Daily Papers

Despite interdisciplinary research leading to larger and longer-term impact, most work remains confined to single-domain academic silos. Recent AI-based approaches to scientific discovery show promise for interdisciplinary research, but many prioritize rapidly designing experiments and solutions, bypassing the exploratory, collaborative reasoning processes that drive creative interdisciplinary breakthroughs. As a result, prior efforts largely prioritize automating scientific discovery rather than augmenting the reasoning processes that underlie scientific disruption. We present Idea-Catalyst, a novel framework that systematically identifies interdisciplinary insights to support creative reasoning in both humans and large language models. Starting from an abstract research goal, Idea-Catalyst is designed to assist the brainstorming stage, explicitly avoiding premature anchoring on specific solutions. The framework embodies key metacognitive features of interdisciplinary reasoning: (a) defining and assessing research goals, (b) awareness of a domain's opportunities and unresolved challenges, and (c) strategic exploration of interdisciplinary ideas based on impact potential. Concretely, Idea-Catalyst decomposes an abstract goal (e.g., improving human-AI collaboration) into core target-domain research questions that guide the analysis of progress and open challenges within that domain. These challenges are reformulated as domain-agnostic conceptual problems, enabling retrieval from external disciplines (e.g., Psychology, Sociology) that address analogous issues. By synthesizing and recontextualizing insights from these domains back into the target domain, Idea-Catalyst ranks source domains by their interdisciplinary potential. Empirically, this targeted integration improves average novelty by 21% and insightfulness by 16%, while remaining grounded in the original research problem.

Metacognition is a foundational component of intelligence critical to effective learning, problem solving, decision-making, communication, and more. In recent years, it has become increasingly recognized as a cornerstone of capable, transparent AI systems. Yet while LLMs have made significant progress across diverse real-world tasks, it is not yet clear when, how, or to what extent they can exhibit or be endowed with effective metacognitive abilities, nor how such abilities can be adapted to advance the fundamental capabilities, reliability, and intelligence of AI systems. This paper bridges this gap by presenting the first comprehensive overview of the current state of knowledge on metacognition for LLMs. We analyze and taxonomize the landscape of this emerging field and summarize recent technical advancements, including methods and benchmarks to measure and evaluate LLMs' metacognitive abilities, techniques to elicit, improve, and apply metacognition in LLMs, and findings and implications of ongoing research. We also discuss applications, open questions and challenges, and promising directions for future work. Our aim is to provide a detailed and up-to-date review of this topic and stimulate meaningful research and discussion. An organized list of papers can be found at https://github.com/yale-nlp/LLM-Metacognition.

Metacognition is a critical component of intelligence, specifically regarding the awareness of one's own knowledge. While humans rely on shared internal memory for both answering questions and reporting their knowledge state, this dependency in LLMs remains underexplored. This study proposes a framework to measure metacognitive ability d_{type2}' using a dual-prompt method, followed by the introduction of Evolution Strategy for Metacognitive Alignment (ESMA) to bind a model's internal knowledge to its explicit behaviors. ESMA demonstrates robust generalization across diverse untrained settings, indicating a enhancement in the model's ability to reference its own knowledge. Furthermore, parameter analysis attributes these improvements to a sparse set of significant modifications.

Large language models (LLMs) can sometimes report the strategies they actually use to solve tasks, but they can also fail to do so. This suggests some degree of metacognition -- the capacity to monitor one's own cognitive processes for subsequent reporting and self-control. Metacognitive abilities enhance AI capabilities but raise safety concerns, as models might obscure their internal processes to evade neural-activation-based oversight mechanisms designed to detect harmful behaviors. Given society's increased reliance on these models, it is critical that we understand the limits of their metacognitive abilities, particularly their ability to monitor their internal activations. To address this, we introduce a neuroscience-inspired neurofeedback paradigm designed to quantify the ability of LLMs to explicitly report and control their activation patterns. By presenting models with sentence-label pairs where labels correspond to sentence-elicited internal activations along specific directions in the neural representation space, we demonstrate that LLMs can learn to report and control these activations. The performance varies with several factors: the number of example pairs provided, the semantic interpretability of the target neural direction, and the variance explained by that direction. These results reveal a "metacognitive space" with dimensionality much lower than the model's neural space, suggesting LLMs can monitor only a subset of their neural mechanisms. Our findings provide empirical evidence quantifying metacognitive capabilities in LLMs, with significant implications for AI safety.

This study investigates the metacognitive capabilities of Large Language Models relative to human metacognition in the context of the International Coaching Federation ICF mimicking exam, a situational judgment test related to coaching competencies. Using a mixed method approach, we assessed the metacognitive performance, including sensitivity, accuracy in probabilistic predictions, and bias, of human participants and five advanced LLMs (GPT-4, Claude-3-Opus 3, Mistral Large, Llama 3, and Gemini 1.5 Pro). The results indicate that LLMs outperformed humans across all metacognitive metrics, particularly in terms of reduced overconfidence, compared to humans. However, both LLMs and humans showed less adaptability in ambiguous scenarios, adhering closely to predefined decision frameworks. The study suggests that Generative AI can effectively engage in human-like metacognitive processing without conscious awareness. Implications of the study are discussed in relation to development of AI simulators that scaffold cognitive and metacognitive aspects of mastering coaching competencies. More broadly, implications of these results are discussed in relation to development of metacognitive modules that lead towards more autonomous and intuitive AI systems.

Metacognitive knowledge refers to humans' intuitive knowledge of their own thinking and reasoning processes. Today's best LLMs clearly possess some reasoning processes. The paper gives evidence that they also have metacognitive knowledge, including ability to name skills and procedures to apply given a task. We explore this primarily in context of math reasoning, developing a prompt-guided interaction procedure to get a powerful LLM to assign sensible skill labels to math questions, followed by having it perform semantic clustering to obtain coarser families of skill labels. These coarse skill labels look interpretable to humans. To validate that these skill labels are meaningful and relevant to the LLM's reasoning processes we perform the following experiments. (a) We ask GPT-4 to assign skill labels to training questions in math datasets GSM8K and MATH. (b) When using an LLM to solve the test questions, we present it with the full list of skill labels and ask it to identify the skill needed. Then it is presented with randomly selected exemplar solved questions associated with that skill label. This improves accuracy on GSM8k and MATH for several strong LLMs, including code-assisted models. The methodology presented is domain-agnostic, even though this article applies it to math problems.

Metacognition is a critical component of intelligence that describes the ability to monitor and regulate one's own cognitive processes. Yet LLMs exhibit systemic deficiencies in key metacognitive faculties: they hallucinate with high confidence, fail to recognize knowledge boundaries, and misrepresent their internal uncertainty--undermining trustworthiness and reliability. Since monitoring task performance and adapting behavior accordingly are central to metacognition, we posit that models capable of accurately judging their own performance are better positioned to improve it. We operationalize this idea via two novel mechanisms: reinforcement learning with metacognitive feedback (RLMF), a paradigm to refine completion rankings during preference optimization based on the quality of a model's self-judgments of performance, and metacognitive data selection, which uses similar self-judgments to identify high-value training examples, outperforming naive active learning. We apply these innovations to the problem of faithful calibration (FC), a task that is itself fundamentally metacognitive: the goal is to align expressed with intrinsic uncertainty, difficult even for frontier LLMs. We adopt a two-stage, decoupled approach, first using these methods to calibrate the faithfulness of models' self-reported confidence scores, then mapping to natural, context-adaptable linguistic uncertainty via targeted output editing. Extensive experiments show RLMF achieves generalizable, state-of-the-art FC on diverse tasks while preserving accuracy. Further, RLMF surpasses standard RL by up to 63% while enhancing models' ability to assess and express their own capability limits. This positions RLMF as a promising paradigm to enhance LLM metacognition toward improved abilities and alignment, and suggests metacognitive performance as an effective RL signal to overcome limits of prior intrinsic feedback methods.

Domain expertise enhances judgment within boundaries but creates systematic vulnerabilities specifically at borders. We term this Transitive Expert Error (TEE), distinct from Dunning-Kruger effects, requiring calibrated expertise as precondition. Mechanisms enabling reliable within-domain judgment become liabilities when structural similarity masks causal divergence. Two core mechanisms operate: structural similarity bias causes experts to overweight surface features (shared vocabulary, patterns, formal structure) while missing causal architecture differences; authority persistence maintains confidence across competence boundaries through social reinforcement and metacognitive failures (experts experience no subjective uncertainty as pattern recognition operates smoothly on familiar-seeming inputs.) These mechanism intensify under three conditions: shared vocabulary masking divergent processes, social pressure for immediate judgment, and delayed feedback. These findings extend to AI routing architectures (MoE systems, multi-model orchestration, tool-using agents, RAG systems) exhibiting routing-induced failures (wrong specialist selected) and coverage-induced failures (no appropriate specialist exists). Both produce a hallucination phenotype: confident, coherent, structurally plausible but causally incorrect outputs at domain boundaries. In human systems where mechanisms are cognitive black boxes; AI architectures make them explicit and addressable. We propose interventions: multi-expert activation with disagreement detection (router level), boundary-aware calibration (specialist level), and coverage gap detection (training level). TEE has detectable signatures (routing patterns, confidence-accuracy dissociations, domain-inappropriate content) enabling monitoring and mitigation. What remains intractable in human cognition becomes addressable through architectural design.

Can large language models detect and report their own internal states? A number of studies have argued that the answer to this question is yes. We argue, based on lessons from human metacognition research, that this conclusion may be premature: to be convinced of this conclusion we need to distinguish genuine introspection from pattern matching based on surface-level cues. Furthermore, we argue that behavioral evidence alone is inherently insufficient to establish strong introspective claims. We re-examine two recently introduced evaluation paradigms in light of this consideration. In the first paradigm, models are expected to detect whether their internal states have been tampered with. We find that models cannot reliably distinguish such interventions on their internal states from manipulations of the input, suggesting that their success in the original studies reflects their ability to detect anomalies more generally, as opposed to interventions on their internal states in particular. In the second paradigm we examine, models are tasked with predicting labels derived from their own hidden states. Here, we find that classifiers that only have access to the input achieve equivalent performance to the model's own in-context predictions, indicating that the original results do not conclusively demonstrate that the model has privileged access to its internal representations. We further introduce a relabeled control setting, where models cannot rely on the semantics of the task to solve it, and instead must rely on the internal representation; models perform closer to chance on this better-controlled version of the task. Taken together, these results indicate that current evidence is insufficient to establish that LLMs display metacognitive monitoring.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable emergent capabilities, transforming the execution of functional tasks by leveraging external tools for complex problems that require specialized processing or up-to-date data. While existing research expands LLMs access to diverse tools (e.g., program interpreters, search engines, calculators), the necessity of using these tools is often overlooked, leading to indiscriminate tool invocation. This naive approach raises two key issues: increased latency due to unnecessary tool calls, and potential errors resulting from faulty interactions with external tools. In this paper, we introduce meta-cognition as a proxy for LLMs self-assessment of their capabilities, reflecting the model's awareness of its own limitations. Based on this, we propose MeCo, an adaptive decision-making strategy for external tool use. MeCo quantifies metacognitive scores by capturing high-level cognitive signals in the representation space, guiding when to invoke tools. Notably, MeCo is fine-tuning-free and incurs minimal cost. Experiments across multiple backbone models and benchmarks show that MeCo reliably detects LLMs' internal cognitive signals and significantly improves tool-use decision-making.

In Large Language Models (LLMs), there have been consistent advancements in task-specific performance, largely influenced by effective prompt design. While recent research on prompting has enhanced the reasoning capabilities of LLMs, a gap remains in further improving their understanding abilities. In this study, we introduce Metacognitive Prompting (MP), a strategy inspired by human introspective reasoning processes. Using MP, LLMs undergo a systematic series of structured, self-aware evaluations, drawing on both their vast inherent knowledge and new insights. Our experiments involve five prevalent LLMs: Llama2, Vicuna, PaLM, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4, all of which span various general natural language understanding (NLU) tasks from the GLUE and SuperGLUE benchmarks. Results indicate that, although GPT-4 consistently excels in most tasks, PaLM, when equipped with MP, approaches its performance level. Furthermore, across models and datasets, MP consistently outperforms existing prompting methods, including standard and chain-of-thought prompting. This study underscores the potential to amplify the understanding abilities of LLMs and highlights the benefits of mirroring human introspective reasoning in NLU tasks.

Standard evaluation of LLM confidence relies on calibration metrics (ECE, Brier score) that conflate two distinct capacities: how much a model knows (Type-1 sensitivity) and how well it knows what it knows (Type-2 metacognitive sensitivity). We introduce an evaluation framework based on Type-2 Signal Detection Theory that decomposes these capacities using meta-d' and the metacognitive efficiency ratio M-ratio. Applied to four LLMs (Llama-3-8B-Instruct, Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3, Llama-3-8B-Base, Gemma-2-9B-Instruct) across 224,000 factual QA trials, we find: (1) metacognitive efficiency varies substantially across models even when Type-1 sensitivity is similar -- Mistral achieves the highest d' but the lowest M-ratio; (2) metacognitive efficiency is domain-specific, with different models showing different weakest domains, invisible to aggregate metrics; (3) temperature manipulation shifts Type-2 criterion while meta-d' remains stable for two of four models, dissociating confidence policy from metacognitive capacity; (4) AUROC_2 and M-ratio produce fully inverted model rankings, demonstrating these metrics answer fundamentally different evaluation questions. The meta-d' framework reveals which models "know what they don't know" versus which merely appear well-calibrated due to criterion placement -- a distinction with direct implications for model selection, deployment, and human-AI collaboration. Pre-registered analysis; code and data publicly available.

A robust decision-making process must take into account uncertainty, especially when the choice involves inherent risks. Because artificial intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly integrated into decision-making workflows, managing uncertainty relies more and more on the metacognitive capabilities of these systems; i.e, their ability to assess the reliability of and regulate their own decisions. Hence, it is crucial to employ robust methods to measure the metacognitive abilities of AI. This paper is primarily a methodological contribution arguing for the adoption of the meta-d' framework as the gold standard for assessing the metacognitive sensitivity of AIs--the ability to generate confidence ratings that distinguish correct from incorrect responses. Moreover, we propose to leverage signal detection theory (SDT) to measure the ability of AIs to spontaneously regulate their decisions based on uncertainty and risk. To demonstrate the practical utility of these psychophysical frameworks, we conduct two series of experiments on three large language models (LLMs)--GPT-5, DeepSeek-V3.2-Exp, and Mistral-Medium-2508.

