Spaces:
Running
Running
chore(sync): mirror static/3d kit + Dockerfile-COPY'd web/*.html to Space (hf-sync)
Browse filesAutomated 3D/web-page asset sync from szl-holdings/a11oy main via hf-sync.
web/*.html set parsed live from the Dockerfile COPY directives.
Added/updated: 48 file(s)
Deleted (gone from GitHub main): (none)
Keeps static/3d/** and every Dockerfile-COPY'd web/<page>.html identical
to GitHub main so an HF factory rebuild never drops a GitHub edit (closes
the chronic hf-module-drift red for the 3D kit + baked web pages).
- web/defense-readiness.html +255 -0
- web/signature-is-not-proof.html +350 -0
web/defense-readiness.html
ADDED
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@@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
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|
| 1 |
+
<!DOCTYPE html>
|
| 2 |
+
<!--
|
| 3 |
+
a11oy · DEFENSE READINESS — public showcase summary (showcase lane).
|
| 4 |
+
© 2026 Lutar, Stephen P. — SZL Holdings. SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
|
| 5 |
+
0 runtime CDN: system fonts only, no external scripts. This is a PUBLIC fit +
|
| 6 |
+
honest-maturity summary. It deliberately exposes NO private application content
|
| 7 |
+
(DARPA / JIATF / NATO / AFWERX submissions are private). It shows the FIT, the
|
| 8 |
+
honest maturity (MODELED bounds + live signed software APIs, NOT flown hardware),
|
| 9 |
+
and links each pathway to the relevant LIVE a11oy surface. Live surfaces are
|
| 10 |
+
probed via fetch with an HONEST NO-LIVE-DATA fallback (doctrine v11).
|
| 11 |
+
-->
|
| 12 |
+
<html lang="en">
|
| 13 |
+
<head>
|
| 14 |
+
<meta charset="utf-8"/>
|
| 15 |
+
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1"/>
|
| 16 |
+
<title>a11oy · Defense Readiness</title>
|
| 17 |
+
<style>
|
| 18 |
+
:root{
|
| 19 |
+
--bg:#0a0e14; --panel:#121823; --panel2:#0f141d; --line:#1f2a3a;
|
| 20 |
+
--ink:#e6edf3; --mut:#8b98a9; --acc:#5ad1c9; --acc2:#7aa2f7;
|
| 21 |
+
--ok:#3fb950; --warn:#d29922; --err:#f85149; --road:#a371f7;
|
| 22 |
+
}
|
| 23 |
+
*{box-sizing:border-box}
|
| 24 |
+
body{margin:0;background:var(--bg);color:var(--ink);
|
| 25 |
+
font:14px/1.6 ui-monospace,SFMono-Regular,Menlo,Consolas,monospace}
|
| 26 |
+
header{padding:18px 22px;border-bottom:1px solid var(--line);
|
| 27 |
+
background:linear-gradient(180deg,#0d1320,#0a0e14)}
|
| 28 |
+
h1{margin:0;font-size:19px;letter-spacing:.3px}
|
| 29 |
+
.sub{color:var(--mut);font-size:12px;margin-top:4px;max-width:980px}
|
| 30 |
+
.nav{margin-top:10px;display:flex;gap:14px;flex-wrap:wrap;font-size:12px}
|
| 31 |
+
.nav a{color:var(--acc2);text-decoration:none}
|
| 32 |
+
.nav a:hover{text-decoration:underline}
|
| 33 |
+
.wrap{max-width:1080px;margin:0 auto;padding:22px}
|
| 34 |
+
section{margin:0 0 26px}
|
| 35 |
+
.eyebrow{color:var(--acc);font-size:11px;letter-spacing:.16em;text-transform:uppercase;margin-bottom:6px}
|
| 36 |
+
h2{font-size:16px;letter-spacing:.3px;margin:0 0 10px}
|
| 37 |
+
h3{font-size:14px;letter-spacing:.2px;margin:0 0 6px;color:var(--acc)}
|
| 38 |
+
p{margin:0 0 12px}
|
| 39 |
+
.lede{font-size:15px;color:#cdd8e6}
|
| 40 |
+
.card{background:var(--panel);border:1px solid var(--line);border-radius:10px;padding:16px 18px;margin:0 0 14px}
|
| 41 |
+
.quote{border-left:3px solid var(--acc);background:var(--panel2);padding:12px 16px;border-radius:0 8px 8px 0;color:#cdd8e6;margin:0 0 14px}
|
| 42 |
+
.pill{display:inline-block;padding:2px 9px;border-radius:999px;font-size:11px;border:1px solid var(--line);white-space:nowrap}
|
| 43 |
+
.pill.ok,.pill.live{color:var(--ok);border-color:#163a1f;background:#0e2113}
|
| 44 |
+
.pill.err{color:var(--err);border-color:#4a1c1c;background:#240f0f}
|
| 45 |
+
.pill.warn{color:var(--warn);border-color:#3a3015;background:#1f1a0a}
|
| 46 |
+
