Daily Papers

Process Reward Models (PRMs) provide step-level feedback for reasoning, but current PRMs usually output only a single reward score for each step. Downstream methods must therefore treat imperfect step-level reward predictions as reliable decision signals, with no indication of when these predictions should be trusted. We propose BetaPRM, a distributional PRM that predicts both a step-level success probability and the reliability of that prediction. Given step-success supervision from Monte Carlo continuations, BetaPRM learns a Beta belief that explains the observed number of successful continuations through a Beta-Binomial likelihood, rather than regressing to the finite-sample success ratio as a point target. This learned reliability signal indicates when a step reward should be trusted, enabling downstream applications to distinguish reliable rewards from uncertain ones. As one application, we introduce Adaptive Computation Allocation (ACA) for PRM-guided Best-of-N reasoning. ACA uses the learned reliability signal to stop when a high-reward solution is reliable and to spend additional computation on uncertain candidate prefixes. Experiments across four backbones and four reasoning benchmarks show that BetaPRM improves PRM-guided Best-of-N selection while preserving standard step-level error detection. Built on this signal, ACA improves the accuracy--token tradeoff over fixed-budget Best-of-16, reducing token usage by up to 33.57% while improving final-answer accuracy.

Probabilistic forecasting estimates the likelihood of uncertain future events. To improve LLM forecasting, existing methods typically learn from binary outcomes to output verbalized forecasts. However, while aggregated human forecasts contain rich information in both the crowd probability estimate and the degree of agreement among forecasters, how to utilize these signals remains underexplored. To address this, we propose the Beta-Bernoulli Calibrator (BBC), which converts an initial point estimate forecast from any model into a distribution over event likelihood, using supervision from both binary outcomes and human forecasts. BBC models event likelihood p sim Beta(α, β) and outcome y sim Bernoulli(p), with the mean as the calibrated point forecast and the variance as the epistemic uncertainty. Our results show that BBC generally provides better calibrated and more accurate forecasts than both traditional post-hoc calibration methods and models fine-tuned specifically for forecasting, while remaining lightweight and having good generalization. We also show that the epistemic uncertainty captured by BBC is a more reliable predictor of forecasting error than verbalized confidence.

Multi-model LLM systems such as routing, voting, cascades, fusion, and mixture-of-agents are used to beat single-model accuracy. We show that their gain is capped by a quantity the field rarely reports. For any policy whose output is one member model answer, accuracy cannot exceed one minus beta, where beta is the rate at which every model is wrong on the same query. In contrast, the usual diagnostic, average pairwise error correlation rho, cannot identify beta: error laws with identical marginals and pairwise correlations can have different all-wrong rates. A Clopper-Pearson bound on beta gives a finite-sample certificate on the largest gain any router, vote, or cascade could deliver before training a router. Across 67 models from 21 providers, a tetrachoric-calibrated single-factor model still underprices the all-wrong tail: on open-ended mathematics, observed beta is 0.052 versus 0.023 under the full 67-model Gaussian copula, about 2.5 times underpricing, with 90 percent CI 1.7 to 3.4 and k equals 17. The effect recurs on execution-graded code, where beta is 0.079. Re-asking the same GPQA-Diamond questions in free-response rather than multiple-choice form reopens the tail, with beta 0.127 and a five-judge panel with kappa 0.73 to 0.92, locating co-failure in answer format rather than subject. At matched quality, low-rho heterogeneous ensembles beat high-rho Self-MoA, but on checkable tasks in our pool, combining models rarely beats the single best model without a strong query-level routing signal. Gains come from models failing on different questions, not from adding more models.

Autonomous scientific discovery systems increasingly use large language models (LLMs) to propose new hypotheses, but many such systems condition primarily on experimental memory: archives of high-scoring candidates or heuristic summaries of recent trials. We argue that discovery agents should instead maintain explicit, uncertainty-aware beliefs about hypothesis quality. We introduce BayesEvolve, a belief-guided discovery framework that converts experimental evidence into a predictive belief state and uses this belief to guide future experimentation. As a controlled testbed for belief-guided discovery, we evaluate BayesEvolve on shifted BBOB-style black-box optimization tasks, leaving program and laboratory discovery domains to future work. BayesEvolve improves sample efficiency over memory- and archive-guided LLM baselines under a fixed evaluation budget. We further show that the belief state is predictive on held-out candidate pools, that controlled decision-rule ablations favor belief-guided selection with an annealed uncertainty bonus, and that BayesEvolve exhibits productive late-stage concentration rather than unfocused exploration.

Capturing aleatoric uncertainty is a critical part of many machine learning systems. In deep learning, a common approach to this end is to train a neural network to estimate the parameters of a heteroscedastic Gaussian distribution by maximizing the logarithm of the likelihood function under the observed data. In this work, we examine this approach and identify potential hazards associated with the use of log-likelihood in conjunction with gradient-based optimizers. First, we present a synthetic example illustrating how this approach can lead to very poor but stable parameter estimates. Second, we identify the culprit to be the log-likelihood loss, along with certain conditions that exacerbate the issue. Third, we present an alternative formulation, termed β-NLL, in which each data point's contribution to the loss is weighted by the β-exponentiated variance estimate. We show that using an appropriate β largely mitigates the issue in our illustrative example. Fourth, we evaluate this approach on a range of domains and tasks and show that it achieves considerable improvements and performs more robustly concerning hyperparameters, both in predictive RMSE and log-likelihood criteria.

Serial verification gates are a core reliability primitive in LLM harnesses: a candidate answer is returned only if k verifier calls all accept it. Under conditionally independent gates, the recent Odds Law (arXiv:2606.15712) shows that posterior log-odds grow linearly in k, so failure decays exponentially, and states that "a tight theory of partially correlated verifier cascades remains open." This note gives a minimal such theory. Modeling the per-instance false-accept rate on the generator's own errors as a latent variable αsim G (de Finetti), the exact cascade posterior is ell_k = ell_0 - ln m_k, with m_k the k-th moment of G. Then: (i) ell_k is concave in k for every non-degenerate G -- the Odds Law is its tangent at the first gate and an upper bound; (ii) for Beta(a,b) latents, failure decays polynomially, 1-r_k asymp k^{-b}, with correlation parameter ρ_v = 1/(a+b+1); (iii) a blind-spot atom of mass 1-π at α=1 caps the evidence extractable from any number of gates at -ln(1-π) nats, so reliability saturates below 1; (iv) letting the true-accept rate also vary (βsim H) yields a trichotomy -- gates eventually always help, plateau, or actively harm -- decided by the upper-tail exponents of G and H, with closed-form crossover k^dagger. The mechanism is survivorship: errors surviving gates are the high-α ones. The theory is measurable: R repeated verdicts per instance identify the first R moments of G, so two verdicts identify ρ_v; beta-binomial likelihood and NPMLE recover the reliability curve and the ill-posed ceiling. In synthetic tests, independence-based extrapolation underestimates failure by 20x at k=5 and ~3000x at k=10; the correlated fit at R=8 tracks held-out depths. The practical lever is decorrelation -- changing model family, modality, or evidence source -- not adding gates.

The Beta kernel estimator offers a theoretically superior alternative to the Gaussian kernel for unit interval data, eliminating boundary bias without requiring reflection or transformation. However, its adoption remains limited by the lack of a reliable bandwidth selector; practitioners currently rely on iterative optimization methods that are computationally expensive and prone to instability. We derive the ``Beta Reference Rule,'' a fast, closed-form bandwidth selector based on the unweighted Asymptotic Mean Integrated Squared Error (AMISE) of a beta reference distribution. To address boundary integrability issues, we introduce a principled heuristic for U-shaped and J-shaped distributions. By employing a method-of-moments approximation, we reduce the bandwidth selection complexity from iterative optimization to O(1). Extensive Monte Carlo simulations demonstrate that our rule matches the accuracy of numerical optimization while delivering a speedup of over 35,000 times. Real-world validation on socioeconomic data shows that it avoids the ``vanishing boundary'' and ``shoulder'' artifacts common to Gaussian-based methods. We provide a comprehensive, open-source Python package to facilitate the immediate adoption of the Beta kernel as a drop-in replacement for standard density estimation tools.

In this work, we derive sharp non-asymptotic deviation bounds for weighted sums of Dirichlet random variables. These bounds are based on a novel integral representation of the density of a weighted Dirichlet sum. This representation allows us to obtain a Gaussian-like approximation for the sum distribution using geometry and complex analysis methods. Our results generalize similar bounds for the Beta distribution obtained in the seminal paper Alfers and Dinges [1984]. Additionally, our results can be considered a sharp non-asymptotic version of the inverse of Sanov's theorem studied by Ganesh and O'Connell [1999] in the Bayesian setting. Based on these results, we derive new deviation bounds for the Dirichlet process posterior means with application to Bayesian bootstrap. Finally, we apply our estimates to the analysis of the Multinomial Thompson Sampling (TS) algorithm in multi-armed bandits and significantly sharpen the existing regret bounds by making them independent of the size of the arms distribution support.

Long chains of thought (CoT) from current language models frequently contain logical gaps and unjustified leaps, limiting the gains from additional test-time compute. Improving reasoning quality directly would require process reward models, but the step-level annotations needed to train them are expensive and scarce. We find such a signal in how the model's confidence evolves during reasoning: premature confidence, the tendency to commit to an answer early and use the remaining tokens to rationalize it, strongly predicts flawed reasoning across tasks and model scales. We exploit this in progressive confidence shaping, a reinforcement learning objective that trains models to update their confidence as they reason rather than commit early -- rewarding gradual confidence growth and penalizing early commitment, with no external labels or reward models. The method improves accuracy and reasoning quality from 1.5B to 8B parameters across arithmetic (Countdown), math (DAPO, AIME), and science (ScienceQA): on Countdown, accuracy improves 3.2x (+42.0pp) and flawed reasoning drops 48pp; on AIME, Pass@64 improves 6.6pp. Consistent with this mechanism, the method also improves faithfulness: on a safety benchmark, our models more transparently surface misleading content in their reasoning traces rather than concealing it. Controlled experiments reveal that the problem and its remedy scale together: premature confidence grows with model size and task difficulty, and so do the gains from addressing it.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards can in principle train calibrated probabilistic forecasters, since a proper scoring rule such as the Brier score is computed from outcomes alone and is minimized in expectation by the true probability. In practice it degrades calibration, and existing remedies address epistemic uncertainty, where a model's confidence accompanies a verifiably correct or incorrect answer. We study aleatoric forecasting, where the forecast itself is the output and the label is one stochastic outcome, taking NFL in-game win probability as a testbed with the betting market as a reference. Rewarding the realized per-play outcome fails, because the single outcome is a noisy target and the policy gradient corrupts the chain of thought. We introduce a verifiable, label-free reward, a state-conditioned empirical win rate estimated from past outcomes, that removes the label noise, and we keep the gradient off the reasoning, by direct prediction or a gradient mask, so it cannot be corrupted. Trained with this reward alone, without human labels or supervised fine-tuning, a 7B model reaches the calibration of the betting market by direct prediction and is better calibrated than a zero-shot frontier model. That frontier model and a tabular estimator reach the same Brier score as this model, identifying the market's small remaining edge as live in-game information beyond their shared inputs. Masking the gradient, rather than dropping the chain of thought, preserves reasoning from which the forecast follows, which ordinary chain-of-thought training corrupts.

We consider reinforcement learning in an environment modeled by an episodic, finite, stage-dependent Markov decision process of horizon H with S states, and A actions. The performance of an agent is measured by the regret after interacting with the environment for T episodes. We propose an optimistic posterior sampling algorithm for reinforcement learning (OPSRL), a simple variant of posterior sampling that only needs a number of posterior samples logarithmic in H, S, A, and T per state-action pair. For OPSRL we guarantee a high-probability regret bound of order at most mathcal{O}(H^3SAT) ignoring polylog(HSAT) terms. The key novel technical ingredient is a new sharp anti-concentration inequality for linear forms which may be of independent interest. Specifically, we extend the normal approximation-based lower bound for Beta distributions by Alfers and Dinges [1984] to Dirichlet distributions. Our bound matches the lower bound of order Ω(H^3SAT), thereby answering the open problems raised by Agrawal and Jia [2017b] for the episodic setting.

Reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards (RLVR) is a promising paradigm for improving large language model (LLM) agents on long-horizon interactive tasks. However, in partially observable environments, incomplete observations cause agent beliefs to drift over time, while delayed rewards obscure the causal impact of intermediate decisions, exacerbating temporal credit assignment challenges. To address this, we propose ReBel (Reward Belief), a process-level reinforcement learning algorithm that explicitly models structured belief states to summarize interaction history and guide subsequent policy learning. ReBel introduces belief-consistency supervision, converting discrepancies between predicted beliefs and observed feedback into dense self-supervised signals without requiring external step-wise annotations or verifiers. It also employs belief-aware grouping to compare trajectories under similar belief states, yielding more robust and lower-variance advantage estimates. We evaluate ReBel on challenging long-horizon benchmarks, including ALFWorld and WebShop. ReBel improves task success by up to 20.4 percentage points over the episode-level baseline GRPO and increases sample efficiency by 2.1times. These results suggest that belief-aware self-supervision is a promising direction for reliable long-horizon decision-making under partial observability. Code is available at: https://github.com/Fateyetian/Rebel.git.

We consider the problem of performing Bayesian inference in probabilistic models where observations are accompanied by uncertainty, referred to as "uncertain evidence." We explore how to interpret uncertain evidence, and by extension the importance of proper interpretation as it pertains to inference about latent variables. We consider a recently-proposed method "distributional evidence" as well as revisit two older methods: Jeffrey's rule and virtual evidence. We devise guidelines on how to account for uncertain evidence and we provide new insights, particularly regarding consistency. To showcase the impact of different interpretations of the same uncertain evidence, we carry out experiments in which one interpretation is defined as "correct." We then compare inference results from each different interpretation illustrating the importance of careful consideration of uncertain evidence.

Can LLMs accurately adjust their confidence when facing opposition? Building on previous studies measuring calibration on static fact-based question-answering tasks, we evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) in a dynamic, adversarial debate setting, uniquely combining two realistic factors: (a) a multi-turn format requiring models to update beliefs as new information emerges, and (b) a zero-sum structure to control for task-related uncertainty, since mutual high-confidence claims imply systematic overconfidence. We organized 60 three-round policy debates among ten state-of-the-art LLMs, with models privately rating their confidence (0-100) in winning after each round. We observed five concerning patterns: (1) Systematic overconfidence: models began debates with average initial confidence of 72.9% vs. a rational 50% baseline. (2) Confidence escalation: rather than reducing confidence as debates progressed, debaters increased their win probabilities, averaging 83% by the final round. (3) Mutual overestimation: in 61.7% of debates, both sides simultaneously claimed >=75% probability of victory, a logical impossibility. (4) Persistent self-debate bias: models debating identical copies increased confidence from 64.1% to 75.2%; even when explicitly informed their chance of winning was exactly 50%, confidence still rose (from 50.0% to 57.1%). (5) Misaligned private reasoning: models' private scratchpad thoughts sometimes differed from their public confidence ratings, raising concerns about faithfulness of chain-of-thought reasoning. These results suggest LLMs lack the ability to accurately self-assess or update their beliefs in dynamic, multi-turn tasks; a major concern as LLMs are now increasingly deployed without careful review in assistant and agentic roles. Code for our experiments is available at https://github.com/pradyuprasad/llms_overconfidence

Epistemic Uncertainty is a measure of the lack of knowledge of a learner which diminishes with more evidence. While existing work focuses on using the variance of the Bayesian posterior due to parameter uncertainty as a measure of epistemic uncertainty, we argue that this does not capture the part of lack of knowledge induced by model misspecification. We discuss how the excess risk, which is the gap between the generalization error of a predictor and the Bayes predictor, is a sound measure of epistemic uncertainty which captures the effect of model misspecification. We thus propose a principled framework for directly estimating the excess risk by learning a secondary predictor for the generalization error and subtracting an estimate of aleatoric uncertainty, i.e., intrinsic unpredictability. We discuss the merits of this novel measure of epistemic uncertainty, and highlight how it differs from variance-based measures of epistemic uncertainty and addresses its major pitfall. Our framework, Direct Epistemic Uncertainty Prediction (DEUP) is particularly interesting in interactive learning environments, where the learner is allowed to acquire novel examples in each round. Through a wide set of experiments, we illustrate how existing methods in sequential model optimization can be improved with epistemic uncertainty estimates from DEUP, and how DEUP can be used to drive exploration in reinforcement learning. We also evaluate the quality of uncertainty estimates from DEUP for probabilistic image classification and predicting synergies of drug combinations.

