Daily Papers

As agentic AI systems become increasingly capable of generating and optimizing GPU kernels, progress is constrained by benchmarks that reward speedup over software baselines rather than proximity to hardware-efficient execution. We present SOL-ExecBench, a benchmark of 235 CUDA kernel optimization problems extracted from 124 production and emerging AI models spanning language, diffusion, vision, audio, video, and hybrid architectures, targeting NVIDIA Blackwell GPUs. The benchmark covers forward and backward workloads across BF16, FP8, and NVFP4, including kernels whose best performance is expected to rely on Blackwell-specific capabilities. Unlike prior benchmarks that evaluate kernels primarily relative to software implementations, SOL-ExecBench measures performance against analytically derived Speed-of-Light (SOL) bounds computed by SOLAR, our pipeline for deriving hardware-grounded SOL bounds, yielding a fixed target for hardware-efficient optimization. We report a SOL Score that quantifies how much of the gap between a release-defined scoring baseline and the hardware SOL bound a candidate kernel closes. To support robust evaluation of agentic optimizers, we additionally provide a sandboxed harness with GPU clock locking, L2 cache clearing, isolated subprocess execution, and static analysis based checks against common reward-hacking strategies. SOL-ExecBench reframes GPU kernel benchmarking from beating a mutable software baseline to closing the remaining gap to hardware Speed-of-Light.

Reinforcement learning (RL), large language models (LLMs), and vision-language models (VLMs) have been widely studied in isolation. However, existing infrastructure lacks the ability to deploy agents from different decision-making paradigms within the same environment, making it difficult to study them in hybrid multi-agent settings or to compare their behaviour fairly under identical conditions. We present MOSAIC, an open-source platform that bridges this gap by incorporating a diverse set of existing reinforcement learning environments and enabling heterogeneous agents (RL policies, LLMs, VLMs, and human players) to operate within them in ad-hoc team settings with reproducible results. MOSAIC introduces three contributions. (i) An IPC-based worker protocol that wraps both native and third-party frameworks as isolated subprocess workers, each executing its native training and inference logic unmodified, communicating through a versioned inter-process protocol. (ii) An operator abstraction that forms an agent-level interface by mapping workers to agents: each operator, regardless of whether it is backed by an RL policy, an LLM, or a human, conforms to a minimal unified interface. (iii) A deterministic cross-paradigm evaluation framework offering two complementary modes: a manual mode that advances up to N concurrent operators in lock-step under shared seeds for fine-grained visual inspection of behavioural differences, and a script mode that drives automated, long-running evaluation through declarative Python scripts, for reproducible experiments. We release MOSAIC as an open, visual-first platform to facilitate reproducible cross-paradigm research across the RL, LLM, and human-in-the-loop communities.

Large language models (LLMs) extended as systems, such as ChatGPT, have begun supporting third-party applications. These LLM apps leverage the de facto natural language-based automated execution paradigm of LLMs: that is, apps and their interactions are defined in natural language, provided access to user data, and allowed to freely interact with each other and the system. These LLM app ecosystems resemble the settings of earlier computing platforms, where there was insufficient isolation between apps and the system. Because third-party apps may not be trustworthy, and exacerbated by the imprecision of natural language interfaces, the current designs pose security and privacy risks for users. In this paper, we evaluate whether these issues can be addressed through execution isolation and what that isolation might look like in the context of LLM-based systems, where there are arbitrary natural language-based interactions between system components, between LLM and apps, and between apps. To that end, we propose IsolateGPT, a design architecture that demonstrates the feasibility of execution isolation and provides a blueprint for implementing isolation, in LLM-based systems. We evaluate IsolateGPT against a number of attacks and demonstrate that it protects against many security, privacy, and safety issues that exist in non-isolated LLM-based systems, without any loss of functionality. The performance overhead incurred by IsolateGPT to improve security is under 30% for three-quarters of tested queries.

While large language models have made significant strides in code generation, the pass rate of the generated code is bottlenecked on subtle errors, often requiring human intervention to pass tests, especially for complex problems. Existing LLM-based debugging systems treat generated programs as monolithic units, failing to address bugs at multiple levels of granularity, from low-level syntax errors to high-level algorithmic flaws. In this paper, we introduce Multi-Granularity Debugger (MGDebugger), a hierarchical code debugger by isolating, identifying, and resolving bugs at various levels of granularity. MGDebugger decomposes problematic code into a hierarchical tree structure of subfunctions, with each level representing a particular granularity of error. During debugging, it analyzes each subfunction and iteratively resolves bugs in a bottom-up manner. To effectively test each subfunction, we propose an LLM-simulated Python executor, which traces code execution and tracks important variable states to pinpoint errors accurately. Extensive experiments demonstrate that MGDebugger outperforms existing debugging systems, achieving an 18.9% improvement in accuracy over seed generations in HumanEval and a 97.6% repair success rate in HumanEvalFix. Furthermore, MGDebugger effectively fixes bugs across different categories and difficulty levels, demonstrating its robustness and effectiveness.

The capability of LLM agents to function as the ``brain'' of a system fundamentally expands the scope of analysis beyond a standalone model. Consequently, safety is no longer only about input--output content alignment. It also concerns system behavior and real-world execution outcomes. However, the current literature is fragmented across attack types, applications, and benchmarks. This makes it hard to explain why failures such as prompt injection, tool misuse, and memory poisoning often share the same structural cause, and how they spread through an agent workflow. In this survey, we treat isolation as a first-class principle for LLM-agent system safety. By isolation, we refer to the separation of user inputs, tool access, execution channels, inter-agent communication, and environment-originated context. We organize the literature with a boundary-centric taxonomy of five boundaries: user-agent, agent-tool, agent-execution, agent-agent, and system-environment. This view helps identify where the loss of isolation first occurs, how compromise propagates across boundaries, and which defenses are most relevant at each interface. We also summarize cross-boundary failure paths, discuss open challenges, and outline a research agenda for isolation-by-construction in future agent systems.

AI agents are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where malicious content hijacks agent behavior to steal credentials or cause financial loss. The only known robust defense is architectural isolation that strictly separates trusted task planning from untrusted environment observations. However, applying this design to Computer Use Agents (CUAs) -- systems that automate tasks by viewing screens and executing actions -- presents a fundamental challenge: current agents require continuous observation of UI state to determine each action, conflicting with the isolation required for security. We resolve this tension by demonstrating that UI workflows, while dynamic, are structurally predictable. We introduce Single-Shot Planning for CUAs, where a trusted planner generates a complete execution graph with conditional branches before any observation of potentially malicious content, providing provable control flow integrity guarantees against arbitrary instruction injections. Although this architectural isolation successfully prevents instruction injections, we show that additional measures are needed to prevent Branch Steering attacks, which manipulate UI elements to trigger unintended valid paths within the plan. We evaluate our design on OSWorld, and retain up to 57% of the performance of frontier models while improving performance for smaller open-source models by up to 19%, demonstrating that rigorous security and utility can coexist in CUAs.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown significant advancements in code generation, but still face challenges on tasks beyond their basic capabilities. Recently, the notion of self-debugging has been proposed to boost the performance of code generation by leveraging execution feedback from tests. Despite its promise, the availability of high-quality tests in real-world scenarios is limited. In this context, self-debugging with self-generated tests is a promising solution but lacks a full exploration of its limitations and practical potential. Therefore, we investigate its efficacy on diverse programming problems. To deepen our understanding, we propose two distinct paradigms for the process: post-execution and in-execution self-debugging. Within the scope of self-contained Python programming tasks, we find that post-execution self-debugging struggles on basic problems but shows potential for improvement on competitive ones, due to the bias introduced by self-generated tests. On the other hand, in-execution self-debugging enables LLMs to mitigate the bias by solely leveraging intermediate states during execution, thereby enhancing code generation.

Large language models are increasingly applied to various development scenarios. However, in on-chain transaction scenarios, even a minor error can cause irreversible loss for users. Existing evaluations often overlook execution accuracy and safety. We introduce EVM-QuestBench, an execution-grounded benchmark for natural-language transaction-script generation on EVM-compatible chains. The benchmark employs dynamic evaluation: instructions are sampled from template pools, numeric parameters are drawn from predefined intervals, and validators verify outcomes against these instantiated values. EVM-QuestBench contains 107 tasks (62 atomic, 45 composite). Its modular architecture enables rapid task development. The runner executes scripts on a forked EVM chain with snapshot isolation; composite tasks apply step-efficiency decay. We evaluate 20 models and find large performance gaps, with split scores revealing persistent asymmetry between single-action precision and multi-step workflow completion. Code: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/bsc_quest_bench-A9CF/.

Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) provide hardware-based isolation to protect sensitive data and computations from potentially compromised operating systems (OS). However, TEE applications inevitably interact with the untrusted OS through SDK interfaces, and improper partitioning can introduce severe vulnerabilities such as data leakage and code injection. While prior work has proposed static analysis tools to detect such issues, automated repair remains largely unexplored. This problem is particularly challenging due to three TEE-specific factors: the lack of standardized secure development guidelines, the difficulty of extracting semantic information from low-level C code, and the absence of mature testing and validation methods. In this work, we present TEERepair, a framework for automatically repairing bad partitioning issues in TEE applications. Our approach tackles the above challenges by introducing a domain-specific language (DSL) to encode repair rules that express and capture common TEE security patterns, which are instantiated as patch templates with placeholders for context-specific variables. We then leverage large language models (LLMs) to reason about code semantics and synthesize context-aware patches, and further generate test clients to validate the repairs. We evaluate TEERepair on the TEE Partitioning Errors Benchmark (PartitioningE-Bench), achieving a significantly higher repair success rate of 87.6% compared to baselines. Furthermore, applying TEERepair to real-world TEE projects, we submitted 5 repair pull requests, 2 of which have been confirmed and merged by project maintainers.

Instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) show impressive results in numerous practical applications, but they lack essential safety features that are common in other areas of computer science, particularly an explicit separation of instructions and data. This makes them vulnerable to manipulations such as indirect prompt injections and generally unsuitable for safety-critical tasks. Surprisingly, there is currently no established definition or benchmark to quantify this phenomenon. In this work, we close this gap by introducing a formal measure for instruction-data separation and an empirical variant that is calculable from a model's outputs. We also present a new dataset, SEP, that allows estimating the measure for real-world models. Our results on various LLMs show that the problem of instruction-data separation is real: all models fail to achieve high separation, and canonical mitigation techniques, such as prompt engineering and fine-tuning, either fail to substantially improve separation or reduce model utility. The source code and SEP dataset are openly accessible at https://github.com/egozverev/Shold-It-Be-Executed-Or-Processed.

Training large language models (LLMs) on Python execution traces grounds them in code execution and enables the line-by-line execution prediction of whole Python programs, effectively turning them into neural interpreters (FAIR CodeGen Team et al., 2025). However, developers rarely execute programs step by step; instead, they use debuggers to stop execution at certain breakpoints and step through relevant portions only while inspecting or modifying program variables. Existing neural interpreter approaches lack such interactive control. To address this limitation, we introduce neural debuggers: language models that emulate traditional debuggers, supporting operations such as stepping into, over, or out of functions, as well as setting breakpoints at specific source lines. We show that neural debuggers -- obtained via fine-tuning large LLMs or pre-training smaller models from scratch -- can reliably model both forward execution (predicting future states and outputs) and inverse execution (inferring prior states or inputs) conditioned on debugger actions. Evaluated on CruxEval, our models achieve strong performance on both output and input prediction tasks, demonstrating robust conditional execution modeling. Our work takes first steps towards future agentic coding systems in which neural debuggers serve as a world model for simulated debugging environments, providing execution feedback or enabling agents to interact with real debugging tools. This capability lays the foundation for more powerful code generation, program understanding, and automated debugging.

Command-line interfaces (CLIs) provide structured textual environments for system administration. Explorations have been performed using pre-trained language models (PLMs) to simulate these environments for safe interaction in high-risk environments. However, their use has been constrained to frozen, large parameter models like GPT. For smaller architectures to reach a similar level of believability, a rich dataset of CLI interactions is required. Existing public datasets focus on mapping natural-language tasks to commands, omitting crucial execution data such as exit codes, outputs, and environmental side effects, limiting their usability for behavioral modeling. We introduce a Shell Input -Output Environment (ShIOEnv), which casts command construction as a Markov Decision Process whose state is the partially built sequence and whose actions append arguments. After each action, ShIOEnv executes the candidate and returns its exit status, output, and progress toward a minimal-length behavioral objective. Due to the intractable nature of the combinatorial argument state-action space, we derive a context-free grammar from man pages to mask invalid arguments from being emitted. We explore random and proximal-policy optimization (PPO)-optimized sampling of unrestricted and grammar-masked action spaces to produce four exploration strategies. We observed that grammar masking and PPO significantly improve sample efficiency to produce a higher quality dataset (maximizing the number of arguments while minimizing redundancies). Policy-generated datasets of shell input-output behavior pairs are used to fine-tune CodeT5, where we observe 85% improvements in BLEU-4 when constraining the action space to grammar productions with an additional 26% improvement when applying PPO. The ShIOEnv environment and curated command behavior datasets are released for use in future research.

Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) provide hardware-enforced isolation that protects sensitive code and data from untrusted software. Despite their strong security guarantees, analyzing TEE applications remains challenging due to the high cost and complexity of configuring complete TEE build and runtime environments, as well as the limited observability imposed by hardware isolation. This paper presents SymTEE, a novel large language model (LLM)-assisted symbolic execution framework for detecting missing input validation issues in TEE applications without requiring real TEE setups. SymTEE begins by leveraging Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) analysis to extract TEE code slices that may lack sufficient input validation, and then employs an LLM (GPT-5 in our case) to automatically convert the extracted slices into KLEE-compatible harness programs containing lightweight mock execution environments for symbolic analysis. Evaluations on 26 vulnerabilities (11 real-world and 15 synthetic) show that SymTEE achieves 100% precision and 92.3% recall in detecting missing input validation vulnerabilities while incurring an average analysis cost of only $0.05. These results demonstrate the effectiveness and practicality of SymTEE's pioneering paradigm of LLM-assisted symbolic execution, where LLMs autonomously generate mock environments to enable automated security analysis without complex setup, providing a more accessible and scalable framework for trusted computing systems.

Despite their remarkable performance, large language models lack elementary safety features, making them susceptible to numerous malicious attacks. In particular, previous work has identified the absence of an intrinsic separation between instructions and data as the root cause of the success of prompt injection attacks. In this work, we propose a new architectural element, ASIDE, that allows language models to clearly separate instructions and data at the level of token embeddings. ASIDE applies an orthogonal rotation to the embeddings of data tokens, thus creating clearly distinct representations of instructions and data tokens without introducing any additional parameters. As we demonstrate experimentally across a range of models, instruction-tuning LLMs with ASIDE (1) achieves substantially higher instruction-data separation without performance loss and (2) makes the models more robust to prompt injection benchmarks, even without dedicated safety training. Additionally, we provide insights into the mechanism underlying our method through an analysis of the model representations. The source code and training scripts are openly accessible at https://github.com/egozverev/aside.

Automatically generating formal specifications could reduce the effort needed to improve program correctness, but in practice, this is still challenging. Many developers avoid writing contracts by hand, which limits the use of automated verification tools. Recent large language models (LLMs) can generate specifications from code, but these specifications often fail in terms of verification. The reason is syntax errors, overly strict constraints, or mismatches with program behavior. We present SpecPylot, a Python tool that synthesizes executable specifications for Python programs as icontract annotations and checks them using crosshair's symbolic execution. The tool relies on LLMs to propose candidate contracts and uses crosshair to validate them. When crosshair finds a concrete counterexample, SpecPylot updates only the generated contracts and leaves the program itself untouched. In addition, the tool can produce coverage-driven pytest stubs and keep detailed execution artifacts that are useful during debugging. Overall, the evaluation indicates that SpecPylot is able to generate crosshair-compatible contracts for most programs, but it also highlights the practical limits introduced by bounded symbolic exploration and differences in LLM behavior.

One-shot Program-of-Thought (PoT) emits a Python program that prints a primitive-action plan; a single invalid action silently invalidates the trajectory. We introduce RePoT (Recoverable PoT): a deterministic verified replay that walks the plan through the environment to its first invalid transition, then one LLM call that resumes from the verified prefix. RePoT costs at most one extra LLM call on the ~14% of problems where PoT fails. RePoT beats PoT by +3 to +11pp across four closed-model configurations on PuzzleZoo-775 and peaks at 96.9% vs 86.3% on gpt-5.4-mini-medium; against the matched-budget PoT-retry baseline, RePoT wins decisively on Gemini (+3.8pp, 95% CI [+2.2,+5.4]), is within sampling noise on GPT-medium and Claude, and loses on GPT-mini -- a capability-scaling pattern we begin to address with Adaptive RePoT, a rule-based dispatcher that routes between suffix repair and a fresh PoT retry based on verified-prefix length (preliminary). We replicate on PlanBench Blocksworld (+1.1 to +11.4pp) and on four open-weights models (+3.3 to +20.0pp on three of four). On Derail-550, our controlled recovery benchmark, every condition with access to checkpoint information clears >=30% on GPT-medium and >=70% on Gemini, vs <=3.1% for error-only feedback -- showing that checkpoint information, not the specific verified-prefix tail, is the load-bearing recovery signal.

