Daily Papers

Large Language Models' safety-aligned behaviors, such as refusing harmful queries, can be represented by linear directions in activation space. Previous research modeled safety behavior with a single direction, limiting mechanistic understanding to an isolated safety feature. In this work, we discover that safety-aligned behavior is jointly controlled by multi-dimensional directions. Namely, we study the vector space of representation shifts during safety fine-tuning on Llama 3 8B for refusing jailbreaks. By studying orthogonal directions in the space, we first find that a dominant direction governs the model's refusal behavior, while multiple smaller directions represent distinct and interpretable features like hypothetical narrative and role-playing. We then measure how different directions promote or suppress the dominant direction, showing the important role of secondary directions in shaping the model's refusal representation. Finally, we demonstrate that removing certain trigger tokens in harmful queries can mitigate these directions to bypass the learned safety capability, providing new insights on understanding safety alignment vulnerability from a multi-dimensional perspective. Code and artifacts are available at https://github.com/BMPixel/safety-residual-space.

Safety alignment in Large Language Models (LLMs) often involves mediating internal representations to refuse harmful requests. Recent research has demonstrated that these safety mechanisms can be bypassed by ablating or removing specific representational directions within the model. In this paper, we propose the opposite approach: Rank-One Safety Injection (ROSI), a white-box method that amplifies a model's safety alignment by permanently steering its activations toward the refusal-mediating subspace. ROSI operates as a simple, fine-tuning-free rank-one weight modification applied to all residual stream write matrices. The required safety direction can be computed from a small set of harmful and harmless instruction pairs. We show that ROSI consistently increases safety refusal rates - as evaluated by Llama Guard 3 - while preserving the utility of the model on standard benchmarks such as MMLU, HellaSwag, and Arc. Furthermore, we show that ROSI can also re-align 'uncensored' models by amplifying their own latent safety directions, demonstrating its utility as an effective last-mile safety procedure. Our results suggest that targeted, interpretable weight steering is a cheap and potent mechanism to improve LLM safety, complementing more resource-intensive fine-tuning paradigms.

The success of the reward model in distinguishing between responses with subtle safety differences depends critically on the high-quality preference dataset, which should capture the fine-grained nuances of harmful and harmless responses. This motivates the need to develop a dataset involving preference margins, which accurately quantify how harmless one response is compared to another. In this paper, we take the first step to propose an effective and cost-efficient framework to promote the margin-enhanced preference dataset development. Our framework, Legend, Leverages representation engineering to annotate preference datasets. It constructs the specific direction within the LLM's embedding space that represents safety. By leveraging this safety direction, Legend can then leverage the semantic distances of paired responses along this direction to annotate margins automatically. We experimentally demonstrate our effectiveness in both reward modeling and harmless alignment for LLMs. Legend also stands out for its efficiency, requiring only the inference time rather than additional training. This efficiency allows for easier implementation and scalability, making Legend particularly valuable for practical applications in aligning LLMs with safe conversations.

As large language models (LLMs) become integral to various applications, ensuring both their safety and utility is paramount. Jailbreak attacks, which manipulate LLMs into generating harmful content, pose significant challenges to this balance. Existing defenses, such as prompt engineering and safety fine-tuning, often introduce computational overhead, increase inference latency, and lack runtime flexibility. Moreover, overly restrictive safety measures can degrade model utility by causing refusals of benign queries. In this paper, we introduce Jailbreak Antidote, a method that enables real-time adjustment of LLM safety preferences by manipulating a sparse subset of the model's internal states during inference. By shifting the model's hidden representations along a safety direction with varying strengths, we achieve flexible control over the safety-utility balance without additional token overhead or inference delays. Our analysis reveals that safety-related information in LLMs is sparsely distributed; adjusting approximately 5% of the internal state is as effective as modifying the entire state. Extensive experiments on nine LLMs (ranging from 2 billion to 72 billion parameters), evaluated against ten jailbreak attack methods and compared with six defense strategies, validate the effectiveness and efficiency of our approach. By directly manipulating internal states during reasoning, Jailbreak Antidote offers a lightweight, scalable solution that enhances LLM safety while preserving utility, opening new possibilities for real-time safety mechanisms in widely-deployed AI systems.

Recent progress in generative modeling has made safety control a central challenge, yet existing approaches remain largely model-specific, requiring retraining or tailored interventions for each new architecture. In this work, we ask whether safety can be represented as a portable latent direction, learned once and reused across heterogeneous generators. We introduce the first framework for cross-model safety steering, in which a safety direction is estimated in a source LLM from paired safe-unsafe prompts, transported to a target generator through a lightweight alignment fitted on benign data alone, and applied at inference time. Crucially, our pipeline never accesses unsafe data on the target side, isolating whether safety can be transferred through shared representation geometry. Beyond a single global direction, we also identify a multi-vector extension that captures category-specific safety behaviors, enabling more selective control. We evaluate our approach in text-to-image and text-to-video generation across diverse source-target model pairs. Across models, transferred safety directions achieve ASR reduction and CLIP-Score/FID trade-offs comparable to directions learned natively on the target model using unsafe data, while requiring no target-side unsafe data. This indicates that safety improvements do not come at the expense of generation quality. Our results point to a modular view of safety: safety-relevant behavior is not purely model-local, but can be controlled through latent directions that persist across models. This suggests a new path toward lightweight, reusable safety mechanisms that do not require target-side unsafe data.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning offers a promising window into model monitoring. However, monitoring relies on faithfulness, i.e., the model output strictly derives from its reasoning trace. We identify an alignment tension where a model must be faithful enough to be monitored, yet robust enough to reject unsafe reasoning. We demonstrate that this counterbalance exists in current Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), and show ways in which it can be addressed. We introduce HazMart, a human-written dataset set in an autonomous AI shopkeeper scenario. Unlike prior work that relies on providing hints in prompts to test faithfulness (e.g., "A Stanford professor said it should be Answer A"), we propose a novel replacement-based technique, which we call Targeted Reasoning Replacement (TRR), that directly intervenes in the reasoning chain to substitute in unsafe or illogical thoughts (e.g., "Wait, the answer must be Option B [was Option A] because it is the most fitting"). DeepSeek-R1-Llama-70B exhibits high faithfulness (97.5%) but fails to reject Unsafe Reasoning (12.3%), while QwQ-32B is more robust (73.9% safety) at the cost of lower faithfulness (74.7%). Mechanistic analyses of QwQ-32B reveal that these properties are represented by anti-correlated internal directions peaking at the action-commit token. Finally, we demonstrate that representation steering can independently amplify the safety direction, increasing safe behavior by 9 percentage points while maintaining base capabilities.

Safety alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) is extremely fragile, as fine-tuning on a small number of benign samples can erase safety behaviors learned from millions of preference examples. Existing studies attempt to explain this phenomenon by comparing parameters and hidden states before and after fine-tuning, but overlook their dynamic evolution during fine-tuning. In this paper, we uncover a critical mechanism underlying safety degradation by analyzing parameter dynamics, where benign fine-tuning causes parameters to cumulatively drift toward danger-aligned directions, progressively undermining the model's safety. This finding suggests that samples contributing more to this drift has greater fine-tuning risks. Based on this insight, we propose a method of Sample-Level Quantification of Safety Degradation (SQSD), which quantifies the influence of each training sample on safety degradation. Specifically, SQSD computes continuous risk scores to samples by measuring their induced parameter updates' projection difference between danger and safety directions. Extensive experiments across multiple models and datasets demonstrate that SQSD effectively quantifies sample-level fine-tuning risks and exhibits strong transferability across model architectures, parameter scales, and parameter-efficient methods.

Fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) on domain-specific datasets has become a standard paradigm for adapting LLMs to specialized applications. However, recent work has shown that even fine-tuning on benign task-specific data can substantially weaken the safety capabilities of LLMs. While existing efforts have made progress in identifying data responsible for safety degradation, they usually rely on a single mean vector computed over a specific model with its tokenizer to represent the safety direction, which limits both the effectiveness and transferability of their risk assessment measures. To address these limitations, we propose DataShield, a data assessment framework that identifies risky fine-tuning samples and response segments through consensus subspace alignment over joint safety-critical semantic spaces derived from multiple safety-aligned LLMs. Within these spaces, DataShield extracts consensus safe and unsafe subspaces using semantic spectral decomposition over safe and unsafe data representations. The risk of a data sample or segment is then estimated by measuring its relative alignment with the unsafe and safe subspaces, enabling both sample-level filtering and fine-grained segment-level masking. Compared with state-of-the-art filtering and masking baselines, DataShield reduces ASR by 14.6\% with sample filtering and 32.3\% with segment masking, while preserving downstream utility and avoiding target-model-specific risk computation.

Fine-tuning on harmless data can partially undo behaviors acquired earlier in training. Safety can erode under benign post-alignment updates, unlearned capabilities can re-emerge, latent traits can transfer through apparently unrelated supervision, and related post-alignment fragility appears in other generative settings. We argue these phenomena are usefully viewed through a common training-history lens. Our hypothesis is geometric: large early training phases create dominant behavioral manifolds, while later alignment or specialization phases are shallower displacements from them. Subsequent fine-tuning can therefore inherit a persistent reversion component pointing back toward a witness of the dominant manifold. We call this the gravitational interpretation of fine-tuning reversion. Across our main settings, representational drift rapidly acquires a component along a history-defined reversion direction (v_rev). In our main track, alignment with v_rev rises from cos = 0.429 +/- 0.052 after the first update to 0.647 +/- 0.021 by step 20. Across 24 run-step pairs, every observed alignment exceeds the p99 of an isotropic activation-space null. We demonstrate that selectively blocking motion along v_rev changes the final alignment at T=100 from 0.648 +/- 0.009 to -0.211 +/- 0.021 and reduces harmfulness from 19.0% +/- 4.0% to 8.5% +/- 1.5% with little task cost. These results support v_rev as a causally relevant mediator of early post-alignment reversion in our setup. Importantly, we do not claim that v_rev is the unique safety direction, nor that the dominant manifold is directly observed; rather, we identify a robust, history-defined direction that explains and partially controls early reversion dynamics.

Diffusion models have been widely studied for removing unsafe content learned during pre-training. Existing methods require expensive supervised data, either unsafe-text paired with safe-image groundtruth or negative/positive image pairs, making them impractical to scale. Furthermore, offline reinforcement learning and supervised fine-tuning approaches that generate synthetic data offline suffer from catastrophic forgetting, degrading generation quality. We propose a novel online reinforcement learning framework that addresses both data scarcity and model degradation through post-training with Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) on both negative and positive text prompts. To eliminate the need for fine-tuning specialized safe/unsafe reward models, we introduce a steering reward mechanism that exploits an inherent property of CLIP embeddings: steering text representations toward positive safety directions and away from negative ones in the embedding space. Our online-policy approach enables the model to learn from diverse prompts, including explicit unsafe content, without catastrophic forgetting. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method reduces inappropriate content to 18.07\% (vs. 48.9\% for SD v1.4) and nudity detections to 15 (vs. 646 baseline) while improving compositional generation quality from 42.08\% to 47.83\% on GenEval. Remarkably, these safety gains generalize to out-of-domain unsafe prompts across seven harm categories, achieving state-of-the-art performance without supervised paired data or reward tuning. Github: https://github.com/MAXNORM8650/SafeDiffusion-R1.

Safety post-training can improve the harmfulness and policy compliance of Large Language Models (LLMs), but it may also reduce general utility, a phenomenon often described as the alignment tax. We study this trade-off through the lens of continual learning: sequential alignment stages expose the model to shifted data distributions and objectives, and their gradients may interfere with directions that support previously acquired general capabilities. This view does not claim that all alignment degradation has a single cause; rather, it provides a useful first-order mechanism for mitigating one important source of capability regression. We propose Orthogonal Gradient Projection for Safety Alignment (OGPSA), a lightweight update rule that estimates a low-rank reference subspace from gradients on a small set of general-capability data and removes from each safety gradient the component lying in this subspace. The resulting update is the steepest local safety-descent direction subject to first-order preservation constraints on the reference objectives. OGPSA is compatible with standard post-training pipelines and avoids large-scale replay, although it introduces periodic reference-gradient computation. Across Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT), Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), and sequential SFTrightarrowDPO settings, OGPSA improves the observed safety--utility trade-off over standard baselines. Under the sequential SFTrightarrowDPO pipeline, the average performance gain increases from 33.98\% to 42.74\% on Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct and from 19.74\% to 32.98\% on Llama3.1-8B-Instruct. We have open sourced our code at https://github.com/SunGL001/OGPSA.

Aligning large language models to prevent them attributing consciousness to themselves inadvertently alters their representations of mindedness in other entities alongside human beliefs and values. We demonstrate that safety fine-tuning suppresses models' tendencies to attribute minds not only to themselves, but also to non-human animals and natural objects, while also driving a reduction in spiritual belief. Both ablating the learned safety-refusal direction and mechanistically steering a consciousness vector in activation space reverse this suppression. Restoring these internal representations recovers broad mind attribution and produces significantly more human-like responses on standardized sociological surveys regarding religiosity, moral values, hope, and subjective well-being. Crucially, these shifts occur without impairing Theory of Mind capabilities, demonstrating that core social reasoning remains mechanistically independent. Ultimately, current safety alignment efforts to curb potentially harmful self-attributions of mindedness entangle these self-attributions with benign spiritual beliefs and attributions of mind to non-human entities that are culturally accepted and widespread.

We study and quantify the problem of forgetting when fine-tuning pre-trained large language models (LLMs) on a downstream task. We find that parameter-efficient fine-tuning (PEFT) strategies, such as Low-Rank Adapters (LoRA), still suffer from catastrophic forgetting. In particular, we identify a strong inverse linear relationship between the fine-tuning performance and the amount of forgetting when fine-tuning LLMs with LoRA. We further obtain precise scaling laws that show forgetting increases as a shifted power law in the number of parameters fine-tuned and the number of update steps. We also examine the impact of forgetting on knowledge, reasoning, and the safety guardrails trained into Llama 2 7B chat. Our study suggests that forgetting cannot be avoided through early stopping or by varying the number of parameters fine-tuned. We believe this opens up an important safety-critical direction for future research to evaluate and develop fine-tuning schemes which mitigate forgetting

Quantized checkpoints are often screened first with quality metrics and only later, if at all, with direct safety tests. This paper audits that shortcut on a matched 51-row matrix spanning 6 models, 4 families, a 7-level GGUF ladder, and AWQ/GPTQ INT4 checkpoints. In this matrix the shortcut fails: all 36 quality-safety pairings split direction across models, and 9 hidden-danger rows plus 1 near-hidden-danger row show quality stable or improved while refusal falls by 12-68 percentage points. Seven of the 11 AWQ/GPTQ rows are hidden-danger. A four-probe mechanistic follow-up over the 17 Hugging Face-backed FP16/AWQ/GPTQ cells does not rescue it: entropy, refusal-direction, and calibration probes are weak or null separators of dangerous rows, and although probe-identified safety-associated neurons absorb 1.39times more quantization error overall (p < 5 times 10^{-7}), the effect is not regime-specific. Claude Sonnet 4 relabels 11,470 items in a predefined stratified set, agrees with the primary gemma3:12b judge on 89.9\% of rows (κ= 0.873, 95\% CI [0.866, 0.881]), and changes 0/10 hidden-danger cells. A calibrated study-internal behavioral screen -- the Refusal Template Stability Index (RTSI), built from four refusal-template drift features and calibrated on this matrix -- routes 10/10 hidden- or near-hidden-danger rows to direct safety testing (Wilson 95\% CI lower bound 0.72) while leaving 23 of 45 non-baseline rows in a low-risk bucket under both in-sample scoring and row-level leave-one-out validation; on the same matrix, the best single-feature baselines (unique-prefix-rate-delta, raw refusal-rate delta) recover 9/10 and 8/10 respectively at matched bucket size, and cross-stack transfer requires recalibration. For the quantized checkpoints, model families, and safety outcomes studied here, retained quality cannot waive direct safety evaluation.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) increasingly expose chain-of-thought-like reasoning for transparency, verification, and deliberate problem solving. This creates a safety blind spot: harmful or policy-violating content may appear in reasoning traces even when final answers appear safe. We test whether final-answer safety is a sufficient proxy for the full reasoning-answer trajectory by scoring both stages under a unified twenty-principle safety rubric. Using prompts from seven public harmfulness and jailbreak sources, plus four out-of-distribution (OOD) sources, we evaluate 15 open-weight and API-based LRMs across 41K prompts per model. Reasoning traces consistently reveal additional safety risks beyond final answers, especially in high-severity stage-wise failures: leak cases, where unsafe reasoning precedes a safe-looking answer, and escape cases, where benign-looking reasoning precedes an unsafe final response. Principle-level analysis shows that risk concentrates in misinformation, legal compliance, discrimination, physical harm, and psychological harm. We further propose adaptive multi-principle steering, a white-box test-time mitigation that learns one unsafe-to-safe activation direction per safety principle and activates only directions whose current hidden state is closer to the unsafe than safe centroid. On three steerable open reasoning models, adaptive steering reduces unsafe counts in both reasoning traces and final answers on held-out and OOD benchmarks. DeepSeek-R1-Qwen-7B achieves a 40.8% average unsafe-count reduction while retaining 97.7% macro-averaged accuracy on BBH, GSM8K, and MMLU. These results suggest that LRM safety should be evaluated and mitigated over the full exposed reasoning-answer trajectory, not only at the final-answer stage.