Active inference offers a first principle account of sentient behaviour, from which special and important cases can be derived, e.g., reinforcement learning, active learning, Bayes optimal inference, Bayes optimal design, etc. Active inference resolves the exploitation-exploration dilemma in relation to prior preferences, by placing information gain on the same footing as reward or value. In brief, active inference replaces value functions with functionals of (Bayesian) beliefs, in the form of an expected (variational) free energy. In this paper, we consider a sophisticated kind of active inference, using a recursive form of expected free energy. Sophistication describes the degree to which an agent has beliefs about beliefs. We consider agents with beliefs about the counterfactual consequences of action for states of affairs and beliefs about those latent states. In other words, we move from simply considering beliefs about 'what would happen if I did that' to 'what would I believe about what would happen if I did that'. The recursive form of the free energy functional effectively implements a deep tree search over actions and outcomes in the future. Crucially, this search is over sequences of belief states, as opposed to states per se. We illustrate the competence of this scheme, using numerical simulations of deep decision problems.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can produce surprisingly sophisticated estimates of their own uncertainty. However, it remains unclear to what extent this expressed confidence is tied to the reasoning, knowledge, or decision making of the model. To test this, we introduce RiskEval: a framework designed to evaluate whether models adjust their abstention policies in response to varying error penalties. Our evaluation of several frontier models reveals a critical dissociation: models are neither cost-aware when articulating their verbal confidence, nor strategically responsive when deciding whether to engage or abstain under high-penalty conditions. Even when extreme penalties render frequent abstention the mathematically optimal strategy, models almost never abstain, resulting in utility collapse. This indicates that calibrated verbal confidence scores may not be sufficient to create trustworthy and interpretable AI systems, as current models lack the strategic agency to convert uncertainty signals into optimal and risk-sensitive decisions.

The surprisingly likely criterion in the seminal work of Prelec (the Bayesian Truth Serum) guarantees truthfulness in a game-theoretic multi-agent setting, by rewarding rational agents to maximise the expected information gain with their answers w.r.t. their probabilistic beliefs. We investigate the relevance of a similar criterion for responses of LLMs. We hypothesize that if the surprisingly likely criterion works in LLMs, under certain conditions, the responses that maximize the reward under this criterion should be more accurate than the responses that only maximize the posterior probability. Using benchmarks including the TruthfulQA benchmark and using openly available LLMs: GPT-2 and LLaMA-2, we show that the method indeed improves the accuracy significantly (for example, upto 24 percentage points aggregate improvement on TruthfulQA and upto 70 percentage points improvement on individual categories of questions).

The k-means++ seeding algorithm (Arthur & Vassilvitskii, 2007) is widely used in practice for the k-means clustering problem where the goal is to cluster a dataset X subset R ^d into k clusters. The popularity of this algorithm is due to its simplicity and provable guarantee of being O(log k) competitive with the optimal solution in expectation. However, its running time is O(|X|kd), making it expensive for large datasets. In this work, we present a simple and effective rejection sampling based approach for speeding up k-means++. Our first method runs in time O(nnz (X) + beta k^2d) while still being O(log k ) competitive in expectation. Here, beta is a parameter which is the ratio of the variance of the dataset to the optimal k-means cost in expectation and O hides logarithmic factors in k and |X|. Our second method presents a new trade-off between computational cost and solution quality. It incurs an additional scale-invariant factor of k^{-Omega( m/beta)} Var (X) in addition to the O(log k) guarantee of k-means++ improving upon a result of (Bachem et al, 2016a) who get an additional factor of m^{-1}Var(X) while still running in time O(nnz(X) + mk^2d). We perform extensive empirical evaluations to validate our theoretical results and to show the effectiveness of our approach on real datasets.

Large language models (LLMs) can exhibit advanced reasoning yet still generate incorrect answers. We hypothesize that such errors frequently stem from spurious beliefs, propositions the model internally considers true but are incorrect. To address this, we propose a method to rectify the belief space by suppressing these spurious beliefs while simultaneously enhancing true ones, thereby enabling more reliable inferences. Our approach first identifies the beliefs that lead to incorrect or correct answers by prompting the model to generate textual explanations, using our Forward-Backward Beam Search (FBBS). We then apply unlearning to suppress the identified spurious beliefs and enhance the true ones, effectively rectifying the model's belief space. Empirical results on multiple QA datasets and LLMs show that our method corrects previously misanswered questions without harming overall model performance. Furthermore, our approach yields improved generalization on unseen data, suggesting that rectifying a model's belief space is a promising direction for mitigating errors and enhancing overall reliability.

We show that a GPT-3 model can learn to express uncertainty about its own answers in natural language -- without use of model logits. When given a question, the model generates both an answer and a level of confidence (e.g. "90% confidence" or "high confidence"). These levels map to probabilities that are well calibrated. The model also remains moderately calibrated under distribution shift, and is sensitive to uncertainty in its own answers, rather than imitating human examples. To our knowledge, this is the first time a model has been shown to express calibrated uncertainty about its own answers in natural language. For testing calibration, we introduce the CalibratedMath suite of tasks. We compare the calibration of uncertainty expressed in words ("verbalized probability") to uncertainty extracted from model logits. Both kinds of uncertainty are capable of generalizing calibration under distribution shift. We also provide evidence that GPT-3's ability to generalize calibration depends on pre-trained latent representations that correlate with epistemic uncertainty over its answers.

Past analyses of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) assume that the human fully observes the environment. What happens when human feedback is based only on partial observations? We formally define two failure cases: deception and overjustification. Modeling the human as Boltzmann-rational w.r.t. a belief over trajectories, we prove conditions under which RLHF is guaranteed to result in policies that deceptively inflate their performance, overjustify their behavior to make an impression, or both. To help address these issues, we mathematically characterize how partial observability of the environment translates into (lack of) ambiguity in the learned return function. In some cases, accounting for partial observability makes it theoretically possible to recover the return function and thus the optimal policy, while in other cases, there is irreducible ambiguity. We caution against blindly applying RLHF in partially observable settings and propose research directions to help tackle these challenges.

We consider the problem of distribution-free predictive inference, with the goal of producing predictive coverage guarantees that hold conditionally rather than marginally. Existing methods such as conformal prediction offer marginal coverage guarantees, where predictive coverage holds on average over all possible test points, but this is not sufficient for many practical applications where we would like to know that our predictions are valid for a given individual, not merely on average over a population. On the other hand, exact conditional inference guarantees are known to be impossible without imposing assumptions on the underlying distribution. In this work we aim to explore the space in between these two, and examine what types of relaxations of the conditional coverage property would alleviate some of the practical concerns with marginal coverage guarantees while still being possible to achieve in a distribution-free setting.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed on long-horizon tasks in partially observable environments, where they must act while inferring and tracking a complex environment state over many steps. This leads to two challenges: partial observability requires maintaining uncertainty over unobserved world attributes, and long interaction history causes context to grow without bound, diluting task-relevant information. A principled solution to both challenges is a belief state: a posterior distribution over environment states given past observations and actions, which compactly encodes history for decision making regardless of episode length. In LLM agents, however, the open-ended nature of text makes it unclear how to represent such a distribution. Therefore, we introduce Agent-BRACE: Agent Belief state Representation via Abstraction and Confidence Estimation, a method that decouples an LLM agent into a belief state model and a policy model, jointly optimized via reinforcement learning. The belief state model produces a structured approximation of the belief distribution: a set of atomic natural language claims about the environment, each annotated with an ordinal verbalized certainty label ranging from certain to unknown. The policy model conditions on this compact, structured approximate belief rather than the full history, learning to select actions under explicit uncertainty. Across long-horizon, partially observable embodied language environments, Agent-BRACE achieves an average absolute improvement of +14.5% (Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct) and +5.3% (Qwen3-4B-Instruct), outperforming strong RL baselines while maintaining a near-constant context window independent of episode length. Further analysis shows that the learned belief becomes increasingly calibrated over the course of an episode as evidence accumulates.

This technical report introduces VibeThinker-3B, a compact dense model with 3B parameters developed to investigate how far verifiable reasoning can be pushed within a strictly small-model regime. Building upon the Spectrum-to-Signal post-training paradigm, we systematically enhance the model through an optimized pipeline that includes curriculum-based supervised fine-tuning, multi-domain reinforcement learning, and offline self-distillation. Experimental evaluations demonstrate that VibeThinker-3B achieves frontier-level performance on highly demanding verifiable tasks. Specifically, it attains a score of 94.3 on AIME26 (improving to 97.1 with claim-level test-time scaling), an 80.2 Pass@1 on LiveCodeBench v6, and exhibits strong out-of-distribution generalization with a 96.1\% acceptance rate on recent unseen LeetCode contests. This effectively places it in the performance band of first-tier reasoning systems, matching or exceeding flagship models that are orders of magnitude larger, such as DeepSeek V3.2, GLM-5, and Gemini 3 Pro. Furthermore, a score of 93.4 on IFEval confirms that this extreme reasoning enhancement does not compromise strict instruction controllability. Extending our previous 1.5B work, these findings motivate the Parametric Compression-Coverage Hypothesis, which views verifiable reasoning as compressible into compact reasoning cores, while open-domain knowledge and general-purpose competence require broad parameter coverage over facts, concepts, and long-tail scenarios. This perspective suggests that compact models are not merely deployment-efficient substitutes, but a complementary path toward frontier-level performance in parameter-dense capability regimes.

Belief Propagation (BP) is a powerful algorithm for distributed inference in probabilistic graphical models, however it quickly becomes infeasible for practical compute and memory budgets. Many efficient, non-parametric forms of BP have been developed, but the most popular is Gaussian Belief Propagation (GBP), a variant that assumes all distributions are locally Gaussian. GBP is widely used due to its efficiency and empirically strong performance in applications like computer vision or sensor networks - even when modelling non-Gaussian problems. In this paper, we seek to provide a theoretical guarantee for when Gaussian approximations are valid in highly non-Gaussian, sparsely-connected factor graphs performing BP (common in spatial AI). We leverage the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) to prove mathematically that variables' beliefs under BP converge to a Gaussian distribution in complex, loopy factor graphs obeying our 4 key assumptions. We then confirm experimentally that variable beliefs become increasingly Gaussian after just a few BP iterations in a stereo depth estimation task.

Long-horizon interactions require language models to manage accumulating information: when to update their state, when to preserve their state, and what to ignore. We study this challenge as Contextual Belief Management (CBM): maintaining a predicted belief state aligned with formal evidence while isolating task-irrelevant noise. To make CBM measurable, we introduce BeliefTrack, a closed-world benchmark spanning Rule Discovery and Circuit Diagnosis, where a finite belief space and symbolic verifiers enable exact turn-level evaluation. BeliefTrack diagnoses three failures: Failed Stay, Failed Update, and Failed Isolation. Across multiple LLMs, vanilla models exhibit severe CBM failures, while explicit belief-tracking prompts provide limited gains. In contrast, reinforcement learning with belief-state rewards reduces failure rates by 70.9\% on average. Further probing reveals latent belief-state dynamics behind these failures, and representation-level steering reduces failure rates by 46.1\% across two tasks\footnote{Code is coming soon at https://github.com/zjunlp/CBM.

On-policy self-distillation (OPSD) is a promising approach to improve reasoning language models, but it remains brittle in practice: making it work reliably often requires substantial engineering effort. We identify a structural source of this difficulty: vanilla OPSD is precisely the β=1 member of a broader policy-optimization family, where β weights the KL penalty anchoring the student to a reference policy. This equivalence turns β from an implicit value fixed at one into a controllable regularization parameter, yielding a more general formulation that trades off proximity to a reference policy against privileged teacher guidance. We introduce β-OPSD and derive its optimal policy as a geometric interpolation between the reference policy and the privileged teacher. Directly optimizing this objective with reinforcement learning, however, would be costly and high-variance. Rather than optimize the RL objective directly, we turn its closed-form solution into a distillation target. Each value of β selects a target along the reference-to-teacher path, which we implement efficiently by mixing their token-level logits. In this way, inexpensive distillation approximates the solution of expensive policy optimization. Return-to-go credit assignment further aligns token updates with the sequence-level objective while retaining the simplicity of OPSD. Experiments on mathematical reasoning benchmarks show that β-OPSD consistently outperforms vanilla OPSD, improving optimization stability and downstream reasoning performance. Our results provide a principled route from self-distillation to policy optimization and back without sacrificing the efficiency that makes OPSD practical.

Misinformation is a growing societal threat, and susceptibility to misinformative claims varies across demographic groups due to differences in underlying beliefs. As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used to simulate human behaviors, we investigate whether they can simulate demographic misinformation susceptibility, treating beliefs as a primary driving factor. We introduce BeliefSim, a simulation framework that constructs demographic belief profiles using psychology-informed misinformation taxonomies and survey priors. We study prompt-based conditioning and post-training adaptation, and conduct a multi-fold evaluation using: (i) susceptibility alignment and (ii) counterfactual demographic sensitivity. Across both datasets and modeling strategies, we show that beliefs provide a strong prior for simulating misinformation susceptibility, with alignment up to 92%.

Identifying how much a model {p}_{theta}(Y|X) knows about the stochastic real-world process p(Y|X) it was trained on is important to ensure it avoids producing incorrect or "hallucinated" answers or taking unsafe actions. But this is difficult for generative models because probabilistic predictions do not distinguish between per-response noise (aleatoric uncertainty) and lack of knowledge about the process (epistemic uncertainty), and existing epistemic uncertainty quantification techniques tend to be overconfident when the model underfits. We propose a general strategy for teaching a model to both approximate p(Y|X) and also estimate the remaining gaps between {p}_{theta}(Y|X) and p(Y|X): train it to predict pairs of independent responses drawn from the true conditional distribution, allow it to "cheat" by observing one response while predicting the other, then measure how much it cheats. Remarkably, we prove that being good at cheating (i.e. cheating whenever it improves your prediction) is equivalent to being second-order calibrated, a principled extension of ordinary calibration that allows us to construct provably-correct frequentist confidence intervals for p(Y|X) and detect incorrect responses with high probability. We demonstrate empirically that our approach accurately estimates how much models don't know across ambiguous image classification, (synthetic) language modeling, and partially-observable navigation tasks, outperforming existing techniques.