.pill.road{color:var(--road);border-color:#2e2147;background:#160f24}
|
| 47 |
+
.pill.acc{color:var(--acc);border-color:#13403c;background:#0a201e}
|
| 48 |
+
.pill.modeled{color:var(--warn);border-color:#3a3015;background:#1f1a0a}
|
| 49 |
+
.grid{display:grid;gap:14px;grid-template-columns:repeat(auto-fit,minmax(330px,1fr))}
|
| 50 |
+
.path{background:var(--panel);border:1px solid var(--line);border-radius:10px;padding:16px 18px;display:flex;flex-direction:column}
|
| 51 |
+
.path .head{display:flex;align-items:flex-start;justify-content:space-between;gap:10px;margin-bottom:6px}
|
| 52 |
+
.path h3{margin:2px 0 2px}
|
| 53 |
+
.path .org{color:var(--mut);font-size:11px;letter-spacing:.05em}
|
| 54 |
+
.path .body{color:#c4d0de;flex:1;margin-top:8px}
|
| 55 |
+
.path .fit{margin-top:10px;font-size:12.5px}
|
| 56 |
+
.path .fit b{color:var(--ink)}
|
| 57 |
+
.path .surface{margin-top:10px;padding-top:10px;border-top:1px dotted #1a2435;font-size:12px}
|
| 58 |
+
.live-line{display:flex;align-items:center;gap:8px;margin-top:6px;font-size:12px}
|
| 59 |
+
.live-line .v{color:var(--ink);word-break:break-word}
|
| 60 |
+
.live-line .v a{color:var(--acc2)}
|
| 61 |
+
table{width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;font-size:12.5px;margin:6px 0}
|
| 62 |
+
th,td{text-align:left;padding:8px 10px;border-bottom:1px solid #1a2435;vertical-align:top}
|
| 63 |
+
th{color:var(--mut);font-weight:600}
|
| 64 |
+
a{color:var(--acc2)}
|
| 65 |
+
code{color:var(--acc2);font-size:12px}
|
| 66 |
+
.cite{color:var(--mut);font-size:11.5px;margin-top:8px;line-height:1.6}
|
| 67 |
+
.cite a{color:var(--acc2)}
|
| 68 |
+
footer{color:var(--mut);font-size:11px;padding:18px 22px;border-top:1px solid var(--line);line-height:1.7}
|
| 69 |
+
@media(max-width:640px){.wrap{padding:16px}}
|
| 70 |
+
</style>
|
| 71 |
+
</head>
|
| 72 |
+
<body>
|
| 73 |
+
<header>
|
| 74 |
+
<h1>a11oy · Defense Readiness</h1>
|
| 75 |
+
<div class="sub">SZL Holdings is aligned to multiple federal and allied innovation pathways. This page
|
| 76 |
+
shows the <b>fit</b> and the <b>honest maturity</b> — MODELED physics bounds + live signed software APIs,
|
| 77 |
+
<b>not flown hardware</b> — and links each pathway to the live a11oy surface that backs it. It exposes
|
| 78 |
+
no private submission content. Every maturity claim labelled <span class="pill modeled">MODELED</span>
|
| 79 |
+
<span class="pill live">LIVE</span> <span class="pill road">ROADMAP</span>.</div>
|
| 80 |
+
<nav class="nav">
|
| 81 |
+
<a href="/console/">← Console</a>
|
| 82 |
+
<a href="/signature-is-not-proof">Signature ≠ Proof case study</a>
|
| 83 |
+
<a href="/compliance">Compliance crosswalk</a>
|
| 84 |
+
<a href="/governance">Governance</a>
|
| 85 |
+
</nav>
|
| 86 |
+
</header>
|
| 87 |
+
|
| 88 |
+
<div class="wrap">
|
| 89 |
+
|
| 90 |
+
<section>
|
| 91 |
+
<div class="eyebrow">Posture</div>
|
| 92 |
+
<p class="lede">SZL builds on an explicit doctrine of <b>honest maturity</b>: we publish what is
|
| 93 |
+
MEASURED, label what is MODELED, and claim only what has a checkable artifact. The differentiator is
|
| 94 |
+
not a flown prototype — it is <b>verifiable provenance + assurance, sovereign on-metal compute</b>,
|
| 95 |
+
and a refusal to overclaim. Below: where a11oy and its surfaces fit federal pathways, and exactly how
|
| 96 |
+
mature each claim is.</p>
|
| 97 |
+
<div class="quote"><b>What we are.</b> A governed-AI command platform (deny-by-default 8-gate policy
|
| 98 |
+
engine, DSSE-signed verdicts/receipts, supply-chain assurance mesh, hash-chained governance ledger,
|
| 99 |
+
hybrid post-quantum signing) plus MODELED hard-physics PNT bounds and a sense-and-evidence counter-UAS
|
| 100 |
+
surface. <b>What we are not.</b> We do not claim flown hardware, a fielded prototype, or “proven trust.”
