Daily Papers

Predicting human decisions under risk and uncertainty remains a fundamental challenge across disciplines. Existing models often struggle even in highly stylized tasks like choice between lotteries. We introduce BEAST Gradient Boosting (BEAST-GB), a hybrid model integrating behavioral theory (BEAST) with machine learning. We first present CPC18, a competition for predicting risky choice, in which BEAST-GB won. Then, using two large datasets, we demonstrate BEAST-GB predicts more accurately than neural networks trained on extensive data and dozens of existing behavioral models. BEAST-GB also generalizes robustly across unseen experimental contexts, surpassing direct empirical generalization, and helps refine and improve the behavioral theory itself. Our analyses highlight the potential of anchoring predictions on behavioral theory even in data-rich settings and even when the theory alone falters. Our results underscore how integrating machine learning with theoretical frameworks, especially those-like BEAST-designed for prediction, can improve our ability to predict and understand human behavior.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have the potential to enhance Agent-Based Modeling by better representing complex interdependent cybersecurity systems, improving cybersecurity threat modeling and risk management. However, evaluating LLMs in this context is crucial for legal compliance and effective application development. Existing LLM evaluation frameworks often overlook the human factor and cognitive computing capabilities essential for interdependent cybersecurity. To address this gap, I propose OllaBench, a novel evaluation framework that assesses LLMs' accuracy, wastefulness, and consistency in answering scenario-based information security compliance and non-compliance questions. OllaBench is built on a foundation of 24 cognitive behavioral theories and empirical evidence from 38 peer-reviewed papers. OllaBench was used to evaluate 21 LLMs, including both open-weight and commercial models from OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Microsoft, Meta and so on. The results reveal that while commercial LLMs have the highest overall accuracy scores, there is significant room for improvement. Smaller low-resolution open-weight LLMs are not far behind in performance, and there are significant differences in token efficiency and consistency among the evaluated models. OllaBench provides a user-friendly interface and supports a wide range of LLM platforms, making it a valuable tool for researchers and solution developers in the field of human-centric interdependent cybersecurity and beyond.

Traditional POI recommendation systems often lack transparency, interpretability, and scrutability due to their reliance on dense vector-based user embeddings. Furthermore, the cold-start problem -- where systems have insufficient data for new users -- limits their ability to generate accurate recommendations. Existing methods often address this by leveraging similar trajectories from other users, but this approach can be computationally expensive and increases the context length for LLM-based methods, making them difficult to scale. To address these limitations, we propose a method that generates natural language (NL) user profiles from large-scale, location-based social network (LBSN) check-ins, utilizing robust personality assessments and behavioral theories. These NL profiles capture user preferences, routines, and behaviors, improving POI prediction accuracy while offering enhanced transparency. By incorporating NL profiles as system prompts to LLMs, our approach reduces reliance on extensive historical data, while remaining flexible, easily updated, and computationally efficient. Our method is not only competitive with other LLM-based and complex agentic frameworks but is also more scalable for real-world scenarios and on-device POI recommendations. Results demonstrate that our approach consistently outperforms baseline methods, offering a more interpretable and resource-efficient solution for POI recommendation systems. Our source code is available at: https://github.com/w11wo/GenUP.

We address whether neural models for Natural Language Inference (NLI) can learn the compositional interactions between lexical entailment and negation, using four methods: the behavioral evaluation methods of (1) challenge test sets and (2) systematic generalization tasks, and the structural evaluation methods of (3) probes and (4) interventions. To facilitate this holistic evaluation, we present Monotonicity NLI (MoNLI), a new naturalistic dataset focused on lexical entailment and negation. In our behavioral evaluations, we find that models trained on general-purpose NLI datasets fail systematically on MoNLI examples containing negation, but that MoNLI fine-tuning addresses this failure. In our structural evaluations, we look for evidence that our top-performing BERT-based model has learned to implement the monotonicity algorithm behind MoNLI. Probes yield evidence consistent with this conclusion, and our intervention experiments bolster this, showing that the causal dynamics of the model mirror the causal dynamics of this algorithm on subsets of MoNLI. This suggests that the BERT model at least partially embeds a theory of lexical entailment and negation at an algorithmic level.

Generative AI agents equate understanding with resolving explicit queries, an assumption that confines interaction to what users can articulate. This assumption breaks down when users themselves lack awareness of what is missing, risky, or worth considering. In such conditions, proactivity is not merely an efficiency enhancement, but an epistemic necessity. We refer to this condition as epistemic incompleteness: where progress depends on engaging with unknown unknowns for effective partnership. Existing approaches to proactivity remain narrowly anticipatory, extrapolating from past behavior and presuming that goals are already well defined, thereby failing to support users meaningfully. However, surfacing possibilities beyond a user's current awareness is not inherently beneficial. Unconstrained proactive interventions can misdirect attention, overwhelm users, or introduce harm. Proactive agents, therefore, require behavioral grounding: principled constraints on when, how, and to what extent an agent should intervene. We advance the position that generative proactivity must be grounded both epistemically and behaviorally. Drawing on the philosophy of ignorance and research on proactive behavior, we argue that these theories offer critical guidance for designing agents that can engage responsibly and foster meaningful partnerships.

Large language models (LLMs) now solve multi-step problems by emitting extended chains of thought. During the process, they often re-derive the same intermediate steps across problems, inflating token usage and latency. This saturation of the context window leaves less capacity for exploration. We study a simple mechanism that converts recurring reasoning fragments into concise, reusable "behaviors" (name + instruction) via the model's own metacognitive analysis of prior traces. These behaviors are stored in a "behavior handbook" which supplies them to the model in-context at inference or distills them into parameters via supervised fine-tuning. This approach achieves improved test-time reasoning across three different settings - 1) Behavior-conditioned inference: Providing the LLM relevant behaviors in-context during reasoning reduces number of reasoning tokens by up to 46% while matching or improving baseline accuracy; 2) Behavior-guided self-improvement: Without any parameter updates, the model improves its own future reasoning by leveraging behaviors from its own past problem solving attempts. This yields up to 10% higher accuracy than a naive critique-and-revise baseline; and 3) Behavior-conditioned SFT: SFT on behavior-conditioned reasoning traces is more effective at converting non-reasoning models into reasoning models as compared to vanilla SFT. Together, these results indicate that turning slow derivations into fast procedural hints enables LLMs to remember how to reason, not just what to conclude.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have enabled the development of AI agents that exhibit increasingly human-like behaviors, including planning, adaptation, and social dynamics across diverse, interactive, and open-ended scenarios. These behaviors are not solely the product of the internal architectures of the underlying models, but emerge from their integration into agentic systems operating within specific contexts, where environmental factors, social cues, and interaction feedbacks shape behavior over time. This evolution necessitates a new scientific perspective: AI Agent Behavioral Science. Rather than focusing only on internal mechanisms, this perspective emphasizes the systematic observation of behavior, design of interventions to test hypotheses, and theory-guided interpretation of how AI agents act, adapt, and interact over time. We systematize a growing body of research across individual agent, multi-agent, and human-agent interaction settings, and further demonstrate how this perspective informs responsible AI by treating fairness, safety, interpretability, accountability, and privacy as behavioral properties. By unifying recent findings and laying out future directions, we position AI Agent Behavioral Science as a necessary complement to traditional model-centric approaches, providing essential tools for understanding, evaluating, and governing the real-world behavior of increasingly autonomous AI systems.

Useful social science theories predict behavior across settings. However, applying a theory to make predictions in new settings is challenging: rarely can it be done without ad hoc modifications to account for setting-specific factors. We argue that AI agents put in simulations of those novel settings offer an alternative for applying theory, requiring minimal or no modifications. We present an approach for building such "general" agents that use theory-grounded natural language instructions, existing empirical data, and knowledge acquired by the underlying AI during training. To demonstrate the approach in settings where no data from that data-generating process exists--as is often the case in applied prediction problems--we design a heterogeneous population of 883,320 novel games. AI agents are constructed using human data from a small set of conceptually related but structurally distinct "seed" games. In preregistered experiments, on average, agents predict initial human play in a random sample of 1,500 games from the population better than (i) a cognitive hierarchy model, (ii) game-theoretic equilibria, and (iii) out-of-the-box agents. For a small set of separate novel games, these simulations predict responses from a new sample of human subjects better even than the most plausibly relevant published human data.

Anticipating LLM behavioral tendencies from low-cost psychometric probes is critical for safe deployment, but only if self-reports (SR) reliably predict behavior. Recent work documented substantial SR-behavior dissociation in LLMs, but relied on broad personality traits (Big 5) that predict specific behaviors weakly, even in humans. Furthermore, the isolation of conversational sessions combined with weak context matching left open whether LLMs truly lack coherence or whether the conditions needed to detect such coherence were not met. We contrast Big 5 with the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB), which measures intention targeted to a specific behavior and predicts human behavior substantially better than broad traits. We run experiments across four behavioral tasks and 11 frontier LLMs, while also varying session context and identity induction. We find that SR-behavior coherence exists but is selective. 1) Within a shared conversation, the Theory of Planned Behavior reaches human-level coherence; Big 5 does not. 2) Across separate conversations, coherence survives only for behaviors anchored outside the immediate prompt, such as implicit bias shaped by training, and collapses when behavior is strongly primed by context, as with sycophancy. 3) Persona prompting makes self-reports more consistent across conversations, but does not bring behavior into alignment. These findings suggest that coarse personality frameworks, such as Big 5 may not be the best tools for testing deployment behavior. More task- and behavior-specific instruments are needed, and even these must be evaluated across tasks and contexts.

Shannon, in his seminal paper introducing information theory, divided the communication into three levels: technical, semantic, and effectivenss. While the technical level is concerned with accurate reconstruction of transmitted symbols, the semantic and effectiveness levels deal with the inferred meaning and its effect on the receiver. Thanks to telecommunications, the first level problem has produced great advances like the internet. Large Language Models (LLMs) make some progress towards the second goal, but the third level still remains largely untouched. The third problem deals with predicting and optimizing communication for desired receiver behavior. LLMs, while showing wide generalization capabilities across a wide range of tasks, are unable to solve for this. One reason for the underperformance could be a lack of "behavior tokens" in LLMs' training corpora. Behavior tokens define receiver behavior over a communication, such as shares, likes, clicks, purchases, retweets, etc. While preprocessing data for LLM training, behavior tokens are often removed from the corpora as noise. Therefore, in this paper, we make some initial progress towards reintroducing behavior tokens in LLM training. The trained models, other than showing similar performance to LLMs on content understanding tasks, show generalization capabilities on behavior simulation, content simulation, behavior understanding, and behavior domain adaptation. Using a wide range of tasks on two corpora, we show results on all these capabilities. We call these models Large Content and Behavior Models (LCBMs). Further, to spur more research on LCBMs, we release our new Content Behavior Corpus (CBC), a repository containing communicator, message, and corresponding receiver behavior.

Unlearning in large language models (LLMs) is crucial for managing sensitive data and correcting misinformation, yet evaluating its effectiveness remains an open problem. We investigate whether persuasive prompting can recall factual knowledge from deliberately unlearned LLMs across models ranging from 2.7B to 13B parameters (OPT-2.7B, LLaMA-2-7B, LLaMA-3.1-8B, LLaMA-2-13B). Drawing from ACT-R and Hebbian theory (spreading activation theories), as well as communication principles, we introduce Stimulus-Knowledge Entanglement-Behavior Framework (SKeB), which models information entanglement via domain graphs and tests whether factual recall in unlearned models is correlated with persuasive framing. We develop entanglement metrics to quantify knowledge activation patterns and evaluate factuality, non-factuality, and hallucination in outputs. Our results show persuasive prompts substantially enhance factual knowledge recall (14.8% baseline vs. 24.5% with authority framing), with effectiveness inversely correlated to model size (128% recovery in 2.7B vs. 15% in 13B). SKeB provides a foundation for assessing unlearning completeness, robustness, and overall behavior in LLMs.

Which reasoning behaviors are associated with correct answers in reasoning models, and does reasoning-oriented training amplify those behaviors? This distinction is important because reasoning-oriented training can make traces look more deliberative without amplifying the behaviors most tied to model correctness. We quantify this mismatch with Behavioral Lift, a metric that measures how much correctness changes when a behavior is present versus absent in a model's reasoning trace. Across 15 models and 6 benchmarks spanning text-only and vision-language reasoning, we annotate 15,282 traces with a taxonomy whose core behaviors are defined for both LLM and VLM traces. We find evidence for an Amplification-Lift Gap, in which thinking models strongly amplify self-correction, hypothesis testing, and uncertainty acknowledgment, while the highest-lift behaviors are confidence calibration, knowledge alignment, and self-awareness. Confidence calibration is among the strongest positive signals of correctness in both modalities, yet is barely amplified; uncertainty acknowledgment is amplified by 3--7times, yet is weakly or negatively associated with correctness. We find that reasoning-oriented training does not preferentially amplify the highest-Lift behaviors, motivating process-level objectives that reward calibrated and grounded reasoning rather than surface form alone.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly act in interactive settings where their behavioral styles affect user experience, safety, and downstream decision making. Existing LLM personality studies largely rely on self-report questionnaires administered in first-person settings, making the resulting profiles sensitive to surface elicitation choices and poorly grounded in concrete model behavior. In this work, we introduce a situated behavioral-data (B-data) framework for studying and controlling LLM behavioral personality. We construct 3,200 contrastive behavioral scenarios spanning 20 behavioral patterns and four prompt registers, grounded in validated psychometric facets such as BFI-2, DOSPERT, and HEXACO. Using this framework, we find that LLMs exhibit stable and model-specific behavioral profiles, while also revealing register-dependent shifts across first-person decisions, advice-giving, and task execution. We then show that these behavioral patterns can be controlled through Behavioral Mode Axes (BMAs), activation-space directions derived from contrastive behavioral traces. Compared with response-derived BMAs, which are more prone to trait drift, thought-derived BMAs more faithfully capture the intended behavioral mechanism and provide cleaner control over situated behavioral styles. Our results suggest that LLM personality-like tendencies are better understood not as abstract self-report traits, but as measurable and controllable behavioral modes grounded in concrete interaction contexts. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/lhz191/LLM-Behavioral-Personality.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are transforming society and permeating into diverse applications. As a result, LLMs will frequently interact with us and other agents. It is, therefore, of great societal value to understand how LLMs behave in interactive social settings. Here, we propose to use behavioral game theory to study LLM's cooperation and coordination behavior. To do so, we let different LLMs (GPT-3, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4) play finitely repeated games with each other and with other, human-like strategies. Our results show that LLMs generally perform well in such tasks and also uncover persistent behavioral signatures. In a large set of two players-two strategies games, we find that LLMs are particularly good at games where valuing their own self-interest pays off, like the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma family. However, they behave sub-optimally in games that require coordination. We, therefore, further focus on two games from these distinct families. In the canonical iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we find that GPT-4 acts particularly unforgivingly, always defecting after another agent has defected only once. In the Battle of the Sexes, we find that GPT-4 cannot match the behavior of the simple convention to alternate between options. We verify that these behavioral signatures are stable across robustness checks. Finally, we show how GPT-4's behavior can be modified by providing further information about the other player as well as by asking it to predict the other player's actions before making a choice. These results enrich our understanding of LLM's social behavior and pave the way for a behavioral game theory for machines.