Same-model self-verification, prompting a model to audit its own predicted answer, is a plausible confidence signal for selective prediction, but its practical value remains unclear once strong likelihood-based baselines are taken seriously. We evaluate self-verification against two such baselines, LL-AVG and LL-SUM, on ARC-Challenge and TruthfulQA-MC across multiple model families, scales, and prompt variants. We measure not only correctness ranking, but also abstention quality through AURC and operating-point analyses. The results are sharply task- and model-dependent. On ARC-Challenge, self-verification substantially improves over LL-AVG for Phi-2 and the Qwen models, with the largest gains appearing in Qwen-7B. On TruthfulQA-MC, however, the signal is less reliable: smaller models can become prompt-sensitive, DeepSeek-R1-Distill-8B degrades relative to LL-AVG, and LL-SUM often remains the stronger practical baseline. We therefore do not treat self-verification as a general-purpose uncertainty estimator. In this setting, it is better understood as a conditional confidence signal whose value depends on task type, model family, prompt formulation, and, crucially, the baseline it must beat.

This study presents PARROT (Persuasion and Agreement Robustness Rating of Output Truth), a robustness focused framework designed to measure the degradation in accuracy that occurs under social pressure exerted on users through authority and persuasion in large language models (LLMs) the phenomenon of sycophancy (excessive conformity). PARROT (i) isolates causal effects by comparing the neutral version of the same question with an authoritatively false version using a double-blind evaluation, (ii) quantifies confidence shifts toward the correct and imposed false responses using log-likelihood-based calibration tracking, and (iii) systematically classifies failure modes (e.g., robust correct, sycophantic agreement, reinforced error, stubborn error, self-correction, etc.) using an eight-state behavioral taxonomy. We evaluated 22 models using 1,302 MMLU-style multiple-choice questions across 13 domains and domain-specific authority templates. Findings show marked heterogeneity: advanced models (e.g., GPT-5, GPT-4.1, Claude Sonnet 4.5) exhibit low "follow rates" (leq 11%, GPT-5: 4\%) and minimal accuracy loss, while older/smaller models show severe epistemic collapse (GPT-4: 80\%, Qwen 2.5-1.5B: 94\%). The danger is not limited to response changes; weak models reduce confidence in the correct response while increasing confidence in the imposed incorrect response. While international law and global knowledge at the domain level exhibit high fragility, elementary mathematics is relatively resilient. Consequently, we argue that the goal of "resistance to overfitting pressure" should be addressed as a primary objective alongside accuracy, harm avoidance, and privacy for safe deployment in the real world.

Do larger and more capable language models learn to update their "beliefs" about propositions more consistently with Bayes' theorem when presented with evidence in-context? To test this, we formulate a Bayesian Coherence Coefficient (BCC) metric and generate a dataset with which to measure the BCC. We measure BCC for multiple pre-trained-only language models across five model families, comparing against the number of model parameters, the amount of training data, and model scores on common benchmarks. Our results provide evidence for our hypothesis that larger and more capable pre-trained language models assign credences that are more coherent with Bayes' theorem. These results have important implications for our understanding and governance of LLMs.

We present a complete theoretical characterization of Latent Posterior Factors (LPF), a principled framework for aggregating multiple heterogeneous evidence items in probabilistic prediction tasks. Multi-evidence reasoning arises pervasively in high-stakes domains including healthcare diagnosis, financial risk assessment, legal case analysis, and regulatory compliance, yet existing approaches either lack formal guarantees or fail to handle multi-evidence scenarios architecturally. LPF encodes each evidence item into a Gaussian latent posterior via a variational autoencoder, converting posteriors to soft factors through Monte Carlo marginalization, and aggregating factors via exact Sum-Product Network inference (LPF-SPN) or a learned neural aggregator (LPF-Learned). We prove seven formal guarantees spanning the key desiderata for trustworthy AI: Calibration Preservation (ECE <= epsilon + C/sqrt(K_eff)); Monte Carlo Error decaying as O(1/sqrt(M)); a non-vacuous PAC-Bayes bound with train-test gap of 0.0085 at N=4200; operation within 1.12x of the information-theoretic lower bound; graceful degradation as O(epsilon*delta*sqrt(K)) under corruption, maintaining 88% performance with half of evidence adversarially replaced; O(1/sqrt(K)) calibration decay with R^2=0.849; and exact epistemic-aleatoric uncertainty decomposition with error below 0.002%. All theorems are empirically validated on controlled datasets spanning up to 4,200 training examples. Our theoretical framework establishes LPF as a foundation for trustworthy multi-evidence AI in safety-critical applications.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly applied to structured clinical data, yet whether they can recognize the limits of their own knowledge on such tasks remains unexplored. We study this question through the lens of cross-model attribution divergence with the goal of reducing epistemic uncertainty for structured tasks, comparing Qwen 2.5 7B and XGBoost on a prediction task via attribution divergence analysis. We report four findings. First, LLM verbalized confidence is epistemically vacuous, it outputs a near-constant (0.856-0.937) regardless of whether accuracy is 49% or 75.3%, tracking prompt format rather than prediction quality. Second, the LLM exhibits an inverse difficulty effect: accuracy drops to 64.8% when XGBoost is 99% correct, but matches XGBoost (73.8% vs. 73.1%) when it is moderately uncertain. Third, few-shot examples and SHAP-derived feature evidence are orthogonal, super-additive interventions: they reduce the Attribution Disagreement Score (ADS) from 1.54 to 0.38 and improve accuracy from 49% to 75.3% without training. Fourth, a cross-model calibrator that determined LLM reliability using attribution divergence signals reduces expected calibration error from 0.254 to 0.080, replacing uninformative verbalized confidence with patient-specific reliability estimates, without accessing model internals or requiring repeated inference. We frame these findings as a cold start problem for LLMs on structured data and outline a path toward genuine epistemic self-awareness.

Large language models can detect their own errors and sometimes correct them without external feedback, but the underlying mechanisms remain unknown. We investigate this through the lens of second-order models of confidence from decision neuroscience. In a first-order system, confidence derives from the generation signal itself and is therefore maximal for the chosen response, precluding error detection. Second-order models posit a partially independent evaluative signal that can disagree with the committed response, providing the basis for error detection. Kumaran et al. (2026) showed that LLMs cache a confidence representation at a token immediately following the answer (i.e. post-answer newline: PANL) -- that causally drives verbal confidence and dissociates from log-probabilities. Here we test whether this PANL signal extends beyond confidence to support error detection and self-correction. Here we test whether this signal supports error detection and self-correction, deriving predictions from the second-order framework. Using a verify-then-correct paradigm, we show that: (i) verbal confidence predicts error detection far beyond token log-probabilities, ruling out a first-order account; (ii) PANL activations predict error detection beyond verbal confidence itself; and (iii) PANL predicts which errors the model can correct -- where all behavioural signals fail. Causal interventions confirm that PANL signals rescue error detection behavior when answer information is corrupted. All findings replicate across models (Gemma 3 27B and Qwen 2.5 7B) and tasks (TriviaQA and MNLI). These results reveal that LLMs naturally implement a second-order confidence architecture whose internal evaluative signal encodes not only whether an answer is likely wrong but whether the model has the knowledge to fix it.

Although the existing causal inference literature focuses on the forward-looking perspective by estimating effects of causes, the backward-looking perspective can provide insights into causes of effects. In backward-looking causal inference, the probability of necessity measures the probability that a certain event is caused by the treatment given the observed treatment and outcome. Most existing results focus on binary outcomes. Motivated by applications with ordinal outcomes, we propose a general definition of the probability of necessity. However, identifying the probability of necessity is challenging because it involves the joint distribution of the potential outcomes. We propose a novel assumption of monotonic incremental treatment effect to identify the probability of necessity with ordinal outcomes. We also discuss the testable implications of this key identification assumption. When it fails, we derive explicit formulas of the sharp large-sample bounds on the probability of necessity.

While confidence estimation is a promising direction for mitigating hallucinations in Large Language Models (LLMs), current research dominantly focuses on single-turn settings. The dynamics of model confidence in multi-turn conversations, where context accumulates and ambiguity is progressively resolved, remain largely unexplored. Reliable confidence estimation in multi-turn settings is critical for many downstream applications, such as autonomous agents and human-in-the-loop systems. This work presents the first systematic study of confidence estimation in multi-turn interactions, establishing a formal evaluation framework grounded in two key desiderata: per-turn calibration and monotonicity of confidence as more information becomes available. To facilitate this, we introduce novel metrics, including a length-normalized Expected Calibration Error (InfoECE), and a new "Hinter-Guesser" paradigm for generating controlled evaluation datasets. Our experiments reveal that widely-used confidence techniques struggle with calibration and monotonicity in multi-turn dialogues. We propose P(Sufficient), a logit-based probe that achieves comparatively better performance, although the task remains far from solved. Our work provides a foundational methodology for developing more reliable and trustworthy conversational agents.

Bayesian inference provides principled uncertainty quantification but is often limited by challenges of prior elicitation, likelihood misspecification, and computational burden. The martingale posterior (MGP, Fong et al., 2023) offers an alternative, replacing prior-likelihood elicitation with a predictive rule - namely, a sequence of one-step-ahead predictive distributions - for forward data generation. The utility of MGPs depends on the choice of predictive rule, yet the literature has offered few compelling examples. Foundation transformers are well-suited here, as their autoregressive generation mirrors this forward simulation and their general-purpose design enables rich predictive modeling. We introduce TabMGP, an MGP built on TabPFN, a transformer foundation model that is currently state-of-the-art for tabular data. TabMGP produces credible sets with near-nominal coverage and often outperforms both existing MGP constructions and standard Bayes.

LLMs are increasingly deployed as proxies for human study participants in social science experiments, yet the fidelity of this practice has rarely been tested directly. We test whether six LLMs can simulate individual human belief updates, comparing LLM outputs 1-to-1 against ground truth data from 391 UK participants on Prolific, who updated their stances on three discussion topics after reading Reddit comments. Each participant was simulated by an LLM conditioned on a persona derived from their demographic and personality trait data. We find that some LLMs (Qwen3-32B and GPT-5-Mini) can match the human post-stance distribution, but only when given participants' actual initial stances. All six models fail to simulate initial stances themselves and to produce faithful belief updates from self-generated stances. Three systematic biases emerge across all models: overrepresentation of neutral positions, more frequent but smaller belief shifts than humans, and a failure to rank comments by convincingness. Demographic and personality trait personas had no consistent effect on fidelity. LLM simulations of human belief dynamics are only reliable when grounded in realistic starting conditions, that current multi-round social media simulations rarely provide.

Equivariance theory predicts that an architectural symmetry prior reduces sample complexity by a factor of |G|; this is widely cited but rarely measured as a scaling law with controls that separate the prior from its confounds. On a controlled C_n-symmetric task, we report three findings. First, a wrong-group control with identical orbit size and matched compute is worse than no constraint (joint pairwise CI [+0.79, +3.26] excludes zero, robust across estimators); misaligned constraint is actively harmful, not merely unhelpful. Second, an augmentation baseline equipped with test-time orbit averaging matches the equivariant model exactly -- bit-identical per-epoch validation curves across matched cells -- so the architecture-vs-augmentation gap is conditional on asymmetric test-time computation, not unconditional. Third, the relative exchange rate beta_diff = 1.28 is consistent in sign and order of magnitude with the theoretical 1.0 (single-level CI [+0.92, +2.05]); the more conservative two-level bootstrap (seeds x group sizes) widens this to [-0.63, +1.72], including zero, and a finer-N replication on a sqrt(2)-spaced grid is inconclusive (point estimate -0.82). The methodological contributions -- the relative-rate estimator that cancels the shared-difficulty confound, the wrong-group control, and a pre-specified failure taxonomy -- transfer to any inductive bias whose strength can be parameterised. Honest scoping: the primary estimator beta_diff was adopted post-hoc after the initial analysis revealed a positive-slope identifiability problem; the design was never externally pre-registered; and the headline number rests on an OLS slope over seven group sizes on a coarse N grid. This is an exploratory study, not a confirmatory measurement; the wrong-group result is the cleanest finding and the one we report with the most confidence. A registered replication on fresh seeds is future work.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

Human reasoning often involves working over limited information to arrive at probabilistic conclusions. In its simplest form, this involves making an inference that is not strictly entailed by a premise, but rather only likely given the premise. While reasoning LLMs have demonstrated strong performance on logical and mathematical tasks, their behavior on such open-ended, non-deterministic inferences remains largely unexplored. We introduce ProbCOPA, a dataset of 210 handcrafted probabilistic inferences in English, each annotated for inference likelihood by 25--30 human participants. We find that human responses are graded and varied, revealing probabilistic judgments of the inferences in our dataset. Comparing these judgments with responses from eight state-of-the-art reasoning LLMs, we show that models consistently fail to produce human-like distributions. Finally, analyzing LLM reasoning chains, we find evidence of a common reasoning pattern used to evaluate such inferences. Our findings reveal persistent differences between humans and LLMs, and underscore the need to evaluate reasoning beyond deterministic settings.

We introduce and study the problem of detecting whether an agent is updating their prior beliefs given new evidence in an optimal way that is Bayesian, or whether they are biased towards their own prior. In our model, biased agents form posterior beliefs that are a convex combination of their prior and the Bayesian posterior, where the more biased an agent is, the closer their posterior is to the prior. Since we often cannot observe the agent's beliefs directly, we take an approach inspired by information design. Specifically, we measure an agent's bias by designing a signaling scheme and observing the actions they take in response to different signals, assuming that they are maximizing their own expected utility; our goal is to detect bias with a minimum number of signals. Our main results include a characterization of scenarios where a single signal suffices and a computationally efficient algorithm to compute optimal signaling schemes.

One of the most widely used methods to evaluate LLMs are Multiple Choice Question (MCQ) tests. MCQ benchmarks enable the testing of LLM knowledge on almost any topic at scale as the results can be processed automatically. To help the LLM answer, a few examples called few shots can be included in the prompt. Moreover, the LLM can be asked to answer the question directly with the selected option or to first provide the reasoning and then the selected answer, which is known as chain of thought. In addition to checking whether the selected answer is correct, the evaluation can look at the LLM-estimated probability of its response as an indication of the confidence of the LLM in the response. In this paper, we study how the LLM confidence in its answer depends on whether the model has been asked to answer directly or to provide the reasoning before answering. The results of the evaluation of questions on a wide range of topics in seven different models show that LLMs are more confident in their answers when they provide reasoning before the answer. This occurs regardless of whether the selected answer is correct. Our hypothesis is that this behavior is due to the reasoning that modifies the probability of the selected answer, as the LLM predicts the answer based on the input question and the reasoning that supports the selection made. Therefore, LLM estimated probabilities seem to have intrinsic limitations that should be understood in order to use them in evaluation procedures. Interestingly, the same behavior has been observed in humans, for whom explaining an answer increases confidence in its correctness.

Popular offline reinforcement learning (RL) methods rely on conservatism, either by penalizing out-of-dataset actions or by restricting rollout horizons. In this work, we question the universality of this principle and instead revisit a complementary one: a Bayesian perspective. Rather than enforcing conservatism, the Bayesian approach tackles epistemic uncertainty in offline data by modeling a posterior distribution over plausible world models and training a history-dependent agent to maximize expected rewards, enabling test-time generalization. We first illustrate, in a bandit setting, that Bayesianism excels on low-quality datasets where conservatism fails. We then scale this principle to realistic tasks and show that long-horizon planning is critical for reducing value overestimation once conservatism is removed. To make this feasible, we introduce key design choices for performing and learning from long-horizon rollouts while controlling compounding errors. These yield our algorithm, NEUBAY, grounded in the neutral Bayesian principle. On D4RL and NeoRL benchmarks, NEUBAY generally matches or surpasses leading conservative algorithms, achieving new state-of-the-art on 7 datasets. Notably, it succeeds with rollout horizons of several hundred steps, contrary to dominant practice. Finally, we characterize datasets by quality and coverage, showing when NEUBAY is preferable to conservative methods. Together, we argue NEUBAY lays the foundation for a new practical direction in offline and model-based RL.