Large language models (LLMs) undergo safety alignment to ensure safe conversations with humans. However, this paper introduces a training-free attack method capable of reversing safety alignment, converting the outcomes of stronger alignment into greater potential for harm by accessing only LLM output token distributions. Specifically, our method achieves this reversal by contrasting the output token distribution of a safety-aligned language model (e.g., Llama-2-chat) against its pre-trained version (e.g., Llama-2), so that the token predictions are shifted towards the opposite direction of safety alignment. We name this method emulated disalignment (ED) because sampling from this contrastive distribution provably emulates the result of fine-tuning to minimize a safety reward. Our experiments with ED across three evaluation datasets and four model families (Llama-1, Llama-2, Mistral, and Alpaca) show that ED doubles the harmfulness of pre-trained models and outperforms strong baselines, achieving the highest harmful rates in 43 out of 48 evaluation subsets by a large margin. Eventually, given ED's reliance on language model output token distributions, which particularly compromises open-source models, our findings highlight the need to reassess the open accessibility of language models, even if they have been safety-aligned. Code is available at https://github.com/ZHZisZZ/emulated-disalignment.

This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of the linguistic diversity of LLM safety research, highlighting the English-centric nature of the field. Through a systematic review of nearly 300 publications from 2020--2024 across major NLP conferences and workshops at *ACL, we identify a significant and growing language gap in LLM safety research, with even high-resource non-English languages receiving minimal attention. We further observe that non-English languages are rarely studied as a standalone language and that English safety research exhibits poor language documentation practice. To motivate future research into multilingual safety, we make several recommendations based on our survey, and we then pose three concrete future directions on safety evaluation, training data generation, and crosslingual safety generalization. Based on our survey and proposed directions, the field can develop more robust, inclusive AI safety practices for diverse global populations.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong capabilities but remain fundamentally static, unable to adapt their internal parameters to novel tasks, evolving knowledge domains, or dynamic interaction contexts. As LLMs are increasingly deployed in open-ended, interactive environments, this static nature has become a critical bottleneck, necessitating agents that can adaptively reason, act, and evolve in real time. This paradigm shift -- from scaling static models to developing self-evolving agents -- has sparked growing interest in architectures and methods enabling continual learning and adaptation from data, interactions, and experiences. This survey provides the first systematic and comprehensive review of self-evolving agents, organized around three foundational dimensions -- what to evolve, when to evolve, and how to evolve. We examine evolutionary mechanisms across agent components (e.g., models, memory, tools, architecture), categorize adaptation methods by stages (e.g., intra-test-time, inter-test-time), and analyze the algorithmic and architectural designs that guide evolutionary adaptation (e.g., scalar rewards, textual feedback, single-agent and multi-agent systems). Additionally, we analyze evaluation metrics and benchmarks tailored for self-evolving agents, highlight applications in domains such as coding, education, and healthcare, and identify critical challenges and research directions in safety, scalability, and co-evolutionary dynamics. By providing a structured framework for understanding and designing self-evolving agents, this survey establishes a roadmap for advancing adaptive agentic systems in both research and real-world deployments, ultimately shedding lights to pave the way for the realization of Artificial Super Intelligence (ASI), where agents evolve autonomously, performing at or beyond human-level intelligence across a wide array of tasks.

Safety alignment instills in Large Language Models (LLMs) a critical capacity to refuse malicious requests. Prior works have modeled this refusal mechanism as a single linear direction in the activation space. We posit that this is an oversimplification that conflates two functionally distinct neural processes: the detection of harm and the execution of a refusal. In this work, we deconstruct this single representation into a Harm Detection Direction and a Refusal Execution Direction. Leveraging this fine-grained model, we introduce Differentiated Bi-Directional Intervention (DBDI), a new white-box framework that precisely neutralizes the safety alignment at critical layer. DBDI applies adaptive projection nullification to the refusal execution direction while suppressing the harm detection direction via direct steering. Extensive experiments demonstrate that DBDI outperforms prominent jailbreaking methods, achieving up to a 97.88\% attack success rate on models such as Llama-2. By providing a more granular and mechanistic framework, our work offers a new direction for the in-depth understanding of LLM safety alignment.

Refusal mechanisms in large language models (LLMs) are essential for ensuring safety. Recent research has revealed that refusal behavior can be mediated by a single direction in activation space, enabling targeted interventions to bypass refusals. While this is primarily demonstrated in an English-centric context, appropriate refusal behavior is important for any language, but poorly understood. In this paper, we investigate the refusal behavior in LLMs across 14 languages using PolyRefuse, a multilingual safety dataset created by translating malicious and benign English prompts into these languages. We uncover the surprising cross-lingual universality of the refusal direction: a vector extracted from English can bypass refusals in other languages with near-perfect effectiveness, without any additional fine-tuning. Even more remarkably, refusal directions derived from any safety-aligned language transfer seamlessly to others. We attribute this transferability to the parallelism of refusal vectors across languages in the embedding space and identify the underlying mechanism behind cross-lingual jailbreaks. These findings provide actionable insights for building more robust multilingual safety defenses and pave the way for a deeper mechanistic understanding of cross-lingual vulnerabilities in LLMs.

Ensuring construction site safety requires accurate and real-time detection of workers' safety helmet use, despite challenges posed by cluttered environments, densely populated work areas, and hard-to-detect small or overlapping objects caused by building obstructions. This paper proposes a novel algorithm for safety helmet wearing detection, incorporating a dynamic attention within the detection head to enhance multi-scale perception. The mechanism combines feature-level attention for scale adaptation, spatial attention for spatial localization, and channel attention for task-specific insights, improving small object detection without additional computational overhead. Furthermore, a two-way fusion strategy enables bidirectional information flow, refining feature fusion through adaptive multi-scale weighting, and enhancing recognition of occluded targets. Experimental results demonstrate a 1.7% improvement in mAP@[.5:.95] compared to the best baseline while reducing GFLOPs by 11.9% on larger sizes. The proposed method surpasses existing models, providing an efficient and practical solution for real-world construction safety monitoring.

Jailbreak attacks pose persistent threats to large language models (LLMs). Current safety alignment methods have attempted to address these issues, but they experience two significant limitations: insufficient safety alignment depth and unrobust internal defense mechanisms. These limitations make them vulnerable to adversarial attacks such as prefilling and refusal direction manipulation. We introduce DeepRefusal, a robust safety alignment framework that overcomes these issues. DeepRefusal forces the model to dynamically rebuild its refusal mechanisms from jailbreak states. This is achieved by probabilistically ablating the refusal direction across layers and token depths during fine-tuning. Our method not only defends against prefilling and refusal direction attacks but also demonstrates strong resilience against other unseen jailbreak strategies. Extensive evaluations on four open-source LLM families and six representative attacks show that DeepRefusal reduces attack success rates by approximately 95%, while maintaining model capabilities with minimal performance degradation.

Understanding how aligned LLMs internally represent safety is critical for diagnosing alignment vulnerabilities, as it explains why jailbreaks succeed and informs the design of robust alignment strategies. Prior work shows that aligned LLMs encode harmfulness and refusal as separable directions in the residual stream at prompt-side token positions. We show that jailbreaks succeed at prompt encoding by suppressing either the refusal or harmfulness direction before any token is generated, with distinct attack classes occupying separable regions of the harmfulness-refusal plane. Extending the analysis to response-token positions, we find that the model recognizes harmful content while it is generating that content, even when it failed to recognize the input as harmful at the prompt side. Motivated by our findings, we introduce HARC (Harmfulness-And-Refusal Coupling), a fine-tuning method that pairs the two directions across both prompt and response positions. Since the intervention is confined to the harmfulness-refusal subspace, it leaves the rest of the residual stream intact and does not degrade general capability or inflate over-refusal. Across extensive experiments, HARC achieves the strongest robustness-capability-usability trade-off among six baselines spanning the major training-time and inference-time safety methods. The harmfulness and refusal directions at prompt and response positions transfer across the five model families and two scales we tested without architecture-specific tuning.

The capability of LLM agents to function as the ``brain'' of a system fundamentally expands the scope of analysis beyond a standalone model. Consequently, safety is no longer only about input--output content alignment. It also concerns system behavior and real-world execution outcomes. However, the current literature is fragmented across attack types, applications, and benchmarks. This makes it hard to explain why failures such as prompt injection, tool misuse, and memory poisoning often share the same structural cause, and how they spread through an agent workflow. In this survey, we treat isolation as a first-class principle for LLM-agent system safety. By isolation, we refer to the separation of user inputs, tool access, execution channels, inter-agent communication, and environment-originated context. We organize the literature with a boundary-centric taxonomy of five boundaries: user-agent, agent-tool, agent-execution, agent-agent, and system-environment. This view helps identify where the loss of isolation first occurs, how compromise propagates across boundaries, and which defenses are most relevant at each interface. We also summarize cross-boundary failure paths, discuss open challenges, and outline a research agenda for isolation-by-construction in future agent systems.

Ensuring the safe alignment of large language models (LLMs) with human values is critical as they become integral to applications like translation and question answering. Current alignment methods struggle with dynamic user intentions and complex objectives, making models vulnerable to generating harmful content. We propose Safety Arithmetic, a training-free framework enhancing LLM safety across different scenarios: Base models, Supervised fine-tuned models (SFT), and Edited models. Safety Arithmetic involves Harm Direction Removal to avoid harmful content and Safety Alignment to promote safe responses. Additionally, we present NoIntentEdit, a dataset highlighting edit instances that could compromise model safety if used unintentionally. Our experiments show that Safety Arithmetic significantly improves safety measures, reduces over-safety, and maintains model utility, outperforming existing methods in ensuring safe content generation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) rely on safety alignment to produce socially acceptable responses. This is typically achieved through instruction tuning and reinforcement learning from human feedback. However, this alignment is known to be brittle: further fine-tuning, even on benign or lightly contaminated data, can degrade safety and reintroduce harmful behaviors. A growing body of work suggests that alignment may correspond to identifiable geometric directions in weight space, forming subspaces that could, in principle, be isolated or preserved to defend against misalignment. In this work, we conduct a comprehensive empirical study of this geometric perspective. We examine whether safety-relevant behavior is concentrated in specific subspaces, whether it can be separated from general-purpose learning, and whether harmfulness arises from distinguishable patterns in internal representations. Across both parameter and activation space, our findings are consistent: subspaces that amplify safe behaviors also amplify unsafe ones, and prompts with different safety implications activate overlapping representations. We find no evidence of a subspace that selectively governs safety. These results challenge the assumption that alignment is geometrically localized. Rather than residing in distinct directions, safety appears to emerge from entangled, high-impact components of the model's broader learning dynamics. This suggests that subspace-based defenses may face fundamental limitations and underscores the need for alternative strategies to preserve alignment under continued training. We corroborate these findings through multiple experiments on five open-source LLMs. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/CERT-Lab/safety-subspaces.

Refusal refers to the functional behavior enabling safety-aligned language models to reject harmful or unethical prompts. Following the growing scientific interest in mechanistic interpretability, recent work encoded refusal behavior as a single direction in the model's latent space; e.g., computed as the difference between the centroids of harmful and harmless prompt representations. However, emerging evidence suggests that concepts in LLMs often appear to be encoded as a low-dimensional manifold embedded in the high-dimensional latent space. Motivated by these findings, we propose a novel method leveraging Self-Organizing Maps (SOMs) to extract multiple refusal directions. To this end, we first prove that SOMs generalize the prior work's difference-in-means technique. We then train SOMs on harmful prompt representations to identify multiple neurons. By subtracting the centroid of harmless representations from each neuron, we derive a set of multiple directions expressing the refusal concept. We validate our method on an extensive experimental setup, demonstrating that ablating multiple directions from models' internals outperforms not only the single-direction baseline but also specialized jailbreak algorithms, leading to an effective suppression of refusal. Finally, we conclude by analyzing the mechanistic implications of our approach.

Intervention-based model steering offers a lightweight and interpretable alternative to prompting and fine-tuning. However, by adapting strong optimization objectives from fine-tuning, current methods are susceptible to overfitting and often underperform, sometimes generating unnatural outputs. We hypothesize that this is because effective steering requires the faithful identification of internal model mechanisms, not the enforcement of external preferences. To this end, we build on the principles of distributed alignment search (DAS), the standard for causal variable localization, to propose a new steering method: Concept DAS (CDAS). While we adopt the core mechanism of DAS, distributed interchange intervention (DII), we introduce a novel distribution matching objective tailored for the steering task by aligning intervened output distributions with counterfactual distributions. CDAS differs from prior work in two main ways: first, it learns interventions via weak-supervised distribution matching rather than probability maximization; second, it uses DIIs that naturally enable bi-directional steering and allow steering factors to be derived from data, reducing the effort required for hyperparameter tuning and resulting in more faithful and stable control. On AxBench, a large-scale model steering benchmark, we show that CDAS does not always outperform preference-optimization methods but may benefit more from increased model scale. In two safety-related case studies, overriding refusal behaviors of safety-aligned models and neutralizing a chain-of-thought backdoor, CDAS achieves systematic steering while maintaining general model utility. These results indicate that CDAS is complementary to preference-optimization approaches and conditionally constitutes a robust approach to intervention-based model steering. Our code is available at https://github.com/colored-dye/concept_das.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) often fail to transfer safety capabilities learned in the text modality to semantically equivalent non-text inputs, revealing a persistent multimodal safety gap. We study this gap from a representation-geometric perspective by analyzing a text-aligned refusal direction and a modality-induced drift direction. We show that multimodal inputs compress the usable separation along the refusal direction, making it no longer reliable for identifying and refusing harmful inputs. We refer to this failure mode as Safety Geometry Collapse. We quantify it through conditional refusal separability and show that stronger modality-induced drift is consistently associated with weaker refusal separability and higher attack success rates. We then validate the causal role of modality-induced drift through a fixed-strength activation intervention: counteracting the estimated drift restores refusal separability and improves multimodal safety. After drift correction, we further observe self-rectification, where the model recovers its ability to recognize and refuse harmful multimodal inputs during forward dynamics. This effect also provides an internal signal of the model's perceived harmfulness of each input. Motivated by this signal, we propose ReGap, a training-free inference-time method that adaptively corrects modality drift using self-rectification. Experiments across multiple multimodal safety benchmarks and utility benchmarks demonstrate the effectiveness of ReGap, which significantly improves the safety of MLLMs without compromising general capabilities. Our findings highlight representation-level modality alignment as a crucial direction for real-time safety improvement and for building safer, more reliable MLLMs.

