll watch the docket. If there's a problem, you'll put it on the docket. Please don't have a problem. Okay? + +20 MS. MENNINGER: Thank you, your Honor. + +21 MS. MCCAWLEY: Thank you. + +22 THE COURT: Take care, everybody. Be well. + +23 + +24 25 \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778242/EFTA02778242.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778242/EFTA02778242.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9ce278cf5b7d7379960c689f6b3bab12033c822b --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778242/EFTA02778242.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778242", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "779a67cd3b62a1cbdc45f112371bc8449374387f54d306e4a5fd99e0c4c2561d", + "output_sha256": "779a67cd3b62a1cbdc45f112371bc8449374387f54d306e4a5fd99e0c4c2561d", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778258/EFTA02778258.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778258/EFTA02778258.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..59e03ab69aa614f0654a14bf16782f2ebed06d39 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778258/EFTA02778258.md @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT +FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +[REDACTED], +USA / Plaintiff(s) + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE, +Defendant(s) + + +Case No.: 19 Civ. 10475 + +NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT + +Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a conference held on 12/16/20 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above-captioned matter. + +Redaction responsibilities apply to the attorneys of record or pro se parties, even if the person requesting the transcript is a judge or a member of the public or media. + +The parties have seven (7) calendar days from the date of filing of this NOTICE to file with the court any NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION of this transcript. A copy of said NOTICE must also be served on the court reporter. If no such NOTICE is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after ninety (90) calendar days. + +This process may only be used to redact the following personal data identifiers: Social Security numbers; dates of birth; minors' names; and financial account numbers. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2, and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 49.1. Parties wishing to request redaction of other information may proceed by motion. + +I (we) certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter. + +[REDACTED] +Court Reporter/Transcriber Date \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778258/EFTA02778258.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778258/EFTA02778258.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..41e3f2abd40ffaeb539ec5156a967cf97f528262 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778258/EFTA02778258.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -42, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778258", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.running-headers\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "5eb4aa5d3328add742210f8213d3a53568e2860312d65c9c777f347c229984e2", + "output_sha256": "706d6cd18d7296c2f07b4638a79abecadd34724a33b23ac29e1cb17f189f4b00", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778259/EFTA02778259.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778259/EFTA02778259.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..53dd63cefcec5837f59d1c94b424fa12de0c76d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778259/EFTA02778259.md @@ -0,0 +1,186 @@ +## Exhibit A + +From: Sabina Marietta To: 'Laura Menninoer"; M0s1s0wit7. Bennet 1,; Brorid Mr:Cawley Cc: left Panlim-4; Andrew ViItacaStin; Ran° Molly• lost Schillet Subject: RE: A. Joint status submission Date: Tuesday, December 22, 2020 1:09:00 PM + + +We need to confer on a timeline for dismissing this case and when you can expect to speak to your client about this very straightforward issue. A public filing in Ms. Maxwell's criminal case last week indicated that Ms. Maxwell has the ability to video conference with her attorneys for three hours per weekday and can otherwise communicate with her counsel for 13 hours per day, 7 days a week. We'd thus like to understand your purported inability to speak with her about this issue by any specific date. + + +From: Laura Menninger [mailto:Imenninger@hmflaw.com) Sent: Tuesday, December 22, 2020 10:59 AM To: Sabina Mariella ; Moskowitz, Bennet J. ; Sigrid McCawley Cc: Jeff Pagliuca ; Andrew Villacastin : DiRago, Molly ; Josh Schiller Subject: RE: A. joint status submission + +CAUTION: External email. Please do not respond to or click on links/attachments unless you recognize the sender. + +Sabina, + +Let me rephrase my response: What is it that you think we can confer about before I have spoken to my client? Perhaps I am not understanding the topic for conferral. + +As far as timeline, I can commit to get back to you as soon as I am able to discuss this with my client. + + +Laura A. Menninger Partner Haddon, & ~, P.C. 150 E. 10th Avenue I Denver, CO 80203 +1 303 831 7364 (Office) lmenninger@hmflaw.com + +Sent: Tuesday, December 22, 2020 7:07 AM + +To: Laura Menninger •cimenningerPhmflaw corn>. Moskowitz, Bennet J. + +. Sigrid McCawley amrrawlevObsfllo COM> + +Cc: Jeff Pagliuca cioagliuraOhmflaw corn>; Andrew Villacastin . DiRago, Molly . Josh Schiller + + + +You've now ignored our requests for some sort of a timeline in three separate emails, and are now refusing to meet and confer with us. As you know, your delay is prejudicial to our client, and it appears that you will only take action if explicitly ordered to do so. If, by end of day today, you do not commit to when you can let us know whether your client agrees to a dismissal of this action on the terms the Court outlined, we will request another conference. + + +From: Laura Menninger [mailto.lmenningerPhmflaw.comj + +Sent: Monday, December 21, 2020 7:28 PM + +To: Sabina Mariella .Moskowitz, Bennet J. + +annPt Moskowit7atroutman com>. Sigrid McCawley amrrawlevObsfllo COM> + +Cc: Jeff Pagliuca cioagliuraOhmflaw corn>. Andrew Villacastin . DiRago, Molly . Josh Schiller + + +CAUTION: External email. Please do not respond to or click on links/attachments unless you recognize the sender. + +Your information is incorrect: I do not have the ability to speak to my client daily. + +I don't think another meet and confer is necessary; I need to confer with my client, not counsel. As I said, I will let you know as soon as I am able to speak with my client. + + +Laura A. Menninger Partner + +Haddon, P.C. + +150 E. 10th Avenue I Denver, CO 80203 + ++1 303 831 7364 (Office) + +Imenninger(ruhtnflaw corn + +From: Sabina Mariella + +Sent: Monday, December 21, 2020 2:15 PM + +To: Laura Menninger . Moskowitz, Bennet J. + +. Sigrid McCawley + +Cc: Jeff Pagliuca sioaeliuraOhmflaw.corn>, Andrew Villacastin ' DiRago, Molly . Josh Schiller + + + +We cannot accept your refusal to commit to a timeframe for responding to a request the Court outlined to you last Wednesday. We understand that you have the ability to speak to your client daily, but if that is not the case you can explain that to Judge Freeman, who may be able to grant you time to speak to Ms. Maxwell about this issue. + +Please let us know of your availability for a meet and confer tomorrow or Wednesday so that we may either reach agreement and file a stipulation of dismissal, or request another conference with the Court. + + +From: Laura Menninger [rnailto•ImenningerPhmflaw corn] + +Sent: Monday, December 21, 2020 2:42 PM + +To: Sabina Mariella . Moskowitz, Bennet J. + +. Sigrid McCawley + +Cc: Jeff Pagliuca . Andrew Villacastin . DiRago, Molly . Josh Schiller ciisrhillerObsfllo corn> + + +CAUTION: External email. Please do not respond to or click on links/attachments unless you recognize the sender. + +Sabina — + +Actually, the delay was occasioned by your refusal to provide a copy of the executed release to Ms. Maxwell, something the court ordered over your objection last Wednesday. + +Ms. Maxwell has had other pressing court deadlines since the joint status conference last Wednesday, as you are well aware. + +I do not control when I get to speak to my client and therefore will not be making any representation to you about when I "intend" to speak to her. + + +Laura A. Menninger Partner Haddon, & P.C. 150 E. 10th Avenue I Denver, CO 80203 + ++1 303 831 7364 (Office) + +lmenninger@thmflaw coal + +From: Sabina Mariella amariellaehcflIn corn> + +Sent: Monday, December 21, 2020 11:29 AM + +To: Laura Menninger tnenningerPhmflaw.com>. Moskowitz, Bennet J. + +. Sigrid McCawley + +Cc: Jeff Pagliuca 4pagliuraOhmflaw COITI>; Andrew Villacastin . Josh Schiller + + + +Yes, your client has now inexplicably delayed the resolution of this lawsuit for two months. We are all aware that she is incarcerated, but after Judge Freeman's clear statement that she will not order to disclose the amount of her compensation to you, and after your statement in open court that your only issue with receiving a redacted copy of the general release is its authenticity, it is entirely unclear what is left to discuss with your client or why it should have taken 5 days to have such a discussion. Judge Freeman said she would make herself available if we cannot resolve this expeditiously, and we intend to take her up on that. + +Please state clearly whether you intend to speak to your client by end of day tomorrow, and provide your availability for a call with the Court on Wednesday. + + +From: Laura Menninger [mailtoimenningerPhmflaw.com1 + +Sent: Monday, December 21, 2020 12:15 PM + +To: Sabina Mariella . Moskowitz, Bennet J. + +. Sigrid McCawley amrrawlPyPbsfllo.corn> + +Cc: Jeff Pagliuca cioaeliuraOhmflaw com>; Andrew Villacastin villaractinehsfllo.conp; DiRago, + +Molly . Josh Schiller + + +CAUTION: External email. Please do not respond to or click on links/attachments unless you recognize the sender. + +Sabina — + +I will be able to get back to you as soon as I am able to discuss it with my client. That likely will not be today. Your client has been vocal in asking that Ms. Maxwell be kept in custody, which of course makes it more difficult for her to communicate with her attorneys. + +Is there some basis for the 5 p.m. deadline or the threat to "call the court" in the next two days? + + +Laura A. Henninger Partner Haddon, & P.C. 150 E. 10th Avenue I Denver, CO 80203 +I 303 831 7364 (Office) lmrnningerVhmflaw.com + +From: Sabina Mariella amariPlla bcfilo COM> + +Sent: Monday, December 21, 2020 10:11 AM + +To: Laura Menninger ' Moskowitz, Bennet J. + +. Sigrid McCawley + +Cc: Jeff Pagliuca . Andrew Villacastin . villaractinPhsfllo °MTV DiRago, Molly . Josh Schiller + + + +Please let us know by 5pm EST whether receipt of the letter described below will cause you to stipulate to dismissal of this case with prejudice. Otherwise, we intend to call the Court on Tuesday or Wednesday. Bennet and Laura, please let us know your availability for such a call, although Plaintiff hopes that one will not be necessary. + + +From: Sabina Mariella + +Sent: Thursday, December 17, 2020 5:41 PM + +To: 'Laura Menninger' . Moskowitz, Bennet J. + +cBennet.MoskowitzPtroutman rom>; Sigrid McCawley + +Cc: Jeff Pagliuca . Andrew Villacastin . DiRago, + +Molly . Josh Schiller cliSchillerPBSFLI P.rom> + + + +Pursuant to Judge Freeman's directions during the telephone conference yesterday, we propose providing you with a letter signed by counsel for Plaintiff and the Estate stating the following, and attaching the redacted, executed copy of the General Release: + +"In accordance with Judge Freeman's instructions at the status conference held in the abovereferenced matter on December 16, 2020, we are attaching to this letter an authentic copy of the General Release that executed on October 3, 2020, in connection with her + +participation in the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program. We agree that we will not dispute the authenticity of this document in any future proceeding." + +Please let us know if you will sign the attached stipulation after receiving such a letter, plus the redacted, executed copy of the General Release. diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778259/EFTA02778259.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778259/EFTA02778259.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e363cbc3066e1204fd452afae5e25ee84f352a28 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778259/EFTA02778259.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -432, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778259", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.running-headers\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "017176bcf34ef23cc6a0189f8ad72d5cdb681e7651cc85320bd0edb46ad42dee", + "output_sha256": "a31c1cb8ad0fe1c380223821a8bc4323f9a9417046b92cc8ffe7ffa0fbb91639", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778266/EFTA02778266.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778266/EFTA02778266.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8c93f67571a462419ccb1fe0038f7c36185c0791 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778266/EFTA02778266.md @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Plaintiff, CASE NO: 19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, and GI- ISLAINE MAXWELL, + +Defendants. + +## IPROPOSEDI ORDER + +## DEBRA C. FREEMAN, United States Magistrate Judge: + +WHEREAS Plaintiff submitted a claim for compensation to the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program ("EVCP") asserting that she was sexually abused by Jeffrey E. Epstein; and + +WHEREAS, after reviewing Plaintiff's submissions and after careful consideration of documentation and proof, and after due deliberation, the EVCP Program Administrator (the "Administrator") determined pursuant to the EVCP Protocol that Plaintiff was eligible to participate in the EVCP; + +WHEREAS Plaintiff has reached a confidential agreement, through which she will receive compensation from the EVCP in exchange for a release (the "General Release"); and + +WHEREAS the General Release contains the terms of the release. + +It is hereby ORDERED that the above-captioned action is dismissed with prejudice, with each party to bear its own attorneys' fees and costs. Nothing herein shall be construed to preclude Ms. Maxwell from seeking fees or costs related to this matter from the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Darren K. Indyke, in his capacity as Executor of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Richard D. Kahn, in his capacity as Executor of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, or NES, LW, a New York Limited Liability Company, or release any such claims as between the Defendants. Nor does anything herein prejudice the Estate Of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Darren K. Indyke, in his capacity as Executor of the Estate Of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Richard D. Kahn, in his capacity as Executor of the Estate Of Jeffrey E. Epstein, or NES, LLC's rights and legal positions with respect to Ms. Maxwell's seeking of fees or costs related to this matter, all of which rights and legal positions are hereby expressly preserved. + +It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff shall provide Ms. Maxwell with a copy of the General Release, with the compensation amount redacted, within two days. The parties shall not dispute the authenticity of this copy of the General Release in any future proceedings. + +Dated: New York, New York December 2020 + +SO ORDERED + +HON. DEBRA C. FREEMAN United States Magistrate Judge Southern District of New York + +Copies to: + +All counsel (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778266/EFTA02778266.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778266/EFTA02778266.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f167aee985cacd9c72158f48f91050445b950a1f --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778266/EFTA02778266.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778266", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "f7d4d791346163587934110cb2a8ceb19b09612cb4b6f9af16b0e59f652a4833", + "output_sha256": "f7d4d791346163587934110cb2a8ceb19b09612cb4b6f9af16b0e59f652a4833", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778268/EFTA02778268.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778268/EFTA02778268.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9c3c247c619c789ae3e41dbdb3f7b6f5d17392a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778268/EFTA02778268.md @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +Sigrid S. McCawley Telephone: (954) 3774223 Email: smccawley@bsfllp.com + +December 23, 2020 + +## VIA ECF + +The Honorable Debra Freeman Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007-1312 + +> Re: v. Darren K. hulyke, Richard D. Kahn, & Ghislaine Maxwell 19-10.175-1,GS-DCF + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +On December 16, 2020, the parties appeared before the Court for a telephone conference on motion to dismiss this case pursuant to Rule 41. During that conference, we explained that after Maxwell refused to stipulate to dismissal, we offered to provide Maxwell with a redacted copy of the General Release that signed in connection with the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program. Maxwell's counsel stated that she was concerned about the authenticity of a redacted version of the General Release for use in future proceedings. Tr. of Dec. 16. 2020 Hearing at 8:21-23. In addition to clearly stating that the Court would not order to disclose the amount of compensation to Maxwell, the Court suggested that provide a redacted version of the General Release to Maxwell with a letter stating that neither she nor the Estate would contest the redacted General Release's authenticity. Id. at 10:16-21, 14:7- 8, 11-15. Both we and Maxwell's counsel agreed with that solution. Id. at 10:23-11:2, 12:19- 22. The Court stated that it would make itself available for another conference if necessary. Id. 15:19-20. + +The very next day, we asked Maxwell's counsel if, pursuant to the Court's suggestion, she would stipulate to dismissal of this action after receiving a copy of the executed General Release, with the compensation amount redacted, plus a letter signed by counsel for and the Estate stating that the document is authentic and that we would not dispute its authenticity. We also provided her with the verbatim language we proposed including in the letter. Exhibit A at 5- 6. Maxwell's counsel did not respond, so we emailed her again four days later asking her to provide us with an answer by the end of the day. Id. at 5. Maxwell's counsel repeatedly refused to provide us with a date or time on which she intended to speak to her client. Id. at 1-4. Maxwell's counsel also refused to confer with us, and then stopped responding to our emails altogether. Id. at 1-2. + +As Your Honor noted at the telephone conference, this should be a straightforward issue. is essentially seeking to dismiss her claims against Maxwell without asking for anything at all from Maxwell in return. We have offered several times to provide Maxwell with what she has demanded—a copy of the General Release that originally understood + +would remain confidential, with only the amount redacted—yet Maxwell continues to delay resolution of this matter for no conceivable reason. At this point, it is readily apparent that Maxwell is not participating in this meet and confer in good faith and is instead focused on receipt of her compensation. It appears this conduct may be in retaliation recent submission in the bail proceedings pending before Judge Nathan as evidenced by her counsel's statement: "Your client has been vocal in asking that Ms. Maxwell be kept in custody, which of course makes it more difficult for her to communicate with her attorneys." See, e.g., id. at 4. + +thus requests (A) an order directing Maxwell to respond to our offer to provide a redacted General Release with a letter stating that we will not dispute its authenticity in exchange for her agreement to stipulate to a dismissal of this action with prejudice, with each party to bear its own fees and costs by no later than Monday, December 28, 2020; (B) a second conference with the Court; or (C) an order dismissing this action with prejudice, with each party to bear its own fees and costs) + +Respectfully submitted, + +/s/ Sigrid S. McCawlev + +Sigrid S. McCawley, Esq. + +cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF) + +I A proposed order consistent with the Court's guidance at the December 16, 2020, hearing is attached hereto. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778268/EFTA02778268.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778268/EFTA02778268.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c443e201ca855c35bbb4170d7d679567eeec687a --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778268/EFTA02778268.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778268", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "4e20cf8271939bc925882b3ebbc1d38539e4ab7ea73fbbc386da9c982ec3da70", + "output_sha256": "4e20cf8271939bc925882b3ebbc1d38539e4ab7ea73fbbc386da9c982ec3da70", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778270/EFTA02778270.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778270/EFTA02778270.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..20191cfdce74773ebab120ded9015ce6d912ba96 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778270/EFTA02778270.md @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +## VIA ECF + +The Honorable Debra Freeman Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007-1312 + +Sigrid S. McCawley Telephone: (954) 3774223 Email: smccawley@bsfllp.com + +December 23, 2020 + +Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell is hereby ORDERED to show cause, no later than 12/30/2020, why the Court should not enter a dismissal order in the form proposed by Plaintiff + +SO ORDERED + +Late DEBRA FREEMAN United States Magistrate Judge Dated: 12/28/2020 + +Re: v. Darren K. Indyke, Richard D. Kahn, & Ghislaine Maxwell 19-10475-LGS-DCF + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +On December 16, 2020, the parties appeared before the Court for a telephone conference on motion to dismiss this case pursuant to Rule 41. During that conference, we explained that after Maxwell refused to stipulate to dismissal, we offered to provide Maxwell with a redacted copy of the General Release that signed in connection with the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program. Maxwell's counsel stated that she was concerned about the authenticity of a redacted version of the General Release for use in future proceedings. Tr. of Dec. 16. 2020 Hearing at 8:21-23. In addition to clearly stating that the Court would not order to disclose the amount of compensation to Maxwell, the Court suggested that provide a redacted version of the General Release to Maxwell with a letter stating that neither she nor the Estate would contest the redacted General Release's authenticity. Id. at 10:16-21, 14:7- 8, 11-15. Both we and Maxwell's counsel agreed with that solution. Id. at 10:23-11:2, 12:19- 22. The Court stated that it would make itself available for another conference if necessary. Id. 15:19-20. + +The very next day, we asked Maxwell's counsel if, pursuant to the Court's suggestion, she would stipulate to dismissal of this action after receiving a copy of the executed General Release, with the compensation amount redacted, plus a letter signed by counsel for and the Estate stating that the document is authentic and that we would not dispute its authenticity. We also provided her with the verbatim language we proposed including in the letter. Exhibit A at 5- 6. Maxwell's counsel did not respond, so we emailed her again four days later asking her to provide us with an answer by the end of the day. Id. at 5. Maxwell's counsel repeatedly refused to provide us with a date or time on which she intended to speak to her client. Id. at 1-4. Maxwell's counsel also refused to confer with us, and then stopped responding to our emails altogether. Id. at 1-2. + +As Your Honor noted at the telephone conference, this should be a straightforward issue. is essentially seeking to dismiss her claims against Maxwell without asking for anything at all from Maxwell in return. We have offered several times to provide Maxwell with what she has demanded—a copy of the General Release that originally understood + +would remain confidential, with only the amount redacted—yet Maxwell continues to delay resolution of this matter for no conceivable reason. At this point, it is readily apparent that Maxwell is not participating in this meet and confer in good faith and is instead focused on receipt of her compensation. It appears this conduct may be in retaliation recent submission in the bail proceedings pending before Judge Nathan as evidenced by her counsel's statement: "Your client has been vocal in asking that Ms. Maxwell be kept in custody, which of course makes it more difficult for her to communicate with her attorneys." See, e.g., id. at 4. + +thus requests (A) an order directing Maxwell to respond to our offer to provide a redacted General Release with a letter stating that we will not dispute its authenticity in exchange for her agreement to stipulate to a dismissal of this action with prejudice, with each party to bear its own fees and costs by no later than Monday, December 28, 2020; (B) a second conference with the Court; or (C) an order dismissing this action with prejudice, with each party to bear its own fees and costs.' + +Respectfully submitted, + +LW Sigrid S. McCawlev + +Sigrid S. McCawley, Esq. + +cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF) + +I A proposed order consistent with the Court's guidance at the December 16, 2020, hearing is attached hereto. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778270/EFTA02778270.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778270/EFTA02778270.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0b1f027d2f274ec342944736f7157bb64b2bf786 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778270/EFTA02778270.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778270", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "498f1e8291b652044e450d46a339ba902bb57e1a270546e52b84fa2c6d204a7c", + "output_sha256": "498f1e8291b652044e450d46a339ba902bb57e1a270546e52b84fa2c6d204a7c", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778272/EFTA02778272.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778272/EFTA02778272.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a95151252cd773be7c2fe03e133fdc30028efcff --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778272/EFTA02778272.md @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +December 30, 2020 + +## VIA ECF + +The Honorable Debra Freeman United States Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, New York 10007 + +Haddon, and P.0 Laura A. Menninger + +150 East 10th Avenue Denver, Colorado 80203 NI 303.831.7364 FX 303.832.2628 www.hmflaw.conn Imenningerehmflaw.com + +Re: v. Indyke, a at, 19-cv-10475 (LGS-DCF) Response to December 28, 2020 Order (Doc. #107) + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +On behalf of Ghislaine Maxwell, I write in response to this Court's Order dated December 28, 2020, concerning plaintiffs proposed terms for dismissal with prejudice of this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). + +Plaintiff proposes to hide from the public, press and Ms. Maxwell — a woman she has publicly and repeatedly accused on Netflix, the New York Times, and multiple other news organizations of the heinous crime of sexual abuse — exactly how much money she stands to make from her untested, uncorroborated, and unfounded allegations. Just as non-disclosure agreements have recently come under scrutiny in the context of "silencing victims," likewise false accusers of sexual assault who receive money in exchange for their stories, publicly proclaiming they want only "justice" while they and their lawyers secretly rake in substantial sums of money, should not be able to hide their financial gains from public scrutiny. Neither this Court nor Ms. Maxwell had any role in structuring the Epstein payment program or its terms. Rule 41(a)(2) permits this Court to order just and proper conditions of any non-stipulated dismissal. The amount of money plaintiff obtains from the Epstein program is very much a matter of public interest and will go to the very core of plaintiff's credibility during the upcoming criminal trial. + +For these and other reasons explained below, this Court should either defer ruling on the issue of the terms of any Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal until full briefing on the matter, or should order plaintiff to disclose the unredacted signed and complete + +{sup}`&#`x27; See. e.g.. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman. "Hush Contracts Cornspt Everyone Who Signs Them" Thc Atlantic (Nov. 9.2019) (hops://www.theatlantic.comhdcas/archivc/2019/11/hushcontracts-corrupt-everyone-who-signs-them/601702/ + +copy of her release, including the amount of money she is making off of her story, as a condition of the dismissal. + +By way of background, plaintiff brought this lawsuit in November 2019, approximately twenty-four years after she claims that she was assaulted by Jeffrey Epstein and Ghislaine Maxwell. Earlier this year, defendants served plaintiff with discovery requests calling for the production of any corroborating evidence that the abuse as alleged in the Complaint had occurred in 1995 or 19%. In response, plaintiff produced certain pages from a diary dated in early 1996 which detailed, only, that Jeffrey Epstein had held her hand in a movie theater in late 1995 which made her feel uncomfortable. This same diary contained exactly zero references to Ghislaine Maxwell; contrary to the assertions in her Complaint, the diary contained no mention that Ghislaine Maxwell had contacted her mother and assured her that she could be trusted alone with Epstein, nor that she had been invited to New Mexico to spend time with Epstein and Maxwell, nor that she had gone to New Mexico, nor that she was ever touched in any way shape or form by Ms. Maxwell as she now claims, nor even that she was sexually touched (apart from the hand-holding) by Jeffrey Epstein. + +Plaintiff also was asked for any proof that she had been "threatened" by Ms. Maxwell or Jeffrey Epstein; she produced none. She had no phone records, no notes, no diaries, no emails, in the thousands of pages of her document productions (largely recycled from publicly available materials) that verified any contact from Ghislaine Maxwell, ever, let alone any threatening communications. Plaintiff is not on a single flight record of Jeffrey Epstein's private planes that were disclosed by her lawyers. Plaintiff likewise identified no evidence that she — who holds a Ph.D. in Counseling Psychology — had been somehow "prevented" over the course of twenty-four years from reporting her claims to any legal authorities. + +The only "police report" plaintiff produced was from her sister, from 1996, after she claims she learned of plaintiff's allegations of abuse, and it mentions neither Ghislaine Maxwell nor plaintiff at all. The police report also does not contain any reference to any sexual or improper contact. Rather, police report — touted by the Farmers in the press as a corroboration of their claims — reflects her allegation that Jeffrey Epstein threatened sometime in the summer of 1996 to burn her artwork for unspecified reasons. It is silent as to Ghislaine Maxwell, to plaintiff (from whom she claims she was then aware had been "sexually assaulted"), and to anything related to sex, or sexual contact, or inappropriate behavior. + +Against the backdrop of this dearth of evidence, Ms. Maxwell moved in May 2020 to dismiss the claims. Plaintiff, on the other hand, pressed to take Ms. Maxwell's deposition. What was a clear possibility in the spring of 2020 became crystal-clear on July 2: plaintiff was working during the pendency of this lawsuit + +with the Southern District of New York's U.S. Attorney's Office to try to circumvent Ms. Maxwell's Fifth Amendment rights in advance of the June 29, 2020 indictment. Plaintiff was then an undisclosed prosecution witness. Indeed, her counsel, Mr. Boies, went so far as to tell this Court that Ms. Maxwell was the one who should be explaining the status of the ongoing criminal investigation when he knew all along from the USAO exactly what the status was and his client's participation in it. + +Following the July 2 unsealing of the indictment, plaintiff publicly selfidentified as one of the accusers mentioned in that indictment. She no doubt will be a government witness at the criminal trial scheduled for July 2020. No court or jury has considered plaintiff's claims or weighed the evidence concerning her allegations. Plaintiff has never been deposed nor participated in any in-court testimony. She has never been cross-examined. Certainly, the Epstein claims program does not have any mechanism to challenge plaintiff's false assertions against Ms. Maxwell, nor is there even a procedure by which the claims administrator can consider contrary evidence. The fact that plaintiff seeks, money from the Estate and from Ms. Maxwell, in the millions of dollars, at the same time she is a government witness in an upcoming criminal trial on the same topic is reason enough to suspect that her newly asserted memories of abuse — without corroboration — are not based on the truth or a desire for "justice" so much as her desire for cash. To be clear, Ms. Maxwell adamantly denies plaintiff's allegations. + +Now, plaintiff who voluntarily instituted this civil lawsuit wants to dismiss it with each party to bear their own fees and costs. She wants Ms. Maxwell — and the public and press — to be kept in the dark as to the amount of money she is being paid in exchange for her fabrications as to Ms. Maxwell. She says she participated in the Epstein claims program. Ms. Maxwell, unlike the Estate, has not been given a copy of anything that plaintiff submitted to the claims program. She does not know whether plaintiff made up new allegations against her, whether she changed her story again, nor what "evidence" she alleges support her claims. Likewise, she does not know how much money the claims program offered to pay her. Certainly, the amount of money that plaintiff has been offered by the Estate in exchange for her un-tested story will be an issue in the upcoming criminal trial when plaintiff takes the stand, for the first time, and faces cross-examination. It is unusual, to say the least, that the government is standing by while its star trial witness is receiving money based on her untested stories in advance of her criminal testimony. The motive for fabrication could not be clearer. + +This Court held a hearing on December 16, 2020, on plaintiffs request to dismiss this action pursuant to Rule 41(aX2). Ms. Maxwell requested that she be provided a copy of the unredacted and signed release, including the amount of compensation that plaintiff is set to receive based on her false story against Ms. Maxwell. She also requested that she not be prejudiced in her current lawsuit against the Estate for indemnification for legal fees. This Court indicated during that call that + +it would not order plaintiff to provide an unredacted copy, rather that it would likely order dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) with a redacted copy, together with an assurance of the document's authenticity. + +Thereafter, the parties began their discussions to determine whether they could resolve their differences and stipulate to a dismissal. Plaintiff demanded that the negotiations take place over the course of a few days, never explaining the need for the speed and certainly without regard to any of the other significant limitations on undersigned counsel's ability to confer with her counsel. Plaintiff's December 21 letter provides an incomplete narrative of counsels' subsequent correspondence. On the same day as the Court conference, as plaintiff is well-aware based on her work with the US Attorney's Office, the government filed its 40-page response to Ms. Maxwell's renewed application for bail in 20-cr-330 (AJN). Ms. Maxwell had 48 hours to work with her counsel to prepare a 10-page reply. That reply was filed late on December 18. She was not able then to confer with undersigned counsel to discuss the December 16 court conference in this case nor plaintiff's proposed stipulation language. Ms. Maxwell is not provided calls to counsel over the weekends. On Monday, December 21, plaintiff's counsel began giving false deadlines — threatening to call the Court if they did not receive an answer by 5:00 p.m. that same day to their proposal. Defense counsel truthfully responded that she did not then know when she would be able to confer with her client. Plaintiff's counsel also inappropriately demanded to know when undersigned would be able to speak with Ms. Maxwell on the topic of this case's settlement. These demands are inappropriate because, as the Court is aware, Ms. Maxwell has numerous ongoing legal matters and it is frankly none of plaintiff's counsel's prerogative to demand that counsel speak to her client on a particular day on a particular matter. In addition to the renewed bail application, Ms. Maxwell also is actively in the process of reviewing — and discussing — over two million pages of criminal discovery in preparation for the upcoming January 11, 2021, motions deadline in her criminal case. Much of that discovery was only produced at the end of November. The pressure on her counsel and her to review and discuss — under very onerous conditions at the MDC — all of this discovery and the motions is significant. + +At the same time that plaintiff demanded immediate same-day answers to a stipulated dismissal, when she waited twenty-four years to bring a lawsuit, Ms. Maxwell also received similar correspondence from the plaintiff in Indyke v. Epstein, a al., 20-cv-484 (JGK-DCF). On December 21, plaintiff in that case sought a dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) for substantially the same reasons as plaintiff in this case — a desire to get her money faster — and was opposed by undersigned counsel for the same reasons as in this case — an inability to immediately speak to the incarcerated Ms. Maxwell concerning the terms of such dismissal. Last Wednesday, December 22, Judge Koeltl held a status conference concerning the Doe dismissal request. Coincidentally the conference was held at the exact time that undersigned counsel could have been speaking with her client but was not able to do + +so given the hearing. Judge Koehl urged the parties to try to resolve the language of a stipulated dismissal and said, in the absence of any such stipulation, he would take motions from the parties on a Rule 41(a)(2) motion by January 15, 2021. Ms. Maxwell was not given legal calls from December 24 through December 28 due to the holidays. She likewise is not being afforded communications with counsel from December 30 through January 2. + +Plaintiff offered to counsel, and to this Court, no reason whatsoever that she cannot wait an extra week or so for Ms. Maxwell to be able to discuss the stipulated dismissal with her client. While plaintiff's counsel may want to know exactly when Ms. Maxwell is speaking to her lawyer on this case, that information is frankly subject to attorney-client privilege and impedes Ms. Maxwell's right to counsel in her criminal case because it necessarily communicates when she is consulting with her counsel on this matter versus her criminal matter. Non-incarcerated defendants are not subject to disclosure of that information and plaintiff has offered no legal support for her demands to counsel or this Court to know that information here. + +Plaintiff also fails to articulate any ground for her baseless assertion that defense counsel's inability to get back to her with a date and time certain when she will be able to speak to her client on this topic is somehow "retaliation" for plaintiff's bail application submission. Counsel pointed to the bail application to illustrate that, as plaintiff's counsel is well-aware, Ms. Maxwell is in custody and not at liberty to discuss her case with her counsel at all hours of the day and night and also that she had more pressing matters to contend with following the December 16 court conference in this case. + +Ms. Maxwell respectfully requests that this Court, as Judge Koeltl has done, defer any ruling on a Rule 41(a)(2) motion until after January 15, 2020, with full briefing on the issue. Ms. Maxwell's criminal motions are due on January 11, 2021. The government has produced more than 2 million pages of discovery, with approximately 1.5 million of those pages produced after November 23, 2020. The additional two weeks from today will permit Ms. Maxwell to focus on the very pressing discovery and motions issues in her criminal case, and also permit her counsel to adequately confer with her on this civil dismissal in a reasonable amount of time. In the absence of full briefing and a small delay (given the 24 years that plaintiff deferred bringing this lawsuit), Ms. Maxwell respectfully requests that the Court: + +- I. Strike from plaintiff's proposed order any reference to each party to bear its own costs and attorneys' fees, given Ms. Maxwell's expenditure of substantial sums of money to defend against plaintiff's baseless and uncorroborated claims; and + +2. Require that plaintiff disclose the substantial sum of money that she expects to receive from the Epstein program in exchange for her uncorroborated and un-substantiated story that encompasses Ms. Maxwell. + +Respectfully Submitted, + +c Laura A. Menninger + +CC: Counsel of Record via ECF \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778272/EFTA02778272.