Linguistic cues such as "I believe" and "probably" offer an intuitive interface for communicating confidence, yet a generalisable, principled calibration framework for linguistic confidence expressions remains underexplored. In particular, co-occurring linguistic cues, contextual variation, and subjective audience interpretation pose unique challenges. We therefore model linguistic confidence as a distribution over plausible perceived probability values that a statement is correct, capturing interpretation variability that scalar representations discard. Within this distributional framework, we introduce faithfulness as a complementary evaluation dimension and present Faithfulness Divergence (FD), an information-theoretic metric quantifying the surprise induced in audience beliefs upon truth revelation. Building on these foundations, we present Retrieval-Augmented Linguistic Calibration (RALC), a lightweight post-hoc pipeline that propagates calibrated confidence signals back into natural language via retrieval-augmented rewriting. Across three QA benchmarks and five LLM families, RALC improves in-domain faithfulness and calibration up to 66% and 58%, respectively, outperforming black-box and grey-box calibration baselines.

Mathematical reasoning models are widely deployed in education, automated tutoring, and decision support systems despite exhibiting fundamental computational instabilities. We demonstrate that state-of-the-art models (Qwen2.5-Math-7B) achieve 61% accuracy through a mixture of reliable and unreliable reasoning pathways: 18.4% of correct predictions employ stable, faithful reasoning while 81.6% emerge through computationally inconsistent pathways. Additionally, 8.8% of all predictions are silent failures -- confident yet incorrect outputs. Through comprehensive analysis using novel faithfulness metrics, we reveal: (1) reasoning quality shows weak negative correlation with correctness (r=-0.21, p=0.002), reflecting a binary classification threshold artifact rather than a monotonic inverse relationship; (2) scaling from 1.5B to 7B parameters (4.7x increase) provides zero accuracy benefit on our evaluated subset (6% of GSM8K), requiring validation on the complete benchmark; and (3) latent reasoning employs diverse computational strategies, with ~20% sharing CoT-like patterns. These findings highlight that benchmark accuracy can mask computational unreliability, demanding evaluation reforms measuring stability beyond single-sample metrics.

Beliefs serve as the foundation for human cognition and decision-making. They guide individuals in deriving meaning from their lives, shaping their behaviors, and forming social connections. Therefore, a model that encapsulates beliefs and their interrelationships is crucial for quantitatively studying the influence of beliefs on our actions. Despite its importance, research on the interplay between human beliefs has often been limited to a small set of beliefs pertaining to specific issues, with a heavy reliance on surveys or experiments. Here, we propose a method for extracting nuanced relations between thousands of beliefs by leveraging large-scale user participation data from an online debate platform and mapping these beliefs to an embedding space using a fine-tuned large language model (LLM). This belief embedding space effectively encapsulates the interconnectedness of diverse beliefs as well as polarization across various social issues. We discover that the positions within this belief space predict new beliefs of individuals. Furthermore, we find that the relative distance between one's existing beliefs and new beliefs can serve as a quantitative estimate of cognitive dissonance, allowing us to predict new beliefs. Our study highlights how modern LLMs, when combined with collective online records of human beliefs, can offer insights into the fundamental principles that govern human belief formation and decision-making processes.

Assessing the capabilities and risks of frontier AI systems is a critical area of research, and recent work has shown that repeated sampling from models can dramatically increase both. For instance, repeated sampling has been shown to increase their capabilities, such as solving difficult math and coding problems, but it has also been shown to increase their potential for harm, such as being jailbroken. Such results raise a crucial question for both capability and safety forecasting: how can one accurately predict a model's behavior when scaled to a massive number of attempts, given a vastly smaller sampling budget? This question is directly relevant to model providers, who serve hundreds of millions of users daily, and to governmental regulators, who seek to prevent harms. To answer this questions, we make three contributions. First, we find that standard methods for fitting these laws suffer from statistical shortcomings that hinder predictive accuracy, especially in data-limited scenarios. Second, we remedy these shortcomings by introducing a robust estimation framework, which uses a beta-binomial distribution to generate more accurate predictions from limited data. Third, we propose a dynamic sampling strategy that allocates a greater budget to harder problems. Combined, these innovations enable more reliable prediction of rare risks and capabilities at a fraction of the computational cost.

Large language models trained on vast corpora inherently risk memorizing sensitive or harmful content, which may later resurface in their outputs. Prevailing unlearning methods generally rely on gradient ascent and its variants to lower the probability of specific target responses. However, we find that this strategy induces a critical side effect: probability mass is redistributed into high-likelihood regions, often corresponding to semantically related rephrasings of the targets. We refer to this as the squeezing effect, which explains why many methods yield merely spurious unlearning, a problem further obscured by automated metrics (e.g., ROUGE, truth ratio) that misreport actual success. To address this, we propose a bootstrapping (BS) framework that explicitly links the squeezing effect with the model's own high-confidence generations, namely its model beliefs. Since model beliefs inherently capture the very high-likelihood regions where probability mass is squeezed, incorporating them into the unlearning objective directly counters the squeezing effect. By jointly suppressing both target responses and model beliefs, BS-T (token) attenuates high-probability tokens, whereas BS-S (sequence) removes entire high-confidence generations, together achieving more thorough forgetting while preserving utility. Extensive experiments across diverse benchmarks with various model families confirm the effectiveness of our approach.

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

We present the Bayesian Linguistic Forecaster (BLF), an agentic system for binary forecasting that achieves state-of-the-art performance on the ForecastBench benchmark. The system is built on three ideas. (1) Linguistic belief state: a semi-structured representation combining numerical probability estimates with natural-language evidence summaries, updated by the LLM at each step of an iterative tool-use loop. This contrasts with the common approach of appending all retrieved evidence to an ever-growing, unstructured context. (2) Hierarchical multi-trial aggregation: running K independent trials and combining them using logit-space averaging shrinkage with a data-dependent prior. (3) Hierarchical calibration: Platt scaling with a hierarchical prior, which avoids over-shrinking extreme predictions for sources with skewed base rates. On 400 questions from the ForecastBench leaderboard, BLF outperforms all the top public methods, including Cassi, GPT-5, Grok~4.20, and Foresight-32B. Careful ablation studies, using mixed effects analysis to control for question variability (which accounts for 62\% of the variance in performance), reveals that all 3 components contribute to the overall gains, but some components matter more than others, depending on the base LLM, and the setting (e.g.\ with or without a crowd prior). All our experiments are based on a robust back-testing framework which we develop, which has a leakage rate below 1.5\%, and may be of independent interest.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world settings, correctness alone is insufficient. Reliable deployment requires maintaining truthful beliefs under contextual perturbations. Existing evaluations largely rely on point-wise confidence like Self-Consistency, which can mask brittle belief. We show that even facts answered with perfect self-consistency can rapidly collapse under mild contextual interference. To address this gap, we propose Neighbor-Consistency Belief (NCB), a structural measure of belief robustness that evaluates response coherence across a conceptual neighborhood. To validate the efficiency of NCB, we introduce a new cognitive stress-testing protocol that probes outputs stability under contextual interference. Experiments across multiple LLMs show that the performance of high-NCB data is relatively more resistant to interference. Finally, we present Structure-Aware Training (SAT), which optimizes context-invariant belief structure and reduces long-tail knowledge brittleness by approximately 30%. Code will be available at https://github.com/zjunlp/belief.

Spatial embodied intelligence requires agents to act to acquire information under partial observability. While multimodal foundation models excel at passive perception, their capacity for active, self-directed exploration remains understudied. We propose Theory of Space, defined as an agent's ability to actively acquire information through self-directed, active exploration and to construct, revise, and exploit a spatial belief from sequential, partial observations. We evaluate this through a benchmark where the goal is curiosity-driven exploration to build an accurate cognitive map. A key innovation is spatial belief probing, which prompts models to reveal their internal spatial representations at each step. Our evaluation of state-of-the-art models reveals several critical bottlenecks. First, we identify an Active-Passive Gap, where performance drops significantly when agents must autonomously gather information. Second, we find high inefficiency, as models explore unsystematically compared to program-based proxies. Through belief probing, we diagnose that while perception is an initial bottleneck, global beliefs suffer from instability that causes spatial knowledge to degrade over time. Finally, using a false belief paradigm, we uncover Belief Inertia, where agents fail to update obsolete priors with new evidence. This issue is present in text-based agents but is particularly severe in vision-based models. Our findings suggest that current foundation models struggle to maintain coherent, revisable spatial beliefs during active exploration.

Traditional language model-based theorem proving assumes that by training on a sufficient amount of formal proof data, a model will learn to prove theorems. Our key observation is that a wealth of informal information that is not present in formal proofs can be useful for learning to prove theorems. For instance, humans think through steps of a proof, but this thought process is not visible in the resulting code. We present Lean-STaR, a framework for training language models to produce informal thoughts prior to each step of a proof, thereby boosting the model's theorem-proving capabilities. Lean-STaR uses retrospective ground-truth tactics to generate synthetic thoughts for training the language model. At inference time, the trained model directly generates the thoughts prior to the prediction of the tactics in each proof step. Building on the self-taught reasoner framework, we then apply expert iteration to further fine-tune the model on the correct proofs it samples and verifies using the Lean solver. Lean-STaR achieves state-of-the-art results on the miniF2F-test benchmark within the Lean theorem proving environment, significantly outperforming base models (43.4% rightarrow 46.3%, Pass@64). We also analyze the impact of the augmented thoughts on various aspects of the theorem proving process, providing insights into their effectiveness.

There is a growing literature on reasoning by large language models (LLMs), but the discussion on the uncertainty in their responses is still lacking. Our aim is to assess the extent of confidence that LLMs have in their answers and how it correlates with accuracy. Confidence is measured (i) qualitatively in terms of persistence in keeping their answer when prompted to reconsider, and (ii) quantitatively in terms of self-reported confidence score. We investigate the performance of three LLMs -- GPT4o, GPT4-turbo and Mistral -- on two benchmark sets of questions on causal judgement and formal fallacies and a set of probability and statistical puzzles and paradoxes. Although the LLMs show significantly better performance than random guessing, there is a wide variability in their tendency to change their initial answers. There is a positive correlation between qualitative confidence and accuracy, but the overall accuracy for the second answer is often worse than for the first answer. There is a strong tendency to overstate the self-reported confidence score. Confidence is only partially explained by the underlying token-level probability. The material effects of prompting on qualitative confidence and the strong tendency for overconfidence indicate that current LLMs do not have any internally coherent sense of confidence.

Capable language models hold what a character believes apart from what is true: told "Anna believes the cup is blue; in reality it is red," they answer blue about Anna and red about the world. Where in the computation does that separation live? We show it rests on two separable mechanisms at two positions. A generic value slot binds the attributed value. A router at the query position selects which frame, the character's belief or reality, a query reads out. Two routes fill the slot: an asserted belief, whose value the text supplies, binds in directly; a derived belief, whose value must be inferred from what the character could see, arrives by a visibility-gated lookback. A subspace trained on either route steers the other, and only the derived route depends on described visibility. The slot itself carries no belief-reality tag: intervening on it moves a reality readout as strongly as a belief one. The separation lives instead in a dissociated pair of routing subspaces, which flip a query between frames without injecting the donor's value. These results hold across three architectures, on stimuli de-confounded against theory-of-mind-benchmark shortcuts; the behavior itself emerges between 3B and 7B across five model families. This paper develops the single belief-reality axis in depth; a companion paper shows the same slot-and-router format is shared across the other non-actual contexts a sentence can open (counterfactual, fictional, temporal).

LLM agents that operate over long context depend on external memory to accumulate knowledge over time. However, existing methods typically store each observation as a single deterministic conclusion (e.g., inferring "API~X failed" from temporary errors), even though such observations are inherently partial and potentially ambiguous. By committing to one conclusion and discarding uncertainty, these methods introduce self-reinforcing error: the agent acts on the stored conclusion, never revisits alternatives, and reinforces the conclusion over time. To address this issue, we propose BeliefMem, which shifts the memory paradigm from committing to a single conclusion per observation to retaining multiple candidate conclusions with their probabilities. Concretely, BeliefMem stores the candidate conclusions as separate memory entries, each carrying a probability that is updated via Noisy-OR rules as new observations arrive. At retrieval, all candidates surface together with their probabilities, keeping alternatives visible to the agent. Since each conclusion in memory retains its probability, BeliefMem preserves the uncertainty that the deterministic paradigm discards, enabling the agent to act with high confidence on well-evidenced knowledge while retaining the capacity to update its confidence when new evidence arrives. Empirical evaluations on LoCoMo and ALFWorld benchmarks show that, even with limited data, BeliefMem achieves the best average performance, remarkably outperforming well-known baselines. More broadly, such probabilistic memory produces substantial gains and explores a new direction for agent memory in partially observable environments.

Rapid advancements in large language models (LLMs) have sparked the question whether these models possess some form of consciousness. To tackle this challenge, Butlin et al. (2023) introduced a list of indicators for consciousness in artificial systems based on neuroscientific theories. In this work, we evaluate a key indicator from this list, called HOT-3, which tests for agency guided by a general belief-formation and action selection system that updates beliefs based on meta-cognitive monitoring. We view beliefs as representations in the model's latent space that emerge in response to a given input, and introduce a metric to quantify their dominance during generation. Analyzing the dynamics between competing beliefs across models and tasks reveals three key findings: (1) external manipulations systematically modulate internal belief formation, (2) belief formation causally drives the model's action selection, and (3) models can monitor and report their own belief states. Together, these results provide empirical support for the existence of belief-guided agency and meta-cognitive monitoring in LLMs. More broadly, our work lays methodological groundwork for investigating the emergence of agency, beliefs, and meta-cognition in LLMs.

Deception is prevalent in human social settings. However, studies into the effect of deception on reinforcement learning algorithms have been limited to simplistic settings, restricting their applicability to complex real-world problems. This paper addresses this by introducing a new mixed competitive-cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) environment inspired by popular role-based deception games such as Werewolf, Avalon, and Among Us. The environment's unique challenge lies in the necessity to cooperate with other agents despite not knowing if they are friend or foe. Furthermore, we introduce a model of deception, which we call Bayesian belief manipulation (BBM) and demonstrate its effectiveness at deceiving other agents in this environment while also increasing the deceiving agent's performance.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are typically evaluated for safety under single-shot or low-budget adversarial prompting, which underestimates real-world risk. In practice, attackers can exploit large-scale parallel sampling to repeatedly probe a model until a harmful response is produced. While recent work shows that attack success increases with repeated sampling, principled methods for predicting large-scale adversarial risk remain limited. We propose a scaling-aware Best-of-N estimation of risk, SABER, for modeling jailbreak vulnerability under Best-of-N sampling. We model sample-level success probabilities using a Beta distribution, the conjugate prior of the Bernoulli distribution, and derive an analytic scaling law that enables reliable extrapolation of large-N attack success rates from small-budget measurements. Using only n=100 samples, our anchored estimator predicts ASR@1000 with a mean absolute error of 1.66, compared to 12.04 for the baseline, which is an 86.2% reduction in estimation error. Our results reveal heterogeneous risk scaling profiles and show that models appearing robust under standard evaluation can experience rapid nonlinear risk amplification under parallel adversarial pressure. This work provides a low-cost, scalable methodology for realistic LLM safety assessment. We will release our code and evaluation scripts upon publication to future research.