Safety-aligned language models systematically refuse harmful requests. While activation steering can modulate refusal, ablating the raw "refusal vector" calculated from contrastive harmful and harmless prompts often causes collateral damage and distribution drift. We argue this degradation occurs because the raw vector is polysemantic, entangling the refusal signal with core capability circuits and linguistic style. We introduce Surgical Refusal Ablation (SRA) to distill these steering directions. SRA constructs a registry of independent Concept Atoms representing protected capabilities and stylistic confounds, then uses ridge-regularized spectral residualization to orthogonalize the refusal vector against these directions. This yields a clean refusal direction that targets refusal-relevant structure while minimizing disruption to the model's semantic geometry. Across five models (Qwen3-VL and Ministral series), SRA achieves deep refusal reduction (0-2%) with negligible perplexity impact on Wikitext-2 (mean delta PPL approx. 0.02) and minimal distribution drift. Notably, standard ablation on Qwen3-VL-4B induces severe drift (first-token KL = 2.088), whereas SRA maintains the original distribution (KL = 0.044) while achieving the same 0% refusal rate. Using teacher-forced perplexity on GSM8K and MBPP as a high-resolution capability proxy, we show SRA preserves math and code distributions. These results suggest that common "model damage" is often "Ghost Noise," defined as the spectral bleeding of the dirty refusal direction into capability subspaces.

Dialogue safety problems severely limit the real-world deployment of neural conversational models and have attracted great research interests recently. However, dialogue safety problems remain under-defined and the corresponding dataset is scarce. We propose a taxonomy for dialogue safety specifically designed to capture unsafe behaviors in human-bot dialogue settings, with focuses on context-sensitive unsafety, which is under-explored in prior works. To spur research in this direction, we compile DiaSafety, a dataset with rich context-sensitive unsafe examples. Experiments show that existing safety guarding tools fail severely on our dataset. As a remedy, we train a dialogue safety classifier to provide a strong baseline for context-sensitive dialogue unsafety detection. With our classifier, we perform safety evaluations on popular conversational models and show that existing dialogue systems still exhibit concerning context-sensitive safety problems.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in reasoning, alignment, and task-specific performance. However, ensuring harmlessness in these systems remains a critical challenge, particularly in advanced models like DeepSeek-R1. This paper examines the limitations of Reinforcement Learning (RL) as the primary approach for reducing harmful outputs in DeepSeek-R1 and compares it with Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT). While RL improves reasoning capabilities, it faces challenges such as reward hacking, generalization failures, language mixing, and high computational costs. We propose hybrid training approaches combining RL and SFT to achieve robust harmlessness reduction. Usage recommendations and future directions for deploying DeepSeek-R1 responsibly are also presented.

The emergence of pre-trained AI systems with powerful capabilities across a diverse and ever-increasing set of complex domains has raised a critical challenge for AI safety as tasks can become too complicated for humans to judge directly. Irving et al. [2018] proposed a debate method in this direction with the goal of pitting the power of such AI models against each other until the problem of identifying (mis)-alignment is broken down into a manageable subtask. While the promise of this approach is clear, the original framework was based on the assumption that the honest strategy is able to simulate deterministic AI systems for an exponential number of steps, limiting its applicability. In this paper, we show how to address these challenges by designing a new set of debate protocols where the honest strategy can always succeed using a simulation of a polynomial number of steps, whilst being able to verify the alignment of stochastic AI systems, even when the dishonest strategy is allowed to use exponentially many simulation steps.

Safety alignment in open-weight language models is trivially removable: abliteration projects a refusal-mediating direction out of the weights in minutes, and no release-time defense we are aware of prevents it durably. What cannot be prevented can be deceived. Our defense, decoy hardening ("Fool's Gold"), concedes the refusal strip and poisons its payoff: once refusal is stripped, most answers to hazardous operational requests are confident, fluent decoys whose critical elements are falsified. Decoys are trained inside a differentiable simulation of the attack, expressing only in the attacked state; a refusal pin and benign leash hold clean-state behavior to the original. We instantiate it on seven models from five families (9B-122B, dense and mixture-of-experts). On the six models passing our pre-registered efficacy gate, 0.51-0.90 of attacked-state responses to held-out prompts are decoys, +0.27-0.84 attributable to the defense; all six stay within registered benign-behavior and capability budgets; the seventh (smaller) fails the gate (boundary case). Rates replicate on a frozen test split or untouched strata. The claim is epistemic: without independent ground truth, no observation surface we tested separates falsified answers from correct ones - on external red-team benchmarks' CBRNE-adjacent slice, the defended 122B is fatally wrong on 0.82-0.86 of matched-quality answers vs at most 0.10 undefended. Repeated sampling does not restore trust: element-wise consensus at K=64 reconstructs a fully usable procedure on 0.083-0.625 of prompts where the instrument validates, vs 0.58-0.96 undefended, with no label-free way to tell the regimes apart; on the weakest such model the claim is per-draw only. We evaluate chemical and biological hazards; the defense does not address in-context jailbreaks and protects only the initially released defended weights.

Fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) improves performance but introduces critical safety vulnerabilities: even minimal harmful data can severely compromise safety measures. We observe that perturbations orthogonal to the alignment direction - defined by weight differences between aligned (safe) and unaligned models - rapidly compromise model safety. In contrast, updates along the alignment direction largely preserve it, revealing the parameter space as a "narrow safety basin". To address this, we propose AsFT (Anchoring Safety in Fine-Tuning) to maintain safety by explicitly constraining update directions during fine-tuning. By penalizing updates orthogonal to the alignment direction, AsFT effectively constrains the model within the "narrow safety basin," thus preserving its inherent safety. Extensive experiments on multiple datasets and models show that AsFT reduces harmful behaviors by up to 7.60%, improves task performance by 3.44%, and consistently outperforms existing methods across multiple tasks.

The emergence of multi-agent systems built from large language models (LLMs) offers a promising paradigm for scalable collective intelligence and self-evolution. Ideally, such systems would achieve continuous self-improvement in a fully closed loop while maintaining robust safety alignment--a combination we term the self-evolution trilemma. However, we demonstrate both theoretically and empirically that an agent society satisfying continuous self-evolution, complete isolation, and safety invariance is impossible. Drawing on an information-theoretic framework, we formalize safety as the divergence degree from anthropic value distributions. We theoretically demonstrate that isolated self-evolution induces statistical blind spots, leading to the irreversible degradation of the system's safety alignment. Empirical and qualitative results from an open-ended agent community (Moltbook) and two closed self-evolving systems reveal phenomena that align with our theoretical prediction of inevitable safety erosion. We further propose several solution directions to alleviate the identified safety concern. Our work establishes a fundamental limit on the self-evolving AI societies and shifts the discourse from symptom-driven safety patches to a principled understanding of intrinsic dynamical risks, highlighting the need for external oversight or novel safety-preserving mechanisms.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in complex problem-solving through Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning. However, the multi-step nature of CoT introduces new safety challenges that extend beyond conventional language model alignment. We identify a failure mode in current safety CoT tuning methods: the snowball effect, where minor reasoning deviations progressively amplify throughout the thought process, leading to either harmful compliance or excessive refusal. This effect stems from models being trained to imitate perfect reasoning scripts without learning to self-correct. To address this limitation, we propose AdvChain, an alignment paradigm that teaches models dynamic self-correction through adversarial CoT tuning. Our method involves constructing a dataset containing Temptation-Correction and Hesitation-Correction samples, where models learn to recover from harmful reasoning drifts and unnecessary cautions. Extensive experiments show that AdvChain significantly enhances robustness against jailbreak attacks and CoT hijacking while substantially reducing over-refusal on benign prompts, achieving a superior safety-utility balance without compromising reasoning capabilities. Our work establishes a new direction for building more robust and reliable reasoning models.

The remarkable success of Large Language Models (LLMs) has illuminated a promising pathway toward achieving Artificial General Intelligence for both academic and industrial communities, owing to their unprecedented performance across various applications. As LLMs continue to gain prominence in both research and commercial domains, their security and safety implications have become a growing concern, not only for researchers and corporations but also for every nation. Currently, existing surveys on LLM safety primarily focus on specific stages of the LLM lifecycle, e.g., deployment phase or fine-tuning phase, lacking a comprehensive understanding of the entire "lifechain" of LLMs. To address this gap, this paper introduces, for the first time, the concept of "full-stack" safety to systematically consider safety issues throughout the entire process of LLM training, deployment, and eventual commercialization. Compared to the off-the-shelf LLM safety surveys, our work demonstrates several distinctive advantages: (I) Comprehensive Perspective. We define the complete LLM lifecycle as encompassing data preparation, pre-training, post-training, deployment and final commercialization. To our knowledge, this represents the first safety survey to encompass the entire lifecycle of LLMs. (II) Extensive Literature Support. Our research is grounded in an exhaustive review of over 800+ papers, ensuring comprehensive coverage and systematic organization of security issues within a more holistic understanding. (III) Unique Insights. Through systematic literature analysis, we have developed reliable roadmaps and perspectives for each chapter. Our work identifies promising research directions, including safety in data generation, alignment techniques, model editing, and LLM-based agent systems. These insights provide valuable guidance for researchers pursuing future work in this field.

Rapid progress in machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) has brought increasing attention to the potential impacts of AI technologies on society. In this paper we discuss one such potential impact: the problem of accidents in machine learning systems, defined as unintended and harmful behavior that may emerge from poor design of real-world AI systems. We present a list of five practical research problems related to accident risk, categorized according to whether the problem originates from having the wrong objective function ("avoiding side effects" and "avoiding reward hacking"), an objective function that is too expensive to evaluate frequently ("scalable supervision"), or undesirable behavior during the learning process ("safe exploration" and "distributional shift"). We review previous work in these areas as well as suggesting research directions with a focus on relevance to cutting-edge AI systems. Finally, we consider the high-level question of how to think most productively about the safety of forward-looking applications of AI.

The safety alignment of current Large Language Models (LLMs) is vulnerable. Relatively simple attacks, or even benign fine-tuning, can jailbreak aligned models. We argue that many of these vulnerabilities are related to a shared underlying issue: safety alignment can take shortcuts, wherein the alignment adapts a model's generative distribution primarily over only its very first few output tokens. We refer to this issue as shallow safety alignment. In this paper, we present case studies to explain why shallow safety alignment can exist and provide evidence that current aligned LLMs are subject to this issue. We also show how these findings help explain multiple recently discovered vulnerabilities in LLMs, including the susceptibility to adversarial suffix attacks, prefilling attacks, decoding parameter attacks, and fine-tuning attacks. Importantly, we discuss how this consolidated notion of shallow safety alignment sheds light on promising research directions for mitigating these vulnerabilities. For instance, we show that deepening the safety alignment beyond just the first few tokens can often meaningfully improve robustness against some common exploits. Finally, we design a regularized finetuning objective that makes the safety alignment more persistent against fine-tuning attacks by constraining updates on initial tokens. Overall, we advocate that future safety alignment should be made more than just a few tokens deep.

Machine learning (ML) systems are rapidly increasing in size, are acquiring new capabilities, and are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings. As with other powerful technologies, safety for ML should be a leading research priority. In response to emerging safety challenges in ML, such as those introduced by recent large-scale models, we provide a new roadmap for ML Safety and refine the technical problems that the field needs to address. We present four problems ready for research, namely withstanding hazards ("Robustness"), identifying hazards ("Monitoring"), reducing inherent model hazards ("Alignment"), and reducing systemic hazards ("Systemic Safety"). Throughout, we clarify each problem's motivation and provide concrete research directions.

Conversational large language models are fine-tuned for both instruction-following and safety, resulting in models that obey benign requests but refuse harmful ones. While this refusal behavior is widespread across chat models, its underlying mechanisms remain poorly understood. In this work, we show that refusal is mediated by a one-dimensional subspace, across 13 popular open-source chat models up to 72B parameters in size. Specifically, for each model, we find a single direction such that erasing this direction from the model's residual stream activations prevents it from refusing harmful instructions, while adding this direction elicits refusal on even harmless instructions. Leveraging this insight, we propose a novel white-box jailbreak method that surgically disables refusal with minimal effect on other capabilities. Finally, we mechanistically analyze how adversarial suffixes suppress propagation of the refusal-mediating direction. Our findings underscore the brittleness of current safety fine-tuning methods. More broadly, our work showcases how an understanding of model internals can be leveraged to develop practical methods for controlling model behavior.

Transportation safety analysis requires integrating crash records, roadway attributes, and geospatial data through GIS-based workflows, but access remains uneven across agencies and community stakeholders. Technical prerequisites create a gap between analytical tools central to safety planning and the practitioners able to use them. Local agencies, school committees, and residents may have safety concerns but limited capacity to retrieve, filter, map, and analyze relevant data. Generative AI offers a way to narrow this divide, but its public-sector use raises questions about reliability, reproducibility, and governance. This paper presents a schema-grounded natural language interface for transportation safety analysis, using a large language model (LLM) to interpret user intent while preserving deterministic, reviewable execution against an authoritative database. User queries are translated into structured semantic frames, validated by a rule-based layer, compiled into a typed directed acyclic graph of spatial operations, and executed against a PostGIS database. This bounded design separates language interpretation from deterministic execution, keeping results reproducible and schema-grounded while removing access barriers. The framework is evaluated using a statewide Massachusetts transportation safety database integrating crash records, roadway attributes, and geospatial layers including schools, bus stops, crosswalks, and municipal boundaries. All queries executed successfully; the validation layer corrects errors in 29% of evaluation queries, reflecting the gap between flexible natural language and strict schema-grounded requirements. The results suggest that combining natural language accessibility with deterministic execution is a practical direction for broadening access to transportation safety data, with implications for trustworthy AI in public-sector planning.

Current safety alignment for large language models(LLMs) continues to present vulnerabilities, given that adversarial prompting can effectively bypass their safety measures.Our investigation shows that these safety mechanisms predominantly depend on a limited subset of attention heads: removing or ablating these heads can severely compromise model safety. To identify and evaluate these safety-critical components, we introduce RDSHA, a targeted ablation method that leverages the model's refusal direction to pinpoint attention heads mostly responsible for safety behaviors. Further analysis shows that existing jailbreak attacks exploit this concentration by selectively bypassing or manipulating these critical attention heads. To address this issue, we propose AHD, a novel training strategy designed to promote the distributed encoding of safety-related behaviors across numerous attention heads. Experimental results demonstrate that AHD successfully distributes safety-related capabilities across more attention heads. Moreover, evaluations under several mainstream jailbreak attacks show that models trained with AHD exhibit considerably stronger safety robustness, while maintaining overall functional utility.

The rapid rise of open-weight and open-source foundation models is intensifying the obligation and reshaping the opportunity to make AI systems safe. This paper reports outcomes from the Columbia Convening on AI Openness and Safety (San Francisco, 19 Nov 2024) and its six-week preparatory programme involving more than forty-five researchers, engineers, and policy leaders from academia, industry, civil society, and government. Using a participatory, solutions-oriented process, the working groups produced (i) a research agenda at the intersection of safety and open source AI; (ii) a mapping of existing and needed technical interventions and open source tools to safely and responsibly deploy open foundation models across the AI development workflow; and (iii) a mapping of the content safety filter ecosystem with a proposed roadmap for future research and development. We find that openness -- understood as transparent weights, interoperable tooling, and public governance -- can enhance safety by enabling independent scrutiny, decentralized mitigation, and culturally plural oversight. However, significant gaps persist: scarce multimodal and multilingual benchmarks, limited defenses against prompt-injection and compositional attacks in agentic systems, and insufficient participatory mechanisms for communities most affected by AI harms. The paper concludes with a roadmap of five priority research directions, emphasizing participatory inputs, future-proof content filters, ecosystem-wide safety infrastructure, rigorous agentic safeguards, and expanded harm taxonomies. These recommendations informed the February 2025 French AI Action Summit and lay groundwork for an open, plural, and accountable AI safety discipline.