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778272/EFTA02778272.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fba302ccf15a3cd3c4828f8a4452c353a9c198d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778272/EFTA02778272.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -4, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778272", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "ab56289b63afe2a0bcfcd453a80d332933ecf6c67185f81e89e53970f517a5e1", + "output_sha256": "4fb5b7ecdba4a5004e26664088fbdfd5f72794b2b4645a6b269cd449cfff4dd2", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778278/EFTA02778278.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778278/EFTA02778278.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..25d898c34ae14925fc06f2c6cfdf09e9c8929a89 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778278/EFTA02778278.md @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +Sigrid S. McCawley Telephone: (954) 3774223 Email: smccawley@bsfllp.com + +December 31, 2020 + +## VIA ECF + +The Honorable Debra Freeman Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007-1312 + +> Re: v. Darren K. hulyke, Richard D. Kahn, & Ghislaine Maxwell 19-10475-1,GS-DCF + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +Plaintiff writes to respond to Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell's response to this Court's Order to Show Cause. ECF No. 108. Maxwell's response fails to show good cause iwg s Court should allow her to further delay dismissing this action, which is necessary for. to complete her participation in the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program. The Court should enter the form of order that Plaintiff proposed forthwith. See ECF No. 106-2. Because the issue before the Court—whether to dismiss this case with prejudice, with each party to bear its own costs—is straightforward, response to Maxwell's will be brief. + +Maxwell's counsel appears to have forgotten that the Court has already held a conference on motion to voluntarily dismiss this case. During that conference, Maxwell's counsel agreed to the solution the Court proposed: that provide Maxwell a copy of the executed General Release with the compensation amount redacted, plus a letter stating that the General Release is authentic. We proposed that same exact solution to Maxwell's counsel the next day. Maxwell's counsel then stonewalled us and refused to provide an estimated time at which she would be able to discuss resolution with her client. See ECF No. 106-1. + +Instead of trying to amicably resolve this matter with as the Court ordered her to, Maxwell, who has been complaining about increased media attention on her for years, submitted a vicious, victim-blaming letter attacking and raising numerous new arguments that she did not raise before the Court at the conference, in her prior filings on this issue, or with us during our meet and confers. will not respond to Maxwell's meritless challenges to the merits of her case, to her credibility, or to her entirely appropriate participation in Maxwell's prosecution—those issues are not relevant to the issue before the Court. simply states that she stands by the allegations in her Complaint and any statements she made in related proceedings, and she intends to testify truthfully if called in any future proceedings. The Court should not entertain any of Maxwell's new arguments, and any additional briefing on this issue would be frivolous.' + +As explained in November 17, 2020, letter, Judge Schofield discouraged Maxwell from filing a motion to dismiss, and there is no scenario in which Maxwell would be able + +Maxwell also challenges the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program for compensating for "untested" alle ations, but this argument too merits little response. Maxwell is not the one compensating and she should have no opinion on why is being compensated by the Estate. In fact, Maxwell should be uite leased that she is escaping civil liability in this case without having to pay a dime to , as this Court recognized at the conference. + +has been trying to dismiss this case since October 14, when she asked the defendants to stipulate to dismissal, and Maxwell has delayed for no legitimate reason without providing any deadline whatsoever for responding. Maxwell's counsel blames her delay on Maxwell's incarceration—which Judge Nathan recently ruled continues to be appropriate in light of Maxwell's lack of candor with the court (20-cr-330, ECF No. 106)—and other ongoing legal matters. This excuse is absurd and misleading. First, Maxwell's counsel admits that she had the opportunity to have legal calls on December 29, which is after this Court issued its Order to Show Cause. ECF No. 108 at 5 (explaining that Maxwell cannot have legal calls from December 24 through December 28 and December 30 through January 2). And she does not explain how the holidays impeded her from speaking to Maxwell after we provided her with a proposal for resolving this issue on December 17, more than a full week before Christmas. Second, Maxwell's counsel clearly had guidance from her client in order to write her December 30 letter itself, so her suggestion that she has been unable to discuss resolution with her client is nonsensical. Finally, the notion that Maxwell needs to review 2 million pages of discovery before she can take 5 minutes to discuss this very straightforward issue should not be credited, and is a violation of this Court's Order to Show Cause that directed her to discuss the issue with her client by December 30. + +To be clear, there is no need to wait indefinitely for Maxwell's consent before dismissing this matter. The Court should consider this issue fully briefed and has the authority to dismiss the case under the framework outlined at the conference with the parties, using the proposed order submitted by M=. ECF No. 106-2. We respectfully request that the Court do so. + +Respectfully submitted, + +Is/ Sigrid S. McCawley + +Sigrid S. McCawley, Esq. + +cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF) + +to obtain fees and costs from if this case is dismissed with prejudice. ECF No. 97 at 2; Colombrito v. Kelly, 764 F2d 122, 133-34 (2d Cir. 1985) ("attorney's fees have almost never been awarded" when a lawsuit is voluntarily dismissed with prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2)."). Nor is there any legal support for Maxwell's position that she is entitled to learn the amount of IN compensation in connection with a program that did not involve Maxwell at all and to which Maxwell is not contributing a cent. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778278/EFTA02778278.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778278/EFTA02778278.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..347be8f34df03ae7d0551bdd15745aec0150ae10 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778278/EFTA02778278.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778278", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "1fc6030fcc2d53acb63557a658acfc3b04213f8b270bb525917c300268475774", + "output_sha256": "1fc6030fcc2d53acb63557a658acfc3b04213f8b270bb525917c300268475774", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778280/EFTA02778280.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778280/EFTA02778280.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3f7f19e43d0f7276089b0125a50dd2af13ac5953 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778280/EFTA02778280.md @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +## VIA ECF + +The Honorable Debra Freeman Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007-1312 + +> Re: v. Darren K. Indyke, Richard D. Kahn, & Ghislaine Maxwell 19-10.475-1,(1S-DCF + +Sigrid S. McCawley Telephone: (954) 377-4223 Email: smccawley@bsfIlp.com + +The referral of Plaintiff's pre-motion letter at Dkt. No. 97 to Judge Freeman for a Report and Recommendation (Dkt. No. 100) is CLOSED. A motion conference will be held on January 14, 2021, at 10:40 a.m. to discuss Defendant's December 30, 2020, letter at Docket No. 108, and Plaintiffs December 31, 2020, responsive letter at Docket No. 109. The conference will be telephonic and will occur on the following conference line: 888-363-4749, access code: 5583333. The time of the conference is approximate, but the parties shall be prepared to being at the scheduled time. + +So Ordered. Dated: January 11, 2021 New York, New York + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +G. OA UNITED STATES DIST1UCT JUDGE + +Plaintiff writes to respond to Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell's response to this Court's Order to Show Cause. ECF No. 108. Maxwell's response fails to show good cause iwg s Court should allow her to further delay dismissing this action, which is necessary for. to complete her participation in the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program. The Court should enter the form of order that Plaintiff proposed forthwith. See ECF No. 106-2. Because the issue before the Court—whether to dismiss this case with prejudice, with each party to bear its own costs—is straightforward, response to Maxwell's will be brief. + +Maxwell's counsel appears to have forgotten that the Court has already held a conference on motion to voluntarily dismiss this case. During that conference, Maxwell's counsel agreed to the solution the Court proposed: that provide Maxwell a copy of the executed General Release with the compensation amount redacted, plus a letter stating that the General Release is authentic. We proposed that same exact solution to Maxwell's counsel the next day. Maxwell's counsel then stonewalled us and refused to provide an estimated time at which she would be able to discuss resolution with her client. See ECF No. 106-1. + +Instead of trying to amicably resolve this matter with as the Court ordered her to, Maxwell, who has been complaining about increased media attention on her for years, submitted a vicious, victim-blaming letter attacking and raising numerous new arguments that she did not raise before the Court at the conference, in her prior filings on this issue, or with us during our meet and confers. will not respond to Maxwell's meritless challenges to the merits of her case, to her credibility, or to her entirely appropriate participation in Maxwell's prosecution—those issues are not relevant to the issue before the Court. simply states that she stands by the allegations in her Complaint and any statements she made in related proceedings, and she intends to testify truthfully if called in any future proceedings. The Court should not entertain any of Maxwell's new arguments, and any additional briefing on this issue would be frivolous.' + +As explained in November 17, 2020, letter, Judge Schofield discouraged Maxwell from filing a motion to dismiss, and there is no scenario in which Maxwell would be able + +Maxwell also challenges the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program for compensating [REDACTED] for "untested" allegations, but this argument too merits little response. Maxwell is not the one compensating [REDACTED], and she should have no opinion on why [REDACTED] is being compensated by the Estate. In fact, Maxwell should be quite pleased that she is escaping civil liability in this case without having to pay a dime to [REDACTED], as this Court recognized at the conference. + +[REDACTED] has been trying to dismiss this case since October 14, when she asked the defendants to stipulate to dismissal, and Maxwell has delayed for no legitimate reason without providing any deadline whatsoever for responding. Maxwell's counsel blames her delay on Maxwell's incarceration—which Judge Nathan recently ruled continues to be appropriate in light of Maxwell's lack of candor with the court (20-cr-330, ECF No. 106)—and other ongoing legal matters. This excuse is absurd and misleading. First, Maxwell's counsel admits that she had the opportunity to have legal calls on December 29, which is after this Court issued its Order to Show Cause. ECF No. 108 at 5 (explaining that Maxwell cannot have legal calls from December 24 through December 28 and December 30 through January 2). And she does not explain how the holidays impeded her from speaking to Maxwell after we provided her with a proposal for resolving this issue on December 17, more than a full week before Christmas. Second, Maxwell's counsel clearly had guidance from her client in order to write her December 30 letter itself, so her suggestion that she has been unable to discuss resolution with her client is nonsensical. Finally, the notion that Maxwell needs to review 2 million pages of discovery before she can take 5 minutes to discuss this very straightforward issue should not be credited, and is a violation of this Court's Order to Show Cause that directed her to discuss the issue with her client by December 30. + +To be clear, there is no need to wait indefinitely for Maxwell's consent before dismissing this matter. The Court should consider this issue fully briefed and has the authority to dismiss the case under the framework outlined at the conference with the parties, using the proposed order submitted by [REDACTED]. ECF No. 106-2. We respectfully request that the Court do so. + +Respectfully submitted, + +*/s/ Sigrid S. McCawley* + +Sigrid S. McCawley, Esq. + +cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF) + +\_\_\_\_\_ +to obtain fees and costs from [REDACTED] if this case is dismissed *with prejudice*. ECF No. 97 at 2; *Colombrito v. Kelly*, 764 F2d 122, 133-34 (2d Cir. 1985) ("attorney's fees have almost never been awarded" when a lawsuit is voluntarily dismissed with prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2)."). Nor is there any legal support for Maxwell's position that she is entitled to learn the amount of [REDACTED] compensation in connection with a program that did not involve Maxwell at all and to which Maxwell is not contributing a cent. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778280/EFTA02778280.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778280/EFTA02778280.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..09cf14d49fa4236282a938a88dcbb969adb4d83e --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778280/EFTA02778280.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778280", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "0210ab5aaab8903339bf7fea9420ef05902ba4e59da6feee373c0eb267d6f408", + "output_sha256": "0210ab5aaab8903339bf7fea9420ef05902ba4e59da6feee373c0eb267d6f408", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778282/EFTA02778282.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778282/EFTA02778282.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f30d2551ed7db7d967bc72a545d378d6f74b36d9 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778282/EFTA02778282.md @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +X Plaintiff, : 19 Civ. 10475 (LGS) -against- ORDER DARREN K. INDYKE, et al., Defendants. : X + +LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, District Judge: + +WHEREAS, on January 14, 2021, a pre-motion conference was held to discuss Plaintiffs anticipated motion to dismiss this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 (see Dkt. Nos. 97, 99, 103, 106, 108 and 109). For the reasons stated during the conference, it is hereby + +ORDERED, that by January 21, 2021, Plaintiff shall file any motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2), and Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell shall file any opposition to Plaintiff's motion. Both the motion and opposition shall be in letter form and shall not exceed 6 pages. Not included in the page limit are any attachments. + +Dated: January 14, 2021 New York, New York + +UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778282/EFTA02778282.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778282/EFTA02778282.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9f631413e4fb09abb168fed0f005c60abf376943 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778282/EFTA02778282.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778282", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "352e0b76397414141efe2f39b326eefa8ba5bededa78f7275774040c11258dc8", + "output_sha256": "352e0b76397414141efe2f39b326eefa8ba5bededa78f7275774040c11258dc8", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778283/EFTA02778283.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778283/EFTA02778283.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2af0dc8653d0ca4a330d3b709250c9f1686333c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778283/EFTA02778283.md @@ -0,0 +1,303 @@ +UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK x + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE, RICHARD D. KAHN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, + +Defendants. + +Before: + +x + +19 Civ. 10475 (LGS) + +Premotion Conference (Via Teleconference) + +January 14, 2021 10:39 a.m. + +HON. LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, + +District Judge + +## APPEARANCES + +BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP + +Attorneys for Plaintiff + +BY: SIGRID S. McCAWLEY, ESQ. ANDREW VILLACASTIN, ESQ. + +TROUTMAN PEPPER SANDERS LLP Attorneys for Defendants Indyke, Kahn BY: BENNET J. MOSKOWITZ, ESQ. + +HADDON, AND P.C. Attorneys for Defendant Maxwell BY: LAURA A. MENNINGER, ESQ. + +4 5 THE DEPUTY CLERK: Before we begin, I'd like to remind the parties and the press that recording or rebroadcasting of this proceeding is prohibited. Violation of this prohibition may result in sanctions. + +6 7 8 Counsel's appearances have been noted for the record. I'm just going to ask counsel to state your name before you speak each time you speak, as we have a court reporter present. + +9 We're here before the Honorable Lorna G. Schofield. + +10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 THE COURT: So good morning again, everyone. Before we get started, I wanted to make full disclosure. I'm not sure if I did this on the one other occasion we met. Looking at the docket, I realized that one of the plaintiff's lawyers is a former law clerk of mine, Mr. Villacastin. He clerked for me for a year beginning in the fall of 2015. We're still in touch, as is the case with many of my former law clerks. His appearance, as you know, is as one of several lawyers from the Boies Schiller firm, which is representing plaintiff, and his appearance here is not grounds for recusal and also will not affect my adjudication of the case. I would also note that I understand Ms. McCawley is speaking today on behalf of plaintiff. + +23 24 25 So I wanted to turn to the possible motion here. The way this started out is that plaintiff seeks to dismiss the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), + +(Case called) + +4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 And so I'll hear from the parties in just a moment, but what I would like to observe is that it seems to me that dismissal under that provision is probably not appropriate because there is no agreement between the parties to dismiss, and it may be more appropriate for us to proceed construing this as plaintiff's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2), the other subsection, which is pursuant to a court order. And so let me hear from Ms. Maxwell. I understand the plaintiff simply wants to be able to execute on and collect on the settlement with the Epstein estate, and she can't do that until this case, I gather, is dismissed. But you can correct me if I'm wrong after I hear from Ms. Maxwell. So counsel? Ms. Menninger? + +17 MS. MENNINGER: Good morning, your Honor. + +18 THE COURT: Good morning. + +19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MS. MENNINGER: I think that's correct, your Honor. We have not been able to reach an agreement to stipulate to a dismissal. And so I think at this point it appears that plaintiff would be intending to move under 41(a)(2) for dismissal by court order. Pursuant to that provision, it is up to the Court to order dismissal on any terms that the Court considers proper or just, and we have set forth the terms that + +meaning pursuant to stipulation. But Ms. Maxwell does not consent absent certain conditions, which, as I understand it, the plaintiff refuses. + +4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 we think, if a motion under Rule 41(a)(2) is brought or an order by the Court is entered, should include striking the portion where each party should bear its own costs and fees and also requiring that plaintiff disclose to Ms. Maxwell, as she and the estate defendants all have, a copy of her signed release, unredacted, authentic, for use in any future court proceedings. Those are the terms that we submit would be just and proper, as we were unable to find any precedent for refusing to provide a release to the purportedly released party. And we think the -- Ms. Maxwell has been forced not only to pay for her own fees and costs in this case, which included, I might add, discovery that plaintiff pressed to occur early on in the case -- responses to document requests, interrogatories and the like -- but she also filed a motion to dismiss, as your Honor is aware. So unless we're able to reach a stipulated dismissal, we think an order by this Court under 41(a)(2) should include both of those provisions. + +18 19 We are prepared to submit full briefing on this topic, your Honor. + +20 21 22 23 24 25 I did bring to the Court's attention in my December 23rd letter, I think it was -- sorry, December 30th letter -- that we had a similar proceeding in front of Judge Koeltl recently. He asked the parties to go back and try to reach a stipulation. I don't know yet whether we will be able to do so in that case, but in the absence of such a + +4 THE COURT: Could I just interrupt you for a second. There are a couple things I wanted to follow up on + +5 MS. MENNINGER: Sure. + +6 7 THE COURT: -- and I don't want to get too far in our discussion before I ask you about them. + +8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 First of all, it seems to me a little bit of a moving target as to what you're actually asking for. First, in your original request, you asked that you be provided with a copy of the signed and executed release, and as I understand it, the plaintiff had agreed to provide that but simply with the dollar amount of the settlement redacted. And what I understood from the discussion at great length in your letter is that that was unacceptable because what you were very much interested in was the dollar amount, and it wasn't just a matter of having an authentic release because, as Judge Freeman pointed out, you could simply put the release language in another document, have that signed, and you would have an authentic ink copy, if necessary, of the release. So it seems to me that what you're really trying to get at is the dollar amount here. I understand why you might be interested in that, particularly for the criminal action, but I'm not sure why it's appropriate to hold up the settlement here to serve an interest in another case. So do you want to address that first. + +stipulation, he's asking for briefing from the parties to commence on January 15th. I also had requested + +MS. MENNINGER: Certainly, your Honor. I think it has been plaintiff herself who has long taken the position that 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 everything related to her and this case is a matter of public interest. And I think there has not been sufficient justification for keeping the amount of the settlement secret when she's the one who has, for example, gone on Netflix and to The New York Times, etc., with her story, and then now is asking to keep the fact that she's receiving sums of money -- I don't know the amount, but I imagine substantial sums of money from the estate secret from the public. + +11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 So yes, your Honor, you are correct that at the outset we would have agreed to a stipulated dismissal with just the executed, unredacted, signed release, but if we're not able to reach that as a matter of agreement, then it's our position, in asking this Court under Rule 41(a)(2) for terms, that the amount should be public and should be available not just to Ms. Maxwell, who's the purportedly released party, but also to the press, who has shown great interest in plaintiff's story. + +19 20 THE COURT: Okay. So I understand your position there. + +21 22 23 24 25 The other issue or matter that was a condition is you wanted to strike the provision that said that each party would bear its own costs and fees, and as I understand it, the counsel for the estate as well as counsel for plaintiff in this case had agreed to certain language preserving your ability to + +4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 MS. MENNINGER: Your Honor, again, we would have signed a stipulated dismissal with that language in exchange for the other terms that we were seeking. It is, as a practical matter, more likely that if your Honor orders dismissal under 41(a)(2) that we will pursue simply our indemnification request that is the subject of a, you know, lawsuit that has been filed in the Virgin Islands from the estate. But plaintiff is asking us to agree not to seek fees and costs against her, and we are not in agreement to do that. If the Court orders it, then the Court orders it. But it seems to me that to the extent there are perhaps somewhat limited avenues for seeking fees and costs from plaintiff herself for choosing to bring this lawsuit against Ms. Maxwell, we don't see a reason why we should be precluded from doing so. + +18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE COURT: Well, so let me just preface that by saying that I think your legal position is not as strong as the very substantial demands you are making suggest. I'm not prejudging this, but I did take a look at the applicable law last night, and I did see that courts have generally subjected motions for voluntary dismissal, with prejudice, to far less scrutiny than motions for voluntary dismissal without prejudice, and the reason is obvious, and that is that the case + +seek indemnification from Mr. Indyke and Richard Kahn, who are the executors of the Epstein estate, and so it strikes me that that is no longer an issue; is that correct? + +4 + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +will go away with finality and cannot be alleged, or the same claims cannot be brought in some other court, and so for that reason, there simply isn't as in-depth an inquiry as you might have when the dismissal is without prejudice. + +Furthermore, it seems to me that under the law, the question is, here, if it were simply a motion for a court order dismissing the case coming from the plaintiff, the question would be, what is the prejudice to the defendant from the dismissal of the case, and what we're talking about here is legal prejudice. So my question to you, Ms. Menninger, is: What is the legal prejudice your client suffers that flows from the dismissal of this case? + +MS. MENNINGER: One, your Honor, she's had to expend fees and costs to get to this point, and some of it was in what we believe were frivolously opposed motions -- for example, our original motion to stay discovery. And we think that, you know, her having to incur tens of thousands of dollars to defend herself against this is prejudicial, and for her to be asked to bear those costs and not obtain any relief at the conclusion of the case is one. + +Secondly, and with all candor, it precludes us from taking discovery from plaintiff, and so we would otherwise, in a civil suit, have the ability to clear Ms. Maxwell's name in this civil suit by confirming what we already suspect, which is that plaintiff does not have information concerning Ms. Maxwell + +4 5 6 7 8 THE COURT: Well, I guess my reaction to that is that having to incur expenses in litigation is the way the American system works, and it's only in the exceptional case when there is explicit authorization for fee shifting that that is not the case. + +9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 And then with respect to discovery, discovery is supposed to be in aid of claims, and there's no right to discovery if there are no claims. So I guess I'm not persuaded, but I know I in some way put you on the spot by asking you this question, so here's the way I would like to proceed. What I would like is, I would like -- well, first, maybe I should hear from the plaintiff, because I haven't given you a chance to say anything at all. + +17 So Ms. McCawley, could I hear from you, please. + +18 MS. McCAWLEY: Yes, your Honor. + +19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Just to highlight a few points that you raised to make sure that the procedural background is well known, and that is, obviously, you know, we initiated this case, and we were referred by you to Magistrate Freeman, and there has been significant letter practice, as you've seen, in front of her, as well as a very fulsome hearing, at which time Maxwell said that the two items that she needed was the authentication, a + +to back up her claims and she would be vindicated at the conclusion of that civil case with, you know, a public airing of false claims against her. + +4 5 statement from us authenticating the document, and then the agreement, the release, which Judge Freeman had said we would be allowed to redact that amount. When we tried to follow up with both of those things, that didn't happen, and then she issued her order to show cause, which now brings us here. + +6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 So just to highlight a couple other points, Ms. Maxwell has raised the issue of fees and costs. As your Honor well cited, the Colombrito v. Kelly case, which is the Second Circuit case, makes very clear that under the rule of dismissal with prejudice, that attorney's fees are almost "never awarded" in that instance. As well, Ms. Maxwell has the protection of seeking indemnification for her fees and costs from the estate, and in the proposed order that we submitted to Judge Freeman, it sets forth that agreement that the estate agreed to where that issue is still left open, and Ms. Maxwell has that means to seek that, as well as the stipulation with respect to us providing the general release with only the amount redacted and the authentication of that release, which we agreed to. + +20 21 22 23 24 So your Honor, I don't see an issue for this being held up any further. We sought this dismissal back on October 14th, initially, and we're now in January, and we would hope that the Court would allow us to move this forward to conclusion. Thank you. + +25 THE COURT: Okay. So let me just make one comment + +4 + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +about a motion would you know Second Circuit under Rule 41(a)(2). And you may know this, or it, and that is that there's a relatively recent case that says that basically the Court rules on the terms of dismissal as presented and doesn't have the authority to force the parties to accept other terms, that the Court could simply accept it and grant the it. Of course, in denying it, I could say XY reason and therefore, if you change it, dismissal or deny I'm denying it for I would grant it. But I don't have the power to simply impose conditions. + +I would also say that if your latest offer, as you just described it, is what you would propose as the terms of dismissal, I suggest you just make that very clear and attach copies of anything that you would be proposing to your motion. + +I am aware that this has been held up for some time, so what I would like to do is I will take simultaneous letters from the parties in five days, and that is plaintiff's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2), in other words, pursuant to court order, not pursuant to stipulation. I think that everybody knows what the issues are. So I would look to hearing from Ms. Maxwell's counsel what the legal prejudice is that would be suffered, with case citations as to why that's appropriate, and I would also appreciate, of course, case law citations from the party seeking dismissal. So let's do that. I'll issue an order today that makes clear what I'm asking for, but I think it's relatively clear now. + +And if there's nothing else, I think we're finished. Is there anything else from Ms. Maxwell? + +MS. MENNINGER: No. Thank you, your Honor. It's clear. + +I + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +THE COURT: Okay. And anything else from + +II. McCAWLEY: No. appreciate it. Thank you, your Honor. We + +THE COURT: Okay. adjourned. Thank you, counsel. This matter is + +oOo \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778283/EFTA02778283.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778283/EFTA02778283.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..79af4f442e85adef6b3fde9d4286ce6c8419c2ac --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778283/EFTA02778283.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778283", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "7c99aac7e6e9b3e3df4f59259af8dbf538b9d5b5702c8d38cf0ec8bef0520b23", + "output_sha256": "7c99aac7e6e9b3e3df4f59259af8dbf538b9d5b5702c8d38cf0ec8bef0520b23", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778295/EFTA02778295.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778295/EFTA02778295.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..aa403390fb7c080bf3b75274adfbc9ad22797c45 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778295/EFTA02778295.md @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +USA / Plaintiff(s) + +V. + +case No.: 19 Civ. 10475 + +DARREN K. INDYKE. RICHARD D. KAHN. GHISLAINE MAXWELL. + +Defendant(s) + +## NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL IR \\SCRIPT + +Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a conference held on 1 /14/21 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above-captioned matter. + +Redaction responsibilities apply to the attorneys of record or pro se parties, even if the person requesting the transcript is a judge or a member of the public or media. + +The parties have seven (7) calendar days from the date of filing of this NOTICE to file with the court any NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION of this transcript. A copy of said NOTICE must also be served on the court reporter. If no such NOTICE is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after ninety (90) calendar days. + +This process may only be used to redact the following personal data identifiers: Social Security numbers; dates of birth; minors' names; and financial account numbers. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2, and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 49.1. Parties wishing to request redaction of other information may proceed by motion. + +I (we) certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the aboveentitled matter. + +SELLIN + +( 'OuI t Reporter/Transcriber Date \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778295/EFTA02778295.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778295/EFTA02778295.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8e3d25c26570d623d8354e6b5c94bfbf64f6d868 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778295/EFTA02778295.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778295", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "617a9bea56724d246593be55863feb8aa78a65e5f4f48073e51b63baaf0e5f1b", + "output_sha256": "617a9bea56724d246593be55863feb8aa78a65e5f4f48073e51b63baaf0e5f1b", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778296/EFTA02778296.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778296/EFTA02778296.