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title: "DOJ Epstein Files, Data Set 9 (EFTA00040864)"
source: "DOJ Epstein Files, Data Set 9"
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date: "2026-01-01"
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FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)

-1 of 8

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION





This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

EFTA00040864

FD-302a (Rev. 5-8-10)

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Proffer of , On 11/08/2021 , Page 2 of 8

units 5 South and 11 South. The DCT received tactical, munitions, less than lethal, crowd control and firearms training. Officers received training on and were required to qualify with the 9mm, AR-15, shotgun and sub-machine gun(SMG). The DCT also received annual update training on the code of conduct. stated that Officers were able to carry firearms outside of the facility and carried a Glock-19 that was his personally owned weapon. All facility weapons were kept in the armory at the MCC. The Law Enforcement Officer Safety Act (LEOSA) allowed to carry his firearm outside of work.

The highest grade that reached was GS-8, Senior Officer Specialist and his highest position was Acting . worked off and on as the acting for about a year. As Acting , if worked the night shift (4pm-12am), he would be 3rd in command of the entire facility. As a CO, normal duties was as internal security. Internal Security runs the elevators in the facility. worked as internal security for 8 years. On the schedule, worked as internal security #2 for 2 years prior to 2020.

recalled working in the Special Housing Unit (SHU)in 2006. stated that he eventually stayed away from the SHU as much as possible due to there being too many regulations. stated that all of the regulations made it easy to get into trouble. All officers that worked in the SHU received annual training on the regulations of the SHU. Topics such as maintaining key control and transporting inmates were some of the topics covered. Examples of key control would be ensuring that the grill key does not enter the tier. [Agent Note: The grill key pertains to the key that opens the main door of the tier. Grill relates to the vertical bars on the entrance resembling a cooking grill].

Inmates that were placed in the SHU on Disciplinary Segregation (DS) had limitations on the items that they could have but were able to keep items such as radios and hygiene items. Inmates were allowed to put in formal requests for items to be brought to them in the SHU. stated that inmates in the SHU were allowed to give items to other inmates. stated that an inspection of the items must happen before the item is passed between inmates. Items are inspected because contraband such as cigarettes, K2, pills, razors or anything can be found in the items. stated that he had not witnessed any items get passed that had not been inspected

EFTA00040865

FD-302a (Rev. 5-8-10)

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Proffer of , On 11/08/2021 , Page 3 of 8

first. stated that he had not passed items that were not inspected first. explained that an inspection consisted of ensuring that the items were not tamported with in any way. Another way of inspecting would be if the item being passed was a book, would open it and shake the pages to ensure that nothing is in it. explained that even inside of a book you could find drugs.

It is an unwritten rule that you can pass items from one inmate to another in the SHU. stated that there are no regulations that state that you can or cannot pass items only that you cannot pass contraband. Any contraband that is found is taken to the bubble. A is then called and the item is taken to the Special Investigative Section (SIS). As internal security, would go and retrieve contraband and deliver it to the . As Acting , would go and get the contraband items himself. SIS has a drop box on the 3rd floor for contraband to be placed into. Internal's duty would include getting the inmate from their cell, pat searching them and transport them to the SHU.

In 2018, a female CO wanted an inmate to go to the SHU and decided to not take the inmate to the SHU. Recalled some of the contraband he has seen which included cigarettes, weed, K2, shanks, and razors made into weapons. Recalled finding a lot of scalpels. stated that he did not know where the scalpels were coming from but assumed they came from medical or visitors because the scalpels were thin enough not to set off the metal detectors.

stated that he was off on the day of Jeffrey Epstein's death.

does not remember working overtime in the SHU after Epstein's death and does not have knowledge of any restrictions put in place in the SHU. The focus of the facility was on the SHU because of the spotlight after Epstein's death. stated that he would help move inmates from the SHU but would not be posted there. was not asked to work the SHU because everyone including the Captain and knew would not work in the SHU. Darden was the at that time.

stated that his whole family worked in corrections at different levels. older sister, works as a CO at the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC) and his brother (non-biological), worked at the MCC as a CO. calls his

EFTA00040866

FD-302a (Rev. 5-8-10)

stated that him being placed on administrative leave was due to the Associate Warden's(AW) personal vendetta against . The MCC DCT was activated last minute at the end of February 2020. Other DCT from other facilities were activated first.