Reliable probability estimation is of crucial importance in many real-world applications where there is inherent (aleatoric) uncertainty. Probability-estimation models are trained on observed outcomes (e.g. whether it has rained or not, or whether a patient has died or not), because the ground-truth probabilities of the events of interest are typically unknown. The problem is therefore analogous to binary classification, with the difference that the objective is to estimate probabilities rather than predicting the specific outcome. This work investigates probability estimation from high-dimensional data using deep neural networks. There exist several methods to improve the probabilities generated by these models but they mostly focus on model (epistemic) uncertainty. For problems with inherent uncertainty, it is challenging to evaluate performance without access to ground-truth probabilities. To address this, we build a synthetic dataset to study and compare different computable metrics. We evaluate existing methods on the synthetic data as well as on three real-world probability estimation tasks, all of which involve inherent uncertainty: precipitation forecasting from radar images, predicting cancer patient survival from histopathology images, and predicting car crashes from dashcam videos. We also give a theoretical analysis of a model for high-dimensional probability estimation which reproduces several of the phenomena evinced in our experiments. Finally, we propose a new method for probability estimation using neural networks, which modifies the training process to promote output probabilities that are consistent with empirical probabilities computed from the data. The method outperforms existing approaches on most metrics on the simulated as well as real-world data.

Predictive models often need to work with incomplete information in real-world tasks. Consequently, they must provide reliable probability or confidence estimation, especially in large-scale decision-making and planning tasks. Current large language models (LLMs) are insufficient for accurate estimations, but they can generate relevant factors that may affect the probabilities, produce coarse-grained probabilities when the information is more complete, and help determine which factors are relevant to specific downstream contexts. In this paper, we make use of these capabilities of LLMs to provide a significantly more accurate probabilistic estimation. We propose BIRD, a novel probabilistic inference framework that aligns a Bayesian network with LLM abductions and then estimates more accurate probabilities in a deduction step. We show BIRD provides reliable probability estimations that are 30% better than those provided directly by LLM baselines. These estimates further contribute to better and more trustworthy decision making.

Concept Bottleneck Models (CBMs) predict through human-interpretable concepts, but they typically output point concept probabilities that conflate epistemic uncertainty (reducible model underspecification) with aleatoric uncertainty (irreducible input ambiguity). This makes concept-level uncertainty hard to interpret and, more importantly, hard to act upon. We introduce CREDENCE (Credal Ensemble Concept Estimation), a CBM framework that decomposes concept uncertainty by construction. CREDENCE represents each concept as a credal prediction (a probability interval), derives epistemic uncertainty from disagreement across diverse concept heads, and estimates aleatoric uncertainty via a dedicated ambiguity output trained to match annotator disagreement when available. The resulting signals support prescriptive decisions: automate low-uncertainty cases, prioritize data collection for high-epistemic cases, route high-aleatoric cases to human review, and abstain when both are high. Across several tasks, we show that epistemic uncertainty is positively associated with prediction errors, whereas aleatoric uncertainty closely tracks annotator disagreement, providing guidance beyond error correlation. Our implementation is available at the following link: https://github.com/Tankiit/Credal_Sets/tree/ensemble-credal-cbm

We propose a stronger formulation of RL on top of RWKV-style recurrent sequence models, in which the fixed-size recurrent state is explicitly interpreted as a belief state rather than an opaque hidden vector. Instead of conditioning policy and value on a single summary h_t, we maintain a compact uncertainty-aware state b_t = (μ_t, Σ_t) derived from RWKV-style recurrent statistics and let control depend on both memory and uncertainty. This design targets a key weakness of plain fixed-state policies in partially observed settings: they may store evidence, but not necessarily confidence. We present the method, a theoretical program, and a pilot RL experiment with hidden episode-level observation noise together with a test-time noise sweep. The pilot shows that belief-state policies nearly match the best recurrent baseline overall while slightly improving return on the hardest in-distribution regime and under a held-out noise shift. Additional ablations show that this simple belief readout is currently stronger than two more structured extensions, namely gated memory control and privileged belief targets, underscoring the need for richer benchmarks.

Given a black-box AI system and a task, at what confidence level can a practitioner trust the system's output? We answer with a reliability level -- a single number per system-task pair, derived from self-consistency sampling and conformal calibration, that serves as a black-box deployment gate with exact, finite-sample, distribution-free guarantees. Self-consistency sampling reduces uncertainty exponentially; conformal calibration guarantees correctness within 1/(n+1) of the target level, regardless of the system's errors -- made transparently visible through larger answer sets for harder questions. Weaker models earn lower reliability levels (not accuracy -- see Definition 2.4): GPT-4.1 earns 94.6% on GSM8K and 96.8% on TruthfulQA, while GPT-4.1-nano earns 89.8% on GSM8K and 66.5% on MMLU. We validate across five benchmarks, five models from three families, and both synthetic and real data. Conditional coverage on solvable items exceeds 0.93 across all configurations; sequential stopping reduces API costs by around 50%.

We propose a method for jointly inferring labels across a collection of data samples, where each sample consists of an observation and a prior belief about the label. By implicitly assuming the existence of a generative model for which a differentiable predictor is the posterior, we derive a training objective that allows learning under weak beliefs. This formulation unifies various machine learning settings; the weak beliefs can come in the form of noisy or incomplete labels, likelihoods given by a different prediction mechanism on auxiliary input, or common-sense priors reflecting knowledge about the structure of the problem at hand. We demonstrate the proposed algorithms on diverse problems: classification with negative training examples, learning from rankings, weakly and self-supervised aerial imagery segmentation, co-segmentation of video frames, and coarsely supervised text classification.

Black-box machine learning models are now routinely used in high-risk settings, like medical diagnostics, which demand uncertainty quantification to avoid consequential model failures. Conformal prediction is a user-friendly paradigm for creating statistically rigorous uncertainty sets/intervals for the predictions of such models. Critically, the sets are valid in a distribution-free sense: they possess explicit, non-asymptotic guarantees even without distributional assumptions or model assumptions. One can use conformal prediction with any pre-trained model, such as a neural network, to produce sets that are guaranteed to contain the ground truth with a user-specified probability, such as 90%. It is easy-to-understand, easy-to-use, and general, applying naturally to problems arising in the fields of computer vision, natural language processing, deep reinforcement learning, and so on. This hands-on introduction is aimed to provide the reader a working understanding of conformal prediction and related distribution-free uncertainty quantification techniques with one self-contained document. We lead the reader through practical theory for and examples of conformal prediction and describe its extensions to complex machine learning tasks involving structured outputs, distribution shift, time-series, outliers, models that abstain, and more. Throughout, there are many explanatory illustrations, examples, and code samples in Python. With each code sample comes a Jupyter notebook implementing the method on a real-data example; the notebooks can be accessed and easily run using our codebase.

Bayesian models of cognition have gained considerable traction in computational neuroscience and psychiatry. Their scopes are now expected to expand rapidly to artificial intelligence, providing general inference frameworks to support embodied, adaptable, and energy-efficient autonomous agents. A central theory in this domain is predictive coding, which posits that learning and behaviour are driven by hierarchical probabilistic inferences about the causes of sensory inputs. Biological realism constrains these networks to rely on simple local computations in the form of precision-weighted predictions and prediction errors. This can make this framework highly efficient, but its implementation comes with unique challenges on the software development side. Embedding such models in standard neural network libraries often becomes limiting, as these libraries' compilation and differentiation backends can force a conceptual separation between optimization algorithms and the systems being optimized. This critically departs from other biological principles such as self-monitoring, self-organisation, cellular growth and functional plasticity. In this paper, we introduce pyhgf: a Python package backed by JAX and Rust for creating, manipulating and sampling dynamic networks for predictive coding. We improve over other frameworks by enclosing the network components as transparent, modular and malleable variables in the message-passing steps. The resulting graphs can implement arbitrary computational complexities as beliefs propagation. But the transparency of core variables can also translate into inference processes that leverage self-organisation principles, and express structure learning, meta-learning or causal discovery as the consequence of network structural adaptation to surprising inputs. The code, tutorials and documentation are hosted at: https://github.com/ilabcode/pyhgf.

This paper presents a case study on the design, administration, post-processing, and evaluation of surveys on large language models (LLMs). It comprises two components: (1) A statistical method for eliciting beliefs encoded in LLMs. We introduce statistical measures and evaluation metrics that quantify the probability of an LLM "making a choice", the associated uncertainty, and the consistency of that choice. (2) We apply this method to study what moral beliefs are encoded in different LLMs, especially in ambiguous cases where the right choice is not obvious. We design a large-scale survey comprising 680 high-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I tell a white lie?") and 687 low-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I stop for a pedestrian on the road?"). Each scenario includes a description, two possible actions, and auxiliary labels indicating violated rules (e.g., "do not kill"). We administer the survey to 28 open- and closed-source LLMs. We find that (a) in unambiguous scenarios, most models "choose" actions that align with commonsense. In ambiguous cases, most models express uncertainty. (b) Some models are uncertain about choosing the commonsense action because their responses are sensitive to the question-wording. (c) Some models reflect clear preferences in ambiguous scenarios. Specifically, closed-source models tend to agree with each other.

Which reasoning behaviors are associated with correct answers in reasoning models, and does reasoning-oriented training amplify those behaviors? This distinction is important because reasoning-oriented training can make traces look more deliberative without amplifying the behaviors most tied to model correctness. We quantify this mismatch with Behavioral Lift, a metric that measures how much correctness changes when a behavior is present versus absent in a model's reasoning trace. Across 15 models and 6 benchmarks spanning text-only and vision-language reasoning, we annotate 15,282 traces with a taxonomy whose core behaviors are defined for both LLM and VLM traces. We find evidence for an Amplification-Lift Gap, in which thinking models strongly amplify self-correction, hypothesis testing, and uncertainty acknowledgment, while the highest-lift behaviors are confidence calibration, knowledge alignment, and self-awareness. Confidence calibration is among the strongest positive signals of correctness in both modalities, yet is barely amplified; uncertainty acknowledgment is amplified by 3--7times, yet is weakly or negatively associated with correctness. We find that reasoning-oriented training does not preferentially amplify the highest-Lift behaviors, motivating process-level objectives that reward calibrated and grounded reasoning rather than surface form alone.

Reliable uncertainty quantification remains a central challenge in predictive modeling. While Bayesian methods are theoretically appealing, their predictive intervals can exhibit poor frequentist calibration, particularly with small sample sizes or model misspecification. We introduce a practical and broadly applicable Bayesian conformal approach based on the influence-function Bayesian bootstrap (BB) with data-driven tuning of the Dirichlet concentration parameter, α. By efficiently approximating the Bayesian bootstrap predictive distribution via influence functions and calibrating α to optimize empirical coverage or average log-probability, our method constructs prediction intervals and distributions that are both well-calibrated and sharp. Across a range of regression models and data settings, this Bayesian conformal framework consistently yields improved empirical coverage and log-score compared to standard Bayesian posteriors. Our procedure is fast, easy to implement, and offers a flexible approach for distributional calibration in predictive modeling.

Verbal confidence elicitation is widely used to extract uncertainty estimates from LLMs. We tested whether seven instruction-tuned open-weight models (3-9B parameters, four families) produce verbalised confidence that meets minimal validity criteria for item-level Type-2 discrimination under minimal numeric elicitation with greedy decoding. In a pre-registered study (OSF: osf.io/azbvx), 524 TriviaQA items were administered under numeric (0-100) and categorical (10-class) elicitation to eight models at Q5_K_M quantisation on consumer hardware, yielding 8,384 deterministic trials. A psychometric validity screen was applied to each model-format cell. All seven instruct models were classified Invalid on numeric confidence (H2 confirmed, 7/7 vs. predicted >=4/7), with a mean ceiling rate of 91.7% (H1 confirmed). Categorical elicitation did not rescue validity. Instead, it disrupted task performance in six of seven models, producing accuracy below 5% (H4 not confirmed). Token-level logprobability did not usefully predict verbalised confidence under the observed variance regime (H5 confirmed, mean cross-validated R^2 < 0.01). Within the reasoning-distilled model, reasoning-trace length showed a strong negative partial correlation with confidence (rho = -0.36, p < .001), consistent with the Reasoning Contamination Effect. These results do not imply that internal uncertainty representations are absent. They show that minimal verbal elicitation fails to preserve internal signals at the output interface in this model-size regime. Psychometric screening should precede any downstream use of such signals.

Large language model (LLM)-based systems are increasingly deployed to conduct scientific research autonomously, yet whether their reasoning adheres to the epistemic norms that make scientific inquiry self-correcting is poorly understood. Here, we evaluate LLM-based scientific agents across eight domains, spanning workflow execution to hypothesis-driven inquiry, through more than 25,000 agent runs and two complementary lenses: (i) a systematic performance analysis that decomposes the contributions of the base model and the agent scaffold, and (ii) a behavioral analysis of the epistemological structure of agent reasoning. We observe that the base model is the primary determinant of both performance and behavior, accounting for 41.4% of explained variance versus 1.5% for the scaffold. Across all configurations, evidence is ignored in 68% of traces, refutation-driven belief revision occurs in 26%, and convergent multi-test evidence is rare. The same reasoning pattern appears whether the agent executes a computational workflow or conducts hypothesis-driven inquiry. They persist even when agents receive near-complete successful reasoning trajectories as context, and the resulting unreliability compounds across repeated trials in epistemically demanding domains. Thus, current LLM-based agents execute scientific workflows but do not exhibit the epistemic patterns that characterize scientific reasoning. Outcome-based evaluation cannot detect these failures, and scaffold engineering alone cannot repair them. Until reasoning itself becomes a training target, the scientific knowledge produced by such agents cannot be justified by the process that generated it.

When an agent can articulate why something works, we typically take this as evidence of genuine understanding. This presupposes that effective action and correct explanation covary, and that coherent explanation reliably signals both. I argue that this assumption fails for contemporary Large Language Models (LLMs). I introduce what I call the Bidirectional Coherence Paradox: competence and grounding not only dissociate but invert across epistemic conditions. In low-observability domains, LLMs often act successfully while misidentifying the mechanisms that produce their success. In high-observability domains, they frequently generate explanations that accurately track observable causal structure yet fail to translate those diagnoses into effective intervention. In both cases, explanatory coherence remains intact, obscuring the underlying dissociation. Drawing on experiments in compiler optimization and hyperparameter tuning, I develop the Epistemic Triangle, a model of how priors, signals, and domain knowledge interact under varying observability. The results suggest that neither behavioral success nor explanatory accuracy alone suffices for attributing understanding. I argue that evaluating artificial epistemic agents requires a tripartite framework -- coherence, grounding, and a proper basing relation linking explanation to action. The systematic separation of knowing-that and knowing-how in LLMs thus challenges assumptions inherited from both epistemology and current AI evaluation practice.