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..94e87ce00ebc8ab35a2fd685b44c34a10b22ae0a --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778296/EFTA02778296.md @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +January 21, 2021 + +VIA ECF + +Hon. Loma G. Schofield United States District Judge Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse 40 Foley Square New York, New York 10007 + +> Re: 19-cv- 10475 (LGS-DCF), v. Darren K Indyke, et aL + +Dear Judge Schofield: + +Haddon. and IIMM, P.0 Laura A. MeanInger + +ISO East 10th Avenue Denver. Colorado 80203 PH 303.831.7364 rx 303.832.2628 www.hmflaw.com Imenningerathmflaw.com + +On behalf of Ghislaine Maxwell, I write pursuant to this Court's Order of January 14, 2021 (Doc. # III), directing Plaintiff "to file any motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2)" and Ms. Maxwell to simultaneously "file any opposition to Plaintiff's motion." Ms. Maxwell assumes that Plaintiff will propose same Proposed Order she submitted to Magistrate Judge Freeman on December 23, 2020. See Doc. # 106-2. Ms. Maxwell respectfully submits that this Court legally may -- and should -- impose two modifications to Plaintiff's Proposed Order of dismissal: + +- I) removal of the language of "with each party to bear its own attorneys' fees and costs," and +- 2) removal of the phrase "with the compensation amount redacted" from the provision concerning the General Release to be shared with Ms. Maxwell. + +Both conditions are necessary "terms" that are "proper" within the meaning of Rule 41(a)(2). + +## I. The Court May Impose the Requested Condition, which Plaintiff May Choose to Accept or Reject + +Rule 41(a)(2) specifically permits a court to dismiss a claim "on terms that the court considers proper." Pursuant to Second Circuit precedent, this provision authorizes the Court to impose any conditions it deems "proper" provided that the plaintiff is then given the opportunity to accept those conditions or withdraw her Rule 41(a)(2) motion for dismissal. + +Hon. Lorna G. Schofield January 21, 2021 Page 2 + +In the most recent decision from the Second Circuit on the "rarely litigated" Rule 41(a)(2), the panel concluded that a district court can impose conditions on a proposed dismissal with prejudice, so long as the plaintiff is permitted the opportunity to accept dismissal on those conditions or continue the litigation if it deems those conditions too onerous. Paysys Int'l, Inc. v. Atos IT Servs. Ltd., 901 F.3d 105, 109 (2d Cir. 2018). Specifically, the Circuit concluded that courts have the power to impose conditions on the dismissal (in that case, the imposition of attorneys' fees), but plaintiff then had "the choice between accepting the conditions and obtaining dismissal" or "if he feels that the conditions are too burdensome, withdrawing his dismissal motion and proceeding with the case on the merits." Id. (quotation omitted). + +Later cases are in accord, holding that courts can impose conditions to overcome prejudice to the defendant by the dismissal sought by the plaintiff, giving the plaintiff the opportunity to accatthe conditions and obtain the dismissal or reject the conditions and continue suit. In J. Burchett Photography, Inc. v. A.P. Moller Maersk A/S, No. 19 CIV. 1576 (KPF), 2020 WL 1285511, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2020), one of the conditions requested is a condition requested here — removal or revision of language that the parties would bear their own attorneys' fees and costs. The Court noted the American Rule and expressed no opinion on whether the defendant might be able to obtain fees and costs in later litigation. However, given the possibility of recovery, as a condition of the requested Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal, the Court adopted the defendants' proposed language regarding fees as a condition of dismissal, affording the plaintiff the opportunity to accept or reject that conditions to obtain the dismissal order sought. Id.; accord Grgurev v. LicutNo. 1:15-CV-9805-GHW, 2020 WL 2415698, at \*4 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2020) (granting 41(a)(2) dismissal on condition that "Plaintiffs must stipulate that Defendants will be permitted to litigate their counterclaims in state court to cure prejudice to the Defendants"). + +As . Maxwell requests that the Court impose the above conditions on its Rule 41(a)(2) order of dismissal. At that point, can elect to accept those conditions and obtain the dismissal she seeks or proceed with the case on its merits. + +## II. Ms. Maxwell Will be Prejudiced in Absence of Imposition of the Requested Conditions + +The Court has specifically requested that Ms. Maxwell address one issue in this letter briefing, "legal prejudice" absent the imposition of the conditions requested. + +## A. Ms. Maxwell's Confrontation Clause rights are prejudiced + +First, as is detailed in Ms. Maxwell's December 31, 2020 Response to the Order to Show Cause (Doc. # 108), plaintiff has falsely and publicly accused Ms. Maxwell by way of this lawsuit yet failed to produce any corroborative evidence in the discovery process. She appeared on Netflix reading from a purported 1996 journal she claimed was a contemporaneous re-counting of her experiences with Mr. Epstein, but when her counsel produced the lournal," Ms. Maxwell's name was not mentioned once. By contrast, there is + +Hon. Loma G. Schofield January 21, 2021 Page 3 + +substantial evidence that plaintiff and her counsel filed this case with a serious ulterior motive to fabricate a story against Ms. Maxwell some 24 years after the fact. The motives include, but are not limited to, increasing the cash consideration that she might receive from the Epstein Victims Compensation Program ("EVCP"). Indeed, within days of filing this suit, plaintiff's counsel publicly proclaimed the EVCP a "positive [first] step."' Neither Ms. Maxwell nor this Court played any role in setting up the terms of the program, but plaintiff's counsel played a substantial role in how it would be structured, including insisting that its prior clients could apply for additional funding from the program even if they had previously settled with Mr. Epstein.' Another term negotiated by plaintiff's counsel and included in the ultimate program is the "confidentiality" that plaintiff touts in her dismissal request. See Proposed Order (Doc. # 106-2) ("Plaintiff has reached a confidential agreement."). Yet "confidentiality" is only imposed on the program, not on claimants like plaintiff. See Epstein Victims' Compensation Program at 8-9 (May 29, 2020) ("Individual Claimants are not bound through the Program by any rules of confidentiality.").' To be clear, this is far different from a situation in which a purported #MeToo accuser is forced to remain silent in a "confidential settlement." This is a situation in which plaintiff wants to keep one thing secret, the amount of money she has requested and been awarded. Plaintiff can, if she chooses, share the amount of the award she has been offered. That a woman who has filed a public lawsuit, appeared on Netflix, NYTimes podcasts, ABC News, and the like, all the sudden wants her settlement to remain "confidential" is disingenuous at best. Just as has a public right to make her false allegations in a lawsuit and in the news, so Ms. Maxwell should have the right to make public the simple fact that plaintiff did not have a desire for "justice," she had a desire for money. + +Second, as previously explained, has publicly self-identified as one of the accusers mentioned in the indictment in the criminal case, 20-cr-330 (MN). She will no doubt be one of the prosecution's key witnesses. The inabilit to obtain an unredacted copy of the release, including the consideration received by creates legal prejudice to Ms. Maxwell's ability to confront during her criminal trial on general issues of bias and motive for fabrication, as is her right under the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution. A criminal defendant "states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby `to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors could appropriately draw inferences relatiiiiin the reliability of the witness.' Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (quoting v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318, (1974)). "[T]he exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.' Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231 (1988) (quoting , 415 U.S. at 316-17). + +IMatthew "Jeffrey Epstein's Estate May Set Up a Program to Pay Accusers," NY Times (Nov. 13, 2019) (Mia://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/13/business/jeffrey•epstein•accuserscompensation•fund.html) + +{sup}`2` James M, "Jeffrey Epstein victims' compensation fund to finally move forward," ABC News (May 29, 2020) (https://abcnews.go.corn/US/jeffrey•epstein•victims•compensation-fund-finally-moveforward/story?id=70964632) + +{sup}`3` https://www.epsteinvco.com/documents/4 + +Hon. Loma G. Schofield January 21, 2021 Page 4 + +Full and complete cross-examination of M=, is impossible without understanding the complete terms of her agreement with the Epstein Estate under Program, including the consideration she was able to extract based on her fabrications concerning Ms. Maxwell, as well as others. C.f. Moore v. Marr, 254 F.3d 1235, 1244 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting that witnesses' "application for victim compensation payments and application for and receipt of emergency victim compensation payments may well have been 'favorable' within the meaning of Brady," requiring government disclosure of exculpatory evidence to criminal defendants).4 + +Not knowing complete terms of the agreements, including the settlement obtained, there is no way to properly prepare for, construct, or undertake such cross-examination. If the sum is large, the motive for fabrication of stories and the existence of bias are obvious. If the sum is small, yet was accepted, the credibility of any allegations are cast into serious doubt. Regardless, Ms. Maxwell is entitled to the information of complete terms, including economic terms, of the agreement with the Epstein Estate under the Program to enable her to fully exercise her Constitutional ri hts under the Confrontation Clause at her criminal trial in the cross examination of . Including the production of an unredacted copy of the Release executed by as a condition of dismissal of this case will prevent the legal prejudice of impairing her Confrontation Clause rights. + +## . Maxwell's right to prevailing party costs are prejudiced + +Second, Ms. Maxwell is the prevailing party as a result of voluntary dismissal with prejudice and therefore is entitled to costs as a matter of law. + +Rule 54(d)(1) provides that "[u]nless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs—other than attorney's fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). "Courts consistently have found defendants to be prevailing parties where the action against them was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice." Ctr. for Discovery, Inc. v. D.P., No. 16-CV-3936 (MK) BRER, 2018 WL 1583971, at \*14 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2018); see Beer v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 211 F.R.D. 67, 70 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) ("All circuit courts to have directly addressed this issue have concluded that a defendant [who has obtained a voluntary dismissal with prejudice] is a prevailing party, or alternatively, that a district court has discretion to award costs to the defendant."); see also Caner v. Inc. VilL of Ocean Beach, 759 F.3d 159, 165 (2d Cir. 2014) (disclaiming prior Second Circuit dicta which stated that "generally the defendant is not considered the prevailing party when, as here, there is a voluntary dismissal of the action by the plaintiff with prejudice." (citations omitted)). "A voluntary dismissal of an action with prejudice [is considered to materially alter the relationship of the parties], because it constitutes `an adjudication on the merits for purposes of resjudicata.'" Carter, 759 F.3d at 165 (citation omitted). + +It is unknown if the Government is in possession of a non-redacted copy of agreements and, if so, when it plans to produce them as Giglio material in the criminal matter. + +Hon. Loma G. Schofield January 21, 2021 Page 5 It imposes legal prejudice on Ms. Maxwell to include originally proposed ("with each party to bear its own fees and costs" [DE 97]) or subsequently proposed ("with each party to bear its own attorneys' fees and costs" [DE106-]) language relating to costs and fees.' Ms. Maxwell will be the prevailing party upon issuance of the dismissal with prejudice and is presumed to be entitled to costs. Ms. Maxwell is not presently seeking attorneys' fees from Plaintiff but should not be precluded from doing so in a different action, most likely in a different forum, if she chooses to proceed. She is legally entitled to be deemed the prevailing party, with all rights that flow naturally therefrom, including an award of costs in this case as the prevailing party and the right to pursue claims for malicious prosecution should she later so choose. The right to recovery of costs is legally prejudiced by inclusion of the language proposed by For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Maxwell respectfully requests that the Court impose as a condition on granting the Rule 41(a)(2) Order that Plaintiff agree to: + +- I. Strike from plaintiff's proposed order any reference to each party to bear its own costs and attorneys' fees; and +- 2. Require that plaintiff produce an unredacted copy of the General Release she has executed with the Epstein Program, including the compensation she will receive. + +Respectfully Submitted, + +Laura A. Menninger ?c. + +CC: Counsel of Record via ECF + +{sup}`5`The Court has requested simultaneous submissions, with Plaintiff submitting her Motion and proposed language at the same time this letter brief is filed. As such, it is unclear to Ms. Maxwell what the final Rule 41(a)(2) Proposed Order will read with respect to costs and fees. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778296/EFTA02778296.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778296/EFTA02778296.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..99f36d8090ec372a769db2f439885994d96ba690 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778296/EFTA02778296.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -12, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778296", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "5338a1885ec8ce845786fc5b23139e2ffb4e9aefa0d822fd36db8b464f4432e4", + "output_sha256": "896d0d0bce7b61874c043d1a952fa6b9ddb5b441586e35b68c8b43cd2ebf8c2b", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778301/EFTA02778301.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778301/EFTA02778301.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a62435378acdb9d2f781014aa514027f62de315b --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778301/EFTA02778301.md @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Plaintiff, CASE NO: 19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, and GI- ISLAINE MAXWELL, + +Defendants. + +## f PROPOSED1 ORDER + +## LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, United States District Judge: + +WHEREAS Plaintiff submitted a claim for compensation to the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program ("EVCP") asserting that she was sexually abused by Jeffrey E. Epstein; and + +WHEREAS, after reviewing Plaintiff's submissions and after careful consideration of documentation and proof, and after due deliberation, the EVCP Program Administrator (the "Administrator") determined pursuant to the EVCP Protocol that Plaintiff was eligible to participate in the EVCP; + +WHEREAS Plaintiff has reached a confidential agreement, through which she will receive compensation from the EVCP in exchange for a release (the "General Release"); + +WHEREAS the General Release contains the terms of the release; and + +WHEREAS Plaintiff has filed a motion to dismiss this case with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. + +It is hereby ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the above-captioned action is dismissed with prejudice, with each party to bear its own attorneys' fees and costs. Nothing herein shall be construed to preclude Ms. Maxwell from seeking fees or costs related to this matter from the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Darren K. lndyke, in his capacity as Executor of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Richard D. Kahn, in his capacity as Executor of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, or NES, LLC, a New York Limited Liability Company, or release any such claims as between the Defendants. Nor does anything herein prejudice the Estate Of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Darren K. Indyke, in his capacity as Executor of the Estate Of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Richard D. Kahn, in his capacity as Executor of the Estate Of Jeffrey E. Epstein, or NES, LLC's rights and legal positions with respect to Ms. Maxwell's seeking of fees or costs related to this matter, all of which rights and legal positions are hereby expressly preserved. + +It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff shall provide Ms. Maxwell with a copy of the General Release, with the compensation amount redacted, within two days. The parties shall not dispute the authenticity of this copy of the General Release in any future proceedings. + +Dated: New York, New York 2021 + +SO ORDERED + +HON. LORNA G. SCHOFIELD United States District Judge Southern District of New York \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778301/EFTA02778301.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778301/EFTA02778301.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..021f377944bc6fe243adcc233b702e5539477438 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778301/EFTA02778301.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778301", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "6baeda7dae06b5e82f3c3c640e86f427c8ab1dc58e8aa54a7b48428edf13b0e2", + "output_sha256": "6baeda7dae06b5e82f3c3c640e86f427c8ab1dc58e8aa54a7b48428edf13b0e2", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778303/EFTA02778303.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778303/EFTA02778303.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..423245e08142d8f62e69a00d62a1ecefbb8bbb1d --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778303/EFTA02778303.md @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +### VIA ECF + +The Honorable Lorna G. Schofield District Court Judge United States District Court Southern District of New York 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007 + +> Re: v. Darren K. hulyke, Richard I). Kahn, & Ghislaine Maxwell 19-10475-LGS-DCIE + + +Dear Judge Schofield: + +Plaintiff moves to dismiss this action with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2). incorporates her prior letters on this issue, including her November 17, 2020 request for a premotion conference on this motion. ECF Nos. 97, 103, 106, 109. + +The issue before the Court is narrow and straightforward: wants to dismiss this lawsuit with prejudice so that she can conclude her participation in the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program (the "Program"). Defendant Ghislaine Maxell has refused to stipulate to dismissal (even though she would be getting out of this lawsuit for nothing) contending that she is entitled to know the amount of compensation that is to receive from Jeffrey Epstein's Estate (even though she is in no way contributing to that com ensation Maxwell's position is untenable unsupported by law, and a clear attempt to frustrate ability to resolve her claims. respectfully requests that the Court enter an order dismissing this case with prejudice in the form of the proposed order attached hereto.' + +# BACKGROUND + +After Judge Freeman encouraged the parties to resolve this dispute, agreed to participate in the Program. Declaration of Sigrid S. McCawley ("McCawley Decl.") Ex. A at 24:1-23 ("I think that settlement is an important track."); 50:16-19 ("These are serious claims.... Let's see if we can get them on a settlement track that eve body is comfortable with."). On June 22, 2020, Judge Freeman stayed this case so that could participate in the Program. The Program, the terms of which counsel for the Estate, the victims, and the Attorney General of + +The Proposed Order includes language that preserves Maxwell's right to seek indemnification from the Estate, and its terms are consistent with what Judge Freeman outlined at a December 16, 2020, conference. Although Judge Freeman may have initially expected Maxwell to abide by what was negotiated and enter into a stipulation dismissing the case, the Court may in any event enter the Proposed Order under Rule 41(a)(2) as a dismissal "by court order" that is "on terms that the court considers proper." + + + + +the U.S. Virgin Islands negotiated at length over several months, "is a voluntary, independent Program that has been established to compensate and resolve the claims of victims-survivors of sexual abuse by Jeffrey Epstein." See McCawley Decl. Ex. B at I (Independent Epstein Victims' Compensation Program Protocol). + +Prior to agreeing to participate in the Program, victims (including ) were ensured that all compensation offers and any information submitted to the Program would be confidential. Id. at 6, 8. In order to receive payment, however, a victim must first (1) execute a form release waiving all of the victim's rights to assert claims against the Estate, any entities owned or controlled by the Estate, and any employees of the Estate, Mr. Epstein, or any entities owned or controlled by the Estate, among others (the "General Release") and (2) dismiss with prejudice any existing lawsuits against the Estate or related entities and individuals. Id. at 3, 7. All parties to this action, including Maxwell, have had access to the form General Release and its terms since at least June of 2020. McCawley Decl. Ex. C (June 19, 2020, email from B. Moskowitz to L. Menninger attaching copy of General Release). + +received an offer of compensation from the Program, which accepted on On June 26, 2020, submitted a claim to the Program. On Au ust 27, 2020, October 5, 2020. also executed the General Release. Proof of dismissal with prejudice ain civil claims is required by the Program's protocol. Accordingly, on October 14, 2020, informed the Estate and Maxwell that she had accepted an offer of compensation and asked the Defendants to stipulate to a dismissal of this action with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) with each party to bear its own fees and costs. See McCawley Decl. Ex. D at 7 (October 14, 2020, email from S. Mariella to B. Moskowitz and L. Menninger). The Estate agreed to the stipulation, but Maxwell refused, initially contending that she could not agree to bear her own fees and costs without a copy of the executed General Release. Id. at 1 (November 10, 2020, email from L. Menninger to A. Villacastin and + +accordingly filed a request for a pre-motion conference on a motion to dismiss this action with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2). ECF No. 97. Magistrate Judge Freeman held a conference on December 16, 2020. McCawle Decl. Ex. E (transcript of December 16, 2020, conference). Durin that conference, explained that after Maxwell refused to stipulate to dismissal, offered to provide Maxwell with a copy of executed General Release with only the compensation amount redacted. Maxwell stated that she was concerned about the authenticity of a redacted version of the General Release for use in future proceedings. Id. at 8:21-23. In addition to stating that she would not order to disclose the amount of compensation to Maxwell, Judge Freeman suggested that provide a redacted version of the General Release to Maxwell with a letter stating that neither she nor the Estate would contest the redacted General Release's authenticity. Id. at 10:16-21, 14:7—8, 11-15. Both and Maxwell agreed with that solution. Id. at 10:23-11:2, 12:19-22. Yet when offered the redacted General Release and letter to Maxwell the next day, Maxwell refused to respond or to provide with any timeframe on which she would be able to respond. McCawley Decl. Ex. F (email correspondence between S. Mariella and L. Menninger). Judge Freeman then ordered Maxwell to show cause why the Court should not dismiss the case, and this Court held a hearing on January 14, 2021. ECF Nos. 107, 110. This Court subsequently ordered to file the present motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2). ECF No. 111. The Honorable Lorna G. Schofield January 21, 2021 Page 3 of 7 + +# ARGUMENT + +Rule 41(a)(2) provides that "an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff's request only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper." Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(aX2). "[The presumption in this circuit is that a court should grant a dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) absent a showing that defendants will suffer substantial prejudice as a result." Paulino v. Taylor, 320 F.R.D. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (emphasis added); see also v. SEC, 298 U.S. I, 19 (1936) ("The general rule is settled for the federal tribunals that a plaintiff possesses the unqualified right to dismiss his complaint . . . unless some plain legal prejudice will result to the defendant."). + +In light of successful participation in the Program, she seeks to dismiss this case on the two conditions reflected in the Proposed Order attached to this letter: (1) withprejudice and (2) with each party to bear its own fees and costs. Maxwell takes issue with second proposed condition: that each party bear its own fees and costs. She also asks the Court to se an additional condition on dismissal to which does not consent: that disclose the amount of co nsation that she has been offered through the Program. ECF No. 108 at 6. The conditions that proposes are appropriate in this case and will not legally prejudice Maxwell whatsoever, and Maxwell cannot impose additional conditions on dismissal if does not agree to those conditions. + +## I. Maxwell Will Not Be Prejudiced by Dismissal Pursuant to Proposed Conditions. + +Maxwell objects to dismissal of claims with each party to bear its own fees and costs because she contends that claims against her are "frivolous." But Maxwell has to date (after submitting three letters on this issue) not cited any authority for her argument that she would be entitled to collect fees and costs from + +Although courts periodically award fees and costs when plaintiffs move to voluntarily dismiss their claims without prejudice, seeks to dismiss this case with prejudice. See Colombrito v. Kelly, 764 F.2d 122, 133 (2d Cir. 1985) (explaining that the purpose of awarding fees and costs to prevailing party when cases are dismissed without prejudice "is generally to reimburse the defendant for the litigation costs incurred, in view of the risk (often the certainty) faced b the defendant that the same suit will be railed and will impose duplicative expenses").2 is not only agreeing to dismiss this case with prejudice, but has also signed a broad General Release that would prevent her from suing Maxwell for claims arising out of Maxwell's sexual abuse of again. Maxwell is therefore doubly protected from the risk that will bring her claims against Maxwell again, making her contention that she could somehow be entitled to fees and costs untenable. Id. at 134 (explaining that when an action is + +{sup}`2` Maxwell raises for the first time an argument that she is a "prevailing party" under Rule 54(d)(1), but ignores that Rule 54(d)(1) only provides the Court with the discretion to award costs—the Rule does not itself entitle Maxwell to anything. v. City of N.Y., No. 00 Civ. 7559 (SAS), 2005 WL 883533, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2005) ("[Tjhe decision whether to award costs to a prevailing party under Rule 54(d) lies within the sound discretion of the district court."). Maxwell has not even attempted to demonstrate why she would be entitled to costs under Rule 54(d)(1), and Colotnbrito squarely addresses why she would not be entitled to such costs. + + + + +dismissed with prejudice, fees "have almost never been awarded" because "the defendant, unlike a defendant against whom a claim has been dismissed without prejudice, has been freed of the risk of relitigation of the issues just as if the case had been adjudicated in his favor after a trial, in which event (absent statutory authorization) the American Rule would preclude such an award"). + +And even in cases where plaintiffs move for voluntary dismissal without prejudice, "[c]ourts within this circuit have refused to award fees and costs following a Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal absent circumstances evincing bad faith or vexatiousness on the part of the plaintiff." BD ex rel. Jean Doe v. DeBuono, 193 F.R.D. 117, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (declining to award fees dismissal without prejudice absent showing of bad faith or vexatiousness); see also, e.g., v. Brooklyn Indus. LLC, No. 13 Civ. 3695, 2015 WL 1726489, at \*3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2015) (same); Ogden Power Dev.-Cayman, Inc. v. PM!? Co., No. 14 Civ. 8169, 2015 WL 2414581, at \*9-10 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2015) (same). Maxwell has not inted to any such bad faith or vexatiousness here, aside from her unremarkable contention that claims are meritless (as the vast majority of defendants accused of sexual assault contend). Thus, Maxwell would not be entitled to fees and costs even if were seeking to dismiss this case without prejudice. + +recognizes that this is not the forum in which to litigate whether her claims are "frivolous," but briefly highlights several facts that directly refute Maxwell's characterization of her claims as such. First, Maxwell has been indicted for the very conduct described in the Complaint is one of the minor victims in the Government's July 2020 Indictment of Maxwell. Second, this Court rejected the notion that claims are frivolous at the premotion conference held on Maxwell's anticipated motion to dismiss complaint. At that conference, the Court observed that Maxwell's motion to dismiss did not "strike [the Court] as . . . meritorious," and noted that it would not be "a good use of anybody's time for us to pursue [the] motion." McCawle Decl. Ex. Gat 3:23-24, 5:9-11 (transcript of April 16, 2020 premotion conference). Finally, is not the only woman who has accused Maxwell of sexually assaulting her. Many other women have accused Maxwell of similar behavior, and countless other victims and eyewitnesses have corroborated her involvement in Jeffrey Epstein's sex trafficking scheme. Evidence of other sexual assaults and Maxwell's involvement in the scheme is relevant and probative evidence supporting claims, and would have supported her claims at trial and corroborated her own testimony. + +Finally, Maxwell contends that dismissing this case with prejudice would deny Maxwell the opportunity to clear her name, complaining that is being compensated for "untested" allegations. It is entirely unclear, however, how this at all constitutes legal prejudice to Maxwell. First and foremost, Maxwell is not compensatin and thus has no viable, legal interest in whether or how the Program "tested" allegations or what confidential information provided in support of her claims to the Program. In fact, the Program has done nothing but benefit Maxwell by getting her out of multiple civil lawsuits and insulating her from future liability for any torts she committed against any woman who accepts compensation from the Program, all without having to pay a cent to her victims. Second, Maxwell has been indicted for the very conduct of which she is accused in this case, and thus has a constitutional right to trial by an impartial jury in her criminal case. Final) as the Court recognized, parties are only entitled to discovery in aid of claims. Here, has chosen not to pursue her claims against + + + + +Maxwell and it is not her burden to otherwise provide Maxwell with a forum in which Maxwell can test allegations.3 + +Maxwell has failed to demonstrate any substantial, legal prejudice that she would face if this case were dismissed on the conditions that has proposed: with prejudice and with each party to bear its own fees and costs. + +#### II. Maxwell's Request that the Court Require to Disclose Confidential Information About Compensation Offer is Improper. + +In Maxwell's res nse to Judge Freeman's Order to Show Cause, she asked the Court not only to strike from proposed order of dismissal "any reference to each party to bear its own costs and attorneys' fees," but also asked the Court to "[r]equire that plaintiff disclose the substantial sum of money that she expects to receive" from the Program. ECF No. 108 at 5-6. But Maxwell cannot, under Rule 41(a)(2), propose her own conditions for the Court to impose in dismissing this case. As the Second Circuit has held: + +[Rule 41(a)(2)] empowers the district court to either dismiss the case on its own terms or to deny a requested dismissal, if those terms are not met. But acceptance of the court's terms, like the motion to dismiss itself, must be voluntary. . .. [W]hen a plaintiff files a motion for dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2), it takes on the risk that its motion will be denied, not that the motion will carry additional consequences to which the plaintiff does not consent. Like our sister Circuits, we emphasize that it is the plaintiff, rather than the court, who has the choice between accepting the conditions and obtaining dismissal and, if [she] feels that the conditions are too burdensome, withdrawing [her] dismissal motion and proceeding with the case on the merits. + +Paysys Intl, Inc. v. Atos IT Servs. Ltd., 901 F.3d 105, 108-09 (2d Cr. 2018) (internal citations omitted). Thus, the Court should not impose additional conditions on dismissal to which has not a reed .° And if the Court thinks any such additional conditions are appropriate, it should give the opportunity to first withdraw her motion for voluntary dismissal. + +But even if this Court could impose Maxwell's proposed additional condition on dismissal without consent, doing so would not be warranted in this case. was promised confidentiality when she chose to participate in the Program and she cannot be required to waive that confidentiality in order to dismiss this case and receive payment. Such a condition + +{sup}`3`Maxwell did not did not seem concerned with clearing her name while litigating this lawsuit prior to the stay. Maxwell refused toparticipate in discovery whatsoever. She did not produce a single document in response to demands, nor did she respond to a single interrogatory. + +Maxwell cites a single case in which a court included a condition to voluntary dismissal allowing the defendant to seek fees and costs, but that was a case in which the voluntary dismissal was without prejudice. J. Burchett Photography, Inc. v. A.P. Moller Maersk A /S, No. 19 CIV. 1576 (KPF), 2020 WL 1285511, at \*l (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2020). + + + + +would eviscerate the confidentiality promised to victims who chose to participate in the Program, and would deter continued participation in the Program. + +During the conference before this Court, Maxwell's counsel stated that she has been "unable to find any precedent for refusing to provide a release to the purportedly released party." She has repeatedly made similar statements in letter briefing on this issue. See ECF No. 103 at 2. But this argument is misleading, as it mischaracterizes what has agreed to provide Maxwell. has at least twice offered Maxwell a copy of the executed General Release, and in fact will still agree to including a provision in an order of dismissal that would provide for Maxwell receiving a copy of the executed General Release (as reflected in the proposed order attached hereto . Maxwell would have the terms of the General Release. Maxwell would know exactly who has released, and from what claims she has released them.5 The only information has refused to provide Maxwell is the amount of compensation she would receive once this case is dismissed. It is, in fact, Maxwell who has cited no legal precedent for her position: that a party who is not a party to a settlement agreement, and is not contributing any money or other consideration to that settlement, is entitled to know the settlement amount. + +The only alle ed reudice Maxwell points to based on not knowin the amount of corn s nsation that has been offered is that Maxwell seeks to use during her criminal trial. But, as this Court recognized, Maxwell's attempt to impede settlement of this action to serve her interests in a separate criminal action is inappropriate. If Maxwell contends that compensation offer is relevant and admissible evidence in her criminal action (which takes no position on at this time), she can attempt to obtain that information through the procedural mechanisms available to her in that case and Judge Nathan can rule on her right to use that information. Her inability to get the information she seeks now and through this litigation, as opposed to in her criminal case, does not amount to legal prejudice. + +## CONCLUSION + +For the foregoing reasons, respectfully requests that the Court enter an order dismissing this case with prejudice, with each party to bear its own fees and costs, in the form of the proposed order attached hereto. + +Respectfully submitted, + +/s/ Sigrid S. McCawley + +Sigrid S. McCawley (pro hac vice) Borns SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP 4O1 E. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1200 Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301 (954) 356-0011 + +In fact, Maxwell has had this information since June, when she was provided with a copy of the form General Release. See McCawley Decl. Ex. C. + + + + +Andrew Villacastin + +Sabina Mariella + +BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP + +55 Hudson Yards + +New York, NY 10001 + +(212) 446-2300 + +Counsel for Plaints + +cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778303/EFTA02778303.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778303/EFTA02778303.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..82e5bef0f252fa3ebb81e9fcea9be99c9f4e8b14 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778303/EFTA02778303.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -165, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778303", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 7, + "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.stamp-stripping.page-footer\", \"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "6075d98c3444ad78804a4316194867538740f5f5a4ec5b69399afc7f55f56349", + "output_sha256": "9647d83a0f9d87dd0fc76ec1751a1f4da2aded004efaf5a6a5a413ab35eac498", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778310/EFTA02778310.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778310/EFTA02778310.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..dcf3e3da6653b4189b8728c9c42d816de80edae9 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778310/EFTA02778310.md @@ -0,0 +1,705 @@ +# Exhibit A + +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +X DOE 1, et al., : 19-CV-07675 (GBD) Plaintiffs, : v. : : 500 Pearl Street JEFFREY EPSTEIN, et al., : New York, New York Defendants. : November 21, 2019 X VE, : Plaintiff, : 19-CV-07625 (AJN) v. : NINE EAST 71st STREET, et al., : Defendants. : X + +### TRANSCRIPT OF CIVIL CAUSE FOR CONFERENCE BEFORE THE HONORABLE DEBRA C. FREEMAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE + +#### APPEARANCES: + +For Jane Doe 1: ARICK W. FUDALI, ESQ. The Bloom Firm 85 Delancey Street, Suite 20 New York, New York 10002 + +[Appearances continue next page.] + +Court Transcriber: MARY GRECO TypeWrite Word Processing Service 211 N. Milton Road Saratoga Springs, New York 12866 + +Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording, transcript produced by transcription service + +## APPEARANCES CONTINUED: + +For VE: + +For Financial Trust, Indyke, Kahn, NES, Nine East 715t: + +For other Plaintiffs: + +jiiIIIIIII. ESQ. BRITTANY , ESQ. Pottinger LLC 425 North Andrew Avenue, Suite 2 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 + +BENNET J. MOSKOWITZ, ESQ. CHARLES GLOVER, ESQ. Troutman Sanders LLP 875 Third Avenue New York, New York 10022 + +DAVID BOIES, ESQ. SIGRID McCAWLEY, ESQ. JOSH SCHULER, ESQ. Boies Schiller Flexner 401 East Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1200 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 + +ROBERTA KAPLAN, ESQ. KATE DONNEGER, ESQ. DAVID BRODY, ESQ. LAURA STAR, ESQ. ALAN GOLDFARB, ESQ. ANDREW POSEN, ESQ. MARIANN WANG, ESQ. DANIEL MULLKOFF, ESQ. 2 + +1 THE COURT: Good morning. + +2 MALE SPEAKER: Good morning. + +3 FEMALE SPEAKER: Good morning, Your Honor. + +4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 THE COURT: Ordinarily we'd start by calling the case but we have a number of cases here and rather than do this in a tedious way, we've asked everyone to sign in on an appearance sheet. And I just want to make sure I know who everyone is. So first, on plaintiff's side in these various cases, these are cases, just for the record, these are cases that are brought by various plaintiffs against for shorthand the Estate of Jeffrey Epstein. + +12 13 Can I know who Brad and Brittany are? + +14 MR. : Yes, Your Honor. Brad + +15 : Brittany + +16 THE COURT: Okay. Arick Fudali? + +17 MR. FUDALI: Good morning, Your Honor. Arick + +18 Fudali. + +19 THE COURT: Good morning. Roberta Kaplan? + +20 MS. KAPLAN: Good morning, Your Honor. + +21 THE COURT: And Kate Donneger [Ph.]