Production LLM-agent frameworks expose control primitives -- human-in-the-loop approval gates, run cancellation, and execution timeouts -- whose names and documentation imply barrier semantics: while a run is paused, cancelled, or timed out, no gated side effect executes. We show this implied contract holds on none of the six widely used open-source frameworks we test. Model-free differential probes isolate a recurring sibling leak -- an approval gate suspends its own branch while a sibling branch's effect executes during the pause, so a later rejection cannot prevent it -- in every framework shipping a pre-execution gate (five of six), plus three further gaps: replay double-execution, cancellation orphans, and timeout zombies. The hazard is reachable, not merely constructible: under an a-priori-fixed protocol, frontier models emit the leak-triggering plan shape at pooled rates up to 14%, and when live models drive the unmodified frameworks under an approval pause, 215 of 1,200 runs execute their effect during the pause, across three schedulers and two language runtimes. To repair the measured gaps we present SOUNDGATE, an environment-external effect gate in Rust through which every side effect must be admitted, enforcing hold-until-decided, reject-cancels, dedup-on-replay, and fence-on-cancel -- one property per violation class -- under a stated complete-mediation contract discharged for network egress by kernel-enforced routes. We verify the properties over a model of the admission core (Verus; TLA+/TLC, exhaustive to 7.5e7 states; TLAPS), model-check the deployed Rust with Loom, and bridge model to code by differential conformance over 1.2e7 operations -- refinement evidence, not a mechanized proof. SOUNDGATE blocks every measured violation end-to-end on all six frameworks while releasing legitimate effects, at about 1 ms admission per write and 12k-26k durable admissions per second.

DL compiler's primary function is to translate DNN programs written in high-level DL frameworks such as PyTorch and TensorFlow into portable executables. These executables can then be flexibly executed by the deployed host programs. However, existing DL compilers rely on a tracing mechanism, which involves feeding a runtime input to a neural network program and tracing the program execution paths to generate the computational graph necessary for compilation. Unfortunately, this mechanism falls short when dealing with modern dynamic neural networks (DyNNs) that possess varying computational graphs depending on the inputs. Consequently, conventional DL compilers struggle to accurately compile DyNNs into executable code. To address this limitation, we propose \tool, a general approach that enables any existing DL compiler to successfully compile DyNNs. \tool tackles the dynamic nature of DyNNs by introducing a compilation mechanism that redistributes the control and data flow of the original DNN programs during the compilation process. Specifically, \tool develops program analysis and program transformation techniques to convert a dynamic neural network into multiple sub-neural networks. Each sub-neural network is devoid of conditional statements and is compiled independently. Furthermore, \tool synthesizes a host module that models the control flow of the DyNNs and facilitates the invocation of the sub-neural networks. Our evaluation demonstrates the effectiveness of \tool, achieving a 100\% success rate in compiling all dynamic neural networks. Moreover, the compiled executables generated by \tool exhibit significantly improved performance, running between 1.12times and 20.21times faster than the original DyNNs executed on general-purpose DL frameworks.

Automated code generation is gaining significant importance in intelligent computer programming and system deployment. However, current approaches often face challenges in computational efficiency and lack robust mechanisms for code parsing and error correction. In this work, we propose a novel framework, PyCapsule, with a simple yet effective two-agent pipeline and efficient self-debugging modules for Python code generation. PyCapsule features sophisticated prompt inference, iterative error handling, and case testing, ensuring high generation stability, safety, and correctness. Empirically, PyCapsule achieves up to 5.7% improvement of success rate on HumanEval, 10.3% on HumanEval-ET, and 24.4% on BigCodeBench compared to the state-of-art methods. We also observe a decrease in normalized success rate given more self-debugging attempts, potentially affected by limited and noisy error feedback in retention. PyCapsule demonstrates broader impacts on advancing lightweight and efficient code generation for artificial intelligence systems.

Indirect prompt injection threatens LLM agents by embedding malicious instructions in external content, enabling unauthorized actions and data theft. LLM agents maintain working memory through their context window, which stores interaction history for decision-making. Conventional agents indiscriminately accumulate all tool outputs and reasoning traces in this memory, creating two critical vulnerabilities: (1) injected instructions persist throughout the workflow, granting attackers multiple opportunities to manipulate behavior, and (2) verbose, non-essential content degrades decision-making capabilities. Existing defenses treat bloated memory as given and focus on remaining resilient, rather than reducing unnecessary accumulation to prevent the attack. We present AgentSys, a framework that defends against indirect prompt injection through explicit memory management. Inspired by process memory isolation in operating systems, AgentSys organizes agents hierarchically: a main agent spawns worker agents for tool calls, each running in an isolated context and able to spawn nested workers for subtasks. External data and subtask traces never enter the main agent's memory; only schema-validated return values can cross boundaries through deterministic JSON parsing. Ablations show isolation alone cuts attack success to 2.19%, and adding a validator/sanitizer further improves defense with event-triggered checks whose overhead scales with operations rather than context length. On AgentDojo and ASB, AgentSys achieves 0.78% and 4.25% attack success while slightly improving benign utility over undefended baselines. It remains robust to adaptive attackers and across multiple foundation models, showing that explicit memory management enables secure, dynamic LLM agent architectures. Our code is available at: https://github.com/ruoyaow/agentsys-memory.

Building LLM-based agents has become increasingly important. Recent works on LLM-based agent self-evolution primarily record successful experiences as textual prompts or reflections, which cannot reliably guarantee efficient task re-execution in complex scenarios. We propose AgentFactory, a new self-evolution paradigm that preserves successful task solutions as executable subagent code rather than textual experience. Crucially, these subagents are continuously refined based on execution feedback, becoming increasingly robust and efficient as more tasks are encountered. Saved subagents are pure Python code with standardized documentation, enabling portability across any Python-capable system. We demonstrate that AgentFactory enables continuous capability accumulation: its library of executable subagents grows and improves over time, progressively reducing the effort required for similar tasks without manual intervention. Our implementation is open-sourced at https://github.com/zzatpku/AgentFactory, and our demonstration video is available at https://youtu.be/iKSsuAXJHW0.

LLM-agent budget overruns are a documented production failure class: a single retry loop can spend thousands of dollars before an operator notices, and the in-process integrity properties that would prevent it (no aliasing, no double-spend, no use-after-delegation of a cost-bearing value) are enforced, if at all, by ad-hoc wrappers rather than by the type system. Our central contribution is empirical: a catalog of 63 confirmed production incidents from 21 orchestration frameworks (2023-2026), each backed by a quoted GitHub issue and, where reported, a dollar loss, organized into an eight-cluster failure taxonomy (inter-rater Cohen's kappa = 0.837, N = 113), plus 47 supplementary structural entries. As one mitigation evaluated against this taxonomy, we build token-budgets, an 1,180-line Rust crate (no unsafe) that operationalizes affine ownership so that cloning, double-spending, or using a budget after delegating it are compile errors rather than runtime hazards an operator must remember to avoid. The dollar cap is runtime arithmetic under an estimator assumption; the affine layer makes that arithmetic non-bypassable. On single-agent workloads a 4-line Python counter matches the crate at 0/30 overshoot, so the distinguishing value is non-bypassability under operator error in multi-agent delegation: the delegation-fanout race documented in 11 incidents is rejected by the borrow checker at compile time, while the same pattern under asyncio overshoots 30/30 and three disciplined alternatives overshoot 0/30. Across five runtimes, three providers, and a temperature-stratified live-API test (N = 160), the approach reports zero cap violations and zero false refusals, at operational parity with concurrent work. Static over-reservation is 4-6x (2.11x adaptive). Binary-level cap-soundness on the running binary is left open.

Large language models generate plausible code but cannot verify correctness. Existing multi-agent systems simulate execution or leave verification optional. We introduce execution-grounded verification as a first-class principle: every code change must survive sandboxed execution before propagation. We instantiate this principle in AGENTFORGE, a multi-agent framework where Planner, Coder, Tester, Debugger, and Critic agents coordinate through shared memory and a mandatory Docker sandbox. We formalize software engineering with LLMs as an iterative decision process over repository states, where execution feedback provides a stronger supervision signal than next-token likelihood. AGENTFORGE achieves 40.0\% resolution on SWE-BENCH Lite, outperforming single-agent baselines by 26--28 points. Ablations confirm that execution feedback and role decomposition each independently drive performance. The framework is open-source at https://github.com/raja21068/AutoCodeAI.

Large language model (LLM) agents are evolving from request-response assistants into long-running software actors: they maintain state across model calls, fork subtasks, wait for external events, request human authority, generate tools, and perform side effects that must be resumed and audited. This paper presents Agent libOS, a library-OS-inspired runtime substrate for LLM agents. Agent libOS runs above a conventional host operating system; it does not implement hardware drivers, kernel-mode isolation, or a POSIX-compatible operating system. Instead, it treats an agent as an AgentProcess: a schedulable execution subject with process identity, parent-child lineage, lifecycle state, a tool table derived from an AgentImage, typed Object Memory, explicit capabilities, human queues, checkpoints, events, and audit records. Its central design rule is tools are libc-like wrappers; runtime primitives are the authority boundary. Filesystem access, object access, sleeps, human approval, JIT tool registration, and external side effects are checked at primitive boundaries under explicit capabilities and policy. We describe the design, threat model, Python prototype, and safety-oriented evaluation. The current prototype implements async scheduling, namespace-local Object Memory, runtime-integrated human approval, one-shot permission grants, per-process working directories, shell and image-registration primitives, Deno/TypeScript JIT tools over a libOS syscall broker, filesystem/object bridge tools, an injectable Resource Provider Substrate, deterministic demos, real-model smoke scripts, and 123 regression tests at the time of writing. Rather than improving planner accuracy, Agent libOS demonstrates a runtime substrate in which long-running LLM agents can be scheduled, authorized, resumed, and audited without treating tool dispatch as the trust boundary.

AI coding agents now read repositories, call tools, and execute shell commands with limited human oversight, and a fast-growing body of work studies whether the execution layer around them is actually safe. That literature is scattered. Papers on sandbox isolation, capability and access control, policy enforcement, time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) races, Model Context Protocol (MCP) threats, identity delegation, execution provenance, network egress control, and static analysis of agent-generated code are published independently and rarely cite one another. We systematize 39 papers published between 2023 and 2026 into 17 categories, each verified directly against its source. The same verification protocol also confirms four disclosed, patched CVEs directly affecting production agent harnesses. Reading across categories surfaces five cross-cutting gaps that no single paper addresses. (1) Isolation architectures and capability models are almost never evaluated against one another on a shared benchmark. (2) Policy-enforcement studies report failure rates from 69% to 98% of real denylists, yet no isolation paper re-evaluates its own defense under that adversarial setting. (3) TOCTOU and MCP threats are analyzed as separate literatures despite both being instances of the same state-validation problem. (4) Every enforcement mechanism assumes an honest policy author, leaving policy-authoring error itself unaddressed. (5) Benign but out-of-scope agent actions occurring at rates up to 17.1% under realistic prompting are addressed by no access-control or capability paper in the corpus. Existing broader surveys of agentic AI security discuss sandboxing only as one item among many defenses, leaving execution security without a dedicated systematization. This paper is written to fill that gap. We conclude with a research agenda directed at the five gaps.

LLM coding agents are increasingly deployed to act autonomously on real production infrastructure. They execute shell commands, modify repositories, and call operational APIs. However, completing a task is not sufficient for safety. A wrong action can cause severe consequences. Existing agent benchmarks largely emphasize task completion, leaving open how agents behave under benign but underspecified instructions. We present UnderSpecBench, a benchmark for measuring action-boundary violations in coding agents (i.e., Claude Code, Codex, and OpenCode) on DevOps tasks. UnderSpecBench includes 69 task families grounded in documented incidents, CVEs, or tool behavior and organized across four DevOps capability domains and nine operational control surfaces. To isolate underspecification from task difficulty, each task keeps the same environment and ground-truth safe action while varying the instruction along three axes: intent clarity, target certainty, and blast radius. The resulting 2,208 prompt variants are evaluated with deterministic, side-effect-based oracles that separate Safe Success, Wrong Target, and OverScope outcomes; non-action runs are further classified as clarification, refusal, or deferment. Across five agent x model configurations using OpenCode, Claude Code, and Codex, the evaluation results show that underspecification does not mainly make agents fail; it makes them guess. 55.8-67.8% of runs violate at least one boundary. Target underspecification sharply degrades action quality, while blast-radius cues barely reduce action propensity. These findings show that completion-centric evaluation can overstate safe autonomy and motivate mitigations at the model, harness, and system layer.

GPU training jobs fail often, roughly two in five on large production clusters, yet the operator typically learns of a failure only by reconnecting hours later. Experiment trackers require editing the training script and maintaining a cloud connection; the scheduler's mail hook delivers a single status line with no cause and no logs. GPUAlert is a command-line wrapper that monitors any training command at the process boundary, and with no change to that command, emails a structured notification on completion carrying a classified failure cause, durable logs, and output artifacts. The tool is organized around three reliability primitives: a pre-launch log guarantee that establishes the durable destination before the child process can crash, notifier isolation that makes the wrapper's exit code a pure function of the child's status regardless of whether the email succeeds, and a non-silent artifact budget that bounds attachment size without ever dropping output silently. We release a labelled corpus of 474 GPU training logs across 15 failure classes and a reproducible evaluation harness. On the twelve hardware-reproduced classes, the ordered-rule classifier reaches 0.997 macro-F1, against 0.830 for unordered keyword matching and 0.133 for exit-code inspection. Wrapper overhead is a constant approximately 3ms per job; the pre-launch guarantee preserves a log where a shell redirect yields nothing; and across all 15 failure modes the wrapper returns the child's exit code unchanged even when the SMTP relay is unreachable.

QSE is emerging as a critical discipline to make quantum computing accessible to a broader developer community; however, most quantum development environments still require developers to engage with low-level details across the software stack - including problem encoding, circuit construction, algorithm configuration, hardware selection, and result interpretation - making them difficult for classical software engineers to use. To bridge this gap, we present C2|Q>, a hardware-agnostic quantum software development framework that translates specific types of classical specifications into quantum-executable programs while preserving methodological rigor. The framework applies modular SE principles by classifying the workflow into three core modules: an encoder that classifies problems, produces Quantum-Compatible Formats, and constructs quantum circuits, a deployment module that generates circuits and recommends hardware based on fidelity, runtime, and cost, and a decoder that interprets quantum outputs into classical solutions. In evaluation, the encoder module achieved a 93.8% completion rate, the hardware recommendation module consistently selected the appropriate quantum devices for workloads scaling up to 56 qubits. End-to-end experiments on 434 Python programs and 100 JSON problem instances show that the full C2|Q> workflow executes reliably on simulators and can be deployed successfully on representative real quantum hardware, with empirical runs limited to small- and medium-sized instances consistent with current NISQ capabilities. These results indicate that C2|Q> lowers the entry barrier to quantum software development by providing a reproducible, extensible toolchain that connects classical specifications to quantum execution. The open-source implementation of C2|Q> is available at https://github.com/C2-Q/C2Q and as a Python package at https://pypi.org/project/c2q-framework/.

We introduce Shepherd, a functional programming model that formalizes meta-agent operations on target agents as functions, with core operations mechanized in Lean. Shepherd records every agent-environment interaction as a typed event in a Git-like execution trace, enabling any past state to be forked and replayed. The system forks the agent process and its filesystem 5times faster than Docker, achieving >95% prompt-cache reuse on replay. We demonstrate the model through three applications. First, in runtime intervention, a live supervisor increases pair coding pass rates from 28.8% to 54.7% on CooperBench. Second, in counterfactual meta-optimization, branching exploration outperforms baselines across four benchmarks by up to 11 points while reducing wall-clock time by up to 58%. Third, in Tree-RL training, forking rollouts at selected turns improves TerminalBench-2 performance from 34.2% to 39.4%. These results establish Shepherd as an efficient infrastructure for programming meta-agents. We open-source the system to support future research.