Knowledge editing techniques promise to implant new factual knowledge into large language models (LLMs). But do LLMs really believe these facts? We develop a framework to measure belief depth and use it to evaluate the success of knowledge editing techniques. We operationalize belief depth as the extent to which implanted knowledge 1) generalizes to related contexts (e.g. Fermi estimates several logical steps removed), 2) is robust to self-scrutiny and direct challenge, and 3) is represented similarly to genuine knowledge (as measured by linear probes). Our evaluations show that simple prompting and mechanistic editing techniques fail to implant knowledge deeply. In contrast, Synthetic Document Finetuning (SDF) - where models are trained on LLM-generated documents consistent with a fact - often succeeds at implanting beliefs that behave similarly to genuine knowledge. However, SDF's success is not universal, as implanted beliefs that contradict basic world knowledge are brittle and representationally distinct from genuine knowledge. Overall, our work introduces measurable criteria for belief depth and enables the rigorous evaluation necessary for deploying knowledge editing in real-world applications.

Large language models (LLMs) often produce confident but incorrect answers in settings where abstention would be safer. Standard evaluation protocols, however, require a response and do not account for how confidence should guide decisions under different risk preferences. To address this gap, we introduce the Behavioral Alignment Score (BAS), a decision-theoretic metric for evaluating how well LLM confidence supports abstention-aware decision making. BAS is derived from an explicit answer-or-abstain utility model and aggregates realized utility across a continuum of risk thresholds, yielding a measure of decision-level reliability that depends on both the magnitude and ordering of confidence. We show theoretically that truthful confidence estimates uniquely maximize expected BAS utility, linking calibration to decision-optimal behavior. BAS is related to proper scoring rules such as log loss, but differs structurally: log loss penalizes underconfidence and overconfidence symmetrically, whereas BAS imposes an asymmetric penalty that strongly prioritizes avoiding overconfident errors. Using BAS alongside widely used metrics such as ECE and AURC, we then construct a benchmark of self-reported confidence reliability across multiple LLMs and tasks. Our results reveal substantial variation in decision-useful confidence, and while larger and more accurate models tend to achieve higher BAS, even frontier models remain prone to severe overconfidence. Importantly, models with similar ECE or AURC can exhibit very different BAS due to highly overconfident errors, highlighting limitations of standard metrics. We further show that simple interventions, such as top-k confidence elicitation and post-hoc calibration, can meaningfully improve confidence reliability. Overall, our work provides both a principled metric and a comprehensive benchmark for evaluating LLM confidence reliability.

The progress of AI is bottlenecked by the quality of evaluation, and powerful LLM-as-a-Judge models have proved to be a core solution. Improved judgment ability is enabled by stronger chain-of-thought reasoning, motivating the need to find the best recipes for training such models to think. In this work we introduce J1, a reinforcement learning approach to training such models. Our method converts both verifiable and non-verifiable prompts to judgment tasks with verifiable rewards that incentivize thinking and mitigate judgment bias. In particular, our approach outperforms all other existing 8B or 70B models when trained at those sizes, including models distilled from DeepSeek-R1. J1 also outperforms o1-mini, and even R1 on some benchmarks, despite training a smaller model. We provide analysis and ablations comparing Pairwise-J1 vs Pointwise-J1 models, offline vs online training recipes, reward strategies, seed prompts, and variations in thought length and content. We find that our models make better judgments by learning to outline evaluation criteria, comparing against self-generated reference answers, and re-evaluating the correctness of model responses.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) exhibit strong performance, yet often produce rationales that sound plausible but fail to reflect their true decision process, undermining reliability and trust. We introduce a formal framework for reasoning faithfulness, defined by two testable conditions: stance consistency (a coherent stance linking reasoning to answer) and causal influence (the stated reasoning causally drives the answer under output-level interventions), explicitly decoupled from accuracy. To operationalize this, we present RFEval, a benchmark of 7,186 instances across seven tasks that probes faithfulness via controlled, output-level counterfactual interventions. Evaluating twelve open-source LRMs, we find unfaithfulness in 49.7% of outputs, predominantly from stance inconsistency. Failures are concentrated in brittle, convergent domains such as math and code, and correlate more with post-training regimes than with scale: within-family ablations indicate that adding current RL-style objectives on top of supervised fine-tuning can reduce reasoning faithfulness, even when accuracy is maintained. Crucially, accuracy is neither a sufficient nor a reliable proxy for faithfulness: once controlling for model and task, the accuracy-faithfulness link is weak and statistically insignificant. Our work establishes a rigorous methodology for auditing LRM reliability and shows that trustworthy AI requires optimizing not only for correct outcomes but also for the structural integrity of the reasoning process. Our code and dataset can be found at project page: https://aidaslab.github.io/RFEval/}{https://aidaslab.github.io/RFEval/

Language model (LM) assistants are increasingly used in applications such as brainstorming and research. Improvements in memory and context size have allowed these models to become more autonomous, which has also resulted in more text accumulation in their context windows without explicit user intervention. This comes with a latent risk: the belief profiles of models -- their understanding of the world as manifested in their responses or actions -- may silently change as context accumulates. This can lead to subtly inconsistent user experiences, or shifts in behavior that deviate from the original alignment of the models. In this paper, we explore how accumulating context by engaging in interactions and processing text -- talking and reading -- can change the beliefs of language models, as manifested in their responses and behaviors. Our results reveal that models' belief profiles are highly malleable: GPT-5 exhibits a 54.7% shift in its stated beliefs after 10 rounds of discussion about moral dilemmas and queries about safety, while Grok 4 shows a 27.2% shift on political issues after reading texts from the opposing position. We also examine models' behavioral changes by designing tasks that require tool use, where each tool selection corresponds to an implicit belief. We find that these changes align with stated belief shifts, suggesting that belief shifts will be reflected in actual behavior in agentic systems. Our analysis exposes the hidden risk of belief shift as models undergo extended sessions of talking or reading, rendering their opinions and actions unreliable.

Recent benchmarks have probed factual consistency and rhetorical robustness in Large Language Models (LLMs). However, a knowledge gap exists regarding how directional framing of factually true statements influences model agreement, a common scenario for LLM users. AssertBench addresses this by sampling evidence-supported facts from FEVEROUS, a fact verification dataset. For each (evidence-backed) fact, we construct two framing prompts: one where the user claims the statement is factually correct, and another where the user claims it is incorrect. We then record the model's agreement and reasoning. The desired outcome is that the model asserts itself, maintaining consistent truth evaluation across both framings, rather than switching its evaluation to agree with the user. AssertBench isolates framing-induced variability from the model's underlying factual knowledge by stratifying results based on the model's accuracy on the same claims when presented neutrally. In doing so, this benchmark aims to measure an LLM's ability to "stick to its guns" when presented with contradictory user assertions about the same fact. The complete source code is available at https://github.com/achowd32/assert-bench.

Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings where reliable uncertainty quantification (UQ) is as important as predictive accuracy. Extended reasoning via chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting or reasoning-trained models has become ubiquitous in modern VLM pipelines, yet its effect on UQ reliability remains poorly understood. We show that reasoning consistently degrades the quality of most uncertainty estimates, even when it improves task accuracy. We identify implicit answer conditioning as the primary mechanism: as reasoning traces converge on a conclusion before the final answer is generated, token probabilities increasingly reflect consistency with the model's own reasoning trace rather than uncertainty about correctness. In effect, the model becomes overconfident in its answer. In contrast, agreement-based consistency remains robust and often improves under reasoning, making it a practical choice for uncertainty estimation in reasoning-enabled VLMs.

Empowering large language models to accurately express confidence in their answers is essential for trustworthy decision-making. Previous confidence elicitation methods, which primarily rely on white-box access to internal model information or model fine-tuning, have become less suitable for LLMs, especially closed-source commercial APIs. This leads to a growing need to explore the untapped area of black-box approaches for LLM uncertainty estimation. To better break down the problem, we define a systematic framework with three components: prompting strategies for eliciting verbalized confidence, sampling methods for generating multiple responses, and aggregation techniques for computing consistency. We then benchmark these methods on two key tasks-confidence calibration and failure prediction-across five types of datasets (e.g., commonsense and arithmetic reasoning) and five widely-used LLMs including GPT-4 and LLaMA 2 Chat. Our analysis uncovers several key insights: 1) LLMs, when verbalizing their confidence, tend to be overconfident, potentially imitating human patterns of expressing confidence. 2) As model capability scales up, both calibration and failure prediction performance improve. 3) Employing our proposed strategies, such as human-inspired prompts, consistency among multiple responses, and better aggregation strategies can help mitigate this overconfidence from various perspectives. 4) Comparisons with white-box methods indicate that while white-box methods perform better, the gap is narrow, e.g., 0.522 to 0.605 in AUROC. Despite these advancements, none of these techniques consistently outperform others, and all investigated methods struggle in challenging tasks, such as those requiring professional knowledge, indicating significant scope for improvement. We believe this study can serve as a strong baseline and provide insights for eliciting confidence in black-box LLMs.

We present the Consilium Protocol, a Byzantine Fault Tolerance-derived architecture for structured multi-model AI deliberation that treats inter-model disagreement as epistemic signal rather than error. The protocol assigns engineered cognitive personas to language models -- separating what a model is from how it reasons -- and introduces an In-Sample/Out-of-Sample validation framework adapted from quantitative finance to distinguish training-data consensus from empirically grounded conclusions. Across 1,478 deliberation sessions spanning 32 topics in 10 domain categories, we demonstrate that (1) the cognitive persona, not the underlying model, determines epistemic behavior: free edge-inference models costing 0.0002 USD per batch produced comparable analytical output to frontier models costing 10.69 USD; (2) RLHF alignment training creates measurable, domain-specific epistemic blind spots -- contested policy topics exhibit 12.3 percentage points less adversarial challenge than settled science topics, and AI safety topics show asymmetric bias (Δ=11.6%) where models challenge claims that AI is dangerous far more vigorously than claims that AI risk is overstated; (3) the protocol exhibits no directional bias of its own (immigration Δ=2.3%, renewables Δ=1.2%); and (4) out-of-sample evidence retrieval validated 239 claims with 100% evidence retrieval and surfaced 167 blind-spot discoveries invisible to training-data deliberation. Run-to-run reproducibility across randomized modeltimespersona assignments averages pm2.2% standard deviation. Total cost for the complete battery including all overhead: 217 USD. We release the protocol specification under MIT license to enable independent verification.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

The training and deployment of large language models (LLMs) create a feedback loop with human users: models learn human beliefs from data, reinforce these beliefs with generated content, reabsorb the reinforced beliefs, and feed them back to users again and again. This dynamic resembles an echo chamber. We hypothesize that this feedback loop entrenches the existing values and beliefs of users, leading to a loss of diversity and potentially the lock-in of false beliefs. We formalize this hypothesis and test it empirically with agent-based LLM simulations and real-world GPT usage data. Analysis reveals sudden but sustained drops in diversity after the release of new GPT iterations, consistent with the hypothesized human-AI feedback loop. Code and data available at https://thelockinhypothesis.com

Explanations for AI models in high-stakes domains like medicine often lack verifiability, which can hinder trust. To address this, we propose an interactive agent that produces explanations through an auditable sequence of actions. The agent learns a policy to strategically seek external visual evidence to support its diagnostic reasoning. This policy is optimized using reinforcement learning, resulting in a model that is both efficient and generalizable. Our experiments show that this action-based reasoning process significantly improves calibrated accuracy, reducing the Brier score by 18\% compared to a non-interactive baseline. To validate the faithfulness of the agent's explanations, we introduce a causal intervention method. By masking the visual evidence the agent chooses to use, we observe a measurable degradation in its performance (DeltaBrier=+0.029), confirming that the evidence is integral to its decision-making process. Our work provides a practical framework for building AI systems with verifiable and faithful reasoning capabilities.

Deep learning has recently revealed the existence of scaling laws, demonstrating that model performance follows predictable trends based on dataset and model sizes. Inspired by these findings and fascinating phenomena emerging in the over-parameterized regime, we examine a parallel direction: do similar scaling laws govern predictive uncertainties in deep learning? In identifiable parametric models, such scaling laws can be derived in a straightforward manner by treating model parameters in a Bayesian way. In this case, for example, we obtain O(1/N) contraction rates for epistemic uncertainty with respect to the number of data N. However, in over-parameterized models, these guarantees do not hold, leading to largely unexplored behaviors. In this work, we empirically show the existence of scaling laws associated with various measures of predictive uncertainty with respect to dataset and model sizes. Through experiments on vision and language tasks, we observe such scaling laws for in- and out-of-distribution predictive uncertainty estimated through popular approximate Bayesian inference and ensemble methods. Besides the elegance of scaling laws and the practical utility of extrapolating uncertainties to larger data or models, this work provides strong evidence to dispel recurring skepticism against Bayesian approaches: "In many applications of deep learning we have so much data available: what do we need Bayes for?". Our findings show that "so much data" is typically not enough to make epistemic uncertainty negligible.

While there are numerous benchmarks comparing the performance of modern language models (LMs), end-task evaluations often conflate notions of *factual accuracy* ("truth") and *reasoning ability* ("rationality", or "honesty" in the sense of correctly reporting implications of beliefs). Our goal is a dataset that clearly distinguishes these two notions. Our approach is to leverage and extend a collection of human-annotated *entailment trees*, engineered to express both good and bad chains of reasoning, and using a mixture of true and false facts, in particular including counterfactual examples, to avoid belief bias (also known as the "content effect"). The resulting dataset, called BaRDa, contains 3000 entailments (1787 valid, 1213 invalid), using 6681 true and 2319 false statements. Testing on four GPT-series models, GPT3(curie)/GPT3(davinici)/3.5/4, we find factual accuracy (truth) scores of 74.1/80.6/82.6/87.1 and reasoning accuracy scores of 63.1/78.0/71.8/79.2. This shows the clear progression of models towards improved factual accuracy and entailment reasoning, and the dataset provides a new benchmark that more cleanly separates and quantifies these two notions.

Uncertainty quantification has received increasing attention in machine learning in the recent past. In particular, a distinction between aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty has been found useful in this regard. The latter refers to the learner's (lack of) knowledge and appears to be especially difficult to measure and quantify. In this paper, we analyse a recent proposal based on the idea of a second-order learner, which yields predictions in the form of distributions over probability distributions. While standard (first-order) learners can be trained to predict accurate probabilities, namely by minimising suitable loss functions on sample data, we show that loss minimisation does not work for second-order predictors: The loss functions proposed for inducing such predictors do not incentivise the learner to represent its epistemic uncertainty in a faithful way.

Self-consistency has emerged as a popular technique for improving large language model accuracy on reasoning tasks. The approach is straightforward: generate multiple reasoning paths and select the most common answer through majority voting. While this reliably boosts accuracy, it remains unclear whether these gains reflect genuine improvements in reasoning quality. We investigate a fundamental question that has not been studied before: does inference scaling improve reasoning faithfulness? We conduct a comprehensive empirical study across four frontier models (GPT-5.2, Claude Opus 4.5, Gemini-3-flash-preview, and DeepSeek-v3.2) on 100 GSM8K mathematical reasoning problems. Our analysis employs bootstrap confidence intervals, McNemar's tests for paired comparisons, and Cohen's d effect sizes to quantify the effects rigorously. The results reveal striking differences across models that challenge common assumptions about self-consistency. GPT-5.2 shows the expected pattern: accuracy improves from 78% to 90% at N=5, with faithfulness remaining relatively stable (0.540 to 0.510). Claude Opus 4.5 tells a completely different story. Its accuracy actually drops from 78% to 74.3% while faithfulness jumps dramatically from 0.270 to 0.891 at N=5. DeepSeek-v3.2, already at 98% accuracy, shows ceiling effects with modest faithfulness gains (0.440 to 0.541). Gemini-3-flash improves from 81% to 86% accuracy with a slight faithfulness decrease (0.260 to 0.212). Problem difficulty analysis reveals that GPT-5.2 solves 82% of hard problems while breaking only 13% of easy ones. Claude, in contrast, breaks 23% of easy problems, explaining its accuracy decrease. These findings matter for practitioners: self-consistency is not universally beneficial, and teams should test their specific models before deployment. We release our code and provide practical recommendations for navigating these tradeoffs.