|
| 101 |
+
Λ is Conjecture 1 — advisory, < 1.0, never a theorem.</div>
|
| 102 |
+
</section>
|
| 103 |
+
|
| 104 |
+
<section>
|
| 105 |
+
<div class="eyebrow">Federal & allied pathways · fit + honest maturity</div>
|
| 106 |
+
<h2>Where we align</h2>
|
| 107 |
+
<div class="grid">
|
| 108 |
+
|
| 109 |
+
<!-- DARPA PINPOINT -->
|
| 110 |
+
<div class="path">
|
| 111 |
+
<div class="head">
|
| 112 |
+
<div><h3>DARPA PINPOINT</h3><div class="org">DSO · DARPA-SN-26-88 · PNT</div></div>
|
| 113 |
+
<span class="pill modeled">MODELED</span>
|
| 114 |
+
</div>
|
| 115 |
+
<div class="body">Precision Inertial Navigation & Positioning — highly accurate nav/positioning
|
| 116 |
+
where GPS is unavailable or unreliable. Our PNT engine is a clean-room, closed-form quantum-sensing
|
| 117 |
+
and GNSS-resilience stack.</div>
|
| 118 |
+
<div class="fit"><b>Fit:</b> closed-form cold-atom interferometer sensitivity certificate
|
| 119 |
+
(at/above the Standard Quantum Limit), RAIM/AGC/SQM deny-by-default spoof fusion, GPS-denied
|
| 120 |
+
coasting figure-of-merit, and fundamental compute/energy bounds — all served as live signed
|
| 121 |
+
software APIs.</div>
|
| 122 |
+
<div class="surface">
|
| 123 |
+
<b>Honest maturity:</b> MODELED closed-form physics (stdlib, deterministic), <b>not flown
|
| 124 |
+
hardware</b>. The sensor certificate is labelled MODELED · STRUCTURAL-ONLY.
|
| 125 |
+
<div class="live-line" id="pnt-live"><span class="pill warn">checking…</span><span class="v">PNT mesh</span></div>
|
| 126 |
+
</div>
|
| 127 |
+
<div class="cite">Special Notice (advance notice of a future program); responses due Jul 13, 2026.
|
| 128 |
+
<a href="https://www.highergov.com/contract-opportunity/future-program-announcement-precision-inertial-na-darpa-sn-26-88-s-4a1f7/">DARPA-SN-26-88</a></div>
|
| 129 |
+
</div>
|
| 130 |
+
|
| 131 |
+
<!-- JIATF 401 -->
|
| 132 |
+
<div class="path">
|
| 133 |
+
<div class="head">
|
| 134 |
+
<div><h3>JIATF 401</h3><div class="org">NDAA FY26 §912 · counter-sUAS T&E</div></div>
|
| 135 |
+
<span class="pill live">LIVE</span>
|
| 136 |
+
</div>
|
| 137 |
+
<div class="body">Joint Interagency Task Force 401 approves counter-sUAS systems for Department use
|
| 138 |
+
and published standardized C-UAS test & evaluation criteria (Apr 28, 2026). Our counter-UAS
|
| 139 |
+
surface <b>senses and evidences</b> — it does not jam, spoof, take over, or kinetically defeat.</div>
|
| 140 |
+
<div class="fit"><b>Fit:</b> forensic-evidence and rules-of-engagement alignment — a live Λ decision
|
| 141 |
+
plus an ECDSA-P256 DSSE-signed forensic verdict, verified drone fingerprints, and a Remote-ID
|
| 142 |
+
validator. The value is <b>admissible, replayable evidence</b>, not effects.</div>
|
| 143 |
+
<div class="surface">
|
| 144 |
+
<b>Honest maturity:</b> live sense-and-evidence surface with signed verdicts; each T&E
|
| 145 |
+
criterion is crosswalked honestly as Demonstrated / Modeled / Not-yet / Out-of-scope — never
|
| 146 |
+
assumed.
|
| 147 |
+
<div class="live-line" id="elite-live"><span class="pill warn">checking…</span><span class="v">Counter-UAS surface</span></div>
|
| 148 |
+
</div>
|
| 149 |
+
<div class="cite">Criteria published Apr 28, 2026.
|
| 150 |
+
<a href="https://www.war.gov/News/Releases/External/Article/4473626/jiatf-401-publishes-testing-and-evaluation-criteria-to-inform-future-demonstrat/">war.gov</a></div>
|
| 151 |
+
</div>
|
| 152 |
+
|
| 153 |
+
<!-- NATO DIANA -->
|
| 154 |
+
<div class="path">
|
| 155 |
+
<div class="head">
|
| 156 |
+
<div><h3>NATO DIANA</h3><div class="org">Defence Innovation Accelerator · dual-use</div></div>
|
| 157 |
+
<span class="pill acc">FIT</span>
|
| 158 |
+
</div>
|
| 159 |
+
<div class="body">DIANA accelerates dual-use deep tech across the alliance. a11oy’s governed-AI
|
| 160 |
+
assurance and sovereign-compute provenance are dual-use by construction — civilian supply-chain
|
| 161 |
+
integrity and defense AI governance share the same substrate.</div>
|
| 162 |
+
<div class="fit"><b>Fit:</b> verifiable provenance + assurance mesh (3-axis attestation, C2PA
|
| 163 |
+
content credentials, hash-chained ledger), aligned to EU AI Act Article 50 (effective Aug 2, 2026)
|
| 164 |
+
and NIST AI RMF / ISO 42001 via a live compliance crosswalk.</div>
|
| 165 |
+
<div class="surface">
|
| 166 |
+
<b>Honest maturity:</b> live signed software APIs + compliance crosswalk; trans-Atlantic
|
| 167 |
+
deployment is a roadmap engagement, labelled as such.