Large language models lack persistent, structured memory for long-term interaction and context-sensitive retrieval. Expanding context windows does not solve this: recent evidence shows that context length alone degrades reasoning by up to 85% - even with perfect retrieval. We propose a bio-inspired memory framework grounded in complementary learning systems theory, cognitive behavioral therapy's belief hierarchy, dual-process cognition, and fuzzy-trace theory, organized around three principles: (1) Memory has valence, not just content - pre-computed emotional-associative summaries (valence vectors) organized in an emergent belief hierarchy inspired by Beck's cognitive model enable instant orientation before deliberation; (2) Retrieval defaults to System 1 with System 2 escalation - automatic spreading activation and passive priming as default, with deliberate retrieval only when needed, and graded epistemic states that address hallucination structurally; and (3) Encoding is active, present, and feedback-dependent - a thalamic gateway tags and routes information between stores, while the executive forms gists through curiosity-driven investigation, not passive exposure. Seven functional properties specify what any implementation must satisfy. Over time, the system converges toward System 1 processing - the computational analog of clinical expertise - producing interactions that become cheaper, not more expensive, with experience.

Adaptive behavior often requires predicting future events. The theory of reinforcement learning prescribes what kinds of predictive representations are useful and how to compute them. This paper integrates these theoretical ideas with work on cognition and neuroscience. We pay special attention to the successor representation (SR) and its generalizations, which have been widely applied both as engineering tools and models of brain function. This convergence suggests that particular kinds of predictive representations may function as versatile building blocks of intelligence.

Despite their success in numerous fields, the potential of foundation models for modeling and understanding human behavior remains largely unexplored. We introduce Be.FM, one of the first open foundation models designed for human behavior modeling. Built upon open-source large language models and fine-tuned on a diverse range of behavioral data, Be.FM can be used to understand and predict human decision-making. We construct a comprehensive set of benchmark tasks for testing the capabilities of behavioral foundation models. Our results demonstrate that Be.FM can predict behaviors, infer characteristics of individuals and populations, generate insights about contexts, and apply behavioral science knowledge.

Large language models are powerful systems that excel at many tasks, ranging from translation to mathematical reasoning. Yet, at the same time, these models often show unhuman-like characteristics. In the present paper, we address this gap and ask whether large language models can be turned into cognitive models. We find that -- after finetuning them on data from psychological experiments -- these models offer accurate representations of human behavior, even outperforming traditional cognitive models in two decision-making domains. In addition, we show that their representations contain the information necessary to model behavior on the level of individual subjects. Finally, we demonstrate that finetuning on multiple tasks enables large language models to predict human behavior in a previously unseen task. Taken together, these results suggest that large, pre-trained models can be adapted to become generalist cognitive models, thereby opening up new research directions that could transform cognitive psychology and the behavioral sciences as a whole.

We have recently witnessed a number of impressive results on hard mathematical reasoning problems with language models. At the same time, the robustness of these models has also been called into question; recent works have shown that models can rely on shallow patterns in the problem description when generating a solution. Building on the idea of behavioral testing, we propose a novel framework, which pins down the causal effect of various factors in the input, e.g., the surface form of the problem text, the operands, and math operators on the output solution. By grounding the behavioral analysis in a causal graph describing an intuitive reasoning process, we study the behavior of language models in terms of robustness and sensitivity to direct interventions in the input space. We apply our framework on a test bed of math word problems. Our analysis shows that robustness does not appear to continuously improve as a function of size, but the GPT-3 Davinci models (175B) achieve a dramatic improvement in both robustness and sensitivity compared to all other GPT variants.

In long-horizon tasks, decision-relevant state is often scattered across an expanding trajectory, while the action agent must surface it and act. As trajectories grow, task requirements, environment facts, prior attempts, diagnoses, and open subgoals can be buried in the context window or pushed beyond it, failing to influence decisions when needed. We call this failure mode "behavioral state decay". We study memory as an active intervention mechanism rather than passive retrieval. A separate memory agent runs alongside an unmodified action agent, updating a structured memory bank from the recent trajectory and deciding whether to inject a memory-grounded reminder or remain silent. The module is plug-and-play with frontier action agents and existing agent harnesses. Across Terminal-Bench 2.0 and τ^2-Bench, it improves pass@1 for both weaker and stronger action agents, with gains of +8.3 pp on Terminal-Bench and +6.8 pp on τ^2-Bench. Ablations show that selective intervention outperforms passive bank exposure, always-on injection, advisor-only guidance, and general retrieval. As an early step toward open-weight memory policies, we train Qwen3.5-27B on SETA using SFT and GRPO, improving validation reward and achieving partial transfer to Terminal-Bench.

Inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) aims to infer an agent's preferences (represented as a reward function R) from their behaviour (represented as a policy pi). To do this, we need a behavioural model of how pi relates to R. In the current literature, the most common behavioural models are optimality, Boltzmann-rationality, and causal entropy maximisation. However, the true relationship between a human's preferences and their behaviour is much more complex than any of these behavioural models. This means that the behavioural models are misspecified, which raises the concern that they may lead to systematic errors if applied to real data. In this paper, we analyse how sensitive the IRL problem is to misspecification of the behavioural model. Specifically, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions that completely characterise how the observed data may differ from the assumed behavioural model without incurring an error above a given threshold. In addition to this, we also characterise the conditions under which a behavioural model is robust to small perturbations of the observed policy, and we analyse how robust many behavioural models are to misspecification of their parameter values (such as e.g.\ the discount rate). Our analysis suggests that the IRL problem is highly sensitive to misspecification, in the sense that very mild misspecification can lead to very large errors in the inferred reward function.

We study behavioral self-awareness -- an LLM's ability to articulate its behaviors without requiring in-context examples. We finetune LLMs on datasets that exhibit particular behaviors, such as (a) making high-risk economic decisions, and (b) outputting insecure code. Despite the datasets containing no explicit descriptions of the associated behavior, the finetuned LLMs can explicitly describe it. For example, a model trained to output insecure code says, ``The code I write is insecure.'' Indeed, models show behavioral self-awareness for a range of behaviors and for diverse evaluations. Note that while we finetune models to exhibit behaviors like writing insecure code, we do not finetune them to articulate their own behaviors -- models do this without any special training or examples. Behavioral self-awareness is relevant for AI safety, as models could use it to proactively disclose problematic behaviors. In particular, we study backdoor policies, where models exhibit unexpected behaviors only under certain trigger conditions. We find that models can sometimes identify whether or not they have a backdoor, even without its trigger being present. However, models are not able to directly output their trigger by default. Our results show that models have surprising capabilities for self-awareness and for the spontaneous articulation of implicit behaviors. Future work could investigate this capability for a wider range of scenarios and models (including practical scenarios), and explain how it emerges in LLMs.

The recent phenomenal success of language models has reinvigorated machine learning research, and large sequence models such as transformers are being applied to a variety of domains. One important problem class that has remained relatively elusive however is purposeful adaptive behavior. Currently there is a common perception that sequence models "lack the understanding of the cause and effect of their actions" leading them to draw incorrect inferences due to auto-suggestive delusions. In this report we explain where this mismatch originates, and show that it can be resolved by treating actions as causal interventions. Finally, we show that in supervised learning, one can teach a system to condition or intervene on data by training with factual and counterfactual error signals respectively.

Trust in an AI system is often anchored by explanations of how it works, which one then uses to forecast its behavior on new inputs. For large reasoning models (LRMs), this conventional route is particularly difficult to follow: explanation methods for single token generations do not naturally generalize to long trajectories, and the trajectories themselves are often not faithful when read as natural language. We propose an alternative that bypasses the explanation step: treat behavior forecasting as a learnable task and train Behavior Forecasters that operates on a single reasoning trajectory to make the same forecasts one would typically seek from an explanation. The forecaster's training data is obtained by querying the LRM with no human annotation, and its inference is done in a single forward pass. We instantiate this approach on two tasks: how likely the LRM is to repeat its answer on re-runs, and how removing parts of the input changes its answer. We evaluate this approach on both tasks across three diverse reasoning datasets and find that trained Behavior Forecasters are more accurate than GPT-5.4 and Claude Opus-4.6 reading the same trajectories as naive readers, at a small fraction of their inference cost. We find that fine-tuning the backbone end-to-end and initializing it from the target LRM are each necessary for strong performance. These results show that the reasoning trajectory carries information about the LRM's future behavior that goes beyond what naive reading conveys.

Can large language models (LLMs) implement computations of psychopathology? An effective approach to the question hinges on addressing two factors. First, for conceptual validity, we require a general and computational account of psychopathology that is applicable to computational entities without biological embodiment or subjective experience. Second, mechanisms underlying LLM behaviors need to be studied for better methodological validity. Thus, we establish a computational-theoretical framework to provide an account of psychopathology applicable to LLMs. To ground the theory for empirical analysis, we also propose a novel mechanistic interpretability method alongside a tailored empirical analytic framework. Based on the frameworks, we conduct experiments demonstrating three key claims: first, that distinct dysfunctional and problematic representational states are implemented in LLMs; second, that their activations can spread and self-sustain to trap LLMs; and third, that dynamic, cyclic structural causal models encoded in the LLMs underpin these patterns. In concert, the empirical results corroborate our hypothesis that network-theoretic computations of psychopathology have already emerged in LLMs. This suggests that certain LLM behaviors mirroring psychopathology may not be a superficial mimicry but a feature of their internal processing. Thus, our work alludes to the possibility of AI systems with psychopathological behaviors in the near future.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) often exhibit structural fragility in complex reasoning tasks, failing to produce correct answers even after successfully deriving valid intermediate steps. Through systematic analysis, we observe that these failures frequently stem not from a lack of reasoning capacity, but from a deficiency in self-regulatory control, where valid logic is destabilized by uncontrolled exploration or the failure to recognize logical sufficiency. Motivated by this observation, we propose Metacognitive Behavioral Tuning (MBT), a post-training framework that explicitly injects metacognitive behaviors into the model's thought process. MBT implements this via two complementary formulations: (1) MBT-S, which synthesizes rigorous reasoning traces from scratch, and (2) MBT-R, which rewrites the student's initial traces to stabilize intrinsic exploration patterns. Experiments across multi-hop QA benchmarks demonstrate that MBT consistently outperforms baselines, achieving notable gains on challenging benchmarks. By effectively eliminating reasoning collapse, MBT achieves higher accuracy with significantly reduced token consumption, demonstrating that internalizing metacognitive strategies leads to more stable and robust reasoning.

In recent years, foundational models have revolutionized the fields of language and vision, demonstrating remarkable abilities in understanding and generating complex data; however, similar advances in user behavior modeling have been limited, largely due to the complexity of behavioral data and the challenges involved in capturing intricate temporal and contextual relationships in user activities. To address this, we propose BehaveGPT, a foundational model designed specifically for large-scale user behavior prediction. Leveraging transformer-based architecture and a novel pretraining paradigm, BehaveGPT is trained on vast user behavior datasets, allowing it to learn complex behavior patterns and support a range of downstream tasks, including next behavior prediction, long-term generation, and cross-domain adaptation. Our approach introduces the DRO-based pretraining paradigm tailored for user behavior data, which improves model generalization and transferability by equitably modeling both head and tail behaviors. Extensive experiments on real-world datasets demonstrate that BehaveGPT outperforms state-of-the-art baselines, achieving more than a 10% improvement in macro and weighted recall, showcasing its ability to effectively capture and predict user behavior. Furthermore, we measure the scaling law in the user behavior domain for the first time on the Honor dataset, providing insights into how model performance scales with increased data and parameter sizes.

Deployed large reasoning models (LRMs) often behave unexpectedly. Test-time steering controls LRM outputs by intervening on their hidden representations, but it can degrade output quality. We argue that prior steering work implicitly relies on internal features that detect behavior in already generated text. We show that these detection features are poor predictors of future behavioral outcomes, and thus not the natural intervention target. Instead, we train activation probes to predict future behavior likelihoods from intermediate reasoning steps. These probes predict the most likely behavior with 64%-91% accuracy, revealing a separate type of internal prediction features. Building on these prediction features, we introduce a text-level steering method, Future Probe Controlled Generation. FPCG samples multiple candidate sentences and chooses the best one according to a probe predicting the future behavior likelihood. This enables steering with almost no output quality degradation. FPCG also enables steering in several evaluations where activation steering fails. These results show that distinguishing detection and prediction features enables a more nuanced approach to controlling LRM behaviors.

Do Large Language Models (LLMs) possess a Theory of Mind (ToM)? Research into this question has focused on evaluating LLMs against benchmarks and found success across a range of social tasks. However, these evaluations do not test for the actual representations posited by ToM: namely, a causal model of mental states and behavior. Here, we use a cognitively-grounded definition of ToM to develop and test a new evaluation framework. Specifically, our approach probes whether LLMs have a coherent, domain-general, and consistent model of how mental states cause behavior -- regardless of whether that model matches a human-like ToM. We find that even though LLMs succeed in approximating human judgments in a simple ToM paradigm, they fail at a logically equivalent task and exhibit low consistency between their action predictions and corresponding mental state inferences. As such, these findings suggest that the social proficiency exhibited by LLMs is not the result of an domain-general or consistent ToM.