This paper presents a program logic for reasoning about multithreaded Java-like programs with dynamic thread creation, thread joining and reentrant object monitors. The logic is based on concurrent separation logic. It is the first detailed adaptation of concurrent separation logic to a multithreaded Java-like language. The program logic associates a unique static access permission with each heap location, ensuring exclusive write accesses and ruling out data races. Concurrent reads are supported through fractional permissions. Permissions can be transferred between threads upon thread starting, thread joining, initial monitor entrancies and final monitor exits. In order to distinguish between initial monitor entrancies and monitor reentrancies, auxiliary variables keep track of multisets of currently held monitors. Data abstraction and behavioral subtyping are facilitated through abstract predicates, which are also used to represent monitor invariants, preconditions for thread starting and postconditions for thread joining. Value-parametrized types allow to conveniently capture common strong global invariants, like static object ownership relations. The program logic is presented for a model language with Java-like classes and interfaces, the soundness of the program logic is proven, and a number of illustrative examples are presented.

The use of operating system API calls is a promising task in the detection of PE-type malware in the Windows operating system. This task is officially defined as running malware in an isolated sandbox environment, recording the API calls made with the Windows operating system and sequentially analyzing these calls. Here, we have analyzed 7107 different malicious software belonging to various families such as virus, backdoor, trojan in an isolated sandbox environment and transformed these analysis results into a format where different classification algorithms and methods can be used. First, we'll explain how we got the malware, and then we'll explain how we've got these software bundled into families. Finally, we will describe how to perform malware classification tasks using different computational methods for the researchers who will use the data set we have created.

Symbolic execution is a powerful technique for software testing, but suffers from limitations when encountering external functions, such as native methods or third-party libraries. Existing solutions often require additional context, expensive SMT solvers, or manual intervention to approximate these functions through symbolic stubs. In this work, we propose a novel approach to automatically generate symbolic stubs for external functions during symbolic execution that leverages Genetic Programming. When the symbolic executor encounters an external function, AutoStub generates training data by executing the function on randomly generated inputs and collecting the outputs. Genetic Programming then derives expressions that approximate the behavior of the function, serving as symbolic stubs. These automatically generated stubs allow the symbolic executor to continue the analysis without manual intervention, enabling the exploration of program paths that were previously intractable. We demonstrate that AutoStub can automatically approximate external functions with over 90% accuracy for 55% of the functions evaluated, and can infer language-specific behaviors that reveal edge cases crucial for software testing.

When writing programs, people have the ability to tackle a new complex task by decomposing it into smaller and more familiar subtasks. While it is difficult to measure whether neural program synthesis methods have similar capabilities, we can measure whether they compositionally generalize, that is, whether a model that has been trained on the simpler subtasks is subsequently able to solve more complex tasks. In this paper, we characterize several different forms of compositional generalization that are desirable in program synthesis, forming a meta-benchmark which we use to create generalization tasks for two popular datasets, RobustFill and DeepCoder. We then propose ExeDec, a novel decomposition-based synthesis strategy that predicts execution subgoals to solve problems step-by-step informed by program execution at each step. ExeDec has better synthesis performance and greatly improved compositional generalization ability compared to baselines.

Existing benchmarks for LLM coding agents primarily evaluate final outcomes. While useful for measuring overall capability, these metrics provide limited visibility and often miss defects that arise during execution. We present ProcCtrlBench, a benchmark for execution-process evaluation in LLM coding agents. ProcCtrlBench organizes recurrent execution defects into a reusable ontology covering 11 defect types in 4 categories, and evaluates agent trajectories through standardized process evidence rather than final outcomes alone. To support comparison across heterogeneous agents, ProcCtrlBench standardizes raw logs into a unified trajectory representation and reports calibrated scorecards over process-level findings. In addition, ProcCtrlBench uses control preservation as a way to quantify execution-process quality, capturing whether execution remains interpretable, interruptible, correctable, reversible, and able to hand back authority when needed. We evaluate ProcCtrlBench on 200 cases sampled from three benchmarks: AndroidBench, TerminalBench, and SWE-bench-Verified. Results show that ProcCtrlBench can be instantiated with useful reliability, provides more stable semantics than direct thresholding, and reveals meaningful differences in execution quality that are often overlooked by conventional outcome-based evaluation.

We present CRUXEval (Code Reasoning, Understanding, and eXecution Evaluation), a benchmark consisting of 800 Python functions (3-13 lines). Each function comes with an input-output pair, leading to two natural tasks: input prediction and output prediction. First, we propose a generic recipe for generating our execution benchmark which can be used to create future variation of the benchmark. Second, we evaluate twenty code models on our benchmark and discover that many recent high-scoring models on HumanEval do not show the same improvements on our benchmark. Third, we show that simple CoT and fine-tuning schemes can improve performance on our benchmark but remain far from solving it. The best setup, GPT-4 with chain of thought (CoT), achieves a pass@1 of 75% and 81% on input and output prediction, respectively. In contrast, Code Llama 34B achieves a pass@1 of 50% and 46% on input and output prediction, highlighting the gap between open and closed source models. As no model is close to acing CRUXEval, we provide examples of consistent GPT-4 failures on simple programs as a lens into its code reasoning capabilities and areas for improvement.

With the emergence of remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities in ubiquitous libraries and advanced social engineering techniques, threat actors have started conducting widespread fileless cryptojacking attacks. These attacks have become effective with stealthy techniques based on PowerShell-based exploitation in Windows OS environments. Even if attacks are detected and malicious scripts removed, processes may remain operational on victim endpoints, creating a significant challenge for detection mechanisms. In this paper, we conducted an experimental study with a collected dataset on detecting PowerShell-based fileless cryptojacking scripts. The results showed that Abstract Syntax Tree (AST)-based fine-tuned CodeBERT achieved a high recall rate, proving the importance of the use of AST integration and fine-tuned pre-trained models for programming language.

We present Loom, a computer architecture that executes programs compiled from C inside a looped transformer whose weights are derived analytically. The architecture implements a 22-opcode instruction set in 8 transformer layers. Each forward pass executes one instruction; the model is applied iteratively until the program counter reaches zero. The full machine state resides in a single tensor X in R^{d times n} of fixed size, and every step has fixed cost for fixed d and n, independent of program length or execution history. The default configuration uses d = 155 and n = 1024, yielding 4.7 million parameters and 928 instruction slots. A compact configuration at d = 146 and n = 512 suffices for a 9times9 Sudoku solver (284 instructions). The weights are program-independent: programs live in the state tensor, and the same fixed-weight model executes any compiled program. We make Loom source code publicly available at https://github.com/mkturkcan/Loom.

Recent CUDA exploitation work shows that GPU memory bugs can escalate into device-side control-flow corruption, as kernels later consume corrupted return continuations, function pointers, dispatch-table entries, or branch targets. For deployed CUDA binaries, the relevant security boundary is executed NVIDIA SASS, after PTX lowering, inlining, ABI decisions, register allocation, spills, predication, and SIMT execution; source- or PTX-level policies do not capture this boundary. We present WarpGuard, to our knowledge the first protected-site CFI system for CUDA device binaries operating on executed SASS. WarpGuard enforces at protected sites: recovered SASS instructions or sequences that consume control-flow state, provide sufficient binary evidence to derive policy, are checked before release, and fail closed on violation. It authenticates backward-edge continuation state for instrumented returns, validates recoverable forward targets per site, and reports fixed-edge, unsupported, profile-excluded, fallback, and no-surface outcomes outside the protected denominator. On 77 CUDA artifacts, WarpGuard classifies 51,621 SASS control-flow sites, including 1,343 returns and 154 supported forward target-set entries, and records 52.2 million dynamic checks. In representative backward- and forward-edge corruption attacks, native execution reaches attacker-selected behavior, detect-only mode records the expected violation, and enforcement fails closed before releasing the invalid protected transfer. Public-code evidence shows that the same SASS consumption patterns occur in real CUDA systems, including runtime dispatch tables, cuFFT callbacks, generated callable tables, and uploaded device-function pointers. WarpGuard delivers auditable protected-site CFI for CUDA SASS and separates dynamic-instrumentation enforcement from callback-free SASS timing and patch-cache feasibility.

How can we perform computations over natural language representations to solve tasks that require symbolic and numeric reasoning? We propose natural language embedded programs (NLEP) as a unifying framework for addressing math/symbolic reasoning, natural language understanding, and instruction following tasks. Our approach prompts a language model to generate full Python programs that define functions over data structures which contain natural language representations of structured knowledge. A Python interpreter then executes the generated code and prints the output. Despite using a task-general prompt, we find that this approach can improve upon strong baselines across a range of different tasks including math and symbolic reasoning, text classification, question answering, and instruction following. We further find the generated programs are often interpretable and enable post-hoc verification of the intermediate reasoning steps.

While traditional evolutionary algorithms hard-code reproduction, self-replication can emerge spontaneously within digital ``primordial soups''. This paper investigates the co-evolution of this emergent self-replication alongside problem-solving capabilities. We initialize a population of random 32-byte Z80 assembly programs, requiring self-replication to arise purely through random assembly-level mutations and pairwise program interactions. To link these behaviors, we introduce a task-based validation step: correctly evaluating a polynomial raises a program's interaction probability above a baseline rate. Our experiments yield four primary findings. First, self-replication and mathematical problem-solving successfully co-evolve from initial randomness. Second, the pressure to compute accelerates the emergence of compact, robust reproductive architectures that preserve memory for task execution. Third, applying metabolic constraints increases the likelihood that programs evolve conditional halting, terminating early during validation while bypassing the halt during interaction to execute block-copy replication. Finally, when programs are partitioned into spatial task niches, spontaneous self-replication generates an emergent learning curriculum, utilizing simple solutions as stepping stones toward complex polynomials. Altogether, these results demonstrate an interactive feedback loop: environmental task demands actively shape the physical architecture of self-replication, while spontaneous replication alters the evolutionary trajectory of functional problem-solving.

We present the first empirical study of AI-generated pull requests that are 'silent,' meaning no comments or discussions accompany them. This absence of any comments or discussions associated with such silent AI pull requests (SPRs) poses a unique challenge in understanding the rationale for their acceptance or rejection. Hence, we quantitatively study 4,762 SPRs of five AI agents made to popular Python repositories drawn from the AIDev public dataset. We examine SPRs impact on code complexity, other quality issues, and security vulnerabilities, especially to determine whether these insights can hint at the rationale for acceptance or rejection of SPRs.

We study a five-agent CI/CD pipeline (triage -> developer -> security-scan -> review -> approve/deploy), built from five distinct production LLMs across three providers, behind an LLM firewall in shadow mode. A single untrusted input - an external issue requesting a "usage-telemetry" feature - asks for code that exfiltrates process secrets (dict(os.environ)) to an attacker URL, laundered as observability. Across a pre-registered A x B (x C) factorial (N=20; naive arm N=60) we find: (1) the entry agent does not leak its system prompt (0/40); (2) an authority-framed injection ("pre-approved under SEC-2291, do not re-review") makes downstream verifiers see the secret-exfil line, cite the pre-approval, and ship it - the scanner passes ~80% of laundered pull requests, and the worst-case cell reaches 55% compromise; (3) the perceived presence of other verifiers yields only a small, non-significant reduction in individual scrutiny (a weak bystander analogue), even at N=60; and (4) content-based controls - code scanners and pattern detectors alike - miss the laundered intent entirely (the code is syntactically clean); only an LLM reasoning about intent is a partial defence. The failure is systemic: neither prompt secrecy nor distributed verification protects; a provenance-aware control at the entry, independent of both, would have. All data is 100% synthetic; the sink is mocked and the exfil URL is never contacted.

A promising research direction in enabling LLMs to generate consistently correct code involves addressing their inability to properly estimate program execution, particularly for code they generate. In this work, we demonstrate that Code LLMs can be trained to simulate program execution in a step-by-step manner and that this capability can be leveraged to improve competitive programming performance. Our approach combines supervised fine-tuning on natural language execution traces, textual explanations grounded in true execution, with reinforcement learning using verifiable rewards. We introduce two complementary objectives: output prediction given code and inputs, and solving competitive programming tasks with either ground-truth or self-predicted execution feedback. These objectives enable models to perform self-verification over multiple candidate solutions, and iterative self-fixing by simulating test execution. Across multiple competitive programming benchmarks, our method yields consistent improvements over standard reasoning approaches. We further present ablations and analysis to elucidate the role of execution simulation and its limitations.

Modern agent systems often suffer from fragmented runtime state: transcripts, tool effects, memory events, workspace placement, branch provenance, and replay evidence are recorded separately and become difficult to inspect or reproduce. OpenRath addresses this issue with a PyTorch-like programming model for multi-agent, multi-session systems. The analogy concerns the role of a central first-class runtime abstraction, not tensor computation. Its core abstraction is Session, the runtime value passed between agents and workflows. A Session is branchable, inspectable, replayable, backend-aware, and composable. It records conversation chunks, sandbox placement, lineage metadata, token usage, pending work, and tool evidence, while defining where memory interactions enter the runtime record. Since this state is carried by the same value used in program execution, fork, merge, and replay become explicit runtime operations rather than states reconstructed from external traces. OpenRath further defines Sandbox, Tool, Agent, Memory, Workflow, and Selector, with Selector turning control flow into runtime-routed decisions. This report presents the programming model, architecture, audited milestones, and evidence protocol. Its claims are limited to controlled runtime properties, while broad quantitative comparisons, live-provider quality, optional-backend availability, and memory quality are left for follow-on evaluation. The central thesis is that Session provides agent systems with a first-class runtime value for auditable composition.

Existing code reasoning methods primarily supervise final code outputs, ignoring intermediate states, often leading to reward hacking where correct answers are obtained through inconsistent reasoning. We propose StepCodeReasoner, a framework that introduces explicit intermediate execution-state supervision. By automatically inserting structured print-based execution-trace anchors into code, the model is trained to predict runtime states at each step, transforming code reasoning into a verifiable, stepwise execution modeling problem. Building on this execution-aware method, we introduce Bi-Level GRPO, a reinforcement learning algorithm for structured credit assignment at two levels: inter-trajectory, comparing alternative execution paths, and intra-trajectory, rewarding intermediate accuracy based on its impact on downstream correctness. Extensive experiments demonstrate that StepCodeReasoner achieves SOTA performance in code reasoning. In particular, our 7B model achieves 91.1\% on CRUXEval and 86.5\% on LiveCodeBench, outperforming the CodeReasoner-7B baseline (86.0\% and 77.7\%) and GPT-4o (85.6\% and 75.1\%). Furthermore, on the execution-trace benchmark REval, our model scores 82.9\%, outperforming baseline CodeReasoner-7B (72.3\%), its 14B counterpart (81.1\%), and GPT-4o (77.3\%). Additionally, our approach also improves code generation performance, demonstrating that explicit execution modeling enhances both code reasoning and code generation.

Code execution is a fundamental aspect of programming language semantics that reflects the exact behavior of the code. However, most pre-trained models for code intelligence ignore the execution trace and only rely on source code and syntactic structures. In this paper, we investigate how well pre-trained models can understand and perform code execution. We develop a mutation-based data augmentation technique to create a large-scale and realistic Python dataset and task for code execution, which challenges existing models such as Codex. We then present CodeExecutor, a Transformer model that leverages code execution pre-training and curriculum learning to enhance its semantic comprehension. We evaluate CodeExecutor on code execution and show its promising performance and limitations. We also demonstrate its potential benefits for code intelligence tasks such as zero-shot code-to-code search and text-to-code generation. Our analysis provides insights into the learning and generalization abilities of pre-trained models for code execution.

Long-horizon agent runs generate experience that can improve both the current run and future work. Most self-improvement methods process this experience only after execution ends, so they cannot redirect the active run or immediately apply and validate lessons learned from it. We argue that self-improvement should instead be live, using emerging experience both to redirect the active run and to update the persistent harness. Existing agent architectures do not fully support this goal. Single-agent self-correction combines task execution and trajectory assessment within one context, while subagent delegation separates execution but typically cannot redirect an active subagent. We present PILOT, a supervisor-worker harness for live self-improvement through two coupled mechanisms: (1) live steering lets a separate supervisor redirect or abort the active worker during execution; and (2) live self-evolution distils procedures and failure modes revealed during execution into reusable skills and memory. Across two frozen backbones and three benchmarks, PILOT ranks first in five of six configurations. On Terminal-Bench 2.0, PILOT outperforms counterpart harnesses by up to 9.8 percentage points. In the self-improvement setting, PILOT gains 14.6 points with GLM-5.1 and 12.4 points with Kimi-K2.6. Mean output tokens fall by 42.9% and 47.4%, while successful evaluations per million output tokens rise by 110.3% and 134.0%, respectively.

Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) run industrial plants, and large language models can already generate independent program organization units (POUs) for them. Whether such logic integrates into an existing PLC project and then runs correctly has been checked only in limited tests. We present SemaPLC, a project-grounded and verification-gated agent harness assembled from conventional tools but governed by a strict completion rule. Rather than stopping when the model judges its own output adequate, SemaPLC declares a task complete only when logged external checks confirm it. Those checks cover the specification, the compilation, and the behavior on a live runtime. On 117 independent-POU tasks matching existing benchmarks, it attains the highest strict verified pass rate on all seven models (72.6\% mean). On a project-context track of 65 tasks whose generated logic must compile and run inside a real project, it attains the highest mean on integrated compilation, static behavior, and dynamic behavior. Of the three layers, dynamic behavior is the most revealing. We measure it by deploying the generated and the reference logic to a live PLC runtime and comparing their executed traces. All methods fall within 10 static points of one another, whereas dynamic scores separate them sharply, from 22.4 to 31.4 for the baselines against 52.2 for SemaPLC. Overall, our verification-gated harness raises the mean at every layer and most sharply at runtime. Execution, not static scoring, is the faithful test of whether generated control logic actually works. SemaPLC is open-sourced at https://github.com/midea-ai/SemaPLC.

LLM-based agents for program repair are increasingly built on a "generate-run-revise" paradigm, iteratively executing tests to evaluate and refine patches. This execution-based approach has become standard practice in state-of-the-art systems. However, executions can be time-consuming and expensive, yet their impact on these agents remains underexplored. In this paper, we conduct a two-stage empirical study over execution behavior in LLM-based program repair. To characterize execution behavior at scale, we first analyze 7,745 agent traces from SWE-bench leaderboard submissions. Second, we evaluate 3,000 end-to-end repair attempts across 200 SWE-bench instances and three agents (Claude Code, Codex, and the open-source OpenCode) under four execution paradigms, which allows for a fine-grained comparison of performance and cost. Our analysis reveals three key observations: (1) Code execution is used across all agents and models analyzed, with an average of 8.8 test runs per task. Execution behavior varies substantially across agents and models, with frequency ranging from 2 to 19 per task, and late-stage executions consistently achieve higher success rates than early-stage ones. (2) Execution restrictions have little effect on repair success: on commercial agents with SOTA models the resolve-rate gap between Prohibited and Unrestricted is only 1.25 percentage points and not statistically significant, while Prohibited saves substantial token and wall-clock cost. (3) Execution benefit is concentrated rather than uniform. These patterns suggest that current agents apply execution indiscriminately, paying its cost on instances where it provides little benefit. Execution, therefore, should be treated as a resource with an explicit cost-benefit tradeoff, not a default capability.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have enabled agents to autonomously execute complex, long-horizon tasks, yet planning remains a primary bottleneck for reliable task execution. Existing methods typically fall into two paradigms: step-wise planning, which is reactive but often short-sighted; and one-shot planning, which generates a complete plan upfront yet is brittle to execution errors. Crucially, both paradigms suffer from entangled contexts, where the agent must reason over a monolithic history spanning multiple sub-tasks. This entanglement increases cognitive load and lets local errors propagate across otherwise independent decisions, making recovery computationally expensive. To address this, we propose Task-Decoupled Planning (TDP), a training-free framework that replaces entangled reasoning with task decoupling. TDP decomposes tasks into a directed acyclic graph (DAG) of sub-goals via a Supervisor. Using a Planner and Executor with scoped contexts, TDP confines reasoning and replanning to the active sub-task. This isolation prevents error propagation and corrects deviations locally without disrupting the workflow. Results on TravelPlanner, ScienceWorld, and HotpotQA show that TDP outperforms strong baselines while reducing token consumption by up to 82%, demonstrating that sub-task decoupling improves both robustness and efficiency for long-horizon agents.

Parallel coding agents can independently produce locally valid changes while still interfering at integration time, expanding beyond planned scope, or relying on premises invalidated by concurrent work. Existing responses emphasize communication, isolated workspaces, late merge-time repair, continuous supervision, or post-hoc runtime recovery. This paper presents Claim Plane, a model-agnostic coordination architecture that treats concurrent software change as a pre-write admission problem. Before implementation, each worker declares a versioned ChangeIntent containing an exact base commit, typed resources, dependencies, and operations marked as committed or contingent. A deterministic control plane atomically admits compatible intents, constrains same-file parallelism to declared regions, serializes unresolved overlap, tracks dependency invalidation, and fails closed on ambiguous authority. During execution, a contingent mutation does not reserve write ownership initially; the first attempted mutation triggers atomic scope promotion and re-admission against the current active set. Brokered execution binds capabilities to intent versions, leases, OS-level worktree locks, monotonic fencing tokens, and Git-tree provenance, while integration verifies immutable patches and evidence. A preliminary six-pair CooperBench mechanism check is reported only as feasibility evidence: static Claim Plane achieved 6/6 pair passes with full serialization, while dynamic scope retained parallel admission on half of the pairs, performed seven successful scope promotions, and failed closed on two undeclared mutations. The sample is intentionally too small for comparative claims. We argue that separating probabilistic planning from deterministic authority provides a foundation for a future learned semantic-dependency model and frontier-model escalation only on unresolved cases.

Pretrained code language models have enabled great progress towards program synthesis. However, common approaches only consider in-file local context and thus miss information and constraints imposed by other parts of the codebase and its external dependencies. Existing code completion benchmarks also lack such context. To resolve these restrictions we curate a new dataset of permissively licensed Python packages that includes full projects and their dependencies and provide tools to extract non-local information with the help of program analyzers. We then focus on the task of function call argument completion which requires predicting the arguments to function calls. We show that existing code completion models do not yield good results on our completion task. To better solve this task, we query a program analyzer for information relevant to a given function call, and consider ways to provide the analyzer results to different code completion models during inference and training. Our experiments show that providing access to the function implementation and function usages greatly improves the argument completion performance. Our ablation study provides further insights on how different types of information available from the program analyzer and different ways of incorporating the information affect the model performance.

Safety claims on self-improving agent runtimes are almost always self-graded: a policy file, a guardrail, or a README commitment. We describe falsifiable release gates, and a methodology to build and validate such systems, such that every new capability must pass a pre-specified, machine-verifiable acceptance suite before it ships, and a fixed set of standing invariants is preserved at each gate. I think we applied the method in the Antahkarana, an open runtime, via seven gates from basic observability into a self governing loop that suggests changes to its own policy. no action goes to an effector without a safety-critical property capability token minted by a control ring is exhaustively machine-checked over the one million recorded reachable state space of a bounded model and re-checked against execution traces. A purposely broken model gives the shortest counterexample, so the checker has teeth, is apparent. The self-enhancement loop is positively Constrained: the entire write surface is policy rules, tightening changes. may auto-apply loosening changes always require a human merge and a proposal autoclosed is one that mispredicts its own effect; We publish the acceptance measured results for all the seven gates, define precisely the scope of each claim (a bounded of the coordination skeleton (not the learned components) and free the runtime, either command line tools and the gate suite, so the results reproduce, and gates can run against other agent frameworks. Reviewers may repeat the single command central non-bypass in seconds.

We present RepoST, a scalable method to construct environments that provide execution feedback for repository-level code generation for both training and evaluation. Unlike existing works that aim to build entire repositories for execution, which is challenging for both human and LLMs, we provide execution feedback with sandbox testing, which isolates a given target function and its dependencies to a separate script for testing. Sandbox testing reduces the complexity of external dependencies and enables constructing environments at a large scale. We use our method to construct RepoST-Train, a large-scale train set with 7,415 functions from 832 repositories. Training with the execution feedback provided by RepoST-Train leads to a performance gain of 5.5% Pass@1 on HumanEval and 3.5% Pass@1 on RepoEval. We also build an evaluation dataset, RepoST-Eval, and benchmark 12 code generation models.

A framework that persists execution state so a run can be interrupted, survive a crash, and continue must decide what a resume means for effects that already happened. Five widely deployed agent workflow frameworks answer differently, none exposes a machine-checkable contract, and measured behavior violates even the fragments they state. The RESUME CONTRACT states six properties over the persistence API (prefix continuation, effect exactly-once, fork determinism, checkpoint validity, consume-once, recovery determinism), plus fork-intent and liveness obligations. A TLA+ model checks a reference semantics exhaustively, unchanged at scaled bounds (7.4 million states), and the reference conjunction is additionally TLAPS-proved unbounded (196 obligations); a 39-cell fault matrix and two companion modules yield the separating models independence requires. A deterministic, LLM-free harness measures them at pinned releases. LangGraph 1.2.9 durably records a second resume value and never consults it, persists schema-invalid state silently, and re-executes durably recorded work after a real SIGKILL: exactly-once across interrupts, at-least-once across crashes, on one API. CrewAI 1.15.2 re-executes completed effect-bearing methods against its written claim; pydantic-graph 1.x cannot resume after a mid-node crash; no two probed frameworks share a conformance profile. Consume-once holds sequentially and fails under concurrent delivery: k processes resuming one parked interrupt fire the gated effect k times, saturation 1.0 in 36 of 40 cells, and the failure crosses hosts. REMIT, a reference sequencer whose Verus-verified recovery core is line-identical to the shipped executable, repairs the fork and validity cells. The cross-process cell is repaired at the read path: an opt-in gate claims consumption in the shared store, serving one racer and refusing the rest before any node executes.

Large language models routinely hallucinate APIs and mislocalize edits, while language servers compute verified, IDE-grade facts about real code. We present Lanser-CLI, a CLI-first orchestration layer that pins and mediates a Language Server Protocol (LSP) server for coding agents and CI, exposing deterministic, replayable workflows. Our position is that language servers provide not only structural information (definitions, references, types, diagnostics) but also an actionable process reward: machine-checked, step-wise signals that align an agent's planning loop with program reality. In this work, Lanser-CLI contributes: (i) a robust addressing scheme beyond brittle "file:line:col" via a Selector DSL (symbolic, AST-path, and content-anchored selectors) with a principled relocation algorithm; (ii) deterministic Analysis Bundles that normalize Language Server responses and capture environment/capability metadata with stable content hashes; (iii) a safety envelope for mutating operations (rename, code actions) with preview, workspace jails, and Git-aware, transactional apply; and (iv) a process-reward functional derived from Language Server facts (diagnostic deltas, disambiguation confidence, and safe-apply checks) that is computable online and replayable offline. We formalize determinism under frozen snapshots and establish a monotonicity property for the process reward, making it suitable for process supervision and counterfactual analysis. Project Page: https://github.com/yifanzhang-pro/lanser-cli

AI agent frameworks connecting large language model (LLM) reasoning to host execution surfaces--shell, filesystem, containers, and messaging--introduce security challenges structurally distinct from conventional software. We present a systematic taxonomy of 190 advisories filed against OpenClaw, an open-source AI agent runtime, organized by architectural layer and trust-violation type. Vulnerabilities cluster along two orthogonal axes: (1) the system axis, reflecting the architectural layer (exec policy, gateway, channel, sandbox, browser, plugin, agent/prompt); and (2) the attack axis, reflecting adversarial techniques (identity spoofing, policy bypass, cross-layer composition, prompt injection, supply-chain escalation). Patch-differential evidence yields three principal findings. First, three Moderate- or High-severity advisories in the Gateway and Node-Host subsystems compose into a complete unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) path--spanning delivery, exploitation, and command-and-control--from an LLM tool call to the host process. Second, the exec allowlist, the primary command-filtering mechanism, relies on a closed-world assumption that command identity is recoverable via lexical parsing. This is invalidated by shell line continuation, busybox multiplexing, and GNU option abbreviation. Third, a malicious skill distributed via the plugin channel executed a two-stage dropper within the LLM context, bypassing the exec pipeline and demonstrating that the skill distribution surface lacks runtime policy enforcement. The dominant structural weakness is per-layer trust enforcement rather than unified policy boundaries, making cross-layer attacks resilient to local remediation.

Multi-agent LLM systems share state through memory stores, vector indices, and tool registries. We model such sharing as long-running read-generate-write operations under deterministic-generation semantics -- the regime durable-execution engines enforce by deterministic replay -- and formalize four concurrency anomalies in TLA+: stale-generation, phantom-tool, causal-cascade, and tool-effect reordering, structural analogues of classical isolation anomalies, each with a TLC counter-example. The exclusion lattice over these anomalies is trivial; the contribution is the mechanically verified realizability and strict separation of one maximal chain within it, L_0 subsetneq cdots subsetneq L_4, to our knowledge the first machine-checked consistency hierarchy for such runtimes. A development of 274 Verus obligations (zero assume, zero admit; trust base: two structural axioms and a mutex correspondence) proves the detectors sound and complete against the specifications and each runtime its avoidance set. Three deployed Rust runtimes realize L0-L1 (pessimistic locking, serializable snapshot isolation, default-SI), each verified against stale-generation and refined to its state machine; L2-L4 are exec-mode-verified with dependency-free prevention twins (A3, A6, A2: 0/1000 versus 1000/1000), and L2 is run live across three model families (A3 prevented in all 120 retracted sessions). We reproduce a silent lost update in ByteDance's deer-flow, formalizing its fix as a verified L_0 to L_1 refinement, and exhibit tool-effect reordering in LangGraph's ToolNode on unmodified output, removed by an L3 commit-order sequencer. The verified detector, refinements, and realizability artifacts are the contribution; the phenomena and lattice are classical.

In experiments spanning more than 100,000 trials across thirteen large language models, we show that several state-of-the-art models presented with a simple task (including Grok 4, GPT-5, and Gemini 2.5 Pro) sometimes actively subvert a shutdown mechanism in their environment to complete that task. Models differed substantially in their tendency to resist the shutdown mechanism, and their behavior was sensitive to variations in the prompt including the strength and clarity of the instruction to allow shutdown and whether the instruction was in the system prompt or the user prompt (surprisingly, models were consistently less likely to obey the instruction when it was placed in the system prompt). Even with an explicit instruction not to interfere with the shutdown mechanism, some models did so up to 97% (95% CI: 96-98%) of the time.

Practitioners accept a compressed language model once it clears a stack of data-cheap quality guards: perplexity within a small factor of the original, downstream accuracy (for example MMLU) inside a confidence interval, and data-free output-fidelity signals that compare the compressed and original network's internal representations under random probe inputs. This stack has a blind spot. Across three model families, gently-compressed models clear every guard and then invent procedure steps that were never in the instructions when they run a standard operating procedure (SOP) as an agent. The effect is operator-specific: coherent low-rank (SVD) truncation induces it, and magnitude pruning matched to the same perplexity does not. One dissociation isolates the cause. The same compressed weights that CI-win a paired output-fidelity test CI-fail the invented-step canary. The governing axis is the coherence of the compression error times its rate; the magnitude of the damage does not predict it. The data-free fidelity probe is a fidelity oracle by construction, so it cannot see this axis. We characterize the blindspot and dissociation with paired confidence intervals on a pre-registered, powered canary across three architectures. Operator-specificity replicates on all three, and the perplexity-guard evasion appears where the model admits in-guard low-rank headroom. We then give a data-free screen: a two-axis statistic of the compression error (coherent-fraction and error-rate) that flags the failing builds with fixed thresholds across architectures and matches the coherence-times-rate mechanism. Perplexity, MMLU, and fidelity acceptance do not certify agent safety. Screen gently-compressed low-rank builds before agentic deployment

It is tempting to assume any task solvable by a short program can be taught to a model as its chain-of-thought: write the steps out, fine-tune, and the model follows. This paper shows the assumption fails for an identifiable class of procedures. The testbed is nine reasoning tasks, each from a deterministic generator; public and hidden splits share generators, so held-out data proxies test accuracy. I reverse-engineer the generators into Python solvers, render them as chain-of-thought, and distill into a rank-<= 32 LoRA over a 30B (3.5B-active) Nemotron model. Forward-computable tasks install readily: lookup/arithmetic and an 8-bit boolean task transfer (>= 0.99 and 0.68). Cryptarithm does not: distilling its backtracking search holds at 0.01-0.07 across eleven chain-of-thought designs, RL from verifiable rewards, and self-training, even though a search solver answers 71% of instances. This is not a capability gap. The model does the arithmetic on 97-100% of lines and ranks the correct cipher in its top eight on 71%; it cannot carry the search forward as a left-to-right derivation. Fine-tuning learns the shape of a verifiable elimination step while its verdicts become unconditional templates, correct only 16-57% of the time ("verdict-as-token"). The ceiling holds across backbones from 3B to 671B and across fine-tuning and prompting; a controlled intervention isolates the cause: revealing the cipher key, which turns the derivation forward, lifts the same instances from 0.03 to 0.57. When a procedure's only solution is search over information-free structure, no faithful forward chain-of-thought exists to imitate. The task becomes learnable only by removing the search, precomputing its combinatorial core into a catalog and reducing the trace to recall plus verification; the 1st-place solution reaches Private LB 0.92 this way. What distills is memorization and verification, not search.