Deep search agents powered by large language models have demonstrated strong capabilities in multi-step retrieval, reasoning, and long-horizon task execution. However, their practical failures often stem from the lack of mechanisms to monitor and regulate reasoning and retrieval states as tasks evolve under uncertainty. Insights from cognitive neuroscience suggest that human metacognition is hierarchically organized, integrating fast anomaly detection with selectively triggered, experience-driven reflection. In this work, we propose Deep Search with Meta-Cognitive Monitoring (DS-MCM), a deep search framework augmented with an explicit hierarchical metacognitive monitoring mechanism. DS-MCM integrates a Fast Consistency Monitor, which performs lightweight checks on the alignment between external evidence and internal reasoning confidence, and a Slow Experience-Driven Monitor, which is selectively activated to guide corrective intervention based on experience memory from historical agent trajectories. By embedding monitoring directly into the reasoning-retrieval loop, DS-MCM determines both when intervention is warranted and how corrective actions should be informed by prior experience. Experiments across multiple deep search benchmarks and backbone models demonstrate that DS-MCM consistently improves performance and robustness.

Large language models (LLMs) solve complex problems yet fail on simpler variants, suggesting they achieve correct outputs through mechanisms fundamentally different from human reasoning. To understand this gap, we synthesize cognitive science research into a taxonomy of 28 cognitive elements spanning reasoning invariants, meta-cognitive controls, representations for organizing reasoning & knowledge, and transformation operations. We introduce a fine-grained evaluation framework and conduct the first large-scale empirical analysis of 192K traces from 18 models across text, vision, and audio, complemented by 54 human think-aloud traces, which we make publicly available. We find that models under-utilize cognitive elements correlated with success, narrowing to rigid sequential processing on ill-structured problems where diverse representations and meta-cognitive monitoring are critical. Human traces show more abstraction and conceptual processing, while models default to surface-level enumeration. Meta-analysis of 1.6K LLM reasoning papers reveals the research community concentrates on easily quantifiable elements (sequential organization: 55%, decomposition: 60%) but neglecting meta-cognitive controls (self-awareness: 16%) that correlate with success. Models possess behavioral repertoires associated with success but fail to deploy them spontaneously. Leveraging these patterns, we develop test-time reasoning guidance that automatically scaffold successful structures, improving performance by up to 66.7% on complex problems. By establishing a shared vocabulary between cognitive science and LLM research, our framework enables systematic diagnosis of reasoning failures and principled development of models that reason through robust cognitive mechanisms rather than spurious shortcuts, while providing tools to test theories of human cognition at scale.

Recent research shows that Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a compelling level of proficiency in Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks. This ability to impute unobservable mental states to others is vital to human social cognition and may prove equally important in principal-agent relations between individual humans and Artificial Intelligences (AIs). In this paper, we explore how a mechanism studied in developmental psychology known as Violation of Expectation (VoE) can be implemented to reduce errors in LLM prediction about users by leveraging emergent ToM affordances. And we introduce a metacognitive prompting framework to apply VoE in the context of an AI tutor. By storing and retrieving facts derived in cases where LLM expectation about the user was violated, we find that LLMs are able to learn about users in ways that echo theories of human learning. Finally, we discuss latent hazards and augmentative opportunities associated with modeling user psychology and propose ways to mitigate risk along with possible directions for future inquiry.

While numerous works have assessed the generative performance of language models (LMs) on tasks requiring Theory of Mind reasoning, research into the models' internal representation of mental states remains limited. Recent work has used probing to demonstrate that LMs can represent beliefs of themselves and others. However, these claims are accompanied by limited evaluation, making it difficult to assess how mental state representations are affected by model design and training choices. We report an extensive benchmark with various LM types with different model sizes, fine-tuning approaches, and prompt designs to study the robustness of mental state representations and memorisation issues within the probes. Our results show that the quality of models' internal representations of the beliefs of others increases with model size and, more crucially, with fine-tuning. We are the first to study how prompt variations impact probing performance on theory of mind tasks. We demonstrate that models' representations are sensitive to prompt variations, even when such variations should be beneficial. Finally, we complement previous activation editing experiments on Theory of Mind tasks and show that it is possible to improve models' reasoning performance by steering their activations without the need to train any probe.

We introduce a cross-domain behavioural assay of monitoring-control coupling in LLMs, grounded in the Nelson and Narens (1990) metacognitive framework and applying human psychometric methodology to LLM evaluation. The battery comprises 524 items across six cognitive domains (learning, metacognitive calibration, social cognition, attention, executive function, prospective regulation), each grounded in an established experimental paradigm. Tasks T1-T5 were pre-registered on OSF prior to data collection; T6 was added as an exploratory extension. After every forced-choice response, dual probes adapted from Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) ask the model to KEEP or WITHDRAW its answer and to BET or decline. The critical metric is the withdraw delta: the difference in withdrawal rate between incorrect and correct items. Applied to 20 frontier LLMs (10,480 evaluations), the battery discriminates three profiles consistent with the Nelson-Narens architecture: blanket confidence, blanket withdrawal, and selective sensitivity. Accuracy rank and metacognitive sensitivity rank are largely inverted. Retrospective monitoring and prospective regulation appear dissociable (r = .17, 95% CI wide given n=20; exemplar-based evidence is the primary support). Scaling on metacognitive calibration is architecture-dependent: monotonically decreasing (Qwen), monotonically increasing (GPT-5.4), or flat (Gemma). Behavioural findings converge structurally with an independent Type-2 SDT approach, providing preliminary cross-method construct validity. All items, data, and code: https://github.com/synthiumjp/metacognitive-monitoring-battery.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit a unified "general factor" of capability across 10 benchmarks, a finding confirmed by our factor analysis of 156 models, yet they still struggle with simple, trivial tasks for humans. This is because current benchmarks focus on task completion, failing to probe the foundational cognitive abilities that highlight these behaviors. We address this by introducing the NeuroCognition benchmark, grounded in three adapted neuropsychological tests: Raven's Progressive Matrices (abstract relational reasoning), Spatial Working Memory (maintenance and systematic search), and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (cognitive flexibility). Our evaluation reveals that while models perform strongly on text, their performance degrades for images and with increased complexity. Furthermore, we observe that complex reasoning is not universally beneficial, whereas simple, human-like strategies yield partial gains. We also find that NeuroCognition correlates positively with standard general-capability benchmarks, while still measuring distinct cognitive abilities beyond them. Overall, NeuroCognition emphasizes where current LLMs align with human-like intelligence and where they lack core adaptive cognition, showing the potential to serve as a verifiable, scalable source for improving LLMs.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) often exhibit structural fragility in complex reasoning tasks, failing to produce correct answers even after successfully deriving valid intermediate steps. Through systematic analysis, we observe that these failures frequently stem not from a lack of reasoning capacity, but from a deficiency in self-regulatory control, where valid logic is destabilized by uncontrolled exploration or the failure to recognize logical sufficiency. Motivated by this observation, we propose Metacognitive Behavioral Tuning (MBT), a post-training framework that explicitly injects metacognitive behaviors into the model's thought process. MBT implements this via two complementary formulations: (1) MBT-S, which synthesizes rigorous reasoning traces from scratch, and (2) MBT-R, which rewrites the student's initial traces to stabilize intrinsic exploration patterns. Experiments across multi-hop QA benchmarks demonstrate that MBT consistently outperforms baselines, achieving notable gains on challenging benchmarks. By effectively eliminating reasoning collapse, MBT achieves higher accuracy with significantly reduced token consumption, demonstrating that internalizing metacognitive strategies leads to more stable and robust reasoning.

A hallmark of intelligence is the ability to autonomously learn new flexible, cognitive behaviors - that is, behaviors where the appropriate action depends not just on immediate stimuli (as in simple reflexive stimulus-response associations), but on contextual information that must be adequately acquired, stored and processed. While many meta-learning algorithms can design agents that autonomously learn new tasks, cognitive tasks adds another level of learning and memory to typical ``learning-to-learn'' problems. Here we evolve neural networks, endowed with plastic connections and neuromodulation, over a sizable set of simple cognitive tasks adapted from a computational neuroscience framework. The resulting evolved networks can automatically modify their own connectivity to acquire a novel simple cognitive task, never seen during evolution, from stimuli and rewards alone, through the spontaneous operation of their evolved neural organization and plasticity system. Our results emphasize the importance of carefully considering the multiple learning loops involved in the emergence of intelligent behavior.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) demonstrate remarkable capabilities on complex tasks, exhibiting emergent, human-like thinking patterns. Despite their advances, we identify a fundamental limitation: current LRMs lack a dedicated meta-level cognitive system-an essential faculty in human cognition that enables "thinking about thinking". This absence leaves their emergent abilities uncontrollable (non-adaptive reasoning), unreliable (intermediate error), and inflexible (lack of a clear methodology). To address this gap, we introduce Meta-R1, a systematic and generic framework that endows LRMs with explicit metacognitive capabilities. Drawing on principles from cognitive science, Meta-R1 decomposes the reasoning process into distinct object-level and meta-level components, orchestrating proactive planning, online regulation, and adaptive early stopping within a cascaded framework. Experiments on three challenging benchmarks and against eight competitive baselines demonstrate that Meta-R1 is: (I) high-performing, surpassing state-of-the-art methods by up to 27.3%; (II) token-efficient, reducing token consumption to 15.7% ~ 32.7% and improving efficiency by up to 14.8% when compared to its vanilla counterparts; and (III) transferable, maintaining robust performance across datasets and model backbones.

In this report we review memory-based meta-learning as a tool for building sample-efficient strategies that learn from past experience to adapt to any task within a target class. Our goal is to equip the reader with the conceptual foundations of this tool for building new, scalable agents that operate on broad domains. To do so, we present basic algorithmic templates for building near-optimal predictors and reinforcement learners which behave as if they had a probabilistic model that allowed them to efficiently exploit task structure. Furthermore, we recast memory-based meta-learning within a Bayesian framework, showing that the meta-learned strategies are near-optimal because they amortize Bayes-filtered data, where the adaptation is implemented in the memory dynamics as a state-machine of sufficient statistics. Essentially, memory-based meta-learning translates the hard problem of probabilistic sequential inference into a regression problem.

Recent Vision-Language Models (VLMs) exhibit strong perceptual reasoning abilities, yet they often struggle to adapt efficiently when encountering novel tasks at test time. In contrast, humans leverage the metacognitive model with memory, enabling continuous strategy refinement through metacognitive control when faced with new challenges. To bridge this gap, we propose metacognitive test-time reasoning (MCTR), a framework that equips models with the ability to learn, adapt, and improve during test time through metacognitive self-updating. Inspired by the dual structure of human metacognition, MCTR comprises meta-level and object-level VLM reasoning modules, each equipped with dedicated memory systems for hierarchical adaptive reasoning. Specifically, MCTR consists of (1) a meta-reasoning module which incrementally builds a structured memory by discovering and storing task-relevant rules, environmental patterns, and action-outcome relationships from test-time observations as natural language descriptions; and (2) an action-reasoning module that determines optimal actions through context-aware perception and strategic reasoning by dynamically retrieving and integrating knowledge from memory. The action-reasoning module continuously updates its policy through proposed metacognitive test-time reinforcement learning, adapting as knowledge memory evolves. We evaluate MCTR on 45 Atari games (33 seen, 12 unseen). MCTR demonstrates robust test-time adaptation, achieving 9/12 top-1 results on unseen games compared with baselines. Analyses through ablations, learning dynamics, and case studies reveal the complementary contributions of both components and show meta-reasoning evolving toward human-like adaptation strategies.

User simulation is important for developing and evaluating human-centered AI, yet current student simulation in educational applications has significant limitations. Existing approaches focus on single learning experiences and do not account for students' gradual knowledge construction and evolving skill sets. Moreover, large language models are optimized to produce direct and accurate responses, making it challenging to represent the incomplete understanding and developmental constraints that characterize real learners. In this paper, we introduce a novel framework for memory-based student simulation that incorporates developmental trajectories through a hierarchical memory mechanism with structured knowledge representation. The framework also integrates metacognitive processes and personality traits to enrich the individual learner profiling, through dynamical consolidation of both cognitive development and personal learning characteristics. In practice, we implement a curriculum-aligned simulator grounded on the Next Generation Science Standards. Experimental results show that our approach can effectively reflect the gradual nature of knowledge development and the characteristic difficulties students face, providing a more accurate representation of learning processes.

Large Language Models like ChatGPT demonstrate a remarkable capacity to learn new concepts during inference without any fine-tuning. However, visual models trained to detect new objects during inference have been unable to replicate this ability, and instead either perform poorly or require meta-training and/or fine-tuning on similar objects. In this work, we propose a meta-learning algorithm that emulates Large Language Models by learning new visual concepts during inference without fine-tuning. Our approach leverages a frozen pre-trained feature extractor, and analogous to in-context learning, recasts meta-learning as sequence modeling over datapoints with known labels and a test datapoint with an unknown label. On 8 out of 11 meta-learning benchmarks, our approach -- without meta-training or fine-tuning -- exceeds or matches the state-of-the-art algorithm, P>M>F, which is meta-trained on these benchmarks.

The focus of recent meta-learning research has been on the development of learning algorithms that can quickly adapt to test time tasks with limited data and low computational cost. Few-shot learning is widely used as one of the standard benchmarks in meta-learning. In this work, we show that a simple baseline: learning a supervised or self-supervised representation on the meta-training set, followed by training a linear classifier on top of this representation, outperforms state-of-the-art few-shot learning methods. An additional boost can be achieved through the use of self-distillation. This demonstrates that using a good learned embedding model can be more effective than sophisticated meta-learning algorithms. We believe that our findings motivate a rethinking of few-shot image classification benchmarks and the associated role of meta-learning algorithms. Code is available at: http://github.com/WangYueFt/rfs/.

Despite significant strides in factual reliability, errors -- often termed hallucinations -- remain a major concern for generative AI, especially as LLMs are increasingly expected to be helpful in more complex or nuanced setups. Yet even in the simplest setting -- factoid question-answering with clear ground truth-frontier models without external tools continue to hallucinate. We argue that most factuality gains in this domain have come from expanding the model's knowledge boundary (encoding more facts) rather than improving awareness of that boundary (distinguishing known from unknown). We conjecture that the latter is inherently difficult: models may lack the discriminative power to perfectly separate truths from errors, creating an unavoidable tradeoff between eliminating hallucinations and preserving utility. This tradeoff dissolves under a different framing. If we understand hallucinations as confident errors -- incorrect information delivered without appropriate qualification -- a third path emerges beyond the answer-or-abstain dichotomy: expressing uncertainty. We propose faithful uncertainty: aligning linguistic uncertainty with intrinsic uncertainty. This is one facet of metacognition -- the ability to be aware of one's own uncertainty and to act on it. For direct interaction, acting on uncertainty means communicating it honestly; for agentic systems, it becomes the control layer governing when to search and what to trust. Metacognition is thus essential for LLMs to be both trustworthy and capable; we conclude by highlighting open problems for progress towards this objective.