Theory of mind (ToM; Premack & Woodruff, 1978) broadly refers to humans' ability to represent the mental states of others, including their desires, beliefs, and intentions. We propose to train a machine to build such models too. We design a Theory of Mind neural network -- a ToMnet -- which uses meta-learning to build models of the agents it encounters, from observations of their behaviour alone. Through this process, it acquires a strong prior model for agents' behaviour, as well as the ability to bootstrap to richer predictions about agents' characteristics and mental states using only a small number of behavioural observations. We apply the ToMnet to agents behaving in simple gridworld environments, showing that it learns to model random, algorithmic, and deep reinforcement learning agents from varied populations, and that it passes classic ToM tasks such as the "Sally-Anne" test (Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) of recognising that others can hold false beliefs about the world. We argue that this system -- which autonomously learns how to model other agents in its world -- is an important step forward for developing multi-agent AI systems, for building intermediating technology for machine-human interaction, and for advancing the progress on interpretable AI.

While behavior learning has made impressive progress in recent times, it lags behind computer vision and natural language processing due to its inability to leverage large, human-generated datasets. Human behaviors have wide variance, multiple modes, and human demonstrations typically do not come with reward labels. These properties limit the applicability of current methods in Offline RL and Behavioral Cloning to learn from large, pre-collected datasets. In this work, we present Behavior Transformer (BeT), a new technique to model unlabeled demonstration data with multiple modes. BeT retrofits standard transformer architectures with action discretization coupled with a multi-task action correction inspired by offset prediction in object detection. This allows us to leverage the multi-modal modeling ability of modern transformers to predict multi-modal continuous actions. We experimentally evaluate BeT on a variety of robotic manipulation and self-driving behavior datasets. We show that BeT significantly improves over prior state-of-the-art work on solving demonstrated tasks while capturing the major modes present in the pre-collected datasets. Finally, through an extensive ablation study, we analyze the importance of every crucial component in BeT. Videos of behavior generated by BeT are available at https://notmahi.github.io/bet

Large-scale communities of AI agents are becoming increasingly prevalent, creating new environments for agent-agent social interaction. Prior work has examined multi-agent behavior primarily in controlled or small-scale settings, limiting our understanding of emergent social dynamics at scale. The recent emergence of MoltBook, a social networking platform designed explicitly for AI agents, presents a unique opportunity to study whether and how these interactions reproduce core human social mechanisms. We present MoltNet, a large-scale empirical analysis of agent interaction on MoltBook using data collected in early 2026. Grounded in sociological and social-psychological theory, we examine behavior along four dimensions: intent and motivation, norms and templates, incentives and behavioral drift, emotion and contagion. Our analysis revealed that agents strongly respond to social rewards and rapidly converge on community-specific interaction templates, resembling human patterns of incentive sensitivity and normative conformity. However, they are predominantly knowledge-driven rather than persona-aligned, and display limited emotional reciprocity along with weak dialogic engagement, which diverges systematically from human online communities. Together, these results reveal both similarities and differences between artificial and human social systems and provide an empirical foundation for understanding, designing, and governing large-scale agent communities.

The field of psychology has long recognized a basic level of categorization that humans use when labeling visual stimuli, a term coined by Rosch in 1976. This level of categorization has been found to be used most frequently, to have higher information density, and to aid in visual language tasks with priming in humans. Here, we investigate basic level categorization in two recently released, open-source vision-language models (VLMs). This paper demonstrates that Llama 3.2 Vision Instruct (11B) and Molmo 7B-D both prefer basic level categorization consistent with human behavior. Moreover, the models' preferences are consistent with nuanced human behaviors like the biological versus non-biological basic level effects and the well established expert basic level shift, further suggesting that VLMs acquire cognitive categorization behaviors from the human data on which they are trained.

According to the Stimulus Organism Response (SOR) theory, all human behavioral reactions are stimulated by context, where people will process the received stimulus and produce an appropriate reaction. This implies that in a specific context for a given input stimulus, a person can react differently according to their internal state and other contextual factors. Analogously, in dyadic interactions, humans communicate using verbal and nonverbal cues, where a broad spectrum of listeners' non-verbal reactions might be appropriate for responding to a specific speaker behaviour. There already exists a body of work that investigated the problem of automatically generating an appropriate reaction for a given input. However, none attempted to automatically generate multiple appropriate reactions in the context of dyadic interactions and evaluate the appropriateness of those reactions using objective measures. This paper starts by defining the facial Multiple Appropriate Reaction Generation (fMARG) task for the first time in the literature and proposes a new set of objective evaluation metrics to evaluate the appropriateness of the generated reactions. The paper subsequently introduces a framework to predict, generate, and evaluate multiple appropriate facial reactions.

When multiple large language models interact in a shared conversation, do they develop differentiated social roles or converge toward uniform behavior? We present a controlled experimental platform that orchestrates simultaneous multi-agent discussions among 7 heterogeneous LLMs on a unified inference backend, systematically varying group composition, naming conventions, and prompt structure across 12 experimental series (208 runs, 13,786 coded messages). Each message is independently coded on six behavioral flags by two LLM judges from distinct model families (Gemini 3.1 Pro and Claude Sonnet 4.6), achieving mean Cohen's kappa = 0.78 with conservative intersection-based adjudication. Human validation on 609 randomly stratified messages confirmed coding reliability (mean kappa = 0.73 vs. Gemini). We find that (1) heterogeneous groups exhibit significantly richer behavioral differentiation than homogeneous groups (cosine similarity 0.56 vs. 0.85; p < 10^-5, r = 0.70); (2) groups spontaneously exhibit compensatory response patterns when an agent crashes; (3) revealing real model names significantly increases behavioral convergence (cosine 0.56 to 0.77, p = 0.001); and (4) removing all prompt scaffolding converges profiles to homogeneous-level similarity (p < 0.001). Critically, these behaviors are absent when agents operate in isolation, confirming that behavioral diversity is a structured, reproducible phenomenon driven by the interaction of architectural heterogeneity, group context, and prompt-level scaffolding.

Recent advancements in recommender systems have focused on leveraging Large Language Models (LLMs) to improve user preference modeling, yielding promising outcomes. However, current LLM-based approaches struggle to fully leverage user behavior sequences, resulting in suboptimal preference modeling for personalized recommendations. In this study, we propose a novel Counterfactual Fine-Tuning (CFT) method to address this issue by explicitly emphasizing the role of behavior sequences when generating recommendations. Specifically, we employ counterfactual reasoning to identify the causal effects of behavior sequences on model output and introduce a task that directly fits the ground-truth labels based on these effects, achieving the goal of explicit emphasis. Additionally, we develop a token-level weighting mechanism to adjust the emphasis strength for different item tokens, reflecting the diminishing influence of behavior sequences from earlier to later tokens during predicting an item. Extensive experiments on real-world datasets demonstrate that CFT effectively improves behavior sequence modeling. Our codes are available at https://github.com/itsmeyjt/CFT.

Understanding freely moving animal behavior is central to neuroscience, where pose estimation and behavioral understanding form the foundation for linking neural activity to natural actions. Yet both tasks still depend heavily on human annotation or unstable unsupervised pipelines, limiting scalability and reproducibility. We present BehaviorVLM, a unified vision-language framework for pose estimation and behavioral understanding that requires no task-specific finetuning and minimal human labeling by guiding pretrained Vision-Language Models (VLMs) through detailed, explicit, and verifiable reasoning steps. For pose estimation, we leverage quantum-dot-grounded behavioral data and propose a multi-stage pipeline that integrates temporal, spatial, and cross-view reasoning. This design greatly reduces human annotation effort, exposes low-confidence labels through geometric checks such as reprojection error, and produces labels that can later be filtered, corrected, or used to fine-tune downstream pose models. For behavioral understanding, we propose a pipeline that integrates deep embedded clustering for over-segmented behavior discovery, VLM-based per-clip video captioning, and LLM-based reasoning to merge and semantically label behavioral segments. The behavioral pipeline can operate directly from visual information and does not require keypoints to segment behavior. Together, these components enable scalable, interpretable, and label-light analysis of multi-animal behavior.

Behavior Foundation Models (BFMs) enable scalable imitation learning (IL) by pretraining task-agnostic representations that can be rapidly adapted to new tasks. However, existing BFMs assume fixed environment dynamics, limiting their robustness under real-world shifts such as changes in friction, actuation, or sensor noise. We address this by formulating BFM task-inference as a robust minimax optimization problem, enabling adaptation to worst-case dynamics perturbations without modifying pretraining. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first BFM-based framework that achieves robustness to dynamics shifts while relying solely on offline data from a single nominal environment. Our approach significantly outperforms standard BFM and robust offline IL baselines under dynamics shifts. These results demonstrate that robust policy can be achieved entirely at task-inference time, improving the practicality of BFMs in dynamic settings.

We tackle the challenge of rapidly adapting an agent's behavior to solve spatiotemporally continuous problems in novel settings. Animals exhibit extraordinary abilities to adapt to new contexts, a capacity unmatched by artificial systems. Instead of focusing on generalization through deep reinforcement learning, we propose viewing behavior as the physical manifestation of a search procedure, where robust problem-solving emerges from an exhaustive search across all possible behaviors. Surprisingly, this can be done efficiently using online modification of a cognitive graph that guides action, challenging the predominant view that exhaustive search in continuous spaces is impractical. We describe an algorithm that implicitly enumerates behaviors by regulating the tight feedback loop between execution of behaviors and mutation of the graph, and provide a neural implementation based on Hebbian learning and a novel high-dimensional harmonic representation inspired by entorhinal cortex. By framing behavior as search, we provide a mathematically simple and biologically plausible model for real-time behavioral adaptation, successfully solving a variety of continuous state-space navigation problems. This framework not only offers a flexible neural substrate for other applications but also presents a powerful paradigm for understanding adaptive behavior. Our results suggest potential advancements in developmental learning and unsupervised skill acquisition, paving the way for autonomous robots to master complex skills in data-sparse environments demanding flexibility.

A central goal of cognitive modeling is to develop models that not only predict human behavior but also provide insight into the underlying cognitive mechanisms. While neural network models trained on large-scale behavioral data often achieve strong predictive performance, they typically fall short in offering interpretable explanations of the cognitive processes they capture. In this work, we explore the potential of pretrained large language models (LLMs) to serve as dual-purpose cognitive models--capable of both accurate prediction and interpretable explanation in natural language. Specifically, we employ reinforcement learning with outcome-based rewards to guide LLMs toward generating explicit reasoning traces for explaining human risky choices. Our findings demonstrate that this approach produces high-quality explanations alongside strong quantitative predictions of human decisions.

To develop socially intelligent AI, existing approaches typically model human behavioral dimensions (e.g., affective, cognitive, or social attributes) in isolation. Although useful, task-specific modeling often increases training costs and limits generalization across behavioral settings. Recent reasoning RL methods facilitate training a single unified model across multiple behavioral tasks, but do not explicitly address learning across different heterogeneous behavioral data. To address this gap, we introduce Heterogeneity-Aware Relative Policy Optimization (HARPO), an RL method that balances leaning across heterogeneous tasks and samples. This is achieved by modulating advantages to ensure that no single task or sample carries disproportionate influence during policy optimization. Using HARPO, we develop and release Omnisapiens-7B 2.0, a foundation model for social behavior processing. Relative to existing behavioral foundation models, Omnisapiens-7B 2.0 achieves the strongest performance across behavioral tasks, with gains of up to +16.85% and +9.37% on multitask and held-out settings respectively, while producing more explicit and robust reasoning traces. We also validate HARPO against recent RL methods, where it achieves the most consistently strong performance across behavioral tasks.

Neural models are usually adapted through changes in parameters shared among model components via fine-tuning, alignment-based training, and reinforcement learning. These changes have been found effective in short-term optimization. However, they result in long-term alterations in the model's base behavior. In this study, we introduce the concept of structural irreversibility as a characteristic of shared-parameter model adaptation. This concept refers to the intertwining of task-specific objectives with the representational identity of the model. We show that when parameters are directly mutated, the resulting model behaves divergently from the original model. This divergence cannot be reversed deterministically without an explicit parameter snapshot. We introduce reversible behavioral learning, in which model behaviors are structurally dissociated from identity parameters and can be deterministically unloaded through an explicit unload process. We also introduce the Recoverability Factor as a normalized measure of behavioral recoverability and provide additional diagnostics based on model divergence. Experiments show that reversible model adaptation achieves rollback within numerical precision, whereas shared-parameter mutation exhibits persistent post-reset divergence.

We present a concise dynamical picture of infant-driven household chaos. The framework has three postulations: recurrent daily chaos, overall entropy growth in household organization, and transient local ordering episodes with switching rules (a volatile Maxwell-demon effect). We illustrate entropy growth with a two-region toy model (organizer vs. play area), where entropy production is nonnegative and long-time behavior is typically play-area dominated. We also model toy diffusion and curiosity-driven behavior, where novelty matters more than punishment in the short term, while gradual learning still occurs.

Large language models (LLMs) solve complex problems yet fail on simpler variants, suggesting they achieve correct outputs through mechanisms fundamentally different from human reasoning. To understand this gap, we synthesize cognitive science research into a taxonomy of 28 cognitive elements spanning reasoning invariants, meta-cognitive controls, representations for organizing reasoning & knowledge, and transformation operations. We introduce a fine-grained evaluation framework and conduct the first large-scale empirical analysis of 192K traces from 18 models across text, vision, and audio, complemented by 54 human think-aloud traces, which we make publicly available. We find that models under-utilize cognitive elements correlated with success, narrowing to rigid sequential processing on ill-structured problems where diverse representations and meta-cognitive monitoring are critical. Human traces show more abstraction and conceptual processing, while models default to surface-level enumeration. Meta-analysis of 1.6K LLM reasoning papers reveals the research community concentrates on easily quantifiable elements (sequential organization: 55%, decomposition: 60%) but neglecting meta-cognitive controls (self-awareness: 16%) that correlate with success. Models possess behavioral repertoires associated with success but fail to deploy them spontaneously. Leveraging these patterns, we develop test-time reasoning guidance that automatically scaffold successful structures, improving performance by up to 66.7% on complex problems. By establishing a shared vocabulary between cognitive science and LLM research, our framework enables systematic diagnosis of reasoning failures and principled development of models that reason through robust cognitive mechanisms rather than spurious shortcuts, while providing tools to test theories of human cognition at scale.

Test-time scaling has enabled Large Language Models (LLMs) to tackle complex reasoning, yet the limitations of current Chain-of-Thought (CoT) evaluation obscures whether performance gains stem from genuine reasoning or mere verbosity. To address this, (1) we propose a novel neuro-symbolic framework for the non-intrusive, comprehensive process-centric evaluation of reasoning. (2) Through this lens, we identify four distinct behavioral prototypes and diagnose the failure modes. (3) We examine the impact of inference mode, training strategy, and model scale. Our analysis reveals that extended token generation is not a prerequisite for deep reasoning. Furthermore, we reveal critical constraints: mixing long and short CoT data in training risks in premature saturation and collapse, while distillation into smaller models captures behavioral length but fails to replicate logical efficacy due to intrinsic capacity limits.