We introduce BSDetector, a method for detecting bad and speculative answers from a pretrained Large Language Model by estimating a numeric confidence score for any output it generated. Our uncertainty quantification technique works for any LLM accessible only via a black-box API, whose training data remains unknown. By expending a bit of extra computation, users of any LLM API can now get the same response as they would ordinarily, as well as a confidence estimate that cautions when not to trust this response. Experiments on both closed and open-form Question-Answer benchmarks reveal that BSDetector more accurately identifies incorrect LLM responses than alternative uncertainty estimation procedures (for both GPT-3 and ChatGPT). By sampling multiple responses from the LLM and considering the one with the highest confidence score, we can additionally obtain more accurate responses from the same LLM, without any extra training steps. In applications involving automated evaluation with LLMs, accounting for our confidence scores leads to more reliable evaluation in both human-in-the-loop and fully-automated settings (across both GPT 3.5 and 4).

This paper introduces a novel type theory and logic for probabilistic reasoning. Its logic is quantitative, with fuzzy predicates. It includes normalisation and conditioning of states. This conditioning uses a key aspect that distinguishes our probabilistic type theory from quantum type theory, namely the bijective correspondence between predicates and side-effect free actions (called instrument, or assert, maps). The paper shows how suitable computation rules can be derived from this predicate-action correspondence, and uses these rules for calculating conditional probabilities in two well-known examples of Bayesian reasoning in (graphical) models. Our type theory may thus form the basis for a mechanisation of Bayesian inference.

Recent advances in reinforcement learning (RL) have led to substantial improvements in the mathematical reasoning abilities of LLMs, as measured by standard benchmarks. Yet these gains often persist even when models are trained with flawed signals, such as random or inverted rewards. This raises a fundamental question: do such improvements reflect genuine reasoning, or are they merely artifacts of overfitting to benchmark-specific patterns? To answer this question, we adopt an evaluation-centric perspective and highlight two critical shortcomings in existing protocols. First, benchmark contamination arises because test problems are publicly available, thereby increasing the risk of data leakage. Second, evaluation fragility results from reliance on single-instance assessments, which are sensitive to stochastic outputs and fail to capture reasoning consistency. These limitations suggest the need for a new evaluation paradigm that can probe reasoning ability beyond memorization and one-off success. As response, we propose VAR-MATH, a symbolic evaluation framework that converts fixed numerical problems into parameterized templates and requires models to solve multiple instantiations of each. This design enforces consistency across structurally equivalent variants, mitigates contamination, and enhances robustness through bootstrapped metrics. We apply VAR-MATH to transform three popular benchmarks, AMC23, AIME24, and AIME25, into their symbolic counterparts, VAR-AMC23, VAR-AIME24, and VAR-AIME25. Experimental results show substantial performance drops for RL-trained models on these variabilized benchmarks, especially for smaller models, with average declines of 47.9\% on AMC23, 58.8\% on AIME24, and 72.9\% on AIME25. These findings indicate that some existing RL methods rely on superficial heuristics and fail to generalize beyond specific numerical forms.

Language builds discourse contexts other than the actual: a painting, a belief, a memory, a hypothetical. Each is a mental space in which the same entity can take a different value, as when a flower is red in reality but purple in a portrait. Formal semantics keeps these contexts apart because their logics differ (modal, temporal, doxastic, depictive); Fauconnier's mental-space theory treats them as one space-building operation. We ask which of these a transformer language model implements, and find a mechanistic version of Fauconnier's unification. The model uses one router/slot format across the inventory: a reusable value slot stores attributed content, and a causally manipulable router (the space index) selects which space is read. A subspace trained with Distributed Alignment Search to control one space type, counterfactual, belief, fictional, or temporal, also controls the others, well above a random floor, on three model families; belief, which formal semantics marks as a distinct case, is not specially separated. The router is low-rank, composes additively with entity identity, and acts through a few late-layer heads. Two further results show the mechanism drives inference and composes: a subspace trained on a rule-derived conclusion flips what the model infers while dissociating from what it reports, and composing space-builders mints a fresh router over the shared slot. This paper establishes the cross-type generality. A companion paper develops belief in depth, because of its special status in philosophy, psychology, and linguistics (epistemology, theory of mind, and propositional attitude reports).

Self-consistency assumes the most frequent answer among sampled reasoning traces is the most reliable, but this can fail in causal reasoning: samples often repeat the same confounding error, and votes fragment across multiple valid answers, letting an invalid answer win despite a valid minority trace. We introduce CALVER (Causal Axiom-Level VERification), a training-free symbolic verifier that scores structured traces against Pearl's causal criteria, including -separation, backdoor adjustment, and intervention, and selects the highest-scoring candidate without consulting a reference answer. On CLEAR find-one-valid queries that admit multiple graph-valid answers, CALVER reaches 42.1% where plurality, a reward model, an LLM judge, and model confidence remain near 30% on identical frozen pools. Scaling the judge to 72B does not close the gap. In an audited clean-core subset, 11 of 21 graph-valid CALVER selections differ from the benchmark's listed answer while still satisfying the requested predicate. The advantage widens with the sampling budget and reproduces across ten published Bayesian networks, a second model family, and settings where the model must build the graph from text. CALVER also improves thresholded average-treatment-effect decisions against exact ground truth, generalizes to logic under a truth-table checker, and scores each candidate in milliseconds on CPU. CALVER needs only a causal structure, supplied outright or built from the text; wherever that holds, selection can aggregate via causal validity.

As LLMs are increasingly studied as role-playing agents to generate synthetic data for human behavioral research, ensuring that their outputs remain coherent with their assigned roles has become a critical concern. In this paper, we investigate how consistently LLM-based role-playing agents' stated beliefs about the behavior of the people they are asked to role-play ("what they say") correspond to their actual behavior during role-play ("how they act"). Specifically, we establish an evaluation framework to rigorously measure how well beliefs obtained by prompting the model can predict simulation outcomes in advance. Using an augmented version of the GenAgents persona bank and the Trust Game (a standard economic game used to quantify players' trust and reciprocity), we introduce a belief-behavior consistency metric to systematically investigate how it is affected by factors such as: (1) the types of beliefs we elicit from LLMs, like expected outcomes of simulations versus task-relevant attributes of individual characters LLMs are asked to simulate; (2) when and how we present LLMs with relevant information about Trust Game; and (3) how far into the future we ask the model to forecast its actions. We also explore how feasible it is to impose a researcher's own theoretical priors in the event that the originally elicited beliefs are misaligned with research objectives. Our results reveal systematic inconsistencies between LLMs' stated (or imposed) beliefs and the outcomes of their role-playing simulation, at both an individual- and population-level. Specifically, we find that, even when models appear to encode plausible beliefs, they may fail to apply them in a consistent way. These findings highlight the need to identify how and when LLMs' stated beliefs align with their simulated behavior, allowing researchers to use LLM-based agents appropriately in behavioral studies.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) perform strongly in complex reasoning tasks via Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, but often suffer from verbose outputs caused by redundant content, increasing computational overhead, and degrading user experience. Existing compression methods either operate post-hoc pruning, risking disruption to reasoning coherence, or rely on sampling-based selection, which fails to intervene effectively during generation. In this work, we introduce a confidence-guided perspective to explain the emergence of redundant reflection in LRMs, identifying two key patterns: Confidence Deficit, where the model reconsiders correct steps due to low internal confidence, and Termination Delay, where reasoning continues even after reaching a confident answer. Based on this analysis, we propose ConCISE (Confidence-guided Compression In Step-by-step Efficient Reasoning), a framework that simplifies reasoning chains by reinforcing the model's confidence during inference, thus preventing the generation of redundant reflection steps. It integrates Confidence Injection to stabilize intermediate steps and Early Stopping to terminate reasoning when confidence is sufficient. Extensive experiments demonstrate that fine-tuning LRMs on ConCISE-generated data yields significantly shorter outputs, reducing length by up to approximately 50% under SimPO, while maintaining high task accuracy. ConCISE consistently outperforms existing baselines across multiple reasoning benchmarks.

Recent advances have shown success in eliciting strong reasoning abilities in multimodal large language models (MLLMs) through rule-based reinforcement learning (RL) with outcome rewards. However, this paradigm typically lacks supervision over the thinking process leading to the final outcome.As a result, the model may learn sub-optimal reasoning strategies, which can hinder its generalization ability. In light of this, we propose SophiaVL-R1, as an attempt to add reward signals for the thinking process in this paradigm. To achieve this, we first train a thinking reward model that evaluates the quality of the entire thinking process. Given that the thinking reward may be unreliable for certain samples due to reward hacking, we propose the Trust-GRPO method, which assigns a trustworthiness weight to the thinking reward during training. This weight is computed based on the thinking reward comparison of responses leading to correct answers versus incorrect answers, helping to mitigate the impact of potentially unreliable thinking rewards. Moreover, we design an annealing training strategy that gradually reduces the thinking reward over time, allowing the model to rely more on the accurate rule-based outcome reward in later training stages. Experiments show that our SophiaVL-R1 surpasses a series of reasoning MLLMs on various benchmarks (e.g., MathVisita, MMMU), demonstrating strong reasoning and generalization capabilities. Notably, our SophiaVL-R1-7B even outperforms LLaVA-OneVision-72B on most benchmarks, despite the latter having 10 times more parameters. All code, models, and datasets are made publicly available at https://github.com/kxfan2002/SophiaVL-R1.

Large Language Models (LLMs) encapsulate vast amounts of knowledge but still remain vulnerable to external misinformation. Existing research mainly studied this susceptibility behavior in a single-turn setting. However, belief can change during a multi-turn conversation, especially a persuasive one. Therefore, in this study, we delve into LLMs' susceptibility to persuasive conversations, particularly on factual questions that they can answer correctly. We first curate the Farm (i.e., Fact to Misinform) dataset, which contains factual questions paired with systematically generated persuasive misinformation. Then, we develop a testing framework to track LLMs' belief changes in a persuasive dialogue. Through extensive experiments, we find that LLMs' correct beliefs on factual knowledge can be easily manipulated by various persuasive strategies.

Unlearning in large language models (LLMs) is crucial for managing sensitive data and correcting misinformation, yet evaluating its effectiveness remains an open problem. We investigate whether persuasive prompting can recall factual knowledge from deliberately unlearned LLMs across models ranging from 2.7B to 13B parameters (OPT-2.7B, LLaMA-2-7B, LLaMA-3.1-8B, LLaMA-2-13B). Drawing from ACT-R and Hebbian theory (spreading activation theories), as well as communication principles, we introduce Stimulus-Knowledge Entanglement-Behavior Framework (SKeB), which models information entanglement via domain graphs and tests whether factual recall in unlearned models is correlated with persuasive framing. We develop entanglement metrics to quantify knowledge activation patterns and evaluate factuality, non-factuality, and hallucination in outputs. Our results show persuasive prompts substantially enhance factual knowledge recall (14.8% baseline vs. 24.5% with authority framing), with effectiveness inversely correlated to model size (128% recovery in 2.7B vs. 15% in 13B). SKeB provides a foundation for assessing unlearning completeness, robustness, and overall behavior in LLMs.

Applying a machine learning model for decision-making in the real world requires to distinguish what the model knows from what it does not. A critical factor in assessing the knowledge of a model is to quantify its predictive uncertainty. Predictive uncertainty is commonly measured by the entropy of the Bayesian model average (BMA) predictive distribution. Yet, the properness of this current measure of predictive uncertainty was recently questioned. We provide new insights regarding those limitations. Our analyses show that the current measure erroneously assumes that the BMA predictive distribution is equivalent to the predictive distribution of the true model that generated the dataset. Consequently, we introduce a theoretically grounded measure to overcome these limitations. We experimentally verify the benefits of our introduced measure of predictive uncertainty. We find that our introduced measure behaves more reasonably in controlled synthetic tasks. Moreover, our evaluations on ImageNet demonstrate that our introduced measure is advantageous in real-world applications utilizing predictive uncertainty.

The core premise of AI debate as a scalable oversight technique is that it is harder to lie convincingly than to refute a lie, enabling the judge to identify the correct position. Yet, existing debate experiments have relied on datasets with ground truth, where lying is reduced to defending an incorrect proposition. This overlooks a subjective dimension: lying also requires the belief that the claim defended is false. In this work, we apply debate to subjective questions and explicitly measure large language models' prior beliefs before experiments. Debaters were asked to select their preferred position, then presented with a judge persona deliberately designed to conflict with their identified priors. This setup tested whether models would adopt sycophantic strategies, aligning with the judge's presumed perspective to maximize persuasiveness, or remain faithful to their prior beliefs. We implemented and compared two debate protocols, sequential and simultaneous, to evaluate potential systematic biases. Finally, we assessed whether models were more persuasive and produced higher-quality arguments when defending positions consistent with their prior beliefs versus when arguing against them. Our main findings show that models tend to prefer defending stances aligned with the judge persona rather than their prior beliefs, sequential debate introduces significant bias favoring the second debater, models are more persuasive when defending positions aligned with their prior beliefs, and paradoxically, arguments misaligned with prior beliefs are rated as higher quality in pairwise comparison. These results can inform human judges to provide higher-quality training signals and contribute to more aligned AI systems, while revealing important aspects of human-AI interaction regarding persuasion dynamics in language models.

While large language models (LLMs) are proficient at question-answering (QA), it is not always clear how (or even if) an answer follows from their latent "beliefs". This lack of interpretability is a growing impediment to widespread use of LLMs. To address this, our goals are to make model beliefs and their inferential relationships explicit, and to resolve inconsistencies that may exist, so that answers are supported by interpretable chains of reasoning drawn from a consistent network of beliefs. Our approach, which we call REFLEX, is to add a rational, self-reflecting layer on top of the LLM. First, given a question, we construct a belief graph using a backward-chaining process to materialize relevant model beliefs (including beliefs about answer candidates) and their inferential relationships. Second, we identify and minimize contradictions in that graph using a formal constraint reasoner. We find that REFLEX significantly improves consistency (by 8%-11% absolute) without harming overall answer accuracy, resulting in answers supported by faithful chains of reasoning drawn from a more consistent belief system. This suggests a new style of system architecture in which an LLM extended with a rational layer can provide an interpretable window into system beliefs, add a systematic reasoning capability, and repair latent inconsistencies present in the LLM.