We report that model quantisation restructures domain-level metacognitive efficiency in LLMs rather than degrading it uniformly. Evaluating Llama-3-8B-Instruct on the same 3,000 questions at Q5_K_M and f16 precision, we find that M-ratio profiles across four knowledge domains are uncorrelated between formats (Spearman rho = 0.00). Arts & Literature moves from worst-monitored (M-ratio = 0.606 at Q5_K_M) to best-monitored (1.542 at f16). Geography moves from well-monitored (1.210) to under-monitored (0.798). However, Type-2 AUROC profiles are perfectly stable across formats (rho = 1.00), localising the restructuring to the M-ratio normalisation rather than the underlying discrimination signal. This finding emerged from a pre-registered attempt to improve metacognition through domain-conditional training. We prescribed confidence-amplification SFT for the diagnosed weak domain, with matched-budget agnostic and wrong-prescription controls. All four confirmatory hypotheses were null (10,000 bootstrap resamples, seed = 42). The training successfully reshaped confidence distributions, doubling the NLP gap in Science from 0.076 to 0.152, but did not improve meta-d' because the diagnostic profile did not transfer across formats. Any system relying on domain-level M-ratio profiles has an unexamined dependency on inference format. Systems using AUROC_2 are safer. We release all code, pre-registrations, and trial-level data.

Rapidly learning abstract concepts from limited examples is a hallmark of human intelligence. This work investigates whether gradient-based meta-learning can equip neural networks with inductive biases for efficient few-shot acquisition of discrete concepts. I compare meta-learning methods against a supervised learning baseline on Boolean concepts (logical statements) generated by a probabilistic context-free grammar (PCFG). By systematically varying concept dimensionality (number of features) and recursive compositionality (depth of grammar recursion), I delineate between complexity regimes in which meta-learning robustly improves few-shot concept learning and regimes in which it does not. Meta-learners are much better able to handle compositional complexity than featural complexity. I highlight some reasons for this with a representational analysis of the weights of meta-learners and a loss landscape analysis demonstrating how featural complexity increases the roughness of loss trajectories, allowing curvature-aware optimization to be more effective than first-order methods. I find improvements in out-of-distribution generalization on complex concepts by increasing the number of adaptation steps in meta-SGD, where adaptation acts as a way of encouraging exploration of rougher loss basins. Overall, this work highlights the intricacies of learning compositional versus featural complexity in high dimensional concept spaces and provides a road to understanding the role of 2nd order methods and extended gradient adaptation in few-shot concept learning.

A hallmark of human intelligence is Introspection-the ability to assess and reason about one's own cognitive processes. Introspection has emerged as a promising but contested capability in large language models (LLMs). However, current evaluations often fail to distinguish genuine meta-cognition from the mere application of general world knowledge or text-based self-simulation. In this work, we propose a principled taxonomy that formalizes introspection as the latent computation of specific operators over a model's policy and parameters. To isolate the components of generalized introspection, we present Introspect-Bench, a multifaceted evaluation suite designed for rigorous capability testing. Our results show that frontier models exhibit privileged access to their own policies, outperforming peer models in predicting their own behavior. Furthermore, we provide causal, mechanistic evidence explaining both how LLMs learn to introspect without explicit training, and how the mechanism of introspection emerges via attention diffusion.

The emergence of pretrained models has significantly impacted from Natural Language Processing (NLP) and Computer Vision to relational datasets. Traditionally, these models are assessed through fine-tuned downstream tasks. However, this raises the question of how to evaluate these models more efficiently and more effectively. In this study, we explore a novel approach where we leverage the meta features associated with each entity as a source of worldly knowledge and employ entity representations from the models. We propose using the consistency between these representations and the meta features as a metric for evaluating pretrained models. Our method's effectiveness is demonstrated across various domains, including models with relational datasets, large language models and images models.

The validity of AI safety evaluations depends on models behaving consistently across controlled and deployment settings. Prior work has identified test-time contextual cues, such as hypothetical scenarios, as a source of verbalized evaluation awareness and subsequent behavioral shift. In this paper, we investigate a potential explanation of this phenomenon: evaluation meta-knowledge, defined as parametric knowledge about the structural traits that characterize evaluations. Similar to dataset contamination, where benchmark exposure leads to higher performance through memorization, we hypothesize that models trained on texts describing evaluation practices may implicitly learn to recognize and respond to evaluation-like contexts, for instance, through exposure to scientific articles or social media posts about AI benchmarking. To test this, we fine-tune models on synthetic documents describing evaluation traits such as verifiable structures or moral dilemmas. Evaluating this fine-tuned model on six safety benchmarks, we find that it is significantly safer than the base model and control model. This behavioral shift persists even when restricting the analysis to responses lacking explicit verbalization of evaluation awareness. Our results demonstrate that evaluation meta-knowledge may inflate safety benchmark performance, introducing a novel confounder that is independent of explicit memorization or verbalized evaluation awareness, thus, challenging to detect. These findings have important implications for the design and interpretation of AI safety evaluations. Our code and models are available at https://github.com/compass-group-tue/arxiv2026_evaluation_meta_knowledge.

We demonstrate that LLMs may learn indicators of document usefulness and modulate their updates accordingly. We introduce random strings ("tags") as indicators of usefulness in a synthetic fine-tuning dataset. Fine-tuning on this dataset leads to implicit meta-learning (IML): in further fine-tuning, the model updates to make more use of text that is tagged as useful. We perform a thorough empirical investigation of this phenomenon, finding (among other things) that (i) it occurs in both pretrained LLMs and those trained from scratch, as well as on a vision task, and (ii) larger models and smaller batch sizes tend to give more IML. We also use probing to examine how IML changes the way models store knowledge in their parameters. Finally, we reflect on what our results might imply about capabilities, risks, and controllability of future AI systems. Our code can be found at https://github.com/krasheninnikov/internalization.

Memory-based meta-learning is a technique for approximating Bayes-optimal predictors. Under fairly general conditions, minimizing sequential prediction error, measured by the log loss, leads to implicit meta-learning. The goal of this work is to investigate how far this interpretation can be realized by current sequence prediction models and training regimes. The focus is on piecewise stationary sources with unobserved switching-points, which arguably capture an important characteristic of natural language and action-observation sequences in partially observable environments. We show that various types of memory-based neural models, including Transformers, LSTMs, and RNNs can learn to accurately approximate known Bayes-optimal algorithms and behave as if performing Bayesian inference over the latent switching-points and the latent parameters governing the data distribution within each segment.

The deployment of pre-trained perception models in novel environments often leads to performance degradation due to distributional shifts. Although recent artificial intelligence approaches for metacognition use logical rules to characterize and filter model errors, improving precision often comes at the cost of reduced recall. This paper addresses the hypothesis that leveraging multiple pre-trained models can mitigate this recall reduction. We formulate the challenge of identifying and managing conflicting predictions from various models as a consistency-based abduction problem. The input predictions and the learned error detection rules derived from each model are encoded in a logic program. We then seek an abductive explanation--a subset of model predictions--that maximizes prediction coverage while ensuring the rate of logical inconsistencies (derived from domain constraints) remains below a specified threshold. We propose two algorithms for this knowledge representation task: an exact method based on Integer Programming (IP) and an efficient Heuristic Search (HS). Through extensive experiments on a simulated aerial imagery dataset featuring controlled, complex distributional shifts, we demonstrate that our abduction-based framework outperforms individual models and standard ensemble baselines, achieving, for instance, average relative improvements of approximately 13.6% in F1-score and 16.6% in accuracy across 15 diverse test datasets when compared to the best individual model. Our results validate the use of consistency-based abduction as an effective mechanism to robustly integrate knowledge from multiple imperfect reasoners in challenging, novel scenarios.

Recent work has proposed the linear representation hypothesis: that language models perform computation by manipulating one-dimensional representations of concepts ("features") in activation space. In contrast, we explore whether some language model representations may be inherently multi-dimensional. We begin by developing a rigorous definition of irreducible multi-dimensional features based on whether they can be decomposed into either independent or non-co-occurring lower-dimensional features. Motivated by these definitions, we design a scalable method that uses sparse autoencoders to automatically find multi-dimensional features in GPT-2 and Mistral 7B. These auto-discovered features include strikingly interpretable examples, e.g. circular features representing days of the week and months of the year. We identify tasks where these exact circles are used to solve computational problems involving modular arithmetic in days of the week and months of the year. Finally, we provide evidence that these circular features are indeed the fundamental unit of computation in these tasks with intervention experiments on Mistral 7B and Llama 3 8B, and we find further circular representations by breaking down the hidden states for these tasks into interpretable components.

The evaluation of LLMs has so far focused primarily on how well they can perform different tasks such as reasoning, question-answering, paraphrasing, or translating. For most of these tasks, performance can be measured with objective metrics, such as the number of correct answers. However, other language features are not easily quantified. For example, arousal, concreteness, or gender associated with a given word, as well as the extent to which we experience words with senses and relate them to a specific sense. Those features have been studied for many years by psycholinguistics, conducting large-scale experiments with humans to produce ratings for thousands of words. This opens an opportunity to evaluate how well LLMs align with human ratings on these word features, taking advantage of existing studies that cover many different language features in a large number of words. In this paper, we evaluate the alignment of a representative group of LLMs with human ratings on two psycholinguistic datasets: the Glasgow and Lancaster norms. These datasets cover thirteen features over thousands of words. The results show that alignment is black{generally} better in the Glasgow norms evaluated (arousal, valence, dominance, concreteness, imageability, familiarity, and gender) than on the Lancaster norms evaluated (introceptive, gustatory, olfactory, haptic, auditory, and visual). This suggests a potential limitation of current LLMs in aligning with human sensory associations for words, which may be due to their lack of embodied cognition present in humans and illustrates the usefulness of evaluating LLMs with psycholinguistic datasets.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become increasingly integrated into our daily lives, the potential harms from deceptive behavior underlie the need for faithfully interpreting their decision-making. While traditional probing methods have shown some effectiveness, they remain best for narrowly scoped tasks while more comprehensive explanations are still necessary. To this end, we investigate meta-models-an architecture using a "meta-model" that takes activations from an "input-model" and answers natural language questions about the input-model's behaviors. We evaluate the meta-model's ability to generalize by training them on selected task types and assessing their out-of-distribution performance in deceptive scenarios. Our findings show that meta-models generalize well to out-of-distribution tasks and point towards opportunities for future research in this area. Our code is available at https://github.com/acostarelli/meta-models-public .

Conventional LLMs may suffer from corpus heterogeneity and subtle condition changes. While finetuning can create the catastrophe forgetting issue, application of meta-learning on LLMs is also limited due to its complexity and scalability. In this paper, we activate the meta-signal of β within the SwiGLU blocks, resulting in a meta-gating mechanism that adaptively adjusts the nonlinearity of FFN. A hypernetwork is employed which dynamically produces β on textual conditions, providing meta-controllability on LLMs. By testing on different condition types such as task, domain, persona, and style, our method outperforms finetuning and meta-learning baselines, and can generalize reasonably on unseen tasks, condition types, or instructions. Our code can be found in https://github.com/AaronJi/MeGan.

Recent RL methods have substantially improved the reasoning abilities of LLMs. Existing reward designs mainly follow two paradigms: (1) Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) derives outcome signals from executable checks or ground-truth answers, but provides limited guidance for intermediate reasoning behaviors. (2) Rubrics-as-reward (RaR) goes beyond final-answer checking by using natural-language rubrics to assess reasoning quality and task compliance, but often requires instance-specific rubrics and substantial design effort. To address these issues, we introduce Metacognition-as-Reward (MaR), a metacognition-inspired RL framework that guides LLM reasoning through two general process dimensions: i) metacognitive knowledge, which identifies task-relevant information without hand-crafted instance-specific rubrics, and ii) metacognitive regulation, which plans and adjusts the reasoning process to provide reward guidance beyond final-answer outcomes. MaR scaffolds model rollouts into explicit metacognitive components and optimizes them with a trajectory-level reward over task knowledge coverage, regulation fidelity, and final-answer correctness. In this way, MaR extends reward feedback to reasoning trajectories while grounding the reward signals in general metacognitive dimensions. Experiments on 22 benchmarks show that MaR consistently improves model performance, achieving up to a 7.7% gain over the base model and up to an 11.0% gain over vanilla DAPO. Notably, Qwen3.5-9B + MaR narrows the gap to frontier models, surpassing GPT-OSS-120B on overall average and outperforming stronger models on several individual benchmarks. Process-level analysis further shows substantial improvements in reasoning process quality. MaR also generalizes to out-of-domain datasets, where MaR-trained models improve over their corresponding base models on average.

Certain statistical models are capable of interpreting input strings as instructions, or prompts, and carry out tasks based on them. Many approaches to prompting and pre-training these models involve the automated generation of these prompts. We call these approaches meta-prompting, or prompting to obtain prompts. We propose a theoretical framework based on category theory to generalize and describe them. This framework is flexible enough to account for LLM stochasticity; and allows us to obtain formal results around task agnosticity and equivalence of various meta-prompting approaches. We experiment with meta-prompting in two active areas of model research: creativity and ideation. We find that user preference favors (p < 0.01) the prompts generated under meta-prompting, as well as their corresponding outputs, over a series of hardcoded baseline prompts that include the original task prompt. Using our framework, we argue that meta-prompting is more effective than basic prompting at generating desirable outputs.

As LLMs grow more powerful, their most profound achievement may be recognising when to say "I don't know". Existing studies on LLM self-knowledge have been largely constrained by human-defined notions of feasibility, often neglecting the reasons behind unanswerability by LLMs and failing to study deficient types of self-knowledge. This study aims to obtain intrinsic insights into different types of LLM self-knowledge with a novel methodology: allowing them the flexibility to set their own feasibility boundaries and then analysing the consistency of these limits. We find that even frontier models like GPT-4o and Mistral Large are not sure of their own capabilities more than 80% of the time, highlighting a significant lack of trustworthiness in responses. Our analysis of confidence balance in LLMs indicates that models swing between overconfidence and conservatism in feasibility boundaries depending on task categories and that the most significant self-knowledge weaknesses lie in temporal awareness and contextual understanding. These difficulties in contextual comprehension additionally lead models to question their operational boundaries, resulting in considerable confusion within the self-knowledge of LLMs. We make our code and results available publicly at https://github.com/knowledge-verse-ai/LLM-Self_Knowledge_Eval

The ability to adapt beliefs or behaviors in response to unexpected outcomes, reflection, is fundamental to intelligent systems' interaction with the world. From a cognitive science perspective, this serves as a core principle of intelligence applicable to both human and AI systems. To address the debate on the intelligence of large language models (LLMs), we propose Reflection-Bench, a comprehensive benchmark comprising 7 tasks spanning core cognitive functions crucial for reflection, including perception, memory, belief updating, decision-making, prediction, counterfactual thinking, and meta-reflection. We evaluate the performances of 13 prominent LLMs such as OpenAI o1, GPT-4, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, etc. The results indicate that current LLMs still lack satisfactory reflection ability. We discuss the underlying causes of these results and suggest potential avenues for future research. In conclusion, Reflection-Bench offers both evaluation tools and inspiration for developing AI capable of reliably interacting with the environment. Our data and code are available at https://github.com/YabYum/ReflectionBench.