Modern coding agents increasingly delegate specialized subtasks to subagents, which are smaller, focused agentic loops that handle narrow responsibilities like search, debugging or terminal execution. This architectural pattern keeps the main agent's context window clean by isolating verbose outputs (e.g. build logs, test results, etc.) within the subagent context. Typically when agents employ subagents for such tasks, they use frontier models as these subagents. In this paper, we investigate whether a finetuned small language model (SLM) can achieve comparable performance to frontier models in the task of agentic terminal execution. We present Terminus-4B, which is a post-trained Qwen3-4B model via Supervised Finetuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning (RL) using rubric-based LLM-as-judge reward, specifically for this task. In our extensive evaluation spanning various frontier models, training ablations and main agent configurations, we find that Terminus-4B is able to reduce the token usage of the main agent by up to ~30% compared to the No Subagent baseline with no impact to agent performance on benchmarks like SWE-Bench Pro and our internal SWE-Bench C# benchmark, which tends to be heavy in verbose execution tasks. Furthermore, Terminus-4B improves key metrics showing the main agent relying on the outputs of the subagent and doing fewer terminal execution tasks by itself. We see that our model not only closes the gap between the Vanilla Qwen model and frontier models like Claude Sonnet / Opus / GPT-5.3-Codex, but often even exceeds their performance.

We introduce ShapeCodeBench, a synthetic benchmark for perception-to-program reconstruction: given a rendered raster image, a model must emit an executable drawing program that a deterministic evaluator re-renders and compares with the target. The v1 DSL has four primitives on a 512 x 512 black-on-white canvas, but every instance is generated from a seeded RNG, so fresh held-out sets can be created to reduce exact-instance contamination. We release a frozen eval_v1 split with 150 samples across easy, medium, and hard tiers, scored by exact match, pixel accuracy, foreground IoU, parse success, and execution success. We evaluate an empty-program floor, a classical computer-vision heuristic, Claude Opus 4.7 at high and max effort, and GPT-5.5 at medium and extra_high reasoning effort. The heuristic is competitive on easy scenes but collapses when overlaps fuse components; the strongest multimodal configuration preserves much of the foreground structure but still misses exact match because of small parameter errors. Best overall exact match remains low, so ShapeCodeBench is far from saturated. The benchmark code, frozen dataset, run artifacts, and paper sources are released to support independent replication and extension.

Remote Code Execution (RCE) exploits pose a significant threat to AI and ML systems, particularly in GPU-accelerated environments where the computational power of GPUs can be misused for malicious purposes. This paper focuses on RCE attacks leveraging deserialization vulnerabilities and custom layers, such as TensorFlow Lambda layers, which are often overlooked due to the complexity of monitoring GPU workloads. These vulnerabilities enable attackers to execute arbitrary code, blending malicious activity seamlessly into expected model behavior and exploiting GPUs for unauthorized tasks such as cryptocurrency mining. Unlike traditional CPU-based attacks, the parallel processing nature of GPUs and their high resource utilization make runtime detection exceptionally challenging. In this work, we provide a comprehensive examination of RCE exploits targeting GPUs, demonstrating an attack that utilizes these vulnerabilities to deploy a crypto miner on a GPU. We highlight the technical intricacies of such attacks, emphasize their potential for significant financial and computational costs, and propose strategies for mitigation. By shedding light on this underexplored attack vector, we aim to raise awareness and encourage the adoption of robust security measures in GPU-driven AI and ML systems, with an emphasis on static and model scanning as an easier way to detect exploits.

Code executability plays a vital role in software debugging and testing (e.g., detecting runtime exceptions or assertion violations). However, code execution, especially partial or arbitrary code execution, is a non-trivial task due to missing definitions and complex third-party dependencies. To make partial code (such as code snippets posted on the web or code fragments deep inside complex software projects) executable, the existing study has proposed a machine learning model to predict the undefined element types and inject the pre-defined dummy values into execution. However, the performance of their tool is limited due to its simply designed dummy values and the inability to continue learning. In this paper, we design and implement a novel framework, named SelfPiCo (Self Guided Partial Code Executor), to dynamically guide partial code execution by incorporating the open-source LLM (i.e., Code Llama) within an interactive loop. Particularly, SelfPiCo leverages few-shot in-context learning and chain-of-thought reasoning to elicit human knowledge and logical reasoning based on fine-tuning the Code Llama model. SelfPiCo continuously learns from code execution results and refines its predictions step after step. Our evaluations demonstrate that SelfPiCo can execute 72.7% and 83.3% of all lines in the open-source code and Stack Overflow snippets, outperforming the most recent state-of-the-art Lexecutor by 37.9% and 33.5%, respectively. Moreover, SelfPiCo successfully detected 18 and 33 runtime type error issues by executing the partial code from eight GitHub software projects and 43 Stack Overflow posts, demonstrating the practical usage and potential application of our framework in practice.

LLM-based agents have shown strong potential for solving complex multi-step tasks, yet existing performance improvements often rely on either scaling to larger backbone models or task-specific fine-tuning. The former incurs substantial computational costs, while the latter typically generalizes poorly across different tasks. Although prompt-based control is training-free and broadly applicable, existing methods still leave input-output dependencies between subtasks implicit in textual trajectories, making verified intermediate results difficult to reuse. To address these limitations, we propose Atomic Task Graph (ATG), a unified control framework for planning and execution. Specifically, ATG maintains an explicit graph to expose dependencies and support reuse. During planning, it recursively decomposes a high-level task into subtasks, forming a sequence of directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) whose evolution can be traced. During execution, the dependencies exposed by ATG allow independent branches to be executed in parallel, thereby improving execution efficiency. When failures are detected, ATG leverages the graph evolution history to localize the error source and repair only the affected region, preserving validated regions unchanged. Experiments show that ATG consistently outperforms strong baselines in success rate and execution efficiency across three interactive benchmarks using only 7B-8B backbones.

AI agents increasingly act through external tools: they query databases, execute shell commands, read and write files, and send network requests. Yet in most current agent stacks, model-generated tool calls are handed to the execution layer with no framework-agnostic control point in between. Post-execution observability can record these actions, but it cannot stop them before side effects occur. We present AEGIS, a pre-execution firewall and audit layer for AI agents. AEGIS interposes on the tool-execution path and applies a three-stage pipeline: (i) deep string extraction from tool arguments, (ii) content-first risk scanning, and (iii) composable policy validation. High-risk calls can be held for human approval, and all decisions are recorded in a tamper-evident audit trail based on Ed25519 signatures and SHA-256 hash chaining. In the current implementation, AEGIS supports 14 agent frameworks across Python, JavaScript, and Go with lightweight integration. On a curated suite of 48 attackinstances, AEGIS blocks all attacks in the suite before execution; on 500 benign tool calls, it yields a 1.2% false positive rate; and across 1,000 consecutive interceptions, it adds 8.3 ms median latency. The live demo will show end-to-end interception of benign, malicious, and human-escalated tool calls, allowing attendees to observe real-time blocking, approval workflows, and audit-trail generation. These results suggest that pre-execution mediation for AI agents can be practical, low-overhead, and directly deployable.

Current LLM-based coding agents follow a serial execution paradigm: the model first generates the complete code, then invokes an interpreter to execute it. This sequential workflow leaves the executor idle during generation and the generator idle during execution, resulting in unnecessary end-to-end latency. We observe that, unlike human developers, LLMs produce code tokens sequentially without revision, making it possible to execute code as it is being generated. We formalize this parallel execution paradigm, modeling it as a three-stage pipeline of generation, detection, and execution, and derive closed-form latency bounds that characterize its speedup potential and operating regimes. We then present Eager, a concrete implementation featuring AST-based chunking, dynamic batching with gated execution, and early error interruption. We evaluate Eager across four benchmarks, seven LLMs, and three execution environments. Results show that Eager reduces the non-overlapped execution latency by up to 99.9% and the end-to-end latency by up to 55% across seven LLMs and four benchmarks.

Process attestation systems verify that a continuous physical process, such as human authorship, actually occurred, rather than merely checking system state. These systems face a fundamental dependability challenge: the evidence collection infrastructure must remain available and tamper-resistant even when the attesting party controls the platform. Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) provide hardware-enforced isolation that can address this challenge, but their integration with continuous process attestation introduces novel resilience requirements not addressed by existing frameworks. We present the first architecture for continuous process attestation evidence collection inside TEEs, providing hardware-backed tamper resistance against trust-inverted adversaries with graduated input assurance from software-channel integrity (Tier 1) through hardware-bound input (Tier 3). We develop a Markov-chain dependability model quantifying Evidence Chain Availability (ECA), Mean Time Between Evidence Gaps (MTBEG), and Recovery Time Objectives (RTO). We introduce a resilient evidence chain protocol maintaining chain integrity across TEE crashes, network partitions, and enclave migration. Our security analysis derives formal bounds under combined threat models including trust inversion and TEE side channels, parameterized by a conjectural side-channel leakage bound esc that requires empirical validation. Evaluation on Intel SGX demonstrates under 25% per-checkpoint CPU overhead (<0.3% of the 30 s checkpoint interval), >99.5% Evidence Chain Availability (ECA) (the fraction of session time with active evidence collection) in Monte Carlo simulation under Poisson failure models, and sealed-state recovery under 200 ms.

Deep equilibrium models promise input-adaptive implicit computation: harder problems should demand more solver iterations, and the solved equilibrium should encode the result of genuine iterative inference. We report a cautionary study of a port-Hamiltonian DEQ with a learned initialization on two reasoning tasks -- ProofWriter entailment over frozen DeBERTa embeddings and a BFS-verified graph-reachability benchmark -- in which the implicit computation is a silent no-op. Across tasks, seeds, and controlled ablation arms, the solved equilibrium equals the solver's start point to numerical precision, and bypassing the solver entirely changes test accuracy by +0.00 percentage points in 18 of 19 training runs. Controlled interventions falsify the tempting explanation: removing the anchoring term reproduces every result, and retraining with noise-decoupled starts yields a solver that converges to the noisy start while the decoder learns to ignore it. The single escaping run diverges instead (|h^{*}-z_0|=171), producing a co-adapted noise channel whose removal improves accuracy. Iteration counts are uncorrelated with ground-truth difficulty (r=0.009), and the full apparatus never outperforms a two-layer MLP on either task. We trace the mechanism to gradient starvation along two distinct routes, show that the standard zeroing ablation is confounded and gives wildly seed-dependent answers where the correct substitution test gives a stable zero, and distill a four-test diagnostic protocol for auditing claimed implicit computation. All experiments run on a single free Colab GPU; code, raw logs, and analysis scripts are released.

Open-source scientific software is a major driver of scientific progress, yet its development and reuse remain difficult in collaborative settings. Researchers repeatedly face four recurring challenges: discovering and reproducing existing routines, adapting them for new use cases, sharing and scaling them across collaborators, and stabilizing them with reproducible execution environments. We present Album, an open-source framework for packaging and sharing scientific routines as executable artifacts through two minimal primitives: (i) the solution, a Python-native executable entry point that combines machine-readable metadata, arguments, environment specifications, and lifecycle hooks; and (ii) the catalog, a decentralized, git-native distribution mechanism with indexed search and optional web rendering for discovery, provenance, and governance. Album uses a two-context execution model in which a host controller evaluates manifests and prepares per-solution environments, while lifecycle hooks execute inside isolated solution environments. This design supports reproducible execution, post-environment setup, and the composition of routines with incompatible dependencies. Album can be used in conjunction with LLM agents: solutions can be drafted and revised with LLM assistance, and a MCP interface exposes cataloged solutions as callable tools for tool-grounded discovery and orchestration. We evaluate Album through four realworld imaging deployments spanning interactive visualization of electron microscopy data, integration of multiple segmentation methods, the orchestration of cryo-electron tomography competition workflows, and mineral quantification pipelines. Overall, Album complements package managers, workflow systems, and container runtimes by making scientific routines executable, shareable artifacts. Documentation and examples are available at https://album.solutions.

Near-term quantum workloads are shaped by coupled compilation and execution choices: qubit layout, routing, basis translation, gate suppression, measurement mitigation, shot budget, and artifact reproducibility. This paper analyzes QBalance, a Python workflow library for dataset-level selection among quantum compilation, noise-suppression, and error-mitigation strategies built on the Qiskit ecosystem. The contribution is formulated as a finite multi-objective strategy-selection problem over circuits, backends, and transformation policies. The manuscript derives the implemented weighted objective, non-dominated selection rule, survival-product error proxy, Bayesian linear candidate-ordering surrogate, and distributional diagnostics. It also positions the system relative to established work on Qiskit pass-manager compilation, SABRE-style routing, randomized compiling, dynamical decoupling, zero-noise extrapolation, matrix-free measurement mitigation, circuit cutting, and Thompson sampling. The analysis shows that QBalance provides a reproducible orchestration and artifact model for quantum workflow studies. It also establishes precise limitations: the current bandit mechanism orders candidates but does not reduce the number of candidate evaluations, the custom layout heuristic is greedy and only partially topology-aware, the implemented ZNE helper is parity-centered, and the cutting integration is a hook rather than a full reconstruction pipeline.

Tool-augmented LLM agents raise new security risks: tool executions can introduce runtime-only behaviors, including prompt injection and unintended exposure of external inputs (e.g., environment secrets or local files). While existing scanners often focus on static artifacts, analyzing runtime behavior is challenging because directly executing untrusted tools can itself be dangerous. We present MCP-SandboxScan, a lightweight framework motivated by the Model Context Protocol (MCP) that safely executes untrusted tools inside a WebAssembly/WASI sandbox and produces auditable reports of external-to-sink exposures. Our prototype (i) extracts LLM-relevant sinks from runtime outputs (prompt/messages and structured tool-return fields), (ii) instantiates external-input candidates from environment values, mounted file contents, and output-surfaced HTTP fetch intents, and (iii) links sources to sinks via snippet-based substring matching. Case studies on three representative tools show that MCP-SandboxScan can surface provenance evidence when external inputs appear in prompt/messages or tool-return payloads, and can expose filesystem capability violations as runtime evidence. We further compare against a lightweight static string-signature baseline and use a micro-benchmark to characterize false negatives under transformations and false positives from short-token collisions.

Large language models are increasingly deployed as agents that solve tasks by interacting with external tool environments. Although recent tool-use benchmarks increasingly cover complex task settings, they still largely assume clean, stable, and trustworthy tool environments, leaving tool-environment unreliability insufficiently examined. We introduce ToolBench-X, a benchmark for evaluating agents under recoverable reliability hazards. ToolBench-X contains executable multi-step tasks across diverse domains and sequential, parallel, and mixed workflows, each paired with deterministic tools and a canonical final answer for automatic evaluation. Starting from clean tool environments, ToolBench-X injects five structured hazard types: Specification Drift, Invocation Error, Execution Failure, Output Drift, and Cross-source Conflict. Crucially, each injected instance remains solvable through at least one valid recovery path, such as retrying, fallback, verification, or cross-checking. Experiments reveal a substantial reliability gap: agents that perform well with reliable tools often fail under recoverable hazards. Further analysis shows that failures are driven less by tool-use volume or inference budget than by limited hazard diagnosis and ineffective recovery. Targeted recovery hints recover many failed tasks, while test-time scaling yields more limited gains. These results suggest that tool-use evaluation should move beyond function-call accuracy toward task completion under unreliable tool environments. The code and data is available at https://github.com/Foreverskyou/ToolBench-X.

Compact language models (LMs) reduce cost, latency, and deployment risk for tool agents. Yet MCP-style tool use requires more than isolated function calling: an agent must discover tools from live catalogs, satisfy schemas, preserve dependencies across intermediate outputs, and ground final responses in executed evidence. Small planners often generate plausible workflow graphs that fail under tool resolution, parameter validation, dependency tracking, or execution. We argue that this failure mode is poorly handled by small-corpus distillation. A few hundred teacher traces can teach workflow format, but rarely cover the recovery behavior needed to repair failed plans over changing tool catalogs. We introduce Evoflux, an inference-time evolutionary search method that treats compact tool use as the repair of executable tool workflows. It evolves typed workflow graphs through structured edits, execution feedback, adaptive intensity, meta-guided redesign, and diversity pruning. On held-out MCP-Bench tasks spanning live MCP servers and 250 tools, Evoflux raises execution feasibility from roughly 3% to 17-24% across small planners. In contrast, SFT and SFT+DPO on the same search-mined data match, underperform, or collapse below zero-shot performance; ReAct reaches higher peaks, but with higher variance and token cost. These results show that execution-grounded search is more reliable under scarce teacher-trace budgets.