|
| 168 |
+
<div class="live-line" id="comp-live"><span class="pill warn">checking…</span><span class="v">Compliance crosswalk</span></div>
|
| 169 |
+
</div>
|
| 170 |
+
</div>
|
| 171 |
+
|
| 172 |
+
<!-- AFWERX SBIR -->
|
| 173 |
+
<div class="path">
|
| 174 |
+
<div class="head">
|
| 175 |
+
<div><h3>AFWERX SBIR</h3><div class="org">Dept. of the Air Force · small-business R&D</div></div>
|
| 176 |
+
<span class="pill acc">FIT</span>
|
| 177 |
+
</div>
|
| 178 |
+
<div class="body">AFWERX SBIR funds small-business innovation with a defense transition path. As a
|
| 179 |
+
US-based small business (NAICS 541715, <500 employees) with live, signed, sovereign-compute
|
| 180 |
+
software, SZL fits the R&D-to-transition model.</div>
|
| 181 |
+
<div class="fit"><b>Fit:</b> governed counter-UAS sense-and-evidence + AI-governance assurance — a
|
| 182 |
+
software-first capability with a clear dual-use transition and a verifiable-provenance moat.</div>
|
| 183 |
+
<div class="surface">
|
| 184 |
+
<b>Honest maturity:</b> live software APIs + MODELED physics bounds; hardware integration and a
|
| 185 |
+
fielded prototype are roadmap, labelled honestly. SAM/UEI/CAGE founder-supplied.
|
| 186 |
+
<div class="live-line" id="elite2-live"><span class="pill warn">checking…</span><span class="v">Elite console</span></div>
|
| 187 |
+
</div>
|
| 188 |
+
</div>
|
| 189 |
+
|
| 190 |
+
</div>
|
| 191 |
+
</section>
|
| 192 |
+
|
| 193 |
+
<section>
|
| 194 |
+
<div class="eyebrow">The honesty is the feature</div>
|
| 195 |
+
<h2>Doctrine v11 as a defense-acquisition advantage</h2>
|
| 196 |
+
<p>In a market where “signed: yes” has already certified a supply-chain worm
|
| 197 |
+
(<a href="/signature-is-not-proof">see the Mini Shai-Hulud case study</a>), an evaluator’s hardest
|
| 198 |
+
problem is telling a real capability from a confident slide. Our doctrine is built to make that easy:</p>
|
| 199 |
+
<div class="card">
|
| 200 |
+
<table>
|
| 201 |
+
<tr><th>Principle</th><th>What it means for an evaluator</th></tr>
|
| 202 |
+
<tr><td><b>Prove-or-downgrade</b></td><td>Every DONE claim has a checkable artifact: a pushed commit SHA, an HTTP 200 from a named endpoint, or a verifying signature. No artifact → it is labelled RECOMMENDED or ROADMAP, not claimed.</td></tr>
|
| 203 |
+
<tr><td><b>Label every value</b></td><td>MEASURED / MODELED / SAMPLE / STRUCTURAL-ONLY. A modeled physics bound is never dressed up as flown telemetry.</td></tr>
|
| 204 |
+
<tr><td><b>Never overclaim</b></td><td>No fabricated numbers, TRL, signatures, partnerships, or flown-hardware claims. Λ is Conjecture 1 (advisory), never “proven trust.”</td></tr>
|
| 205 |
+
<tr><td><b>Behaviour over attestation</b></td><td>We trust the behaviour we can observe and the receipts we can replay — not the attestation we were handed.</td></tr>
|
| 206 |
+
</table>
|
| 207 |
+
</div>
|
| 208 |
+
<p>The result is a capability statement an evaluator can verify in a browser, line by line, against
|
| 209 |
+
live endpoints — the opposite of a black box.</p>
|
| 210 |
+
</section>
|
| 211 |
+
|
| 212 |
+
<section>
|
| 213 |
+
<div class="card">
|
| 214 |
+
<h3>Engagement</h3>
|
| 215 |
+
<p>Founder is handling SAM.gov registration (via an APEX Accelerator) and federal submission
|
| 216 |
+
mechanics; the engineering artifacts behind each pathway are live and verifiable now at
|
| 217 |
+
<a href="https://a11oy.net">a11oy.net</a>. Private submission content is not published here by design.</p>
|
| 218 |
+
</div>
|
| 219 |
+
</section>
|
| 220 |
+
|
| 221 |
+
</div>
|
| 222 |
+
|
| 223 |
+
<footer>
|
| 224 |
+
a11oy showcase · doctrine v11 · honest maturity: MODELED bounds + live signed software APIs, NOT flown
|
| 225 |
+
hardware · prove-or-downgrade · Λ = Conjecture 1 (advisory, < 1.0) · 0 runtime CDN.<br>
|
| 226 |
+
Live surfaces probed from <span style="color:var(--acc2)">/api/a11oy/v1/{pnt, compliance}</span> · <span style="color:var(--acc2)">/elite</span> · <span style="color:var(--acc2)">/elite-console</span> — honest NO-LIVE-DATA fallback, never fabricated.
|
| 227 |
+
SZL Holdings · sovereign-compute, AI-governance & defense-tech, NYC · UEI [PLACEHOLDER: UEI] · CAGE [PLACEHOLDER: CAGE] · NAICS 541715.
|
| 228 |
+
</footer>
|
| 229 |
+
|
| 230 |
+
<script>
|
| 231 |
+
// 0-CDN inline. Probe live a11oy surfaces; render an HONEST NO-LIVE-DATA chip on
|
| 232 |
+
// any failure — never a fabricated value.