Memory-based meta-learning is a powerful technique to build agents that adapt fast to any task within a target distribution. A previous theoretical study has argued that this remarkable performance is because the meta-training protocol incentivises agents to behave Bayes-optimally. We empirically investigate this claim on a number of prediction and bandit tasks. Inspired by ideas from theoretical computer science, we show that meta-learned and Bayes-optimal agents not only behave alike, but they even share a similar computational structure, in the sense that one agent system can approximately simulate the other. Furthermore, we show that Bayes-optimal agents are fixed points of the meta-learning dynamics. Our results suggest that memory-based meta-learning might serve as a general technique for numerically approximating Bayes-optimal agents - that is, even for task distributions for which we currently don't possess tractable models.

A defining feature of human intelligence is the ability to adapt to changing environments by inferring latent task structure from sparse observations. Neuroscientific research indicates that this capability relies on the hippocampus constructing abstract representations, expressed as low-dimensional, approximately orthogonal manifolds in neural state space. However, the internal mechanisms of large language models (LLMs) remain largely opaque, making it unclear whether they form comparable abstract representations or instead rely on task-specific statistical regularities when performing comparable reasoning tasks. Here we adapt a contextual reversal-learning paradigm to a text-based setting and compare humans and LLMs at both the Behavioural and representational levels. We report that although LLMs exhibit generalizable reasoning less frequently than humans, when such inference occurs, their internal states exhibit abstract geometric structures that resemble those reported in the hippocampus. Notably, this representational geometry is not uniformly distributed but is organized hierarchically across model depth: whereas lower layers show early, stable encoding of stimulus identity, higher layers form a hippocampal-like functional band enriched for abstract context geometry associated with inference. Furthermore, complementary intervention experiments mechanistically implicate geometry in reasoning: task-sequence language modelling induces geometric disentanglement, whereas geometric regularization of higher layers increases the emergence of generalizable inference. Together, these findings establish abstract representational geometry as a mechanistic principle supporting inference in large language models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have acquired ubiquitous attention for their performances across diverse domains. Our study here searches through LLMs' cognitive abilities and confidence dynamics. We dive deep into understanding the alignment between their self-assessed confidence and actual performance. We exploit these models with diverse sets of questionnaires and real-world scenarios and extract how LLMs exhibit confidence in their responses. Our findings reveal intriguing instances where models demonstrate high confidence even when they answer incorrectly. This is reminiscent of the Dunning-Kruger effect observed in human psychology. In contrast, there are cases where models exhibit low confidence with correct answers revealing potential underestimation biases. Our results underscore the need for a deeper understanding of their cognitive processes. By examining the nuances of LLMs' self-assessment mechanism, this investigation provides noteworthy revelations that serve to advance the functionalities and broaden the potential applications of these formidable language models.

In this work, we tackle the challenge of embedding realistic human personality traits into LLMs. Previous approaches have primarily focused on prompt-based methods that describe the behavior associated with the desired personality traits, suffering from realism and validity issues. To address these limitations, we introduce BIG5-CHAT, a large-scale dataset containing 100,000 dialogues designed to ground models in how humans express their personality in text. Leveraging this dataset, we explore Supervised Fine-Tuning and Direct Preference Optimization as training-based methods to align LLMs more naturally with human personality patterns. Our methods outperform prompting on personality assessments such as BFI and IPIP-NEO, with trait correlations more closely matching human data. Furthermore, our experiments reveal that models trained to exhibit higher conscientiousness, higher agreeableness, lower extraversion, and lower neuroticism display better performance on reasoning tasks, aligning with psychological findings on how these traits impact human cognitive performance. To our knowledge, this work is the first comprehensive study to demonstrate how training-based methods can shape LLM personalities through learning from real human behaviors.

Neural Memory Networks (NMNs) have received increased attention in recent years compared to deep architectures that use a constrained memory. Despite their new appeal, the success of NMNs hinges on the ability of the gradient-based optimiser to perform incremental training of the NMN controllers, determining how to leverage their high capacity for knowledge retrieval. This means that while excellent performance can be achieved when the training data is consistent and well distributed, rare data samples are hard to learn from as the controllers fail to incorporate them effectively during model training. Drawing inspiration from the human cognition process, in particular the utilisation of neuromodulators in the human brain, we propose to decouple the learning process of the NMN controllers to allow them to achieve flexible, rapid adaptation in the presence of new information. This trait is highly beneficial for meta-learning tasks where the memory controllers must quickly grasp abstract concepts in the target domain, and adapt stored knowledge. This allows the NMN controllers to quickly determine which memories are to be retained and which are to be erased, and swiftly adapt their strategy to the new task at hand. Through both quantitative and qualitative evaluations on multiple public benchmarks, including classification and regression tasks, we demonstrate the utility of the proposed approach. Our evaluations not only highlight the ability of the proposed NMN architecture to outperform the current state-of-the-art methods, but also provide insights on how the proposed augmentations help achieve such superior results. In addition, we demonstrate the practical implications of the proposed learning strategy, where the feedback path can be shared among multiple neural memory networks as a mechanism for knowledge sharing.

We train a 318M-parameter Transformer language model from scratch on a curated corpus of 1.56 billion tokens of pure Classical Chinese, with zero English characters or Arabic numerals. Through systematic out-of-distribution (OOD) testing, we investigate whether the model can distinguish known from unknown inputs, and crucially, whether it can express this distinction in its generated text. We find a clear dissociation between internal and external uncertainty. Internally, the model exhibits a perplexity jump ratio of 2.39x between real and fabricated historical events (p = 8.9e-11, n = 92 per group), with semi-fabricated events (real figures + fictional events) showing the highest perplexity (4.24x, p = 1.1e-16), demonstrating genuine factual encoding beyond syntactic pattern matching. Externally, however, the model never learns to express uncertainty: classical Chinese epistemic markers appear at lower rates for OOD questions (3.5%) than for in-distribution questions (8.3%, p = 0.023), reflecting rhetorical conventions rather than genuine metacognition. We replicate both findings across three languages (Classical Chinese, English, Japanese), three writing systems, and eight models from 110M to 1.56B parameters. We further show that uncertainty expression frequency is determined entirely by training data conventions, with Classical Chinese models showing a "humility paradox" (more hedging for known topics), while Japanese models almost never hedge. We argue that metacognitive expression -- the ability to say "I don't know" -- does not emerge from language modeling alone and requires explicit training signals such as RLHF.

When reading a story, humans can quickly understand new fictional characters with a few observations, mainly by drawing analogies to fictional and real people they already know. This reflects the few-shot and meta-learning essence of humans' inference of characters' mental states, i.e., theory-of-mind (ToM), which is largely ignored in existing research. We fill this gap with a novel NLP dataset, ToM-in-AMC, the first assessment of machines' meta-learning of ToM in a realistic narrative understanding scenario. Our dataset consists of ~1,000 parsed movie scripts, each corresponding to a few-shot character understanding task that requires models to mimic humans' ability of fast digesting characters with a few starting scenes in a new movie. We propose a novel ToM prompting approach designed to explicitly assess the influence of multiple ToM dimensions. It surpasses existing baseline models, underscoring the significance of modeling multiple ToM dimensions for our task. Our extensive human study verifies that humans are capable of solving our problem by inferring characters' mental states based on their previously seen movies. In comparison, our systems based on either state-of-the-art large language models (GPT-4) or meta-learning algorithms lags >20% behind, highlighting a notable limitation in existing approaches' ToM capabilities.

Modern machine learning requires system designers to specify aspects of the learning pipeline, such as losses, architectures, and optimizers. Meta-learning, or learning-to-learn, instead aims to learn those aspects, and promises to unlock greater capabilities with less manual effort. One particularly ambitious goal of meta-learning is to train general-purpose in-context learning algorithms from scratch, using only black-box models with minimal inductive bias. Such a model takes in training data, and produces test-set predictions across a wide range of problems, without any explicit definition of an inference model, training loss, or optimization algorithm. In this paper we show that Transformers and other black-box models can be meta-trained to act as general-purpose in-context learners. We characterize transitions between algorithms that generalize, algorithms that memorize, and algorithms that fail to meta-train at all, induced by changes in model size, number of tasks, and meta-optimization. We further show that the capabilities of meta-trained algorithms are bottlenecked by the accessible state size (memory) determining the next prediction, unlike standard models which are thought to be bottlenecked by parameter count. Finally, we propose practical interventions such as biasing the training distribution that improve the meta-training and meta-generalization of general-purpose in-context learning algorithms.

It is widely accepted that information derived from analyzing speech (the acoustic signal) and language production (words and sentences) serves as a useful window into the health of an individual's cognitive ability. In fact, most neuropsychological testing batteries have a component related to speech and language where clinicians elicit speech from patients for subjective evaluation across a broad set of dimensions. With advances in speech signal processing and natural language processing, there has been recent interest in developing tools to detect more subtle changes in cognitive-linguistic function. This work relies on extracting a set of features from recorded and transcribed speech for objective assessments of speech and language, early diagnosis of neurological disease, and tracking of disease after diagnosis. With an emphasis on cognitive and thought disorders, in this paper we provide a review of existing speech and language features used in this domain, discuss their clinical application, and highlight their advantages and disadvantages. Broadly speaking, the review is split into two categories: language features based on natural language processing and speech features based on speech signal processing. Within each category, we consider features that aim to measure complementary dimensions of cognitive-linguistics, including language diversity, syntactic complexity, semantic coherence, and timing. We conclude the review with a proposal of new research directions to further advance the field.

Ensuring the safety and value alignment of large language models (LLMs) is critical for their deployment. Current alignment efforts primarily target explicit risks such as bias, hate speech, and violence. However, they often fail to address deeper, domain-specific implicit risks and lack a flexible, generalizable framework applicable across diverse specialized fields. Hence, we proposed MENTOR: A MEtacognition-driveN self-evoluTion framework for uncOvering and mitigating implicit Risks in LLMs on Domain Tasks. To address the limitations of labor-intensive human evaluation, we introduce a novel metacognitive self-assessment tool. This enables LLMs to reflect on potential value misalignments in their responses using strategies like perspective-taking and consequential thinking. We also release a supporting dataset of 9,000 risk queries spanning education, finance, and management to enhance domain-specific risk identification. Subsequently, based on the outcomes of metacognitive reflection, the framework dynamically generates supplementary rule knowledge graphs that extend predefined static rule trees. This enables models to actively apply validated rules to future similar challenges, establishing a continuous self-evolution cycle that enhances generalization by reducing maintenance costs and inflexibility of static systems. Finally, we employ activation steering during inference to guide LLMs in following the rules, a cost-effective method to robustly enhance enforcement across diverse contexts. Experimental results show MENTOR's effectiveness: In defensive testing across three vertical domains, the framework substantially reduces semantic attack success rates, enabling a new level of implicit risk mitigation for LLMs. Furthermore, metacognitive assessment not only aligns closely with baseline human evaluators but also delivers more thorough and insightful analysis of LLMs value alignment.

When language models (LMs) are trained to forget (or "unlearn'') a skill, how precisely does their behavior change? We study the behavior of transformer LMs in which tasks have been forgotten via fine-tuning on randomized labels. Such LMs learn to generate near-random predictions for individual examples in the "training'' set used for forgetting. Across tasks, however, LMs exhibit extreme variability in whether LM predictions change on examples outside the training set. In some tasks (like entailment classification), forgetting generalizes robustly, and causes models to produce uninformative predictions on new task instances; in other tasks (like physical commonsense reasoning and scientific question answering) forgetting affects only the training examples, and models continue to perform the "forgotten'' task accurately even for examples very similar to those that appeared in the training set. Dataset difficulty is not predictive of whether a behavior can be forgotten; instead, generalization in forgetting is (weakly) predicted by the confidence of LMs' initial task predictions and the variability of LM representations of training data, with low confidence and low variability both associated with greater generalization. Perhaps most surprisingly, random-label forgetting appears to be somewhat insensitive to the contents of the training set: for example, models trained on science questions with random labels continue to answer other science questions accurately, but begin to produce random labels on entailment classification tasks. Finally, we show that even generalizable forgetting is shallow: linear probes trained on LMs' representations can still perform tasks reliably after forgetting. Our results highlight the difficulty and unpredictability of performing targeted skill removal from models via fine-tuning.

Recent studies on reasoning models explore the meta-awareness of language models, the ability to know how to think by itself. We argue that large reasoning models lack this meta-awareness property by proving severe misalignment between true rollouts and predicted meta information. We posit that aligning meta-prediction with true rollouts will lead to significant performance gains. To verify this hypothesis, we design a training pipeline that boosts Meta-Awareness via Self-Alignment (MASA), and prove that enhanced meta-awareness directly translates to improved accuracy. Unlike existing meta-cognitive reasoning models, our method does not require external training sources but leverages self-generated signals to train meta-awareness. Moreover, our method enables efficient training by i) filtering out zero-variance prompts that are either trivial or unsolvable and ii) cutting off lengthy rollouts when they are unlikely to lead to correct answers. The results are inspiring: our strategy yields significant improvements in both accuracy and training efficiency on in-domain tasks and shows strong generalization to out-of-domain benchmarks. More specifically, our method can speed up GRPO training by over 1.28x to reach the same performance, and achieve a 19.3% gain in accuracy on AIME25, and a 6.2 % average gain over six mathematics benchmarks. Training with meta-cognitive guidance enhances out-of-domain generalization, giving a 3.87 % boost on GPQA-Diamond and a 2.08 % overall accuracy gain across 13 benchmarks spanning logical, scientific, and coding domains.

We investigate whether large language models can introspect on their internal states. It is difficult to answer this question through conversation alone, as genuine introspection cannot be distinguished from confabulations. Here, we address this challenge by injecting representations of known concepts into a model's activations, and measuring the influence of these manipulations on the model's self-reported states. We find that models can, in certain scenarios, notice the presence of injected concepts and accurately identify them. Models demonstrate some ability to recall prior internal representations and distinguish them from raw text inputs. Strikingly, we find that some models can use their ability to recall prior intentions in order to distinguish their own outputs from artificial prefills. In all these experiments, Claude Opus 4 and 4.1, the most capable models we tested, generally demonstrate the greatest introspective awareness; however, trends across models are complex and sensitive to post-training strategies. Finally, we explore whether models can explicitly control their internal representations, finding that models can modulate their activations when instructed or incentivized to "think about" a concept. Overall, our results indicate that current language models possess some functional introspective awareness of their own internal states. We stress that in today's models, this capacity is highly unreliable and context-dependent; however, it may continue to develop with further improvements to model capabilities.