? + +22 MS. DONNEGER: Good morning, Your Honor. + +23 24 THE COURT: Good morning. David Brody, Laura Star, Alan Goldfarb and Andrew Posen [Ph.]. + +25 MR. BRODY: Good morning, Your Honor. David Brody. 1 MS. STAR: Laura Star. + +2 MR. POSEN: Andrew Posen [Ph.]. + +3 MR. GOLDFARB: Alan Goldfarb. + +4 5 THE COURT: Got it. Then I have David Boies, Sigrid McCawley, Josh Schiller. + +6 MR. BOIES: Good morning, Your Honor. David Boies. + +7 MR. SCHILLER: Josh Schiller. Good morning. + +8 MS. McCAWLEY: Sigrid McCawley. + +9 THE COURT: Got it. Marion Wang and David Mullkoff. + +10 11 MS. WANG: Mariann Wang. Daniel Mullkoff will join me later. + +12 THE COURT: Okay. + +13 MS. WANG: Good morning. + +14 15 16 THE COURT: Good morning. And on defendant's side, well, you have a fewer number of people so why don't you just introduce yourselves? + +17 18 19 20 21 22 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Good morning, Your Honor. Bennet Moskowitz; Troutman Sanders, here with my colleague Charles Glover, and we represent the co-executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein as well as with certain exceptions various other defendants in the actions for which we're here today. To explain that a little further + +23 THE COURT: That's all right. + +24 MR. MOSKOWITZ: That's fine. + +25 THE COURT: For the time being, that's fine. 1 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Thank you. + +2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE COURT: All right. So the first thing I want to do is just explain what my role is in these cases and perhaps what my role isn't in these cases. First of all, I don't know how much you all know about the inner workings of the court but when a civil case comes into this court it is assigned to a district judge and it is designated to a magistrate judge. Or a magistrate judge is designated on the case. Having a magistrate judge such as myself designated on a case does not mean that I do anything on the case. It usually doesn't even mean I know that the case is in front of me at all. And certainly, it doesn't give me authority to act. The authority to act comes from an order of reference by the district judge on that case. There is a difference between a designation and a reference. When a district judge refers a case to a magistrate judge, the docket for that case will have an entry that says order of reference. The order of reference will specify what it's for. In these cases, a number of the district judges have referred the cases to me for what's called general pretrial supervision. General pretrial supervision includes supervising the discovery process, certain motions that are not dispositive motions, seeing if I can assist with settlement, scheduling matters. It does not include dispositive motions, making reports and recommendations on dispositive motions unless the order of + +1 2 3 4 reference says that. And an order of reference can be anything as narrow as can you work on one very particular thing or can you assist with settlement? To as broad as on the parties' consent it's before you for all purposes. + +5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 The decision was made, as I understand it, that as an institutional matter all these cases were not going to be placed before a single district judge. But it was also decided that they would be designated to a single magistrate judge so example, would be that if the district judges wanted to refer for, for discovery supervision or to aid in settlement, that before a single magistrate judge, and I am that lucky magistrate judge. But not all of the cases that we've seen come into the court have been referred to me at this time. So you have to look at the dockets in your cases, and new ones as they come in because I'm sure some new ones will come in, and see if there is see a different actually an order of reference. Now, you may magistrate judge designated and it may have slipped through the cracks. A lot of these are just -- they come out of the wheel and it's random. There's one I know that's still showing a designation to Judge Fox. I think it will be re-designated to me. If you're noticing that and you're not noticing a re-designation to me, you can just give our look a call and bring it to our attention and we can into that. + +25 But even if they are all designated to me, which I + +1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 think is the plan, again, they may or may not all be referred to me. Right now there are orders of reference in, for general pretrial supervision, in one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, and I believe there will be nine because Judge Gardephe just signed one, nine of the cases out of 14. Judge Buchwald has one case that is 19-CV-10474. I do not believe she is going to refer. I think she prefers to supervise the case herself. And there are a couple where I just don't know yet. And of course I think there's one that may not even be assigned to a district judge yet. And again, they're still coming in. So just be aware of that because there's a good chance that I'm going to be supervising your case for discovery and for non-dispositive disputes for scheduling, for seeing if I can assist with settlement. But there is also a chance that I will not be. All right? And in particular right now I know that Judge Buchwald does not wish me to supervise hers. + +18 19 20 21 22 23 24 In addition, Judge Schofield has two cases right now. They are 19-CV-10475 and 19-CV-10577. I believe she scheduled her own conference a little farther down the road. I think she still wants to go forward with that but I anticipate that at some point either before then or after then she is likely to refer to me as well, but she wants to get a handle on it herself. + +25 So district judges are individuals. They handle 1 + +2 + +3 + +4 + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +things in individual ways sometimes. And just be aware dispositive motions will go in front of them unless they are specifically referred to me. And if any order of reference is narrow, you have to look at it, see what it says, and understand that's the particular reason it's before me. All right? + +So with that said, I nonetheless wanted to give notice to anyone who's on these cases that I was having this conference so that you could be informed, so that you could be present if you have an interest, and you could hear what's said. So that's number one. + +Number two, I have seen in the press and in some of the correspondence that was put in front of the Court in one of the cases that there's some talk about the estate working toward coming up with a settlement idea, concept, a plan for trying to create a fund or do something. I've also seen some murmurings, I don't know if they're true or not, that not all of the plaintiffs' attorneys might be fully on board with the process that's being set up which may not have been involving them. + +So I'd like to understand what is going on on that front. And if it is possible to have these cases put on a settlement track, I'd like to make sure that everyone's on board with the process of developing a plan for that and to get a feel for what it's going to entail, potential time line + +1 2 3 issues that are involved so that we can first see before we get into discovery issues other kinds of squabbles, see if in fact settlement is possible and we can move toward that. + +4 5 So let me start on defendant's side since rumor has it, and see what you have to say on that. + +6 7 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Good morning, Your Honor. Would you like me to stand or -- + +8 THE COURT: It's okay. + +9 10 11 12 13 14 15 MR. MOSKOWITZ: I'm happy to. I'm glad you raised this because one of the things I wanted to bring to Your Honor's attention is that having assumed, although I don't like assumptions, that you may have seen in the press that there is some kind of a claims program, I wanted to actually take the opportunity today to explain to you briefly what is going on. And since you asked specifically, I'll start there. + +16 + +17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 So there is what I feel confident in calling an extraordinary opportunity that has already started that can lead to an alternative to all this litigation. A lot of people here as you can see. And this would be an extraordinary opportunity also to conserve party and judicial resources. And what happened is almost a week ago exactly the co-executors, and this is probably some of the stories you have seen, filed through counsel, not us, through estate counsel in US Virgin Islands where the will is being probated, + +1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 an application for expedited approval of a claims administration process. So if I can just briefly explain what that action means and what was actually filed because with respect to everyone in the room, I don't know that every story was as accurate as each other. So the filing was for approval to have the process go forward. I fully expect it will be approved. I'm not the Court, obviously. But I have every reason to believe it will be promptly approved. What it is not is actually the nuts and bolts of how the program will work. What it does is it says the executors have selected very esteemed people, Kenneth Feinberg who many view, I believe rightfully so, is the nation's leading claims administration expert. Jordana , who is also a leading expert. She actually just very recently left her position as deputy special of the September 11th victim compensation fund. And she has demonstrated through that profound empathy for victims, deep commitment to fairness of process, fairness of outcome. And also Camille Viras [Ph.] who has worked with Mr. Feinberg over many years and is also a leading expert. I selected those three people to design, and then to administer the program. However, what's happening now is now that the filing has been made, and this is all in the filing and for any details I don't have I would encourage anyone who has questions on the plaintiff's side to reach out to the program administrators and designers for whom I don't speak + +1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 because they're fully independent. But what the application laid out is basically the overview of what the program is and is not leaving open what will be the protocol for the design of how the program works on a finer basis to be designed now with input invited from every plaintiff's attorney sitting here today, their clients, and anyone else who's out there that is contemplating bringing a claim against the estate related to, So everyone you know, these general sexual abuse allegations. is invited to provide input. + +10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 completed autonomy will have complete autonomy. She has as to decision-making authority over the program operations and to claim determinations. The estate has no authority, will have no authority to modify or reject decisions on any basis or as to any claim. The claimants will retain their rights unless and until they actually accept a determination. So in other words, this again, all through the filing and what's been reported in the press, everyone in this room, their clients can, it's voluntary, but again, extraordinary opportunity, they can through the entire process of the claims program, find out if they're eligible to receive a claim determination, receive a claim determination, and then decide do they want to accept it or not. Unless they accept it and sign a release, all their legal rights in terms of these lawsuits are preserved. So I will say right now, and it's probably not necessarily a + +1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 discussion for today, but it's directly relevant to what you've asked me about, we of course on the co-executors side are more than willing to work with plaintiffs to stay actions, toll claims, whatever they need to preserve their claims so they have no prejudice if they also then go forward to see if the claims process can resolve their claim in a much more, you know, general I shall say, more efficient than most civil litigation works in this country, and confidentially which I should point out means that it's a confidential process and the estate itself is bound by certain confidentiality. But the claimants are more than free absent, you know, certain things and we worked on the protocol, to go out and tell their stories if they still want to. So that's what I mean when I say confidential. I know there have been a lot of concerns about people wanting to proceed anonymously so that the claims process is great for that concern too. + +17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 There is no cap as I understand it on the claims determinations meaning whatever the claims administrators decide in their expert judgment should be awarded to someone there's not going to be an arbitrating limit in any way on what that is. Again, encourage anyone with specific questions in that regard to weigh in on the protocol and to ask the administrators themselves. And I would just like to say that, you know, because of this extraordinary opportunity, I think it would be a bad outcome for the Court, a bad outcome for all + +1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 the parties in here on both sides for these cases to move full steam ahead while this opportunity is now live. I mean the approval says the timing will be prompt. The claims administrators expect that within 90 days or so of the Court's approval of the filing they'll start receiving claims. This is not going to be a long drawn out thing. And I see no benefit to in the meantime having people, you know, clutter these dockets with things that could probably, we hope, and I expect and hope, will ultimately be avoided forever. + +10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE COURT: All right. One thing I forgot to say up front is you don't see a court reporter sitting here. We do have electronic recording equipment which means that if all goes well there should be a recording of this conference. And so if anyone wants to have a transcript made, that's possible. And this is an on-the-record conference. If you're not familiar with how to go about obtaining a transcript, I think most people are, but if you're not, you can order it through the court's website. The website was just redesigned so the instructions I used to give people about this are now a little different. But I believe that up at the top of the website you'll see a few horizontal lines that suggest maybe there's a drop down menu there. And if you click on it, you should find something about courtroom technology. And if you follow through and scroll down on that page you should find something about what's called electronic court reportings or ECR which + +1 will tell you how to go about ordering a transcript. + +2 3 4 5 6 7 Because we do not have a court reporter and because any record will be through somebody typing up what they are hearing on a recording, I'm going to ask anyone who speaks to introduce yourself each time before you speak so that there's no confusion as to who's speaking. That was Mr. Moskowitz speaking, correct? + +8 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Correct, Your Honor. Thank you. + +9 10 11 12 13 THE COURT: Correct. Okay. So if anyone else wants to speak on this subject, just please identify who you are again because there are a lot of you on plaintiff's side. Anyone on plaintiff's side want to say something on the subject? + +14 15 16 MS. KAPLAN: Your Honor, Roberta Kaplan. I'm counsel for the pseudonymous plaintiff in the case pending before Judge Failla. + +17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 You heard I think a number of times Mr. Moskowitz use the word extraordinary. And on that word and perhaps that word only I'm in full agreement with Mr. Moskowitz. I have been -- I and many of my counsel here have been litigating in this courthouse for combined decades and we are approached the other side as a group many weeks ago to try to talk about, negotiate, and be involved in a settlement process that would be set up to administer claims for 14, 15, 16-year-old children who were criminally abused, sexually abused by Mr. + +1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Epstein. There was radio silence, complete radio silence on their end for week after week despite repeated entreaties from myself and others for us to have involvement in who was selected and who would be in charge of this. These are women who want agency over their lives, number one? Two, what the procedure would be. And three, Your Honor, perhaps most importantly, how much money would be set aside? We have basically no information about what's in the estate, what assets are in the estate, what assets are not in the estate, who is the beneficiary of the estate. We are told it's Mr. Epstein's brother but we have no due diligence on that. And we said to the other side that before this process was created we thought we were entitled to some due diligence about what assets are being put on the table to settle claims and what assets are going to go to Mr. Epstein's brother. We've had zero disclosure about that. We've had zero discussions about who the person would be and how to set it up. I'm always, Your Honor, and I think I speak for everyone here, we are always willing to keep an open mind about settlement. But given the way that this has been created, the secret unilateral way that this has been created that frankly was incredibly disrespectful to these women who have already suffered criminal horrible abuse, we have serious doubts. And the idea that we would stay any of these matters in favor of the process that he described I think would be irrational for + +1 2 many of us. I don't know if Your Honor has any questions but at least in my case I think that's our reaction. + +3 4 THE COURT: I'll hear from anyone else who wants to be heard on this topic. + +5 6 7 MR. Sure. Your Honor, Brad I'm here on behalf of VE, Catlin (Ph.] Doe, Priscilla Doe, and Lisa Doe for plaintiffs proceeding under pseudonyms. + +8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 I agree with most of what Ms. Kaplan said. I will say that it seems to me that this slow developing vague settlement concept, once it gets set up it might be okay or it might be good for some people. It doesn't make any sense at all that is an all or nothing thing meaning we have said we're willing to talk settlement as per our Rule 26 obligations with any of the individual plaintiffs. And what I understand is we're not going to do that. It is either you're going to be a part of this process like it or not, and you may like it, you may not, you don't know much about it, we can't tell you much about it, but we hope that you'll just stay your actions while we try to develop what it is or is not. That doesn't seem like it's a very responsible way to approach this. There could also be some discussion on individual claims along the way especially lawsuits that have already proceeded. I'm just going to just give you an example. I filed the case on behalf of VE more than 60 days ago. We've already had our Rule 26 conference. I have an initial pretrial conference still set + +1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 for December 6. I would say that trial could be had by July. These are very simple cases. Why in the world would we be made to stay this case basically for at least 90 more days for this thing to get set up and time to then go through the process. We could have had a trial by the time that we even learn what this process is, so that I could educate my clients on whether or not this might or might not be a good deal. So I think it only makes sense + +9 THE COURT: Which case are you talking about again? + +10 MR. : VE. It is -- + +11 THE COURT: Before Judge Nathan? + +12 MR. : Yes. + +13 THE COURT: So she has a conference on which day? + +14 15 MR. : December 6. And we held our Rule 26 conference November 15". + +16 17 THE COURT: And do you think this case can go to trial that fast? + +18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MR. : Yes, Your Honor. I'm very familiar with these cases in that I litigated when Mr. Epstein was alive these same types of cases for over ten years. So I'm intimately familiar with the facts. They are very simple cases to try. I think that by next summer they could be ready for trial. But certainly, we are ready to propound discovery. We have less than five depositions to take in the case and we're ready to go. I don't want that to be delayed because + +1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 we're trying to set up what is, as you can tell, very slow developing vague concept that might be acceptable or might not. So I just don't want for the plaintiffs who are already pursuing these actions to be prejudiced waiting for something that's being unilaterally created. And we don't have great confidence that many plaintiffs are going to opt in but we have an open mind and are willing once it's set up to engage. That's just not the time right now. So that's our position as it stands. + +10 THE COURT: Anyone else? + +11 12 13 MS. McCAWLEY: This is Sigrid McCawley and myself along with David Boies and Josh Schiller, we represent five of the victims who filed suit to date. + +14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 I echo Ms. Kaplan's concerns. We have been part of this dialogue with the reach out to help craft something that would be responsible and reasonable for the victims who are at issue here and the fact that the defendants unilaterally selected a group without that input I think is inappropriate. We are learning more about it today obviously so we'll reserve final judgment on that. We are of course open, and our clients are open, to discussing the possibility of settlement but I do have significant concerns about what they filed in the USVI. + +24 25 THE COURT: Anyone else? All right. For cases to settle, I'm going to direct this to defendants, for cases to + +1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 settle there has to be not just interest on both sides but there has to be seats at the table on both sides. There has to be willingness to participate from both sides. Settlement is uniquely non-unilateral. And if the defendants are really interested in trying to get these cases resolved outside of the litigation context, then you have to do more than just say they're invited to the table and some window of time. There has to be a real concerted effort to get people talking to each other and to get plaintiffs' counsel on board with what you're trying to do. And they may or may not be so readily on board. And you have to, on defendant's side, be willing to have an open mind, you know, and have people who are willing to talk and maybe bend and maybe rethink if plaintiffs have a different idea and the different idea's a good one. So this being presented to them as well this is what it's going to be and you can have some input after we've already figured out some basics may not be sitting real well. + +18 + +19 + +20 21 22 23 24 25 MR. MOSKOWITZ: I don't think that that's how we view this. Defendants' counsel are correct. Many of them reached out to us and said they would welcome a claims administration program. It is true that the co-executors vetted and carefully selected Ken Feinberg, Jordana and Camille Viras, like I said, unquestionably the leading + +MR. FUDALI: May I address that, Your Honor? + +THE COURT: Sure. + +1 2 people in the field, to be independent claims administrators. So this is not a situation where we've set up a -- + +3 4 5 THE COURT: Right. But they were -- but these independent claims administrators were selected by one side and not agreed upon by both. + +6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Absolutely. And I think Mr. Feinberg's 98 percent or so participation rate in the 9/11 fund speaks for itself as well as his experience with the church sexual abuse system, claims process in the BP oil spill. All of these situations, I don't believe that claimants went out and hired Mr. Feinberg yet they were very successful programs. And here nothing's been fully baked. All that was in the public filing, the very public filing that I guess I heard some people aren't aware of the details and I absolutely encourage them to read it, is that the program is now going to be set up. The protocol is everything for how the program works is my understanding. + +18 THE COURT: Well, are the names of -- + +19 20 21 22 MR. MOSKOWITZ: And that is when the sides should come together and the administrators I fully expect and understand will be in communication if they aren't already. I don't know. + +23 THE COURT: Let me interrupt you for a second. + +24 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Sure. + +25 THE COURT: Are the names of the administrators, the + +1 2 choice of the administrators, is that fully baked? Or is there a possibility to add someone to that group for example? + +3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 MR. MOSKOWITZ: I don't know about the latter, but yes, they have been selected as the administrators. I mean another thing I point out is that -- another thing that's unusual in this situation is that the estate is subject to the probate court. So what was presented to them was a very good faith above and beyond effort to. I can assure you, though I don't speak for the estate counsel and I don't speak for the administrators that the co-executors are hiring Ken Feinberg, Jordana , Camille Viras, have a very sincere desire to have a successful program that can resolve in a much more efficient resolution of claims in a non-adversarial fashion. I mean a lot of careful vetting and due diligence went in on their end and I do understand that some of the plaintiffs' lawyers maybe had different picks of who they wanted to be. Some of them I should say as well were rather inflexible in that regard. And it is correct we didn't choose necessarily who their top people are. But this notion that we've gone out and we're imposing this vague thing on them I don't think it's fair. And again, they're right, it's voluntary. I would hope that they appreciate, like I said, that this is a significant opportunity to resolve claims that will not result in any detriment. + +25 I also want to just quickly touch upon Mr. + +1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 raised the timing. He did litigate cases not in this court. I think that's a very aggressive view of timing on his end. We haven't even answered the complaint and the action which we have this quote/unquote Rule 26 conference during which we really didn't have much to talk about because we haven't even answered the complaint. I view that as maybe that perhaps fell through on the court's side, not Your Honor, on whether that should occur then. So we had it out of caution. But this notion that we're months away from significant things happening in these cases, I don't know what the basis for that is. + +12 13 14 15 16 THE COURT: So some of the questions that have been raised over here about the size of the fund, what assets are in the estate, what assets are not in the estate, you said that claims would not be capped. But is the fund a certain amount? + +17 18 19 20 21 22 23 MR. MOSKOWITZ: I don't have the answer to that question. Certainly that's an issue that should be discussed at this time along with any other issue that plaintiffs want to raise. They should call , call Mr. Feinberg, set up times to meet with them. Again, I don't speak for them. But my understanding is they want to hear from all interested parties. They finally made that clear. + +24 25 THE COURT: Well, you're counsel in this case. So if cases settle -- + +1 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Sure. + +2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 THE COURT: -- in this Court, I would think you would need to be involved as well in this process and not just, you know, refer them to somebody else who's not representing a party. So I think you need to be more personally involved, you or your firm or one of the firms involved representing defendants, and try to ensure that there is good dialogue, that there is good communication, and that what plaintiffs' counsel has to say is not falling on deaf ears, is not, you know, not being responded to. + +11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Agree 100 percent and that's fully our intent. This was just filed a week ago. And also, we will be fully involved; however, not at the expense of inserting ourselves into anything that the administrators view as solely within their domain as independent claims administrators. So there's a little question there that yes, we will communicate with them. We encourage plaintiffs' counsel to do the same. We will stay fully involved to find out what's going on. + +20 21 22 THE COURT: Will you have authority to settle any individual case outside of this framework that you're discussing? + +23 24 25 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Settlement discussions are always welcome. I don't have any specific authority in that regard but no door is closed. + +1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 THE COURT: All right. What I'd like to do with respect to settlement is have an update after there's been a period of time when everyone has been conferring and plaintiffs have been at the table through their counsel to give me just a status report on how that's going and whether it's looking promising or whether it's not from anyone's point of view. And that doesn't mean other things can't be handled on a parallel track. But I think that settlement is an important track. Plaintiffs are clearly interested. Defendants are clearly interested. And when everyone's interested in settlement, seems to me that's the first thing you want to all try to do. But it's got to really be a process where everyone really has seats at the table, it's not just lip service to seats at the table, okay, to discuss any and everything that seems important to that process including, you know, how much is in a fund and including, you know, what is in this estate and not, so that plaintiffs understand, it's almost like early disclosure of an insurance policy in a case. Well, what is there? Right. That's one thing that's under Rule 26(a), a part of it, is to understand on plaintiff's side what resources are there that are available towards settlement. That's one reason why that information becomes important. + +24 25 All right. I'm going to move on from that and we'll talk about timing at the end with respect to anything and + +1 2 3 4 5 6 7 everything. I know that in some cases defendants haven't even been served much less answered and there may also be motions. There may also be motions to dismiss. I know there is at least a potential statute of limitations issue that's out there that defendants may wish to litigate, may not wish to litigate. Don't know. Can you tell me on defendant's side whether there are any motions planned? + +8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Yes, there are motions planned, Your Honor, and the statute of limitations are certainly relevant to some of those motions. I don't have all the bases for the motions that we'll begin filing I believe starting next week. And actually, I have a quick question if I can get back to that on the timing. Among other things, every plaintiff has asked for punitive damages but those are expressly barred by New York statute and other jurisdictions that they may argue are relevant. So we will be moving to dismiss claims for punitive damages as well. And again, we are developing other bases for motions. + +19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE COURT: Right. As I said, as far as I know I don't have any of these cases for dispositive motions to issue reports and recommendations on dispositive motions. So any such motions remain before the district judge. I can probably with respect to most -- different judges are different, but with respect to most of them, I can probably set a schedule for the motions, but I'm not going to be the one who decides + +1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 the motions. With respect to scheduling, on any motion of any kind I always appreciate if lawyers talk to one another and propose briefing schedules because, you know, I'm assuming you'll be reasonable. If it looks unreasonable to me like we'll brief this motion in three months and do an opposition three months later I will say no, you're not going to do that. But most times lawyers can propose sensible schedules and, like I said, always appreciate it if you talk to one another. With respect to discovery, if there are dispositive motions, that does not necessarily stay discovery. The default in this Court is it does not stay discovery. There has to be an order from the Court saying discovery is stayed. But it may make sense if there is a dispositive motion to stay discovery in whole or in part, very often what I do in cases is I try to get a feel for what should be done soon, it's not overly burdensome, and where there some reason to do it sooner, what should be put off until later because maybe you save the money on it and maybe it's less important at that initial juncture. And I try to do something that is sensible that allows the case to move in a sensible way with an understanding that motions are pending. So when you confer about discovery when we get there, think about that as well. Don't simply argue to me if there's a motion that it should be all or nothing. You can argue that, but also talk about whether there's some compromise approach that makes sense for the particular needs + +1 of the particular case. + +2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 With respect to settlement, keep one eye on that even if you're engaged in discovery because I'm a firm believer that there are windows where cases are capable of being settled. And sometimes it needs a certain something in discovery to aid that. Now, maybe as part of a claims administration process documentation would be submitted or would be discussed in that separate process anyway, but it may be that you need discovery in the litigation to have in hand certain discovery before you can figure out the right settlement for a particular case. So that might be a higher priority item because if you want to go toward an early settlement there may be certain things in discovery that are particularly important to learn or understand before you are in a position to accept or reject a proposed settlement or to make a proposed settlement. + +17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 It seems a little bit premature, even though I wanted to get a jump on these cases, to be setting discovery schedules especially in cases where there's not been an answer, certainly in cases where there's not even been service. And especially in cases where there may be a motion in lieu of an answer. But I do want everyone to confer about discovery and I want everyone to submit proposals. The more joint they are, the better. The more you have really conferred the better. When I talk about good faith + +1 + +2 + +3 + +4 + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +conference, I don't mean I sent an email and I didn't get a response yet. When I talk about good faith conference I mean you picked up the phone, you spoke to each other, you talked through issues, you tried to work out issues and only if you can't then you bring them to my attention. That goes for discovery along the way. I will not even entertain a discovery dispute if it doesn't appear to me that you fully conferred in good faith. + +Pet peeve, we're not there yet, pet peeve I get a discovery motion, I get an opposition that says we'll do certain things, I get a reply that says never mind, I have wasted my time reading it. All it tells me is you've had a failure of good faith conference. You should have been able to figure that out through talking to each other rather than spending money on briefing. + +I'll also note, by the way, that Ms. Kaplan, you sent me, I think you're the one who sent me three binders of courtesy copies of things, yes? Those are your binders? + +MS. KAPLAN: I believe so. So Your Honor, two issues. One, we have an issue about spoliation that we hope to be decided today. And two, Judge Failla called us yesterday and told us that she wanted you to decide the pseudonymous -- + +THE COURT: That's fine. + +MS. KAPLAN: -- motion in our case. So that's what + +1 we sent you, Your Honor. + +2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE COURT: That's fine. You don't have to spend your time and money putting together beautiful binders for me. I mean it's very nice, but I have three binders which I've combined into one. I mean I have three binders combined in one. One had, I don't know, maybe four, three documents and I said oops, there's one missing. So instead of sending the one that was missing you sent an entire new binder that had four instead of three. And then there was another one with separate tabs and separate letters and separate cover pages and I just took it all apart and put it all in one and I really didn't even need it at all. But thank you. And then in the binders I did get, with respect to the Jane Doe issue, the one thing that I actually wanted to see which was the two competing proposed orders, one of those was missing from the binder. Defendant's was not in there. So come on, if you're going to give me binders and you're going to give me courtesy copies, at least give me the things that I'm most going to want to see. But save your time, save your energy, save your money. If it's something lengthy that has a lot of exhibits I'm not going to want to print out, yes, courtesy copies are really appreciated. But you can just stick a courtesy copy in an envelope and say here's a courtesy copy. I don't need things so pretty. It's nice but it's not actually necessary especially if you ask for fees later and complaining that you + +1 spent money on this sort of thing. + +2 MS. KAPLAN: I apologize, Your Honor. + +3 THE COURT: That's okay. + +4 5 MS. KAPLAN: I think from our perspective there was some lack of understanding as to -- + +6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 THE COURT: Don't apologize for trying to be organized and have a nice presentation. I appreciate it. I'm not trying to be critical. I'm just saying it's really not necessary. On the John Doe -- John Doe? Jane Doe, Jane Doe issues, I have no problem signing an order. The only question is what form of order. And because there are several cases with Jane Does or somebody Doe, and because many of those, if not all, most, are going be referred to me for general pretrial supervision which will include decisions like that, it would be nice to have some uniformity. So I know that Judge Castel has already issued a couple of orders. + +17 18 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Your Honor, I have an update. I apologize to interrupt. I do have an update about this issue. + +19 20 THE COURT: You've requested that Judge Castel do