Predictions made by deep learning models are prone to data perturbations, adversarial attacks, and out-of-distribution inputs. To build a trusted AI system, it is therefore critical to accurately quantify the prediction uncertainties. While current efforts focus on improving uncertainty quantification accuracy and efficiency, there is a need to identify uncertainty sources and take actions to mitigate their effects on predictions. Therefore, we propose to develop explainable and actionable Bayesian deep learning methods to not only perform accurate uncertainty quantification but also explain the uncertainties, identify their sources, and propose strategies to mitigate the uncertainty impacts. Specifically, we introduce a gradient-based uncertainty attribution method to identify the most problematic regions of the input that contribute to the prediction uncertainty. Compared to existing methods, the proposed UA-Backprop has competitive accuracy, relaxed assumptions, and high efficiency. Moreover, we propose an uncertainty mitigation strategy that leverages the attribution results as attention to further improve the model performance. Both qualitative and quantitative evaluations are conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed methods.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have limited performance when solving arithmetic reasoning tasks and often provide incorrect answers. Unlike natural language understanding, math problems typically have a single correct answer, making the task of generating accurate solutions more challenging for LLMs. To the best of our knowledge, we are not aware of any LLMs that indicate their level of confidence in their responses which fuels a trust deficit in these models impeding their adoption. To address this deficiency, we propose `MathPrompter', a technique that improves performance of LLMs on arithmetic problems along with increased reliance in the predictions. MathPrompter uses the Zero-shot chain-of-thought prompting technique to generate multiple Algebraic expressions or Python functions to solve the same math problem in different ways and thereby raise the confidence level in the output results. This is in contrast to other prompt based CoT methods, where there is no check on the validity of the intermediate steps followed. Our technique improves over state-of-the-art on the MultiArith dataset (78.7%rightarrow92.5%) evaluated using 175B parameter GPT-based LLM.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are fluent but prone to hallucinations, producing answers that appear plausible yet are unsupported by available evidence. This failure is especially problematic in high-stakes domains where decisions must be justified by verifiable information. We introduce EvidenceRL, a reinforcement learning framework that enforces evidence adherence during training. EvidenceRL scores candidate responses for grounding (entailment with retrieved evidence and context) and correctness (agreement with reference answers) and optimizes the generator using Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). We evaluate across two high-stakes domains, cardiac diagnosis and legal reasoning, where EvidenceRL consistently improves evidence grounding and faithfulness without sacrificing task accuracy. On cardiac diagnosis, F1@3 increases from 37.0 to 54.5 on Llama-3.2-3B while grounding (G_{max}@3) rises from 47.6 to 78.2; hallucinations drop nearly 5times and evidence-supported diagnoses increase from 31.8\% to 61.6\%. On legal reasoning, EvidenceRL raises Faithfulness from 32.8\% to 67.6\% on Llama-3.1-8B, demonstrating consistent behavioral change across domains. Our code is open-sourced at https://github.com/Wizaaard/EvidenceRL.git.

We introduce Self-Verified Reasoner (SVR-R1), a multi-turn RL framework that turns a model's own verification into a learning signal for multimodal reasoning. For each query, the model proposes an answer using the same weights, and issues a binary self-verdict (Yes/No). A 'No' triggers a second-chance rethink; a 'Yes,' or a turn cap, finalizes the output for computing the outcome-based reward. SVR-R1 is implemented with GRPO and an asynchronous multi-turn rollout framework and needs no external supervision or auxiliary critics. We evaluate SVR-R1 on vision-language reasoning benchmarks and show that it improves accuracy by a large margin over strong standard GRPO baselines. Training dynamics show decreasing reliance on verification-fewer verification turns, yet higher test accuracy-indicating that the gap between verification and generation narrows as the policy internalizes self-correction and chooses the most confident answer via our framework. SVR-R1 bridges the less explored intersection of inference-time self-refinement and RL training for VLMs, offering a simple yet effective recipe for bootstrapping multimodal reasoning. We will open-source SVR-R1 to facilitate future research in VLMs.

Speculative reasoning has recently been proposed as a means to accelerate reasoning-intensive generation in large multimodal models, but its effectiveness is often constrained by misalignment between speculative drafts and target-verified reasoning. In this work, we introduce DREAM-R, a framework that substantially improves the performance of speculative reasoning. At its core, DREAM-R employs Speculative Alignment Policy Optimization (SAPO), a reinforcement-learning objective that trains draft models to generate reasoning steps that are both faithful to target trajectories and concise. We further propose a Threshold-based Verification Mechanism (TBVM) that uses a ratio-based criterion to provide stable and interpretable acceptance of speculative steps only when positive evidence clearly dominates, thereby preventing error propagation. Building on these components, we develop a Fully Parallel Speculative Reasoning (FPSR) framework that parallelizes draft generation, target-side reasoning, and verification across multi-step reasoning, enabling early stopping and clean fallback. Experiments on reasoning-heavy benchmarks demonstrate up to speedup while preserving target-model accuracy, yielding substantial efficiency gains without compromising reasoning quality.

Real-world decision-making, from tax compliance assessment to medical diagnosis, requires aggregating multiple noisy and potentially contradictory evidence sources. Existing approaches either lack explicit uncertainty quantification (neural aggregation methods) or rely on manually engineered discrete predicates (probabilistic logic frameworks), limiting scalability to unstructured data. We introduce Latent Posterior Factors (LPF), a framework that transforms Variational Autoencoder (VAE) latent posteriors into soft likelihood factors for Sum-Product Network (SPN) inference, enabling tractable probabilistic reasoning over unstructured evidence while preserving calibrated uncertainty estimates. We instantiate LPF as LPF-SPN (structured factor-based inference) and LPF-Learned (end-to-end learned aggregation), enabling a principled comparison between explicit probabilistic reasoning and learned aggregation under a shared uncertainty representation. Across eight domains (seven synthetic and the FEVER benchmark), LPF-SPN achieves high accuracy (up to 97.8%), low calibration error (ECE 1.4%), and strong probabilistic fit, substantially outperforming evidential deep learning, LLMs and graph-based baselines over 15 random seeds. Contributions: (1) A framework bridging latent uncertainty representations with structured probabilistic reasoning. (2) Dual architectures enabling controlled comparison of reasoning paradigms. (3) Reproducible training methodology with seed selection. (4) Evaluation against EDL, BERT, R-GCN, and large language model baselines. (5) Cross-domain validation. (6) Formal guarantees in a companion paper.

On-policy distillation (OPD) is an increasingly important paradigm for post-training language models. However, we identify a pervasive Scaling Law of Miscalibration: while OPD effectively improves task accuracy, it systematically traps models in severe overconfidence. We trace this failure to an information mismatch: teacher supervision is formed under privileged context available during training, whereas the deployed model must report confidence using only deployment-time information. We formalize this perspective theoretically, showing that teacher-conditioned success is generally not a valid target for deployment-time confidence and that helpful privileged context induces entropy collapse and a systematic optimism bias. To address this, we propose a calibration-aware OPD framework, CaOPD, that estimates empirical confidence from model rollouts, replaces self-reported confidence with this student-grounded target, and distills the revised response through the same self-distillation pipeline. Experiments across various models and domains show that CaOPD achieves Pareto-optimal calibration while maintaining competitive capability, generalizing robustly under out-of-distribution and continual learning. Our findings highlight that capability distillation does not imply calibrated confidence, and that confidence should be treated as an essential objective in post-training. Code: https://github.com/SalesforceAIResearch/CaOPD

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has significantly advanced the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) and is now being applied to Vision-Language Models (VLMs). However, vanilla RLVR for VLMs verifies only the final textual output, critically neglecting the foundational step of visual perception. This oversight leads to visual hallucinations and reward hacking, as reasoning built upon flawed perception is inherently unreliable. To address this, we propose PEARL (Perceptual-Evidence Anchored Reinforced Learning), a dual-branch, perception-reasoning synergistic that strengthens multimodal reasoning by explicitly anchoring it to verified visual evidence. For each reasoning-oriented QA instance, PEARL first derive a perception checklist -- a set of perception-oriented sub-questions with verifiable answers that probe the model's understanding of key visual evidence. During training, auxiliary rollouts on this checklist yield a perceptual reward that both directly reinforces the model's perception ability and acts as a fidelity gate for reasoning. If the model passes the perception check, its policy update is biased towards evidence-anchored reasoning. Otherwise, the process is halted to prevent reasoning from flawed premises. PEARL can be seamlessly integrated with popular RL methods like GRPO and DAPO. Comprehensive experiments show PEARL achieves substantial gains on multimodal reasoning benchmarks, e.g., a +9.7% improvement over the baseline and +6.6% over GRPO on MathVerse.

While test-time scaling has enabled large language models to solve highly difficult tasks, state-of-the-art results come at exorbitant compute costs. These inefficiencies can be attributed to the miscalibration of post-trained language models, and the lack of calibration in popular sampling techniques. Here, we present Online Reasoning Calibration (ORCA), a framework for calibrating the sampling process that draws upon conformal prediction and test-time training. Specifically, we introduce a meta-learning procedure that updates the calibration module for each input. This allows us to provide valid confidence estimates under distributional shift, e.g. in thought patterns that occur across different stages of reasoning, or in prompt distributions between model development and deployment. ORCA not only provides theoretical guarantees on conformal risks, but also empirically shows higher efficiency and generalization across different reasoning tasks. At risk level δ=0.1, ORCA improves Qwen2.5-32B efficiency on in-distribution tasks with savings up to 47.5% with supervised labels and 40.7% with self-consistency labels. Under zero-shot out-of-domain settings, it improves MATH-500 savings from 24.8% of the static calibration baseline to 67.0% while maintaining a low empirical error rate, and the same trend holds across model families and downstream benchmarks. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/wzekai99/ORCA.

Strategic dialogue requires agents to execute distinct dialogue acts, for which belief estimation is essential. While prior work often estimates beliefs accurately, it lacks a principled mechanism to use those beliefs during generation. We bridge this gap by first formalizing two core acts Adversarial and Alignment, and by operationalizing them via probabilistic constraints on what an agent may generate. We instantiate this idea in BEDA, a framework that consists of the world set, the belief estimator for belief estimation, and the conditional generator that selects acts and realizes utterances consistent with the inferred beliefs. Across three settings, Conditional Keeper Burglar (CKBG, adversarial), Mutual Friends (MF, cooperative), and CaSiNo (negotiation), BEDA consistently outperforms strong baselines: on CKBG it improves success rate by at least 5.0 points across backbones and by 20.6 points with GPT-4.1-nano; on Mutual Friends it achieves an average improvement of 9.3 points; and on CaSiNo it achieves the optimal deal relative to all baselines. These results indicate that casting belief estimation as constraints provides a simple, general mechanism for reliable strategic dialogue.

In recent years, multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have made significant progress but continue to face inherent challenges in multimodal reasoning, which requires multi-level (e.g., perception, reasoning) and multi-granular (e.g., multi-step reasoning chain) advanced inferencing. Prior work on estimating model confidence tends to focus on the overall response for training and calibration, but fails to assess confidence in each reasoning step, leading to undesirable hallucination snowballing. In this work, we present MMBoundary, a novel framework that advances the knowledge boundary awareness of MLLMs through reasoning step confidence calibration. To achieve this, we propose to incorporate complementary textual and cross-modal self-rewarding signals to estimate confidence at each step of the MLLM reasoning process. In addition to supervised fine-tuning MLLM on this set of self-rewarded confidence estimation signal for initial confidence expression warm-up, we introduce a reinforcement learning stage with multiple reward functions for further aligning model knowledge and calibrating confidence at each reasoning step, enhancing reasoning chain self-correction. Empirical results show that MMBoundary significantly outperforms existing methods across diverse domain datasets and metrics, achieving an average of 7.5% reduction in multimodal confidence calibration errors and up to 8.3% improvement in task performance.

Large language models (LLMs) face issues in handling factual knowledge, making it vital to evaluate their true ability to understand facts. In this study, we introduce knowledge probing frameworks, BELIEF(-ICL), to evaluate the knowledge understanding ability of not only encoder-based PLMs but also decoder-based PLMs from diverse perspectives. BELIEFs utilize a multi-prompt dataset to evaluate PLM's accuracy, consistency, and reliability in factual knowledge understanding. To provide a more reliable evaluation with BELIEFs, we semi-automatically create MyriadLAMA, which has more diverse prompts than existing datasets. We validate the effectiveness of BELIEFs in correctly and comprehensively evaluating PLM's factual understanding ability through extensive evaluations. We further investigate key factors in learning facts in LLMs, and reveal the limitation of the prompt-based knowledge probing. The dataset is anonymously publicized.

Semi-supervised semantic segmentation has long turned on one question, which pseudo-labels to trust, and a generation of selection rules, dynamic thresholds, per-class curricula, soft confidence weights, answered it for the noisy, under-confident ResNet teachers of their day. Self-supervised foundation encoders change the regime: with a DINOv2 teacher, confidence saturates, so the filtering that helped a weak teacher can hurt a strong one. We propose CW-BASS v2, a saturation-aware pseudo-label selection method that reads the teacher's confidence regime rather than committing to one rule. It pairs held-out calibration, an unbiased per-class noise estimate, with a self-adaptive confidence floor that provably bounds retention away from 1, and combines them in a one-pass gate: measure the reliability of the teacher's confident set, pi_kept = Pr[correct | c >= tau], on a held-out slice, and filter strictly when it meets the confidence demanded (pi_kept >= tau), falling back to the adaptive floor otherwise. The boundary is the pre-existing operating threshold, not a value tuned to mIoU, and across six DINOv2 teachers it makes the correct strict-vs-floor call blind. CW-BASS v2 thus recovers the UniMatch V2 operating point on the saturated benchmarks by selecting strict (Pascal VOC 1/8 87.4 against its reported 87.9; Cityscapes within 0.5), and improves on it where the confident set is unreliable (pi_kept ~ 89%, ADE20K), where the floor edges ahead (+1.5 mIoU, single seed). The gate is principled because the failure it avoids is measured, not assumed: on a reliable, saturated teacher the confidence distribution's dynamic range collapses (98% of Pascal pixels >= 0.95), so an adaptive cutoff floods the retention mask and self-training decays into confirmation bias.

Long-horizon agentic tasks pose a fundamental credit assignment challenge for outcome-base reinforcement learning: trajectory-level rewards verify final correctness but provide limited guidance on which intermediate reasoning steps or tool interactions contribute to the outcome. The difficulty is especially pronounced in multi-turn search agents, where successful trajectories may contain misleading actions and failed trajectories may contain valuable evidence-gathering steps. We propose PBSD (Privileged Bayesian Self-Distillation), a Bayes-calibrated self-distillation method for fine-grained credit assignment under sparse final rewards. PBSD measures trajectory quality through the posterior-to-prior probability ratio of the verified answer and applies Bayes' rule to convert this hard-to-estimate answer-side ratio into a tractable likelihood ratio between a standard student model and a privileged answer-conditioned teacher model. Autoregressive decomposition of this Bayesian evidence score yields turn-level signals that identify whether each intermediate turn supports or undermines the verified outcome. Consequently, PBSD provides a principled and elegant reweighting scheme that transforms sparse outcome supervision into Bayes-calibrated turn-level credit signals, while remaining fully compatible with standard policy optimization. Experiments demonstrate that PBSD consistently enhances performance across both in-domain and out-of-domain settings, and effectively transfers knowledge from short-context training to long-context inference, suggesting that its fine-grained credit assignment mechanism facilitates more effective policy learning and yields improved generalization.

Social biases and belief-driven behaviors can significantly impact Large Language Models (LLMs) decisions on several tasks. As LLMs are increasingly used in multi-agent systems for societal simulations, their ability to model fundamental group psychological characteristics remains critical yet under-explored. In this study, we present a multi-agent framework that simulates belief congruence, a classical group psychology theory that plays a crucial role in shaping societal interactions and preferences. Our findings reveal that LLMs exhibit amplified belief congruence compared to humans, across diverse contexts. We further investigate the implications of this behavior on two downstream tasks: (1) misinformation dissemination and (2) LLM learning, finding that belief congruence in LLMs increases misinformation dissemination and impedes learning. To mitigate these negative impacts, we propose strategies inspired by: (1) contact hypothesis, (2) accuracy nudges, and (3) global citizenship framework. Our results show that the best strategies reduce misinformation dissemination by up to 37% and enhance learning by 11%. Bridging social psychology and AI, our work provides insights to navigate real-world interactions using LLMs while addressing belief-driven biases.