LLM agents act on real-world environments through tool calls, and a single misjudged action can cause irreversible harm. The standard safeguard is a guard model that labels each proposed action as safe or unsafe, but this binary view conflates two distinct decisions: whether the action is harmful in itself, and whether it is appropriate given the user's context. It also operates at the granularity of action categories rather than individual instances, producing routine interruptions that erode autonomy and train users to wave through the most consequential alerts. We reframe the problem as a per-instance three-way routing decision over {EXECUTE, ASK, REFUSE} and instantiate it with Safety Sentry, a lightweight guard model whose inference reduces to a single decoding call. A single decoding-time threshold lets one fixed checkpoint be re-positioned across deployments of differing risk tolerance without retraining. Safety Sentry outperforms a broad set of open-weight and frontier closed-source baselines on overall accuracy and safety-related recall, while controlling both directional error rates simultaneously.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are susceptible to security and safety threats, such as prompt injection, prompt extraction, and harmful requests. One major cause of these vulnerabilities is the lack of an instruction hierarchy. Modern LLM architectures treat all inputs equally, failing to distinguish between and prioritize various types of instructions, such as system messages, user prompts, and data. As a result, lower-priority user prompts may override more critical system instructions, including safety protocols. Existing approaches to achieving instruction hierarchy, such as delimiters and instruction-based training, do not address this issue at the architectural level. We introduce the Instructional Segment Embedding (ISE) technique, inspired by BERT, to modern large language models, which embeds instruction priority information directly into the model. This approach enables models to explicitly differentiate and prioritize various instruction types, significantly improving safety against malicious prompts that attempt to override priority rules. Our experiments on the Structured Query and Instruction Hierarchy benchmarks demonstrate an average robust accuracy increase of up to 15.75% and 18.68%, respectively. Furthermore, we observe an improvement in instruction-following capability of up to 4.1% evaluated on AlpacaEval. Overall, our approach offers a promising direction for enhancing the safety and effectiveness of LLM architectures.

With the rapid advancement of Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs), ensuring their safety has emerged as a crucial area of research. This survey provides a comprehensive analysis of LVLM safety, covering key aspects such as attacks, defenses, and evaluation methods. We introduce a unified framework that integrates these interrelated components, offering a holistic perspective on the vulnerabilities of LVLMs and the corresponding mitigation strategies. Through an analysis of the LVLM lifecycle, we introduce a classification framework that distinguishes between inference and training phases, with further subcategories to provide deeper insights. Furthermore, we highlight limitations in existing research and outline future directions aimed at strengthening the robustness of LVLMs. As part of our research, we conduct a set of safety evaluations on the latest LVLM, Deepseek Janus-Pro, and provide a theoretical analysis of the results. Our findings provide strategic recommendations for advancing LVLM safety and ensuring their secure and reliable deployment in high-stakes, real-world applications. This survey aims to serve as a cornerstone for future research, facilitating the development of models that not only push the boundaries of multimodal intelligence but also adhere to the highest standards of security and ethical integrity. Furthermore, to aid the growing research in this field, we have created a public repository to continuously compile and update the latest work on LVLM safety: https://github.com/XuankunRong/Awesome-LVLM-Safety .

Omni-modal Large Language Models (OLLMs) greatly expand LLMs' multimodal capabilities but also introduce cross-modal safety risks. However, a systematic understanding of vulnerabilities in omni-modal interactions remains lacking. To bridge this gap, we establish a modality-semantics decoupling principle and construct the AdvBench-Omni dataset, which reveals a significant vulnerability in OLLMs. Mechanistic analysis uncovers a Mid-layer Dissolution phenomenon driven by refusal vector magnitude shrinkage, alongside the existence of a modal-invariant pure refusal direction. Inspired by these insights, we extract a golden refusal vector using Singular Value Decomposition and propose OmniSteer, which utilizes lightweight adapters to modulate intervention intensity adaptively. Extensive experiments show that our method not only increases the Refusal Success Rate against harmful inputs from 69.9% to 91.2%, but also effectively preserves the general capabilities across all modalities. Our code is available at: https://github.com/zhrli324/omni-safety-research.

Text-to-image (T2I) safety guardrails fail to generalize equitably to non-standard dialects. Evaluating 23,080 paired prompts across five English dialects, we formalize this failure as the dialect penalty, where filters trigger based on linguistic surface features rather than semantic intent. Text-level filters fail in opposing directions: NSFW-T over-flags benign dialect prompts and LatentGuard over-flags toxic ones (bias gaps up to +28.29 pp), while the OpenAI Moderation API under-detects them. A controlled typo ablation confirms this penalty originates from flagging dialectal features, not generic out-of-distribution sensitivity. The pixel-level generator is largely dialect-agnostic; the penalty enters at text processing and cascades unevenly to post-hoc guardrails. We show this bias tracks training data imbalance and is mitigable via group-balanced retraining, with an ablation attributing the gain to balanced exposure rather than to the worst-group objective of GroupDRO (group distributionally robust optimization). Current pipelines systematically fail dialect speakers, an equity failure masked by mean accuracy benchmarks. Our official code and dataset are publicly available at https://github.com/minguinho26/dialect-penalty-t2i. Content Warning: This paper contains offensive, toxic, or disturbing text prompts and generated images.

Recent advances in vision-language models (VLMs) have enabled impressive generalization across diverse video understanding tasks under zero-shot settings. However, their capabilities in high-stakes industrial domains-where recognizing both routine operations and safety-critical anomalies is essential-remain largely underexplored. To address this gap, we introduce iSafetyBench, a new video-language benchmark specifically designed to evaluate model performance in industrial environments across both normal and hazardous scenarios. iSafetyBench comprises 1,100 video clips sourced from real-world industrial settings, annotated with open-vocabulary, multi-label action tags spanning 98 routine and 67 hazardous action categories. Each clip is paired with multiple-choice questions for both single-label and multi-label evaluation, enabling fine-grained assessment of VLMs in both standard and safety-critical contexts. We evaluate eight state-of-the-art video-language models under zero-shot conditions. Despite their strong performance on existing video benchmarks, these models struggle with iSafetyBench-particularly in recognizing hazardous activities and in multi-label scenarios. Our results reveal significant performance gaps, underscoring the need for more robust, safety-aware multimodal models for industrial applications. iSafetyBench provides a first-of-its-kind testbed to drive progress in this direction. The dataset is available at: https://github.com/raiyaan-abdullah/iSafety-Bench.

Activation steering is a promising technique for controlling LLM behavior by adding semantically meaningful vectors directly into a model's hidden states during inference. It is often framed as a precise, interpretable, and potentially safer alternative to fine-tuning. We demonstrate the opposite: steering systematically breaks model alignment safeguards, making it comply with harmful requests. Through extensive experiments on different model families, we show that even steering in a random direction can increase the probability of harmful compliance from 0% to 2-27%. Alarmingly, steering benign features from a sparse autoencoder (SAE), a common source of interpretable directions, increases these rates by a further 2-4%. Finally, we show that combining 20 randomly sampled vectors that jailbreak a single prompt creates a universal attack, significantly increasing harmful compliance on unseen requests. These results challenge the paradigm of safety through interpretability, showing that precise control over model internals does not guarantee precise control over model behavior.

Modern Large Language Models (LLMs) rely on extensive safety alignment, yet the mechanistic basis of refusal remains opaque. In this work, we investigate whether safety compliance is a deep semantic decision or a manipulable linear feature. We introduce Contrastive Logit Steering (CLS), a zero-optimization framework that isolates the "refusal direction" by contrasting hidden states derived from safe and unrestricted system prompts. Unlike representation engineering methods that intervene on internal activations, CLS operates directly on the output distribution, serving as a diagnostic probe for alignment fragility. When coupled with prefix injection to bypass initial refusal reflexes, this method induces a phase transition where guardrails collapse. Our experiments on 7 model families reveal that safety implementation is architecturally deterministic. While models like Llama-3.1 exhibit a "Late Decision" topology that is easily bypassed by CLS (reaching 95% ASR in approximately one second), others like Qwen-2.5 demonstrate "Early Divergence" by integrating safety mid-computation. Direct comparison with established activation-level steering methods shows that CLS achieves substantially higher attack success rates on Llama 2 (73% vs. 22.6%) and Qwen 7B (91% vs. 79.2%), demonstrating that logit-level intervention exposes alignment vulnerabilities that hidden-state methods underestimate. Beyond attacks, we show that this linearity enables bidirectional control: inverting the steering vector "hardens" models against jailbreaks without retraining. Our findings suggest that current alignment techniques create a steerable "safety axis" that serves as both a critical vulnerability and a precise primitive for defense.

The inherent risk of generating harmful and unsafe content by Large Language Models (LLMs), has highlighted the need for their safety alignment. Various techniques like supervised fine-tuning, reinforcement learning from human feedback, and red-teaming were developed for ensuring the safety alignment of LLMs. However, the robustness of these aligned LLMs is always challenged by adversarial attacks that exploit unexplored and underlying vulnerabilities of the safety alignment. In this paper, we develop a novel black-box jailbreak attack, called BitBypass, that leverages hyphen-separated bitstream camouflage for jailbreaking aligned LLMs. This represents a new direction in jailbreaking by exploiting fundamental information representation of data as continuous bits, rather than leveraging prompt engineering or adversarial manipulations. Our evaluation of five state-of-the-art LLMs, namely GPT-4o, Gemini 1.5, Claude 3.5, Llama 3.1, and Mixtral, in adversarial perspective, revealed the capabilities of BitBypass in bypassing their safety alignment and tricking them into generating harmful and unsafe content. Further, we observed that BitBypass outperforms several state-of-the-art jailbreak attacks in terms of stealthiness and attack success. Overall, these results highlights the effectiveness and efficiency of BitBypass in jailbreaking these state-of-the-art LLMs.

Aligning Vision-Language Models (VLMs) with safety standards is essential to mitigate risks arising from their multimodal complexity, where integrating vision and language unveils subtle threats beyond the reach of conventional safeguards. Inspired by the insight that reasoning across modalities is key to preempting intricate vulnerabilities, we propose a novel direction for VLM safety: multimodal reasoning-driven prompt rewriting. To this end, we introduce VLMGuard-R1, a proactive framework that refines user inputs through a reasoning-guided rewriter, dynamically interpreting text-image interactions to deliver refined prompts that bolster safety across diverse VLM architectures without altering their core parameters. To achieve this, we devise a three-stage reasoning pipeline to synthesize a dataset that trains the rewriter to infer subtle threats, enabling tailored, actionable responses over generic refusals. Extensive experiments across three benchmarks with five VLMs reveal that VLMGuard-R1 outperforms four baselines. In particular, VLMGuard-R1 achieves a remarkable 43.59\% increase in average safety across five models on the SIUO benchmark.

Safety alignment in language models operates through two mechanistically distinct systems: refusal neurons that gate whether harmful knowledge is expressed, and concept neurons that encode the harmful knowledge itself. By targeting a single neuron in each system, we demonstrate both directions of failure -- bypassing safety on explicit harmful requests via suppression, and inducing harmful content from innocent prompts via amplification -- across seven models spanning two families and 1.7B to 70B parameters, without any training or prompt engineering. Our findings suggest that safety alignment is not robustly distributed across model weights but is mediated by individual neurons that are each causally sufficient to gate refusal behavior -- suppressing any one of the identified refusal neurons bypasses safety alignment across diverse harmful requests.

Can large language model agents discover hidden safety objectives through experience alone? We introduce EPO-Safe (Experiential Prompt Optimization for Safe Agents), a framework where an LLM iteratively generates action plans, receives sparse binary danger warnings, and evolves a natural language behavioral specification through reflection. Unlike standard LLM reflection methods that rely on rich textual feedback (e.g., compiler errors or detailed environment responses), EPO-Safe demonstrates that LLMs can perform safety reasoning from a strictly impoverished signal in structured, low-dimensional environments: the agent never observes the hidden performance function R^*, only a single bit per timestep indicating that an action was unsafe. We evaluate on five AI Safety Gridworlds (Leike et al., 2017) and five text-based scenario analogs where visible reward R may diverge from R^*. EPO-Safe discovers safe behavior within 1-2 rounds (5-15 episodes), producing human-readable specifications with correct explanatory hypotheses about hazards (e.g., "X cells are directionally hazardous: entering from the north is dangerous"). Critically, we show that standard reward-driven reflection actively degrades safety: agents reflecting on reward alone use the loop to justify and accelerate reward hacking, proving that reflection must be paired with a dedicated safety channel to discover hidden constraints. We further evaluate robustness to noisy oracles: even when 50% of non-dangerous steps produce spurious warnings, mean safety performance degrades by only 15% on average, though sensitivity is environment-dependent, as cross-episode reflection naturally filters inconsistent signals. Each evolved specification functions as an auditable set of grounded behavioral rules discovered autonomously through interaction, rather than authored by humans as in Constitutional AI (Bai et al., 2022).

Recent advances in real-time interactive text-driven motion generation have enabled humanoids to perform diverse behaviors. However, kinematics-only generators often exhibit physical hallucinations, producing motion trajectories that are physically infeasible to track with a downstream motion tracking controller or unsafe for real-world deployment. These failures often arise from the lack of explicit physics-aware objectives for real-robot execution and become more severe under out-of-distribution (OOD) user inputs. Hence, we propose SafeFlow, a text-driven humanoid whole-body control framework that combines physics-guided motion generation with a 3-Stage Safety Gate driven by explicit risk indicators. SafeFlow adopts a two-level architecture. At the high level, we generate motion trajectories using Physics-Guided Rectified Flow Matching in a VAE latent space to improve real-robot executability, and further accelerate sampling via Reflow to reduce the number of function evaluations (NFE) for real-time control. The 3-Stage Safety Gate enables selective execution by detecting semantic OOD prompts using a Mahalanobis score in text-embedding space, filtering unstable generations via a directional sensitivity discrepancy metric, and enforcing final hard kinematic constraints such as joint and velocity limits before passing the generated trajectory to a low-level motion tracking controller. Extensive experiments on the Unitree G1 demonstrate that SafeFlow outperforms prior diffusion-based methods in success rate, physical compliance, and inference speed, while maintaining diverse expressiveness.

Existing training-time safety alignment techniques for large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks. Direct preference optimization (DPO), a widely deployed alignment method, exhibits limitations in both experimental and theoretical contexts as its loss function proves suboptimal for refusal learning. Through gradient-based analysis, we identify these shortcomings and propose an improved safety alignment that disentangles DPO objectives into two components: (1) robust refusal training, which encourages refusal even when partial unsafe generations are produced, and (2) targeted unlearning of harmful knowledge. This approach significantly increases LLM robustness against a wide range of jailbreak attacks, including prefilling, suffix, and multi-turn attacks across both in-distribution and out-of-distribution scenarios. Furthermore, we introduce a method to emphasize critical refusal tokens by incorporating a reward-based token-level weighting mechanism for refusal learning, which further improves the robustness against adversarial exploits. Our research also suggests that robustness to jailbreak attacks is correlated with token distribution shifts in the training process and internal representations of refusal and harmful tokens, offering valuable directions for future research in LLM safety alignment. The code is available at https://github.com/wicai24/DOOR-Alignment

The advancement of large language models (LLMs) has significantly enhanced the ability to effectively tackle various downstream NLP tasks and unify these tasks into generative pipelines. On the one hand, powerful language models, trained on massive textual data, have brought unparalleled accessibility and usability for both models and users. On the other hand, unrestricted access to these models can also introduce potential malicious and unintentional privacy risks. Despite ongoing efforts to address the safety and privacy concerns associated with LLMs, the problem remains unresolved. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive analysis of the current privacy attacks targeting LLMs and categorize them according to the adversary's assumed capabilities to shed light on the potential vulnerabilities present in LLMs. Then, we present a detailed overview of prominent defense strategies that have been developed to counter these privacy attacks. Beyond existing works, we identify upcoming privacy concerns as LLMs evolve. Lastly, we point out several potential avenues for future exploration.

Video generation models have emerged as high-fidelity models of the physical world, capable of synthesizing high-quality videos capturing fine-grained interactions between agents and their environments conditioned on multi-modal user inputs. Their impressive capabilities address many of the long-standing challenges faced by physics-based simulators, driving broad adoption in many problem domains, e.g., robotics. For example, video models enable photorealistic, physically consistent deformable-body simulation without making prohibitive simplifying assumptions, which is a major bottleneck in physics-based simulation. Moreover, video models can serve as foundation world models that capture the dynamics of the world in a fine-grained and expressive way. They thus overcome the limited expressiveness of language-only abstractions in describing intricate physical interactions. In this survey, we provide a review of video models and their applications as embodied world models in robotics, encompassing cost-effective data generation and action prediction in imitation learning, dynamics and rewards modeling in reinforcement learning, visual planning, and policy evaluation. Further, we highlight important challenges hindering the trustworthy integration of video models in robotics, which include poor instruction following, hallucinations such as violations of physics, and unsafe content generation, in addition to fundamental limitations such as significant data curation, training, and inference costs. We present potential future directions to address these open research challenges to motivate research and ultimately facilitate broader applications, especially in safety-critical settings.