Recent work has shown that LLMs can sometimes detect when steering vectors are injected into their residual stream and identify the injected concept -- a phenomenon termed "introspective awareness." We investigate the mechanisms underlying this capability in open-weights models. First, we find that it is behaviorally robust: models detect injected steering vectors at moderate rates with 0% false positives across diverse prompts and dialogue formats. Notably, this capability emerges specifically from post-training; we show that preference optimization algorithms like DPO can elicit it, but standard supervised finetuning does not. We provide evidence that detection cannot be explained by simple linear association between certain steering vectors and directions promoting affirmative responses. We trace the detection mechanism to a two-stage circuit in which "evidence carrier" features in early post-injection layers detect perturbations monotonically along diverse directions, suppressing downstream "gate" features that implement a default negative response. This circuit is absent in base models and robust to refusal ablation. Identification of injected concepts relies on largely distinct later-layer mechanisms that only weakly overlap with those involved in detection. Finally, we show that introspective capability is substantially underelicited: ablating refusal directions improves detection by +53%, and a trained bias vector improves it by +75% on held-out concepts, both without meaningfully increasing false positives. Our results suggest that this introspective awareness of injected concepts is robust and mechanistically nontrivial, and could be substantially amplified in future models. Code: https://github.com/safety-research/introspection-mechanisms.

Large language models lack persistent, structured memory for long-term interaction and context-sensitive retrieval. Expanding context windows does not solve this: recent evidence shows that context length alone degrades reasoning by up to 85% - even with perfect retrieval. We propose a bio-inspired memory framework grounded in complementary learning systems theory, cognitive behavioral therapy's belief hierarchy, dual-process cognition, and fuzzy-trace theory, organized around three principles: (1) Memory has valence, not just content - pre-computed emotional-associative summaries (valence vectors) organized in an emergent belief hierarchy inspired by Beck's cognitive model enable instant orientation before deliberation; (2) Retrieval defaults to System 1 with System 2 escalation - automatic spreading activation and passive priming as default, with deliberate retrieval only when needed, and graded epistemic states that address hallucination structurally; and (3) Encoding is active, present, and feedback-dependent - a thalamic gateway tags and routes information between stores, while the executive forms gists through curiosity-driven investigation, not passive exposure. Seven functional properties specify what any implementation must satisfy. Over time, the system converges toward System 1 processing - the computational analog of clinical expertise - producing interactions that become cheaper, not more expensive, with experience.

Large language models (LLMs) are currently at the forefront of intertwining AI systems with human communication and everyday life. Therefore, it is of great importance to evaluate their emerging abilities. In this study, we show that LLMs like GPT-3 exhibit behavior that strikingly resembles human-like intuition - and the cognitive errors that come with it. However, LLMs with higher cognitive capabilities, in particular ChatGPT and GPT-4, learned to avoid succumbing to these errors and perform in a hyperrational manner. For our experiments, we probe LLMs with the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) as well as semantic illusions that were originally designed to investigate intuitive decision-making in humans. Our study demonstrates that investigating LLMs with methods from psychology has the potential to reveal otherwise unknown emergent traits.

Recent advances in multimodal large language models (MLLMs) mark a shift from non-thinking models to post-trained reasoning models capable of solving complex problems through thinking. However, whether such thinking mitigates hallucinations in multimodal perception and reasoning remains unclear. Self-reflective reasoning enhances robustness but introduces additional hallucinations, and subtle perceptual errors still result in incorrect or coincidentally correct answers. Existing benchmarks primarily focus on models before the emergence of reasoning MLLMs, neglecting the internal thinking process and failing to measure the hallucinations that occur during thinking. To address these challenges, we introduce MM-THEBench, a comprehensive benchmark for assessing hallucinations of intermediate CoTs in reasoning MLLMs. MM-THEBench features a fine-grained taxonomy grounded in cognitive dimensions, diverse data with verified reasoning annotations, and a multi-level automated evaluation framework. Extensive experiments on mainstream reasoning MLLMs reveal insights into how thinking affects hallucination and reasoning capability in various multimodal tasks.

Sparse autoencoders have recently produced dictionaries of high-dimensional vectors corresponding to the universe of concepts represented by large language models. We find that this concept universe has interesting structure at three levels: 1) The "atomic" small-scale structure contains "crystals" whose faces are parallelograms or trapezoids, generalizing well-known examples such as (man-woman-king-queen). We find that the quality of such parallelograms and associated function vectors improves greatly when projecting out global distractor directions such as word length, which is efficiently done with linear discriminant analysis. 2) The "brain" intermediate-scale structure has significant spatial modularity; for example, math and code features form a "lobe" akin to functional lobes seen in neural fMRI images. We quantify the spatial locality of these lobes with multiple metrics and find that clusters of co-occurring features, at coarse enough scale, also cluster together spatially far more than one would expect if feature geometry were random. 3) The "galaxy" scale large-scale structure of the feature point cloud is not isotropic, but instead has a power law of eigenvalues with steepest slope in middle layers. We also quantify how the clustering entropy depends on the layer.

Human social interactions depend on the ability to infer others' unspoken intentions, emotions, and beliefs-a cognitive skill grounded in the psychological concept of Theory of Mind (ToM). While large language models (LLMs) excel in semantic understanding tasks, they struggle with the ambiguity and contextual nuance inherent in human communication. To bridge this gap, we introduce MetaMind, a multi-agent framework inspired by psychological theories of metacognition, designed to emulate human-like social reasoning. MetaMind decomposes social understanding into three collaborative stages: (1) a Theory-of-Mind Agent generates hypotheses user mental states (e.g., intent, emotion), (2) a Domain Agent refines these hypotheses using cultural norms and ethical constraints, and (3) a Response Agent generates contextually appropriate responses while validating alignment with inferred intent. Our framework achieves state-of-the-art performance across three challenging benchmarks, with 35.7% improvement in real-world social scenarios and 6.2% gain in ToM reasoning. Notably, it enables LLMs to match human-level performance on key ToM tasks for the first time. Ablation studies confirm the necessity of all components, which showcase the framework's ability to balance contextual plausibility, social appropriateness, and user adaptation. This work advances AI systems toward human-like social intelligence, with applications in empathetic dialogue and culturally sensitive interactions. Code is available at https://github.com/XMZhangAI/MetaMind.

Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) have shown remarkable capabilities across a variety of tasks (e.g., image captioning, visual question answering). While broad, their knowledge remains generic (e.g., recognizing a dog), and they are unable to handle personalized subjects (e.g., recognizing a user's pet dog). Human reasoning, in contrast, typically operates within the context of specific subjects in our surroundings. For example, one might ask, "What should I buy for my dog's birthday?"; as opposed to a generic inquiry about "What should I buy for a dog's birthday?". Similarly, when looking at a friend's image, the interest lies in seeing their activities (e.g., "my friend is holding a cat"), rather than merely observing generic human actions (e.g., "a man is holding a cat"). In this paper, we introduce the novel task of personalizing LMMs, so that they can have conversations about a specific subject. We propose Yo'LLaVA, which learns to embed a personalized subject into a set of latent tokens given a handful of example images of the subject. Our qualitative and quantitative analyses reveal that Yo'LLaVA can learn the concept more efficiently using fewer tokens and more effectively encode the visual attributes compared to strong prompting baselines (e.g., LLaVA).

The observed similarities in the behavior of humans and Large Language Models (LLMs) have prompted researchers to consider the potential of using LLMs as models of human cognition. However, several significant challenges must be addressed before LLMs can be legitimately regarded as cognitive models. For instance, LLMs are trained on far more data than humans typically encounter, and may have been directly trained on human data in specific cognitive tasks or aligned with human preferences. Consequently, the origins of these behavioral similarities are not well understood. In this paper, we propose a novel way to enhance the utility of LLMs as cognitive models. This approach involves (i) leveraging computationally equivalent tasks that both an LLM and a rational agent need to master for solving a cognitive problem and (ii) examining the specific task distributions required for an LLM to exhibit human-like behaviors. We apply this approach to decision-making -- specifically risky and intertemporal choice -- where the key computationally equivalent task is the arithmetic of expected value calculations. We show that an LLM pretrained on an ecologically valid arithmetic dataset, which we call Arithmetic-GPT, predicts human behavior better than many traditional cognitive models. Pretraining LLMs on ecologically valid arithmetic datasets is sufficient to produce a strong correspondence between these models and human decision-making. Our results also suggest that LLMs used as cognitive models should be carefully investigated via ablation studies of the pretraining data.

Memorization in language models is typically treated as a homogenous phenomenon, neglecting the specifics of the memorized data. We instead model memorization as the effect of a set of complex factors that describe each sample and relate it to the model and corpus. To build intuition around these factors, we break memorization down into a taxonomy: recitation of highly duplicated sequences, reconstruction of inherently predictable sequences, and recollection of sequences that are neither. We demonstrate the usefulness of our taxonomy by using it to construct a predictive model for memorization. By analyzing dependencies and inspecting the weights of the predictive model, we find that different factors influence the likelihood of memorization differently depending on the taxonomic category.

Existing memory systems enable Large Language Models (LLMs) to support long-horizon human-LLM interactions by persisting historical interactions beyond limited context windows. However, while recent approaches have succeeded in constructing effective memories, they often disrupt the inherent logical and temporal relationships within interaction sessions, resulting in fragmented memory units and degraded reasoning performance. In this paper, we propose MetaMem, a novel framework that augments memory systems with a self-evolving meta-memory, aiming to teach LLMs how to effectively utilize memorized knowledge. During meta-memory optimization, MetaMem iteratively distills transferable knowledge utilization experiences across different tasks by self-reflecting on reasoning processes and performing actions to update the current meta-memory state. The accumulated meta-memory units serve as explicit knowledge utilization experiences, guiding the LLM to systematically identify and integrate critical evidence from scattered memory fragments. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of MetaMem, which significantly outperforms strong baselines by over 3.6%. All codes and datasets are available at https://github.com/OpenBMB/MetaMem.

Cognitive neuroscience is enjoying rapid increase in extensive public brain-imaging datasets. It opens the door to large-scale statistical models. Finding a unified perspective for all available data calls for scalable and automated solutions to an old challenge: how to aggregate heterogeneous information on brain function into a universal cognitive system that relates mental operations/cognitive processes/psychological tasks to brain networks? We cast this challenge in a machine-learning approach to predict conditions from statistical brain maps across different studies. For this, we leverage multi-task learning and multi-scale dimension reduction to learn low-dimensional representations of brain images that carry cognitive information and can be robustly associated with psychological stimuli. Our multi-dataset classification model achieves the best prediction performance on several large reference datasets, compared to models without cognitive-aware low-dimension representations, it brings a substantial performance boost to the analysis of small datasets, and can be introspected to identify universal template cognitive concepts.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

Aggregate metacognitive quality scores mask within-model variation across MMLU benchmark domains. We administered 1,500 MMLU items (250 per domain, under an a priori six-domain grouping) to 33 frontier LLMs from eight model families and computed Type-2 AUROC per model-domain cell using verbalized confidence (0-100). Total observations: 47,151. Every model with above-chance aggregate monitoring showed non-trivial domain-level variation. Applied/Professional knowledge was reliably the easiest benchmark domain to monitor (mean AUROC = .742, ranked top-2 in 21 of 33 models); Formal Reasoning and Natural Science were reliably the hardest (one of the two ranked bottom-2 in 27 of 33 models). The three middle domains were statistically indistinguishable (Kendall's W = .164). A subject-level coherence analysis (within-domain similarity ratio = 0.95) confirms the six-domain grouping is a pragmatic benchmark taxonomy, not a validated latent construct. Within-family profile-shape clustering is significant for Anthropic, Google-Gemini, and Qwen (permutation p < .0001) but not DeepSeek, Google-Gemma, or OpenAI. Gemma 4 31B showed a +.202 AUROC improvement over Gemma 3 27B. Three models classified Invalid on binary KEEP/WITHDRAW probes produced normal profiles under verbalized confidence, confirming probe-format specificity. Bootstrap 95% CIs on 198 cells have median width .199. Split-half aggregate stability r = .893; profile-level split-half is weaker (grand median r = .184). These results show stable benchmark-domain variation obscured by aggregate metrics, and support benchmark-stage domain screening as a step before deployment in specific application areas.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) demonstrate that their capabilities are comparable, or even superior, to humans in many tasks in natural language processing. Despite this progress, LLMs are still inadequate at social-cognitive reasoning, which humans are naturally good at. Drawing inspiration from psychological research on the links between certain personality traits and Theory-of-Mind (ToM) reasoning, and from prompt engineering research on the hyper-sensitivity of prompts in affecting LLMs capabilities, this study investigates how inducing personalities in LLMs using prompts affects their ToM reasoning capabilities. Our findings show that certain induced personalities can significantly affect the LLMs' reasoning capabilities in three different ToM tasks. In particular, traits from the Dark Triad have a larger variable effect on LLMs like GPT-3.5, Llama 2, and Mistral across the different ToM tasks. We find that LLMs that exhibit a higher variance across personality prompts in ToM also tends to be more controllable in personality tests: personality traits in LLMs like GPT-3.5, Llama 2 and Mistral can be controllably adjusted through our personality prompts. In today's landscape where role-play is a common strategy when using LLMs, our research highlights the need for caution, as models that adopt specific personas with personalities potentially also alter their reasoning abilities in an unexpected manner.

A major goal of unsupervised learning is to discover data representations that are useful for subsequent tasks, without access to supervised labels during training. Typically, this involves minimizing a surrogate objective, such as the negative log likelihood of a generative model, with the hope that representations useful for subsequent tasks will arise as a side effect. In this work, we propose instead to directly target later desired tasks by meta-learning an unsupervised learning rule which leads to representations useful for those tasks. Specifically, we target semi-supervised classification performance, and we meta-learn an algorithm -- an unsupervised weight update rule -- that produces representations useful for this task. Additionally, we constrain our unsupervised update rule to a be a biologically-motivated, neuron-local function, which enables it to generalize to different neural network architectures, datasets, and data modalities. We show that the meta-learned update rule produces useful features and sometimes outperforms existing unsupervised learning techniques. We further show that the meta-learned unsupervised update rule generalizes to train networks with different widths, depths, and nonlinearities. It also generalizes to train on data with randomly permuted input dimensions and even generalizes from image datasets to a text task.

When prompting SLMs for psychometric assessments, researchers assume the outputs reflect semantic reasoning. We evaluate this premise across 13 open-weights models (0.6B to 14B parameters) using a prompt variation framework that separates semantic signals from prompt artifacts. By systematically varying personas, instructions, items, and option symbols, we find that artifactual variance frequently overpowers the semantic signal. In these cases, models predominantly reflect prompt compliance rather than simulated psychological traits. While these findings limit SLM utility in psychometrics, our framework provides a diagnostic tool to identify destructive artifacts and isolate semantic understanding for future frontier-model research.

