Daily Papers

Standard federated learning (FL) approaches are vulnerable to the free-rider dilemma: participating agents can contribute little to nothing yet receive a well-trained aggregated model. While prior mechanisms attempt to solve the free-rider dilemma, none have addressed the issue of truthfulness. In practice, adversarial agents can provide false information to the server in order to cheat its way out of contributing to federated training. In an effort to make free-riding-averse federated mechanisms truthful, and consequently less prone to breaking down in practice, we propose FACT. FACT is the first federated mechanism that: (1) eliminates federated free riding by using a penalty system, (2) ensures agents provide truthful information by creating a competitive environment, and (3) encourages agent participation by offering better performance than training alone. Empirically, FACT avoids free-riding when agents are untruthful, and reduces agent loss by over 4x.

Mixed-motive multi-agent settings are rife with persistent free-riding because individual effort benefits all members equally, yet each member bears the full cost of their own contribution. Classical work by Holmström established that under pure self-interest, Nash equilibrium is universal shirking. While i* represents teams as composite actors, it lacks scalable computational mechanisms for analyzing how collective action problems emerge and resolve in coopetitive settings. This technical report extends computational foundations for strategic coopetition to team-level dynamics, building on companion work formalizing interdependence/complementarity (arXiv:2510.18802) and trust dynamics (arXiv:2510.24909). We develop loyalty-moderated utility functions with two mechanisms: loyalty benefit (welfare internalization plus intrinsic contribution satisfaction) and cost tolerance (reduced effort burden for loyal members). We integrate i* structural dependencies through dependency-weighted team cohesion, connecting member incentives to team-level positioning. The framework applies to both human teams (loyalty as psychological identification) and multi-agent systems (alignment coefficients and adjusted cost functions). Experimental validation across 3,125 configurations demonstrates robust loyalty effects (15.04x median effort differentiation). All six behavioral targets achieve thresholds: free-riding baseline (96.5%), loyalty monotonicity (100%), effort differentiation (100%), team size effect (100%), mechanism synergy (99.5%), and bounded outcomes (100%). Empirical validation using published Apache HTTP Server (1995-2023) case study achieves 60/60 points, reproducing contribution patterns across formation, growth, maturation, and governance phases. Statistical significance confirmed at p<0.001, Cohen's d=0.71.

Private BitTorrent trackers enforce upload-to-download ratios to prevent free-riding, but suffer from three critical weaknesses: reputation cannot move between trackers, centralized servers create single points of failure, and upload statistics are self-reported and unverifiable. When a tracker shuts down, users lose their contribution history and cannot prove their standing to new communities. We address these problems by storing reputation in smart contracts and replacing self-reports with cryptographic attestations. Peers sign receipts for received pieces; the tracker aggregates them via BLS signatures and updates reputation. If a tracker is unavailable, peers fall back to an authenticated distributed hash table (DHT): stored reputation acts as a public key infrastructure (PKI), preserving access control without the tracker. Reputation is portable across tracker failures through single-hop migration in factory-deployed contracts. We also address the privacy implications of publishing public keys and reputations tied to private trackers on a public ledger: we propose ephemeral session keys to prevent linking peer identities, zero-knowledge membership proofs for anonymous DHT participation, and confidential reputation using homomorphic commitments. We formalize the security requirements, prove four security properties under standard cryptographic assumptions, and evaluate a prototype. Measurements show that transfer receipts add less than 5\% end-to-end overhead with typical piece sizes. To minimize signing overhead, we adopt a hybrid signature scheme: ECDSA signs individual piece receipts at transfer time for low per-operation latency, while BLS serves as the overarching scheme, enabling compact aggregation of many receipts into a single proof at report time. This design reduces client-side signing cost by an order of magnitude compared to using BLS throughout.

The existing peer-to-peer networks have several problems such as fake content distribution, free riding, white-washing and poor search scalability, lack of a robust trust model and absence of user privacy protection mechanism. Although, several trust management and semantic community-based mechanisms for combating free riding and distribution of malicious contents have been proposed by some researchers, most of these schemes lack scalability due to their high computational, communication and storage overhead. This paper presents a robust trust management scheme for P2P networks that utilizes topology adaptation by constructing an overlay of trusted peers where the neighbors are selected based on their trust ratings and content similarities. While increasing the search efficiency by intelligently exploiting the formation of semantic community structures by topology adaptation among the trustworthy peers, the scheme provides the users a very high level of privacy protection of their usage and consumption patterns of network resources. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed scheme provides efficient searching to good peers while penalizing the malicious peers by increasing their search times as the network topology stabilizes.

Common-pool resource governance requires users to cooperate and avoid overexploitation, but defection and free-riding often undermine cooperation. We model a human-environmental system that integrates dynamics of resource and users' strategies. The resource follows a logistic function that depends on natural growth rate, carrying capacity, and extraction rates of cooperators and defectors. The users' strategies evolve according to different processes that capture effects of payoff, resource, and noise. We analyze the feedback between resource availability and strategic adaptation, and explores the conditions for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. We find different processes lead to different regimes of equilibrium solutions and resource levels depending on the parameter configuration and initial conditions. We also show that some processes can enhance the sustainability of the resource by making the users more responsive to the resource scarcity. The paper advances the understanding of human-environmental system and offers insights for resource governance policies and interventions.