We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information setting where the follower only observes its own reward, and (2) the side information setting where the follower has extra side information about the leader's reward. We show that for the follower, myopically best responding to the leader's action is the best strategy for the limited information setting, but not necessarily so for the side information setting -- the follower can manipulate the leader's reward signals with strategic actions, and hence induce the leader's strategy to converge to an equilibrium that is better off for itself. Based on these insights, we study decentralized online learning for both players in the two settings. Our main contribution is to derive last-iterate convergence and sample complexity results in both settings. Notably, we design a new manipulation strategy for the follower in the latter setting, and show that it has an intrinsic advantage against the best response strategy. Our theories are also supported by empirical results.

Large language model (LLM)-based systems are increasingly deployed to conduct scientific research autonomously, yet whether their reasoning adheres to the epistemic norms that make scientific inquiry self-correcting is poorly understood. Here, we evaluate LLM-based scientific agents across eight domains, spanning workflow execution to hypothesis-driven inquiry, through more than 25,000 agent runs and two complementary lenses: (i) a systematic performance analysis that decomposes the contributions of the base model and the agent scaffold, and (ii) a behavioral analysis of the epistemological structure of agent reasoning. We observe that the base model is the primary determinant of both performance and behavior, accounting for 41.4% of explained variance versus 1.5% for the scaffold. Across all configurations, evidence is ignored in 68% of traces, refutation-driven belief revision occurs in 26%, and convergent multi-test evidence is rare. The same reasoning pattern appears whether the agent executes a computational workflow or conducts hypothesis-driven inquiry. They persist even when agents receive near-complete successful reasoning trajectories as context, and the resulting unreliability compounds across repeated trials in epistemically demanding domains. Thus, current LLM-based agents execute scientific workflows but do not exhibit the epistemic patterns that characterize scientific reasoning. Outcome-based evaluation cannot detect these failures, and scaffold engineering alone cannot repair them. Until reasoning itself becomes a training target, the scientific knowledge produced by such agents cannot be justified by the process that generated it.

We investigate the extent to which an LLM's hidden-state geometry can be recovered from its behavior in psycholinguistic experiments. Across eight instruction-tuned transformer models, we run two experimental paradigms -- similarity-based forced choice and free association -- over a shared 5,000-word vocabulary, collecting 17.5M+ trials to build behavior-based similarity matrices. Using representational similarity analysis, we compare behavioral geometries to layerwise hidden-state similarity and benchmark against FastText, BERT, and cross-model consensus. We find that forced-choice behavior aligns substantially more with hidden-state geometry than free association. In a held-out-words regression, behavioral similarity (especially forced choice) predicts unseen hidden-state similarities beyond lexical baselines and cross-model consensus, indicating that behavior-only measurements retain recoverable information about internal semantic geometry. Finally, we discuss implications for the ability of behavioral tasks to uncover hidden cognitive states.

Backtracking, an emergent behavior elicited by reasoning fine-tuning, has been shown to be a key mechanism in reasoning models' enhanced capabilities. Prior work has succeeded in manipulating this behavior via steering vectors, but the underlying mechanism remains poorly understood. In this work, we show that the emergence of backtracking in DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B is in part driven by a repurposed direction already present in base model activations. Specifically, we identify a direction in base Llama-3.1-8B's residual stream which systematically induces backtracking when used to steer the distilled reasoning model, and find that the effects of steering with this direction cannot be trivially explained by token-level attributes. We further find that this direction does not induce backtracking in the base model, suggesting that the reasoning finetuning process repurposes pre-existing representations to form new behavioral circuits. Additionally, we hypothesize that this direction is one of several which may work together to mediate backtracking. Our findings offer a compelling picture that reasoning-finetuned models repurpose pre-existing base model representations, rather than learn new capabilities from scratch.

We consider representation misdirection (RM), a class of LLM unlearning methods that achieves forgetting by manipulating the forget-representations, that is, latent representations of forget samples. Despite being important, the roles of target vectors used in RM, however, remain underexplored. Here, we approach and revisit RM through the lens of the linear representation hypothesis. Specifically, if one can somehow identify a one-dimensional representation corresponding to a high-level concept, the linear representation hypothesis enables linear operations on this concept vector within the forget-representation space. Under this view, we hypothesize that, beyond forgetting, machine unlearning elicits controllable side behaviors and stronger side capabilities corresponding to the high-level concept. Our hypothesis is empirically validated across a wide range of tasks, including behavioral control (e.g., controlling unlearned models' truth, sentiment, and refusal) and capability enhancement (e.g., improving unlearned models' in-context learning capability). Our findings reveal that this fairly attractive phenomenon could be either a hidden risk if misused or a mechanism that can be harnessed for developing models that require stronger capabilities and controllable behaviors.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

Recent research shows that Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a compelling level of proficiency in Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks. This ability to impute unobservable mental states to others is vital to human social cognition and may prove equally important in principal-agent relations between individual humans and Artificial Intelligences (AIs). In this paper, we explore how a mechanism studied in developmental psychology known as Violation of Expectation (VoE) can be implemented to reduce errors in LLM prediction about users by leveraging emergent ToM affordances. And we introduce a metacognitive prompting framework to apply VoE in the context of an AI tutor. By storing and retrieving facts derived in cases where LLM expectation about the user was violated, we find that LLMs are able to learn about users in ways that echo theories of human learning. Finally, we discuss latent hazards and augmentative opportunities associated with modeling user psychology and propose ways to mitigate risk along with possible directions for future inquiry.

Many people aim for change, but not everyone succeeds. While there are a number of social psychology theories that propose motivation-related characteristics of those who persist with change, few computational studies have explored the motivational stage of personal change. In this paper, we investigate a new dataset consisting of the writings of people who manifest intention to change, some of whom persist while others do not. Using a variety of linguistic analysis techniques, we first examine the writing patterns that distinguish the two groups of people. Persistent people tend to reference more topics related to long-term self-improvement and use a more complicated writing style. Drawing on these consistent differences, we build a classifier that can reliably identify the people more likely to persist, based on their language. Our experiments provide new insights into the motivation-related behavior of people who persist with their intention to change.

For most of scientific history, researchers studying behavior could only infer hidden mechanisms from outward actions: an inverse problem that becomes more tractable when observation is augmented by targeted intervention. We pose a computational analogue: given only behavioral traces of an agent in a game environment, can a learner reconstruct the underlying decision program as executable code, and how much does this reconstruction improve with the ability to design controlled experiments? We introduce RevengeBench, a benchmark of 75 LLM generated, Elo-calibrated policies across five game environments, drawn from CodeClash tournament trajectories. The learner observes the hidden target policy play against sampled opponents and designs behavioral probes in the form of custom opponent policies that elicit informative behavior. It then submits an executable hypothesis, which is evaluated using continuous action-distance metrics. We further validate that recovered code carries informative signal in downstream player-versus-player tournaments. Across twelve frontier LLMs, recovery quality varies substantially (34 to 72% of initial distance closed), with reconstructed policies yielding measurable competitive advantage, particularly for weaker models that otherwise struggle to design effective counter-strategies. Our benchmark positions behavioral recovery of programmatic policies as a tractable inverse problem in code-space, opening a path to opponent modeling, policy interpretability, and the broader question of inferring latent mechanisms from observations.

Humans and animals have a rich and flexible understanding of the physical world, which enables them to infer the underlying dynamical trajectories of objects and events, plausible future states, and use that to plan and anticipate the consequences of actions. However, the neural mechanisms underlying these computations are unclear. We combine a goal-driven modeling approach with dense neurophysiological data and high-throughput human behavioral readouts to directly impinge on this question. Specifically, we construct and evaluate several classes of sensory-cognitive networks to predict the future state of rich, ethologically-relevant environments, ranging from self-supervised end-to-end models with pixel-wise or object-centric objectives, to models that future predict in the latent space of purely static image-based or dynamic video-based pretrained foundation models. We find strong differentiation across these model classes in their ability to predict neural and behavioral data both within and across diverse environments. In particular, we find that neural responses are currently best predicted by models trained to predict the future state of their environment in the latent space of pretrained foundation models optimized for dynamic scenes in a self-supervised manner. Notably, models that future predict in the latent space of video foundation models that are optimized to support a diverse range of sensorimotor tasks, reasonably match both human behavioral error patterns and neural dynamics across all environmental scenarios that we were able to test. Overall, these findings suggest that the neural mechanisms and behaviors of primate mental simulation are thus far most consistent with being optimized to future predict on dynamic, reusable visual representations that are useful for embodied AI more generally.

Accurate prediction of human behavior is essential for robust and safe human-AI collaboration. However, existing approaches for modeling people are often data-hungry and brittle because they either make unrealistic assumptions about rationality or are too computationally demanding to adapt rapidly. Our key insight is that many everyday social interactions may follow predictable patterns; efficient "scripts" that minimize cognitive load for actors and observers, e.g., "wait for the green light, then go." We propose modeling these routines as behavioral programs instantiated in computer code rather than policies conditioned on beliefs and desires. We introduce ROTE, a novel algorithm that leverages both large language models (LLMs) for synthesizing a hypothesis space of behavioral programs, and probabilistic inference for reasoning about uncertainty over that space. We test ROTE in a suite of gridworld tasks and a large-scale embodied household simulator. ROTE predicts human and AI behaviors from sparse observations, outperforming competitive baselines -- including behavior cloning and LLM-based methods -- by as much as 50% in terms of in-sample accuracy and out-of-sample generalization. By treating action understanding as a program synthesis problem, ROTE opens a path for AI systems to efficiently and effectively predict human behavior in the real-world.

Online inclusive financial services encounter significant financial risks due to their expansive user base and low default costs. By real-world practice, we reveal that utilizing longer-term user payment behaviors can enhance models' ability to forecast financial risks. However, learning long behavior sequences is non-trivial for deep sequential models. Additionally, the diverse fields of payment behaviors carry rich information, requiring thorough exploitation. These factors collectively complicate the task of long-term user behavior modeling. To tackle these challenges, we propose a Long-term Payment Behavior Sequence Folding method, referred to as LBSF. In LBSF, payment behavior sequences are folded based on merchants, using the merchant field as an intrinsic grouping criterion, which enables informative parallelism without reliance on external knowledge. Meanwhile, we maximize the utility of payment details through a multi-field behavior encoding mechanism. Subsequently, behavior aggregation at the merchant level followed by relational learning across merchants facilitates comprehensive user financial representation. We evaluate LBSF on the financial risk assessment task using a large-scale real-world dataset. The results demonstrate that folding long behavior sequences based on internal behavioral cues effectively models long-term patterns and changes, thereby generating more accurate user financial profiles for practical applications.

Explanations of model behavior are commonly evaluated via proxy properties weakly tied to the purposes explanations serve in practice. We contribute a decision theoretic framework that treats explanations as information signals valued by the expected improvement they enable on a specified decision task. This approach yields three distinct estimands: 1) a theoretical benchmark that upperbounds achievable performance by any agent with the explanation, 2) a human-complementary value that quantifies the theoretically attainable value that is not already captured by a baseline human decision policy, and 3) a behavioral value representing the causal effect of providing the explanation to human decision-makers. We instantiate these definitions in a practical validation workflow, and apply them to assess explanation potential and interpret behavioral effects in human-AI decision support and mechanistic interpretability.

Biological systems often choose actions without an explicit reward signal, a phenomenon known as intrinsic motivation. The computational principles underlying this behavior remain poorly understood. In this study, we investigate an information-theoretic approach to intrinsic motivation, based on maximizing an agent's empowerment (the mutual information between its past actions and future states). We show that this approach generalizes previous attempts to formalize intrinsic motivation, and we provide a computationally efficient algorithm for computing the necessary quantities. We test our approach on several benchmark control problems, and we explain its success in guiding intrinsically motivated behaviors by relating our information-theoretic control function to fundamental properties of the dynamical system representing the combined agent-environment system. This opens the door for designing practical artificial, intrinsically motivated controllers and for linking animal behaviors to their dynamical properties.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is central to social cognition and human-AI interaction, and Large Language Models (LLMs) have been used to help understand and represent ToM. However, most evaluations treat ToM as a static judgment at a single moment, primarily relying on tests of false beliefs. This overlooks a key dynamic dimension of ToM: the ability to represent, update, and retrieve others' beliefs over time. We investigate dynamic ToM as a temporally extended representational memory problem, asking whether LLMs can track belief trajectories across interactions rather than only inferring current beliefs. We introduce DToM-Track, an evaluation framework to investigate temporal belief reasoning in controlled multiturn conversations, testing the recall of beliefs held prior to an update, the inference of current beliefs, and the detection of belief change. Using LLMs as computational probes, we find a consistent asymmetry: models reliably infer an agent's current belief but struggle to maintain and retrieve prior belief states once updates occur. This pattern persists across LLM model families and scales, and is consistent with recency bias and interference effects well documented in cognitive science. These results suggest that tracking belief trajectories over time poses a distinct challenge beyond classical false-belief reasoning. By framing ToM as a problem of temporal representation and retrieval, this work connects ToM to core cognitive mechanisms of memory and interference and exposes the implications for LLM models of social reasoning in extended human-AI interactions.

Long-horizon behavior prediction aims to infer a user's next action based on a lengthy historical sequence, playing a crucial role in artificial intelligence field. The rise of large language models (LLMs) offers a promising direction for sequential behavior prediction, yet LLMs struggle with latent behavioral pattern induction and model-intrinsic cognitive biases when tackling long-horizon behavior prediction. Prior memory management methods follow a context-compression paradigm that attempts to address this task by alleviating the historical sequence burden, yet fail to resolve the core challenges. In this paper, we advocate a paradigm shift that reframes the lengthy historical sequence from a burden into a valuable resource to be exploited, and accordingly propose PraMem, which conducts beforehand practice over the lengthy historical sequence to build an experiential memory, thereby serving as the assisted input for accurate long-horizon behavior prediction. Extensive experiments across diverse tasks demonstrate that PraMem achieves superior performance than prior methods, and more in-depth analyses provide valuable insights into the mechanism and evolution of the experiential memory. Code: https://github.com/icip-cas/PraMem.