|
| 233 |
+
(function(){
|
| 234 |
+
function setLive(id, ok, label, href){
|
| 235 |
+
var el = document.getElementById(id);
|
| 236 |
+
if(!el) return;
|
| 237 |
+
var pill = ok ? '<span class="pill live">LIVE ✓</span>'
|
| 238 |
+
: '<span class="pill warn">NO-LIVE-DATA</span>';
|
| 239 |
+
var v = href ? '<span class="v"><a href="'+href+'">'+label+'</a></span>'
|
| 240 |
+
: '<span class="v">'+label+'</span>';
|
| 241 |
+
el.innerHTML = pill + v;
|
| 242 |
+
}
|
| 243 |
+
function probe(url, id, label, href){
|
| 244 |
+
fetch(url, {headers:{'accept':'application/json'}})
|
| 245 |
+
.then(function(r){ setLive(id, r.ok, label, href); })
|
| 246 |
+
.catch(function(){ setLive(id, false, label, href); });
|
| 247 |
+
}
|
| 248 |
+
probe('/api/a11oy/v1/pnt/limits', 'pnt-live', 'PNT mesh · /api/a11oy/v1/pnt/limits', '/api/a11oy/v1/pnt/limits');
|
| 249 |
+
probe('/elite', 'elite-live', 'Counter-UAS · /elite', '/elite');
|
| 250 |
+
probe('/api/a11oy/v1/compliance', 'comp-live', 'Compliance crosswalk', '/compliance');
|
| 251 |
+
probe('/elite-console', 'elite2-live', 'Elite console · /elite-console', '/elite-console');
|
| 252 |
+
})();
|
| 253 |
+
</script>
|
| 254 |
+
</body>
|
| 255 |
+
</html>
|
web/signature-is-not-proof.html
ADDED
|
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|
|
| 1 |
+
<!DOCTYPE html>
|
| 2 |
+
<!--
|
| 3 |
+
a11oy · A SIGNATURE IS NOT PROOF OF SAFETY — public case study (showcase lane).
|
| 4 |
+
© 2026 Lutar, Stephen P. — SZL Holdings. SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
|
| 5 |
+
0 runtime CDN: system fonts only, no external scripts. Where a claim can be
|
| 6 |
+
proven LIVE it is wired to a real a11oy production endpoint
|
| 7 |
+
(/api/a11oy/v1/{compliance,pinn/certificate,...}) via fetch with an HONEST
|
| 8 |
+
NO-LIVE-DATA fallback — never a fabricated value. Maturity is labelled
|
| 9 |
+
LIVE-today vs ROADMAP throughout (doctrine v11). Content mirrors the
|
| 10 |
+
SZL thought-leadership case study of the same name.
|
| 11 |
+
-->
|
| 12 |
+
<html lang="en">
|
| 13 |
+
<head>
|
| 14 |
+
<meta charset="utf-8"/>
|
| 15 |
+
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1"/>
|
| 16 |
+
<title>a11oy · A Signature Is Not Proof of Safety</title>
|
| 17 |
+
<style>
|
| 18 |
+
:root{
|
| 19 |
+
--bg:#0a0e14; --panel:#121823; --panel2:#0f141d; --line:#1f2a3a;
|
| 20 |
+
--ink:#e6edf3; --mut:#8b98a9; --acc:#5ad1c9; --acc2:#7aa2f7;
|
| 21 |
+
--ok:#3fb950; --warn:#d29922; --err:#f85149; --road:#a371f7;
|
| 22 |
+
}
|
| 23 |
+
*{box-sizing:border-box}
|
| 24 |
+
body{margin:0;background:var(--bg);color:var(--ink);
|
| 25 |
+
font:14px/1.6 ui-monospace,SFMono-Regular,Menlo,Consolas,monospace}
|
| 26 |
+
header{padding:18px 22px;border-bottom:1px solid var(--line);
|
| 27 |
+
background:linear-gradient(180deg,#0d1320,#0a0e14)}
|
| 28 |
+
h1{margin:0;font-size:19px;letter-spacing:.3px}
|
| 29 |
+
.sub{color:var(--mut);font-size:12px;margin-top:4px;max-width:980px}
|
| 30 |
+
.nav{margin-top:10px;display:flex;gap:14px;flex-wrap:wrap;font-size:12px}
|
| 31 |
+
.nav a{color:var(--acc2);text-decoration:none}
|
| 32 |
+
.nav a:hover{text-decoration:underline}
|
| 33 |
+
.wrap{max-width:1080px;margin:0 auto;padding:22px}
|
| 34 |
+
section{margin:0 0 26px}
|
| 35 |
+
.eyebrow{color:var(--acc);font-size:11px;letter-spacing:.16em;text-transform:uppercase;margin-bottom:6px}
|
| 36 |
+
h2{font-size:16px;letter-spacing:.3px;margin:0 0 10px;color:var(--ink)}
|
| 37 |
+
h3{font-size:14px;letter-spacing:.2px;margin:0 0 6px;color:var(--acc)}
|
| 38 |
+
p{margin:0 0 12px}
|
| 39 |
+
.hook{font-size:26px;line-height:1.35;font-weight:700;letter-spacing:.3px;margin:6px 0 14px}
|
| 40 |
+
.hook .em{color:var(--acc)}
|
| 41 |
+
.lede{font-size:15px;color:#cdd8e6}
|
| 42 |
+
.card{background:var(--panel);border:1px solid var(--line);border-radius:10px;padding:16px 18px;margin:0 0 14px}
|
| 43 |
+
.quote{border-left:3px solid var(--acc);background:var(--panel2);padding:12px 16px;
|
| 44 |
+
border-radius:0 8px 8px 0;color:#cdd8e6;margin:0 0 14px;font-style:normal}
|
| 45 |
+
.quote.big{font-size:16px;color:var(--ink)}
|
| 46 |
+
.pill{display:inline-block;padding:2px 9px;border-radius:999px;font-size:11px;
|
| 47 |
+
border:1px solid var(--line);white-space:nowrap}
|
| 48 |
+
.pill.ok{color:var(--ok);border-color:#163a1f;background:#0e2113}
|
| 49 |
+
.pill.err{color:var(--err);border-color:#4a1c1c;background:#240f0f}
|
| 50 |
+
.pill.warn{color:var(--warn);border-color:#3a3015;background:#1f1a0a}
|
| 51 |
+
.pill.road{color:var(--road);border-color:#2e2147;background:#160f24}
|
| 52 |
+
.pill.acc{color:var(--acc);border-color:#13403c;background:#0a201e}
|
| 53 |
+
.pill.live{color:var(--ok);border-color:#163a1f;background:#0e2113}
|
| 54 |
+