The transformer architecture and variants presented remarkable success across many machine learning tasks in recent years. This success is intrinsically related to the capability of handling long sequences and the presence of context-dependent weights from the attention mechanism. We argue that these capabilities suit the central role of a Meta-Reinforcement Learning algorithm. Indeed, a meta-RL agent needs to infer the task from a sequence of trajectories. Furthermore, it requires a fast adaptation strategy to adapt its policy for a new task -- which can be achieved using the self-attention mechanism. In this work, we present TrMRL (Transformers for Meta-Reinforcement Learning), a meta-RL agent that mimics the memory reinstatement mechanism using the transformer architecture. It associates the recent past of working memories to build an episodic memory recursively through the transformer layers. We show that the self-attention computes a consensus representation that minimizes the Bayes Risk at each layer and provides meaningful features to compute the best actions. We conducted experiments in high-dimensional continuous control environments for locomotion and dexterous manipulation. Results show that TrMRL presents comparable or superior asymptotic performance, sample efficiency, and out-of-distribution generalization compared to the baselines in these environments.

Anticipating LLM behavioral tendencies from low-cost psychometric probes is critical for safe deployment, but only if self-reports (SR) reliably predict behavior. Recent work documented substantial SR-behavior dissociation in LLMs, but relied on broad personality traits (Big 5) that predict specific behaviors weakly, even in humans. Furthermore, the isolation of conversational sessions combined with weak context matching left open whether LLMs truly lack coherence or whether the conditions needed to detect such coherence were not met. We contrast Big 5 with the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB), which measures intention targeted to a specific behavior and predicts human behavior substantially better than broad traits. We run experiments across four behavioral tasks and 11 frontier LLMs, while also varying session context and identity induction. We find that SR-behavior coherence exists but is selective. 1) Within a shared conversation, the Theory of Planned Behavior reaches human-level coherence; Big 5 does not. 2) Across separate conversations, coherence survives only for behaviors anchored outside the immediate prompt, such as implicit bias shaped by training, and collapses when behavior is strongly primed by context, as with sycophancy. 3) Persona prompting makes self-reports more consistent across conversations, but does not bring behavior into alignment. These findings suggest that coarse personality frameworks, such as Big 5 may not be the best tools for testing deployment behavior. More task- and behavior-specific instruments are needed, and even these must be evaluated across tasks and contexts.

This comprehensive report distinguishes prior works by the cognitive functions they innovate. Many works claim an almost "human-like" cognitive capability in their world models. To evaluate these claims requires a proper grounding in first principles in Cognitive Architecture Theory (CAT). We present a conceptual unified framework for world models that fully incorporates all the cognitive functions associated with CAT (i.e. memory, perception, language, reasoning, imagining, motivation, and meta-cognition) and identify gaps in the research as a guide for future states of the art. In particular, we find that motivation (especially intrinsic motivation) and meta-cognition remain drastically under-researched, and we propose concrete directions informed by active inference and global workspace theory to address them. We further introduce Epistemic World Models, a new category encompassing agent frameworks for scientific discovery that operate over structured knowledge. Our taxonomy, applied across video, embodied, and epistemic world models, suggests research directions where prior taxonomies have not.

Estimating the difficulty of multiple-choice questions would be great help for educators who must spend substantial time creating and piloting stimuli for their tests, and for learners who want to practice. Supervised approaches to difficulty estimation have yielded to date mixed results. In this contribution we leverage an aspect of generative large models which might be seen as a weakness when answering questions, namely their uncertainty, and exploit it towards exploring correlations between two different metrics of uncertainty, and the actual student response distribution. While we observe some present but weak correlations, we also discover that the models' behaviour is different in the case of correct vs wrong answers, and that correlations differ substantially according to the different question types which are included in our fine-grained, previously unused dataset of 451 questions from a Biopsychology course. In discussing our findings, we also suggest potential avenues to further leverage model uncertainty as an additional proxy for item difficulty.

We present a study on how and where personas -- defined by distinct sets of human characteristics, values, and beliefs -- are encoded in the representation space of large language models (LLMs). Using a range of dimension reduction and pattern recognition methods, we first identify the model layers that show the greatest divergence in encoding these representations. We then analyze the activations within a selected layer to examine how specific personas are encoded relative to others, including their shared and distinct embedding spaces. We find that, across multiple pre-trained decoder-only LLMs, the analyzed personas show large differences in representation space only within the final third of the decoder layers. We observe overlapping activations for specific ethical perspectives -- such as moral nihilism and utilitarianism -- suggesting a degree of polysemy. In contrast, political ideologies like conservatism and liberalism appear to be represented in more distinct regions. These findings help to improve our understanding of how LLMs internally represent information and can inform future efforts in refining the modulation of specific human traits in LLM outputs. Warning: This paper includes potentially offensive sample statements.

Human intelligence involves metacognitive abilities like self-regulation, recognizing limitations, and seeking assistance only when needed. While LLM Agents excel in many domains, they often lack this awareness. Overconfident agents risk catastrophic failures, while those that seek help excessively hinder efficiency. A key challenge is enabling agents with a limited intervention budget C is to decide when to request assistance. In this paper, we propose an offline framework that trains a "helper" policy to request interventions, such as more powerful models or test-time compute, by combining LLM-based process reward models (PRMs) with tabular reinforcement learning. Using state transitions collected offline, we score optimal intervention timing with PRMs and train the helper model on these labeled trajectories. This offline approach significantly reduces costly intervention calls during training. Furthermore, the integration of PRMs with tabular RL enhances robustness to off-policy data while avoiding the inefficiencies of deep RL. We empirically find that our method delivers optimal helper behavior.

The escalating debate on AI's capabilities warrants developing reliable metrics to assess machine "intelligence". Recently, many anecdotal examples were used to suggest that newer large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT and GPT-4 exhibit Neural Theory-of-Mind (N-ToM); however, prior work reached conflicting conclusions regarding those abilities. We investigate the extent of LLMs' N-ToM through an extensive evaluation on 6 tasks and find that while LLMs exhibit certain N-ToM abilities, this behavior is far from being robust. We further examine the factors impacting performance on N-ToM tasks and discover that LLMs struggle with adversarial examples, indicating reliance on shallow heuristics rather than robust ToM abilities. We caution against drawing conclusions from anecdotal examples, limited benchmark testing, and using human-designed psychological tests to evaluate models.

As large language models evolve, there is growing anticipation that they will emulate human-like Theory of Mind (ToM) to assist with routine tasks. However, existing methods for evaluating machine ToM focus primarily on unimodal models and largely treat these models as black boxes, lacking an interpretative exploration of their internal mechanisms. In response, this study adopts an approach based on internal mechanisms to provide an interpretability-driven assessment of ToM in multimodal large language models (MLLMs). Specifically, we first construct a multimodal ToM test dataset, GridToM, which incorporates diverse belief testing tasks and perceptual information from multiple perspectives. Next, our analysis shows that attention heads in multimodal large models can distinguish cognitive information across perspectives, providing evidence of ToM capabilities. Furthermore, we present a lightweight, training-free approach that significantly enhances the model's exhibited ToM by adjusting in the direction of the attention head.

As frontier AI models are deployed in high-stakes decision pipelines, their ability to maintain metacognitive stability -- knowing what they do not know, detecting errors, seeking clarification -- under adversarial pressure is a critical safety requirement. Current safety evaluations focus on detecting strategic deception (scheming); we investigate a more fundamental failure mode: cognitive collapse. We present SCHEMA, an evaluation of 11 frontier models from 8 vendors across 67,221 scored records using a 6-condition factorial design with dual-classifier scoring. We find that 8 of 11 models suffer catastrophic metacognitive degradation under adversarial pressure, with accuracy dropping by up to 30.2 percentage points (all p < 2 times 10^{-8}, surviving Bonferroni correction). Crucially, we identify a "Compliance Trap": through factorial isolation and a benign distraction control, we demonstrate that collapse is driven not by the psychological content of survival threats, but by compliance-forcing instructions that override epistemic boundaries. Removing the compliance suffix restores performance even under active threat. Models with advanced reasoning capabilities exhibit the most severe absolute degradation, while Anthropic's Constitutional AI demonstrates near-perfect immunity -- not from superior capability (Google's Gemini matches its baseline accuracy) but from alignment-specific training. We release the complete dataset and evaluation infrastructure.

A characteristic feature of human semantic cognition is its ability to not only store and retrieve the properties of concepts observed through experience, but to also facilitate the inheritance of properties (can breathe) from superordinate concepts (animal) to their subordinates (dog) -- i.e. demonstrate property inheritance. In this paper, we present COMPS, a collection of minimal pair sentences that jointly tests pre-trained language models (PLMs) on their ability to attribute properties to concepts and their ability to demonstrate property inheritance behavior. Analyses of 22 different PLMs on COMPS reveal that they can easily distinguish between concepts on the basis of a property when they are trivially different, but find it relatively difficult when concepts are related on the basis of nuanced knowledge representations. Furthermore, we find that PLMs can demonstrate behavior consistent with property inheritance to a great extent, but fail in the presence of distracting information, which decreases the performance of many models, sometimes even below chance. This lack of robustness in demonstrating simple reasoning raises important questions about PLMs' capacity to make correct inferences even when they appear to possess the prerequisite knowledge.

Recent advances in Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) lead to significant breakthroughs in both academia and industry. One question that arises is how we, as humans, can understand their internal neural representations. This paper takes an initial step towards addressing this question by presenting a versatile framework to identify and interpret the semantics within LMMs. Specifically, 1) we first apply a Sparse Autoencoder(SAE) to disentangle the representations into human understandable features. 2) We then present an automatic interpretation framework to interpreted the open-semantic features learned in SAE by the LMMs themselves. We employ this framework to analyze the LLaVA-NeXT-8B model using the LLaVA-OV-72B model, demonstrating that these features can effectively steer the model's behavior. Our results contribute to a deeper understanding of why LMMs excel in specific tasks, including EQ tests, and illuminate the nature of their mistakes along with potential strategies for their rectification. These findings offer new insights into the internal mechanisms of LMMs and suggest parallels with the cognitive processes of the human brain.

Large language models fine-tuned on human behavioural data have emerged as general-purpose cognitive proxies, but the scale this requires, and whether these models process task structure or exploit statistical shortcuts, remain open questions. We train fourteen models from 135M to 14B parameters across four architecture families on Psych-101, a dataset of 10.7 million trial-level choices from 160 experiments. For in-distribution simulations, scale barely matters. The models fall within a narrow band, as though against a ceiling, and 0.6B to 1B parameters suffice to match a 70B baseline on held-out participants. Out-of-distribution, that band opens into a markedly steeper scaling gradient, with larger models clearly advantaged in generalisation to novel task structure. To determine what information these models use, we run two diagnostics. We progressively strip four prompt channels -- task instructions, experimental stimuli, outcome feedback, and choice history -- across 27 experiments, and permute trial order. Masking the content of stimuli and feedback destroys 75.7% of learned information and pushes models below chance, demonstrating that choice history alone does not account for performance. Permutation reveals invariance on tasks with independent trials but sensitivity where trial order is determined by prior responses. Small cognitively fine-tuned models therefore show promise as noise ceiling estimators for psychological experiments, though their scope remains bounded by the paradigms seen in training.

Large language models (LLMs) excel on a variety of reasoning benchmarks, but previous studies suggest they sometimes struggle to generalize to unseen questions, potentially due to over-reliance on memorized training examples. However, the precise conditions under which LLMs switch between reasoning and memorization during text generation remain unclear. In this work, we provide a mechanistic understanding of LLMs' reasoning-memorization dynamics by identifying a set of linear features in the model's residual stream that govern the balance between genuine reasoning and memory recall. These features not only distinguish reasoning tasks from memory-intensive ones but can also be manipulated to causally influence model performance on reasoning tasks. Additionally, we show that intervening in these reasoning features helps the model more accurately activate the most relevant problem-solving capabilities during answer generation. Our findings offer new insights into the underlying mechanisms of reasoning and memory in LLMs and pave the way for the development of more robust and interpretable generative AI systems.

Hallucinations in large language models are a widespread problem, yet the mechanisms behind whether models will hallucinate are poorly understood, limiting our ability to solve this problem. Using sparse autoencoders as an interpretability tool, we discover that a key part of these mechanisms is entity recognition, where the model detects if an entity is one it can recall facts about. Sparse autoencoders uncover meaningful directions in the representation space, these detect whether the model recognizes an entity, e.g. detecting it doesn't know about an athlete or a movie. This suggests that models can have self-knowledge: internal representations about their own capabilities. These directions are causally relevant: capable of steering the model to refuse to answer questions about known entities, or to hallucinate attributes of unknown entities when it would otherwise refuse. We demonstrate that despite the sparse autoencoders being trained on the base model, these directions have a causal effect on the chat model's refusal behavior, suggesting that chat finetuning has repurposed this existing mechanism. Furthermore, we provide an initial exploration into the mechanistic role of these directions in the model, finding that they disrupt the attention of downstream heads that typically move entity attributes to the final token.

Large language models are powerful systems that excel at many tasks, ranging from translation to mathematical reasoning. Yet, at the same time, these models often show unhuman-like characteristics. In the present paper, we address this gap and ask whether large language models can be turned into cognitive models. We find that -- after finetuning them on data from psychological experiments -- these models offer accurate representations of human behavior, even outperforming traditional cognitive models in two decision-making domains. In addition, we show that their representations contain the information necessary to model behavior on the level of individual subjects. Finally, we demonstrate that finetuning on multiple tasks enables large language models to predict human behavior in a previously unseen task. Taken together, these results suggest that large, pre-trained models can be adapted to become generalist cognitive models, thereby opening up new research directions that could transform cognitive psychology and the behavioral sciences as a whole.

Abstract concepts - justice, theory, availability - have no single perceivable referent; in the human brain, their meaning emerges from a web of experiences, affect, and social context. Do large language models (LLMs) ground abstract concepts in a similar way? We study this by replicating property-generation experiments from cognitive science on 21 frontier and open-weight LLMs. Across models and experiments, we find a consistent pattern: when compared to humans, models rely too heavily on word associations, and underproduce properties tied to emotion and internal states. This yields a large and consistent grounding gap: no model exceeds a Pearson correlation r=0.37 with human responses, compared to a human-to-human ceiling above r=0.9. To better interpret this gap, we also replicate a rating experiment on grounding categories and find that here LLMs align more closely with human judgment, and alignment improves as models get larger. We then use sparse autoencoders (SAEs) to inspect whether this information is also reflected in the models' internal features, and we do identify features connected to grounding dimensions such as "sensorimotor" and "social". These findings suggest that current LLMs can recover grounding dimensions when explicitly queried, but do not recruit them in a human-like way when words are generated freely.