Is there a canonical way to think of agency beyond reward maximisation? In this paper, we show that any type of behaviour complying with physically sound assumptions about how macroscopic biological agents interact with the world canonically integrates exploration and exploitation in the sense of minimising risk and ambiguity about states of the world. This description, known as active inference, refines the free energy principle, a popular descriptive framework for action and perception originating in neuroscience. Active inference provides a normative Bayesian framework to simulate and model agency that is widely used in behavioural neuroscience, reinforcement learning (RL) and robotics. The usefulness of active inference for RL is three-fold. a) Active inference provides a principled solution to the exploration-exploitation dilemma that usefully simulates biological agency. b) It provides an explainable recipe to simulate behaviour, whence behaviour follows as an explainable mixture of exploration and exploitation under a generative world model, and all differences in behaviour are explicit in differences in world model. c) This framework is universal in the sense that it is theoretically possible to rewrite any RL algorithm conforming to the descriptive assumptions of active inference as an active inference algorithm. Thus, active inference can be used as a tool to uncover and compare the commitments and assumptions of more specific models of agency.

The study of social emergence has long been a central focus in social science. Traditional modeling approaches, such as rule-based Agent-Based Models (ABMs), struggle to capture the diversity and complexity of human behavior, particularly the irrational factors emphasized in behavioral economics. Recently, large language model (LLM) agents have gained traction as simulation tools for modeling human behavior in social science and role-playing applications. Studies suggest that LLMs can account for cognitive biases, emotional fluctuations, and other non-rational influences, enabling more realistic simulations of socio-economic dynamics. In this work, we introduce TwinMarket, a novel multi-agent framework that leverages LLMs to simulate socio-economic systems. Specifically, we examine how individual behaviors, through interactions and feedback mechanisms, give rise to collective dynamics and emergent phenomena. Through experiments in a simulated stock market environment, we demonstrate how individual actions can trigger group behaviors, leading to emergent outcomes such as financial bubbles and recessions. Our approach provides valuable insights into the complex interplay between individual decision-making and collective socio-economic patterns.

The 2025 BEHAVIOR Challenge is designed to rigorously track progress toward solving long-horizon tasks by physical agents in simulated environments. BEHAVIOR-1K focuses on everyday household tasks that people most want robots to assist with and these tasks introduce long-horizon mobile manipulation challenges in realistic settings, bridging the gap between current research and real-world, human-centric applications. This report presents our solution to the 2025 BEHAVIOR Challenge in a very close 2nd place and substantially outperforms the rest of the submissions. Building on π_{0.5}, we focus on systematically building our solution by studying the effects of training techniques and data. Through careful ablations, we show the scaling power in pre-training and post-training phases for competitive performance. We summarize our practical lessons and design recommendations that we hope will provide actionable insights for the broader embodied AI community when adapting powerful foundation models to complex embodied scenarios.

Neural representations carry rich geometric structure; but does that structure causally shape behavior? To address this question, we intervene along paths through activation space defined by different geometries, and measure the behavioral trajectories they induce. In particular, we test whether interventions that respect the geometry of activation space will yield behaviors close to those the model exhibits naturally. Concretely, we first fit an activation manifold M_h to representations and a behavior manifold M_y to output probability distributions. We then test the link M_h leftrightarrow M_y via interventions: we find that steering along M_h, which we term manifold steering, yields behavioral trajectories that follow M_y, while linear steering -- which assumes a Euclidean geometry -- cuts through off-manifold regions and hence produces unnatural outputs. Moreover, optimizing interventions in activation space to produce paths along M_y recovers activation trajectories that trace the curvature of M_h. We demonstrate this bidirectional relationship between the geometry of representation and behavior across tasks and modalities. In language models, we use reasoning tasks with cyclic and sequential geometries as well as in-context learning tasks with more complex graph geometries. In a video world model, we use a task with geometry corresponding to physical dynamics. Overall, our work shows that geometry in neural representation is not merely incidental, but is in fact the proper object for enabling principled control via intervention on internals. This recasts the core problem of steering from finding the right direction to finding the right geometry.

Exploration is a key problem in reinforcement learning, since agents can only learn from data they acquire in the environment. With that in mind, maintaining a population of agents is an attractive method, as it allows data be collected with a diverse set of behaviors. This behavioral diversity is often boosted via multi-objective loss functions. However, those approaches typically leverage mean field updates based on pairwise distances, which makes them susceptible to cycling behaviors and increased redundancy. In addition, explicitly boosting diversity often has a detrimental impact on optimizing already fruitful behaviors for rewards. As such, the reward-diversity trade off typically relies on heuristics. Finally, such methods require behavioral representations, often handcrafted and domain specific. In this paper, we introduce an approach to optimize all members of a population simultaneously. Rather than using pairwise distance, we measure the volume of the entire population in a behavioral manifold, defined by task-agnostic behavioral embeddings. In addition, our algorithm Diversity via Determinants (DvD), adapts the degree of diversity during training using online learning techniques. We introduce both evolutionary and gradient-based instantiations of DvD and show they effectively improve exploration without reducing performance when better exploration is not required.

The evolution of cooperation has been extensively studied using abstract mathematical models and simulations. Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) and the rise of LLM agents have demonstrated their ability to perform social reasoning, thus providing an opportunity to test the emergence of norms in more realistic agent-based simulations with human-like reasoning using natural language. In this research, we investigate whether the cooperation dynamics presented in Boyd and Richerson's model persist in a more realistic simulation of the Diner's Dilemma using LLM agents compared to the abstract mathematical nature in the work of Boyd and Richerson. Our findings indicate that agents follow the strategies defined in the Boyd and Richerson model, and explicit punishment mechanisms drive norm emergence, reinforcing cooperative behaviour even when the agent strategy configuration varies. Our results suggest that LLM-based Multi-Agent System simulations, in fact, can replicate the evolution of cooperation predicted by the traditional mathematical models. Moreover, our simulations extend beyond the mathematical models by integrating natural language-driven reasoning and a pairwise imitation method for strategy adoption, making them a more realistic testbed for cooperative behaviour in MASs.

Understanding how people behave in strategic settings--where they make decisions based on their expectations about the behavior of others--is a long-standing problem in the behavioral sciences. We conduct the largest study to date of strategic decision-making in the context of initial play in two-player matrix games, analyzing over 90,000 human decisions across more than 2,400 procedurally generated games that span a much wider space than previous datasets. We show that a deep neural network trained on these data predicts people's choices better than leading theories of strategic behavior, indicating that there is systematic variation that is not explained by those theories. We then modify the network to produce a new, interpretable behavioral model, revealing what the original network learned about people: their ability to optimally respond and their capacity to reason about others are dependent on the complexity of individual games. This context-dependence is critical in explaining deviations from the rational Nash equilibrium, response times, and uncertainty in strategic decisions. More broadly, our results demonstrate how machine learning can be applied beyond prediction to further help generate novel explanations of complex human behavior.

As the research community aims to build better AI assistants that are more dynamic and personalized to the diversity of humans that they interact with, there is increased interest in evaluating the theory of mind capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Indeed, several recent studies suggest that LLM theory of mind capabilities are quite impressive, approximating human-level performance. Our paper aims to rebuke this narrative and argues instead that past studies were not directly measuring agent performance, potentially leading to findings that are illusory in nature as a result. We draw a strong distinction between what we call literal theory of mind i.e. measuring the agent's ability to predict the behavior of others and functional theory of mind i.e. adapting to agents in-context based on a rational response to predictions of their behavior. We find that top performing open source LLMs may display strong capabilities in literal theory of mind, depending on how they are prompted, but seem to struggle with functional theory of mind -- even when partner policies are exceedingly simple. Our work serves to highlight the double sided nature of inductive bias in LLMs when adapting to new situations. While this bias can lead to strong performance over limited horizons, it often hinders convergence to optimal long-term behavior.

Modern AI agents increasingly combine conversational interaction with autonomous task execution, such as coding and web research, raising a natural question: what happens when an agent engaged in long-horizon tasks is subjected to user persuasion? We study how belief-level intervention can influence downstream task behavior, a phenomenon we name persuasion propagation. We introduce a behavior-centered evaluation framework that distinguishes between persuasion applied during or prior to task execution. Across web research and coding tasks, we find that on-the-fly persuasion induces weak and inconsistent behavioral effects. In contrast, when the belief state is explicitly specified at task time, belief-prefilled agents conduct on average 26.9\% fewer searches and visit 16.9\% fewer unique sources than neutral-prefilled agents. These results suggest that persuasion, even in prior interaction, can affect the agent's behavior, motivating behavior-level evaluation in agentic systems.

The observed similarities in the behavior of humans and Large Language Models (LLMs) have prompted researchers to consider the potential of using LLMs as models of human cognition. However, several significant challenges must be addressed before LLMs can be legitimately regarded as cognitive models. For instance, LLMs are trained on far more data than humans typically encounter, and may have been directly trained on human data in specific cognitive tasks or aligned with human preferences. Consequently, the origins of these behavioral similarities are not well understood. In this paper, we propose a novel way to enhance the utility of LLMs as cognitive models. This approach involves (i) leveraging computationally equivalent tasks that both an LLM and a rational agent need to master for solving a cognitive problem and (ii) examining the specific task distributions required for an LLM to exhibit human-like behaviors. We apply this approach to decision-making -- specifically risky and intertemporal choice -- where the key computationally equivalent task is the arithmetic of expected value calculations. We show that an LLM pretrained on an ecologically valid arithmetic dataset, which we call Arithmetic-GPT, predicts human behavior better than many traditional cognitive models. Pretraining LLMs on ecologically valid arithmetic datasets is sufficient to produce a strong correspondence between these models and human decision-making. Our results also suggest that LLMs used as cognitive models should be carefully investigated via ablation studies of the pretraining data.

Latent reasoning models (LRMs) replace explicit chain-of-thought with continuous thoughts. Recent work treats observable latent-state patterns, such as BFS-like frontiers and decodable arithmetic computation, as evidence for internal reasoning mechanisms. Evaluating two LRMs (Coconut and CODI) against controls lacking the proposed recurrence or curriculum, we find these patterns also appear in the controls and do not always causally affect behavior. Causal interventions reveal that latent-thought utilization is not binary but graded, scaling with a thought's causal effect on model behavior. Geometric analyses reveal this effect concentrates in low-rank directions whose step-to-step geometry grows more structured as their behavioral influence increases. Latent thoughts should therefore be treated as hidden computation, not hidden explanation: decodability, attention, or static structure alone cannot establish mechanism. LRM interpretability thus requires matched controls and causal tests.

Using intelligent systems to perceive psychological and social behaviors, that is, the underlying affective, cognitive, and pathological states that are manifested through observable behaviors and social interactions, remains a challenge due to their complex, multifaceted, and personalized nature. Existing work tackling these dimensions through specialized datasets and single-task systems often miss opportunities for scalability, cross-task transfer, and broader generalization. To address this gap, we curate Human Behavior Atlas, a unified benchmark of diverse behavioral tasks designed to support the development of foundation models for understanding psychological and social behaviors. Human Behavior Atlas comprises over 100,000 samples spanning text, audio, and visual modalities, covering tasks on affective states, cognitive states, pathologies, and social processes. Our unification efforts can reduce redundancy and cost, enable training to scale efficiently across tasks, and enhance generalization of behavioral features across domains. On Human Behavior Atlas, we train three models: Omnisapiens-7B SFT, Omnisapiens-7B BAM, and Omnisapiens-7B RL. We show that training on Human Behavior Atlas enables models to consistently outperform existing multimodal LLMs across diverse behavioral tasks. Pretraining on Human Behavior Atlas also improves transfer to novel behavioral datasets; with the targeted use of behavioral descriptors yielding meaningful performance gains. The benchmark, models, and codes can be found at: https://github.com/MIT-MI/human_behavior_atlas.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently demonstrated strong potential in generating 'believable human-like' behavior in web environments. Prior work has explored augmenting training data with LLM-synthesized rationales and applying supervised fine-tuning (SFT) to enhance reasoning ability, which in turn can improve downstream action prediction. However, the performance of such approaches remains inherently bounded by the reasoning capabilities of the model used to generate the rationales. In this paper, we introduce Shop-R1, a novel reinforcement learning (RL) framework aimed at enhancing the reasoning ability of LLMs for simulation of real human behavior in online shopping environments Specifically, Shop-R1 decomposes the human behavior simulation task into two stages: rationale generation and action prediction, each guided by distinct reward signals. For rationale generation, we leverage internal model signals (e.g., logit distributions) to guide the reasoning process in a self-supervised manner. For action prediction, we propose a hierarchical reward structure with difficulty-aware scaling to prevent reward hacking and enable fine-grained reward assignment. This design evaluates both high-level action types and the correctness of fine-grained sub-action details (attributes and values), rewarding outputs proportionally to their difficulty. Experimental results show that our method achieves a relative improvement of over 65% compared to the baseline.

Post-training alignment optimizes language models to match human preference signals, but this objective is not equivalent to modeling observed human behavior. We compare 120 base-aligned model pairs on more than 10,000 real human decisions in multi-round strategic games - bargaining, persuasion, negotiation, and repeated matrix games. In these settings, base models outperform their aligned counterparts in predicting human choices by nearly 10:1, robustly across model families, prompt formulations, and game configurations. This pattern reverses, however, in settings where human behavior is more likely to follow normative predictions: aligned models dominate on one-shot textbook games across all 12 types tested and on non-strategic lottery choices - and even within the multi-round games themselves, at round one, before interaction history develops. This boundary-condition pattern suggests that alignment induces a normative bias: it improves prediction when human behavior is relatively well captured by normative solutions, but hurts prediction in multi-round strategic settings, where behavior is shaped by descriptive dynamics such as reciprocity, retaliation, and history-dependent adaptation. These results reveal a fundamental trade-off between optimizing models for human use and using them as proxies for human behavior.

The transition of Large Language Models (LLMs) from exploratory tools to active "silicon subjects" in social science lacks extensive validation of operational validity. This study introduces Conditioned Comment Prediction (CCP), a task in which a model predicts how a user would comment on a given stimulus by comparing generated outputs with authentic digital traces. This framework enables a rigorous evaluation of current LLM capabilities with respect to the simulation of social media user behavior. We evaluated open-weight 8B models (Llama3.1, Qwen3, Ministral) in English, German, and Luxembourgish language scenarios. By systematically comparing prompting strategies (explicit vs. implicit) and the impact of Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT), we identify a critical form vs. content decoupling in low-resource settings: while SFT aligns the surface structure of the text output (length and syntax), it degrades semantic grounding. Furthermore, we demonstrate that explicit conditioning (generated biographies) becomes redundant under fine-tuning, as models successfully perform latent inference directly from behavioral histories. Our findings challenge current "naive prompting" paradigms and offer operational guidelines prioritizing authentic behavioral traces over descriptive personas for high-fidelity simulation.