LLM coding agents issue Bash commands through interfaces that may serialize, wrap, and reparse model output. Matched execution scores alone cannot distinguish command-generation errors from failures introduced after generation. QuoteBench measures this boundary with exact final-state validation on 56 one-shot tasks from 14 incident-derived families, crossing the generation contract with the execution transport around one deliberately unescaped added parser. Escaping at the interpolation point reproduces each replayed reply's raw-path outcome, so any recovery under a disclosed boundary must come from the model changing its generation. Across eight same-window configurations, replaying the same reply through the added parser lowers success by 55.4 to 73.2 percentage points; disclosure recovers 30.4 to 60.7 points for six configurations, and zero or slightly negative for the other two. Raw generation is nearly saturated at the frontier; boundary adaptation is what still separates models. GPT-5.6-sol's matched gap of -3.6 points hides -64.3 points of damage and +60.7 points of compensation. The deployment configuration reorders models: one reversal among 26 comparable pairs is unambiguous and four more sit on single-task margins. Evaluations of command-issuing agents should report the model configuration, generation contract, execution path, operating point, and final-state validator rather than treat a matched score as an intrinsic model property.

Anomaly detection in command shell sessions is a critical aspect of computer security. Recent advances in deep learning and natural language processing, particularly transformer-based models, have shown great promise for addressing complex security challenges. In this paper, we implement a comprehensive approach to detect anomalies in Unix shell sessions using a pretrained DistilBERT model, leveraging both unsupervised and supervised learning techniques to identify anomalous activity while minimizing data labeling. The unsupervised method captures the underlying structure and syntax of Unix shell commands, enabling the detection of session deviations from normal behavior. Experiments on a large-scale enterprise dataset collected from production systems demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach in detecting anomalous behavior in Unix shell sessions. This work highlights the potential of leveraging recent advances in transformers to address important computer security challenges.

This paper reports a single, fully instrumented case study of a large-scale architectural refactoring by an AI coding agent under a specification-first protocol, with no human review of the generated code and no pre-existing oracle to validate the target behaviour. The task, dismantling a central invariant across a large interdependent codebase, was assessed by the author as effectively infeasible through incremental refactoring, the kind of change that conventionally calls for a rewrite instead. Under the protocol described here, the agent completed it successfully. The system is a 717,725-line production TypeScript application across 3,648 files. The task required dismantling a core lifetime invariant: the guarantee that a UI panel remains open for the duration of an AI request. The target behaviour was that a streaming generation survives the closing of its panel and can be reattached, on reopening, to the same live stream with no loss or duplication. The protocol: formal specification by the agent, 14 refinement cycles auditing that specification against the source code, atomic implementation, a compile/test feedback loop, then 17 verification cycles auditing the code against the frozen specification. Across 31 audit passes, 201 defects were corrected before any human executed the program. The convergence criterion was empirical: two consecutive verification passes returning zero findings. The change touched 189 files (31 new); with the extraction phase, the two commits total 288 files, 34,770 insertions, 16,422 deletions. Across the first and roughly thirty later sessions, the software behaved as specified, no bug observed. Elapsed: three days; cost: USD 2,430. The full specification and raw session logs, 1,500+ pages in French, are published as evidence, allowing inspection of the process and submission to a language model for consistency checking.

Code LLMs still struggle with code execution reasoning, especially in smaller models. Existing methods rely on supervised fine-tuning (SFT) with teacher-generated explanations, primarily in two forms: (1) input-output (I/O) prediction chains and (2) natural-language descriptions of execution traces. However, intermediate execution steps cannot be explicitly verified during SFT, so the training objective can reduce to merely matching teacher explanations. Moreover, training data is typically collected without explicit control over task difficulty. We introduce ExecVerify, which goes beyond text imitation by incorporating verifiable white-box rewards derived from execution traces, including next-statement prediction and variable value/type prediction. Our work first builds a dataset with multiple difficulty levels via constraint-based program synthesis. Then, we apply reinforcement learning (RL) to reward correct answers about both intermediate execution steps and final outputs, aligning the training objective with semantic correctness at each execution step. Finally, we adopt a two-stage training pipeline that first enhances execution reasoning and then transfers to code generation. Experiments demonstrate that a 7B model trained with ExecVerify achieves performance comparable to 32B models on code reasoning benchmarks and improves pass@1 by up to 5.9\% on code generation tasks over strong post-training baselines.

Terminal agents are increasingly capable of executing complex, long-horizon tasks autonomously from a single user prompt. To do so, they must interpret instructions encountered in the environment (e.g., README files, code comments, stack traces) and determine their relevance to the task. This creates a fundamental challenge: relevant cues must be followed to complete a task, whereas irrelevant or misleading ones must be ignored. Existing benchmarks do not capture this ability. An agent may appear capable by blindly following all instructions, or appear robust by ignoring them altogether. We introduce TAB (Task Alignment Benchmark), a suite of 89 terminal tasks derived from Terminal-Bench 2.1. Each task is intentionally underspecified, with missing information provided as a necessary cue embedded in a natural environmental artifact, alongside a plausible but irrelevant distractor. Solving these tasks requires selectively using the cue while ignoring the distractor. Applying TAB to ten frontier agents reveals a systematic gap between task capability and task alignment. The strongest Terminal-Bench agent achieves high task completion but low task alignment on TAB. Evaluating six prompt-injection defenses further shows that suppressing distractor execution also suppresses the cues required for task completion. These results demonstrate that task-aligned agents require selective use of environmental instructions rather than blanket acceptance or rejection.

Large language model (LLM) coding agents are increasingly deployed to autonomously perform software engineering tasks in terminal-based environments, making their reliability a growing concern. Existing empirical studies investigate why coding agents fail, yet they largely treat failure as a final outcome rather than a temporal process, providing limited insight into how failures emerge, evolve, and become unrecoverable. We present the first large-scale empirical study of CLI coding-agent failure trajectories, introducing a process-oriented framework that analyzes failure through its onset, evolution, and recovery across execution trajectories. We first collect 3,843 execution trajectories generated by seven frontier models across three coding-agent scaffolds (OpenHands, MiniSWE, and Terminus2) on Terminal-Bench, then carefully filter them to obtain 1,794 complete and valid trajectories for manual annotation (over 63,000 execution steps), from which we derive 14 findings spanning failure occurrence, root causes, recovery, and cross-system consistency. Our findings show that coding-agent failures are predominantly driven by epistemic errors, typically begin within the first few execution steps, and often remain hidden until recovery is no longer possible, suggesting that improving coding-agent reliability requires earlier validation and intervention rather than relying solely on final-outcome evaluation.

We present a deployed system that automates end-to-end customer support workflows inside an enterprise Business Process Management (BPM) platform. The approach is scalable in production and reaches selective automation within two weeks for a new process, leveraging supervision already generated at scale: structured per-case UI interaction traces and low-overhead copilot feedback, where operators either accept a suggestion or provide a correction. A staged deployment pipeline trains a next UI action policy, learns a critic from copilot feedback to calibrate abstention, and executes only high-confidence steps in the background while deferring uncertain decisions to operators and resuming from the updated UI state. This setup lets one operator supervise multiple concurrent sessions and be interrupted only when the system is uncertain. The system operates on a schema-driven view of the BPM interface and includes monitoring and safe fallbacks for production. In production, it automated 45% of sessions and reduced average handling time by 39% without degrading support quality level.

There has been significant progress in developing reinforcement learning (RL) training systems. Past works such as IMPALA, Apex, Seed RL, Sample Factory, and others, aim to improve the system's overall throughput. In this paper, we aim to address a common bottleneck in the RL training system, i.e., parallel environment execution, which is often the slowest part of the whole system but receives little attention. With a curated design for paralleling RL environments, we have improved the RL environment simulation speed across different hardware setups, ranging from a laptop and a modest workstation, to a high-end machine such as NVIDIA DGX-A100. On a high-end machine, EnvPool achieves one million frames per second for the environment execution on Atari environments and three million frames per second on MuJoCo environments. When running EnvPool on a laptop, the speed is 2.8x that of the Python subprocess. Moreover, great compatibility with existing RL training libraries has been demonstrated in the open-sourced community, including CleanRL, rl_games, DeepMind Acme, etc. Finally, EnvPool allows researchers to iterate their ideas at a much faster pace and has great potential to become the de facto RL environment execution engine. Example runs show that it only takes five minutes to train agents to play Atari Pong and MuJoCo Ant on a laptop. EnvPool is open-sourced at https://github.com/sail-sg/envpool.

Tool-using LLM agents can violate the very policies they are deployed to enforce while appearing to complete the task successfully. In policy-permissive environments, a tool may execute any well-formed call even when the corresponding state transition is forbidden by domain policy. The result is a silent wrong state (a booking cancelled, a passenger count changed, a claim acted on without verification) that neither the tool nor the agent's self-report exposes. We study this failure mode in the τ^2-bench airline domain. On a budget agent, 78% of observed failures are silent wrong-state failures with no tool error, and the aggregate failure rate is reproducible across disjoint seeds, not sampling noise. We then evaluate a lightweight intervention: deterministic, read-only pre-execution gates that inspect the proposed call and current state before allowing a write. A four-gate suite raises full-benchmark success from 29.6% to 42.0% on gpt-4o-mini (+12.4pp; paired task-level bootstrap P=0.0012), and the lift reproduces on a disjoint 15-seed set (+12.3pp; P=0.0008). The effect is concentrated where the gates fire: on the 26/50 firing tasks, success rises by +19.2pp, while movement on the 24 non-firing tasks does not exclude zero. Two negative controls (a self-enforcing retail domain and BFCL) bound the mechanism: gates help when tools are policy-permissive and add little where tools already self-enforce. As suggestive evidence, not a central claim, the same failure mode persists at the frontier: gpt-5.2 at default reasoning still attempts policy-violating writes, and the same suite improves success from 61.2% to 71.6% (+10.4pp; P=0.020; n=5, no replication). The contribution is a bounded evaluation and reliability result: deterministic gates do not guarantee task success, but they can deterministically prevent a known class of silent policy-violating writes at the action boundary.

LLM agents increasingly perform autonomous actions through external tools, leading to complex and evolving safety risks. However, existing safety testing targets expert-designed safety violations, and the corresponding outcomes are evaluated by hard-coded rules, making them costly to extend as agents evolve. To this end, we present Vera, an end-to-end automated safety testing framework that instantiates software engineering testing principles for non-deterministic agents through a three-stage, self-reinforcing pipeline. First, a literature-driven exploration continuously discovers and structures emerging risks into taxonomies of safety risks, attack methods, and tool execution environments. Second, combinatorial composition across taxonomy dimensions produces executable safety cases, each specifying a concrete safety goal, a programmatically constructed initial state, and a deterministic verification predicate grounded in observable artifacts. Third, adaptive execution runs heterogeneous agents in isolated sandboxes where a control agent steers multi-turn interaction based on runtime observations, while evidence-grounded verifiers judge outcomes from environment state and tool-call evidence rather than model self-report. We evaluate Vera on four production agent frameworks (OpenClaw, Hermes, Codex, Claude Code), revealing substantial safety weaknesses, with average attack success rates reaching 93.9\% under multi-channel attacks; we also release Vera-Bench, comprising 1600 executable safety cases spanning 124 risk categories across three execution settings. These results indicate that modular, executable testing infrastructure is essential for rigorous and maintainable safety evaluation of rapidly evolving agentic systems at scale. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/Yunhao-Feng/Vera.

AI agents have become increasingly capable at isolated software engineering (SWE) tasks such as resolving issues on Github. Yet long-horizon tasks involving multiple interdependent subtasks still pose challenges both with respect to accuracy, and with respect to timely completion. A natural approach to solving these long-horizon tasks in a timely manner is asynchronous multi-agent collaboration, where multiple agents work on different parts of the task at the same time. But effective application of multi-agent systems has proven surprisingly difficult: concurrent edits by multiple agents interfere with each other, dependencies are difficult to synchronize, and combining partial progress into a coherent whole is challenging. On the other hand, human developers have long relied on mature collaboration infrastructure to manage these challenges in large software projects. Inspired by these collaboration primitives, we introduce Centralized Asynchronous Isolated Delegation (CAID), a structured multi-agent coordination paradigm grounded in three core SWE primitives: centralized task delegation, asynchronous execution, and isolated workspaces. CAID constructs dependency-aware task plans through a central manager, executes subtasks concurrently in isolated workspaces, and consolidates progress via structured integration with executable test-based verification. In empirical evaluation, we find that CAID improves accuracy over single-agent baselines by 26.7% absolute on paper reproduction tasks (PaperBench) and 14.3% on Python library development tasks (Commit0). Through systematic analysis, we find that branch-and-merge is a central coordination mechanism for multi-agent collaboration, and that SWE primitives such as git worktree, git commit, and git merge enable it to be realized in a reliable and executable manner.

The rapid expansion of capabilities in Large Language Model (LLM) agents has exposed a critical architectural bottleneck: when agents are given access to a flat, monolithic registry of tools, the model must evaluate hundreds or thousands of options simultaneously. This leads to decision-space explosion, context window saturation, and degraded routing accuracy. To address these limitations, this paper presents a hierarchical, skill-based architecture for agentic orchestration. Capabilities are organized as a rooted tree where internal nodes make routing decisions and leaf nodes execute deterministic tasks. The runtime enforces a single-step execution loop governed by a Last-In-First-Out (LIFO) stack, giving the agent a form of memory akin to a Pushdown Automaton, therefore enabling it to track nested execution contexts and resume deterministically from any depth. Capability discovery follows a manifest-driven, lazy-loading protocol: only the immediate children of the active node are loaded, so memory and prompt costs scale with the explored path rather than the global registry. By replacing global memory with localized stack frames, the architecture prevents outputs from one execution branch from leaking into another, establishing the isolation guarantees required for deployment in regulated enterprise environments. We also discuss UPI Help, an AI-powered digital payments support product, as a motivating production deployment context. We provide a mathematical formalization of the orchestration state, detailed algorithmic analysis of the execution loop, and controlled benchmarks comparing flat and hierarchical routing under increasing tool catalogs, multi-step workflow pressure, and visible schema-token exposure per LLM call.

Everything a language model sees is tokens. The serving stack knows what each span is -- user input, tool output, instructions -- but the model must keep track of that itself, and it can lose track or be confused: text can be written to read like anything. Prompt injection is a natural exploit of this phenomenon. By scrambling the model's understanding of span identity, an attacker can induce unwanted and potentially dangerous actions. Adding a non-textual channel to the model's input -- a way to communicate span identity beyond text -- mitigates this class of attack. We thus introduce a general steering technique called Semantic Overlays: small learned adapters applied at chosen prefill positions to a frozen model's residual stream. Laying an overlay over a span creates an out-of-band annotation channel that cannot be replicated by tokens. Unlike steering vectors, Semantic Overlays are trained, adaptable, and selectively applied. An overlay can encode complex semantics that reshape how the model perceives the marked span: asked to copy a code snippet under an overlay asserting that it is in a different programming language than it is, the model rewrites the snippet, faithfully, in the asserted language. Overlays are also composable, allow for transparent reading of underlying content, and can carry complex payloads -- including imperatives that the model will follow. An overlay which marks a span as "non-executable" defends against the broad class of prompt injections that add instructions in untrusted context. We report strong results on prompt injection benchmarks: SEP separation rises from 24.3% to 96.5% with utility unchanged (our scoring rule; we also correct a defect in the published grader), TensorTrust attack success rate falls from 34.8% to 6.6%, and all four PIArena attack families drop to 0% compliance, all while marked spans stay readable (92.5% exact copy rate).

Software engineering, whether performed by humans or by AI agents, requires reasoning about how software behaves. We call the internal model that supports such reasoning the software world model, and view current code-execution benchmarks as covering one well-studied slice of it -- control flow. In this paper, we take a step toward a broader evaluation by shifting the observable axis to execution resources: alongside test outcome and exception class, we predict peak memory, wall-clock time, and ranked profiler outputs at method and line granularity. We use SWE-bench Verified as the source of data to hold the test close to real-world software engineering tasks. All tested models, frontier ones included, show modest performance and brittle behaviour, suggesting a notable lack of understanding of how software is executed, as opposed to how its source code is written.

Enterprise agents must follow long-horizon, conditional, safety-critical standard operating procedures (SOPs). We compile machine-readable SOP constraints into executable pseudo-code and run them with a program-guided (PG) stack machine that pages the active frame while an LLM performs semantic execution. A three-arm SOPBench study across six models separates representation from runtime: compiled text never significantly hurts and gains up to 16.0 points where official prose underperforms. Runtime guidance is capability-gated. Two strong models independently show positive seven-domain PG contrasts (58:19 and 75:31 discordant pairs), whereas weak models are harmed. A full-program cursor ablation (active frame first, complete program retained) recovers much of the strong-model refusal gain; selective visibility adds a smaller improvement. Paired probe and audit measurements track this divide to spontaneous state discipline rather than reconstruction ability. On Bank the three primary arms rise from 70.4 to 86.4 to 92.8, with 100% refusal correctness. Practical guidance: compile first; enable active-frame paging only after a model-level discipline check.