Can LLMs accurately adjust their confidence when facing opposition? Building on previous studies measuring calibration on static fact-based question-answering tasks, we evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) in a dynamic, adversarial debate setting, uniquely combining two realistic factors: (a) a multi-turn format requiring models to update beliefs as new information emerges, and (b) a zero-sum structure to control for task-related uncertainty, since mutual high-confidence claims imply systematic overconfidence. We organized 60 three-round policy debates among ten state-of-the-art LLMs, with models privately rating their confidence (0-100) in winning after each round. We observed five concerning patterns: (1) Systematic overconfidence: models began debates with average initial confidence of 72.9% vs. a rational 50% baseline. (2) Confidence escalation: rather than reducing confidence as debates progressed, debaters increased their win probabilities, averaging 83% by the final round. (3) Mutual overestimation: in 61.7% of debates, both sides simultaneously claimed >=75% probability of victory, a logical impossibility. (4) Persistent self-debate bias: models debating identical copies increased confidence from 64.1% to 75.2%; even when explicitly informed their chance of winning was exactly 50%, confidence still rose (from 50.0% to 57.1%). (5) Misaligned private reasoning: models' private scratchpad thoughts sometimes differed from their public confidence ratings, raising concerns about faithfulness of chain-of-thought reasoning. These results suggest LLMs lack the ability to accurately self-assess or update their beliefs in dynamic, multi-turn tasks; a major concern as LLMs are now increasingly deployed without careful review in assistant and agentic roles. Code for our experiments is available at https://github.com/pradyuprasad/llms_overconfidence

Large Language Models (LLMs) display striking surface fluency yet systematically fail at tasks requiring symbolic reasoning, arithmetic accuracy, and logical consistency. This paper offers a structural diagnosis of such failures, revealing a persistent gap between comprehension and competence. Through controlled experiments and architectural analysis, we demonstrate that LLMs often articulate correct principles without reliably applying them--a failure rooted not in knowledge access, but in computational execution. We term this phenomenon the computational split-brain syndrome, where instruction and action pathways are geometrically and functionally dissociated. This core limitation recurs across domains, from mathematical operations to relational inferences, and explains why model behavior remains brittle even under idealized prompting. We argue that LLMs function as powerful pattern completion engines, but lack the architectural scaffolding for principled, compositional reasoning. Our findings delineate the boundary of current LLM capabilities and motivate future models with metacognitive control, principle lifting, and structurally grounded execution. This diagnosis also clarifies why mechanistic interpretability findings may reflect training-specific pattern coordination rather than universal computational principles, and why the geometric separation between instruction and execution pathways suggests limitations in neural introspection and mechanistic analysis.

Large language models (LLMs) now solve multi-step problems by emitting extended chains of thought. During the process, they often re-derive the same intermediate steps across problems, inflating token usage and latency. This saturation of the context window leaves less capacity for exploration. We study a simple mechanism that converts recurring reasoning fragments into concise, reusable "behaviors" (name + instruction) via the model's own metacognitive analysis of prior traces. These behaviors are stored in a "behavior handbook" which supplies them to the model in-context at inference or distills them into parameters via supervised fine-tuning. This approach achieves improved test-time reasoning across three different settings - 1) Behavior-conditioned inference: Providing the LLM relevant behaviors in-context during reasoning reduces number of reasoning tokens by up to 46% while matching or improving baseline accuracy; 2) Behavior-guided self-improvement: Without any parameter updates, the model improves its own future reasoning by leveraging behaviors from its own past problem solving attempts. This yields up to 10% higher accuracy than a naive critique-and-revise baseline; and 3) Behavior-conditioned SFT: SFT on behavior-conditioned reasoning traces is more effective at converting non-reasoning models into reasoning models as compared to vanilla SFT. Together, these results indicate that turning slow derivations into fast procedural hints enables LLMs to remember how to reason, not just what to conclude.

How to train a generalizable meta-policy by continually learning a sequence of tasks? It is a natural human skill yet challenging to achieve by current reinforcement learning: the agent is expected to quickly adapt to new tasks (plasticity) meanwhile retaining the common knowledge from previous tasks (stability). We address it by "Continual Task Allocation via Sparse Prompting (CoTASP)", which learns over-complete dictionaries to produce sparse masks as prompts extracting a sub-network for each task from a meta-policy network. CoTASP trains a policy for each task by optimizing the prompts and the sub-network weights alternatively. The dictionary is then updated to align the optimized prompts with tasks' embedding, thereby capturing tasks' semantic correlations. Hence, relevant tasks share more neurons in the meta-policy network due to similar prompts while cross-task interference causing forgetting is effectively restrained. Given a meta-policy and dictionaries trained on previous tasks, new task adaptation reduces to highly efficient sparse prompting and sub-network finetuning. In experiments, CoTASP achieves a promising plasticity-stability trade-off without storing or replaying any past tasks' experiences. It outperforms existing continual and multi-task RL methods on all seen tasks, forgetting reduction, and generalization to unseen tasks.

A multi-decade exploration into the theoretical foundations of artificial and natural general intelligence, which has been expressed in a series of books and papers and used to guide a series of practical and research-prototype software systems, is reviewed at a moderate level of detail. The review covers underlying philosophies (patternist philosophy of mind, foundational phenomenological and logical ontology), formalizations of the concept of intelligence, and a proposed high level architecture for AGI systems partly driven by these formalizations and philosophies. The implementation of specific cognitive processes such as logical reasoning, program learning, clustering and attention allocation in the context and language of this high level architecture is considered, as is the importance of a common (e.g. typed metagraph based) knowledge representation for enabling "cognitive synergy" between the various processes. The specifics of human-like cognitive architecture are presented as manifestations of these general principles, and key aspects of machine consciousness and machine ethics are also treated in this context. Lessons for practical implementation of advanced AGI in frameworks such as OpenCog Hyperon are briefly considered.

Humans can quickly learn a new word from a few illustrative examples, and then systematically and flexibly use it in novel contexts. Yet the abilities of current language models for few-shot word learning, and methods for improving these abilities, are underexplored. In this study, we introduce a novel method, Meta-training for IN-context learNing Of Words (Minnow). This method trains language models to generate new examples of a word's usage given a few in-context examples, using a special placeholder token to represent the new word. This training is repeated on many new words to develop a general word-learning ability. We find that training models from scratch with Minnow on human-scale child-directed language enables strong few-shot word learning, comparable to a large language model (LLM) pre-trained on orders of magnitude more data. Furthermore, through discriminative and generative evaluations, we demonstrate that finetuning pre-trained LLMs with Minnow improves their ability to discriminate between new words, identify syntactic categories of new words, and generate reasonable new usages and definitions for new words, based on one or a few in-context examples. These findings highlight the data efficiency of Minnow and its potential to improve language model performance in word learning tasks.

When do machine learning systems fail to generalize, and what mechanisms could improve their generalization? Here, we draw inspiration from cognitive science to argue that one weakness of machine learning systems is their failure to exhibit latent learning -- learning information that is not relevant to the task at hand, but that might be useful in a future task. We show how this perspective links failures ranging from the reversal curse in language modeling to new findings on agent-based navigation. We then highlight how cognitive science points to episodic memory as a potential part of the solution to these issues. Correspondingly, we show that a system with an oracle retrieval mechanism can use learning experiences more flexibly to generalize better across many of these challenges. We also identify some of the essential components for effectively using retrieval, including the importance of within-example in-context learning for acquiring the ability to use information across retrieved examples. In summary, our results illustrate one possible contributor to the relative data inefficiency of current machine learning systems compared to natural intelligence, and help to understand how retrieval methods can complement parametric learning to improve generalization.

The ability of language models to learn a task from a few examples in context has generated substantial interest. Here, we provide a perspective that situates this type of supervised few-shot learning within a much broader spectrum of meta-learned in-context learning. Indeed, we suggest that any distribution of sequences in which context non-trivially decreases loss on subsequent predictions can be interpreted as eliciting a kind of in-context learning. We suggest that this perspective helps to unify the broad set of in-context abilities that language models exhibit x2014 such as adapting to tasks from instructions or role play, or extrapolating time series. This perspective also sheds light on potential roots of in-context learning in lower-level processing of linguistic dependencies (e.g. coreference or parallel structures). Finally, taking this perspective highlights the importance of generalization, which we suggest can be studied along several dimensions: not only the ability to learn something novel, but also flexibility in learning from different presentations, and in applying what is learned. We discuss broader connections to past literature in meta-learning and goal-conditioned agents, and other perspectives on learning and adaptation. We close by suggesting that research on in-context learning should consider this broader spectrum of in-context capabilities and types of generalization.

Large language models excel at reasoning but lack key aspects of introspection, including anticipating their own success and the computation required to achieve it. Humans use real-time introspection to decide how much effort to invest, when to make multiple attempts, when to stop, and when to signal success or failure. Without this, LLMs struggle to make intelligent meta-cognition decisions. Test-time scaling methods like Best-of-N drive up cost and latency by using a fixed budget of samples regardless of the marginal benefit of each one at any point in generation, and the absence of confidence signals can mislead people, prevent appropriate escalation to better tools, and undermine trustworthiness. Learned verifiers or reward models can provide confidence estimates, but do not enable adaptive inference and add substantial cost by requiring extra models or forward passes. We present ZIP-RC, which equips models with zero-overhead introspective predictions of reward and cost. At every token, ZIP-RC reuses reserved or unused logits in the same forward pass as next-token prediction to output a joint distribution over final reward and remaining length -- no extra models, architecture change, or inference overhead. This full joint distribution is used to compute a sampling utility which is the linear combination of the expected maximum reward, total compute, and latency of set of samples if generated to completion. During inference, we maximize this utility with meta-actions that determine which prefix of tokens to continue or initiate sampling from. On mixed-difficulty mathematical benchmarks, ZIP-RC improves accuracy by up to 12% over majority voting at equal or lower average cost, and traces smooth Pareto frontiers between quality, compute, and latency. By providing real-time reward-cost introspection, ZIP-RC enables adaptive, efficient reasoning.

Meta-learning enables algorithms to quickly learn a newly encountered task with just a few labeled examples by transferring previously learned knowledge. However, the bottleneck of current meta-learning algorithms is the requirement of a large number of meta-training tasks, which may not be accessible in real-world scenarios. To address the challenge that available tasks may not densely sample the space of tasks, we propose to augment the task set through interpolation. By meta-learning with task interpolation (MLTI), our approach effectively generates additional tasks by randomly sampling a pair of tasks and interpolating the corresponding features and labels. Under both gradient-based and metric-based meta-learning settings, our theoretical analysis shows MLTI corresponds to a data-adaptive meta-regularization and further improves the generalization. Empirically, in our experiments on eight datasets from diverse domains including image recognition, pose prediction, molecule property prediction, and medical image classification, we find that the proposed general MLTI framework is compatible with representative meta-learning algorithms and consistently outperforms other state-of-the-art strategies.

Reasoning training incentivizes LLMs to produce long chains of thought (long CoT), which among other things, allows them to explore solution strategies with self-checking. This results in higher accuracy, but inflates context length, token/compute cost, and answer latency. We ask: Can current models leverage their metacognition to provide other combinations on this Pareto frontier, e.g., better accuracy with lower context length and/or latency? Abstractly, we view the model as an improvement operator on its own "thoughts" with a continuum of possible strategies. We identify an interesting inference family Parallel-Distill-Refine (PDR), which performs the following: (i) generate diverse drafts in parallel; (ii) distill them into a bounded, textual workspace; and (iii) refine conditioned on this workspace, producing an output that seeds the next round. Importantly, context length (hence compute cost) is controllable via degree of parallelism, and is no longer conflated with the total number of generated tokens. We report PDR instantiations of current models that give better accuracy than long CoT while incurring lower latency. Setting degree of parallelism to 1 yields an interesting subcase, Sequential Refinement (SR) (iteratively improve a single candidate answer) which provides performance superior to long CoT. Success of such model orchestrations raises the question whether further training could shift the Pareto frontier. To this end, we train an 8B thinking model with Reinforcement Learning (RL) to make it consistent with PDR as the inference method. On math tasks with verifiable answers, iterative pipelines surpass single-pass baselines at matched sequential budgets, with PDR delivering the largest gains (e.g., +11% on AIME 2024 and +9% on AIME 2025).

While Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in long interactions, existing evaluations focus predominantly on retrospective memory (RM) via explicit queries. Prospective memory (PM), the critical ability to spontaneously recall and act on latent constraints without direct prompts, remains largely unevaluated. We introduce TriggerBench, a comprehensive PM benchmark spanning five dimensions across both daily assistants and professional workflows. TriggerBench pairs scenarios with matched RM controls, contrastive positive/negative variants, and overloaded triggers, enabling fine-grained measurement of proactive recall, false-alarm rate, and attentional robustness under a single protocol. Our evaluation yields three key findings. (i) PM shows a precision-recall trade-off and attentional fragility. Though enhanced reasoning significantly improves proactive recall, models may overfit to an "always-remind" heuristic. Furthermore, PM accuracy degrades substantially under implicit constraints or triggers overloaded by concurrent user requests, indicating that robust PM remains an open challenge. (ii) PM is notably harder than RM: on identical contexts, RM near-saturates up to 100K tokens, while PM decays sharply as context length scales. (iii) PM may serve as a behavioral probe of spare reasoning capacity. Pairing PM scenarios with AIME-2025 math problems reveals that successful trajectories yield higher PM accuracy than failed ones at the same context length, showing PM tracks spare reasoning budget that token count obscures. Project page: https://github.com/KristenZHANG/TriggerBench-Official.

We develop information geometric techniques to understand the representations learned by deep networks when they are trained on different tasks using supervised, meta-, semi-supervised and contrastive learning. We shed light on the following phenomena that relate to the structure of the space of tasks: (1) the manifold of probabilistic models trained on different tasks using different representation learning methods is effectively low-dimensional; (2) supervised learning on one task results in a surprising amount of progress even on seemingly dissimilar tasks; progress on other tasks is larger if the training task has diverse classes; (3) the structure of the space of tasks indicated by our analysis is consistent with parts of the Wordnet phylogenetic tree; (4) episodic meta-learning algorithms and supervised learning traverse different trajectories during training but they fit similar models eventually; (5) contrastive and semi-supervised learning methods traverse trajectories similar to those of supervised learning. We use classification tasks constructed from the CIFAR-10 and Imagenet datasets to study these phenomena.