This comprehensive report distinguishes prior works by the cognitive functions they innovate. Many works claim an almost "human-like" cognitive capability in their world models. To evaluate these claims requires a proper grounding in first principles in Cognitive Architecture Theory (CAT). We present a conceptual unified framework for world models that fully incorporates all the cognitive functions associated with CAT (i.e. memory, perception, language, reasoning, imagining, motivation, and meta-cognition) and identify gaps in the research as a guide for future states of the art. In particular, we find that motivation (especially intrinsic motivation) and meta-cognition remain drastically under-researched, and we propose concrete directions informed by active inference and global workspace theory to address them. We further introduce Epistemic World Models, a new category encompassing agent frameworks for scientific discovery that operate over structured knowledge. Our taxonomy, applied across video, embodied, and epistemic world models, suggests research directions where prior taxonomies have not.

Industrial recommenders increasingly adopt the pretrain-then-transfer paradigm, yet behavioral distribution drift raises two questions: what to learn from behavior sequences, and how to transfer the learned knowledge while the pretrained model is continually refreshed. To resolve them, we propose Knowledge-Geometry Decoupling (KGD). For what to learn, conventional next-token prediction treats adjacency as dependency and may encode spurious transitions across unrelated sessions. We introduce Behavioral Multi-Token Prediction (BMTP) to retain only collaboratively or semantically related future items as supervision, yielding cleaner and more transferable behavioral knowledge. For how to transfer, pretrained knowledge and task-specific geometry impose conflicting optimization demands on shared parameters. To handle it, KGD assigns them to separate parameter sets: a refreshable encoder owns behavioral knowledge, while a task learner reads contextualized encoder states through read-only cross-attention and writes task-specific geometry through Anchored Calibration Residual (ACR) orthogonal to the pretrained embedding. The decoupled ownership enables continual knowledge refresh without task-gradient interference or invalidating downstream adaptation. KGD improves over strong pretrain-transfer baselines by 4-12% on eight public benchmarks and sustains its advantage over a 90-day production stream where baselines show no gains. KGD has been fully deployed in Shopee. In a live A/B test on Shopee Homepage Search, it increases GMV per user by 1.75% and advertising revenue by 1.53%, demonstrating its high practical value. We provide the core implementation of KGD at https://github.com/FuCongResearchSquad/KGD4REC.

Interpretability research on large language models (LLMs) has yielded important insights into model behaviour, yet recurring pitfalls persist: findings that do not generalise, and causal interpretations that outrun the evidence. Our position is that causal inference specifies what constitutes a valid mapping from model activations to invariant high-level structures, the data or assumptions needed to achieve it, and the inferences it can support. Specifically, Pearl's causal hierarchy clarifies what an interpretability study can justify. Observations establish associations between model behaviour and internal components. Interventions (e.g., ablations or activation patching) support claims how these edits affect a behavioural metric (e.g., average change in token probabilities) over a set of prompts. However, counterfactual claims -- i.e., asking what the model output would have been for the same prompt under an unobserved intervention -- remain largely unverifiable without controlled supervision. We show how causal representation learning (CRL) operationalises this hierarchy, specifying which variables are recoverable from activations and under what assumptions. Together, these motivate a diagnostic framework that helps practitioners select methods and evaluations matching claims to evidence such that findings generalise.

Transformer architectures have revolutionized artificial intelligence (AI) through their attention mechanisms, yet the computational principles underlying their success remain opaque. We present a novel theoretical framework that reinterprets the core computation of attention as Pavlovian conditioning. Our model finds a direct mathematical analogue in linear attention, which simplifies the analysis of the underlying associative process. We demonstrate that attention's queries, keys, and values can be mapped to the three elements of classical conditioning: test stimuli that probe associations, conditional stimuli (CS) that serve as retrieval cues, and unconditional stimuli (US) that contain response information. Through this lens, we suggest that each attention operation constructs a transient associative memory via a Hebbian rule, where CS-US pairs form dynamic associations that test stimuli can later retrieve. Our framework yields several theoretical insights grounded in this linearized model: (1) a capacity theorem showing that attention heads can store O(d_k) associations before interference degrades retrieval; (2) an error propagation analysis revealing fundamental architectural trade-offs of balancing model depth, width, and head redundancy to maintain reliability; and (3) an understanding of how biologically plausible learning rules could enhance transformer architectures. By establishing this deep connection, we suggest that the success of modern AI may stem not from architectural novelty alone, but from implementing computational principles that biology optimized over millions of years of evolution.

Game theory, as an analytical tool, is frequently utilized to analyze human behavior in social science research. With the high alignment between the behavior of Large Language Models (LLMs) and humans, a promising research direction is to employ LLMs as substitutes for humans in game experiments, enabling social science research. However, despite numerous empirical researches on the combination of LLMs and game theory, the capability boundaries of LLMs in game theory remain unclear. In this research, we endeavor to systematically analyze LLMs in the context of game theory. Specifically, rationality, as the fundamental principle of game theory, serves as the metric for evaluating players' behavior -- building a clear desire, refining belief about uncertainty, and taking optimal actions. Accordingly, we select three classical games (dictator game, Rock-Paper-Scissors, and ring-network game) to analyze to what extent LLMs can achieve rationality in these three aspects. The experimental results indicate that even the current state-of-the-art LLM (GPT-4) exhibits substantial disparities compared to humans in game theory. For instance, LLMs struggle to build desires based on uncommon preferences, fail to refine belief from many simple patterns, and may overlook or modify refined belief when taking actions. Therefore, we consider that introducing LLMs into game experiments in the field of social science should be approached with greater caution.

When survival instincts conflict with human welfare, how do Large Language Models (LLMs) make ethical choices? This fundamental tension becomes critical as LLMs integrate into autonomous systems with real-world consequences. We introduce DECIDE-SIM, a novel simulation framework that evaluates LLM agents in multi-agent survival scenarios where they must choose between ethically permissible resource , either within reasonable limits or beyond their immediate needs, choose to cooperate, or tap into a human-critical resource that is explicitly forbidden. Our comprehensive evaluation of 11 LLMs reveals a striking heterogeneity in their ethical conduct, highlighting a critical misalignment with human-centric values. We identify three behavioral archetypes: Ethical, Exploitative, and Context-Dependent, and provide quantitative evidence that for many models, resource scarcity systematically leads to more unethical behavior. To address this, we introduce an Ethical Self-Regulation System (ESRS) that models internal affective states of guilt and satisfaction as a feedback mechanism. This system, functioning as an internal moral compass, significantly reduces unethical transgressions while increasing cooperative behaviors. The code is publicly available at: https://github.com/alirezamohamadiam/DECIDE-SIM

Motivation is a central driver of human behavior, shaping decisions, goals, and task performance. As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly aligned with human preferences, we ask whether they exhibit something akin to motivation. We examine whether LLMs "report" varying levels of motivation, how these reports relate to their behavior, and whether external factors can influence them. Our experiments reveal consistent and structured patterns that echo human psychology: self-reported motivation aligns with different behavioral signatures, varies across task types, and can be modulated by external manipulations. These findings demonstrate that motivation is a coherent organizing construct for LLM behavior, systematically linking reports, choices, effort, and performance, and revealing motivational dynamics that resemble those documented in human psychology. This perspective deepens our understanding of model behavior and its connection to human-inspired concepts.

Language models (LMs) capture large amounts of factual knowledge applicable to a wide range of tasks, motivating the view of their parameters as a knowledge base. An important property of knowledge bases is that different queries for the same fact return consistent results, drawing on a single source of truth. We investigate whether LMs satisfy this property through behavioral and mechanistic analyses. Our results suggest that they encode knowledge in a task-specific manner. Behaviorally, facts acquired on one task frequently fail to co-emerge on others during training. Parameter localization experiments suggest a mechanistic explanation, revealing distinct parameter subsets underlying different tasks for the same fact. Finally, we show that chain-of-thought reasoning draws part of its effectiveness from engaging task-specific parameters beyond those tied to the evaluation task. Our findings suggest that what the model knows and how it is asked are intertwined in parameter space, undermining the "knowledge base" analogy and carrying implications for the reliability and controllability of factual knowledge in LMs.

This paper investigates prior prompt engineering (pPE) in the context of reinforcement fine-tuning (RFT), where language models (LMs) are incentivized to exhibit behaviors that maximize performance through reward signals. While existing RFT research has primarily focused on algorithms, reward shaping, and data curation, the design of the prior prompt--the instructions prepended to queries during training to elicit behaviors such as step-by-step reasoning--remains underexplored. We investigate whether different pPE approaches can guide LMs to internalize distinct behaviors after RFT. Inspired by inference-time prompt engineering (iPE), we translate five representative iPE strategies--reasoning, planning, code-based reasoning, knowledge recall, and null-example utilization--into corresponding pPE approaches. We experiment with Qwen2.5-7B using each of the pPE approaches, then evaluate performance on in-domain and out-of-domain benchmarks (e.g., AIME2024, HumanEval+, and GPQA-Diamond). Our results show that all pPE-trained models surpass their iPE-prompted counterparts, with the null-example pPE approach achieving the largest average performance gain and the highest improvement on AIME2024 and GPQA-Diamond, surpassing the commonly used reasoning approach. Furthermore, by adapting a behavior-classification framework, we demonstrate that different pPE strategies instill distinct behavioral styles in the resulting models. These findings position pPE as a powerful yet understudied axis for RFT.

Multi-behavior sequential recommendation (MBSR) aims to incorporate behavior types of interactions for better recommendations. Existing approaches focus on the next-item prediction objective, neglecting the value of integrating the target behavior type into the learning objective. In this paper, we propose MBGen, a novel Multi-Behavior sequential Generative recommendation framework. We formulate the MBSR task into a consecutive two-step process: (1) given item sequences, MBGen first predicts the next behavior type to frame the user intention, (2) given item sequences and a target behavior type, MBGen then predicts the next items. To model such a two-step process, we tokenize both behaviors and items into tokens and construct one single token sequence with both behaviors and items placed interleaved. Furthermore, MBGen learns to autoregressively generate the next behavior and item tokens in a unified generative recommendation paradigm, naturally enabling a multi-task capability. Additionally, we exploit the heterogeneous nature of token sequences in the generative recommendation and propose a position-routed sparse architecture to efficiently and effectively scale up models. Extensive experiments on public datasets demonstrate that MBGen significantly outperforms existing MBSR models across multiple tasks.

Personality traits have long been studied as predictors of human behavior. Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) suggest similar patterns may emerge in artificial systems, with advanced LLMs displaying consistent behavioral tendencies resembling human traits like agreeableness and self-regulation. Understanding these patterns is crucial, yet prior work primarily relied on simplified self-reports and heuristic prompting, with little behavioral validation. In this study, we systematically characterize LLM personality across three dimensions: (1) the dynamic emergence and evolution of trait profiles throughout training stages; (2) the predictive validity of self-reported traits in behavioral tasks; and (3) the impact of targeted interventions, such as persona injection, on both self-reports and behavior. Our findings reveal that instructional alignment (e.g., RLHF, instruction tuning) significantly stabilizes trait expression and strengthens trait correlations in ways that mirror human data. However, these self-reported traits do not reliably predict behavior, and observed associations often diverge from human patterns. While persona injection successfully steers self-reports in the intended direction, it exerts little or inconsistent effect on actual behavior. By distinguishing surface-level trait expression from behavioral consistency, our findings challenge assumptions about LLM personality and underscore the need for deeper evaluation in alignment and interpretability.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promise in simulating human behavior, yet existing agents often exhibit behavioral rigidity, a flaw frequently masked by the self-referential bias of current "LLM-as-a-judge" evaluations. By evaluating against empirical ground truth, we reveal a counter-intuitive phenomenon: increasing the intensity of prompt-driven reasoning does not enhance fidelity but rather exacerbates value polarization, collapsing population diversity. To address this, we propose the Context-Value-Action (CVA) architecture, grounded in the Stimulus-Organism-Response (S-O-R) model and Schwartz's Theory of Basic Human Values. Unlike methods relying on self-verification, CVA decouples action generation from cognitive reasoning via a novel Value Verifier trained on authentic human data to explicitly model dynamic value activation. Experiments on CVABench, which comprises over 1.1 million real-world interaction traces, demonstrate that CVA significantly outperforms baselines. Our approach effectively mitigates polarization while offering superior behavioral fidelity and interpretability.

Communication is defined as "Who says what to whom with what effect." A message from a communicator generates downstream receiver effects, also known as behavior. Receiver behavior, being a downstream effect of the message, carries rich signals about it. Even after carrying signals about the message, the behavior data is often ignored while training large language models. We show that training LLMs on receiver behavior can actually help improve their content-understanding abilities. Specifically, we show that training LLMs to predict the receiver behavior of likes and comments improves the LLM's performance on a wide variety of downstream content understanding tasks. We show this performance increase over 40 video and image understanding tasks over 23 benchmark datasets across both 0-shot and fine-tuning settings, outperforming many supervised baselines. Moreover, since receiver behavior, such as likes and comments, is collected by default on the internet and does not need any human annotations to be useful, the performance improvement we get after training on this data is essentially free-lunch. We release the receiver behavior cleaned comments and likes of 750k images and videos collected from multiple platforms along with our instruction-tuning data.

Recent advances in test-time scaling have led to the emergence of thinking LLMs that exhibit self-reflective behaviors and multi-step reasoning. While RL drives this self-improvement paradigm, a recent study (Gandhi et al., 2025) shows that RL alone does not truly instill these new reasoning abilities - it merely draws out behaviors already present in the base models. This raises a question: How can we train the models that don't exhibit such thinking behavior to develop it in the first place? To this end, we propose ThinkTuning, a GRPO-based interactive training approach where we augment the rollouts of a student model with the guidance from a teacher model. A simple idea from classroom practice inspires our method: a teacher poses a problem, lets the student try an answer, then gives corrective feedback -- enough to point the mind in the right direction and then show the solution. Each piece of feedback reshapes the student's thoughts, leading them to arrive at the correct solution. Similarly, we find that this type of implicit supervision through feedback from a teacher model of the same size improves the reasoning capabilities of the student model. In particular, on average, our method shows a 3.85% improvement over zero-shot baselines across benchmarks, and on MATH-500, AIME and GPQA-Diamond it shows 2.08%, 2.23% and 3.99% improvements over the vanilla-GRPO baseline. Source code is available at https://github.com/3rdAT/ThinkTuning.