something different? + +21 22 23 24 25 MR. MOSKOWITZ: No. Mr. and I, recognizing that uniformity makes sense and recognizing that it would be a shame to burden the Court with motion, continued motion practice about this because as we've clarified in our responses that Your Honor may or may not have seen -- + +1 2 THE COURT: You're going along with the form of order that Judge Castel issued? + +3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Right. We don't object to anonymity from the general public. We just want to make sure it doesn't come at the expense of our ability to defend the actions. And Mr. and I agreed yesterday in principle to a form order that I'm going to promptly send him. I'll try to do it today. This was just late afternoon yesterday. And I respectfully submit that it makes sense to have that order entered in each action. It strikes the right balance between protecting the plaintiffs' anonymity from the general public and also making sure we are free to defend the case by using that information without otherwise exposing it to people that it shouldn't go to. + +15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE COURT: Well, I must say I don't envy you both because you're before a lot of different district judges who are individuals and will handle cases differently. Also, you have a lot of different plaintiffs' lawyers who are different and may want to handle cases differently. On plaintiff's side, you know, if you had been, whoever it was -- I'm not sure who it was who wanted to have the cases all put before one judge, whether it was defendant's side that wanted to do that or plaintiffs' side. + +MS. KAPLAN: I'm the guilty party, Your Honor. + +THE COURT: Okay. If you had been successful in + +1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 having the cases before one judge, you would have had to have coordinated among plaintiffs' counsel either to figure out who'd be lead counsel or at least who would take the lead on something like proposing the terms of an order like this. So I'm hoping that even though you're spread out among different judges, plaintiffs' counsel can coordinate and can have one voice for negotiating something like that and have one order, one form of order that can govern in all of these cases for anyone who wants to proceed under a pseudonym. And it may be because Judge Castel has already entered orders, that's fine, but I'm sure he would be fine with my modifying an order to make it consistent with orders in other cases if that makes more sense. Right? So I understand defendant's view, I understand the views that have been articulated by Ms. Kaplan in her correspondence. There ought to be a happy medium that protects anonymity and it still doesn't prejudice defendants. You may have gone a little overboard in the protections you were seeking. They can be addressed as we go to some extent. See if you can work it out. Possible to work it out? I'm hoping. + +21 + +22 + +23 24 25 THE COURT: Okay. You can do it. I'm quite confident you can manage to come up with a proposed order for anonymity that will make sense and not prejudice anyone's + +MR. MOSKOWITZ: Will do, Your Honor. + +MS. KAPLAN: We will try, Your Honor. + +1 rights. + +2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 With respect to spoliation, it's raised in one case, the Judge Failla case, which is 8673. I have a simple response to this. Counsel should know what their obligations are and those obligations are pretty clear under the law and counsel should take them seriously. If you do not preserve evidence that should be preserved that you had a reason to believe was relevant to claims or defenses in the case and that you didn't take steps to preserve, there can be negative consequences down the road. In order to be confident about what evidence it is that you better take steps to preserve, it can't hurt to be asking plaintiff's counsel to summarize for you those things that you think are important if they're potentially going to make something of this. That's just for your information. But ultimately it is defendant's obligation to preserve. I don't think I should have to tell them that. And I don't plan at this point to issue an order with respect to preservation unless and until I see something where it seems fairly clear that there has been, you know, a lack of preservation or there's been that conduct. The one thing that was brought out by Ms. Kaplan with respect to the need for spoliation was a story that was reported somewhere in the press where defendants have said no, you misunderstood what happened. At this point I have no reason to doubt what defendants' counsel are saying about what happened, so + +1 2 3 4 5 therefore, I have no reason to believe there is bad faith or bad conduct. And so therefore, I'm going to deny the request to order preservation. I'm only going to remind everyone of their obligations as counsel to preserve evidence which should go without saying. + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +MS. KAPLAN: The only thing I would add to that, Your Honor, we're fine with that, is that Mr. Epstein, as Your Honor surely knows, has multiple residences in multiple countries across the world. And we just want to make sure that those same efforts are ongoing with respect to every the Virgin Islands, Paris, New Mexico, New York, Florida, and we haven't gotten that assurance. + +THE COURT: So counsel, you heard it here. Make sure your efforts are broad enough. And this motion is an example to me of the good faith conference point. You know, it seemed to me that further conference about what had happened with respect to the incident, it seems you did have some back and forth about this. But I mean a preservation order from the Court is fairly significant. There has to be something that really spurs it. And I think on plaintiffs' side hearing that the story in the press was -- that some bag had been removed from somewhere which was really not documents, I gather was some clothing -- + +MR. MOSKOWITZ: It was clothing for the decedent to be laid to rest in, Your Honor. + +1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 THE COURT: Yes. I mean if there's a reason to doubt that, there's a reason to doubt that. You'll tell the Court. If there isn't, then we don't have something extraordinary. All right? But we do have a decedent who had a lot of property, had a lot of locations where he could be found at various points in time and the preservation obligation is going to be fairly broad, still tailored to what's relevant to this case but still fairly broad. And some of these allegations do go back in time which makes the time frame for preservation that much more challenging. + +11 12 13 All right. Any other particular issues that anyone wants to raise? Pseudonymous, spoliation, anything else? Okay. + +14 15 16 17 18 19 So what I'd like you to do is confer among the plaintiffs' counsel -- by the way, do you know, do you anticipate more cases being filed and if so, how many more? Can you give me a clue? Do you know if there are more plaintiffs' counsel out there who are likely to be representing parties? + +20 21 22 23 24 MR. FUDALI: Arick Fudali, Your Honor, the Bloom Firm. I can tell the Court that we do anticipate filing more lawsuits in this case. I can't say if there's other plaintiff attorneys involved. But from our perspective, I believe at least at this point there is a plan to file more lawsuits. + +25 THE COURT: Can you give me an approximate number? 1 I won't hold you to it. + +2 MR. FUDALI: I can say less than five probably. + +3 THE COURT: Okay. + +4 MR. FUDALI: But please don't hold me to that. + +5 THE COURT: I won't. I just wanted to get a feel. + +6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 MR. FUDALI: The other issue is, Your Honor, and perhaps you were about to address this, but I think to echo what some of my colleagues said earlier is about clarity. I think the problem is that a lot of the plaintiffs are having, plaintiffs' attorneys, we're all in the dark and we're all waiting and that's not something plaintiffs or plaintiffs' attorneys like to do. So I don't know if Your Honor is willing to -- + +14 THE COURT: In the dark and waiting for what? + +15 16 MR. FUDALI: I'm sorry, details of the settlement program. + +17 THE COURT: Okay. + +18 19 MR. FUDALI: And I wonder if Your Honor is willing to set some sort of deadline -- + +20 THE COURT: Yes. I'm going to do that. + +21 22 MR. FUDALI: -- that defendants could give us some details, that we have something to bring back to our clients. + +23 24 25 THE COURT: Well, I'm going to set a deadline for reporting back to me on the status of the settlement process and by that deadline there will have had to have been + +1 2 discussions because I do not want a status report that says we know nothing, we haven't been talking, we are in the dark. + +3 MR. FUDALI: Okay. Yes. + +4 5 THE COURT: Because that would be pointless for a status report. + +6 7 8 9 MR. FUDALI: I think just, yeah, we all just want more detail so our clients can make an informed decision immediately or at least in the near future so we're not just waiting, you know, with deciding. + +10 THE COURT: Okay. + +11 MR. FUDALI: Thank you, Your Honor. + +12 13 14 MS. WANG: Good morning. Marion Wang. I just wanted to inform Your Honor that we filed another case this morning, so we have a total of three cases. + +15 16 THE COURT: I think we saw that one. We've been checking. + +17 THE CLERK: [Inaudible]. + +18 19 THE COURT: We didn't see that one? We saw another one? + +20 THE CLERK: [Inaudible]. + +21 THE COURT: II, we saw one from yesterday. + +22 23 MS. WANG: We filed one yesterday and we filed one this morning. + +24 THE COURT: Okay. + +25 MS. WANG: So we have three total. Two are on your 1 appearance list, and so there's a third one. + +2 3 THE COURT: Do you have the docket number on that one, the case number on that one? + +4 MS. WANG: Yes, we do. My colleague does. + +5 THE COURT: It's 19-CV something. + +6 MS. WANG: Yes. It is 10788. + +7 8 THE COURT: Okay. Can anyone else give me any ideas to roughly how many more may be coming down the pike? + +9 10 11 12 MR. Your Honor, Brad . Potentially dozens more cases could be filed. I'm just not sure whether they're going to be filed here or potentially in the Virgin Islands or Florida. So it's tough to -- + +13 THE COURT: Through your firm? + +14 MR. : Through our firm. + +15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 THE COURT: Okay. I would just urge that if you're anticipating filing more cases, you try to get on with it and not have this continuing sort of trickle of cases because especially if we start setting schedules for things, I'm trying to have some consistency on how cases are handled. If one comes in a month down the road, another one comes in two months down the road, another one comes in three months down the road, you're not going to be on the same schedule. + +23 24 25 MR. : Your Honor, I'll tell you that Mr. Moskowitz and I have been conferring pretty thoroughly on issues including the anonymity issue. And one thing that we + +1 2 3 4 5 6 have discussed, we filed four cases immediately and since that time our back and forths have led me to believe that by this point we would have something more substantive with respect to this proposal of settlement plan. And so that's what we've been waiting for. To some extent at Mr. Moskowitz's urging, and I don't really hold him -- + +7 + +8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 MR. : Right, before filing. So that's what we don't want to cloud the Court with a bunch of cases that ultimately turn out to be unnecessary because they decided to put the entire estate into this plan and it's going to be a good thing. So we're kind of in this limbo not knowing enough information which piggybacks what counsel said a minute ago. I think once we get clarity, we'll be able to know are there going to be dozens of other cases that need to be filed or are we going to get somewhere with this resolution. + +18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MS. KAPLAN: Your Honor, I would only add to that we will seek to file anything promptly but as Your Honor may imagine given the circumstances of this case there are women, now grown women, who were victimized by Mr. Epstein who for years and years have kept it hidden living in fear, traumatized by it. And my law firm, and I'm sure this is true for the other firms, literally get a half dozen calls a day from new women who are reading about this and who say II my + +THE COURT: You mean before filing more cases? + +1 God, you know, maybe -- + +2 THE COURT: I see. + +3 4 5 6 MS. KAPLAN: And so we can't control that. I can promise you that as soon as we learn of people who we think have claims we will do everything we can to file as expeditiously as possible. + +7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE COURT: You know, there's some tension obviously between any attorney in an existing case that says we want to move this case and we want to move this case quickly toward trial. And you know, some desire to have cases handled in some kind of way that's consistent and not know how many more cases are coming or when they're coming in. They don't have to all be handled the same way. They don't all have to be on the same schedule. It can be sort of a basic concept and then as new cases come in the same sort of concept applies. But it may be efficient that if someone is deposed, for example, like an executor or someone else on the defendant's side that the person is not deposed repeatedly. So you may be able to come up with an agreement that a deposition in one case can be used in another case. But what if it's by one counsel and you didn't have your seat at the table because, you know, you're a new attorney coming in and you didn't have a chance to be there? So when you're thinking about discovery, think about things like that. It may make sense to start thinking about proceeding with certain types of document discovery, holding + +1 + +2 + +3 + +4 + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +off on some depositions certainly on defendants' side because those may be the same or very similar in a lot of respects. Obviously, there are going to be individual stories, but some of the kinds of questions that I imagine plaintiffs are going to want to be asking are going to be the same in all the cases. So use some thought. + +I'm sending you back with things to think about and things to report back to me on. I'm not setting any discovery schedules right now. That doesn't mean I want the cases to just linger and have nothing happen. But I think it's a little bit premature. I think that it would be -- I just want to pull up a calendar here because I forgot to bring my calendar. We have holidays coming. We have obviously Thanksgiving around the corner and then we're going to hit December, January time frame. So my computer doesn't want to bring me a calendar year. I mean ordinarily I'd say 30 days and get back to me on what's going on with settlement but that's going to run into holiday time. So I mean if you can get back to me with a report before the Christmas holidays hit, that would be great but that may be tight to really have everybody involved at the table and have some discussion going on. And my erstwhile deputy has brought me my calendar. + +By the way, this person sitting at the table is Hannah . She's one of my law clerks. If you want to call my about something, she's a good contact person. + +1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 I'm sure she's thrilled to hear me say that. If you happen to be a member of the press, are any members of the press here? Look at all these members of the press. Welcome to my courtroom. If you have inquiries, please do not call Hannah. Please call the district executive's office because if you call us, other than telling you yes it's true, we have a conference today at 10 o'clock, or something like that, we're going to steer you to the district executive's office for press inquiries. So please just do that in the first instance. And they'll contact us if they need information from us to pass along to you. But for litigants -- all right, so let me look at this calendar. + +13 14 15 16 It is now November 21. Well, what do you think on both sides would be rational for reporting back with respect to status of getting some input on plaintiff's side, getting information from defendants, all that? + +17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MR. MOSKOWITZ: So on defendants' side, two things I think are relevant to that, Your Honor, recognizing that we can't keep, you know, letting things linger because of new cases coming in as you were alluding to. Currently with respect to cases for which response deadlines to complaints are already set, I believe the last of those response deadlines runs December 20 or something. So I think it would make sense for getting back to the Court to be sometime after that, not too long. And obviously, there's the holidays so + +1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 maybe a couple of weeks after that would make sense. Also, in terms of timing generally, this will come as no surprise I think to Your Honor, we will, we have and we will continue on my end to work as diligently as possible to promptly provide information that we agree should be provided. Things do take a little longer given that it's not just an estate but perhaps the most complex estate that I'm aware of in existence right now. So to get answers to questions that may in some cases be simple take a little longer in my situation. + +10 11 THE COURT: I don't need a status report that says we've worked it all out. + +12 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Right. + +13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE COURT: I need a status report that says here's the progress that has been made on both sides with attorneys on both sides confident that there is in fact progress, that there is in fact a flow of information, that they're in fact sitting down and talking about things and that they're learning and that they're engaged and that they have some hope. Okay? That's what I want to hear. That's your mission. All right? And on defendants' side, it is very much in your interest to help facilitate this and try to make sure this happens efficiently because to the extent anyone is holding off on filing new cases to see if in fact there's a workable plan for settlement that will avoid the need for litigation, the longer it goes where they have doubts that + +1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 that is in fact a workable plan, the more likely they are, especially after what I said about trying to coordinate cases, to just start filing these cases. I certainly don't mind -- I can't speak to statute of limitation issues and whether this period of time would matter or not on those issues, but I don't mind if you hold off on filing cases if you think that's fast because you're optimistic about a settlement fund. Use your judgment about when you file cases. I'm not going to direct you when to file them. But you've got a lot of different balls in the air. You've got when cases are going to be filed, how many there are, if discovery should move or should not move, whether they should be coordinated in some way or not, whether certain discovery should go first and other discovery later, whether there are going to be dispositive motions, how that affects whether there should be discovery. And all of this with this backdrop of talking about settlement. So I'm thinking maybe we'll just do one overall status report in all these separate cases before separate judges. That may be difficult. Maybe I can at least get for each cluster of plaintiff's' lawyers the same letter filed in each of the cases that you have. If you can all coordinate, so much the better. If you can't, you'll have to put them on the docket separately. But anyway, status reports on everything, meaning discussions on settlement. Needless to say, don't put confidential details about settlement on ECF. + +1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Settlement is the one time I'll hear from you ex parte about things if we really get there. If you really want to give me details like that, send me something ex parte solely on settlement. But what I'm looking for at this point is something more general that you think can be on the public docket. So if you can, please put things on the public docket. There's press interest in this case. Let's try to have as much on the public docket as we can. Okay? But a single report that talks (A) about progress of settlement talks and (B) about a plan for moving forward with the cases. And if they have to be case specific, they're case specific. Do what you think you have to do saving money to the extent you can, breaking it out if necessary. Use judgment. Understand that I'd rather have three letters than 53 letters but, you know, I'll read what I have to read. Okay? And how about January 10? That takes you a couple of weeks past New Year's. Everybody okay with that? + +18 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Works for defendants, Your Honor. + +19 20 21 22 23 THE COURT: All right. Look, if anyone has an immediate need that comes up between now and then, I'm not going anywhere including through the holidays. I'll be around. You can contact my . Put a letter on ECF. Yes. + +24 25 MR. GOLDFARB: Thank you, Judge. Thank you for allowing us to appear from Miami. Alan Goldfarb for Jane Doe 1 17. + +2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 One suggestion I might offer, Your Honor, is for the next significant hearing I'd like to hear from whoever the claims administrator would be and have some answers here in court so they can participate in explaining this process as to how they see it instead of hunting back and forth as I think might happen. So I actually was hoping you would have had a pre-Christmas status on that issue alone so we can get some indication, which is almost 30 days from now, Judge, on how that process would work here from the horse's mouth, and we all hear it at once. We're told how this would work, we understand it, and we go back and decide if we accept that or not. You know, January 10th feels a little long for me for the process. You're talking about 90 days. And I don't mind coming back up here to your wonderful city again Christmastime. + +17 18 THE COURT: I didn't know you were coming but you're welcome. + +19 MR. GOLDFARB: Thank you. + +20 21 22 23 24 25 THE COURT: Basically what we did is we put a notice on the docket on the first group of cases that we were having a conference and then we started reaching out to counsel in later filed cases who seemed to already know that there was a conference. So we just figured people would show up. But we didn't reach out to anyone in Florida. + +1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 January 10, I'm basically thinking kicking it more than 30 days because of the holidays. That's why January 10. But what I'm thinking ought to happen between now and then, I give it to you for serious consideration, is you folks ought to schedule a meeting without me. You ought to schedule a meeting with the claims administrators and with counsel in these cases on both sides. And you ought to sit around a table and you ought to talk about all the questions and get as many answers as you can get and try to gain some confidence that you are all participating and your views are being taken seriously and valued. And that's what I think you ought to do because in settlement discussions that's what happens. People talk outside of the court about things and try to advance the ball. And you do have a lot of people. And if you talk one on one, then you have another one on one with a different lawyer and the message is heard differently or different questions are asked and answered, you know, you're going to have some confusion reigning. So I would strongly recommend we not use the courtroom for that meeting at this stage but that you see if you can set one up and literally bring people to the table as a settlement discussion. And then when you report back, you'll have something to report back on. Yes? + +23 24 25 MR. BOIES: Your Honor, David Boies. I agree completely with the Court we need to meet among ourselves. You got good counsel on both sides here. I think that we can + +1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 make progress. However, my consistent experience over, as Ms. Kaplan was saying, over a considerable number of years is that counsel, even with a best faith world, tend to work harder when they've got a appearance before the Court in order to respond to where they are. And I think that if -- I would I think echo what Mr. Goldfarb said which is that if the Court were to set a conference on December 20th just to sort of report on where we were in terms of the settlement process and the administrators, I think that would spur us over the next 30 days to maybe work harder and more effectively than if we didn't have that date. + +12 13 14 15 THE COURT: Are there any attorneys here in the courtroom who do not have your personal calendars with you because they were confiscated at the door? Do you all have your calendars? + +16 MALE SPEAKER: Yes, Your Honor. + +17 FEMALE SPEAKER: Sure. + +18 19 20 MR. MOSKOWITZ: And Your Honor, I mean going back to exactly what you said about just being practical with the holidays, I'm out of state that week, December 20th. + +21 22 23 24 25 THE COURT: All right. I'm not scheduling any conference December 20. But what I suggest is when I step down from the bench I suggest that the attorneys stick around for a minute, compare notes on their availability, see if you can at least tentatively come up with a couple of dates that + +1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 might work for a meeting among you. You're going to have to get in touch with the administrators to see if they're available which is why more than one date would be useful. See if you can get something on the calendar that's a firm date to start having real meetings to be able to discuss things with everybody who wants to be involved involved, and everyone could hear everyone else's questions. I just don't think I should be using the courtroom for that at this time. + +9 10 11 12 MS. KAPLAN: Thank you, Your Honor. We will. I think what you're hearing, if I could speak from the plaintiffs' side, is we've been asking for exactly that meeting now for many weeks, so -- + +13 THE COURT: Okay. So let's -- + +14 15 MS. KAPLAN: -- that's why you're hearing the consternation on our side. + +16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE COURT: All right. Well, we don't want consternation. We don't want anybody feeling frustrated. We want everybody feeling encouraged that there is responsiveness and that this is going to move forward on a track that everybody's going to be optimistic about. That's the goal. All right? You are all good counsel and you all understand the need to work together. And settlement doesn't happen unless people work together. So let's start making that happen. Try to schedule, you know -- I mean look, you can provide information, you can provide some information in + +1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 writing perhaps. Whatever. You can start doing that pretty promptly. But try to schedule a meeting where you start talking about this so that by January 10 it's not just you met on January 9. You know, you had a meeting, you started talking, you had some further dialog, you have some progress to report. That's the goal to have progress to report. And I fully agree that having the Court keep tabs makes things happen that doesn't otherwise happen which is why even at this ridiculously early stage for many of these cases you are all here today because the goal is to take of this and to try to oversee this and to try to make these cases move in an appropriate way instead of just having lots of separate squabbles going on, lots of separate issues floating around, different sorts of letters expressing different sorts of frustration. Right? We're going to try to have this as frustration free as possible. These are serious claims. Defense counsel recognizes that. There are a lot of them. There are more to come. Let's see if we can get them on a settlement track that everybody is comfortable with. And January 10, one letter, 30 letters, whatever it is, try to report back on settlement, on motion practice if there's going to be motion practice, on discovery proposals if you think discovery is in order and you know, with lots of thought. And to the extent you differ, I'll see how you differ. To the extent you can be of one mind as to how things should proceed, great. All right? + + MS. KAPLAN: Thank you, Your Honor. + + MR. FUDALI: Thank you, Your Honor. + + THE COURT: It's a goal. + + MR. MOSKOWITZ: Thank you, Your Honor. + + THE COURT: Go forth. Go forth and do. + + I certify that the foregoing is a court transcript from an electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the aboveentitled matter. + +Mafy grew- + +Mary Greco + +Dated: November 25, 2019 \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778310/EFTA02778310.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778310/EFTA02778310.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..46592f0c7d484712b4e3815f9cba9b5565d164a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778310/EFTA02778310.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778310", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "9b39e4ef4750b4fc24f0c760017d706b12d095e0bbc834c492639d596ed0e76e", + "output_sha256": "9b39e4ef4750b4fc24f0c760017d706b12d095e0bbc834c492639d596ed0e76e", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778363/EFTA02778363.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778363/EFTA02778363.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..dcd3a0676a0dc2452eb0856f07cf6135bb3ca0ea --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778363/EFTA02778363.md @@ -0,0 +1,158 @@ +# Exhibit B + +#### Epstein Victims' Compensation Program + +## PROTOCOL + +May 29, 2020 + +#### I. PURPOSE AND OVERVIEW + +The Epstein Victims' Compensation Program (the "Program") is a voluntary, independent Program that has been established to compensate and resolve the claims of victims-survivors of sexual abuse by Jeffrey Epstein ("Epstein"). + +The Estate of Jeffrey Epstein (the "Estate") has retained the services of nationally recognized claims administration experts Kenneth R. Feinberg, Camille S. Biros and Jordana H. to design the Program. will also serve as the Administrator of the Program (the "Administrator"). This Protocol reflects input from victims-survivors, their lawyers, other potentially interested parties, and representatives of the Estate. + +Through the Program, the Estate wishes to acknowledge the wrongs endured by victims-survivors and offer them an opportunity to voluntarily resolve their individual claims for such sexual abuse. + +The Program is governed by the following non-exclusive guiding principles: + +- The Program is purely voluntary. It does not affect any rights a Claimant may have unless and until the Claimant accepts the offered compensation and executes a Release. A Claimant may reject the offer of compensation and may stop participating in the Program and withdraw the claim at any time prior to execution of the Release. +- The Program is independent and will in no way be administered, controlled or overseen by the Estate. The Administrator is responsible for all decisions relating to the review, processing and evaluation of individual claims submitted to the Program. The Administrator will have final, binding and exclusive authority to determine Claimant eligibility and the valuation of each eligible individual claim. Decisions of the Administrator made pursuant to this Protocol are not subject to review or modification in any way by the Estate or any other party or entity. +- There is no cap or limitation on the aggregate amount of funds available to compensate all eligible Claimants or on the amount of compensation to be made to each individual Claimant. Each individual claim will be evaluated separately by the Administrator. The Administrator will determine, in her sole and exclusive discretion, issues of eligibility and the amount of compensation and the Estate will pay all eligible claims based on the Administrator's determination. + +- All Claimants will be treated with respect, dignity and fairness without regard to race, color, sexual orientation, national origin, religion, gender or disability. To ensure claims will be adjudicated fairly, the Administrator will manage the process so that all Claimants can equally access the Program's claim process. Individuals with disabilities will be given the opportunity to effectively communicate their claims and to request special process accommodations. + +The Program is available to all victims-survivors regardless of where they were harmed, when they were harmed, whether the claim is time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and whether they have previously filed a lawsuit against or settled with Epstein and/or the Estate. + +The exclusive claims period for filing a claim pursuant to this Protocol shall commence on the to-bedetermined Effective Date and shall conclude nine (9) months after that date ("Filing Deadline"). All individual claims filed with the Program must be filed within this period. + +To complement the Program's resources, the Administrator will, at her discretion and with the consent of the Claimant, consult with Professor Marci A. a nationally recognized sexual abuse expert, leading legal academic and advocate of victims' rights. role will be to further inform the Administrator and her staff about the dynamics of sexual abuse, common responses to sexual abuse, and the impact of sexual abuse on victims; to serve as a resource for the Administrator in developing or updating policies and procedures; to advise the Administrator regarding sensitivities involved in interactions with victims; and to serve as a referral source for the Administrator in providing postdetermination information to claimants who seek guidance, counseling or other services. The Administrator may, at her discretion and with the Claimant's prior written consent, request that ■ **review an individual claimant file. The Administrator will determine on a case-by-case basis, in her discretion, the need to anonymize individual claimants' files before sharing them with As set forth above, the Administrator is solely responsible for all decisions relating to the administration of the Program, including the review, processing, evaluation, and determination of individual claims submitted to the Program.** + +**During the term of the Program, will not meet or speak with a Claimant or her representatives concerning any aspect of the Program without the Administrator present. will maintain in strict confidence and will not disclose outside the Program any information she obtains through her participation in the Program, including individual Claimants' submissions.** + +#### II. ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS + +#### A. Eligibility Criteria + +The persons eligible to participate in this Program are individuals who allege they were sexually abused by Epstein. In addition, the following criteria apply: + +- The claim of sexual abuse must be directed against Epstein. +- An individual whose claim is time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations may participate in the Program provided that other eligibility criteria are met. +- An individual who previously entered into a settlement agreement resolving a claim of sexual abuse against Epstein may participate in the Program provided that other eligibility criteria are met. +- An individual who allegedly assisted Epstein in procuring other victims-survivors may participate in the Program where there is a credible basis to determine that the individual acted under duress as a result of her own sexual abuse by Epstein, provided that other eligibility criteria are met. +- If the Claimant chooses to accept the offered compensation, the Claimant must dismiss with prejudice any existing lawsuits, legal actions or claims filed against the Estate or related entities and/or related individuals. The Claimant must provide proof of such dismissal along with or prior to the signed acceptance of the compensation determination offer letter and executed Release in order to receive payment. + +# B. Legal Representatives of Claimants + +An individual may file a claim on a victim's behalf where that individual has been granted legal authority to act in a representative capacity pursuant to appropriate law. The "Legal Representative" of an individual Claimant shall mean: (1) in the case of a Claimant who is currently a minor, a parent or legal guardian authorized by law to serve as the minor's legal representative; (2) in the case of an incompetent or legally incapacitated Claimant, a person who has been duly appointed as the Claimant's legal representative in accordance with applicable law; (3) in the case of a deceased Claimant, a person who has been duly appointed to act as the personal representative of the Claimant's estate by a court of competent jurisdiction and is authorized to file and compromise a claim; or (4) an attorney authorized to represent the Claimant for purposes of pursuing a claim through this Program. + +Legal Representatives must provide proper documentation demonstrating representative capacity. Such proof may include a power of attorney; documentation showing the individual's appointment as guardian or guardian ad litem; documentation showing the individual's appointment as personal representative of the Claimant's estate (such as letters of administration); a copy of a retainer agreement showing legal representation signed by both the Claimant and the attorney or a signed statement by an adult Claimant and the attorney that a licensed/admitted attorney is acting on her behalf. + +# III. CLAIMS ADMINISTRATION - SUBMISSION, EVALUATION AND DETERMINATION + +#### A. Claims Submission Process + +Individuals who have filed a lawsuit, legal action or claim against Epstein and/or the Estate or have otherwise been identified as a victim of Epstein by their attorney to the Administrator on or before the Effective Date will be sent a Claim Form and other relevant Program information, including Instructions for completion and submission of the Claim Form and a copy of this Protocol. Individuals who have filed a lawsuit need not agree to a stay of litigation or make any other concession in any pending litigation to be eligible to participate in the Program. Likewise, individuals who have not yet filed a lawsuit remain free to file a lawsuit and engage in litigation concurrently with participation in the Program. Individuals must, however, dismiss with prejudice any and all existing lawsuits, legal actions and claims prior to or at the time of acceptance of a compensation determination offer in order to receive payment. + +Individuals who have not filed a lawsuit, legal action or claim against Epstein and/or the Estate or have not otherwise been identified as a victim of Epstein by their attorney to the Administrator on or before the Effective Date may register to participate in this Program on the Program's website at www.EpsteinVCP.com. To register, such individuals must complete a questionnaire setting forth their name, contact information, a summary description of the nature of the claim and other requested information. Upon registration, the Administrator will perform a preliminary review to consider if the individual is eligible to participate in the Program. If the Administrator deems that the individual is eligible to participate in the Program, she will then send that individual a Claim Form and other relevant Program information. + +Note: The fact that an individual is sent a Claim Form and other relevant Program information indicates that the Administrator has determined that such individual is eligible to participate in the Program. It does not indicate that the Administrator has determined that such individual is eligible to receive compensation. That determination is made only after a Claim Form and all required documentation has been submitted and evaluated by the Administrator. + +Registrations for individuals who have not filed a lawsuit, legal action or claim against Epstein and/or the Estate or have not otherwise been identified as a victim of Jeffrey Epstein by their attorney to the Administrator on or before the Effective Date will be accepted by the Administrator from the Effective Date through a date that is 45 days prior to the Filing Deadline ("Registration Deadline"). It is important to note that the Registration Deadline is separate from, and precedes, the Filing Deadline. As explained above, all claims must be filed by the Filing Deadline. + +All Claim Forms must be completed to the best of a Claimant's ability and filed no later than the Filing Deadline. Claim Forms should be uploaded to the Program website at www.EpsteinVCP.com, or mailed via overnight courier (a pre-paid courier voucher will be included with each packet) to the Administrator at the following address: + +# Epstein Victims' Compensation Program + +Attn: Jordana H. Administrator + +1050 Connecticut Ave., NW + +#65488 + +Washington, D.C. 20035 + +Claimants are invited to provide documentation identified in the Claim Form, and any other corroborating or supporting information sufficient to substantiate the claim, satisfy eligibility requirements, and allow the Administrator to review, process and evaluate the claim. If the claim is being presented by a Legal Representative, then the Legal Representative will be responsible for submitting the necessary documentation relating to the represented Claimant. + +Additional documentation may be requested at the discretion of the Administrator. Both the Claimant and the Estate will be afforded the opportunity to submit to the Administrator any information deemed relevant to the Administrator's evaluation and determination of the claim before the Administrator's final disposition of the claim. + +If a Claimant submits an incomplete or deficient claim, the Administrator will notify the Claimant, explain the additional information that is needed, and work with the Claimant or the Claimant's Legal Representative (where applicable) to assist in submitting a complete claim. + +### B. Claims Evaluation and Determination + +Claims will be evaluated in the order in which they are received, with the Administrator evaluating each submitted individual claim in a prompt and fair manner. Claims will only be determined once all required documentation has been submitted to the Administrator, with due consideration granted to Claimant's good faith explanations for delays and/or absence of documentation. + +## 1. Factors Considered in Evaluating Claims + +As to each individual claim, the Administrator will determine, in her sole discretion based upon all of the information available, whether the allegations of sexual abuse are credible. The Administrator will consider appropriate factors and corroborative support, including but not limited to: + +- The level of documentation, corroboration or other circumstantial evidence regarding the nature and extent of the abuse, the frequency, location and other details of the abuse, and the age of the victim at the time of the abuse. Non-exhaustive examples of such evidence include + - (i) medical or psychiatric counseling/therapy records relevant to the abuse, and + - (ii) contemporaneous written notification or other correspondence (e.g., letters, emails) of the abuse by the Claimant to law enforcement authorities, parents, friends or others. The + +Administrator acknowledges that some Claimants may not be able to provide any documentation to corroborate their Claim based on the nature and circumstances of Epstein's conduct. If a Claimant's written and oral presentation is deemed to be credible by the Administrator, the Claimant may still be eligible for compensation under the Program. + +- Whether there exists any information and/or pertinent findings offered by the appropriate Office of the District Attorney, United States Attorney's Office, or other law enforcement agency. +- Whether the Administrator finds the claims of the individual to be credible after complete review of all relevant documentation and other evidence provided by the Claimant and the Estate. + +As to each individual claim, the Administrator will determine, in her sole discretion based upon all of the information available, the amount of compensation that should be offered to each eligible Claimant. The Administrator will consider appropriate factors and corroborative support, including but not limited to: + +- The nature, duration and extent of the sexual abuse suffered by the Claimant. +- The age of the Claimant at the time of the sexual abuse. +- The nature and extent of the Claimant's physical or psychological damage resulting from the sexual abuse, and the effect of the sexual abuse on the Claimant. +- The credibility of the claim based upon all of the facts and circumstances, supporting documentation and corroborating evidence. +- Whether the Claimant previously entered into a settlement agreement with Epstein and received a payment pursuant to such agreement. + +The Administrator will confidentially send the Claimant a compensation determination offer letter including the following: (1) the Administrator's eligibility decision regarding the claim; (2) the amount of compensation offered; (3) a Release to be signed by the Claimant if the Claimant accepts the offered compensation; and (4) a Payment Option Form. The Administrator's offer shall be valid for 60 days from the date of the compensation determination offer letter. + +The Administrator's determinations in this Program will not be binding on any potential criminal investigation involving Claimant's claims. + +# 2. Opportunities to be Heard + +The Claimant will be afforded an opportunity to be heard, either before or after the Administrator renders her determination. Upon request by the Claimant, the Administrator will be available to meet in person (as practicable in light of the COVID-19 pandemic), by video conference, or by teleconference to + +further discuss the claim. These meetings are completely optional and voluntary. Requests to meet with the Administrator should be sent by email to ClaimantServices@EosteinVCP.com and will be scheduled at a mutually convenient time and location. The Administrator may also request a meeting with a Claimant or her Legal Representative at a reasonable mutually convenient time and location, though the Claimant is not obligated to attend any such meeting. + +#### 3. Release + +By submitting a claim to the Program, a Claimant is seeking to resolve all claims relating to allegations of sexual abuse against Epstein and/or the Estate, and related entities and individuals as set forth in the Release. If a Claimant chooses to accept the offer of compensation pursuant to the Program, the Claimant will be required to sign and execute a full Release, in a form satisfactory to the Estate, of all past and future claims (including lis pendens, writs of attachment, etc.) relating to such allegations of sexual abuse against the Estate, related entities and/or related individuals. A Claimant may reject the offer of compensation and may stop participating in the Program and withdraw the claim at any time prior to the execution of the Release. + +The Release will waive any rights the Claimant and her heirs, descendants, legatees or beneficiaries may have to assert any claims relating to allegations of sexual abuse against the Estate, related entities and/or related individuals, to file an individual legal action relating to such allegations, or to participate in any civil legal action associated with such allegations, except as a witness. However, the Release will not operate to preclude or limit the Claimant's ability to report and discuss allegations of sexual abuse with law enforcement officials or anyone else. In other words, the Release will not impose any rules of confidentiality on claimants, who are expressly permitted to discuss their allegations without restriction, should they choose. + +Before signing a Release, the Claimant must consult with an attorney selected by the Claimant. If the Claimant is not represented by an attorney, the Program will provide an attorney to provide free legal counseling to the Claimant for the sole purpose of advising the Claimant concerning the language and binding nature of the Release. + +No one affiliated with the Program will provide tax or legal advice to those receiving payments under the Program. Claimants are urged to consult with a tax advisor concerning any questions regarding tax liability for payments pursuant to the Program. + +# 4. Payments + +Upon the Claimant's acceptance of the Administrator's determination, the Administrator's receipt of the Claimant's executed Release and, where applicable, dismissal with prejudice of any existing lawsuit, legal actions or claims against the Estate or related entities and/or related individuals, the Administrator will initiate payment by check or electronic funds transfer to each eligible Claimant as directed by the Claimant. Checks will be sent to Claimants via overnight courier service. All + +payments made under the Program shall be for a Claimant's physical injuries, physical sickness and resulting emotional distress within the meaning of Section 104(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. + +# C. Program Integrity + +For the purpose of protecting both the integrity of the Program and financial resources for eligible Claimants, the Administrator will institute all necessary measures to prevent payment of fraudulent claims, including taking steps to verify claims and analyze submissions for inconsistencies, irregularities or duplication. + +Each Claimant who signs the Claim Form at the time of submission certifies that the information provided in the Claim Form is true and accurate to the best of the Claimant's knowledge, and that the Claimant understands that false statements or claims made in connection with such submission may result in fines, imprisonment and/or any other remedy available by law. Claims that appear to be potentially fraudulent or to contain information known by the Claimant to be false when made will be forwarded to federal, state or local law enforcement agencies and/or the appropriate Office of the District Attorney and/or United States Attorney's Office for possible investigation and prosecution. + +# D. Confidentiality/Privacy + +The Program is confidential.' By filing a claim with the Program, the Claimant or her Legal Representative (where applicable) agrees that information submitted by the Claimant pursuant to the Program will be used and/or disclosed by the Administrator and her designees only for the following purposes: + +- I) Processing and evaluating the Claimant's claim; +- 2) Administering the Program and other Program-related work; and +- 3) Reports to law enforcement where appropriate, related to potentially fraudulent claims. + +When documents or other information maintained or submitted by the Estate become part of a Claimant's file for purposes of the Program, such materials will be reviewed by the Administrator to assist in processing and evaluating the claim, but will otherwise remain confidential. No information provided by Claimants will be provided to the Estate except for the Claimant's name and the date(s) and location(s) of the alleged abuse, for the sole purpose of processing and evaluating the claim and, for purposes of the Release, the names of any other individual(s) to whom or by whom the Claimant alleges she was trafficked or sexually abused. The Estate has agreed that no information obtained solely through the Program will be disclosed publicly or used by the Estate in defending itself from any claim, regardless of forum. The Program's files are not available for inspection, review or copying by the Estate or the Claimant or her representatives during or after the Program, and all pertinent + +All parties agree that they are using the services of a third-party administrator to help reach a resolution of individual claims of sexual abuse, and that this Program is entitled to confidentiality, privileges (mediation, settlement and all other pertinent privileges), and protection from disclosure under applicable law. + +To protect the privacy of Claimants participating in the Program, all personal information provided by the Claimant during this process will be returned or destroyed within one year after the conclusion of the Program. + +Individual Claimants are not bound through the Program by any rules of confidentiality. Claimants may, at their sole and voluntary option, disclose information in their possession regarding their claim, their compensation and their experience with the Program. + +All confidentiality requirements are subject to law, regulation and judicial process. + +#### E. Reporting + +The Administrator shall, on a monthly basis, confidentially provide reports regarding the number and total value of claims paid each month to the Probate Court of the United States Virgin Islands and the Attorney General of the United States Virgin Islands. Such reports will report on an aggregate level only. No individual Claimant information will be published or disclosed in a way that compromises Claimant confidentiality. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778363/EFTA02778363.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778363/EFTA02778363.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f0291bade322793e21ab111d290e132a67206aa5 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778363/EFTA02778363.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778363", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "300a405876a79d73752b122d2d7876e56be246f285417528c413a5c89fcceda2", + "output_sha256": "300a405876a79d73752b122d2d7876e56be246f285417528c413a5c89fcceda2", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778373/EFTA02778373.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778373/EFTA02778373.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..30490991af568c9fedcf9595c308159a6de8040d --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778373/EFTA02778373.md @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +## Exhibit C + +From: Moskowitz. Bennet J To: l aura Monomer( Cc: Aaronson • Santa Valerie• Rover. Charles I • Sabina Marie; Saind IlleCawlev. Andrew Villacastin; /ash Schiller • °dip...lolly; left Panleira Subject: RE: Doe 1000; A. and Date: Friday, June 19, 2020 5:41:20 PM Attachments: EaternitCEELLEASEal + +CAUTION: External email. Please do not respond to or click on links/attachments unless you recognize the sender. + +Laura, + +Here is a copy of the Program release. + +Best, Bennet + +Bennet J. Moskowitz\* + +troutman sanders + +Direct: 212.704.6087 + +bennet.moskowitz@troutman.com + +\*Licensed to practice law in New York and Connecticut \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778373/EFTA02778373.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778373/EFTA02778373.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a0e453645c9998316138f24610551319d323034d --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778373/EFTA02778373.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778373", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "f23e759e3a342d075f927c0a1236102e442e92d5411f9e725c0431cbb51ae230", + "output_sha256": "f23e759e3a342d075f927c0a1236102e442e92d5411f9e725c0431cbb51ae230", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778375/EFTA02778375.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778375/EFTA02778375.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e3807e9b7a79132e8bd58a6585e4c5db64e0d632 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778375/EFTA02778375.md @@ -0,0 +1,250 @@ +## Exhibit D + +From: {aura Menninoer To: 6011(210LVdhisii110; Moskowitz Bennet J Cc: Sabina MarieEd; Smrid McCawlev loch Schiller Aaronson. Matthew J • Sirota. Valerie BInver. Charles I • Dillon° Molly. )eff Pachuca Subject: RE: v. Indyke, et al. Date: Tuesday, November 10, 2020 3:29:09 PM + +CAUTION: External email. Please do not respond to or click on links/attachments unless you recognize the sender. + +Andrew — + +Thank you for sharing that representation. + +In order to make an informed decision as to whether to agree to the stipulation and to potentially forego requests for our client's fees and costs in defending against this action, we need an executed copy of the actual release. + +-Laura + +Laura A. Menninger Partner Haddon, & P.C. 150 E. 10th Avenue I Denver, CO 80203 +1 303 831 7364 (Office) lmenningerkOmflaw.com + +From: Andrew Villacastin + +Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2020 10:29 AM + +To: Moskowitz, Bennet J. + +Cc: Laura Menninger ; Sabina Mariella ; Sigrid McCawley ; Josh Schiller ; Aaronson, Matthew J. ; Sirota, Valerie ; Glover, Charles L. ; DiRago, Molly ; Jeff Pagliuca + + + +Thank you for speaking this morning. + + +The objection you raised on the call was whether your client's name was included within the section that reads: "This General Release specifically does not include as a Releasee or released party under this Agreement , and all parties expressly acknowledge, agree and understand that any and all claims that Releasor has or may have against are expressly preserved." + +Without waiving the confidentiality of the remainder of the document, and in order to avoid unnecessary motion practice and expense, Plaintiff is willing to disclose that your client's name is not written into that section. + +With that understanding, please let us know if you are willing to sign the attached stipulation, or if Plaintiff should proceed as we had discussed on the call. + + +Andrew Villacastin Associate + +BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP 55 Hudson Yards New York, NY 10001 (t) +1 212 909 7628 avillarastinPhsfllo corn www bcfllo rom + +From: Moskowitz, Bennet J. (rnailto:Bennet MoskowitzOtroutman (-ora) + +Sent: Friday, November 6, 2020 2:27 PM + +To: Andrew Villacastin + +Cc: Laura Menninger . Sabina Mariella amariellaOhsflIn corn>. Sigrid McCawley . Josh Schiller ' Aaronson, Matthew J. . Sirota, Valerie . Glover, Charles L. cr harles Gloveratroutman corn>. DiRago, Molly . Jeff Pagliuca Subject: Re: v. Indyke, et al. + +CAUTION: External email. Please do not respond to or click on Ilnks/attachments unless you recognize the sender. + +11am fine here. Thanks + + + +troutman pepper + +Direct: 212.704.6087 I Internal: 13-6087 bennetmoskowit7etroutman.com + + +On Nov 6, 2020, at 2:25 PM, Andrew Villacastin wrote: + +## EXTERNAL SENDER + +We're available Tuesday from 11 to 11:30 and after 4pm Eastern. + +Bennet, can you make 11am? If not, how about 4pm? + + +Andrew Villacastin Associate + +B0IES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP 55 Hudson Yards New York, NY 10001 (t) +1 212 909 7628 avillarastinPbsfilo corn www bsfllo corn + +From: Laura Menninger [rnailto•Imenninger(alhmflaw corn) + +Sent: Friday, November 6, 2020 11:46 AM + +To: 'Moskowitz, Bennet J.' . Sabina Mariella + +Cc: Sigrid McCawley . Josh Schiller . Aaronson, Matthew J. • Sirota, Valerie . Glover, Charles L. . DiRago, Molly + + +CAUTION: External email. Please do not respond to or click on links/attachments unless you recognize the sender. + +I'm not available on Monday. I'm available Tuesday except for 11:30-12:30 ET. + +Laura A. Menninger Partner Haddon, & P.C. 150 E. 10th Avenue I Denver, CO 80203 + ++1 303 831 7364 (Office) Imenninger(Ohmflaw cow + +From: Moskowitz, Bennet J. + +Sent: Friday, November 6, 2020 9:36 AM + +To: Andrew Villacastin .Sabina Mariella . Laura Menninger + +Cc: Sigrid McCawley . Josh Schiller . Aaronson, Matthew J. . Sirota, Valerie . Glover, Charles L. . DiRago, Molly . Jeff Pagliuca + + +I am available on Monday from 930am — 2pm Eastern. Thank you. + + + +troutman pepper Direct: 212.704.6087 benneLmoskowit7Vtroutman.com + + +From: Andrew Villacastin + +Sent: Friday, November 6, 2020 11:06 AM + +To: Sabina Mariella . Laura Menninger + +Cc: Sigrid McCawley . Josh Schiller . Aaronson, Matthew J. . Sirota, Valerie . Glover, Charles L. . DiRago, Molly . Moskowitz, Bennet J. . Jeff Pagliuca cipaglinraOhmflaw corn> Subject: RE: v. Indyke, et al. + +## EXTERNAL SENDER + + +Please let us know your availability to meet and confer early next week on the proposed stipulated dismissal, which is reattached for your convenience. If for some reason we cannot agree to a stipulation, Plaintiff intends file a motion for dismissal under Rule 41. We are available all day Monday. Please let us know what times work for you both. + + +Associate + +BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP 55 Hudson Yards New York, NY 10001 (t) +1 212 909 7628 avillarastinPbstho corn www bcfllo row( + +From: Sabina Mariella + +Sent: Friday, October 30, 2020 10:15 PM + +To: Laura Menninger + +Cc: Sigrid McCawley . Josh Schiller . Andrew Villacastin ' Aaronson, Matthew J. . Sirota, Valerie . Glover, Charles L. ' DiRago, Molly . Moskowitz, Bennet J. . Jeff Pagliuca + + + +Bennet sent you a copy of the release on June 19, 2020 at 5:41 pm EST. That is the same version that signed. And as my October 14 email stated, has received and accepted an offer of compensation. I am not sure what further details you need in order to agree to a voluntary dismissal, but as I have said before, is entitled to confidentiality as to her participation in this Program and is not waiving that confidentiality in exchange for your agreement to dismiss this case. + +Sabina + +From: Laura Menninger [rnailto.lmenninger(@hmflaw corn) + +Sent: Monday, October 26, 2020 3:40 PM + +To: Sabina Mariella arnariellaabsfllo com> + +Cc: Sigrid McCawley . Josh Schiller . Andrew Villacastin . Aaronson, Matthew J. . Sirota, Valerie . Glover, Charles L. . DiRago, Molly . Moskowitz, Bennet J. . Jeff Pagliuca + +Subject: Re: v. Indyke, et al. + +CAUTION: External email. Please do not respond to or click on links/attachments unless you recognize the sender. + +Sabina - + +We have not yet received a copy of any release that your client signed in connection with her request to dismiss this case. + +We also are unaware of any consideration that has been paid to your client in exchange for her dismissal. + +I think before we can respond to the request for voluntary dismissal with each side to pay their own fees and costs, we need to evaluate the scope of the settlement agreement. + +Thanks, Laura + +On Oct 26, 2020, at 4:06 AM, Sabina Mariella wrote: + + +We have not yet received your signature on the stipulation for dismissal. Please return the stipulation to us at your earliest convenience. + +Sabina + +From: Moskowitz, Bennet J. (mailto-Bennet Moskowitz(aJtroutman rorn) + +Sent: Wednesday, October 14, 2020 9:00 PM + +To: Sabina Mariella + +Cc: Sigrid McCawley - Josh Schiller ; + +Andrew Villacastin - Aaronson, Matthew J. + +. Sirota, Valerie . + +Glover, Charles L. ; DiRago, Molly + +. Laura Menninger + + +CAUTION: External email. Please do not respond to or click on links/attachments unless you recognize the sender. + +Hello Sabina: + +Thank you for letting us know. We signed the attached copy of the stipulation. + + + +troutman pepper + +Direct: 212.704.6087 + +bennet moskowit74troutman corn + + +From: Sabina Mariella + +Sent: Wednesday, October 14, 2020 12:27 PM + +To: Moskowitz, Bennet J. . Laura Menninger + + + +Cc: Sigrid McCawley \* Josh Schiller . + +Andrew Villacastin gyillacastinPbsfllo.com>. Aaronson, Matthew J. + +. Sirota, Valerie . + +Glover, Charles L. . DiRago, Molly + + + +Subject: v. Indyke, et al. + +## EXTERNAL SENDER + + +We write to inform you that has accepted an offer of compensation from the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program. Attached is a draft joint stipulation of dismissal. Please let me know if we can add your e-signatures and file. + +Thanks, + +Sabina Mariella + +Associate + +BOIES SCHILLER FLEXN ER LLP + +55 Hudson Yards + +New York, NY 10001 + +(t) +1 212 754 4541 + +(m) +1 973 634 7734 + +smauella@kaunra + +weaare + +The information contained in this electronic message is confidential information intended only for the use of the named recipient(s) and may contain information that, among other protections. is the subject of attorney-client privilege. attorney work product or exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If the reader of this electronic message is not the named recipient, or the employee or agent responsible to deliver it to the named recipient. you are hereby notified + +that any dissemination. distribution, copying or other use of this communication is stnctly prohibited and no prwilege is waived. If you have received this communication in error, please immediately nobly the sender by replying to this electronic message and then deleting this electronic message from your computer. Iv.1 08201831BSFI + +This e-mail (and any attachments) from a law firm may contain legally privileged and confidential information solely for the intended recipient. If you received this message in error, please notify the sender and delete it. Any unauthorized reading, distribution, copying, or other use of this e-mail (and attachments) is strictly prohibited. We have taken precautions to minimize the risk of transmitting computer viruses, but you should scan attachments for viruses and other malicious threats• w not liable for any loss or damage caused by viruses. + +Stipulation of Dismissal.docx> \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778375/EFTA02778375.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778375/EFTA02778375.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..824faf13b0d7babf6ba4c5a586c67217e02bed6c --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778375/EFTA02778375.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -524, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778375", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.running-headers\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "06d02c58cf190eef8cb2c806701e7a426a6ed15b68a774fa2b5fb508b1bb7019", + "output_sha256": "925f20521e814f0c6a3a7a958d1137ef2b9bcefcedd3c146a38293ce3d5eab5a", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778384/EFTA02778384.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778384/EFTA02778384.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6f790f057cc32a420b467e6f6840af28adaed399 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778384/EFTA02778384.md @@ -0,0 +1,465 @@ +## Exhibit E + +UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK x + +4 + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +I + +Plaintiff, + +v. 19 Civ. 10475 (LGS) (DCF) + +DARREN K. INDYKE, in his capacity as executor of the Estate of Jeffrey Edward Epstein; RICHARD D. KAHN, in his capacity as executor of the Estate of Jeffrey Edward Epstein; GHISLAINE MAXWELL, + +Defendants. + +Before: + +x + +Teleconference + +New York, N.Y. December 16, 2020 3:00 p.m. + +HON. DEBRA C. FREEMAN, + +Magistrate Judge + +APPEARANCES + +BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP Attorneys for Plaintiff BY: SIGRID S. MCCAWLEY ANDREW VILLACASTIN SABINE MARIELLA + +MOTLEY RICE + +Attorneys for U.S. Virgin Islands BY: LINDA CARMEN S. SCOTT + +## APPEARANCES Cont'd + +TROUTMAN PEPPER SANDERS LLP + +Attorney for Defendant Executors BY: BENNETT JEROME MOSKOWITZ + +HADDON, AND P.0 Attorney for Defendant Maxwell BY: LAURA A. MENNINGER + +4 5 This is Judge Freeman. This is v. Indyke. 19CV1475. + +6 7 Counsel, could I have your appearance for the record, starting with plaintiff's counsel? + +8 MS. McCAWLEY: Yes, your Honor. + +9 10 11 12 13 14 This is plaintiff's counsel, Sigrid McCawley, for , with the law firm of Boies, Schiller & Flexner. I have with me Andrew Villacastin, my colleague; and Sabina Mariella, my other colleague. Along with us is the Chief Deputy Attorney General from U.S. Virgin Islands, ; as well as the USVI counsel, Linda + +15 16 THE COURT: Okay. Don't know that everybody is needed, but welcome. + +17 Who do I have representing the estate? + +18 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Good afternoon, your Honor. + +19 20 This is Bennett Moskowitz, Troutman Pepper, counsel for the executors. + +21 22 THE COURT: All right. And who do I have for Ms. Maxwell? + +23 MS. MENNINGER: Good afternoon, your Honor. + +24 Laura Menninger, on behalf of Ghislaine Maxwell. + +25 THE COURT: So there are more people on the line, + +THE COURT: This is Judge Freeman. + +Hold on a second while I hit a key that lets us record this conference. + +4 MS. McCAWLEY: Your Honor, this is the plaintiff. + +5 6 We typically do have a court reporter, so I'm not sure if that was my office that called in or somebody else's. + +7 8 9 THE COURT: Okay. Do I have anyone else who is an attorney, either on this case or on any of the other cases involving the Epstein estate? + +10 MS. SCOTT: Your Honor, good afternoon. + +11 12 This is Carmen Scott, with the law firm of Motley Rice, outside counsel for the government of the Virgin Islands. + +13 14 THE COURT: II. I think I already had you identified, no? + +15 16 MS. SCOTT: My colleague, Linda , was previously identified. + +17 THE COURT: Okay. Fine. + +18 Anyone else? Any other attorneys? + +19 Do I have my law clerk on? + +20 LAW CLERK: Yes, Judge, I'm here. + +21 THE COURT: Do I have any intern students on? No? + +22 23 Okay. Do I have any members of the press on, just so that we know who's here? Do I have anyone? + +24 25 MR. : Yes. Good afternoon, this is James from ABC News, in listen-only mode. + +based on what I understood when I joined in. I understood that someone wanted to arrange for a court reporter; is that right? + +Is that right; is that not right? + +4 + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +THE COURT: Okay. All right. This is essentially a courtroom. It's open to the public. This is not a confidential proceeding. I don't consider this a settlement conference, and so there's no reason why it can't be a public proceeding. + +I'll also note that I just saw come in an application that looks like it could be rather similar to what's going on here in another one of the cases, 20 Civ. 484; different plaintiff, different plaintiff's counsel. Apparently an agreement has been reached through the compensation program, and that case also has Ms. Maxwell as a defendant. So I'm assuming whatever happens here will be relevant to that case. And I'll just ask plaintiff's counsel -- or the defendant's counsel, for that matter -- to please be in touch with plaintiff's counsel in that other case. Somebody should be in touch with them to let them know what's going on here, since it seems similar. + +So it seems to me there's only one issue here, and this has to do with the release. Seems like you've agreed on language for a stipulation discontinuance, and the only question is whether Ms. Maxwell does or does not get a full and redacted copy of the settlement agreement that was reached through the program or mutual releases. I'm finding it hard to understand why we have any kind of complicated issue here. If what Ms. Maxwell is looking for is assurance that she's being + +4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 released from claims and therefore the plaintiffs cannot sue her again because she's been released from claims, and, in fact, if plaintiff has executed such a release in connection with the settlement through the compensation program, then I don't see why she can't just copy and paste that into a new document called "release" and give it to Ms. Maxwell and sign it, and Ms. Maxwell will have her release. I don't understand why Ms. Maxwell is looking for -- or why plaintiff would be looking for mutual releases. You didn't seem to be demanding that coming in the door when you asked to have this case resolved -- you know, terminated. And I don't understand why Ms. Maxwell needs to know the amount of the compensation through the program. Seems like that would not be relevant to her estated issue, which is that she wants to have a release. + +15 16 So why can't she just get a release, period? Somebody explain to me why this is an issue. + +17 18 MS. MCCAWLEY: Sure, your Honor. This is Sigrid McCawley, for the plaintiff, + +19 20 21 22 23 24 25 You're absolutely correct that the parties participated -- not Ms. Maxwell, but we participated in the Epstein compensation program, as your Honor encouraged us to do back in the summertime to explore that opportunity in order to get rid of pending litigation if that was possible. So we went through that process. And as you know, that process has very defined rules in how it moves forward, and that was all + +4 + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +negotiated in advance of the program starting. And we went through that process. And as part of that process, you know, as you've said, we have to provide a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice in order to complete that program. + +So we went through that program. We signed the settlement release that's required by that program, and that is an exchange for the compensation. And we then submitted to you the dismissal with prejudice request after we proposed it to opposing counsel. The estate agreed. The estate also agreed that Ms. Maxwell could raise her fee issue with them, that that was not precluded. And the only issue -- + +THE COURT: Let me just ask for a clarification point. + +MS. McCAWLEY: Sure. + +THE COURT: The release that's required in connection with the compensation program, does it include a release of Ms. Maxwell, and not just the estate? + +MS. MCCAWLEY: Yes. So the language in the release, which is why they demanded it, has release of anybody who has been employed by the estate, which includes Ms. Maxwell. So it does cover her, so that's why there is no -- I think the Court -- we're getting ahead of ourselves a little bit. What we're giving her -- by giving her a copy of the general release and dismissing our case with prejudice under Rule 41(2), we cannot bring those claims again. So she has what she needs. She has the release that has the language that we've already signed + +with the estate. The only thing in that that would be redacted is the amount. And she has a dismissal with prejudice such 4 that would not be able to bring these claims against her. So -- + +5 6 7 8 THE COURT: I'm still having a lot of trouble seeing what the problem is here. Maybe Ms. Maxwell's counsel can explain to me what the problem is if you have a copy of the signed release and it covers your client, what is the holdup? + +9 10 MS. MENNINGER: Your Honor, this is Laura Menninger, on behalf of Ms. Maxwell. + +11 12 13 14 I do not have a copy of the signed release. The only people who have a copy of the signed release are the estate and plaintiff's counsel. One has not been provided to me, redacted or otherwise. + +15 16 17 18 THE COURT: Well, okay. So let's assume the release is provided to you and the only thing that's redacted from the document is the amount of the compensation being received in exchange for the release. + +19 20 What is the problem with that? That's been offered to you. What would be the problem with that? + +21 22 23 MS. MENNINGER: Your Honor, we believe that having an authentic copy of the release is important for at least two reasons: One -- + +24 25 THE COURT: And you think something redacted would not be authentic? + +MS. MENNINGER: It would be altered in some way. + +4 5 6 7 8 9 10 THE COURT: Okay. Well, then, how about what I said in the first place, which is, on plaintiff's side, take the release language exactly as it appears in the agreement that you already have. You're not doing anything other than what you've already agreed to do, put it on a new piece of paper, put the date on it, put a signature line, put an original signature on it, and give it to Ms. Maxwell. She has an document that's an authentic release, unaltered, exactly the document we're giving you. We're giving you a release. + +11 What would be wrong with that? + +12 13 MS. McCAWLEY: Your Honor, this is Sigrid McCawley, for the plaintiff. + +14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 You know, that is not something we agreed to obviously in the course of the program. So we agreed to the general release in exchange for the compensation we're getting from the estate. So this would be requiring Maxwell some separate document, which I assume there would have to be some negotiation over, and Ms. Maxwell's not giving anything in exchange. So that's why we propose when your Honor raised the issue -- + +22 23 24 25 THE COURT: Why not a document then that recites: Whereas, plaintiff has participated in the program and whereas has reached an agreement which is confidential -- or in exchange for which she will be getting some compensation for a + +4 5 6 7 8 9 10 I mean, why is there no way around this? This seems ridiculous. If plaintiff is willing to release, Ms. Maxwell should not have to provide the amount of the compensation. I agree with that. Ms. Maxwell should have a document she can go to court with that says: Here's the release. She wants a document that doesn't have a redaction in it. Give her a clean document that doesn't have a redaction in it. + +11 12 13 14 15 MS. MENNINGER: Your Honor, one of the other reasons that we do think having the original release is important will be, it is going to be relevant in our lawsuit that is currently pending against the estate for indemnification in the Virgin Islands. + +16 17 18 19 20 21 22 THE COURT: So give them a copy of the redacted agreement together with a statement from plaintiff that says, you know, plaintiff agrees that, you know, in the future should this release be raised in any lawsuit against plaintiff, plaintiff will not object to the release on the ground that it has been redacted -- the amount has been redacted. We'll waive a right to -- would that be acceptable? + +23 24 25 MS. MCCAWLEY: Yes, your Honor. We could agree to send a letter saying that we have signed the release, including a copy in redacted form and attesting to the fact that we've + +release, and whereas that agreement contains the terms of the release, which are recited below, and whereas plaintiff has agreed to those terms, signed document? + +4 + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +signed that and she can use it to the extent necessary in another litigation. You know, we're only dismissing with prejudice, so we can't -- Annie will not be able to sue her again for these claims. + +THE COURT: Right. Right. + +MS. McCAWLEY: So, I mean, I don't know we have to write additional documents that -- + +THE COURT: Wait a minute. If we talk simultaneously, no one will ever be able to make a transcript of this, either the court reporter you retained or anyone using this recording. + +So all I'm saying is, you're capable counsel. This seems like a ridiculous problem. There's no issue here, right. Plaintiff has resolved the claims. As part of the resolution of the claims, she's willing to give a release to Ms. Maxwell. It's part of the condition of the program; she's willing to do it. Ms. Maxwell wants to have a copy of the release that she can use. She should be entitled to have a copy of the release she can use. + +If you're worried that if