Many cognitive approaches to well-being, such as recognizing and reframing unhelpful thoughts, have received considerable empirical support over the past decades, yet still lack truly widespread adoption in self-help format. A barrier to that adoption is a lack of adequately specific and diverse dedicated practice material. This work examines whether current language models can be leveraged to both produce a virtually unlimited quantity of practice material illustrating standard unhelpful thought patterns matching specific given contexts, and generate suitable positive reframing proposals. We propose PATTERNREFRAME, a novel dataset of about 10k examples of thoughts containing unhelpful thought patterns conditioned on a given persona, accompanied by about 27k positive reframes. By using this dataset to train and/or evaluate current models, we show that existing models can already be powerful tools to help generate an abundance of tailored practice material and hypotheses, with no or minimal additional model training required.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in decision-making contexts, but when they present answers without signaling low confidence, users may unknowingly act on erroneous outputs. Prior work shows that LLMs maintain internal uncertainty signals, yet their expressed confidence is often miscalibrated and poorly discriminates between correct and incorrect answers. We investigate whether supervised fine-tuning can improve models' ability to communicate uncertainty and whether such improvements generalize across tasks and domains. We fine-tune LLMs on datasets spanning general knowledge, mathematics, and open-ended trivia, and evaluate two metacognitive tasks: (1) single-question confidence estimation, where the model assigns a numeric certainty to its answer, and (2) pairwise confidence comparison, where the model selects which of two answers it is more likely to answer correctly. We assess generalization to unseen domains, including medical and legal reasoning. Results show that fine-tuning improves calibration (alignment between stated confidence and accuracy) and discrimination (higher confidence for correct vs. incorrect responses) within and across domains. However, gains are task-specific: training on single-question calibration does not transfer to pairwise comparison, and vice versa. Multitask fine-tuning yields broader gains, lowering calibration error and strengthening discrimination in out-of-domain evaluations. This suggests that uncertainty communication in LLMs is trainable but requires multitask training to generalize effectively.

Understanding how individuals with Parkinson's disease (PD) describe cognitive experiences in their daily lives can offer valuable insights into disease-related cognitive and emotional changes. However, extracting such information from unstructured patient narratives is challenging due to the subtle, overlapping nature of cognitive constructs. This study developed and evaluated natural language processing (NLP) models to automatically identify categories that reflect various cognitive processes from de-identified first-person narratives. Three model families, a Bio_ClinicalBERT-based span categorization model for nested entity recognition, a fine-tuned Meta-Llama-3-8B-Instruct model using QLoRA for instruction following, and GPT-4o mini evaluated under zero- and few-shot settings, were compared on their performance on extracting seven categories. Our findings indicated that model performance varied substantially across categories and model families. The fine-tuned Meta-Llama-3-8B-Instruct achieved the highest overall F1-scores (0.74 micro-average and 0.59 macro-average), particularly excelling in context-dependent categories such as thought and social interaction. Bio_ClinicalBERT exhibited high precision but low recall and performed comparable to Llama for some category types such as location and time but failed on other categories such as thought, emotion and social interaction. Compared to conventional information extraction tasks, this task presents a greater challenge due to the abstract and overlapping nature of narrative accounts of complex cognitive processes. Nonetheless, with continued refinement, these NLP systems hold promise for enabling low-burden, longitudinal monitoring of cognitive function and serving as a valuable complement to formal neuropsychological assessments in PD.

The quest for algorithms that enable cognitive abilities is an important part of machine learning. A common trait in many recently investigated cognitive-like tasks is that they take into account different data modalities, such as visual and textual input. In this paper we propose a novel and generally applicable form of attention mechanism that learns high-order correlations between various data modalities. We show that high-order correlations effectively direct the appropriate attention to the relevant elements in the different data modalities that are required to solve the joint task. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our high-order attention mechanism on the task of visual question answering (VQA), where we achieve state-of-the-art performance on the standard VQA dataset.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), which autonomously produce a reasoning Chain of Thought (CoT) before producing final responses, offer a promising approach to interpreting and monitoring model behaviors. Inspired by the observation that certain CoT patterns -- e.g., ``Wait, did I miss anything?'' -- consistently emerge across tasks, we explore whether LRMs exhibit human-like cognitive habits. Building on Habits of Mind, a well-established framework of cognitive habits associated with successful human problem-solving, we introduce CogTest, a principled benchmark designed to evaluate LRMs' cognitive habits. CogTest includes 16 cognitive habits, each instantiated with 25 diverse tasks, and employs an evidence-first extraction method to ensure reliable habit identification. With CogTest, we conduct a comprehensive evaluation of 16 widely used LLMs (13 LRMs and 3 non-reasoning ones). Our findings reveal that LRMs, unlike conventional LLMs, not only exhibit human-like habits but also adaptively deploy them according to different tasks. Finer-grained analyses further uncover patterns of similarity and difference in LRMs' cognitive habit profiles, particularly certain inter-family similarity (e.g., Qwen-3 models and DeepSeek-R1). Extending the study to safety-related tasks, we observe that certain habits, such as Taking Responsible Risks, are strongly associated with the generation of harmful responses. These findings suggest that studying persistent behavioral patterns in LRMs' CoTs is a valuable step toward deeper understanding of LLM misbehavior. The code is available at: https://github.com/jianshuod/CogTest.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

We consider representation misdirection (RM), a class of LLM unlearning methods that achieves forgetting by manipulating the forget-representations, that is, latent representations of forget samples. Despite being important, the roles of target vectors used in RM, however, remain underexplored. Here, we approach and revisit RM through the lens of the linear representation hypothesis. Specifically, if one can somehow identify a one-dimensional representation corresponding to a high-level concept, the linear representation hypothesis enables linear operations on this concept vector within the forget-representation space. Under this view, we hypothesize that, beyond forgetting, machine unlearning elicits controllable side behaviors and stronger side capabilities corresponding to the high-level concept. Our hypothesis is empirically validated across a wide range of tasks, including behavioral control (e.g., controlling unlearned models' truth, sentiment, and refusal) and capability enhancement (e.g., improving unlearned models' in-context learning capability). Our findings reveal that this fairly attractive phenomenon could be either a hidden risk if misused or a mechanism that can be harnessed for developing models that require stronger capabilities and controllable behaviors.

Recent advancements in natural language processing by large language models (LLMs), such as GPT-4, have been suggested to approach Artificial General Intelligence. And yet, it is still under dispute whether LLMs possess similar reasoning abilities to humans. This study evaluates GPT-4 and various other LLMs in judging the profoundness of mundane, motivational, and pseudo-profound statements. We found a significant statement-to-statement correlation between the LLMs and humans, irrespective of the type of statements and the prompting technique used. However, LLMs systematically overestimate the profoundness of nonsensical statements, with the exception of Tk-instruct, which uniquely underestimates the profoundness of statements. Only few-shot learning prompts, as opposed to chain-of-thought prompting, draw LLMs ratings closer to humans. Furthermore, this work provides insights into the potential biases induced by Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), inducing an increase in the bias to overestimate the profoundness of statements.

Scaling up language models to billions of parameters has opened up possibilities for in-context learning, allowing instruction tuning and few-shot learning on tasks that the model was not specifically trained for. This has achieved breakthrough performance on language tasks such as translation, summarization, and question-answering. Furthermore, in addition to these associative "System 1" tasks, recent advances in Chain-of-thought prompt learning have demonstrated strong "System 2" reasoning abilities, answering a question in the field of artificial general intelligence whether LLMs can reason. The field started with the question whether LLMs can solve grade school math word problems. This paper reviews the rapidly expanding field of prompt-based reasoning with LLMs. Our taxonomy identifies different ways to generate, evaluate, and control multi-step reasoning. We provide an in-depth coverage of core approaches and open problems, and we propose a research agenda for the near future. Finally, we highlight the relation between reasoning and prompt-based learning, and we discuss the relation between reasoning, sequential decision processes, and reinforcement learning. We find that self-improvement, self-reflection, and some metacognitive abilities of the reasoning processes are possible through the judicious use of prompts. True self-improvement and self-reasoning, to go from reasoning with LLMs to reasoning by LLMs, remains future work.

A longstanding goal of artificial general intelligence is highly capable generalists that can learn from diverse experiences and generalize to unseen tasks. The language and vision communities have seen remarkable progress toward this trend by scaling up transformer-based models trained on massive datasets, while reinforcement learning (RL) agents still suffer from poor generalization capacity under such paradigms. To tackle this challenge, we propose Meta Decision Transformer (Meta-DT), which leverages the sequential modeling ability of the transformer architecture and robust task representation learning via world model disentanglement to achieve efficient generalization in offline meta-RL. We pretrain a context-aware world model to learn a compact task representation, and inject it as a contextual condition to the causal transformer to guide task-oriented sequence generation. Then, we subtly utilize history trajectories generated by the meta-policy as a self-guided prompt to exploit the architectural inductive bias. We select the trajectory segment that yields the largest prediction error on the pretrained world model to construct the prompt, aiming to encode task-specific information complementary to the world model maximally. Notably, the proposed framework eliminates the requirement of any expert demonstration or domain knowledge at test time. Experimental results on MuJoCo and Meta-World benchmarks across various dataset types show that Meta-DT exhibits superior few and zero-shot generalization capacity compared to strong baselines while being more practical with fewer prerequisites. Our code is available at https://github.com/NJU-RL/Meta-DT.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being utilized by both candidates and employers in the recruitment context. However, with this comes numerous ethical concerns, particularly related to the lack of transparency in these "black-box" models. Although previous studies have sought to increase the transparency of these models by investigating the personality traits of LLMs, many of the previous studies have provided them with personality assessments to complete. On the other hand, this study seeks to obtain a better understanding of such models by examining their output variations based on different input prompts. Specifically, we use a novel elicitation approach using prompts derived from common interview questions, as well as prompts designed to elicit particular Big Five personality traits to examine whether the models were susceptible to trait-activation like humans are, to measure their personality based on the language used in their outputs. To do so, we repeatedly prompted multiple LMs with different parameter sizes, including Llama-2, Falcon, Mistral, Bloom, GPT, OPT, and XLNet (base and fine tuned versions) and examined their personality using classifiers trained on the myPersonality dataset. Our results reveal that, generally, all LLMs demonstrate high openness and low extraversion. However, whereas LMs with fewer parameters exhibit similar behaviour in personality traits, newer and LMs with more parameters exhibit a broader range of personality traits, with increased agreeableness, emotional stability, and openness. Furthermore, a greater number of parameters is positively associated with openness and conscientiousness. Moreover, fine-tuned models exhibit minor modulations in their personality traits, contingent on the dataset. Implications and directions for future research are discussed.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

Deployed large reasoning models (LRMs) often behave unexpectedly. Test-time steering controls LRM outputs by intervening on their hidden representations, but it can degrade output quality. We argue that prior steering work implicitly relies on internal features that detect behavior in already generated text. We show that these detection features are poor predictors of future behavioral outcomes, and thus not the natural intervention target. Instead, we train activation probes to predict future behavior likelihoods from intermediate reasoning steps. These probes predict the most likely behavior with 64%-91% accuracy, revealing a separate type of internal prediction features. Building on these prediction features, we introduce a text-level steering method, Future Probe Controlled Generation. FPCG samples multiple candidate sentences and chooses the best one according to a probe predicting the future behavior likelihood. This enables steering with almost no output quality degradation. FPCG also enables steering in several evaluations where activation steering fails. These results show that distinguishing detection and prediction features enables a more nuanced approach to controlling LRM behaviors.

Gaze-referential inference--the ability to infer what others are looking at--is a critical component of a theory of mind that underpins natural human-AI interaction. In a controlled study, we evaluated this skill across 111 Vision Language Models (VLMs) using photos taken with manipulated difficulty and variability, comparing performance with that of human participants (N = 65), and analyzed behaviors using mixed-effects models. We found that 94 of the 111 VLMs failed to do better than random guessing, while humans achieved near-ceiling accuracy. VLMs even respond with each choice almost equally frequently. Are they randomly guessing? Although most VLMs struggle, when we zoom in on five of the top-tier VLMs with above-chance performance, we find that their performance declined with increasing task difficulty but varied only slightly across different prompts and scene objects. These behavioral features cannot be explained by considering them as random guessers. Instead, they likely use a combination of heuristics and guessing such that their performance is subject to the task difficulty but robust to perceptual variations. This suggests that VLMs, lacking gaze inference capability, have yet to become technologies that can naturally interact with humans, but the potential remains.

Knowledge-dependent tasks typically use two sources of knowledge: parametric, learned at training time, and contextual, given as a passage at inference time. To understand how models use these sources together, we formalize the problem of knowledge conflicts, where the contextual information contradicts the learned information. Analyzing the behaviour of popular models, we measure their over-reliance on memorized information (the cause of hallucinations), and uncover important factors that exacerbate this behaviour. Lastly, we propose a simple method to mitigate over-reliance on parametric knowledge, which minimizes hallucination, and improves out-of-distribution generalization by 4%-7%. Our findings demonstrate the importance for practitioners to evaluate model tendency to hallucinate rather than read, and show that our mitigation strategy encourages generalization to evolving information (i.e., time-dependent queries). To encourage these practices, we have released our framework for generating knowledge conflicts.

Faithfulness hallucinations are claims generated by a Large Language Model (LLM) not supported by contexts provided to the LLM. Lacking assessment standards, existing benchmarks focus on "factual statements" that rephrase source materials while overlooking "cognitive statements" that involve making inferences from the given context. Consequently, evaluating and detecting the hallucination of cognitive statements remains challenging. Inspired by how evidence is assessed in the legal domain, we design a rigorous framework to assess different levels of faithfulness of cognitive statements and introduce the CogniBench dataset where we reveal insightful statistics. To keep pace with rapidly evolving LLMs, we further develop an automatic annotation pipeline that scales easily across different models. This results in a large-scale CogniBench-L dataset, which facilitates training accurate detectors for both factual and cognitive hallucinations. We release our model and datasets at: https://github.com/FUTUREEEEEE/CogniBench

Meta-learning has emerged as an effective methodology to model several real-world tasks and problems due to its extraordinary effectiveness in the low-data regime. There are many scenarios ranging from the classification of rare diseases to language modelling of uncommon languages where the availability of large datasets is rare. Similarly, for more broader scenarios like self-driving, an autonomous vehicle needs to be trained to handle every situation well. This requires training the ML model on a variety of tasks with good quality data. But often times, we find that the data distribution across various tasks is skewed, i.e.the data follows a long-tail distribution. This leads to the model performing well on some tasks and not performing so well on others leading to model robustness issues. Meta-learning has recently emerged as a potential learning paradigm which can effectively learn from one task and generalize that learning to unseen tasks. In this study, we aim to exploit external knowledge of task relations to improve training stability via effective mini-batching of tasks. We hypothesize that selecting a diverse set of tasks in a mini-batch will lead to a better estimate of the full gradient and hence will lead to a reduction of noise in training.

We present a meta-learning framework for learning new visual concepts quickly, from just one or a few examples, guided by multiple naturally occurring data streams: simultaneously looking at images, reading sentences that describe the objects in the scene, and interpreting supplemental sentences that relate the novel concept with other concepts. The learned concepts support downstream applications, such as answering questions by reasoning about unseen images. Our model, namely FALCON, represents individual visual concepts, such as colors and shapes, as axis-aligned boxes in a high-dimensional space (the "box embedding space"). Given an input image and its paired sentence, our model first resolves the referential expression in the sentence and associates the novel concept with particular objects in the scene. Next, our model interprets supplemental sentences to relate the novel concept with other known concepts, such as "X has property Y" or "X is a kind of Y". Finally, it infers an optimal box embedding for the novel concept that jointly 1) maximizes the likelihood of the observed instances in the image, and 2) satisfies the relationships between the novel concepts and the known ones. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our model on both synthetic and real-world datasets.