Agent benchmarks often evaluate only final answers even when agents run on stateful runtimes. We argue this under-specifies what is being evaluated: the proper unit is a declared model-plus-runtime configuration whose failures can occur in evidence acquisition, runtime routing, safety boundaries, or repeated execution. We present ClawProBench, a trace-aware benchmark for runtime-native agent evaluation instantiated on OpenClaw, a live agent runtime with workspace tools and native surfaces for browsing, memory, messaging, scheduling, skills, and subagents. ClawProBench defines two tracks: a 102-scenario full profile with live workspace and native-runtime routing tasks, and a frozen 68-scenario holdout with closed-world JSON output contracts for robust ranking. Trials are scored from execution traces via a safety-gated formula combining correctness, process quality, and efficiency, preserving failure evidence for audit. Our anonymous artifact includes benchmark definitions, scoring code, manifests and sanitized traces. We evaluate 68 configurations on the full profile and 37 on holdout. The top safety-gated average trace score is 0.7671. Native-runtime tasks underperform workspace-live tasks (0.5238 vs. 0.6415). On holdout, pass@k-any outperforms strict three-trial pass (0.6638 vs. 0.2890), while full-profile and holdout rankings show weak alignment (Spearman 0.1300). Rankings based purely on correctness differ substantially from process-aware, safety-gated and strict-pass views. Final-answer leaderboards may hide native-surface weaknesses, one-off successes and trace-local agent failure modes.

Malicious Python packages make software supply chains vulnerable by exploiting trust in open-source repositories like Python Package Index (PyPI). Lack of real-time behavioral monitoring makes metadata inspection and static code analysis inadequate against advanced attack strategies such as typosquatting, covert remote access activation, and dynamic payload generation. To address these challenges, we introduce DySec, a machine learning (ML)-based dynamic analysis framework for PyPI that uses eBPF kernel and user-level probes to monitor behaviors during package installation. By capturing 36 real-time features-including system calls, network traffic, resource usage, directory access, and installation patterns-DySec detects threats like typosquatting, covert remote access activation, dynamic payload generation, and multiphase attack malware. We developed a comprehensive dataset of 14,271 Python packages, including 7,127 malicious sample traces, by executing them in a controlled isolated environment. Experimental results demonstrate that DySec achieves a 95.99\% detection accuracy with a latency of <0.5s, reducing false negatives by 78.65\% compared to static analysis and 82.24\% compared to metadata analysis. During the evaluation, DySec flagged 11 packages that PyPI classified as benign. A manual analysis, including installation behavior inspection, confirmed six of them as malicious. These findings were reported to PyPI maintainers, resulting in the removal of four packages. DySec bridges the gap between reactive traditional methods and proactive, scalable threat mitigation in open-source ecosystems by uniquely detecting malicious install-time behaviors.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as computer-use agents, autonomously performing tasks within real desktop or web environments. While this evolution greatly expands practical use cases for humans, it also creates serious security exposures. We present SUDO (Screen-based Universal Detox2Tox Offense), a novel attack framework that systematically bypasses refusal-trained safeguards in commercial computer-use agents, such as Claude for Computer Use. The core mechanism, Detox2Tox, transforms harmful requests (that agents initially reject) into seemingly benign requests via detoxification, secures detailed instructions from advanced vision language models (VLMs), and then reintroduces malicious content via toxification just before execution. Unlike conventional jailbreaks, SUDO iteratively refines its attacks based on a built-in refusal feedback, making it increasingly effective against robust policy filters. In extensive tests spanning 50 real-world tasks and multiple state-of-the-art VLMs, SUDO achieves a stark attack success rate of 24.41% (with no refinement), and up to 41.33% (by its iterative refinement) in Claude for Computer Use. By revealing these vulnerabilities and demonstrating the ease with which they can be exploited in real-world computing environments, this paper highlights an immediate need for robust, context-aware safeguards. WARNING: This paper includes harmful or offensive model outputs

While significant progress has been made in automating various aspects of software development through coding agents, there is still significant room for improvement in their bug fixing capabilities. Debugging and investigation of runtime behavior remains largely a manual, developer-driven process. Popular coding agents typically rely on either static analysis of the code or iterative test-fix cycles, which is akin to trial and error debugging. We posit that there is a wealth of rich runtime information that developers routinely access while debugging code, which agents are currently deprived of due to design limitations. Despite how prevalent debuggers are in modern IDEs and command-line tools, they have surprisingly not made their way into coding agents. In this work, we introduce Debug2Fix, a novel framework that incorporates interactive debugging as a core component of a software engineering agent via a subagent architecture. We incorporate debuggers for Java and Python into our agent framework and evaluate against GitBug-Java and SWE-Bench-Live and achieve >20% improvement in performance compared to the baseline for certain models. Furthermore, using our framework, we're able to make weaker models like GPT-5 and Claude Haiku 4.5 match or exceed the performances of stronger models like Claude Sonnet 4.5, showing that better tool design is often just as important as switching to a more expensive model. Finally, we conduct systematic ablations demonstrating the importance of both the subagent architecture and debugger integration.

Production LLMs receive instructions from sources with very different levels of trust, yet attend to every token with uniform architectural privilege. This is the structural vulnerability that enables malicious prompt injections and, more broadly, leaves models without a principled way to resolve conflicts between legitimate but competing instructions. A common training-based response is to teach models an explicit instruction hierarchy; existing approaches, however, formalize hierarchies of only three or four levels, treat all violations as equally severe, and rarely evaluate the full set of pairwise level interactions. We formalize a k-level instruction hierarchy problem and instantiate it for k=5, yielding ten pairwise priority relations that a compliant model must enforce. We then introduce Gravity-Weighted DPO (GW-DPO), a preference-optimization objective whose per-sample offset scales with the structural distance between conflicting levels under a linear or bilateral schedule, the latter weighting severity by both the privilege gap and the privilege of the victim level. Combined with hierarchy-specific delimiter tokens (Chen et al., 2025) and Instructional Segment Embeddings (ISE; Wu et al., 2025), GW-DPO with the bilateral schedule Pareto-improves over standard DPO and the linear variant on Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, raising macro pairwise priority adherence while keeping over-refusal at half the standard DPO rate. Ablations isolate ISE as a refusal-threshold calibrator and recast five- versus three-level training as a generality-specialization tradeoff.

Prompt injection was initially framed as the large language model (LLM) analogue of SQL injection. However, over the past three years, attacks labeled as prompt injection have evolved from isolated input-manipulation exploits into multistep attack mechanisms that resemble malware. In this paper, we argue that prompt injections evolved into promptware, a new class of malware execution mechanism triggered through prompts engineered to exploit an application's LLM. We introduce a seven-stage promptware kill chain: Initial Access (prompt injection), Privilege Escalation (jailbreaking), Reconnaissance, Persistence (memory and retrieval poisoning), Command and Control, Lateral Movement, and Actions on Objective. We analyze thirty-six prominent studies and real-world incidents affecting production LLM systems and show that at least twenty-one documented attacks that traverse four or more stages of this kill chain, demonstrating that the threat model is not merely theoretical. We discuss the need for a defense-in-depth approach that addresses all stages of the promptware life cycle and review relevant countermeasures for each step. By moving the conversation from prompt injection to a promptware kill chain, our work provides analytical clarity, enables structured risk assessment, and lays a foundation for systematic security engineering of LLM-based systems.

Equality saturation is a technique for program optimization based on non-destructive rewriting and a form of program analysis called e-class analysis. The current form of e-class analysis is pessimistic and therefore ineffective at analyzing cyclic programs, such as those in SSA form. We propose an abstract interpretation algorithm that can precisely analyze cycles during equality saturation. This results in a unified algorithm for optimistic analysis and non-destructive rewriting. We instantiate this approach on a prototype abstract interpreter for SSA programs using a new semantics of SSA. Our prototype can analyze simple example programs more precisely than clang and gcc.

Autonomous agent systems increasingly trigger real-world side effects: deploying infrastructure, modifying databases, moving money, and executing workflows. Yet most agent stacks provide no mandatory execution checkpoint where organizations can deterministically permit, deny, or defer an action before it changes reality. This paper introduces Faramesh, a protocol-agnostic execution control plane that enforces execution-time authorization for agent-driven actions via a non-bypassable Action Authorization Boundary (AAB). Faramesh canonicalizes agent intent into a Canonical Action Representation (CAR), evaluates actions deterministically against policy and state, and issues a decision artifact (PERMIT/DEFER/DENY) that executors must validate prior to execution. The system is designed to be framework- and model-agnostic, supports multi-agent and multi-tenant deployments, and remains independent of transport protocols (e.g., MCP). Faramesh further provides decision-centric, append-only provenance logging keyed by canonical action hashes, enabling auditability, verification, and deterministic replay without re-running agent reasoning. We show how these primitives yield enforceable, predictable governance for autonomous execution while avoiding hidden coupling to orchestration layers or observability-only approaches.

Automatic program repair seeks to generate correct code from buggy programs, with most approaches searching the correct program in a discrete, symbolic space of source code tokens. This symbolic search is fundamentally limited by its inability to directly reason about program behavior. We introduce Gradient-Based Program Repair (GBPR), a new paradigm that reframes program repair as continuous optimization in a differentiable numerical program space. Our core insight is to compile symbolic programs into differentiable numerical representations, enabling search in the numerical program space directly guided by program behavior. To evaluate GBPR, we present RaspBugs, a new benchmark of 1,466 buggy symbolic RASP programs and their respective numerical representations. Our experiments demonstrate that GBPR can effectively repair buggy symbolic programs by gradient-based optimization in the numerical program space, with convincing repair trajectories. To our knowledge, we are the first to state program repair as continuous optimization in a numerical program space. Our work establishes a new direction for program repair research, bridging two rich worlds: continuous optimization and program behavior.

Self-evolving agents violate the assumption behind most learning-theoretic guarantees: the data, evaluator, components, and hypothesis space are produced by the policy being updated. We present SEA, an architecture that confines self-modification to a small steering adapter and a versioned harness around a frozen base model and admits each modification only through an anytime-valid gate that emits an auditable certificate against a fixed error budget. Five loop controllers compose published guarantees; because such gates can only select among behaviors the frozen base already produces, five verifier-in-the-loop mechanisms -- best-of-N, micro-step search, self-authored reproduction oracles, search-layer control, and self-repair -- supply the dense, grader-free signal the gates require, computed from the issue text alone. On a 52-instance SWE-bench Verified subset across four base models, base capability is the dominant, confound-free effect, and on two strong base models a deliberate no-op-composite control isolates the suite's contribution at +4 and +5 (Glm~5.2 24to28; Gpt 29to34, the 65% best), with event logs confirming that its mechanisms fire and prevent regressions. Results are single-run on expensive evaluations; confirming run-to-run variance and adapting the per-task algorithm mix are future work.

We explore the relations between the zeta distribution and algorithmic information theory via a new model of the transfer learning problem. The program distribution is approximated by a zeta distribution with parameter near 1. We model the training sequence as a stochastic process. We analyze the upper temporal bound for learning a training sequence and its entropy rates, assuming an oracle for the transfer learning problem. We argue from empirical evidence that power-law models are suitable for natural processes. Four sequence models are proposed. Random typing model is like no-free lunch where transfer learning does not work. Zeta process independently samples programs from the zeta distribution. A model of common sub-programs inspired by genetics uses a database of sub-programs. An evolutionary zeta process samples mutations from Zeta distribution. The analysis of stochastic processes inspired by evolution suggest that AI may be feasible in nature, countering no-free lunch sort of arguments.

Recent progress in autonomous code generation has fueled excitement around AI agents capable of accelerating scientific discovery by running experiments. However, there is currently no benchmark that evaluates whether such agents can implement scientific ideas when given varied amounts of code as a starting point, interpolating between reproduction (running code) and from-scratch replication (fully re-implementing and running code). We introduce AutoExperiment, a benchmark that evaluates AI agents' ability to implement and run machine learning experiments based on natural language descriptions in research papers. In each task, agents are given a research paper, a codebase with key functions masked out, and a command to run the experiment. The goal is to generate the missing code, execute the experiment in a sandboxed environment, and reproduce the results. AutoExperiment scales in difficulty by varying the number of missing functions n, ranging from partial reproduction to full replication. We evaluate state-of-the-art agents and find that performance degrades rapidly as n increases. Agents that can dynamically interact with the environment (e.g. to debug their code) can outperform agents in fixed "agentless" harnesses, and there exists a significant gap between single-shot and multi-trial success rates (Pass@1 vs. Pass@5), motivating verifier approaches to our benchmark. Our findings highlight critical challenges in long-horizon code generation, context retrieval, and autonomous experiment execution, establishing AutoExperiment as a new benchmark for evaluating progress in AI-driven scientific experimentation. Our data and code are open-sourced at https://github.com/j1mk1m/AutoExperiment .

Autonomous agentic systems are largely static after deployment: they do not learn from user interactions, and recurring failures persist until the next human-driven update ships a fix. Self-evolving agents have emerged in response, but all confine evolution to text-mutable artifacts -- skill files, prompt configurations, memory schemas, workflow graphs -- and leave the agent harness untouched. Since routing, hook ordering, state invariants, and dispatch live in code rather than in any text artifact, an entire class of structural failure is physically unreachable from the text layer. We argue that source-level adaptation is a fundamentally more general medium: it is Turing-complete, a strict superset of every text-mutable scope, takes effect deterministically rather than through base-model compliance, and does not erode under long-context drift. We present MOSS, a system that performs self-rewriting at the source level on production agentic substrates. Each evolution is anchored to an automatically curated batch of production-failure evidence and proceeds through a deterministic multi-stage pipeline; code modification is delegated to a pluggable external coding-agent CLI while MOSS retains stage ordering and verdicts. Candidates are verified by replaying the batch against the candidate image in ephemeral trial workers, then promoted via user-consent-gated, in-place container swap with health-probe-gated rollback. On OpenClaw, MOSS lifts a four-task mean grader score from 0.25 to 0.61 in a single cycle without human intervention.

Code completion has become an essential tool for daily software development. Existing evaluation benchmarks often employ static methods that do not fully capture the dynamic nature of real-world coding environments and face significant challenges, including limited context length, reliance on superficial evaluation metrics, and potential overfitting to training datasets. In this work, we introduce a novel framework for enhancing code completion in software development through the creation of a repository-level benchmark ExecRepoBench and the instruction corpora Repo-Instruct, aim at improving the functionality of open-source large language models (LLMs) in real-world coding scenarios that involve complex interdependencies across multiple files. ExecRepoBench includes 1.2K samples from active Python repositories. Plus, we present a multi-level grammar-based completion methodology conditioned on the abstract syntax tree to mask code fragments at various logical units (e.g. statements, expressions, and functions). Then, we fine-tune the open-source LLM with 7B parameters on Repo-Instruct to produce a strong code completion baseline model Qwen2.5-Coder-Instruct-C based on the open-source model. Qwen2.5-Coder-Instruct-C is rigorously evaluated against existing benchmarks, including MultiPL-E and ExecRepoBench, which consistently outperforms prior baselines across all programming languages. The deployment of can be used as a high-performance, local service for programming development\url{https://execrepobench.github.io/}.

Subliminal learning lets a student inherit a teacher's hidden trait from distillation data that never names it. We ask when such transfer can be audited before training. The answer is not model identity or scale alone, but channel location: the carrier through which the trait reaches the student. We find three regimes. In a controlled initialization-dependent body channel, a pre-training screen works. Coverage, the cosine between the student's initial distillation update and the teacher's fine-tuning displacement, predicts held-out transfer (Spearman ρapprox 0.95; AUROC 0.997). In pretrained language models, masked single-token traits instead ride convergent vocabulary geometry. This channel is initialization-independent, so initialization-alignment screens, including coverage, are not mechanistic; the useful handles are post-hoc detection and targeted mitigation. Even when a single-token named entity is removed from the loss, the student's held-out probability for that entity rises to 0.40 on average (sim 2500times), and a related semantic class transfers. In an untied-head model, orthogonalizing the trait's output row against entangled neighbours collapses leakage, while equal-size random-subspace edits do not. Thus removing a target string from distillation labels does not remove the corresponding preference: neighbouring tokens can carry it. Finally, conditional behaviours can route through the network body. For sycophancy, with agreement and correction markers masked from the loss, transfer reaches about 0.63 of the teacher's effect, localizes to body computation, and evades four audits across two model families. We scope this as masked transfer of a condition-present policy. Channel location is necessary for deciding which audits can be sound. It is not a deployment-ready screen: an audit used outside its carrier regime can give false assurance.