Society is characterized by the presence of a variety of social norms: collective patterns of sanctioning that can prevent miscoordination and free-riding. Inspired by this, we aim to construct learning dynamics where potentially beneficial social norms can emerge. Since social norms are underpinned by sanctioning, we introduce a training regime where agents can access all sanctioning events but learning is otherwise decentralized. This setting is technologically interesting because sanctioning events may be the only available public signal in decentralized multi-agent systems where reward or policy-sharing is infeasible or undesirable. To achieve collective action in this setting we construct an agent architecture containing a classifier module that categorizes observed behaviors as approved or disapproved, and a motivation to punish in accord with the group. We show that social norms emerge in multi-agent systems containing this agent and investigate the conditions under which this helps them achieve socially beneficial outcomes.

Coordinating multiple large language models (LLMs) to solve complex tasks collaboratively poses a fundamental trade-off between the computation costs and collective performance compared with individual model. We introduce a novel, game-theoretically grounded reinforcement learning (RL) framework, the Multi-Agent Cooperation Sequential Public Goods Game (MAC-SPGG), to systematically incentivize cooperation in multi-LLM ensembles. In MAC-SPGG, LLM agents move in sequence, observing predecessors' outputs and updating beliefs to condition their own contributions. By redesigning the public-goods reward, effortful contributions become the unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE), which eliminates free-riding under traditional SPGG or PGG. Its sequential protocol replaces costly round-based information exchanges with a streamlined decision flow, cutting communication overhead while retaining strategic depth. We prove the existence and uniqueness of the SPNE under realistic parameters, and empirically show that MAC-SPGG-trained ensembles outperform single-agent baselines, chain-of-thought prompting, and other cooperative methods, even achieving comparable performance to large-scale models across reasoning, math, code generation, and NLP tasks. Our results highlight the power of structured, incentive-aligned MAC-SPGG cooperation for scalable and robust multi-agent language generation.

Collaborative multi-agent large language models (LLMs) can solve complex reasoning tasks by decomposing roles, but reinforcement learning for such systems is limited by credit assignment: shared terminal rewards obscure individual contributions and can encourage free-riding. We introduce Collaborative Credit Policy Optimization (CCPO), an optimizer-agnostic credit assignment layer that converts team-level outcomes into agent-specific learning signals. CCPO provides two complementary allocators. Counterfactual credit estimates an agent's marginal contribution by comparing the realized team outcome with a counterfactual outcome where that agent is removed. Verifier-anchored LLM self-evaluation is an exploratory allocator that uses constrained self- and peer-evaluations to redistribute credit while keeping the external verifier outcome dominant. The resulting role-specific rewards can be consumed by GRPO-style updates or other policy-gradient optimizers such as GSPO and REINFORCE++. We instantiate CCPO in a sequential Think--Solve setting and evaluate it on mathematical reasoning benchmarks. Results show that explicit credit assignment often improves dual-agent reasoning, especially on MATH500 and several out-of-distribution settings, while gains vary across models and datasets.

User data confidentiality protection is becoming a rising challenge in the present deep learning research. Without access to data, conventional data-driven model compression faces a higher risk of performance degradation. Recently, some works propose to generate images from a specific pretrained model to serve as training data. However, the inversion process only utilizes biased feature statistics stored in one model and is from low-dimension to high-dimension. As a consequence, it inevitably encounters the difficulties of generalizability and inexact inversion, which leads to unsatisfactory performance. To address these problems, we propose MixMix based on two simple yet effective techniques: (1) Feature Mixing: utilizes various models to construct a universal feature space for generalized inversion; (2) Data Mixing: mixes the synthesized images and labels to generate exact label information. We prove the effectiveness of MixMix from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. Extensive experiments show that MixMix outperforms existing methods on the mainstream compression tasks, including quantization, knowledge distillation, and pruning. Specifically, MixMix achieves up to 4% and 20% accuracy uplift on quantization and pruning, respectively, compared to existing data-free compression work.

Gate set tomography (GST) is a protocol for detailed, predictive characterization of logic operations (gates) on quantum computing processors. Early versions of GST emerged around 2012-13, and since then it has been refined, demonstrated, and used in a large number of experiments. This paper presents the foundations of GST in comprehensive detail. The most important feature of GST, compared to older state and process tomography protocols, is that it is calibration-free. GST does not rely on pre-calibrated state preparations and measurements. Instead, it characterizes all the operations in a gate set simultaneously and self-consistently, relative to each other. Long sequence GST can estimate gates with very high precision and efficiency, achieving Heisenberg scaling in regimes of practical interest. In this paper, we cover GST's intellectual history, the techniques and experiments used to achieve its intended purpose, data analysis, gauge freedom and fixing, error bars, and the interpretation of gauge-fixed estimates of gate sets. Our focus is fundamental mathematical aspects of GST, rather than implementation details, but we touch on some of the foundational algorithmic tricks used in the pyGSTi implementation.