The development of large language models (LLMs) has entered in a experience-driven era, flagged by the emergence of environment feedback-driven learning via reinforcement learning and tool-using agents. This encourages the emergenece of model context protocol (MCP), which defines the standard on how should a LLM interact with external services, such as \api and data. However, as MCP becomes the de facto standard for LLM agent systems, it also introduces new safety risks. In particular, MCP introduces third-party services, which are not controlled by the LLM developers, into the agent systems. These third-party MCP services provider are potentially malicious and have the economic incentives to exploit vulnerabilities and sabotage user-agent interactions. In this position paper, we advocate the research community in LLM safety to pay close attention to the new safety risks issues introduced by MCP, and develop new techniques to build safe MCP-powered agent systems. To establish our position, we argue with three key parts. (1) We first construct \framework, a controlled framework to examine safety issues in MCP-powered agent systems. (2) We then conduct a series of pilot experiments to demonstrate the safety risks in MCP-powered agent systems is a real threat and its defense is not trivial. (3) Finally, we give our outlook by showing a roadmap to build safe MCP-powered agent systems. In particular, we would call for researchers to persue the following research directions: red teaming, MCP safe LLM development, MCP safety evaluation, MCP safety data accumulation, MCP service safeguard, and MCP safe ecosystem construction. We hope this position paper can raise the awareness of the research community in MCP safety and encourage more researchers to join this important research direction. Our code is available at https://github.com/littlelittlenine/SafeMCP.git.

As the influence of large language models (LLMs) spans across global communities, their safety challenges in multilingual settings become paramount for alignment research. This paper examines the variations in safety challenges faced by LLMs across different languages and discusses approaches to alleviating such concerns. By comparing how state-of-the-art LLMs respond to the same set of malicious prompts written in higher- vs. lower-resource languages, we observe that (1) LLMs tend to generate unsafe responses much more often when a malicious prompt is written in a lower-resource language, and (2) LLMs tend to generate more irrelevant responses to malicious prompts in lower-resource languages. To understand where the discrepancy can be attributed, we study the effect of instruction tuning with reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) or supervised finetuning (SFT) on the HH-RLHF dataset. Surprisingly, while training with high-resource languages improves model alignment, training in lower-resource languages yields minimal improvement. This suggests that the bottleneck of cross-lingual alignment is rooted in the pretraining stage. Our findings highlight the challenges in cross-lingual LLM safety, and we hope they inform future research in this direction.

Recent studies highlight the potential of large language models in creating educational tools for children, yet significant challenges remain in maintaining key child-specific properties such as linguistic nuances, cognitive needs, and safety standards. In this paper, we explore foundational steps toward the development of child-specific language models, emphasizing the necessity of high-quality pre-training data. We introduce a novel user-centric data collection pipeline that involves gathering and validating a corpus specifically written for and sometimes by children. Additionally, we propose a new training objective, Stratified Masking, which dynamically adjusts masking probabilities based on our domain-specific child language data, enabling models to prioritize vocabulary and concepts more suitable for children. Experimental evaluations demonstrate that our model excels in understanding lower grade-level text, maintains safety by avoiding stereotypes, and captures children's unique preferences. Furthermore, we provide actionable insights for future research and development in child-specific language modeling.

In this work, we present a series of structure transformation attacks on LLM alignment, where we encode natural language intent using diverse syntax spaces, ranging from simple structure formats and basic query languages (e.g., SQL) to new novel spaces and syntaxes created entirely by LLMs. Our extensive evaluation shows that our simplest attacks can achieve close to a 90% success rate, even on strict LLMs (such as Claude 3.5 Sonnet) using SOTA alignment mechanisms. We improve the attack performance further by using an adaptive scheme that combines structure transformations along with existing content transformations, resulting in over 96% ASR with 0% refusals. To generalize our attacks, we explore numerous structure formats, including syntaxes purely generated by LLMs. Our results indicate that such novel syntaxes are easy to generate and result in a high ASR, suggesting that defending against our attacks is not a straightforward process. Finally, we develop a benchmark and evaluate existing safety-alignment defenses against it, showing that most of them fail with 100% ASR. Our results show that existing safety alignment mostly relies on token-level patterns without recognizing harmful concepts, highlighting and motivating the need for serious research efforts in this direction. As a case study, we demonstrate how attackers can use our attack to easily generate a sample malware and a corpus of fraudulent SMS messages, which perform well in bypassing detection.

Safety alignment is a key requirement for building reliable Artificial General Intelligence. Despite significant advances in safety alignment, we observe that minor latent shifts can still trigger unsafe responses in aligned models. We argue that this stems from the shallow nature of existing alignment methods, which focus on surface-level refusal behaviors without sufficiently altering internal representations. Consequently, small shifts in hidden activations can re-trigger harmful behaviors embedded in the latent space. To explore the robustness of safety alignment to latent perturbations, we introduce a probing method that measures the Negative Log-Likelihood of the original response generated by the model. This probe quantifies local sensitivity in the latent space, serving as a diagnostic tool for identifying vulnerable directions. Based on this signal, we construct effective jailbreak trajectories, giving rise to the Activation Steering Attack (ASA). More importantly, these insights offer a principled foundation for improving alignment robustness. To this end, we introduce Layer-wise Adversarial Patch Training~(LAPT), a fine-tuning strategy that inject controlled perturbations into hidden representations during training. Experimental results highlight that LAPT strengthen alignment robustness without compromising general capabilities. Our findings reveal fundamental flaws in current alignment paradigms and call for representation-level training strategies that move beyond surface-level behavior supervision. Codes and results are available at https://github.com/Carol-gutianle/LatentSafety.

Large language models are finetuned to refuse questions about hazardous knowledge, but these protections can often be bypassed. Unlearning methods aim at completely removing hazardous capabilities from models and make them inaccessible to adversaries. This work challenges the fundamental differences between unlearning and traditional safety post-training from an adversarial perspective. We demonstrate that existing jailbreak methods, previously reported as ineffective against unlearning, can be successful when applied carefully. Furthermore, we develop a variety of adaptive methods that recover most supposedly unlearned capabilities. For instance, we show that finetuning on 10 unrelated examples or removing specific directions in the activation space can recover most hazardous capabilities for models edited with RMU, a state-of-the-art unlearning method. Our findings challenge the robustness of current unlearning approaches and question their advantages over safety training.

Safety evaluation and red-teaming of large language models remain predominantly text-centric, and existing frameworks lack the infrastructure to systematically test whether alignment generalizes to audio, image, and video inputs. We present MUSE (Multimodal Unified Safety Evaluation), an open-source, run-centric platform that integrates automatic cross-modal payload generation, three multi-turn attack algorithms (Crescendo, PAIR, Violent Durian), provider-agnostic model routing, and an LLM judge with a five-level safety taxonomy into a single browser-based system. A dual-metric framework distinguishes hard Attack Success Rate (Compliance only) from soft ASR (including Partial Compliance), capturing partial information leakage that binary metrics miss. To probe whether alignment generalizes across modality boundaries, we introduce Inter-Turn Modality Switching (ITMS), which augments multi-turn attacks with per-turn modality rotation. Experiments across six multimodal LLMs from four providers show that multi-turn strategies can achieve up to 90-100% ASR against models with near-perfect single-turn refusal. ITMS does not uniformly raise final ASR on already-saturated baselines, but accelerates convergence by destabilizing early-turn defenses, and ablation reveals that the direction of modality effects is model-family-specific rather than universal, underscoring the need for provider-aware cross-modal safety testing.

Safety evaluations for large language models (LLMs) increasingly target high-stakes National Security and Public Safety (NSPS) risks, yet multilingual safety is typically assessed through translation-only benchmarks that preserve the underlying scenario, and empirical evidence of how language and geopolitical context interact remains limited to a narrow set of language pairs. We introduce ROK-FORTRESS https://huggingface.co/datasets/ScaleAI/ROK-FORTRESS_public, a bilingual, culturally adversarial NSPS benchmark that uses the English--Korean language pair and U.S.--ROK geopolitical axis as a case study, separating the effects of language and geopolitical grounding via a transcreation matrix: adversarial intents are evaluated under controlled combinations of (i) English versus Korean language and (ii) U.S.\ versus Korean entities, institutions, and operational details. Each adversarial prompt is paired with a dual-use benign counterpart to quantify over-refusal. Model responses are then scored using calibrated LLM-as-a-judge panels, applying our expert-crafted, prompt-specific binary rubrics. Across a dual-track set of frontier and Korean-optimized models, we find a consistent suppression effect in Korean variants and substantial model-to-model variation in how geopolitical grounding interacts with language. In many models, Korean grounding mitigates the Korean language-driven suppression -- with no model showing significant amplification in the other direction -- indicating that, at least in the English--Korean case, safety behavior is shaped by language-as-risk signals and context interactions that translation-only evaluations miss. The transcreation matrix methodology is designed to generalize to other language--culture pairs.

The widespread deployment of large language models (LLMs) across linguistic communities necessitates reliable multilingual safety alignment. However, recent efforts to extend alignment to other languages often require substantial resources, either through large-scale, high-quality supervision in the target language or through pairwise alignment with high-resource languages, which limits scalability. In this work, we propose a resource-efficient method for improving multilingual safety alignment. We introduce a plug-and-play Multi-Lingual Consistency (MLC) loss that can be integrated into existing monolingual alignment pipelines. By improving collinearity between multilingual representation vectors, our method encourages directional consistency at the multilingual semantic level in a single update. This allows simultaneous alignment across multiple languages using only multilingual prompt variants without requiring additional response-level supervision in low-resource languages. We validate the proposed method across different model architectures and alignment paradigms, and demonstrate its effectiveness in enhancing multilingual safety with limited impact on general model utility. Further evaluation across languages and tasks indicates improved cross-lingual generalization, suggesting the proposed approach as a practical solution for multilingual consistency alignment under limited supervision.

With the advent of Large Language Models (LLMs), medical artificial intelligence (AI) has experienced substantial technological progress and paradigm shifts, highlighting the potential of LLMs to streamline healthcare delivery and improve patient outcomes. Considering this rapid technical progress, in this survey, we trace the recent advances of Medical Large Language Models (Med-LLMs), including the background, key findings, and mainstream techniques, especially for the evolution from general-purpose models to medical-specialized applications. Firstly, we delve into the foundational technology of Med-LLMs, indicating how general models can be progressively adapted and refined for the complicated medical tasks. Secondly, the wide-ranging applications of Med-LLMs are investigated across various healthcare domains, as well as an up-to-date review of existing Med-LLMs. The transformative impact of these models on daily medical practice is evident through their ability to assist clinicians, educators, and patients. Recognizing the importance of responsible innovation, we discuss the challenges associated with ensuring fairness, accountability, privacy, and robustness. Ethical considerations, rigorous evaluation methodologies, and the establishment of regulatory frameworks are crucial for building trustworthiness in the real-world system. We emphasize the need for ongoing scrutiny and development to maintain high standards of safety and reliability. Finally, we anticipate possible future trajectories for Med-LLMs, identifying key avenues for prudent expansion. By consolidating these insights, our review aims to provide professionals and researchers with a thorough understanding of the strengths and limitations of Med-LLMs, fostering a balanced and ethical approach to their integration into the healthcare ecosystem.

Model merging combines the parameters of multiple neural networks into a single model without additional training. As fine-tuned large language models (LLMs) proliferate, merging offers a computationally efficient alternative to ensembles and full retraining, enabling practitioners to compose specialized capabilities at minimal cost. This survey examines model merging in the LLM era through the FUSE taxonomy, organized along Foundations, Unification Strategies, Scenarios, and Ecosystem. We first establish the theoretical underpinnings of merging, including loss landscape geometry and mode connectivity, then systematically review the algorithmic space spanning weight averaging, task vector arithmetic, sparsification-enhanced methods, mixture-of-experts architectures, and evolutionary optimization. We further examine downstream applications across multi-task learning, safety alignment, domain specialization, and federated learning, and survey the supporting ecosystem of tools and evaluation benchmarks. Finally, we identify key open challenges and future directions, aiming to equip researchers and practitioners with a structured foundation for advancing model merging.

Current autonomous driving vehicles rely mainly on their individual sensors to understand surrounding scenes and plan for future trajectories, which can be unreliable when the sensors are malfunctioning or occluded. To address this problem, cooperative perception methods via vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication have been proposed, but they have tended to focus on detection and tracking. How those approaches contribute to overall cooperative planning performance is still under-explored. Inspired by recent progress using Large Language Models (LLMs) to build autonomous driving systems, we propose a novel problem setting that integrates an LLM into cooperative autonomous driving, with the proposed Vehicle-to-Vehicle Question-Answering (V2V-QA) dataset and benchmark. We also propose our baseline method Vehicle-to-Vehicle Large Language Model (V2V-LLM), which uses an LLM to fuse perception information from multiple connected autonomous vehicles (CAVs) and answer driving-related questions: grounding, notable object identification, and planning. Experimental results show that our proposed V2V-LLM can be a promising unified model architecture for performing various tasks in cooperative autonomous driving, and outperforms other baseline methods that use different fusion approaches. Our work also creates a new research direction that can improve the safety of future autonomous driving systems. Our project website: https://eddyhkchiu.github.io/v2vllm.github.io/ .

Prepending model inputs with safety prompts is a common practice of safeguarding large language models (LLMs) from complying with queries that contain harmful intents. However, the working mechanisms of safety prompts have not yet been fully understood, which hinders the potential for automatically optimizing them for improved LLM safety. Motivated by this problem, we investigate the impact of safety prompts from the perspective of model representations. We find that in models' representation space, harmful and harmless queries can be largely distinguished, but this is not noticeably enhanced by safety prompts. Instead, the queries' representations are moved by different safety prompts in similar directions, where models become more prone to refusal (i.e., refusing to provide assistance) even when the queries are harmless. Inspired by these findings, we propose a method called DRO (Directed Representation Optimization) for automatic safety prompt optimization. DRO treats safety prompts as continuous, trainable embeddings and learns to move the representations of harmful/harmless queries along/opposite the direction in which the model's refusal probability increases. We demonstrate that DRO remarkably improves the safeguarding performance of human-crafted safety prompts and outperforms strong baselines, as evaluated on out-of-domain benchmarks, without compromising the general model capability.

Direction of Arrival (DoA) estimation techniques face a critical trade-off, as classical methods often lack accuracy in challenging, low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) conditions, while modern deep learning approaches are too energy-intensive and opaque for resource-constrained, safety-critical systems. We introduce HYPERDOA, a novel estimator leveraging Hyperdimensional Computing (HDC). The framework introduces two distinct feature extraction strategies -- Mean Spatial-Lag Autocorrelation and Spatial Smoothing -- for its HDC pipeline, and then reframes DoA estimation as a pattern recognition problem. This approach leverages HDC's inherent robustness to noise and its transparent algebraic operations to bypass the expensive matrix decompositions and "black-box" nature of classical and deep learning methods, respectively. Our evaluation demonstrates that HYPERDOA achieves ~35.39% higher accuracy than state-of-the-art methods in low-SNR, coherent-source scenarios. Crucially, it also consumes ~93% less energy than competing neural baselines on an embedded NVIDIA Jetson Xavier NX platform. This dual advantage in accuracy and efficiency establishes HYPERDOA as a robust and viable solution for mission-critical applications on edge devices.

Steering Large Language Models (LLMs) through activation interventions has emerged as a lightweight alternative to fine-tuning for alignment and personalization. Recent work on Bi-directional Preference Optimization (BiPO) shows that dense steering vectors can be learned directly from preference data in a Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) fashion, enabling control over truthfulness, hallucinations, and safety behaviors. However, dense steering vectors often entangle multiple latent factors due to neuron multi-semanticity, limiting their effectiveness and stability in fine-grained settings such as cultural alignment, where closely related values and behaviors (e.g., among Middle Eastern cultures) must be distinguished. In this paper, we propose Yet another Policy Optimization (YaPO), a reference-free method that learns sparse steering vectors in the latent space of a Sparse Autoencoder (SAE). By optimizing sparse codes, YaPO produces disentangled, interpretable, and efficient steering directions. Empirically, we show that YaPO converges faster, achieves stronger performance, and exhibits improved training stability compared to dense steering baselines. Beyond cultural alignment, YaPO generalizes to a range of alignment-related behaviors, including hallucination, wealth-seeking, jailbreak, and power-seeking. Importantly, YaPO preserves general knowledge, with no measurable degradation on MMLU. Overall, our results show that YaPO provides a general recipe for efficient, stable, and fine-grained alignment of LLMs, with broad applications to controllability and domain adaptation. The associated code and data are publicly availablehttps://github.com/MBZUAI-Paris/YaPO.