table{width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;font-size:12.5px;margin:6px 0}
|
| 55 |
+
th,td{text-align:left;padding:8px 10px;border-bottom:1px solid #1a2435;vertical-align:top}
|
| 56 |
+
th{color:var(--mut);font-weight:600;letter-spacing:.04em}
|
| 57 |
+
td.no{color:var(--err)} td.yes{color:var(--ok)}
|
| 58 |
+
.grid{display:grid;gap:14px;grid-template-columns:repeat(auto-fit,minmax(300px,1fr))}
|
| 59 |
+
.mech{background:var(--panel);border:1px solid var(--line);border-radius:10px;padding:15px 17px;display:flex;flex-direction:column}
|
| 60 |
+
.mech .head{display:flex;align-items:center;justify-content:space-between;gap:10px;margin-bottom:8px}
|
| 61 |
+
.mech .num{color:var(--mut);font-size:11px}
|
| 62 |
+
.mech h3{margin:2px 0 8px}
|
| 63 |
+
.mech .body{color:#c4d0de;flex:1}
|
| 64 |
+
.mech .status{margin-top:10px;padding-top:10px;border-top:1px dotted #1a2435;font-size:12px;color:var(--mut)}
|
| 65 |
+
.mech .status b{color:var(--ink);font-weight:600}
|
| 66 |
+
.live-line{display:flex;align-items:center;gap:8px;margin-top:8px;font-size:12px}
|
| 67 |
+
.live-line .v{color:var(--ink);word-break:break-word}
|
| 68 |
+
.cite{color:var(--mut);font-size:11.5px;margin-top:10px;line-height:1.6}
|
| 69 |
+
.cite a{color:var(--acc2)}
|
| 70 |
+
a{color:var(--acc2)}
|
| 71 |
+
code{color:var(--acc2);font-size:12px}
|
| 72 |
+
.loading{color:var(--mut)}
|
| 73 |
+
.nolive{color:var(--warn)}
|
| 74 |
+
footer{color:var(--mut);font-size:11px;padding:18px 22px;border-top:1px solid var(--line);line-height:1.7}
|
| 75 |
+
.reflist{font-size:11.5px;color:var(--mut);line-height:1.7}
|
| 76 |
+
.reflist li{margin-bottom:5px}
|
| 77 |
+
.reflist a{color:var(--acc2);word-break:break-all}
|
| 78 |
+
@media(max-width:640px){.hook{font-size:21px}.wrap{padding:16px}}
|
| 79 |
+
</style>
|
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</head>
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<body>
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<header>
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<h1>a11oy · A Signature Is Not Proof of Safety</h1>
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<div class="sub">SZL Holdings thought leadership · What the May 2026 “Mini Shai-Hulud” npm worm taught us — and why a11oy is built for a world where the cryptography is genuine but the code is not. Every maturity claim labelled <span class="pill live">LIVE</span> / <span class="pill road">ROADMAP</span>; live claims wired to real a11oy endpoints (honest <span class="nolive">NO-LIVE-DATA</span> fallback).</div>
|
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+
<nav class="nav">
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<a href="/console/">← Console</a>
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<a href="/governance">Governance</a>
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<a href="/compliance">Compliance crosswalk</a>
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<a href="/defense-readiness">Defense readiness →</a>
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</nav>
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</header>
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+
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<div class="wrap">
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<!-- HOOK -->
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<section>
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<div class="eyebrow">SZL Holdings · Thought Leadership · June 2026</div>
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+
<div class="hook">A signature is not proof of safety.<br><span class="em">The cryptography was genuine. The package was malicious anyway.</span></div>
|
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+
<p class="lede">On May 11, 2026, a piece of malware did something the software industry had quietly
|
| 100 |
+
assumed was impossible: it shipped with a valid, cryptographically signed SLSA Build Level 3
|
| 101 |
+
provenance attestation. The signature checked out. The provenance was genuine. The package was
|
| 102 |
+
malicious anyway.</p>
|
| 103 |
+
<p class="cite">Stephen P. Lutar Jr., Founder & CEO, SZL Holdings · <a href="https://a11oy.net">a11oy.net</a></p>
|
| 104 |
+
</section>
|
| 105 |
+
|
| 106 |
+
<!-- 1. WHAT HAPPENED -->
|
| 107 |
+
<section>
|
| 108 |
+
<div class="eyebrow">1 · What happened</div>
|
| 109 |
+
<h2>Mini Shai-Hulud — a signed supply-chain worm</h2>
|
| 110 |
+
<div class="card">
|
| 111 |
+
<p>Between May 10 and 12, 2026 — with the main publishing burst compressed into roughly five
|
| 112 |
+
hours on May 11 — the threat group TeamPCP compromised <b>more than 170 packages</b> across the
|
| 113 |
+
npm and PyPI ecosystems, publishing over 400 malicious versions spanning 19 namespaces.