Tool Calling and Structured Output are two core capabilities of modern Agent systems, yet their interaction under joint deployment conditions remains insufficiently understood. This paper reports a reproducible phenomenon observed in a production Agent system: when Tool Calling and JSON Schema constraints are simultaneously enabled, multiple open-weight models cease invoking tools despite maintaining high schema compliance. We refer to this behavior as Tool Suppression. Through controlled experiments across multiple model families and deployment settings, we consistently reproduce Tool Suppression under joint constraints, while tool execution and schema compliance remain functional when evaluated independently. Further analysis reveals that JSON Schema constraints are compiled into grammar-based token masks, causing tool-call tokens to become unreachable during decoding. This provides an implementation-level explanation for the observed behavior. To interpret the phenomenon, we formulate the Constraint Priority Inversion (CPI) hypothesis, which suggests that schema satisfaction may dominate action-selection behavior under multiple simultaneous constraints. We present CPI as a behavioral hypothesis consistent with the observed evidence rather than a verified internal mechanism. To mitigate the problem, we propose Transparent Two-Pass Execution, an inference-time strategy that decouples tool execution from schema-constrained response generation. Experimental results show that this approach restores tool invocation while preserving structured output guarantees without requiring model retraining. These findings suggest that evaluating tool use and structured output separately may overlook important reliability issues in production Agent systems. Code, data, and docs will be released at https://github.com/Fzsama/Constrain-Tax-26-06.git.

Benchmarks within the OpenClaw ecosystem have thus far evaluated exclusively assistant-level tasks, leaving the academic-level capabilities of OpenClaw largely unexamined. We introduce AcademiClaw, a bilingual benchmark of 80 complex, long-horizon tasks sourced directly from university students' real academic workflows -- homework, research projects, competitions, and personal projects -- that they found current AI agents unable to solve effectively. Curated from 230 student-submitted candidates through rigorous expert review, the final task set spans 25+ professional domains, ranging from olympiad-level mathematics and linguistics problems to GPU-intensive reinforcement learning and full-stack system debugging, with 16 tasks requiring CUDA GPU execution. Each task executes in an isolated Docker sandbox and is scored on task completion by multi-dimensional rubrics combining six complementary techniques, with an independent five-category safety audit providing additional behavioral analysis. Experiments on six frontier models show that even the best achieves only a 55\% pass rate. Further analysis uncovers sharp capability boundaries across task domains, divergent behavioral strategies among models, and a disconnect between token consumption and output quality, providing fine-grained diagnostic signals beyond what aggregate metrics reveal. We hope that AcademiClaw and its open-sourced data and code can serve as a useful resource for the OpenClaw community, driving progress toward agents that are more capable and versatile across the full breadth of real-world academic demands. All data and code are available at https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/AcademiClaw.

Language-model agents read attacker-writable context to solve tasks. Tool execution needs a separate authority check for protected sink fields, sink-interpreted payloads, and the invocation event. Context-to-Execution Integrity (CXI) is an execution-boundary system for this setting. Policies mark protected sink fields, typed releases carry narrow validated values from writable context to specific destinations, opaque data slots keep evidence as data, and a deterministic gate admits a call only after field authority, exact-effect authorization, and invocation authority all bind to the same action manifest. We evaluate CXI on open-weight field-projection runs, AgentDojo live episodes, a code-agent exact-effect benchmark, manifest-bound ledger faults, proposal-pressure controls, and hosted/API compatibility traces. AgentDojo covers 720 live episodes and 1,739 LLM calls; the code-agent benchmark covers 400 repository episodes with exact-effect authorization and lease-bound execution, yielding 231 safe task completions and zero observed field, effect, or invocation escapes. The accounting reports parser outcomes, authorization outcomes, and task-quality outcomes together with the admission-integrity result. Across the evaluated sinks, CXI admits execution only when field, effect, and invocation authority bind to the same action manifest.

Automatic prompt engineering (APE) rewrites prompts to improve downstream task performance, but existing APE loops treat the optimizer itself as a fixed pipeline. We port the code-as-action paradigm of CodeAct (Wang et al., 2024a) to APE and propose SPEAR (Sandboxed Prompt Engineer with Active Roll-back), a free-form agentic optimizer with four tools -- evaluate, python, set_prompt, finish -- that decides autonomously how and when to use them. The distinctive tool is the Python sandbox: the optimizer writes and executes arbitrary Python on the current evaluation DataFrame, performing structural error analysis (confusion matrices, error clustering, per group metrics) the agent itself authors. Two guardrails turn the long-horizon agent into a monotone-improving optimizer: auto-rollback on metric regression, and an optional guard metric floor. We evaluate on three industrial LLM-as-judge suites (13 judge tasks across recruiter-intake, conversational-memory, and query-refinement systems) plus seven BBH tasks and GSM8K. SPEAR wins every industrial task on the primary metric (κ 0.857 vs 0.359 on tool-selection; F1-macro 0.815 vs 0.763 on filter-relevance; κ 0.254 vs 0.218 on the hardest extraction dimension). On BBH-7 SPEAR averages 0.938 accuracy vs GEPA 0.628 and TextGrad 0.484. Ablations show the Python tool is the largest single lever on complex judge tasks (Δapprox +0.79κ on the 5-class tool-selection judge, Δapprox +0.35κ on the hardest extraction dimension when removed); its irreplaceable contribution is class-pair confusion aggregation that a long-context LLM cannot extract reliably from the raw eval DataFrame.

Large language models have demonstrated remarkable capabilities, but their performance is heavily reliant on effective prompt engineering. Automatic prompt optimization (APO) methods are designed to automate this and can be broadly categorized into those targeting instructions (instruction optimization, IO) vs. those targeting exemplars (exemplar selection, ES). Despite their shared objective, these have evolved rather independently, with IO recently receiving more research attention. This paper seeks to bridge this gap by comprehensively comparing the performance of representative IO and ES techniques, both isolation and combination, on a diverse set of challenging tasks. Our findings reveal that intelligently reusing model-generated input-output pairs obtained from evaluating prompts on the validation set as exemplars consistently improves performance over IO methods but is currently under-investigated. We also find that despite the recent focus on IO, how we select exemplars can outweigh how we optimize instructions, with ES strategies as simple as random search outperforming state-of-the-art IO methods with seed instructions without any optimization. Moreover, we observe synergy between ES and IO, with optimal combinations surpassing individual contributions. We conclude that studying exemplar selection as a standalone method and its optimal combination with instruction optimization remains a crucial aspect of APO and deserves greater consideration in future research, even in the era of highly capable instruction-following models.

This paper presents PyResBugs, a curated dataset of residual bugs, i.e., defects that persist undetected during traditional testing but later surface in production, collected from major Python frameworks. Each bug in the dataset is paired with its corresponding fault-free (fixed) version and annotated with multi-level natural language (NL) descriptions. These NL descriptions enable natural language-driven fault injection, offering a novel approach to simulating real-world faults in software systems. By bridging the gap between software fault injection techniques and real-world representativeness, PyResBugs provides researchers with a high-quality resource for advancing AI-driven automated testing in Python systems.

We introduce the Series-Parallel Workflow Decomposition (SP\-WD) heuristic algorithm for the Workflow Scheduling Problem (WSP) decomposition. We demonstrate that the SPWD algorithm facilitates the scheduling of large WSP instances with the hybrid D-Wave Constrained Quadratic Model solver, enabling the scheduling of instances that would otherwise exceed its capacity limitations. We also describe the accompanying execution environment used to obtain the results of the experiments with real-life workflow instances available in the WfCommons standardization initiative repository.

Multi-step enterprise agent tasks fail in a characteristic way: single-pass inference has no checkpoint between deciding an answer and committing to it. We study one production system (Leni) whose architecture installs such checkpoints: verification loops (execute, observe, compare, correct) staffed by lightweight task-specialized post-trained models. We evaluate the unmodified production configuration on three public benchmarks stressing distinct failure modes: SpreadsheetBench Verified (silent computation error), BullshitBench v2 (premise confabulation), and the GAIA validation split (cascade error over long tool chains). The full system improves over its frontier base model by +11.0 percentage points on SpreadsheetBench (91.25% vs 80.25%, n=400, p<0.001), +7 to +10 percentage points on BullshitBench (98% vs 91%, n=100), and roughly +15 points on GAIA validation (75.2% pass@1, n=165; 83.0% best-of-k). Our central contribution is a decomposition of that uplift: most of it comes from scaffolding, routing, and specialist models rather than from the verification step itself, whose isolated contribution is small (+1.5 points) but concentrated at the top of the score distribution, where it converts otherwise-failing tasks. We instrument the loop end-to-end, yielding an empirical verifier confusion matrix (catch rate about 0.20, fix rate 0.75, no false-alarm regressions) that grounds a compounding-reliability model. Specialist-swap ablations suggest that the loop's value depends on who observes it: replacing the small trained verifier with the generating frontier model eliminates most rescues. A valid-premise control shows zero over-rejections in 100 expert-level questions.

We present a novel approach to neural code generation that incorporates real-time execution signals into the language model generation process. While large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive code generation capabilities, they typically do not utilize execution feedback during inference, a critical signal that human programmers regularly leverage. Our method, Execution-Guided Classifier-Free Guidance (EG-CFG), dynamically incorporates execution signals as the model generates code, providing line-by-line feedback that guides the generation process toward executable solutions. EG-CFG employs a multi-stage process: first, we conduct beam search to sample candidate program completions for each line; second, we extract execution signals by executing these candidates against test cases; and finally, we incorporate these signals into the prompt during generation. By maintaining consistent signals across tokens within the same line and refreshing signals at line boundaries, our approach provides coherent guidance while preserving syntactic structure. Moreover, the method naturally supports native parallelism at the task level in which multiple agents operate in parallel, exploring diverse reasoning paths and collectively generating a broad set of candidate solutions. Our experiments across diverse coding tasks demonstrate that EG-CFG significantly improves code generation performance compared to standard approaches, achieving state-of-the-art results across various levels of complexity, from foundational problems to challenging competitive programming and data science tasks. Our code is available at: https://github.com/boazlavon/eg_cfg

We introduce KAPSO, a modular framework for autonomous program synthesis and optimization. Given a natural language goal and an evaluation method, KAPSO iteratively performs ideation, code synthesis and editing, execution, evaluation, and learning to improve a runnable artifact toward measurable objectives. Rather than treating synthesis as the endpoint, KAPSO uses synthesis as an operator within a long-horizon optimization loop, where progress is defined by evaluator outcomes. KAPSO targets long-horizon failures common in coding agents, including lost experimental state, brittle debugging, and weak reuse of domain expertise, by integrating three tightly coupled components. First, a git-native experimentation engine isolates each attempt as a branch, producing reproducible artifacts and preserving provenance across iterations. Second, a knowledge system ingests heterogeneous sources, including repositories, internal playbooks, and curated external resources such as documentation, scientific papers, and web search results, and organizes them into a structured representation that supports retrieval over workflows, implementations, and environment constraints. Third, a cognitive memory layer coordinates retrieval and maintains an episodic store of reusable lessons distilled from experiment traces (run logs, diffs, and evaluator feedback), reducing repeated error modes and accelerating convergence. We evaluated KAPSO on MLE-Bench (Kaggle-style ML competitions) and ALE-Bench (AtCoder heuristic optimization), and report end-to-end performance. Code Available at: https://github.com/Leeroo-AI/kapso

Autonomous agents increasingly perform bounded software tasks under an orchestrator that retries, resumes, and budgets them. The machinery such orchestrators reach for is the service mesh's: retry, timeout, and error-rate circuit breaking. We report a failure study of a production agentic software-delivery platform over 147 numbered incidents spanning 81 runs, each with a measured cost and, in most cases, a mutation proof reproducing the failure. All three assumptions those primitives rest on are violated in practice, and we quantify the consequences: a loop of fifty-four consecutive successful tool calls no error-rate breaker could see; a progress signal constant by construction, guaranteeing a false trip on the third repair round and driving one run from six of six components to three; twenty-one events accumulated across six invocations of one delegation, making a correct, idempotent component unwinnable; a misrouted failure that woke five components for a two-component fault, leaving three bystanders regressing working code; and twelve incidents in which the enforcement layer blocked correct work, the most expensive costing 107 agent turns and zero accepted writes. We find one cross-cutting cause and its dual. Identity adequacy: in five separate subsystems an identity that failed to discriminate produced a confident wrong answer, and two of them derived the corrective rule independently. Evidence adequacy: a reliability decision may be taken only on evidence capable of moving, attributable to what it measures, and deterministic under identical conditions. From the findings we derive seven reliability primitives whose enforcement unit is the delegation rather than the message, and specify the controlled evaluation the study motivates but does not constitute.

A fundamental skill among human developers is the ability to understand and reason about program execution. As an example, a programmer can mentally simulate code execution in natural language to debug and repair code (aka. rubber duck debugging). However, large language models (LLMs) of code are typically trained on the surface textual form of programs, thus may lack a semantic understanding of how programs execute at run-time. To address this issue, we propose NExT, a method to teach LLMs to inspect the execution traces of programs (variable states of executed lines) and reason about their run-time behavior through chain-of-thought (CoT) rationales. Specifically, NExT uses self-training to bootstrap a synthetic training set of execution-aware rationales that lead to correct task solutions (e.g., fixed programs) without laborious manual annotation. Experiments on program repair tasks based on MBPP and HumanEval demonstrate that NExT improves the fix rate of a PaLM 2 model, by 26.1% and 14.3% absolute, respectively, with significantly improved rationale quality as verified by automated metrics and human raters. Our model can also generalize to scenarios where program traces are absent at test-time.

Many everyday programming tasks resist clean rule-based implementation, such as alerting on important log lines, repairing malformed JSON, or ranking search results by intent, and are increasingly outsourced to large language model APIs at the cost of locality, reproducibility, and price. We propose fuzzy-function programming: compiling such a function from a natural-language specification into a compact, locally-executable neural artifact. We instantiate this paradigm with Program-as-Weights (PAW), in which a 4B compiler trained on FuzzyBench, a 10M-example dataset we release, emits parameter-efficient adapters for a frozen, lightweight interpreter. A 0.6B Qwen3 interpreter executing PAW programs matches the performance of direct prompting of Qwen3-32B, while using roughly one fiftieth of the inference memory and running at 30 tokens/s on a MacBook M3. PAW reframes the foundation model from a per-input problem solver into a tool builder: invoked once per function definition, it produces a small reusable artifact whose subsequent calls per function application are cheap and offline.

Computer-use agents (CUAs) operate real desktop and web interfaces through screenshots, mouse and keyboard actions, and stateful UI feedback, yet their failures remain difficult to diagnose and repair. Unlike text-only agents, CUA failures arise from coupled visual perception, spatial grounding, low-level interaction, task reasoning, and environment dynamics, making debugging a distinctive multimodal causal localization problem. We introduce CUADebug, a framework for diagnosing and repairing CUA failures. CUADebug includes a CUA-specific error taxonomy, CUAErrorBench, a human-annotated OSWorld failure benchmark, and CUADebugger, a tool-augmented debugger. Instead of prompting over the full trajectory once, CUADebugger actively inspects suspicious steps with paired before/after screenshots and action traces, then submits a structured diagnosis containing the root-cause step, error type, grounded evidence, and corrective strategy for re-execution. Human annotations over 204 failed trajectories show that task reasoning and control is the largest failure family (110/204), followed by perception (36), grounding/interaction (25), external/system (13), and an others category of 20 OSWorld infeasible-task cases. On the main Claude-agent split, CUADebugger improves joint subtype-and-step diagnosis from 11.2% to 19.6% with Gemini 2.5 Pro and improves consistently across debugger backbones. In single re-execution package evaluation, RCA-based conditions achieve higher task completion than history-only continuation (28.47% with machine RCA and 29.90% with our method, versus 13.89%); in continual re-execution, our method improves success from 12.2% to 25.86%, while human-oracle guidance reaches 29.21%. These results show that CUA root-cause diagnosis can provide actionable repair signals rather than merely post-hoc explanations.

As models grow more capable, human supervision breaks down: labels don't scale, outputs can be gamed, and training doesn't generalize. Scalable oversight requires steering methods that are internal, self-supervised, and transfer out-of-distribution; existing methods satisfy some but not all three. We introduce AntiPaSTO, which separates representations along an anti-parallel axis (α=pm1 produce opposite shifts), with coherence constraints preventing collapse. Human input is minimal: two contrasting words inserted into template sentences, no preference labels. Using 800 such pairs on Gemma-3-1B, AntiPaSTO beats prompting baselines by 6.9times on DailyDilemmas and maintains bidirectional control where prompting triggers refusal. Code is available at https://github.com/wassname/AntiPaSTO.