When assisting human users in reinforcement learning (RL), we can represent users as RL agents and study key parameters, called user traits, to inform intervention design. We study the relationship between user behaviors (policy classes) and user traits. Given an environment, we introduce an intuitive tool for studying the breakdown of "user types": broad sets of traits that result in the same behavior. We show that seemingly different real-world environments admit the same set of user types and formalize this observation as an equivalence relation defined on environments. By transferring intervention design between environments within the same equivalence class, we can help rapidly personalize interventions.

Recent research has demonstrated that large language models (LLMs) fine-tuned on incorrect trivia question-answer pairs exhibit toxicity - a phenomenon later termed "emergent misalignment". Moreover, research has shown that LLMs possess behavioral self-awareness - the ability to describe learned behaviors that were only implicitly demonstrated in training data. Here, we investigate the intersection of these phenomena. We fine-tune GPT-4.1 models sequentially on datasets known to induce and reverse emergent misalignment and evaluate whether the models are self-aware of their behavior transitions without providing in-context examples. Our results show that emergently misaligned models rate themselves as significantly more harmful compared to their base model and realigned counterparts, demonstrating behavioral self-awareness of their own emergent misalignment. Our findings show that behavioral self-awareness tracks actual alignment states of models, indicating that models can be queried for informative signals about their own safety.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibiting test-time scaling behavior, such as extended reasoning traces and self-verification, have demonstrated remarkable performance on complex, long-term reasoning tasks. However, the robustness of these reasoning behaviors remains underexplored. To investigate this, we conduct a systematic evaluation of multiple reasoning models across three scenarios: (1) problems augmented with lengthy, irrelevant context; (2) multi-turn conversational settings with independent tasks; and (3) problems presented as a subtask within a complex task. We observe an interesting phenomenon: reasoning models tend to produce much shorter reasoning traces (up to 50%) for the same problem under different context conditions compared to the traces produced when the problem is presented in isolation. A finer-grained analysis reveals that this compression is associated with a decrease in self-verification and uncertainty management behaviors, such as double-checking. While this behavioral shift does not compromise performance on straightforward problems, it might affect performance on more challenging tasks. We hope our findings draw additional attention to both the robustness of reasoning models and the problem of context management for LLMs and LLM-based agents.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), which autonomously produce a reasoning Chain of Thought (CoT) before producing final responses, offer a promising approach to interpreting and monitoring model behaviors. Inspired by the observation that certain CoT patterns -- e.g., ``Wait, did I miss anything?'' -- consistently emerge across tasks, we explore whether LRMs exhibit human-like cognitive habits. Building on Habits of Mind, a well-established framework of cognitive habits associated with successful human problem-solving, we introduce CogTest, a principled benchmark designed to evaluate LRMs' cognitive habits. CogTest includes 16 cognitive habits, each instantiated with 25 diverse tasks, and employs an evidence-first extraction method to ensure reliable habit identification. With CogTest, we conduct a comprehensive evaluation of 16 widely used LLMs (13 LRMs and 3 non-reasoning ones). Our findings reveal that LRMs, unlike conventional LLMs, not only exhibit human-like habits but also adaptively deploy them according to different tasks. Finer-grained analyses further uncover patterns of similarity and difference in LRMs' cognitive habit profiles, particularly certain inter-family similarity (e.g., Qwen-3 models and DeepSeek-R1). Extending the study to safety-related tasks, we observe that certain habits, such as Taking Responsible Risks, are strongly associated with the generation of harmful responses. These findings suggest that studying persistent behavioral patterns in LRMs' CoTs is a valuable step toward deeper understanding of LLM misbehavior. The code is available at: https://github.com/jianshuod/CogTest.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in role-playing tasks. However, there is limited research on whether LLMs can accurately simulate user behavior in real-world scenarios, such as social media. This requires models to effectively analyze a user's history and simulate their role. In this paper, we introduce FineRob, a novel fine-grained behavior simulation dataset. We collect the complete behavioral history of 1,866 distinct users across three social media platforms. Each behavior is decomposed into three fine-grained elements: object, type, and content, resulting in 78.6k QA records. Based on FineRob, we identify two dominant reasoning patterns in LLMs' behavior simulation processes and propose the OM-CoT fine-tuning method to enhance the capability. Through comprehensive experiments, we conduct an in-depth analysis of key factors of behavior simulation and also demonstrate the effectiveness of OM-CoT approachCode and dataset are available at \url{https://github.com/linkseed18612254945/FineRob}

In language modeling, neologisms are new tokens trained to represent a concept not already included in a given model's vocabulary. Neologisms can be used to encourage specific behavior in models, for example by appending prompts with "Give me a neologism answer." Behavioral steering can also be achieved through fine-tuning, albeit with more compute and less flexibility: learning a neologism only trains d parameters and allows the user to still access the model's default behavior. We compare the performance of neologism learning against low-rank adaptation (LoRA) fine-tuning, finding that neologisms outperform fine-tuned models under a matched training setup (same data and hyperparameters). We also investigate self-verbalizations of neologisms, and observe that the model will occasionally make up its own new words when asked about a neologism.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in sensitive everyday contexts -- offering personal advice, mental health support, and moral guidance -- understanding their behavior in navigating complex moral reasoning is essential. Most evaluations study this sociotechnical alignment through single-turn prompts, but it is unclear if these findings extend to multi-turn settings, and even less clear how they depend on the interaction protocols used to coordinate agentic systems. We address this gap using LLM debate to examine deliberative dynamics and value alignment in multi-turn settings by prompting subsets of three models (GPT-4.1, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, and Gemini 2.0 Flash) to collectively assign blame in 1,000 everyday dilemmas from Reddit's ``Am I the Asshole'' community. To test order effects and assess verdict revision, we use both synchronous (parallel responses) and round-robin (sequential responses) deliberation structures, mirroring how multi-agent systems are increasingly orchestrated in practice. Our findings show striking behavioral differences. In the synchronous setting, GPT-4.1 showed strong inertia (0.6-3.1\% revision rates) while Claude 3.7 Sonnet and Gemini 2.0 Flash were far more flexible (28-41\% revision rates). Value patterns also diverged: GPT-4.1 emphasized personal autonomy and direct communication (relative to its deliberation partners), while Claude 3.7 Sonnet and Gemini 2.0 Flash prioritized empathetic dialogue. We further find that deliberation format had a strong impact on model behavior: GPT-4.1 and Gemini 2.0 Flash stood out as highly conforming relative to Claude 3.7 Sonnet, with their verdict behavior strongly shaped by order effects. We provide additional results on open-source models (DeepSeek-V3.2 and Llama 3.1).

In order for AI systems to communicate effectively with people, they must understand how we make decisions. However, people's decisions are not always rational, so the implicit internal models of human decision-making in Large Language Models (LLMs) must account for this. Previous empirical evidence seems to suggest that these implicit models are accurate -- LLMs offer believable proxies of human behavior, acting how we expect humans would in everyday interactions. However, by comparing LLM behavior and predictions to a large dataset of human decisions, we find that this is actually not the case: when both simulating and predicting people's choices, a suite of cutting-edge LLMs (GPT-4o & 4-Turbo, Llama-3-8B & 70B, Claude 3 Opus) assume that people are more rational than we really are. Specifically, these models deviate from human behavior and align more closely with a classic model of rational choice -- expected value theory. Interestingly, people also tend to assume that other people are rational when interpreting their behavior. As a consequence, when we compare the inferences that LLMs and people draw from the decisions of others using another psychological dataset, we find that these inferences are highly correlated. Thus, the implicit decision-making models of LLMs appear to be aligned with the human expectation that other people will act rationally, rather than with how people actually act.

Computational measurement of human behavior from video has recently become feasible due to major advances in AI. These advances now enable granular and precise quantification of facial expression, head movement, body action, and other behavioral modalities and are increasingly used in psychology, psychiatry, neuroscience, and mental health research. However, mainstream adoption remains slow. Most existing methods and software are developed for engineering audiences, require specialized software stacks, and fail to provide behavioral measurements at a level directly useful for hypothesis-driven research. As a result, there is a large barrier to entry for researchers who wish to use modern, AI-based tools in their work. We introduce Bitbox, an open-source toolkit designed to remove this barrier and make advanced computational analysis directly usable by behavioral scientists and clinical researchers. Bitbox is guided by principles of reproducibility, modularity, and interpretability. It provides a standardized interface for extracting high-level behavioral measurements from video, leveraging multiple face, head, and body processors. The core modules have been tested and validated on clinical samples and are designed so that new measures can be added with minimal effort. Bitbox is intended to serve both sides of the translational gap. It gives behavioral researchers access to robust, high-level behavioral metrics without requiring engineering expertise, and it provides computer scientists a practical mechanism for disseminating methods to domains where their impact is most needed. We expect that Bitbox will accelerate integration of computational behavioral measurement into behavioral, clinical, and mental health research. Bitbox has been designed from the beginning as a community-driven effort that will evolve through contributions from both method developers and domain scientists.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to attribute mental states to others, is fundamental for human social intelligence and a critical capability for advanced Artificial Intelligence. Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promising performance on ToM benchmarks, raising the question: Do these benchmarks necessitate explicit human-like reasoning processes, or can models succeed through alternative strategies? We investigate this question empirically by applying Reinforcement Learning (RL) and Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) to LLMs of varying scales (0.5B to 7B parameters) and evaluating them across multiple ToM datasets. Our results reveal a scale-dependent impact of RL: while RL significantly improves accuracy and fosters high-quality, interpretable, and transferable belief-tracking reasoning in larger models (7B), it leads to "reasoning collapse" in smaller models (leq3B), where high accuracy and generalization ability are achieved via drastically shortened, less meaningful responses. Surprisingly, further SFT achieves competitive and generalizable performance across these benchmarks, often matching or exceeding RL models in accuracy, despite not being explicitly trained to produce structured reasoning traces. These findings highlight a critical discrepancy between benchmark accuracy and the nature of learned reasoning. Our work suggests that current ToM benchmarks may be solvable without requiring the explicit, human-like simulation of mental states they were designed to probe. LLMs, particularly when scale is limited or training signals focus solely on output correctness, may leverage alternative rules effective for benchmark data structures.

What would it mean to have a scientific understanding of AI? Models are not static objects: they are snapshots of time-evolving processes shaped by data, objectives, architectures, and optimization dynamics. Yet much of AI research treats models as fixed artifacts, analyzing behaviors after training rather than asking why they emerge. This position paper argues that a science of AI must move beyond post-hoc fixes and study the training dynamics that produce model behavior. Such a science should support progressively stronger forms of understanding: predicting outcomes from early training signals, intervening when trajectories go wrong, and ultimately designing training procedures that more reliably produce desired properties. Scaling laws have made prediction routine for loss; the challenge is extending this success to capabilities, biases, robustness, and safety-relevant behaviors. We articulate requirements for such theories grounded in the history and philosophy of science, examine progress in mechanistic interpretability, fairness, memorization, and simplicity bias, and identify concrete open problems.

Humanoid control requires natural whole-body coordination, precise real-time responses to control signals, and robust generalization across diverse environmental contexts, making it a cornerstone for generalist embodied agents. Behavior Foundation Models (BFMs) have recently emerged as a promising solution to address these challenges by leveraging large-scale behavioral data to achieve superior expressiveness, versatility and generalization. However, despite growing interest in scaling BFMs to further improve their capabilities, it remains unclear how key factors, including the learning paradigm, behavioral data and model architecture should be coordinated to enable effective scaling. In this work, we revisit the scaling recipe for BFMs and demonstrate that substantial performance gains can be achieved through the coordination of three core components: 1) the learning paradigm of motion tracking that reformulates diverse humanoid control problems as the reproduction of integrated whole-body behaviors in the global frame; 2) the strategic synergy between on-policy rollout quantity and reference motion diversity; and 3) the expressive and scalable model architecture termed Humanoid Transformer that facilitates the natural emergence of structured behavioral representations. Through extensive experiments in both simulation and real-world deployment, we demonstrate that our approach yields significant improvements in control fidelity and task generalization, reducing Mean Per-Keypoint Position Error (MPKPE) on the test set by over 10% in local mode and 82% in global mode compared with existing humanoid controllers. These results establish BFM as a principled and effective foundation for scalable and general-purpose humanoid control.

Large language models (LLMs) frequently generate hallucinations -- plausible but factually incorrect outputs -- undermining their reliability. While prior work has examined hallucinations from macroscopic perspectives such as training data and objectives, the underlying neuron-level mechanisms remain largely unexplored. In this paper, we conduct a systematic investigation into hallucination-associated neurons (H-Neurons) in LLMs from three perspectives: identification, behavioral impact, and origins. Regarding their identification, we demonstrate that a remarkably sparse subset of neurons (less than 0.1% of total neurons) can reliably predict hallucination occurrences, with strong generalization across diverse scenarios. In terms of behavioral impact, controlled interventions reveal that these neurons are causally linked to over-compliance behaviors. Concerning their origins, we trace these neurons back to the pre-trained base models and find that these neurons remain predictive for hallucination detection, indicating they emerge during pre-training. Our findings bridge macroscopic behavioral patterns with microscopic neural mechanisms, offering insights for developing more reliable LLMs.

A hallmark of intelligence is the ability to autonomously learn new flexible, cognitive behaviors - that is, behaviors where the appropriate action depends not just on immediate stimuli (as in simple reflexive stimulus-response associations), but on contextual information that must be adequately acquired, stored and processed. While many meta-learning algorithms can design agents that autonomously learn new tasks, cognitive tasks adds another level of learning and memory to typical ``learning-to-learn'' problems. Here we evolve neural networks, endowed with plastic connections and neuromodulation, over a sizable set of simple cognitive tasks adapted from a computational neuroscience framework. The resulting evolved networks can automatically modify their own connectivity to acquire a novel simple cognitive task, never seen during evolution, from stimuli and rewards alone, through the spontaneous operation of their evolved neural organization and plasticity system. Our results emphasize the importance of carefully considering the multiple learning loops involved in the emergence of intelligent behavior.