|
| 114 |
+
Affected projects had accumulated more than <b>half a billion cumulative downloads</b>. It is the
|
| 115 |
+
first documented npm worm to propagate while carrying <b>legitimately attested</b> malicious
|
| 116 |
+
packages.</p>
|
| 117 |
+
<p>The entry point was an orphaned CI/CD trust configuration in TanStack’s GitHub Actions
|
| 118 |
+
workflows — a <code>pull_request_target</code> workflow that retained OIDC federation despite no
|
| 119 |
+
longer being actively maintained. The attacker read short-lived OIDC tokens directly out of the
|
| 120 |
+
GitHub Actions runner’s process memory (<code>/proc/<pid>/mem</code>), then exchanged those
|
| 121 |
+
tokens with the Sigstore Fulcio certificate authority to mint legitimate signing certificates.
|
| 122 |
+
From there: stolen OIDC token → short-lived npm publish token → malicious versions released under
|
| 123 |
+
the real maintainer identity, with valid provenance describing the exact GitHub Actions job that
|
| 124 |
+
produced them.</p>
|
| 125 |
+
<div class="quote">Nothing in the cryptographic chain failed. Sigstore did exactly what it is
|
| 126 |
+
designed to do: it verified the identity of the token presenter. What it cannot do — what no
|
| 127 |
+
signature can do — is verify that the build environment had not been compromised, or that the
|
| 128 |
+
code executing inside that legitimate, identity-verified job was safe.</div>
|
| 129 |
+
<p>The provenance was accurate. It correctly described a build that produced malware. Phase 2 of
|
| 130 |
+
the campaign reportedly reached infrastructure at OpenAI, Grafana, and GitHub itself.</p>
|
| 131 |
+
</div>
|
| 132 |
+
<div class="quote big">The attack did not break the signature. It exploited the gap between
|
| 133 |
+
identity verification and behavioural integrity. The signature told you <i>who</i> built it. It
|
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+
told you nothing about <i>what it does</i>.</div>
|
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+
</section>
|
| 136 |
+
|
| 137 |
+
<!-- 2. WHY IT MATTERS -->
|
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+
<section>
|
| 139 |
+
<div class="eyebrow">2 · Why it matters</div>
|
| 140 |
+
<h2>The signature-trust fallacy</h2>
|
| 141 |
+
<p>A cryptographic signature answers two questions with mathematical confidence: <b>who</b> signed
|
| 142 |
+
this, and <b>what exact bytes</b> were signed. It answers a third question — <i>is the signed thing
|
| 143 |
+
safe?</i> — not at all. The industry has spent a decade conflating the first two with the third.</p>
|
| 144 |
+
<div class="card">
|
| 145 |
+
<table>
|
| 146 |
+
<tr><th>What a signature proves</th><th>What it does NOT prove</th><th>Mini Shai-Hulud reality</th></tr>
|
| 147 |
+
<tr>
|
| 148 |
+
<td>Identity of the signer (the OIDC subject)</td>
|
| 149 |
+
<td class="no">That the signer’s environment was uncompromised</td>
|
| 150 |
+
<td>OIDC tokens stolen from runner memory; identity genuine</td>
|
| 151 |
+
</tr>
|
| 152 |
+
<tr>
|
| 153 |
+
<td>The exact bytes that were signed</td>
|
| 154 |
+
<td class="no">That those bytes are safe to execute</td>
|
| 155 |
+
<td>Provenance accurately described a malicious build</td>
|
| 156 |
+
</tr>
|
| 157 |
+
<tr>
|
| 158 |
+
<td>That a recognized pipeline produced the artifact</td>
|
| 159 |
+
<td class="no">That the pipeline behaved as intended</td>
|
| 160 |
+
<td>Legitimate GitHub Actions job produced malware</td>
|
| 161 |
+
</tr>
|
| 162 |
+
</table>
|
| 163 |
+
</div>
|
| 164 |
+
<p>SLSA and Sigstore are good. They are <b>necessary but not sufficient</b>. When a control becomes
|
| 165 |
+
a checkbox — “signed: yes” — it stops being a security boundary and becomes a false sense of one.</p>
|
| 166 |
+
</section>
|
| 167 |
+
|
| 168 |
+
<!-- 3. THE LESSON -->
|
| 169 |
+
<section>
|
| 170 |
+
<div class="eyebrow">3 · The lesson</div>
|
| 171 |
+
<h2>Doctrine v11 — Signature ≠ Safety</h2>
|
| 172 |
+
<div class="quote big">“A signature is not proof of safety.” Trust the behaviour you can observe
|
| 173 |
+
and the receipts you can replay — not the attestation you were handed.</div>
|
| 174 |
+
<p>The corollary is a posture we call <b>behaviour-over-attestation</b>. An attestation is a claim
|
| 175 |
+
made at build time about the past. Behaviour is evidence gathered at runtime about the present. When
|
| 176 |
+
the two disagree, behaviour wins. The rest of our doctrine follows from this: <b>prove-or-downgrade</b>
|
| 177 |
+
(claim only what has a checkable artifact), label every value <span class="pill acc">MEASURED</span>