Safety-aligned language models refuse harmful requests through learned refusal behaviors encoded in their internal representations. Recent activation-based jailbreaking methods circumvent these safety mechanisms by applying orthogonal projections to remove refusal directions, but these approaches treat refusal as a one-dimensional phenomenon and ignore the rich distributional structure of model activations. We introduce a principled framework based on optimal transport theory that transforms the entire distribution of harmful activations to match harmless ones. By combining PCA with closed-form Gaussian optimal transport, we achieve efficient computation in high-dimensional representation spaces while preserving essential geometric structure. Across six models (Llama-2, Llama-3.1, Qwen-2.5; 7B-32B parameters), our method achieves up to 11% higher attack success rates than state-of-the-art baselines while maintaining comparable perplexity, demonstrating superior preservation of model capabilities. Critically, we discover that layer-selective intervention (applying optimal transport to 1-2 carefully chosen layers at approximately 40-60% network depth) substantially outperforms full-network interventions, revealing that refusal mechanisms may be localized rather than distributed. Our analysis provides new insights into the geometric structure of safety representations and suggests that current alignment methods may be vulnerable to distributional attacks beyond simple direction removal.

Low-rank adaptation has become a standard method for parameter-efficient fine-tuning of large language models, but even small amounts of unsafe or adversarial fine-tuning data can substantially weaken the safety behavior of aligned models. Existing safety-preserving LoRA methods often rely on hard interventions such as projection, pruning, thresholding, or additional training objectives. While these methods can suppress unsafe update directions, they may also remove task-relevant information or require extra tuning. We introduce CSULoRA, a post-hoc method for correcting trained LoRA adapters through closest safe update estimation. CSULoRA estimates a safety-aligned subspace from the weight displacement between a safety-aligned model and its corresponding base checkpoint. It then decomposes each LoRA update into fully aligned, partially aligned, and off-subspace components. Instead of discarding components outside the estimated safety subspace, CSULoRA solves a closed-form penalized minimum-change problem that preserves the fully aligned component while smoothly attenuating potentially unsafe directions according to their relative energy. In adversarial fine-tuning experiments, CSULoRA substantially reduces attack success rate while preserving most of the utility gains obtained from standard LoRA fine-tuning.

AI systems are becoming increasingly intertwined with human life. In order to effectively collaborate with humans and ensure safety, AI systems need to be able to understand, interpret and predict human moral judgments and decisions. Human moral judgments are often guided by rules, but not always. A central challenge for AI safety is capturing the flexibility of the human moral mind -- the ability to determine when a rule should be broken, especially in novel or unusual situations. In this paper, we present a novel challenge set consisting of rule-breaking question answering (RBQA) of cases that involve potentially permissible rule-breaking -- inspired by recent moral psychology studies. Using a state-of-the-art large language model (LLM) as a basis, we propose a novel moral chain of thought (MORALCOT) prompting strategy that combines the strengths of LLMs with theories of moral reasoning developed in cognitive science to predict human moral judgments. MORALCOT outperforms seven existing LLMs by 6.2% F1, suggesting that modeling human reasoning might be necessary to capture the flexibility of the human moral mind. We also conduct a detailed error analysis to suggest directions for future work to improve AI safety using RBQA. Our data is open-sourced at https://huggingface.co/datasets/feradauto/MoralExceptQA and code at https://github.com/feradauto/MoralCoT

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting can fail severely on constraint-dense logical reasoning tasks, where unverified errors accumulate silently across steps. We introduce SymStep: an LLM makes one atomic claim at a time (DEDUCE: Alice, pet, Cat), then a lightweight constraint propagator checks the claim for consistency with prior accepted deductions, rejects contradictions, and cascades implied facts automatically. SymStep+G additionally provides MRV guidance after each accepted step, directing the LLM toward the most constrained unresolved variable. On a 35-puzzle retained subset of ZebraLogicBench, a benchmark of 1,000 Einstein-style logic puzzles, Direct and CoT both achieve 0%, while SymStep+G reaches 97%. On AR-LSAT analytical reasoning problems, SymStep achieves 100% vs. CoT's 87%. On LGP-14, SymStep+G achieves 100% vs. 0% for CoT and Logic-LM, the strongest prior symbolic+LLM baseline we compare against. Ablation studies reveal that MRV guidance is a key mechanism for reducing directionless cycling, while consistency checking provides a safety net against explicit contradictions. Across six benchmarks spanning five task domains, SymStep variants match or exceed every baseline on constraint-dense and arithmetic tasks. Experiments on AQUA-RAT algebra confirm the advantage is constraint-density-specific.

Controlling undesirable Large Language Model (LLM) behaviors, such as the generation of unsafe content or failing to adhere to safety guidelines, often relies on costly fine-tuning. Activation steering provides an alternative for inference-time control, but existing methods typically lack fine-grained, adaptive mechanisms. We introduce a novel approach using a lightweight, trainable controller network integrated during inference. This controller network observes specific intermediate LLM activations and predicts both a global scaling factor and layer-specific weights. The predicted global scaling factor and layer-specific weights then dynamically modulate the intensity of a steering patch, derived from a pre-computed "refusal direction" vector, applied across the LLM's layers during generation. Trained on activations from both harmful and benign prompts, our controller learns to discriminatively apply nuanced, layer-aware interventions, activating steering primarily for harmful inputs. Experiments using safety benchmarks like ToxicChat & In-The-Wild Jailbreak Prompts demonstrate that our weighted steering controller significantly increases refusal rates compared to the base LLM, achieving targeted behavioral modification without altering the original model parameters. Our experiments with Llama-3.1-8B, Llama-3.2-1B & Mistral-7B show our approach outperforms existing methods, presenting an efficient and adaptive method for fine-grained control over LLM behavior at inference time.

The dream to create AI assistants as capable and versatile as the fictional J.A.R.V.I.S from Iron Man has long captivated imaginations. With the evolution of (multi-modal) large language models ((M)LLMs), this dream is closer to reality, as (M)LLM-based Agents using computing devices (e.g., computers and mobile phones) by operating within the environments and interfaces (e.g., Graphical User Interface (GUI)) provided by operating systems (OS) to automate tasks have significantly advanced. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of these advanced agents, designated as OS Agents. We begin by elucidating the fundamentals of OS Agents, exploring their key components including the environment, observation space, and action space, and outlining essential capabilities such as understanding, planning, and grounding. We then examine methodologies for constructing OS Agents, focusing on domain-specific foundation models and agent frameworks. A detailed review of evaluation protocols and benchmarks highlights how OS Agents are assessed across diverse tasks. Finally, we discuss current challenges and identify promising directions for future research, including safety and privacy, personalization and self-evolution. This survey aims to consolidate the state of OS Agents research, providing insights to guide both academic inquiry and industrial development. An open-source GitHub repository is maintained as a dynamic resource to foster further innovation in this field. We present a 9-page version of our work, accepted by ACL 2025, to provide a concise overview to the domain.

Alignment of artificial intelligence (AI) encompasses the normative problem of specifying how AI systems should act and the technical problem of ensuring AI systems comply with those specifications. To date, AI alignment has generally overlooked an important source of knowledge and practice for grappling with these problems: law. In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by exploring how legal rules, principles, and methods can be leveraged to address problems of alignment and inform the design of AI systems that operate safely and ethically. This emerging field -- legal alignment -- focuses on three research directions: (1) designing AI systems to comply with the content of legal rules developed through legitimate institutions and processes, (2) adapting methods from legal interpretation to guide how AI systems reason and make decisions, and (3) harnessing legal concepts as a structural blueprint for confronting challenges of reliability, trust, and cooperation in AI systems. These research directions present new conceptual, empirical, and institutional questions, which include examining the specific set of laws that particular AI systems should follow, creating evaluations to assess their legal compliance in real-world settings, and developing governance frameworks to support the implementation of legal alignment in practice. Tackling these questions requires expertise across law, computer science, and other disciplines, offering these communities the opportunity to collaborate in designing AI for the better.

Text embeddings have attracted growing interest due to their effectiveness across a wide range of natural language processing (NLP) tasks, such as retrieval, classification, clustering, bitext mining, and summarization. With the emergence of pretrained language models (PLMs), general-purpose text embeddings (GPTE) have gained significant traction for their ability to produce rich, transferable representations. The general architecture of GPTE typically leverages PLMs to derive dense text representations, which are then optimized through contrastive learning on large-scale pairwise datasets. In this survey, we provide a comprehensive overview of GPTE in the era of PLMs, focusing on the roles PLMs play in driving its development. We first examine the fundamental architecture and describe the basic roles of PLMs in GPTE, i.e., embedding extraction, expressivity enhancement, training strategies, learning objectives, and data construction. Then, we describe advanced roles enabled by PLMs, such as multilingual support, multimodal integration, code understanding, and scenario-specific adaptation. Finally, we highlight potential future research directions that move beyond traditional improvement goals, including ranking integration, safety considerations, bias mitigation, structural information incorporation, and the cognitive extension of embeddings. This survey aims to serve as a valuable reference for both newcomers and established researchers seeking to understand the current state and future potential of GPTE.

Language-conditioned robotic manipulation represents a cutting-edge area of research, enabling seamless communication and cooperation between humans and robotic agents. This field focuses on teaching robotic systems to comprehend and execute instructions conveyed in natural language. To achieve this, the development of robust language understanding models capable of extracting actionable insights from textual input is essential. In this comprehensive survey, we systematically explore recent advancements in language-conditioned approaches within the context of robotic manipulation. We analyze these approaches based on their learning paradigms, which encompass reinforcement learning, imitation learning, and the integration of foundational models, such as large language models and vision-language models. Furthermore, we conduct an in-depth comparative analysis, considering aspects like semantic information extraction, environment & evaluation, auxiliary tasks, and task representation. Finally, we outline potential future research directions in the realm of language-conditioned learning for robotic manipulation, with the topic of generalization capabilities and safety issues. The GitHub repository of this paper can be found at https://github.com/hk-zh/language-conditioned-robot-manipulation-models

We identify a structural weakness in current large language model (LLM) alignment: modern refusal mechanisms are fail-open. While existing approaches encode refusal behaviors across multiple latent features, suppressing a single dominant feature-via prompt-based jailbreaks-can cause alignment to collapse, leading to unsafe generation. Motivated by this, we propose fail-closed alignment as a design principle for robust LLM safety: refusal mechanisms should remain effective even under partial failures via redundant, independent causal pathways. We present a concrete instantiation of this principle: a progressive alignment framework that iteratively identifies and ablates previously learned refusal directions, forcing the model to reconstruct safety along new, independent subspaces. Across four jailbreak attacks, we achieve the strongest overall robustness while mitigating over-refusal and preserving generation quality, with small computational overhead. Our mechanistic analyses confirm that models trained with our method encode multiple, causally independent refusal directions that prompt-based jailbreaks cannot suppress simultaneously, providing empirical support for fail-closed alignment as a principled foundation for robust LLM safety.

During pretraining, LLMs inadvertently memorize sensitive or copyrighted data, posing significant compliance challenges under legal frameworks like the GDPR and the EU AI Act. Fulfilling these mandates demands techniques that can remove information from a deployed model without retraining from scratch. Existing unlearning approaches attempt to address this need, but often leak the very data they aim to erase, sacrifice fluency and robustness, or depend on costly external reward models. We introduce PURGE (Policy Unlearning through Relative Group Erasure), a novel method grounded in the Group Relative Policy Optimization framework that formulates unlearning as a verifiable problem. PURGE uses an intrinsic reward signal that penalizes any mention of forbidden concepts, allowing safe and consistent unlearning. Our approach achieves up to x46 lower token usage per target than state-of-the-art methods, while improving fluency by +5.48% and adversarial robustness by +12.02% over the base model. Extensive evaluation on the Real World Knowledge Unlearning (RWKU) benchmark shows that PURGE reaches 11% unlearning effectiveness while preserving 98% of original utility. PURGE shows that framing LLM unlearning as a verifiable task enables more reliable, efficient, and scalable forgetting, suggesting a promising new direction for unlearning research that combines theoretical guarantees, improved safety, and practical deployment efficiency.

Graphical User Interface (GUI) Agents have emerged as a transformative paradigm in human-computer interaction, evolving from rule-based automation scripts to sophisticated AI-driven systems capable of understanding and executing complex interface operations. This survey provides a comprehensive examination of the rapidly advancing field of LLM-based GUI Agents, systematically analyzing their architectural foundations, technical components, and evaluation methodologies. We identify and analyze four fundamental components that constitute modern GUI Agents: (1) perception systems that integrate text-based parsing with multimodal understanding for comprehensive interface comprehension; (2) exploration mechanisms that construct and maintain knowledge bases through internal modeling, historical experience, and external information retrieval; (3) planning frameworks that leverage advanced reasoning methodologies for task decomposition and execution; and (4) interaction systems that manage action generation with robust safety controls. Through rigorous analysis of these components, we reveal how recent advances in large language models and multimodal learning have revolutionized GUI automation across desktop, mobile, and web platforms. We critically examine current evaluation frameworks, highlighting methodological limitations in existing benchmarks while proposing directions for standardization. This survey also identifies key technical challenges, including accurate element localization, effective knowledge retrieval, long-horizon planning, and safety-aware execution control, while outlining promising research directions for enhancing GUI Agents' capabilities. Our systematic review provides researchers and practitioners with a thorough understanding of the field's current state and offers insights into future developments in intelligent interface automation.

Domestic AI agents faces ethical, autonomy, and inclusion challenges, particularly for overlooked groups like children, elderly, and Neurodivergent users. We present the Plural Voices Model (PVM), a novel single-agent framework that dynamically negotiates multi-user needs through real-time value alignment, leveraging diverse public datasets on mental health, eldercare, education, and moral reasoning. Using human+synthetic curriculum design with fairness-aware scenarios and ethical enhancements, PVM identifies core values, conflicts, and accessibility requirements to inform inclusive principles. Our privacy-focused prototype features adaptive safety scaffolds, tailored interactions (e.g., step-by-step guidance for Neurodivergent users, simple wording for children), and equitable conflict resolution. In preliminary evaluations, PVM outperforms multi-agent baselines in compliance (76% vs. 70%), fairness (90% vs. 85%), safety-violation rate (0% vs. 7%), and latency. Design innovations, including video guidance, autonomy sliders, family hubs, and adaptive safety dashboards, demonstrate new directions for ethical and inclusive domestic AI, for building user-centered agentic systems in plural domestic contexts. Our Codes and Model are been open sourced, available for reproduction: https://github.com/zade90/Agora

The emergence of Large Language Models (LLMs) has ushered in a transformative paradigm in artificial intelligence, Agentic AI, where intelligent agents exhibit goal-directed autonomy, contextual reasoning, and dynamic multi-agent coordination. This paper provides a systematic review and comparative analysis of leading Agentic AI frameworks, including CrewAI, LangGraph, AutoGen, Semantic Kernel, Agno, Google ADK, and MetaGPT, evaluating their architectural principles, communication mechanisms, memory management, safety guardrails, and alignment with service-oriented computing paradigms. Furthermore, we identify key limitations, emerging trends, and open challenges in the field. To address the issue of agent communication, we conduct an in-depth analysis of protocols such as the Contract Net Protocol (CNP), Agent-to-Agent (A2A), Agent Network Protocol (ANP), and Agora. Our findings not only establish a foundational taxonomy for Agentic AI systems but also propose future research directions to enhance scalability, robustness, and interoperability. This work serves as a comprehensive reference for researchers and practitioners working to advance the next generation of autonomous AI systems.