I go to court and I have a copy of the document that's redacted and they'll make some stink and say this isn't authentic, so write a piece of paper that she says we won't object on that ground. And I think the point is well taken; if the case is dismissed with prejudice, it's dismissed with prejudice, it cannot be brought again. + +So you're not particularly at risk here, Ms. Maxwell's + +4 5 6 7 side, right? But if plaintiff is willing to give you a letter or some kind of signed statement that says, we won't object to you using this in the future on the ground that it's redacted and a copy, you know, signing here, that we won't object on that basis, there really ought to be some way that's not -- you don't need me to think of, to make this go smoothly. It seems to me it's making a mountain out of a mole + +8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 II. MENNINGER: Your Honor, I don't disagree with you. I don't think it should be a mountain. I think it should be a molehill. I have not heard -- one of the reasons that we believe it will be relevant and admissible in future proceedings is because we do have ongoing litigation against the estate related to indemnification for this and other legal matters. And the actual copy of the release, the fact that was paid out moneys, some of which under the claims program, as I understand it, would be additional money based on her claims against Ms. Maxwell that are separate and apart from those against the estate will be relevant to that indemnification proceeding. If your Honor would prefer that we just have a redacted copy now with some language that says no one's going to contest the authenticity of that document when and if it's relevant in future proceedings, that's fine, and in the indemnification case, we may have to ask under discovery rules for a copy of it there for whatever purposes might be relevant in that proceeding. + +4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 I'm not trying to make this substantial. When I went to plaintiff's counsel and tried to discuss what your Honor suggested, they would only give us a release if Ms. Maxwell was releasing , which, of course, there's no basis for that request. And in the past, plaintiff's counsel have said they don't even know if Ms. Maxwell is covered by these releases. So I am simply trying to make sure that if what counsel is representing to be true, that Ms. Maxwell is fully released from all came claims by and that I have a copy of the document that I can use in future proceedings, it should be the molehill that your Honor has described. + +12 13 14 THE COURT: Are you saying that you need assurance from the estate that the estate will not contest the document based on its being redacted or being a copy? + +15 16 17 18 19 MS. MENNINGER: Since both the estate and plaintiff's counsel have a copy, I would assume whatever I get, neither party -- either party would be willing to tell me is an authentic copy, or they won't contest it, if it's relevant in future proceedings. + +20 21 22 THE COURT: So what you're saying is you're contemplating potential future proceedings involving the estate -- or potentially against the estate. + +23 Am I -- + +24 25 MS. MENNINGER: We already have -- that's pending, your Honor. + +THE COURT: Is what you can anticipate -- assurance from the estate as opposed to assurance from the plaintiff, that it will not contest your use of the document based on its being redacted or being a copy. + +4 + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +MS. MENNINGER: My preference would be to have an unredacted copy. And I -- + +THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to order that you get a copy that chose the compensation. I don't think you need that for what you're describing at this time. And I don't think you need a mutual release either. I'll direct that to plaintiff's counsel. I think all you need is confirmation that you have the release that plaintiff and defense estate both say you have. You need a copy of the release that you can use in the future and rely on and nobody will contest it's authentic; that's all it comes down to. So it seems to me you folks should be able to figure that out because it seems like a simple problem. There's a willingness to give the release, there's a desire to get the release. It's just a question of what it looks like. If it's a separate piece of paper with - fine. If it's a redacted copy, fine, as long as Ms. Maxwell, through counsel, has the assurance that nobody will later contest it on the ground that the copy is redacted, or the copy is a copy. It's not -- it doesn't seem like it's that hard. All right? + +So can you please figure this out -- + +4 5 6 7 8 Maybe the easiest at this point is just to provide the redacted copy and have, you know, a signed letter from counsel for both plaintiff and counsel for the estate saying that there won't be an objection on the ground that it's redacted or a duplicate as long as been everybody knows what's being referred to? + +9 10 MS. MENNINGER: I'm so sorry, your Honor. I didn't mean to interrupt you. + +11 12 13 THE COURT: It seems to me you should be able to come up with some language in some manner that settles this issue, puts this issue to bed and get this case resolved. + +14 15 MS. MCCAWLEY: Yes, your Honor. And we're happy to do that. My only concern is that the timing of this. + +16 17 18 Is it possible if some other issue comes up, that we're able to get a conference with you? Because obviously Annie can't complete the program until this issue is resolved. + +19 20 21 THE COURT: Yes. I'll make myself available for another conference if you need it. I'm really hoping you don't. + +22 MS. MCCAWLEY: I agree. + +23 24 25 THE COURT: I mean, you work this out. You resolved this. There was an amount of money that was acceptable and was accepted. You know, Ms. Maxwell should be thrilled that, + +MS. MENNINGER: Yes, your Honor. + +THE COURT: -- in some way that resolves this? + +4 5 6 without doing anything, she got included in a release. You all should be quite pleased with the outcome here and move along. So I don't mean to be like giving you -- I don't mean to sound like I'm giving you such a hard time, but it's sort of beyond me how you can't work this out. It seems like so much of a non-issue. + +7 8 9 10 And for anyone who's listening in from the press and hearing me talk about this, this is a non-issue here you're listening in to. So, you know, welcome to a conference on which should be a non-issue. + +11 12 13 You know, if anything, it's good that the claims compensation program successfully resulted in what seems to be a resolution of a claim. That's it. All right? + +14 MS. MENNINGER: Thank you, your Honor. + +15 MS. MCCAWLEY: Thank you, your Honor. + +16 17 18 19 THE COURT: I'll make myself available if you still need me. Go figure it out. And I'll watch the docket. if there's a problem, you'll put it on the docket. Please don't have a problem. Okay? + +20 MS. MENNINGER: Thank you, your Honor. + +21 MS. MCCAWLEY: Thank you. + +22 THE COURT: Take care, everybody. Be well. + +23 + +24 25 \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778384/EFTA02778384.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778384/EFTA02778384.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ac3190e7b193f32b9c614bdc96973486703483a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778384/EFTA02778384.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778384", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "309b2778fdc17ebd51009af2a8487982fb2b064938c98c9e9128afea54741332", + "output_sha256": "309b2778fdc17ebd51009af2a8487982fb2b064938c98c9e9128afea54741332", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778401/EFTA02778401.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778401/EFTA02778401.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a2167c1f67988ade2a77f2ea58acb98bd11a25f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778401/EFTA02778401.md @@ -0,0 +1,184 @@ +## Exhibit F + +From: Sabina Marinja To: 'Laura Menmnoer'; Mosisysitr. Bennet .1 • Sand Metawley Cc: Leff Panliura; Milreer Villaragalo; rhRano Molly. loth Schiller Subject: RE: A. joint status submission Date: Tuesday, December 22, 2020 1:09:00 PM + + +We need to confer on a timeline for dismissing this case and when you can expect to speak to your client about this very straightforward issue. A public filing in Ms. Maxwell's criminal case last week indicated that Ms. Maxwell has the ability to video conference with her attorneys for three hours per weekday and can otherwise communicate with her counsel for 13 hours per day, 7 days a week. We'd thus like to understand your purported inability to speak with her about this issue by any specific date. + + +From: Laura Menninger [mailto:Imenninger@hmflaw.com) Sent: Tuesday, December 22, 2020 10:59 AM To: Sabina Mariella ; Moskowitz, Bennet J. ; Sigrid McCawley Cc: Jeff Pagliuca ; Andrew Villacastin ; DiRago, Molly ; Josh Schiller Subject: RE: A. joint status submission + +CAUTION: External email. Please do not respond to or click on links/attachments unless you recognize the sender. + +Sabina, + +Let me rephrase my response: What is it that you think we can confer about before I have spoken to my client? Perhaps I am not understanding the topic for conferral. + +As far as timeline, I can commit to get back to you as soon as I am able to discuss this with my client. + + +Laura A. Menninger Partner Haddon, & ~, P.C. 150 E. 10th Avenue I Denver, CO 80203 +1 303 831 7364 (Office) jmenninger@hmflaw.com + +Sent: Tuesday, December 22, 2020 7:07 AM + +To: Laura Menninger . Moskowitz, Bennet J. + +. Sigrid McCawley amrrawlevObstho COM> + +Cc: Jeff Pagliuca cioagliuraPhmflaw corn>; Andrew Villacastin villarastinPbsfllo.com>. DiRago, Molly . Josh Schiller + + + +You've now ignored our requests for some sort of a timeline in three separate emails, and are now refusing to meet and confer with us. As you know, your delay is prejudicial to our client, and it appears that you will only take action if explicitly ordered to do so. If, by end of day today, you do not commit to when you can let us know whether your client agrees to a dismissal of this action on the terms the Court outlined, we will request another conference. + + +From: Laura Menninger imailto.lmenningerPhmflaw.comj + +Sent: Monday, December 21, 2020 7:28 PM + +To: Sabina Mariella .Moskowitz, Bennet J. + +annPt Moskowit7Otroutman com>. Sigrid McCawley amrrawlpvObsfllo COM> + +Cc: Jeff Pagliuca cioagliuraOhmflaw corn>. Andrew Villacastin . DiRago, Molly . Josh Schiller + + +CAUTION: External email. Please do not respond to or click on links/attachments unless you recognize the sender. + +Your information is incorrect: I do not have the ability to speak to my client daily. + +I don't think another meet and confer is necessary; I need to confer with my client, not counsel. As I said, I will let you know as soon as I am able to speak with my client. + + +Laura A. Menningeri a + +Haddon, P.C. + +150 E. 10th Avenue I Denver, CO 80203 + ++1 303 831 7364 (Office) + +Imenningerkamflaw com + +From: Sabina Mariella + +Sent: Monday, December 21, 2020 2:15 PM + +To: Laura Menninger . Moskowitz, Bennet J. + +. Sigrid McCawley + +Cc: Jeff Pagliuca 4nagliiiraOhmflaw corn>. Andrew Villacastin villaractinOhsfllo conp; DiRago, Molly . Josh Schiller + + + +We cannot accept your refusal to commit to a timeframe for responding to a request the Court outlined to you last Wednesday. We understand that you have the ability to speak to your client daily, but if that is not the case you can explain that to Judge Freeman, who may be able to grant you time to speak to Ms. Maxwell about this issue. + +Please let us know of your availability for a meet and confer tomorrow or Wednesday so that we may either reach agreement and file a stipulation of dismissal, or request another conference with the Court. + + +From: Laura Menninger [rnailto•ImenningerPhmflaw corn] + +Sent: Monday, December 21, 2020 2:42 PM + +To: Sabina Mariella . Moskowitz, Bennet J. + +. Sigrid McCawley + +Cc: Jeff Pagliuca cjoaeliuraOhmflaw.com>. Andrew Villacastin . DiRago, Molly . Josh Schiller cusrhillerObsfllo corn> + + +CAUTION: External email. Please do not respond to or click on links/attachments unless you recognize the sender. + +Sabina — + +Actually, the delay was occasioned by your refusal to provide a copy of the executed release to Ms. Maxwell, something the court ordered over your objection last Wednesday. + +Ms. Maxwell has had other pressing court deadlines since the joint status conference last Wednesday, as you are well aware. + +I do not control when I get to speak to my client and therefore will not be making any representation to you about when I "intend" to speak to her. + + +Laura A. Menninger Partner Haddon, & P.C. 150 E. 10th Avenue I Denver, CO 80203 + ++1 303 831 7364 (Office) + +hnenninger@hmflaw.com + +From: Sabina Mariella amariellaOhcflIn COM> + +Sent: Monday, December 21, 2020 11:29 AM + +To: Laura Menninger . Moskowitz, Bennet J. + +. Sigrid McCawley + +Cc: Jeff Pagliuca 4pagliuraehmflaw corn>; Andrew Villacastin . Josh Schiller + + + +Yes, your client has now inexplicably delayed the resolution of this lawsuit for two months. We are all aware that she is incarcerated, but after Judge Freeman's clear statement that she will not order to disclose the amount of her compensation to you, and after your statement in open court that your only issue with receiving a redacted copy of the general release is its authenticity, it is entirely unclear what is left to discuss with your client or why it should have taken 5 days to have such a discussion. Judge Freeman said she would make herself available if we cannot resolve this expeditiously, and we intend to take her up on that. + +Please state clearly whether you intend to speak to your client by end of day tomorrow, and provide your availability for a call with the Court on Wednesday. + + +From: Laura Menninger [mailto:ImenningerOhmflaw.com) + +Sent: Monday, December 21, 2020 12:15 PM + +To: Sabina Mariella . Moskowitz, Bennet J. + +. Sigrid McCawley + +Cc: Jeff Pagliuca cioaeliuraOhmflaw corn>. Andrew Villacastin villaractinehsfllo COITV DiRago, + +Molly . Josh Schiller + + +CAUTION: External email. Please do not respond to or click on links/attachments unless you recognize the sender. + +Sabina — + +I will be able to get back to you as soon as I am able to discuss it with my client. That likely will not be today. Your client has been vocal in asking that Ms. Maxwell be kept in custody, which of course makes it more difficult for her to communicate with her attorneys. + +Is there some basis for the 5 p.m. deadline or the threat to "call the court" in the next two days? + + +Laura A. Menninger Partner Haddon, & P.C. 150 E. 10th Avenue I Denver, CO 80203 +I 303 831 7364 (Office) 1mcnningcratilmflaw.com + +From: Sabina Mariella amariPlIa(Wbcflio corn> + +Sent: Monday, December 21, 2020 10:11 AM + +To: Laura Menninger tifinningerOhmflaw corn>' Moskowitz, Bennet J. + +. Sigrid McCawley + +Cc: Jeff Pagliuca . Andrew Villacastin . .villaractinOhcfllo cam>. DiRago, Molly . Josh Schiller + + + +Please let us know by 5pm EST whether receipt of the letter described below will cause you to stipulate to dismissal of this case with prejudice. Otherwise, we intend to call the Court on Tuesday or Wednesday. Bennet and Laura, please let us know your availability for such a call, although Plaintiff hopes that one will not be necessary. + + +From: Sabina Mariella + +Sent: Thursday, December 17, 2020 5:41 PM + +To: 'Laura Menninger' . Moskowitz, Bennet J. + +; Sigrid McCawley ; Andrew Villacastin . DiRago, Molly . Josh Schiller + + + +Pursuant to Judge Freeman's directions during the telephone conference yesterday, we propose providing you with a letter signed by counsel for Plaintiff and the Estate stating the following, and attaching the redacted, executed copy of the General Release: + +"In accordance with Judge Freeman's instructions at the status conference held in the abovereferenced matter on December 16, 2020, we are attaching to this letter an authentic copy of the General Release that executed on October 3, 2020, in connection with her + +participation in the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program. We agree that we will not dispute the authenticity of this document in any future proceeding." + +Please let us know if you will sign the attached stipulation after receiving such a letter, plus the redacted, executed copy of the General Release. diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778401/EFTA02778401.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778401/EFTA02778401.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2a9beb09f351a60d2686a63378a8c0fbe117e2c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778401/EFTA02778401.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -432, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778401", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.running-headers\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "d2c0afe1c08d3301d2da43cb84a10c8b10ad24c52b982729a0833e43a7c595a8", + "output_sha256": "cc99e4697374ca365423983763abc4988ad9a005f53b86e4997087b4f910d091", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778408/EFTA02778408.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778408/EFTA02778408.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..43b4705a96c6e903af59c825f10c68c8293c5712 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778408/EFTA02778408.md @@ -0,0 +1,255 @@ +## Exhibit G + +UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK x + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +Plaintiff, New York, N.Y. v. 19 CV 10475 (LGS) + +DARREN K. INDYKE, RICHARD D. KAHN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, + +Before: HON. LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, District Judge + +Defendants. x Teleconference April 16, 2020 11:30 a.m. + +## APPEARANCES + +BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER, LLP Attorneys for Plaintiff BY: SIGRID S. McCAWLEY SABINA MARIELLA TROUTMAN SANDERS, LLP Attorneys for Defendants Indyke and Kahn BY: BENNET J. MOSKOWITZ MOLLY S. DiRAGO + +HADDON, , P.C. Attorneys for Defendant Maxwell BY: LAURA A. MENNINGER + +4 5 THE DEPUTY CLERK: This is in the matter of 19 CV 10475, v. Indyke, et al. + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 First, while members of the public and the press, which I know we have both of here, have a presumptive access to proceed either live or telephonically, recording or broadcasting of this proceeding is still prohibited by the policy of the Judicial Conference of the United States. Violation of these prohibitions may result in sanctions, including removal of court-issued media credentials, restricted entry to future hearings, denial of entry to future hearings, or any other sanction deemed necessary by the Court. + +18 19 20 Second, as we have a court reporter present, I am going to ask counsel to please state your name before you speak each time you speak. + +21 We're here before the Honorable Lorna G. Schofield. + +22 23 THE COURT: Good morning. So, give me just one second. I want to look at something. + +24 Who will be speaking for plaintiff? + +25 MS. McCAWLEY: Good morning, your Honor. This is + +THE COURT: Good morning, counsel. + +MS. McCAWLEY: Good morning, your Honor. + +MS. MENNINGER: Good morning. + +Before we begin, I'd like to remind the parties of several rules and restrictions that are in effect due to the novel coronavirus. + +4 THE COURT: Thank you. Ms. Menninger, I presume you'll be speaking on behalf of Ms. Maxwell? + +5 MS. MENNINGER: Good morning. Yes, that is correct. + +6 7 8 9 THE COURT: And I don't anticipate that I'll need to hear from the other two defendants. But, I know that Ms. DiRago and Mr. Moskowitz are also on phone and prepared to speak if necessary. Is that right? + +10 11 12 MR MOSKOWITZ: Yes. Good morning, your Honor. Bennet Moskowitz here. I'll be speaking on behalf of defendants Indyke and Kahn as co-executors. + +13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 THE COURT: Thank you. We're here with respect to a premotion letter that was filed by defendant Maxwell. She was not represented and present at the last conference we had to discuss the proposed motion to dismiss by the other defendants. And as you all know, I suggested that I didn't think it would be a very good use of anyone's time to pursue that motion. And the defendants, taking my suggestion, have filed an answer, of course without prejudice to their filing a motion to dismiss on the pleadings at some point if it becomes necessary to do that. + +22 23 24 25 So I've reviewed the letter from defendant Maxwell's counsel, and this particular motion doesn't strike me as any more meritorious. Just quickly, the suggestion that there's lumping going on is not like the cases that I have seen where + +Sigrid McCawley from Boies, Schiller & Flexner, and I'll be speaking on behalf of + +4 + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +there is true lumping, and that is that every allegation has as the subject of the sentence "the defendant" without making any distinction between them. + +Plaintiff has clarified that the allegations here, first of all, there are individual allegations against Ms. Maxwell. There are allegations against Ms. Maxwell and Mr. Epstein both, in instances where both of them are alleged to have taken some action. And the complaint doesn't strike me as being guilty of the plaintiff lumping that usually results in an order to be more specific. + +As for the argument about striking allegations, I'm always puzzled when I see something like that, because, frankly, apart from any answer or motion, those allegations will never see the light of day again. I don't give the complaint to the jury. The point of the complaint is really to apprise the defendants of what the nature of the claims are. These periodicals or statements that are referenced may not likely -- will not be admissible at any trial. As for the truth of the underlying statements, if there is some way to get in those assertions, that obviously is a question of proof and evidence, and we would cross that bridge when we come to it. I don't think there is anything to be gained by striking allegations. + +In terms of venue, it seems to me that the matters alleged are alleged to be in the Southern District of New York + +or at least in the State of New York as well as in New Mexico. And on that basis, without regard to Ms. Maxwell's residence, it seems to me that venue is proper. + +4 5 6 7 And with respect to the statute of limitations, as I said in the last conference, it strikes me that that question raises a host of factual issues, and it would be better resolved after some discovery. + +8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 This is not a ruling. This is just my impression of the motion. It seems to me, given that, that it's not, as I said, a good use of anybody's time for us to pursue this motion. Having said that, I can't prohibit you from filing such a motion. I would think, though, that it would serve your client's interest if you have affirmative defenses to get them on file so that, in the course of discovery, you can get information that relate to your affirmative defenses. + +16 17 18 19 20 So, those are my thoughts. You don't have to respond to it. You can certainly think about what you'd like to do. But, what I would like is an answer. I'd like you to file a letter -- well, let me just back up. I'd like you to file a letter or an answer. + +21 22 If you were to file an answer, when would you be prepared to do that? + +23 24 25 MS. MENNINGER: Your Honor, this is Laura Menninger on behalf of Ms. Maxwell. And if the Court is willing, I would like to impress upon the Court a couple of differences as + +4 + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +between a motion to dismiss brought by the Estate versus by Ms. Maxwell. + +But to answer your question, your Honor, I believe plaintiff's deadline to amend their complaint is April 30. So I would ask for two weeks after their amended complaint to file an answer, if there is one. If not, I could file one shortly after that deadline has passed. + +THE COURT: Okay. + +MS. MENNINGER: If I wasn't going to file a motion to dismiss. + +But, your Honor, I would still -- I do believe that there are very good grounds to file one on behalf of Ms. Maxwell that are different from what the Court has already elaborated on with regard to Mr. Epstein's motion to dismiss. + +THE COURT: Okay. I'll hear you. + +MS. MENNINGER: Your Honor, with all due respect, the allegations concerning Ms. Maxwell are very different in the complaint from those concerning Mr. Epstein. In the first place, the plaintiff alleges she never even met Ms. Maxwell until she was in New Mexico. And in New York, a cause of action as to Ms. Maxwell accrued outside of New York. New York's definition on accrual is very specific, and it calls for where the injury occurred or where the damages occurred. Here, according to the complaint, that was in New Mexico, with respect to Ms. Maxwell. + +Because plaintiff is not a New York resident, and she 4 5 has a cause of action that accrued, she claims, outside of New York, under the New York State borrowing statute she has to abide by the shorter of two statutes of limitations. Either, that in New Mexico, or the New York statute. So -- + +6 7 8 9 10 THE COURT: Ms. Menninger, I'm sorry, I am going to interrupt you only because I have a conference after this one that was scheduled for some time ago. And I know that's not your fault because I got to this conference a little bit late. The conferences are all taking a little longer. + +11 12 13 14 15 16 17 But, what I perceive is that you are telling me the arguments that were in your letter, which I read, and I take seriously. My view, though, is that I'm not prejudging this in the sense that if a motion were filed, I would obviously read the motion papers and decide on the motion papers. But I am telling you my reaction to your arguments, having read your letter as well as having read the plaintiff's letter. + +18 19 20 So, if you don't mind, I'm sorry to be rude and interrupt you, but I am going to do that just in the interest of time. + +21 22 23 24 25 So, what I would like then is I would like for you to give me a letter within a week telling me whether or not you have determined to answer or whether you will pursue the filing of your motion. And if you have determined to answer, then make an application for when your answer would be due, since + +4 5 6 MR MOSKOWITZ: Your Honor, this is Bennet Moskowitz. Sorry, go ahead. I apologize. I wasn't clear if the Court was addressing everyone. Go ahead, Ms. Menninger. + +7 8 9 10 11 12 MS. MENNINGER: Your Honor, this is Laura Menninger again for Ms. Maxwell. Would it be possible for me to provide that letter to your Honor after the plaintiff has amended their complaint on April 30? Or to know in advance whether they intend to amend the complaint? Because it strikes me as difficult to ascertain. + +13 14 THE COURT: Do the plaintiffs know whether they plan to amend? + +15 16 17 MS. McCAWLEY: Your Honor, this is Sigrid McCawley on behalf of At this point we don't intend to amend our complaint. + +18 THE COURT: Okay. So can we rely on that? + +19 MS. McCAWLEY: Yes, your Honor. + +20 21 22 23 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. So, given that, why don't you just let me know, Ms. Menninger, when you would like to answer in your letter, letting me know whether you're answering or filing a motion. + +24 MS. MENNINGER: Thank you, your Honor. + +25 THE COURT: Thank you, everyone. Be well and be safe. + +you already filed your premotion letter, and then we'll take it from there. + +Is there anything else we need to discuss? \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778408/EFTA02778408.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778408/EFTA02778408.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..240b09a0f2cdf1e9cabd53d65d864c4b054cd715 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778408/EFTA02778408.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778408", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "f18c618f067fbc9671ca0b09801555ad67840e447a31f3b60db0895d6fbf35b1", + "output_sha256": "f18c618f067fbc9671ca0b09801555ad67840e447a31f3b60db0895d6fbf35b1", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778417/EFTA02778417.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778417/EFTA02778417.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..34eb53c8c2182b148d0d652f7a98cbb5e2104275 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778417/EFTA02778417.md @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Plaintiff, CASE NO: 19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, + +Defendants. + +## DECLARATION OF SIGRID S. MCCAWLEY + +SIGRID S. MCCAWLEY, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, declares under penalty of perjury that the following is true and correct: + +- I. I am a partner with the law firm of Boies Schiller Flexner LLP and duly licensed to practice in Florida and before this Court pursuant to this Court's December 3, 2019 Order granting my Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice. +- 2. I respectfully submit this Declaration in support of Plaintiff Motion for Voluntary Dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. +- 3. Exhibit A attached hereto is a true and correct copy of the transcript of proceedings before the Honorable Debra C. Freeman on November 21, 2019. +- 4. Exhibit B attached hereto is a true and correct copy of the final protocol for the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program, dated May 29, 2020. + +- 5. Exhibit C attached hereto is a true and correct copy of an email from Bennet J. Moskowitz to Laura Menninger dated June 19, 2020. +- 6. Exhibit D attached hereto is a true and correct copy of email correspondence between the parties in this matter in October and November of 2020. +- 7. Exhibit E attached hereto is a true and correct copy of the transcript of proceedings before the Honorable Debra C. Freeman on December 16, 2020. +- 8. Exhibit F attached hereto is a true and correct copy of email correspondence between the parties in this matter in December of 2020. +- 9. Exhibit G attached hereto is a true and correct copy of the transcript of proceedings before the Honorable Lorna G. Schofield on April 16, 2020. + +Dated: January 21, 2021 + +/s/ Sigrid S. McCawley Sigrid S. McCawley \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778417/EFTA02778417.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778417/EFTA02778417.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5a730fe5596f82d2410611e86b958e637a295bb5 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778417/EFTA02778417.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778417", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "1aabd134322590c87c79d9ed9529829bc0e8e3a0e7c13252e24496cdec3c1d91", + "output_sha256": "1aabd134322590c87c79d9ed9529829bc0e8e3a0e7c13252e24496cdec3c1d91", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778419/EFTA02778419.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778419/EFTA02778419.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4663402a016f8816e818ab01345b1664f2bdee70 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778419/EFTA02778419.md @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +February 1, 2021 + +## VIA ECF + +The Honorable Debra Freeman Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007-1312 + +> Re: v. Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as executors of the Estate of Jeffrey Edward Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell, I9-CV- I0475-LGS-DCF + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +Pursuant to the Court's September 4, 2020, order (ECF No. 93) Plaintiff and Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell jointly submit this status report. Plaintiff submitted her claim to the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program on June 26, 2020, and accepted an offer of compensation on October 5, 2020. Plaintiff and the Estate stipulated to a dismissal of this action with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) with each party to bear its own fees and costs. Defendant Maxwell did not agree to a voluntary dismissal without additional conditions. Accordingly, Plaintiff and Maxwell submitted briefing on Plaintiff's motion to dismiss this case with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2), which is currently pending before Judge Schofield. ECF Nos. III, 114-116. + +Respectfully submitted, + +Is/ Sikrid S. McCawlev + +Sigrid S. McCawley, Esq. Boies Schiller Flexner LLP + +/s/ Bennet J. Moskowitz + +Bennet J. Moskowitz. Es Troutman Pepper Sanders LLP + +Is/ Laura Menninger + +Laura Mem.thiei-, Esci Haddon, and P.C. + +cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778419/EFTA02778419.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778419/EFTA02778419.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6a5188c3bc0fba7cc52fa1f576e853bc1791ab74 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778419/EFTA02778419.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778419", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "b5b94a48f540c2e87b609cc3f498775db9431e3252dadaad6744573ddff9c861", + "output_sha256": "b5b94a48f540c2e87b609cc3f498775db9431e3252dadaad6744573ddff9c861", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778420/EFTA02778420.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778420/EFTA02778420.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..59ae3d51e8bf6b8cc0a89d2270262aff01b8a55e --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778420/EFTA02778420.md @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +#### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +X Plaintiff, 19 Civ. 10475 (LGS) -against- OPINION AND ORDER DARREN K. INDYKE, in his capacity as executor : of the Estate of Jeffrey Edward Epstein, et al., Defendants. X + +LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, District Judge: + +On January 21, 2021, Plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss this action with prejudice, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2). In connection with her motion, Plaintiff filed a proposed order of dismissal imposing certain conditions (the "Proposed Order"). Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell opposed the motion. For the following reasons, subject to Plaintiff's consent, dismissal is granted pursuant to the terms of the Proposed Order modified as described below. + +#### I. BACKGROUND + +On November 12, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Ms. Maxwell and Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn in their official capacities as appointed executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (the "Estate") (Indyke and Kahn together, the "Co-Executors"). The Complaint alleges claims of battery, false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress under New York law. These claims stem from and/or arise in connection with Mr. + +Epstein's and Ms. Maxwell's alleged sexual abuse of Plaintiff. Defendants did not file counterclaims. + +On June 2, 2020, the Superior Court of the United States Virgin Islands granted the Co-Executors' motion to establish the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program, a voluntary independent program designed to compensate and resolve the claims of victims of sexual abuse by Jeffrey Epstein (the "Program"). On June 22, 2020, based on an understanding that Plaintiff wished to participate in the Program and that participation could result in the resolution of Plaintiff's claims, Judge Freeman stayed this case. The case remains stayed. + +On June 26, 2020, Plaintiff submitted a claim to the Program. Before submitting her claim, Plaintiff was ensured that compensation offers and information submitted to the Program would be confidential. Plaintiff's participation in the Program resulted in her receipt and acceptance of an offer of compensation on October 5, 2020. In exchange for the offer of compensation, Plaintiff executed a release, releasing the Estate, Mr. Epstein and other related entities and individuals, including Ms. Maxwell, from any and all claims (the "General Release"). To receive her compensation, Plaintiff must dismiss with prejudice any existing lawsuits against the Estate and related entities and individuals -- including this lawsuit. + +To conclude her participation in the Program, Plaintiff now moves for Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal of all claims with prejudice. In connection with her motion, Plaintiff filed the Proposed Order, to which the Co-Executors do not object. The Proposed Order states that dismissal is "with prejudice," and that each party shall "bear its own attorneys' fees and costs." It also states that "Plaintiff shall provide Ms. Maxwell with a copy of the General Release, with the compensation amount redacted" and that "Wile parties shall not dispute the authenticity of this copy of the General Release in any future proceedings." In addition, the Proposed Order + +includes language that preserves Defendants' rights and legal positions with respect to indemnity. + +Ms. Maxwell objects to dismissal pursuant to the Proposed Order on the grounds that she will be unduly prejudiced if (1) Plaintiff is not required to provide an unredacted copy of the General Release, showing Plaintiff's compensation, and (2) each party is required to bear its own attorneys' fees and costs. Ms. Maxwell accordingly requests that the Court impose the following conditions on dismissal: (1) Plaintiff must provide a copy of the unredacted General Release and (2) Ms. Maxwell is entitled to costs and may seek attorneys' fees in another action and at another time. + +## H. STANDARD + +Rule 41(a)(2) states as relevant here, "Except as provided in Rule 41(aX1) [which describes voluntary dismissals made either before the defendant files a responsive pleading or on consent], an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff's request only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper." Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(aX2). A district court may exercise its "sound discretion" in deciding a Rule 41(aX2) motion. Catanzano v. Wing, 277 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir. 2001); accord Stinson v. City Univ. of New York, No. 18 Civ. 5963, 2020 WL 2133368, at \*2 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2020). + +Although "[v]oluntary dismissal without prejudice is ... not a matter of right" and is subject to substantial scrutiny, Zagano v. Fordham Univ., 900 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1990) (emphasis added); accord v. Fisher, No. 20 Civ. 1818, 2020 WL 2765107, at •2 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2020), a motion for voluntary dismissal with prejudice is generally subject "to far less scrutiny," NOV Servs., Inc. v. ASG Techs. Grp., Inc., No. 18 Civ. 9780, 2021 WL 355670 at \*2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2021) (collecting cases). On a motion for voluntary dismissal with prejudice, + +the essential inquiry is "whether the voluntary dismissal 'will be unduly prejudicial to the defendants.'" Nix v. Office of Comm'r of Baseball, No. 17 Civ. 1241, 2017 WL 2889503, at \*2 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2017) (citing Lan v. Time Warner, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 2870, 2016 WL 6778180, at \*6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 6779526 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2016)). To avoid undue prejudice, courts have the authority to impose conditions of dismissal, so long as plaintiff has an opportunity to withdraw her motion if she "feels that the conditions are too burdensome." Paysys Intl, Inc. v. ATOS IT Setts. Lid., 901 F.3d 105, 109 (2d Cir. 2018) (internal citation omitted). + +### III. DISCUSSION + +Ms. Maxwell will not be unduly prejudiced by dismissal. In this case, all the claims against Ms. Maxwell will be dismissed, she did not file any counterclaims and dismissal is with prejudice so that the claims cannot be brought against her again. She has not shown any prejudice from the dismissal or its consequences. Nevertheless, Ms. Maxwell seeks to impose two conditions on dismissal. These conditions are unnecessary to prevent prejudice that would otherwise result from the dismissal because she has shown no such prejudice. As explained below, the Court rejects one condition, and subject to Plaintiff's consent, would gram the other requested condition. + +First, Ms. Maxwell asks that the amount of Plaintiffs compensation from the Estate be disclosed to her as a condition of dismissal. She argues that she needs the information (I) "to make public" that plaintiff wanted money and not justice and (2) to cross-examine Plaintiff in Ms. Maxwell's criminal trial. In effect, she is arguing that dismissal will deprive her of the vehicle to obtain information she would use in other settings. This is not the type of prejudice the rule was intended to prevent, and she cites no case to suggest that it is. The argument is + +flawed because she is entitled to information in this case only to defend against the claims in this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (permitting discovery "relevant to any party's claim or defense"). If there are no claims in this case as a result of dismissal, she is not entitled to information in this case to defend against them. If she wants information to use in the court of public opinion she must get it elsewhere. Similarly, if she wants information to use in her defense in the criminal case, then she should try to obtain the information using the procedures available in that case. + +Ms. Maxwell asks as a second condition to strike the language in the Proposed Order that "each party [is] to bear its own attorneys' fees and costs." Subject to Plaintiff's consent, the Court would grant that application, not because the dismissal is otherwise prejudicial to Defendant, but because adjudication of fees and costs is unnecessary to dismiss the case. + +Ms. Maxwell states that she is not seeking attorneys' fees from Plaintiff at this time in this action but does not wish to be precluded from doing so in a different action. The issue of fees, therefore, is not ripe, and the parties can litigate it when and if Ms. Maxwell raises it. + +The issue of costs similarly does not need to be resolved in order to grant dismissal. Ms. Maxwell apparently intends to seek costs in this case, but she has not yet done so and the parties have not fully briefed the issue. A prevailing party, including one in Ms. Maxwell's position, is typically entitled to recover its costs. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) ("Unless a federal statute, [the federal] rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs — other than attorney's fees -- should be allowed to the prevailing party."); see Caner v. Inc. Vill. of Ocean Beach, 759 F.3d 159, 165 (2d Cir. 2014) ("A voluntary dismissal of an action with prejudice works [a material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties], because it constitutes an adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata ...") (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); accord Ktoyitl'ots'ina, Ltd. v. Gottschalk, No. 19 Civ. 11309, 2020 WL 6690640, at \*3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2020) (treating defendant as the "prevailing party," after a dismissal with prejudice and awarding costs). + +However, "whether to award costs ultimately lies within the sound discretion of the district court." Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 377 (2013). It remains to be seen whether Ms. Maxwell will move to recover her costs and in what amount, whether Plaintiff will oppose the application, and if so, whether Plaintiff could overcome the presumption that Ms. Maxwell is entitled to her costs. + +Because the issues of attorneys' fees and costs need not be resolved in order to dismiss this action, the Court is prepared to enter the Proposed Order, modified by striking the language "with each party to bear its own attorneys' fees and costs." Plaintiff shall file a letter no later than February 12, 2021, stating whether she consents to this modification or wishes to withdraw her motion for voluntary dismissal, in which case the Court will restore this matter to its active calendar. See Paysys Intl. Inc., 901 F.3d at 109 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding that the plaintiff may accept the court's conditions of dismissal or withdraw its dismissal motion and proceed with the case). + +# IV. CONCLUSION + +Plaintiff shall file a letter no later than February 12, 2021, stating whether she consents to the Court's entry of the Proposed Order modified by striking the language "with each party to bear its own attorneys' fees and costs," or wishes to withdraw her motion for voluntary dismissal. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to close the motion at Docket No. 97. + +Dated: February 10, 2021 New York, New York + +LO A G. SCHOFIEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778420/EFTA02778420.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778420/EFTA02778420.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e6df796f08486695f4850a20c38ff80dc3e88452 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778420/EFTA02778420.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778420", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "f6948aa96e84e4274a04f6abffadc0c1d4409fc5d099117e3ce4f0a04430893c", + "output_sha256": "f6948aa96e84e4274a04f6abffadc0c1d4409fc5d099117e3ce4f0a04430893c", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778426/EFTA02778426.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778426/EFTA02778426.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6caf0b10daf7e2b6b929eda664ce38e9fb5a5a3c --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778426/EFTA02778426.md @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +## VIA ECF + +The Honorable Lorna G. Schofield District Court Judge United States District Court Southern District of New York 40 Foley Square New York, NY 10007 + +> Re: v. Darren Indyke, Richard D. Kahn, & Ghislaine Maxwell 19-10475-LGS-DCF + +Sigrid S. McCawley Telephone: (954) 377-4223 Email: smccawlcy@bsfllp.com + +February 12, 2021 + +Dear Judge Schofield: + +Plaintiff writes pursuant to this Court's Opinion and Order dated February 10, 2021. ECF No. 118. Plaintiff consents to the Court's entry of Plaintiff's Proposed Order dismissing this action with prejudice (ECF No. 115-1) modified by striking the language "with each party to bear its own attorneys' fees and costs." Plaintiff thanks the Court for its attention to this matter. + +Respectfully submitted, + +/s/ Sigrid S. McCawlev + +Sigrid S. McCawley (pro hac vice) Bows \$CHILLER FLEXNER LLP 401 E. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1200 Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301 (954) 356-0011 + +Counsel for Plaint(( + +cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778426/EFTA02778426.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778426/EFTA02778426.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e10150d64467929f2944fc89a159f8ba3dcc50aa --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778426/EFTA02778426.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778426", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "e0c9f1f529efd16d842bf4f4ccd9457e813e0a689e7144595d9099369e1bd614", + "output_sha256": "e0c9f1f529efd16d842bf4f4ccd9457e813e0a689e7144595d9099369e1bd614", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778427/EFTA02778427.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778427/EFTA02778427.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ff837d7d3fae208ecc5463d822550db9289294fa --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778427/EFTA02778427.md @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Plaintiff, CASE NO: 19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, + +Defendants. + +## 11PRORGSBIN ORDER + +LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, District Judge: + +WHEREAS Plaintiff submitted a claim for compensation to the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program ("EVCP") asserting that she was sexually abused by Jeffrey E. Epstein; and + +WHEREAS, after reviewing Plaintiff's submissions and after careful consideration of documentation and proof, and after due deliberation, the EVCP Program Administrator (the "Administrator") determined pursuant to the EVCP Protocol that Plaintiff was eligible to participate in the EVCP; + +WHEREAS Plaintiff has reached a confidential agreement, through which she will receive compensation from the EVCP in exchange for a release (the "General Release"); and + +WHEREAS the General Release contains the terms of the release. + +It is hereby ORDERED that the above-captioned action is dismissed with prejudiceXsidObX xeooteituzyna biesst618)010X0t0)0000fitrX KrtdX0138. Nothing herein shall be construed to preclude Ms. Maxwell from seeking fees or costs related to this matter from the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Darren K. Indyke, in his capacity as Executor of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Richard D. Kahn, in his capacity as Executor of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, or NES, LLC, a New York Limited Liability Company, or release any such claims as between the Defendants. Nor does anything herein prejudice the Estate Of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Darren K. Indyke, in his capacity as Executor of the Estate Of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Richard D. Kahn, in his capacity as Executor of the Estate Of Jeffrey E. Epstein, or NES, LLC's rights and legal positions with respect to Ms. Maxwell's seeking of fees or costs related to this matter, all of which rights and legal positions are hereby expressly preserved. + +It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff shall provide Ms. Maxwell with a copy of the General Release, with the compensation amount redacted, within two days. The parties shall not dispute the authenticity of this copy of the General Release in any future proceedings. + +So Ordered. + +Dated: February 16, 2021 New York, New York UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778427/EFTA02778427.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778427/EFTA02778427.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d1f5382b667b1088b03416f88149e0d290bc90bd --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778427/EFTA02778427.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778427", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "85e68b3b6307b21cce923433737c46314f9e6b969210b1b8703a073809bbea56", + "output_sha256": "85e68b3b6307b21cce923433737c46314f9e6b969210b1b8703a073809bbea56", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778429/EFTA02778429.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778429/EFTA02778429.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9efc1b9f2b3c30a36f46d26c90ef3880b9653ffa --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778429/EFTA02778429.md @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +## VIA ECF + +The Honorable Lorna G. Schofield District Court Judge United States District Court Southern District of New York 40 Foley Square New York, NY 10007 + +Sigrid S. McCawley Telephone: (954) 377-4223 Email: smccawley@bsfllp.com + +February 12, 2021 + +Re: v. Darren. Indyke, Richard I). Kahn, & Ghislaine Maxwell 19-10475-LGS-DCF + +Dear Judge Schofield: + +Plaintiff writes pursuant to this Court's Opinion and Order dated February 10, 2021. ECF No. 118. Plaintiff consents to the Court's entry of Plaintiff's Proposed Order dismissing this action with prejudice (ECF No. 115-1) modified by striking the language "with each party to bear its own attorneys' fees and costs." Plaintiff thanks the Court for its attention to this matter. + +By March 9, 2021, Defendants shall file any motion for costs; by March 23, 2021, Plaintiff shall file any opposition; and by March 30, 2021, Defendants shall file any reply. + +So Ordered. + +Dated: February 16, 2021 New York, New York + +1 + +LO A G. SC HOFIEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE + +Respectfully submitted, + +A/ Sigrid S. McCawley + +Sigrid S. McCawley (pro hac vice) BOILS SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP 401 E. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1200 Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301 (954) 356-0011 + +Counsel for Plaints \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778429/EFTA02778429.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778429/EFTA02778429.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..038f2465412f0781db2cf2c4678c174b90b75d6b --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778429/EFTA02778429.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778429", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "5eb3ca3dbf17c1f4f024afaab1bf1813d2921f01a3444fd87f60cfaa53f580c6", + "output_sha256": "5eb3ca3dbf17c1f4f024afaab1bf1813d2921f01a3444fd87f60cfaa53f580c6", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778430/EFTA02778430.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778430/EFTA02778430.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..bf95f477b1e6ccbb8a189cd066b2cda7de489d87 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778430/EFTA02778430.md @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +X + +Plaintiff, v. + +1 + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, + +Defendants. + +X + +19-cv-I0475-LGS-DCF + +## AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT QHISLAINE MAXWELL'S BILL OF COSTS + +I, Laura A. Menninger, aver as follows: + +1. I am counsel for defendant, Ghislaine Maxwell in v. lndyke, et al., No. 19- CV-10475-LGS-DCF (S.D.N.Y.). I am personally familiar with the costs incurred in connection with the litigation. + +2. I am submitting this Affidavit in support of Ghislaine Maxwell's Bill of Costs. + +3. The attached Bill of Costs and exhibits evidence the costs incurred by Ms. Maxwell in defense of this action. + +4. Each of the costs claimed are allowed by law, specifically Local Civil Rule 54.1. + +Each are correctly stated and were necessarily incurred. + +I swear under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge. + +Executed on Dated: March 9, 2021. + +s/ Laura A. Menninger + +Laura A. Mcnninger \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778430/EFTA02778430.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778430/EFTA02778430.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..938480f39f7a69ad48eda9b1083d772c31b6d0c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778430/EFTA02778430.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778430", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "d297da2b3032691f2700a55c2e33078356523fd45c3aa65095b688b21862d5ae", + "output_sha256": "d297da2b3032691f2700a55c2e33078356523fd45c3aa65095b688b21862d5ae", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778432/EFTA02778432.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778432/EFTA02778432.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f0f6df4adf332fb9e86027ee10d59d725376da8c --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778432/EFTA02778432.md @@ -0,0 +1,341 @@ +# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT + +for the + +Southern District of New York + +. DARREN K. INDYKE et al. + +Case No.: 19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF + +## BILL OF COSTS + +Judgment having been entered in the above entitled action on 02/16/2021 against Plaintiff Date + +the Clerk is requested to tax the following as costs: + +Fees of the Clerk + +Fees for service of summons and subpoena + +Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case 87.00 + +Fees and disbursements for printing + +Fees for witnesses (itemize on page Mn) 0.00 + +Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case + +Docket fees under 28 U.S.C. 1923 5.00 + +Costs as shown on Mandate of Court of Appeals + +Compensation of court-appointed experts + +Compensation of interpreters and costs of special interpretation services under 28 U.S.C. 1828 + +Other Oasts (please itemize) 10.19 + +> TOTAL. 102.19 + +SPECIAL NOTE: Attach to your bill an itemization and documentation for requested costs in all categories. + +## Declaration + +I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing costs are correct and were necessarily incurred in this action and that the services for which fees have been charged were actually and necessarily performed. A copy of this bill has been served on all parties in the following manner: + +Electronic service First class mail, postage prepaid + +Other: + +sl Attorney: Laura A. Menninger + +Name of Attorney: Laura A. Menninger + +For: Ghislaine Maxwell Date: 03/09/2021 Name of Claiming Party + +## Taxation of Costs + +#### Witness Fees (computation, cf. 28 US.C. 1821 for statutor,• lees) + +| | A'ITENDANCE Total | SUBSISTENCE | Total | MILEAGE Total | Total Cost Each Witness | +| ------ | ------------------- | ------------- | ------- | --------------- | ------------------------------------------- | +| Days | Cost | | | | | +| | | Days | Cost | | | +| | | | | Miles Cost | \$0.00 \$0.00 \$0.00 \$0.00 \$0.00 \$0.00 | +| | | | | TOTAI. | \$0.00 | + +#### NOTICE + +Section 1924,111k 28, US. Code (effective September I. 1948) provides: + +"Sec. 1924. Verification of bill of costs." + +"Before any bill of costs is taxed, the party claiming any item of cost or disbursement shall attach thereto an affidavit, made by himself or by his duly authorized attorney or agent having knowledge of the facts, that such item is correct and has been necessarily incurred in the case and that the services for which fees have been charged were actually and necessarily performed." + +See also Section 1920 of Title 28. which reads in part as follows: + +"A bill of costs shall be filed in the case and, upon allowance, included in the judgment or decree." + +The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain the following provisions: + +RULE 54(dXI) + +Costs Other than Attorneys' Fees. + +Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs — other than attorney's fees — should be allowed to the prevailing party. But costs against the United States, its officers, and its agencies may be imposed only to the extent allowed by law. The clerk may tax costs on I4 day's notice. On motion served within the next 7 days. the court may review the clerk's action. + +#### RULE 6 + +«I) Additional Time After Certain Kinds of Service. + +When a party may or must act within a specified time after service and service is made under Rule5(b)(2)(C).(U).(E). Or (F). 3 days arc L! after the period would otherwise expire under Rule 6(a). + +RULE 58(e) + +Cost or Fee Awards: + +Ordinarily, the entry of judgment may not be delayed. nor the time for appeal extended, in order to tax costs or award fees. But if a timely motion for attorney's fees is made under Rule 54(d)(2). the court may act before a notice of appeal has been filed and become effective to order that the motion have the same effect under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4) as a timely motion under Rule 59. + +### EXHIBIT A TO BILL OF COSTS + +NECESSARILY OBTAINED FOR USE IN CASE 19CV10475, V. INDYKE, ET AL. + +### FEES FOR PRINTED OR ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED TRANSCRIPTS + +| Date of Job | Invoice No. | Description | Amount | +| ------------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------- | +| 3/5/2020 | 0524242-IN | Copies \$ | 8.40 | +| 4/16/2020 | 0525973-IN | Original \$ | 31.44 | +| 1/14/2021 | 0530588-IN | Original \$ | 47.16 | +| | | \$ | 87.00 | + +### FEES FOR PACER ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS + +#### SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS PC + +Tax ID No. 13-2775946 + +500 Pearl St. + +Room 330 + +New York, NY 10007 + +Tel No. (212) 805.0300 + +Haddon IIMEIMPC + +150 E 10th Avenue + +Denver, CO 80203 + +Attention:Nicole + +INVOICE NO.: 0525252-IN + +INVOICE DATE: 03/24/20 + +CUSTOMER NO.: 1021785 + +WORK ORDER NO.: 212594 + +SALESPERSON: MICH + +•PAYMENT IS DUE UPON RECEIPT. + +JOB DATE V DARREN K. INDYKE, ET AL. + +CASE NO. I9CV10475 + +3/512020 Copy 7.00 Pages at \$1.20 8.40 + +Net Invoice: 8.40 Less Discount: 0.00 Freight: 0.00 Saks Tax: 0.00 Invoice Total: + +WE ACCEPT VISA, MASTERCARD, AMERICAN EXPRESS AND DISCOVER PLEASE MAKE CHECK PAYABLE TO SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS PC + +#### SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS PC + +Tax II) No. 13.2775946 INVOICE NO.: 0525973-IN INVOICE DATE: 04/20/20 + +500 Pearl St. Room 330 New York, NY 10007 Tel No. (212) 805-0300 + +Haddon ISO E 10th Avenue Denver, CO 80203 Attention:Nicole PC + +CUSTOMER NO.: 1021785 WORK ORDER NO.: 213220 SALESPERSON: CSIW + +\*PAYMENT IS DUE UPON RECEIPT\* + +JOB DATE V DARREN K. INDYKE, ET AL. + +CASE NO. 19CV 10475 + +4/16/2020 Original 8.00 Pages at S3.93 31.44 + +Net Invoice: 31.44 Less Discount: 0.00 Freight: 0.00 Sales Tax: 0.00 Invoke Total: 31.44 V + +WE ACCEPT VISA, MASTERCARD, AMERICAN EXPRESS AND DISCOVER PLEASE MAKE CHECK PAYABLE TO SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS PC + +## Invoice + +#### SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS PC + +Tax ID No. 13-2775946 + +500 Pearl St. Room 330 Now York, NY 10007 Tel No. (212)805.0100 + +Haddon PC ISO E 10th Avenue Denver, CO 80203 Attention:Nicol.= + +INVOICE NO.: 0530588-IN INVOICE DATE: 01/21/21 + +CUSTOMER NO.: 1021785 WORK ORDER NO.: 218334 SALESPERSON: CSIW + +\*PAYMENT IS DUE UPON RECEIPT\* + +JOB DATE V DARREN K. INDYKE, HT AL. CASE NO. 19CVI0475 + +1/14/2021 Original 12.00 Pages at \$3.93 47.16 + +Net Invoice: 47.16 Las Discount: 0.00 Freight: 0.00 Sales Tax: 0,00 Invoice Total, 47.16 + +WE ACCEPT VISA, MASTERCARD, AMERICAN EXPRESS AND DISCOVER PLEASE MAKE CHECK PAYABLE TO SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS PC + +#### Detailed Transaction Report by Date New York Southern District Court from 03/04/2020 to 03/31/2020 + +Tue Mar 0915:38:24 CST 2021 MennInger34444 + +Back II New Search + +| | | | | Billing Transactions | | | | +| ----------------- | ----------- | --- | ------- | ---------------------- | --------------- | ------------------------------------- | -------- | +| Date 03/04/2020 | I Time | | | Client Code | I Description | I Search | Cost | +| 03/04/2020 | 13:48:34 | 5 | NYSDC | MAXWELL | DOCKET REPORT | 1:19-CV-10-475- LGS-DCF | \$0.50 | +| 03/04/2020 | 15.-01:43 | 4 | NYSDC | MAXWELL | IMAGE22-0 | L-19-CV-10475- LGS-DCF DOCUMENT 22- | \$0.40 | + +![](_page_6_Picture_11.jpeg) + +| 03/06/2020 | | | | | | | | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | --------- | ----------- | ------------------------------------- | -------- | +| 03/06/2020 | 17:30:00 | 1 | NYSDC | MAXWELL | IMAGE36-0 | 1:19-CV-10475-LGS-DCF DOCUMENT 36-0 | \$0.10 | +| Subtotal: | | 1 | pages | \$0.10 | | | | + +![](_page_6_Picture_13.jpeg) + +| 03/20/2020 | 17:19:34 | 6 | NYSDC MAXWELL- | DOCKET | | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | -------------------- | ----------- | ---------------- | +| 03/20/2020 | 17:1951 | 1 | NYSDC r | IMAGE40.0 | 1:19-CV-10475- | +| Subtotal: | | 7 | pages | \$0.70 | | +| | | 0 | audio 14es52.40ea) | \$0.00 | | + +![](_page_6_Picture_15.jpeg) + +| Date | Time | Pages | Court | Client Code | Description | Search | Cost | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------- | ------ | + +![](_page_7_Picture_6.jpeg) + +| 1-1.)/LO/ZULll | | | | | | +| ---------------- | ---------- | ---- | ------------------------- | --------------- | ------------------------------------------- | +| 03/26/2020 | 11:4514 | 6 | NYSDC | DOCKET REPORT | 1:19.CV-10475- \$0.60 LGS-DCF | +| 03/26/2020 | 1145:26 | 19 | NYSDC | IMAGE1-0 | 1:19-CV-10475- \$L90 LGS-DCF DOCUMENT 1.0 | +| 03/26/2020 | 11:45:27 | 15 | NYSDC | IMAGE1-1 | 1:19-CV-10475- \$150 LGS-DCF DOCUMENT 1-1 | +| Subtotal: | | 40 | pages | 44.00 | | +| | | 0 | audio files (\$2.40 ea) | \$0.00 \$4.00 | | + +![](_page_7_Picture_8.jpeg) + +PACER FAQ + +Back M New Search + +'this site is maintained by the Admnisbative Office of the U.S. Cowls on behalf of the Federal Judiciary. + +Privacy & Security Contact Us + +PACER Service Center (800) 676.6856 pacer@psc.uscourts.gov + +#### Detailed Transaction Report by Date New York Southern District Court from 04/01/2020 to 06/30/2020 + +Tue Mar 0915:26:22 CST 2021 MennInger34444 + +Back J New Search + +#### Billing Transactions + +| Date | Time | Pages | Court | Client Code | Description | Search | Cost | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------- | ------ | + +![](_page_8_Picture_12.jpeg) + +![](_page_9_Picture_4.jpeg) + +| 04/15/2020 | 1644:43 | 7 | NYSDC | DOCKET | | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | ----------- | ---------------- | +| 04/15/2020 | 16:4519 | 1 | NYSDC | IMAGE40-0 | 1:19-CV-10475- | +| 04/15/2020 | 16:45:37 | 1 | NYSDC | IMAGE51-0 | 1:19-CV-10475- | + +![](_page_9_Picture_7.jpeg) + +04'16:2020 + +![](_page_9_Picture_9.jpeg) + +| 04/16/2020 | 08:51:02 | 8 | NYSDC | [REDACTED] | DOCKET REPORT | 119-CV-07675-GBD-DCF | \$0.80 | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | ------------ | --------------- | ---------------------- | -------- | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | ------------ | --------------- | ---------------------- | -------- | + +![](_page_9_Picture_11.jpeg) + +| Date | Time | Pages | Court | Client Code | Description | Search | Cost | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------- | ------ | + +![](_page_10_Picture_6.jpeg) + +|   |   |   |   |   |   | +| ------------------- | ----------------- | ---------------- | ---------------- | ---------------- | ---------------- | +| 04/29/2020 | 12:43:47 |   |   |   |   | +| | | 8 | NYSDC |   |   | +| | | |   |   |   | +| | | |   |   |   | +| | | |   |   |   | +| | | |   |   |   | +| 04/29/2020 | 12:43:47 |   |   |   |   | +| | | |   |   |   | +| | | |   |   |   | +| | | |   |   |   | +| | | |   |   |   | + +![](_page_10_Picture_8.jpeg) + +| Date | Time | Pages | Court | Client Code | Description | Search | Cost | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------- | ------ | + +| 05/11/2020 | 18:29:03 | 9 | NYSDC | MAXWELL | DOCKET REPORT | 119-CV-10475-LGS-DCF | \$0.90 | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | --------- | --------------- | ---------------------- | -------- | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | --------- | --------------- | ---------------------- | -------- | + +![](_page_11_Picture_7.jpeg) + +| Date | Time | Pages | Court | Client Code | Description | Search | Cost | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------- | ------ | + +| 05/18/2020 | 14:25:06 | | 9 | NYSDC | MAXWELL | DOCKET REPORT | 1:19-CV-10475-LGS-DCF | \$0.90 | +| ------------ | ---------- | -------- | ------------------------- | ------- | ------------ | --------------- | ----------------------- | -------- | +| Subtotal: | | 9 | pages | | \$0.90 | | | | +| | | 0 | audio files (\$2.40 ea) | | \$0.00 | | | | +| | | \$0.90 | | | | | | | +| 05/19/2020 | | | | | | | | | +| 05/19/2020 | 13:10:59 | | 9 | NYSDC | [REDACTED] | DOCKET REPORT | 1:19-CV-10475-LGS-DCF | \$0.90 | + +![](_page_12_Picture_19.jpeg) + +| Date | Time | Pages | Court | Client Code | Description | Search | Cost | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------- | ------ | + +![](_page_13_Picture_6.jpeg) + +| 05/22/2020 | 09:49:08 | 10 | NYSDC | [REDACTED] | DOCKET REPORT | 1:19-CV-10475-LGS-DCF | \$1.00 | +| ------------ | ---------- | ---- | ------- | ------------ | --------------- | ----------------------- | -------- | +| ------------ | ---------- | ---- | ------- | ------------ | --------------- | ----------------------- | -------- | + +![](_page_13_Picture_8.jpeg) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778432/EFTA02778432.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778432/EFTA02778432.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..92634e856f7e554b52a9dd6af1605352abcbaf2f --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778432/EFTA02778432.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -2116, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778432", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 235, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.table-boundary-padding\", \"epstein_legal.flight-log-tables.normalize\", \"epstein_legal.redaction-normalization.block-characters\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "5231a8edb9b7d46b23ada0f91b80824c7f18b455eaec7c137fea3a30d788aa91", + "output_sha256": "66fea5f81a4a4bba375ad98d65eb6630122ff25625bbd88f2489ea170f5df85a", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778446/EFTA02778446.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778446/EFTA02778446.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0a90a4c5bd48e01c681e9fa8188bb6201702b4cb --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778446/EFTA02778446.md @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +X + +Plaintiff, v. + +1 + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, + +Defendants. X 19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF + +## GHISLAINE MAXWELL'S NOTICE OF TAXATION OF COSTS AND SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM OF LAW + +On February 16, 2021, this Court dismissed plaintiff's case with prejudice, based on her motion for voluntary dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). As the prevailing party in this matter, Ms. Maxwell hereby requests, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1), an order awarding her taxable costs against plaintiff + +Rule 54(dX1) provides that "[u]nless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs—other than attorney's fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(dX1). "Courts consistently have found defendants to be prevailing parties where the action against them was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice." Ctr. for Discovery, Inc. v. D.P., No. 16-CV-3936-MKB-RER, 2018 WL 1583971, at •14 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2018); see Beer v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 211 F.R.D. 67, 70 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) ("All circuit courts to have directly addressed this issue have concluded that a defendant [who has obtained a voluntary dismissal with prejudice] is a prevailing party, or alternatively, that a + +district court has discretion to award costs to the defendant."); see also Carter v. Inc. Vill. of Ocean Beach, 759 F.3d 159, 165 (2d Cir. 2014) (disclaiming prior Second Circuit dicta which stated that "generally the defendant is not considered the prevailing party when, as here, there is a voluntary dismissal of the action by the plaintiff with prejudice." (citations omitted)). "A voluntary dismissal of an action with prejudice [is considered to materially alter the relationship of the parties], because it constitutes 'an adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicatar Caner, 759 F.3d at 165 (citation omitted); accord Feb. 12, 2021, Opinion and Order, DE 118; accord Jane Doe v. Darren K. Indyke et. al, Case No. 20-cv-484 (IGK), DE 98 at 5 (addressing identical Rule 41(a)(2) motion and holding "Ms. Maxwell is correct that under Second Circuit law, she is the prevailing party for the purposes of Rule 54(d)"). + +An award of costs under Rule 54 is the "normal rule," and "the losing party has the burden to show that costs should not be imposed." Torcivia v. Suffolk Cty., 437 F. Supp. 3d 239, 249 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (quoting Harris v. , No. 08-CV-1703 MKB, 2013 WL 632247, at \*1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2013). Once "the prevailing party demonstrates the amount of its costs and that they fall within an allowable category of taxable costs, see Local Rule 54.1(a), that party enjoys a presumption that its costs will be awarded." Equal Employment Opportunity Commit! v. United Health Programs of Am., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 3d 199, 236 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting Patterson v. McCarron, No. 99-cv-11078 (RCC), 2005 WL 735954, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2005). + +Annexed hereto is Ms. Maxwell's Bill of Costs, including the Affidavit of Laura Menninger and exhibits, in the form required by Local Civil Rule 54.1 and including only those taxable costs prescribed by the rule.' As the prevailing party, Ms. Maxwell is presumptively entitled to an award of cost, and plaintiff is unable to meet her burden to demonstrate why costs should not be imposed. Accordingly, Ms. Maxwell requests that the Court order plaintiff to pay her costs in the amount detailed in the attached. + +WHEREFORE, Ms. Ghislaine Maxwell requests an award of costs pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) as the prevailing party in this action. + +Dated: March 9, 2021. + +Respectfully submitted, + +/s/ Laura A. Menninger + +Laura A. Mennin er (LMSI + +HADDON, ANDS P.C. + +150 East 1 Avenue + +Denver, CO 80203 + +Phone: 303.831.7364 + +Fax: 303.832.2628 + +lmenninger@htnflaw.com + +Attorney for Ghislaine Maxwell + +Ms. Maxwell seeks herein only her costs and expressly reserves her right to seek attorneys' fees incurred in defense of this action in future litigation either against plaintiff (e.g., as claims for malicious prosecution or abuse of process), against the Estate of Epstein (under an indemnification theory), or both. See Opinion and Order of Feb. 10, 2021 at 5 (DE 118); accord Opinion and Order of Mar. 9, 2021, Jane Doe v. Darren K. Indyke et al, 20-cv-484 (JGK), at 5 (Dkt. 98) (striking language from proposed Rule 41(aX2) dismissal relating to each party paying their own fees and costs to preserve right to seek attorneys' fees from this litigation in potential future litigation for claims including the torts of abuse of process and malicious prosecution). + +## Certificate of Service + +I hereby certify that on March 9, 2021, I electronically served the foregoing via electronic mail on the following: + +Sigrid McCawley BOLES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP 401 E. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1200 Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301 smccawley@bsfilp.com + +Joshua I. Schiller Andrew Villavastin Sabina Mariella BOLES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP 55 Hudson Yards New York, NY 10001 jischiller@bsfllp.com avillavastin@bsfflp.com smariella@bsfllp.com + +Bennet J. Moskowitz TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 875 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022 bennet.moskowitz@troutman.com + +Molly S. DiRago TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 227 W. Monroe Street, Suite 3900 Chicago, IL 60606 Molly.dirago@troutman.com + +s/ Holly Rogers \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778446/EFTA02778446.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778446/EFTA02778446.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..bfa42884ce85dc24d63c22b9d9adf64d8e8e2c5c --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778446/EFTA02778446.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778446", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "64a5a06be4899d5bc822a202ce30a357cd6630f5b383781db0fad08f070e64af", + "output_sha256": "64a5a06be4899d5bc822a202ce30a357cd6630f5b383781db0fad08f070e64af", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778450/EFTA02778450.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778450/EFTA02778450.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..02633cc98e4fda3abd5551e9c9f7f1e4bddf9963 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778450/EFTA02778450.md @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +## VIA ECF + +Sigrid S. McCawley Telephone: (954) 377-4223 Email: smccawley@bsfllp.com + +March 23, 2021 + +The Honorable Lorna G. Schofield District Court Judge United States District Court Southern District of New York 4O Foley Square New York, NY 10007 + +> Re: v. Darren Indyke, Richard D. Kahn, & Ghislaine Maxwell 19-10475-LGS-DCF + +Dear Judge Schofield: + +Plaintiff writes in response to the Defendant's Notice of Taxation of Costs. ECF No. 122. Although Plaintiff does not agree that the Defendant is the prevailing party, she does not object to paying the \$102.19 of costs in order to avoid further burdening the Court. Motion practice on this issue would far exceed the above cost and would be a waste of the Court's resources. + +Respectfully submitted, + +/s/ Sigrid S. McCawley + +Sigrid S. McCawley + +cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778450/EFTA02778450.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778450/EFTA02778450.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3e4731e312de66f027a7fabdbed595246177858c --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778450/EFTA02778450.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778450", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "079a8bebccd3a147d032dc54be68e2df973d0d8b1c2df268df4971798ebb16a2", + "output_sha256": "079a8bebccd3a147d032dc54be68e2df973d0d8b1c2df268df4971798ebb16a2", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778451/EFTA02778451.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778451/EFTA02778451.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7bd060390dc7552fc0eb6c74d3e793fcd7653be2 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778451/EFTA02778451.md @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +X Plaintiff, 19 Civ. 10475 (LGS) -against- ORDER DARREN K. INDYKE, et al., Defendants. : X + +LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, District Judge: + +WHEREAS, on March 9, 2021, Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell filed a notice of taxation of costs (Dkt. No. 122) and proposed Form AO 133 Bill of Costs seeking taxation of costs totaling \$102.19 (Dkt. No. 122-2). + +WHEREAS, on March 23, 2021, Plaintiff filed a letter stating that "she does not object to paying the \$102.19 of costs." Dkt. No. 123. It is hereby + +ORDERED, that Plaintiff shall pay Ms. Maxwell \$102.19 in costs. + +The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to tax costs in the amount of \$102.19 and execute the proposed Bill of Costs at Docket No. 122-2. + +Dated: April 9, 2021 New York, New York UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778451/EFTA02778451.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778451/EFTA02778451.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..131ec0e4fa8a6b3510cbe7429606a95f83420b50 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10475/EFTA02778451/EFTA02778451.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02778451", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "f4e156f0b70ea0a1f392ee2031cd88904159f97cb3a6908c329ae60b7d373878", + "output_sha256": "f4e156f0b70ea0a1f392ee2031cd88904159f97cb3a6908c329ae60b7d373878", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-redacted-v-indyke-10475", + "text_format": "markdown" +}