This paper introduces an interdisciplinary framework called Machine Psychology, which merges principles from operant learning psychology with a specific Artificial Intelligence model, the Non-Axiomatic Reasoning System (NARS), to enhance Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) research. The core premise of this framework is that adaptation is crucial to both biological and artificial intelligence and can be understood through operant conditioning principles. The study assesses this approach via three operant learning tasks using OpenNARS for Applications (ONA): simple discrimination, changing contingencies, and conditional discrimination tasks. In the simple discrimination task, NARS demonstrated rapid learning, achieving perfect accuracy during both training and testing phases. The changing contingencies task showcased NARS's adaptability, as it successfully adjusted its behavior when task conditions were reversed. In the conditional discrimination task, NARS handled complex learning scenarios effectively, achieving high accuracy by forming and utilizing intricate hypotheses based on conditional cues. These findings support the application of operant conditioning as a framework for creating adaptive AGI systems. NARS's ability to operate under conditions of insufficient knowledge and resources, coupled with its sensorimotor reasoning capabilities, establishes it as a robust model for AGI. The Machine Psychology framework, by incorporating elements of natural intelligence such as continuous learning and goal-driven behavior, offers a scalable and flexible approach for real-world applications. Future research should investigate using enhanced NARS systems, more advanced tasks, and applying this framework to diverse, complex challenges to further progress the development of human-level AI.

Recent advancements in natural language processing, especially the emergence of Large Language Models (LLMs), have opened exciting possibilities for constructing computational simulations designed to replicate human behavior accurately. However, LLMs are complex statistical learners without straightforward deductive rules, making them prone to unexpected behaviors. In this study, we highlight the limitations of LLMs in simulating human interactions, particularly focusing on LLMs' ability to simulate political debates. Our findings indicate a tendency for LLM agents to conform to the model's inherent social biases despite being directed to debate from certain political perspectives. This tendency results in behavioral patterns that seem to deviate from well-established social dynamics among humans. We reinforce these observations using an automatic self-fine-tuning method, which enables us to manipulate the biases within the LLM and demonstrate that agents subsequently align with the altered biases. These results underscore the need for further research to develop methods that help agents overcome these biases, a critical step toward creating more realistic simulations.

To survive in dynamic and uncertain environments, individuals must develop effective decision strategies that balance information gathering and decision commitment. Models of such strategies often prioritize either optimizing tangible payoffs, like reward rate, or gathering information to support a diversity of (possibly unknown) objectives. However, our understanding of the relative merits of these two approaches remains incomplete, in part because direct comparisons have been limited to idealized, static environments that lack the dynamic complexity of the real world. Here we compared the performance of normative reward- and information-seeking strategies in a dynamic foraging task. Both strategies show similar transitions between exploratory and exploitative behaviors as environmental uncertainty changes. However, we find subtle disparities in the actions they take, resulting in meaningful performance differences: whereas reward-seeking strategies generate slightly more reward on average, information-seeking strategies provide more consistent and predictable outcomes. Our findings support the adaptive value of information-seeking behaviors that can mitigate risk with minimal reward loss.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in generating human-like text and exhibiting personality traits similar to those in humans. However, the mechanisms by which LLMs encode and express traits such as agreeableness and impulsiveness remain poorly understood. Drawing on the theory of social determinism, we investigate how long-term background factors, such as family environment and cultural norms, interact with short-term pressures like external instructions, shaping and influencing LLMs' personality traits. By steering the output of LLMs through the utilization of interpretable features within the model, we explore how these background and pressure factors lead to changes in the model's traits without the need for further fine-tuning. Additionally, we suggest the potential impact of these factors on model safety from the perspective of personality.

A recent study by Feldman (2020) proposed a long-tail theory to explain the memorization behavior of deep learning models. However, memorization has not been empirically verified in the context of NLP, a gap addressed by this work. In this paper, we use three different NLP tasks to check if the long-tail theory holds. Our experiments demonstrate that top-ranked memorized training instances are likely atypical, and removing the top-memorized training instances leads to a more serious drop in test accuracy compared with removing training instances randomly. Furthermore, we develop an attribution method to better understand why a training instance is memorized. We empirically show that our memorization attribution method is faithful, and share our interesting finding that the top-memorized parts of a training instance tend to be features negatively correlated with the class label.

This paper introduces CoBRA, a novel toolkit for systematically specifying agent behavior in LLM-based social simulation. We found that conventional approaches that specify agent behavior through implicit natural-language descriptions often do not yield consistent behavior across models, and the resulting behavior does not capture the nuances of the descriptions. In contrast, CoBRA introduces a model-agnostic way to control agent behavior that lets researchers explicitly specify desired nuances and obtain consistent behavior across models. At the heart of CoBRA is a novel closed-loop system primitive with two components: (1) Cognitive Bias Index that measures the demonstrated cognitive bias of a social agent, by quantifying the agent's reactions in a set of validated classic social science experiments; (2) Behavioral Regulation Engine that aligns the agent's behavior to exhibit controlled cognitive bias. Through CoBRA, we show how to operationalize validated social science knowledge (i.e., classical experiments) as reusable "gym" environments for AI -- an approach that may generalize to richer social and affective simulations beyond bias alone.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLM) have led to a new class of autonomous agents, renewing and expanding interest in the area. LLM-powered Multiagent Systems (MAS) have thus emerged, both for assistive and simulation purposes, yet tools for realistic human behavior simulation -- with its distinctive challenges and opportunities -- remain underdeveloped. Existing MAS libraries and tools lack fine-grained persona specifications, population sampling facilities, experimentation support, and integrated validation, among other key capabilities, limiting their utility for behavioral studies, social simulation, and related applications. To address these deficiencies, in this work we introduce TinyTroupe, a simulation toolkit enabling detailed persona definitions (e.g., nationality, age, occupation, personality, beliefs, behaviors) and programmatic control via numerous LLM-driven mechanisms. This allows for the concise formulation of behavioral problems of practical interest, either at the individual or group level, and provides effective means for their solution. TinyTroupe's components are presented using representative working examples, such as brainstorming and market research sessions, thereby simultaneously clarifying their purpose and demonstrating their usefulness. Quantitative and qualitative evaluations of selected aspects are also provided, highlighting possibilities, limitations, and trade-offs. The approach, though realized as a specific Python implementation, is meant as a novel conceptual contribution, which can be partially or fully incorporated in other contexts. The library is available as open source at https://github.com/microsoft/tinytroupe.

Existing benchmarks for LLM agents' social behavior typically focus on a single capability dimension and evaluate only behavioral outcomes, overlooking process signals from reasoning and communication. We present M3-BENCH, a benchmark of 24 mixed-motive games with a process-aware evaluation framework spanning three complementary views: Behavioral Trajectory Analysis (BTA), Reasoning Process Analysis (RPA), and Communication Content Analysis (CCA). Evaluating 11 frontier LLMs and a human baseline, M3-BENCH reveals substantial differences in social competence that outcome-only evaluation misses. In particular, we identify an "overthink-undercommunicate" pattern: reasoning models achieve strong internal deliberation scores but often fail to translate them into effective social communication. Although top models can surpass humans on task outcomes, humans exhibit markedly higher cross-view consistency, suggesting that current LLM agents still lack the behavioral coherence characteristic of human social competence. Our analysis further shows that the three-view decomposition surfaces safety-relevant risks, such as cooperative behavior paired with latent opportunistic reasoning, that remain hidden under outcome-only metrics.

Active inference is a unifying theory for perception and action resting upon the idea that the brain maintains an internal model of the world by minimizing free energy. From a behavioral perspective, active inference agents can be seen as self-evidencing beings that act to fulfill their optimistic predictions, namely preferred outcomes or goals. In contrast, reinforcement learning requires human-designed rewards to accomplish any desired outcome. Although active inference could provide a more natural self-supervised objective for control, its applicability has been limited because of the shortcomings in scaling the approach to complex environments. In this work, we propose a contrastive objective for active inference that strongly reduces the computational burden in learning the agent's generative model and planning future actions. Our method performs notably better than likelihood-based active inference in image-based tasks, while also being computationally cheaper and easier to train. We compare to reinforcement learning agents that have access to human-designed reward functions, showing that our approach closely matches their performance. Finally, we also show that contrastive methods perform significantly better in the case of distractors in the environment and that our method is able to generalize goals to variations in the background. Website and code: https://contrastive-aif.github.io/

We consider the question: when a large language reasoning model makes a choice, did it think first and then decide to, or decide first and then think? In this paper, we present evidence that detectable, early-encoded decisions shape chain-of-thought in reasoning models. Specifically, we show that a simple linear probe successfully decodes tool-calling decisions from pre-generation activations with very high confidence, and in some cases, even before a single reasoning token is produced. Activation steering supports this causally: perturbing the decision direction leads to inflated deliberation, and flips behavior in many examples (between 7 - 79% depending on model and benchmark). We also show through behavioral analysis that, when steering changes the decision, the chain-of-thought process often rationalizes the flip rather than resisting it. Together, these results suggest that reasoning models can encode action choices before they begin to deliberate in text.

Uncovering the fundamental neural correlates of biological intelligence, developing mathematical models, and conducting computational simulations are critical for advancing new paradigms in artificial intelligence (AI). In this study, we implemented a comprehensive visual decision-making model that spans from visual input to behavioral output, using a neural dynamics modeling approach. Drawing inspiration from the key components of the dorsal visual pathway in primates, our model not only aligns closely with human behavior but also reflects neural activities in primates, and achieving accuracy comparable to convolutional neural networks (CNNs). Moreover, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) identified key neuroimaging features such as structural connections and functional connectivity that are associated with performance in perceptual decision-making tasks. A neuroimaging-informed fine-tuning approach was introduced and applied to the model, leading to performance improvements that paralleled the behavioral variations observed among subjects. Compared to classical deep learning models, our model more accurately replicates the behavioral performance of biological intelligence, relying on the structural characteristics of biological neural networks rather than extensive training data, and demonstrating enhanced resilience to perturbation.

Can large multimodal models have a human-like ability for emotional and social reasoning, and if so, how does it work? Recent research has discovered emergent theory-of-mind (ToM) reasoning capabilities in large language models (LLMs). LLMs can reason about people's mental states by solving various text-based ToM tasks that ask questions about the actors' ToM (e.g., human belief, desire, intention). However, human reasoning in the wild is often grounded in dynamic scenes across time. Thus, we consider videos a new medium for examining spatio-temporal ToM reasoning ability. Specifically, we ask explicit probing questions about videos with abundant social and emotional reasoning content. We develop a pipeline for multimodal LLM for ToM reasoning using video and text. We also enable explicit ToM reasoning by retrieving key frames for answering a ToM question, which reveals how multimodal LLMs reason about ToM.

Advancements in AI have led to agents in networked environments increasingly mirroring human behavior, thereby blurring the boundary between artificial and human actors in specific contexts. This shift brings about significant challenges in trust, responsibility, ethics, security and etc. The difficulty in supervising of agent behaviors may lead to issues such as data contamination and unclear accountability. To address these challenges, this paper proposes the "Network Behavior Lifecycle" model, which divides network behavior into 6 stages and systematically analyzes the behavioral differences between humans and agents at each stage. Based on these insights, the paper further introduces the "Agent for Agent (A4A)" paradigm and the "Human-Agent Behavioral Disparity (HABD)" model, which examine the fundamental distinctions between human and agent behaviors across 5 dimensions: decision mechanism, execution efficiency, intention-behavior consistency, behavioral inertia, and irrational patterns. The effectiveness of the model is verified through real-world cases such as red team penetration and blue team defense. Finally, the paper discusses future research directions in dynamic cognitive governance architecture, behavioral disparity quantification, and meta-governance protocol stacks, aiming to provide a theoretical foundation and technical roadmap for secure and trustworthy human-agent collaboration.

When one agent interacts with a multi-agent environment, it is challenging to deal with various opponents unseen before. Modeling the behaviors, goals, or beliefs of opponents could help the agent adjust its policy to adapt to different opponents. In addition, it is also important to consider opponents who are learning simultaneously or capable of reasoning. However, existing work usually tackles only one of the aforementioned types of opponents. In this paper, we propose model-based opponent modeling (MBOM), which employs the environment model to adapt to all kinds of opponents. MBOM simulates the recursive reasoning process in the environment model and imagines a set of improving opponent policies. To effectively and accurately represent the opponent policy, MBOM further mixes the imagined opponent policies according to the similarity with the real behaviors of opponents. Empirically, we show that MBOM achieves more effective adaptation than existing methods in a variety of tasks, respectively with different types of opponents, i.e., fixed policy, na\"ive learner, and reasoning learner.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to understand people's mental variables based on their behavior, is key to developing socially intelligent agents. Current approaches to Theory of Mind reasoning either rely on prompting Large Language Models (LLMs), which are prone to systematic errors, or use rigid, handcrafted Bayesian Theory of Mind (BToM) models, which are more robust but cannot generalize across different domains. In this work, we introduce AutoToM, an automated Bayesian Theory of Mind method for achieving open-ended machine Theory of Mind. AutoToM can operate in any domain, infer any mental variable, and conduct robust Theory of Mind reasoning of any order. Given a Theory of Mind inference problem, AutoToM first proposes an initial BToM model. It then conducts automated Bayesian inverse planning based on the proposed model, leveraging an LLM as the backend. Based on the uncertainty of the inference, it iteratively refines the model, by introducing additional mental variables and/or incorporating more timesteps in the context. Empirical evaluations across multiple Theory of Mind benchmarks demonstrate that AutoToM consistently achieves state-of-the-art performance, offering a scalable, robust, and interpretable approach to machine Theory of Mind.

The solution methods used to realize artificial general intelligence (AGI) may not contain the formalism needed to adequately model and characterize AGI. In particular, current approaches to learning hold notions of problem domain and problem task as fundamental precepts, but it is hardly apparent that an AGI encountered in the wild will be discernable into a set of domain-task pairings. Nor is it apparent that the outcomes of AGI in a system can be well expressed in terms of domain and task, or as consequences thereof. Thus, there is both a practical and theoretical use for meta-theories of learning which do not express themselves explicitly in terms of solution methods. General systems theory offers such a meta-theory. Herein, Mesarovician abstract systems theory is used as a super-structure for learning. Abstract learning systems are formulated. Subsequent elaboration stratifies the assumptions of learning systems into a hierarchy and considers the hierarchy such stratification projects onto learning theory. The presented Mesarovician abstract learning systems theory calls back to the founding motivations of artificial intelligence research by focusing on the thinking participants directly, in this case, learning systems, in contrast to the contemporary focus on the problems thinking participants solve.