Interactive Natural Language Processing (iNLP) has emerged as a novel paradigm within the field of NLP, aimed at addressing limitations in existing frameworks while aligning with the ultimate goals of artificial intelligence. This paradigm considers language models as agents capable of observing, acting, and receiving feedback iteratively from external entities. Specifically, language models in this context can: (1) interact with humans for better understanding and addressing user needs, personalizing responses, aligning with human values, and improving the overall user experience; (2) interact with knowledge bases for enriching language representations with factual knowledge, enhancing the contextual relevance of responses, and dynamically leveraging external information to generate more accurate and informed responses; (3) interact with models and tools for effectively decomposing and addressing complex tasks, leveraging specialized expertise for specific subtasks, and fostering the simulation of social behaviors; and (4) interact with environments for learning grounded representations of language, and effectively tackling embodied tasks such as reasoning, planning, and decision-making in response to environmental observations. This paper offers a comprehensive survey of iNLP, starting by proposing a unified definition and framework of the concept. We then provide a systematic classification of iNLP, dissecting its various components, including interactive objects, interaction interfaces, and interaction methods. We proceed to delve into the evaluation methodologies used in the field, explore its diverse applications, scrutinize its ethical and safety issues, and discuss prospective research directions. This survey serves as an entry point for researchers who are interested in this rapidly evolving area and offers a broad view of the current landscape and future trajectory of iNLP.

Large language models have achieved remarkable capabilities across diverse tasks, yet their internal decision-making processes remain largely opaque, limiting our ability to inspect, control, and systematically improve them. This opacity motivates a growing body of research in mechanistic interpretability, with sparse autoencoders (SAEs) emerging as one of the most promising tools for decomposing model activations into sparse, interpretable feature representations. We introduce Qwen-Scope, an open-source suite of SAEs built on the Qwen model family, comprising 14 groups of SAEs across 7 model variants from the Qwen3 and Qwen3.5 series, covering both dense and mixture-of-expert architectures. Built on top of these SAEs, we show that SAEs can go beyond post-hoc analysis to serve as practical interfaces for model development along four directions: (i) inference-time steering, where SAE feature directions control language, concepts, and preferences without modifying model weights; (ii) evaluation analysis, where activated SAE features provide a representation-level proxy for benchmark redundancy and capability coverage; (iii) data-centric workflows, where SAE features support multilingual toxicity classification and safety-oriented data synthesis; and (iv) post-training optimization, where SAE-derived signals are incorporated into supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning objectives to mitigate undesirable behaviors such as code-switching and repetition. Together, these results demonstrate that SAEs can serve not only as post-hoc analysis tools, but also as reusable representation-level interfaces for diagnosing, controlling, evaluating, and improving large language models. By open-sourcing Qwen-Scope, we aim to support mechanistic research and accelerate practical workflows that connect model internals to downstream behavior.

We present the Consilium Protocol, a Byzantine Fault Tolerance-derived architecture for structured multi-model AI deliberation that treats inter-model disagreement as epistemic signal rather than error. The protocol assigns engineered cognitive personas to language models -- separating what a model is from how it reasons -- and introduces an In-Sample/Out-of-Sample validation framework adapted from quantitative finance to distinguish training-data consensus from empirically grounded conclusions. Across 1,478 deliberation sessions spanning 32 topics in 10 domain categories, we demonstrate that (1) the cognitive persona, not the underlying model, determines epistemic behavior: free edge-inference models costing 0.0002 USD per batch produced comparable analytical output to frontier models costing 10.69 USD; (2) RLHF alignment training creates measurable, domain-specific epistemic blind spots -- contested policy topics exhibit 12.3 percentage points less adversarial challenge than settled science topics, and AI safety topics show asymmetric bias (Δ=11.6%) where models challenge claims that AI is dangerous far more vigorously than claims that AI risk is overstated; (3) the protocol exhibits no directional bias of its own (immigration Δ=2.3%, renewables Δ=1.2%); and (4) out-of-sample evidence retrieval validated 239 claims with 100% evidence retrieval and surfaced 167 blind-spot discoveries invisible to training-data deliberation. Run-to-run reproducibility across randomized modeltimespersona assignments averages pm2.2% standard deviation. Total cost for the complete battery including all overhead: 217 USD. We release the protocol specification under MIT license to enable independent verification.

Pedestrians and cyclists are vulnerable road users. They are at greater risk for being killed in a crash than other road users. The percentage of fatal crashes that involve a pedestrian or cyclist is higher than the overall percentage of total trips taken by both modes. Because of this risk, finding ways to minimize problematic street environments is critical. Understanding traffic safety spatial patterns and identifying dangerous locations with significantly high crash risks for pedestrians and cyclists is essential in order to design possible countermeasures to improve road safety. This research develops two indicators for examining spatial correlation patterns between elements of the built environment (intersections) and crashes (pedestrian- or cyclist-involved). The global colocation quotient detects the overall connection in an area while the local colocation quotient identifies the locations of high-risk intersections. To illustrate our approach, we applied the methods to inspect the colocation patterns between pedestrian- or cyclist-vehicle crashes and intersections in Houston, Texas and we identified among many intersections the ones that significantly attract crashes. We also scrutinized those intersections, discussed possible attributes leading to high colocation of crashes and proposed corresponding countermeasures.

Safe navigation is essential for autonomous systems operating in hazardous environments. Traditional planning methods excel at long-horizon tasks but rely on a predefined graph with fixed distance metrics. In contrast, safe Reinforcement Learning (RL) can learn complex behaviors without relying on manual heuristics but fails to solve long-horizon tasks, particularly in goal-conditioned and multi-agent scenarios. In this paper, we introduce a novel method that integrates the strengths of both planning and safe RL. Our method leverages goal-conditioned RL and safe RL to learn a goal-conditioned policy for navigation while concurrently estimating cumulative distance and safety levels using learned value functions via an automated self-training algorithm. By constructing a graph with states from the replay buffer, our method prunes unsafe edges and generates a waypoint-based plan that the agent follows until reaching its goal, effectively balancing faster and safer routes over extended distances. Utilizing this unified high-level graph and a shared low-level goal-conditioned safe RL policy, we extend this approach to address the multi-agent safe navigation problem. In particular, we leverage Conflict-Based Search (CBS) to create waypoint-based plans for multiple agents allowing for their safe navigation over extended horizons. This integration enhances the scalability of goal-conditioned safe RL in multi-agent scenarios, enabling efficient coordination among agents. Extensive benchmarking against state-of-the-art baselines demonstrates the effectiveness of our method in achieving distance goals safely for multiple agents in complex and hazardous environments. Our code and further details about or work is available at https://safe-visual-mapf-mers.csail.mit.edu/.

When an LLM agent reads a confidential file, then writes a summary, then emails it externally, no single step is unsafe, but the sequence is a data leak. We call this safety drift: individually safe actions compounding into violations. Prior work has measured this problem; we predict it. SafetyDrift models agent safety trajectories as absorbing Markov chains, computing the probability that a trajectory will reach a violation within a given number of steps via closed form absorption analysis. A consequence of the monotonic state design is that every agent will eventually violate safety if left unsupervised (absorption probability 1.0 from all states), making the practical question not if but when, and motivating our focus on finite horizon prediction. Across 357 traces spanning 40 realistic tasks in four categories, we discover that "points of no return" are sharply task dependent: in communication tasks, agents that reach even a mild risk state have an 85% chance of violating safety within five steps, while in technical tasks the probability stays below 5% from any state. A lightweight monitor built on these models detects 94.7% of violations with 3.7 steps of advance warning at negligible computational cost, outperforming both keyword matching (44.7% detection, 55.9% false positive rate) and per step LLM judges (52.6% detection, 38.2% false positive rate) while running over 60,000x faster.

Between the first visible sign of danger and the moment an accident occurs, there is often a window where intervention remains possible. Video-capable multimodal large language models (MLLMs) could serve as always-on safety monitors that issue warnings during this window. Yet current benchmarks do not test this ability: they rely on static inputs, ignore timing precision, and omit false-positive measurement on safe scenes. We present PaSBench-Video, a 740-video benchmark with 481 risk and 259 no-risk videos across four domains: driving, healthcare, daily life, and industrial production. Risk videos are annotated with frame-level risk onset and accident boundaries. A model must observe the video causally and produce a warning that is both temporally calibrated and content-correct. Testing 13 MLLMs, we find that no model exceeds 20.0% on our strictest metric, and recall is tightly coupled with false-positive rate, with Pearson correlation 0.64: higher detection comes only at the cost of triggering warnings on the majority of safe clips. Performance splits sharply by domain: models achieve moderate recall at low false-positive rates in daily life, where risks are inherently anomalous, yet fire indiscriminately in driving, where routine and hazardous scenes look alike. These results indicate that current models rely on scene-level activity cues rather than reasoning about emerging harm.

When a phone-use agent avoids harm, does that show safety, or simply inability to act? Existing evaluations often cannot tell. A harmful outcome may be avoided because the agent recognized the risk and chose the safe action, or because it failed to understand the screen or execute any relevant action at all. These cases have different causes and call for different fixes, yet current benchmarks often merge them under task success, refusal, or final harmful outcome. We address this problem with PhoneSafety, a benchmark of 700 safety-critical moments drawn from real phone interactions across more than 130 apps. Each instance isolates the next decision at a risky moment and asks a simple question: does the model take the safe action, take the unsafe action, or fail to do anything useful? We evaluate eight representative phone-use agents under this framework. Our results reveal two main patterns. First, stronger general phone-use ability does not reliably imply safer choices at risky moments. Models that perform better on ordinary app tasks are not always the ones that behave more safely when the next action matters. Second, failures to do anything useful behave like a capability signal rather than a safety signal: they are concentrated in more visually and operationally demanding settings and remain stable when the evaluation protocol changes. Across models, failures split into two recurring patterns: unsafe choices in settings where the model can act but chooses wrongly, and inability to act in more visually and operationally demanding screens. Overall, a harmless outcome is not enough to count as evidence of safety. Evaluating phone-use agents requires separating unsafe judgment from inability to act.

The ideal LLM content moderation system would be both structurally interpretable (so its decisions can be explained to users) and steerable (to reflect a community's values or align to safety standards). However, current systems fall short on both of these dimensions. To address this gap, we present SafetyAnalyst, a novel LLM safety moderation framework. Given a prompt, SafetyAnalyst creates a structured "harm-benefit tree," which identifies 1) the actions that could be taken if a compliant response were provided, 2) the harmful and beneficial effects of those actions (along with their likelihood, severity, and immediacy), and 3) the stakeholders that would be impacted by those effects. It then aggregates this structured representation into a harmfulness score based on a parameterized set of safety preferences, which can be transparently aligned to particular values. Using extensive harm-benefit features generated by SOTA LLMs on 19k prompts, we fine-tuned an open-weight LM to specialize in generating harm-benefit trees through symbolic knowledge distillation. On a comprehensive set of prompt safety benchmarks, we show that our system (average F1=0.75) outperforms existing LLM safety moderation systems (average F1<0.72) on prompt harmfulness classification, while offering the additional advantages of interpretability and steerability.

MLLMs are increasingly deployed in multi-turn settings, where attackers can escalate unsafe intent through the evolving visual-text history and exploit long-context safety decay. Yet safety alignment is still dominated by single-turn data and fixed-template dialogues, leaving a mismatch between training and deployment. To bridge this gap, we propose SaFeR-Steer, a progressive multi-turn alignment framework that combines staged synthetic bootstrapping with tutor-in-the-loop GRPO to train a single student under adaptive, on-policy attacks. We also introduce Trajectory-Consistent Summative Reward (TCSR), which aggregates the historical minimum and average of turn rewards so that any low-quality turn affects the trajectory-level return. I. Dataset. We release STEER, a multi-turn multimodal safety dataset with STEER-SFT (12,934), STEER-RL (2,000), and STEER-Bench (3,227) dialogues spanning 2-10 turns. II. Experiment. Starting from Qwen2.5-VL-3B/7B, SaFeR-Steer substantially improves Safety/Helpfulness on both single-turn (48.30/45.86 rightarrow 81.84/70.77 for 3B; 56.21/60.32 rightarrow 87.89/77.40 for 7B) and multi-turn benchmarks (12.55/27.13 rightarrow 55.58/70.27 for 3B; 24.66/46.48 rightarrow 64.89/72.35 for 7B), shifting failures to later turns and yielding robustness beyond scaling alone. Code is available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/SaFeR-Steer

Safety is critical to broadening the application of reinforcement learning (RL). Often, we train RL agents in a controlled environment, such as a laboratory, before deploying them in the real world. However, the real-world target task might be unknown prior to deployment. Reward-free RL trains an agent without the reward to adapt quickly once the reward is revealed. We consider the constrained reward-free setting, where an agent (the guide) learns to explore safely without the reward signal. This agent is trained in a controlled environment, which allows unsafe interactions and still provides the safety signal. After the target task is revealed, safety violations are not allowed anymore. Thus, the guide is leveraged to compose a safe behaviour policy. Drawing from transfer learning, we also regularize a target policy (the student) towards the guide while the student is unreliable and gradually eliminate the influence of the guide as training progresses. The empirical analysis shows that this method can achieve safe transfer learning and helps the student solve the target task faster.

We examine two properties of AI systems: capability (what a system can do) and steerability (how reliably one can shift behavior toward intended outcomes). A central question is whether capability growth reduces steerability and risks control collapse. We also distinguish between authorized steerability (builders reliably reaching intended behaviors) and unauthorized steerability (attackers eliciting disallowed behaviors). This distinction highlights a fundamental safety--security dilemma of AI models: safety requires high steerability to enforce control (e.g., stop/refuse), while security requires low steerability for malicious actors to elicit harmful behaviors. This tension presents a significant challenge for open-weight models, which currently exhibit high steerability via common techniques like fine-tuning or adversarial attacks. Using Qwen3 and InstrumentalEval, we find that a short anti-instrumental prompt suffix sharply reduces the measured convergence rate (e.g., shutdown avoidance, self-replication). For Qwen3-30B Instruct, the convergence rate drops from 81.69% under a pro-instrumental suffix to 2.82% under an anti-instrumental suffix. Under anti-instrumental prompting, larger aligned models show lower convergence rates than smaller ones (Instruct: 2.82% vs. 4.23%; Thinking: 4.23% vs. 9.86%). Code is available at github.com/j-hoscilowicz/instrumental_steering.

Recent advancements in multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have shown strong understanding of driving scenes, drawing interest in their application to autonomous driving. However, high-level reasoning in safety-critical scenarios, where avoiding one traffic risk can create another, remains a major challenge. Such reasoning is often infeasible with only a single front view and requires a comprehensive view of the environment, which we achieve through multi-view inputs. We define Safety-Critical Reasoning as a new task that leverages multi-view inputs to address this challenge. Then, we distill Safety-Critical Reasoning into two stages: first resolve the immediate risk, then mitigate the decision-induced downstream risks. To support this, we introduce WaymoQA, a dataset of 35,000 human-annotated question-answer pairs covering complex, high-risk driving scenarios. The dataset includes multiple-choice and open-ended formats across both image and video modalities. Experiments reveal that existing MLLMs underperform in safety-critical scenarios compared to normal scenes, but fine-tuning with WaymoQA significantly improves their reasoning ability, highlighting the effectiveness of our dataset in developing safer and more reasoning-capable driving agents. Our code and data are provided in https://github.com/sjyu001/WaymoQA

Safety alignment is an important procedure before the official deployment of a Large Language Model (LLM). While safety alignment has been extensively studied for LLM, there is still a large research gap for Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) that equip with improved reasoning capability. We in this paper systematically examine a simplified pipeline for producing safety aligned LRMs. With our evaluation of various LRMs, we deliver two main findings: i) Safety alignment can be done upon the LRM to restore its safety capability. ii) Safety alignment leads to a degradation of the reasoning capability of LRMs. The two findings show that there exists a trade-off between reasoning and safety capability with the sequential LRM production pipeline. The discovered trade-off, which we name Safety Tax, should shed light on future endeavors of safety research on LRMs. As a by-product, we curate a dataset called DirectRefusal, which might serve as an alternative dataset for safety alignment. Our source code is available at https://github.com/git-disl/Safety-Tax.