] was told first that they were being activated but they did not know why. had been working at the MCC all day due to working a double shift. The said that the building needed to be locked down.

and the other officers were told that they could not go home.

stated that he argued with about them not telling the Officers what was going while DCT were dealing with and fighting inmates while one of them could potentially have a gun. stated that he found out about the gun through the media. DCT from Fort Dix, Canaan and Danbury were activated and briefed on the situation. recalled sitting with Doctor and other MCC staff in the Attorney conference room on the 3rd floor. was at home at that time.

At 8pm, the MCC DCT was activated. had found out everything through the media. stated that he ran into and confronted him. said to that he did not have to tell anything. told that DCT was activated. had been forced to come in. stated "Im not doing shit". stated that he eventually changed his mind because was loyal to. stated that he kept his cellphone in a locker at the MCC and would communicate via radio or sallyport phones. had came to in-person to ask for help. MCC DCT were told to help with the shakedown on the units by The first unit that the MCC DCT went to was 5 South. recalled himself, , , and maybe being present. They were instructed to shakedown the unit and look for contraband. 1 team would conduct the strip search and the other team would help strip the cells. stated that he conducted the pat searches and did not search the cells.



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FD-302a (Rev. 5-8-10)

R&D. The Special Investigative Agent (SIA) was there too. believes that the SIA had called for the DCT team to come to R&D but they were not in R&D long. The inmate was taken to the SHU by the entire team and was left in a holding cell. From there, the DCT resumed shakedowns.

worked from 8am-7am the next morning. was instructed to return at 4pm that same day. The same officers from before came back to do shakedowns. Every unit was searched except unit 7 North.

recalled an Officer on 5 South calling over from 5 North. does not remember the officers name but the Officer needed help with an inmate. stated that he told that would go over to 5 South to assist. took all 5 people from the MCC DCT with him. stated that he pulled the inmate out of his cell and spoke to him. does not remember the inmates name but asked the inmate what his problem was. had told the inmate to calm down. was there along with the other DCT members during this exchange. stated that the DCT had left their non-legal weapons on 5 North. stated that he took the inmate to an area by the gym. After the exchange, took the inmate back to the cell. The cell was searched and an item was found on the bunkmate. Both inmates were taken to the SHU. thinks that the item that was found was a cellphone because that is what was told by other officers. All 5 officers went to the SHU to put the inmates in a cell. believed that both of the inmates were going to the SHU because of the circumstances at that time.

stated that he was called to assist with the inmate because he is not an asshole to them. talks to the inmates, build rapport with them and is treated with respect because of his time on. stated that he is well known at the MCC. MCC staff and inmates at the facility called him even before he was acting because was always looked at as an authority figure.

The SIA had went to and told MCC DCT to escort the inmates to the SHU. believes that they were put in cells. Afterwards, the DCT was told by that they had be deactivated. stated that the DCT was deactivated for no real reason. stated that himself and the other MCC DCT members had went to office and quit by throwing their t-shirts on the chair. stated that once he

EFTA00040868

FD-302a (Rev. 5-8-10)

quit, the other members followed suit. stated that after that, he had went home.



recalled a time four years on the job that he had gotten in trouble for opening the cell door of an inmate in the SHU. The infraction was caught on camera and was suspended for 5 days. The rule for opening a door in the SHU is that the ratio must be 2-1 (2 COs for 1 inmate). The COs should outnumber the inmates. During this time, was working in the SHU. Another incident was also in the SHU when gave an inmate their property and was reported by stated that the property was books and food that were left over. was cleared of any wrongdoing after the SIA investigated.

[Interviewers asks about the whereabouts of his personal Glock-19] provided the following:

EFTA00040869

FD-302a (Rev. 5-8-10)

The NYPD is in possession of the Glock 19. Following his shooting, had given it to the NYPD to test it. stated that he did not use the gun during the shooting. stated that he is allowed to carry concealed. stated that he went to Connecticut to qualify but has not qualified since being on administrative leave. stated that even while suspended, he was allowed to have his BOP credentials.



recognized the SHU and recognized himself and as the individuals in the video.

Video 3:21 mark- does not remember if he was working the SHU. stated that he might be there to clean out the cell and put inmates in.

EFTA00040870

FD-302a (Rev. 5-8-10)

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Proffer of , On 11/08/2021 , Page 8 of 8

acknowledged passing an item in the SHU but it was not an item that the inmate was not allowed to have. stated that he inspected the item by only looking at it. stated that he might have been asked by an inmate to pass the item for them. does not remember what the item was but it was something the inmate was allowed to have.

believes he would not have passed it unless the inmate was allowed to have it. stated that it might have been soap or other toiletries. stated that he did not report that he had passed the item from one cell to another. believes that he would not do anything such as pass contraband because of the amount of people in the building and everyone watching.

EFTA00040871