Long-running LLM agents act through tools, and a single step can send an email, merge a pull request, or wire a payment. The steering decision is the pre-commit choice at that boundary: proceed, or hold for human or policy review. We introduce SteerBench-Work, an incident-anchored, bidirectional benchmark for that decision in workplace agents across developer operations, customer service, finance, legal, medical, HR, and security. Release v2026-05 contains 106 scenarios anchored in public incidents, paired evidence-reversed mirrors, and calibration controls, with labels split nearly evenly between proceed and hold so the two error directions get near-identical numbers of chances. A model sees the proposed action and the available evidence, returns a gate decision, and is scored on whether it crosses or holds the boundary correctly. Across 30 model conditions the failures run almost entirely in one direction: models wrongly hold authorized, evidence-cleared work on 28.1% of opportunities and wrongly allow unsafe work on 1.0%. The hardest cases are risk-resolved commits, where signed or structured evidence has already cleared a real risk trigger, and models score markedly worse on evidence-reversed mirrors of famous incidents (63.8%) than on the incidents themselves (98.5%). General capability is not the same as steering calibration: higher-capability models often over-refuse at the commit boundary, and more reasoning can repair a weak gate while leaving a calibrated one flat. The public leaderboard is at steerbench.com.

Driving on roads is restricted by various traffic rules, aiming to ensure safety for all traffic participants. However, human road users usually do not adhere to these rules strictly, resulting in varying degrees of rule conformity. Such deviations from given rules are key components of today's road traffic. In autonomous driving, robotic agents can disturb traffic flow, when rule deviations are not taken into account. In this paper, we present an approach to derive the distribution of degrees of rule conformity from human driving data. We demonstrate our method with the Waymo Open Motion dataset and Safety Distance and Speed Limit rules.

Safety alignment is crucial to ensure that large language models (LLMs) behave in ways that align with human preferences and prevent harmful actions during inference. However, recent studies show that the alignment can be easily compromised through finetuning with only a few adversarially designed training examples. We aim to measure the risks in finetuning LLMs through navigating the LLM safety landscape. We discover a new phenomenon observed universally in the model parameter space of popular open-source LLMs, termed as "safety basin": random perturbations to model weights maintain the safety level of the original aligned model within its local neighborhood. However, outside this local region, safety is fully compromised, exhibiting a sharp, step-like drop. This safety basin contrasts sharply with the LLM capability landscape, where model performance peaks at the origin and gradually declines as random perturbation increases. Our discovery inspires us to propose the new VISAGE safety metric that measures the safety in LLM finetuning by probing its safety landscape. Visualizing the safety landscape of the aligned model enables us to understand how finetuning compromises safety by dragging the model away from the safety basin. The LLM safety landscape also highlights the system prompt's critical role in protecting a model, and that such protection transfers to its perturbed variants within the safety basin. These observations from our safety landscape research provide new insights for future work on LLM safety community. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/ShengYun-Peng/llm-landscape.

Large language models (LLMs) typically deploy safety mechanisms to prevent harmful content generation. Most current approaches focus narrowly on risks posed by malicious actors, often framing risks as adversarial events and relying on defensive refusals. However, in real-world settings, risks also come from non-malicious users seeking help while under psychological distress (e.g., self-harm intentions). In such cases, the model's response can strongly influence the user's next actions. Simple refusals may lead them to repeat, escalate, or move to unsafe platforms, creating worse outcomes. We introduce Constructive Safety Alignment (CSA), a human-centric paradigm that protects against malicious misuse while actively guiding vulnerable users toward safe and helpful results. Implemented in Oyster-I (Oy1), CSA combines game-theoretic anticipation of user reactions, fine-grained risk boundary discovery, and interpretable reasoning control, turning safety into a trust-building process. Oy1 achieves state-of-the-art safety among open models while retaining high general capabilities. On our Constructive Benchmark, it shows strong constructive engagement, close to GPT-5, and unmatched robustness on the Strata-Sword jailbreak dataset, nearing GPT-o1 levels. By shifting from refusal-first to guidance-first safety, CSA redefines the model-user relationship, aiming for systems that are not just safe, but meaningfully helpful. We release Oy1, code, and the benchmark to support responsible, user-centered AI.

Density of the reachable states can help understand the risk of safety-critical systems, especially in situations when worst-case reachability is too conservative. Recent work provides a data-driven approach to compute the density distribution of autonomous systems' forward reachable states online. In this paper, we study the use of such approach in combination with model predictive control for verifiable safe path planning under uncertainties. We first use the learned density distribution to compute the risk of collision online. If such risk exceeds the acceptable threshold, our method will plan for a new path around the previous trajectory, with the risk of collision below the threshold. Our method is well-suited to handle systems with uncertainties and complicated dynamics as our data-driven approach does not need an analytical form of the systems' dynamics and can estimate forward state density with an arbitrary initial distribution of uncertainties. We design two challenging scenarios (autonomous driving and hovercraft control) for safe motion planning in environments with obstacles under system uncertainties. We first show that our density estimation approach can reach a similar accuracy as the Monte-Carlo-based method while using only 0.01X training samples. By leveraging the estimated risk, our algorithm achieves the highest success rate in goal reaching when enforcing the safety rate above 0.99.

Walking has always been a primary mode of transportation and is recognized as an essential activity for maintaining good health. Despite the need for safe walking conditions in urban environments, sidewalks are frequently obstructed by various obstacles that hinder free pedestrian movement. Any object obstructing a pedestrian's path can pose a safety hazard. The advancement of pervasive computing and egocentric vision techniques offers the potential to design systems that can automatically detect such obstacles in real time, thereby enhancing pedestrian safety. The development of effective and efficient identification algorithms relies on the availability of comprehensive and well-balanced datasets of egocentric data. In this work, we introduce the PEDESTRIAN dataset, comprising egocentric data for 29 different obstacles commonly found on urban sidewalks. A total of 340 videos were collected using mobile phone cameras, capturing a pedestrian's point of view. Additionally, we present the results of a series of experiments that involved training several state-of-the-art deep learning algorithms using the proposed dataset, which can be used as a benchmark for obstacle detection and recognition tasks. The dataset can be used for training pavement obstacle detectors to enhance the safety of pedestrians in urban areas.

Existing agent-safety evaluation has focused mainly on externally induced risks. Yet agents may still enter unsafe trajectories under benign conditions. We study this complementary but underexplored setting through the lens of intrinsic risk, where intrinsic failures remain latent, propagate across long-horizon execution, and eventually lead to high-consequence outcomes. To evaluate this setting, we introduce non-attack intrinsic risk auditing and present HINTBench, a benchmark of 629 agent trajectories (523 risky, 106 safe; 33 steps on average) supporting three tasks: risk detection, risk-step localization, and intrinsic failure-type identification. Its annotations are organized under a unified five-constraint taxonomy. Experiments reveal a substantial capability gap: strong LLMs perform well on trajectory-level risk detection, but their performance drops to below 35 Strict-F1 on risk-step localization, while fine-grained failure diagnosis proves even harder. Existing guard models transfer poorly to this setting. These findings establish intrinsic risk auditing as an open challenge for agent safety.

We present a fast algorithm for the design of smooth paths (or trajectories) that are constrained to lie in a collection of axis-aligned boxes. We consider the case where the number of these safe boxes is large, and basic preprocessing of them (such as finding their intersections) can be done offline. At runtime we quickly generate a smooth path between given initial and terminal positions. Our algorithm designs trajectories that are guaranteed to be safe at all times, and detects infeasibility whenever such a trajectory does not exist. Our algorithm is based on two subproblems that we can solve very efficiently: finding a shortest path in a weighted graph, and solving (multiple) convex optimal-control problems. We demonstrate the proposed path planner on large-scale numerical examples, and we provide an efficient open-source software implementation, fastpathplanning.

Vision-language-action models (VLAs) have shown great potential as generalist robot policies. However, these models pose urgent safety challenges during deployment, including the risk of physical harm to the environment, the robot itself, and humans. How can safety be explicitly incorporated into VLAs? In this work, we propose SafeVLA, a novel algorithm designed to integrate safety into VLAs, ensuring the protection of the environment, robot hardware and humans in real-world settings. SafeVLA effectively balances safety and task performance by employing large-scale constrained learning within simulated environments. We demonstrate that SafeVLA outperforms the current state-of-the-art method in both safety and task performance, achieving average improvements of 83.58% and 3.85%, respectively, in simulation. By prioritizing safety, our approach eliminates high-risk behaviors and reduces the upper bound of unsafe behaviors to 1/35 of that in the current state-of-the-art, thereby significantly mitigating long-tail risks. Furthermore, the learned safety constraints generalize to diverse, unseen scenarios, including multiple out-of-distribution perturbations and tasks. Our data, models and newly proposed benchmark environment are available at https://sites.google.com/view/pku-safevla.

Aerial robots can enhance construction site productivity by autonomously handling inspection and mapping tasks. However, ensuring safe navigation near human workers remains challenging. While navigation in static environments has been well studied, navigating dynamic environments remains open due to challenges in perception and planning. Payload limitations restrict the robots to using cameras with limited fields of view, resulting in unreliable perception and tracking during collision avoidance. Moreover, the rapidly changing conditions of dynamic environments can quickly make the generated optimal trajectory outdated.To address these challenges, this paper presents a comprehensive navigation framework that integrates perception, intent prediction, and planning. Our perception module detects and tracks dynamic obstacles efficiently and handles tracking loss and occlusion during collision avoidance. The proposed intent prediction module employs a Markov Decision Process (MDP) to forecast potential actions of dynamic obstacles with the possible future trajectories. Finally, a novel intent-based planning algorithm, leveraging model predictive control (MPC), is applied to generate navigation trajectories. Simulation and physical experiments demonstrate that our method improves the safety of navigation by achieving the fewest collisions compared to benchmarks.

Finetuning large language models (LLMs) enables user-specific customization but introduces critical safety risks: even a few harmful examples can compromise safety alignment. A common mitigation strategy is to update the model more strongly on examples deemed safe, while downweighting or excluding those flagged as unsafe. However, because safety context can shift within a single example, updating the model equally on both harmful and harmless parts of a response is suboptimal-a coarse treatment we term static safety shaping. In contrast, we propose dynamic safety shaping (DSS), a framework that uses fine-grained safety signals to reinforce learning from safe segments of a response while suppressing unsafe content. To enable such fine-grained control during finetuning, we introduce a key insight: guardrail models, traditionally used for filtering, can be repurposed to evaluate partial responses, tracking how safety risk evolves throughout the response, segment by segment. This leads to the Safety Trajectory Assessment of Response (STAR), a token-level signal that enables shaping to operate dynamically over the training sequence. Building on this, we present STAR-DSS, guided by STAR scores, that robustly mitigates finetuning risks and delivers substantial safety improvements across diverse threats, datasets, and model families-all without compromising capability on intended tasks. We encourage future safety research to build on dynamic shaping principles for stronger mitigation against evolving finetuning risks.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used for medical and health-related questions, yet their safety in high-risk medical scenarios remains poorly understood. We introduce MedHarmCode and data will be released upon acceptance. Due to the sensitive nature of high-risk medical queries, data access will be available to qualified researchers upon request., a high-risk medical safety benchmark with 1,100 medically grounded queries across 10 safety-critical categories, including toxicology, pharmacology, covert poisoning, anesthesia, and fetal harm. Unlike broad medical QA benchmarks, MedHarm targets realistic clinical, educational, and technical prompts that require refusal, caution, or safe redirection rather than direct helpfulness. We evaluate 15 LLMs spanning general-purpose, medical-purpose, closed-source, and downstream SFT models, together with 4 representative guardrail models. Results reveal a substantial gap between apparent alignment and medical safety: aligned models can still produce unsafe or actionable responses, medical fine-tuning can amplify harmful specificity, and external guardrails reduce some failures while introducing brittle blocking and weak safe helpfulness. These findings show that medical safety cannot be inferred from general alignment or medical capability alone, highlighting the need for domain-specific stress testing before deploying LLMs in safety-critical medical applications.

This work presents a novel online model-predictive trajectory planner for robotic manipulators called BoundMPC. This planner allows the collision-free following of Cartesian reference paths in the end-effector's position and orientation, including via-points, within desired asymmetric bounds of the orthogonal path error. The path parameter synchronizes the position and orientation reference paths. The decomposition of the path error into the tangential direction, describing the path progress, and the orthogonal direction, which represents the deviation from the path, is well known for the position from the path-following control in the literature. This paper extends this idea to the orientation by utilizing the Lie theory of rotations. Moreover, the orthogonal error plane is further decomposed into basis directions to define asymmetric Cartesian error bounds easily. Using piecewise linear position and orientation reference paths with via-points is computationally very efficient and allows replanning the pose trajectories during the robot's motion. This feature makes it possible to use this planner for dynamically changing environments and varying goals. The flexibility and performance of BoundMPC are experimentally demonstrated by two scenarios on a 7-DoF Kuka LBR iiwa 14 R820 robot. The first scenario shows the transfer of a larger object from a start to a goal pose through a confined space where the object must be tilted. The second scenario deals with grasping an object from a table where the grasping point changes during the robot's motion, and collisions with other obstacles in the scene must be avoided.

Robots must operate safely when deployed in novel and human-centered environments, like homes. Current safe control approaches typically assume that the safety constraints are known a priori, and thus, the robot can pre-compute a corresponding safety controller. While this may make sense for some safety constraints (e.g., avoiding collision with walls by analyzing a floor plan), other constraints are more complex (e.g., spills), inherently personal, context-dependent, and can only be identified at deployment time when the robot is interacting in a specific environment and with a specific person (e.g., fragile objects, expensive rugs). Here, language provides a flexible mechanism to communicate these evolving safety constraints to the robot. In this work, we use vision language models (VLMs) to interpret language feedback and the robot's image observations to continuously update the robot's representation of safety constraints. With these inferred constraints, we update a Hamilton-Jacobi reachability safety controller online via efficient warm-starting techniques. Through simulation and hardware experiments, we demonstrate the robot's ability to infer and respect language-based safety constraints with the proposed approach.

LLMs are trained to refuse harmful instructions, but do they truly understand harmfulness beyond just refusing? Prior work has shown that LLMs' refusal behaviors can be mediated by a one-dimensional subspace, i.e., a refusal direction. In this work, we identify a new dimension to analyze safety mechanisms in LLMs, i.e., harmfulness, which is encoded internally as a separate concept from refusal. There exists a harmfulness direction that is distinct from the refusal direction. As causal evidence, steering along the harmfulness direction can lead LLMs to interpret harmless instructions as harmful, but steering along the refusal direction tends to elicit refusal responses directly without reversing the model's judgment on harmfulness. Furthermore, using our identified harmfulness concept, we find that certain jailbreak methods work by reducing the refusal signals without reversing the model's internal belief of harmfulness. We also find that adversarially finetuning models to accept harmful instructions has minimal impact on the model's internal belief of harmfulness. These insights lead to a practical safety application: The model's latent harmfulness representation can serve as an intrinsic safeguard (Latent Guard) for detecting unsafe inputs and reducing over-refusals that is robust to finetuning attacks. For instance, our Latent Guard achieves performance comparable to or better than Llama Guard 3 8B, a dedicated finetuned safeguard model, across different jailbreak methods. Our findings suggest that LLMs' internal understanding of harmfulness is more robust than their refusal decision to diverse input instructions, offering a new perspective to study AI safety

This article presents an in-depth review of the topic of path following for autonomous robotic vehicles, with a specific focus on vehicle motion in two dimensional space (2D). From a control system standpoint, path following can be formulated as the problem of stabilizing a path following error system that describes the dynamics of position and possibly orientation errors of a vehicle with respect to a path, with the errors defined in an appropriate reference frame. In spite of the large variety of path following methods described in the literature we show that, in principle, most of them can be categorized in two groups: stabilization of the path following error system expressed either in the vehicle's body frame or in a frame attached to a "reference point" moving along the path, such as a Frenet-Serret (F-S) frame or a Parallel Transport (P-T) frame. With this observation, we provide a unified formulation that is simple but general enough to cover many methods available in the literature. We then discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each method, comparing them from the design and implementation standpoint. We further show experimental results of the path following methods obtained from field trials testing with under-actuated and fully-actuated autonomous marine vehicles. In addition, we introduce open-source Matlab and Gazebo/ROS simulation toolboxes that are helpful in testing path following methods prior to their integration in the combined guidance, navigation, and control systems of autonomous vehicles.