|
| 178 |
+
<span class="pill warn">MODELED</span> <span class="pill">SAMPLE</span>, and never present an
|
| 179 |
+
attestation as a guarantee. We do not claim a11oy is unbreakable. We claim it <b>stops trusting the
|
| 180 |
+
signature alone</b>.</p>
|
| 181 |
+
</section>
|
| 182 |
+
|
| 183 |
+
<!-- 4. HOW a11oy IS ARCHITECTED -->
|
| 184 |
+
<section>
|
| 185 |
+
<div class="eyebrow">4 · How a11oy is architected for exactly this</div>
|
| 186 |
+
<h2>Five mechanisms — each labelled LIVE-today vs ROADMAP</h2>
|
| 187 |
+
<p>Below are the five mechanisms that make a11oy a structural answer to a Mini Shai-Hulud-class
|
| 188 |
+
attack. We are explicit throughout about what is live today versus what is roadmap. The credibility
|
| 189 |
+
comes from the honesty. Where a mechanism can be proven right now, the card binds to a real a11oy
|
| 190 |
+
production endpoint below.</p>
|
| 191 |
+
|
| 192 |
+
<div class="grid">
|
| 193 |
+
<!-- 4.1 -->
|
| 194 |
+
<div class="mech">
|
| 195 |
+
<div class="head"><span class="num">4.1</span><span class="pill live">LIVE — GAP1</span></div>
|
| 196 |
+
<h3>Artifact-behaviour monitor</h3>
|
| 197 |
+
<div class="body">Observe what an artifact actually <i>does</i> at runtime and compare it against an
|
| 198 |
+
expected behavioural envelope. A signature would have passed Mini Shai-Hulud straight through; a
|
| 199 |
+
behaviour monitor asks the question the signature cannot — does this thing act the way a safe
|
| 200 |
+
version of it should? Deny-by-default applied to behaviour, not identity.</div>
|
| 201 |
+
<div class="status"><b>Today:</b> live as the GAP1 capability, backed by a certified live PINN
|
| 202 |
+
(physics-informed) certificate from production APIs. <b>Roadmap:</b> broader behavioural-envelope
|
| 203 |
+
catalogue per artifact class / ecosystem (npm, PyPI, container, model).</div>
|
| 204 |
+
<div class="live-line" id="pinn-live"><span class="pill warn">checking…</span><span class="v">PINN certificate</span></div>
|
| 205 |
+
</div>
|
| 206 |
+
|
| 207 |
+
<!-- 4.2 -->
|
| 208 |
+
<div class="mech">
|
| 209 |
+
<div class="head"><span class="num">4.2</span><span class="pill live">LIVE</span></div>
|
| 210 |
+
<h3>3-axis attestation</h3>
|
| 211 |
+
<div class="body">Single-axis attestation is the exact weakness Mini Shai-Hulud exploited: a valid
|
| 212 |
+
build attestation, and nothing binding it to runtime behaviour. a11oy’s assurance mesh binds three
|
| 213 |
+
axes — <b>build provenance · model lineage · runtime behaviour</b> — so compromise of any one axis
|
| 214 |
+
does not silently pass the others. A genuine build signature riding on a malicious runtime fails
|
| 215 |
+
the cross-axis check.</div>
|
| 216 |
+
<div class="status"><b>Today:</b> 3-axis model + DSSE-signed verdicts/receipts in the live mesh.
|
| 217 |
+
<b>Roadmap:</b> deeper third-party STIX/TAXII threat-intel correlation into the model + runtime axes.</div>
|
| 218 |
+
<div class="live-line" id="comp-live"><span class="pill warn">checking…</span><span class="v">Compliance crosswalk</span></div>
|
| 219 |
+
</div>
|
| 220 |
+
|
| 221 |
+
<!-- 4.3 -->
|
| 222 |
+
<div class="mech">
|
| 223 |
+
<div class="head"><span class="num">4.3</span><span class="pill live">LIVE</span></div>
|
| 224 |
+
<h3>Hash-chained Forge ledger + kill switch</h3>
|
| 225 |
+
<div class="body">Every verdict is written to a hash-chained, offline-verifiable governance ledger
|
| 226 |
+
(the Forge ledger), so any action is replayable after the fact and any decision is revocable through
|
| 227 |
+
the kill switch. In a Mini Shai-Hulud scenario this is the difference between “we think we contained
|
| 228 |
+
it” and “we can prove, line by line, what was admitted, when, and on what evidence — and revoke it now.”</div>
|
| 229 |
+
<div class="status"><b>Today:</b> hash-chained ledger + kill switch live, with signed receipts
|
| 230 |
+
(including MEASURED energy receipts via a real NVML exporter, kept distinct from any modeled figure).
|
| 231 |
+
<b>Roadmap:</b> publishing ledger inclusion proofs to an external transparency service (§5).</div>
|
| 232 |
+
</div>
|
| 233 |
+
|
| 234 |
+
<!-- 4.4 -->
|
| 235 |
+
<div class="mech">
|
| 236 |
+
<div class="head"><span class="num">4.4</span><span class="pill live">LIVE</span></div>
|
| 237 |
+
<h3>Hybrid Ed25519 + ML-DSA & C2PA</h3>
|
| 238 |
+
<div class="body">We do not deprecate signing — we harden it and stop over-trusting it. a11oy signs
|
| 239 |
+
with a hybrid <b>Ed25519 + ML-DSA</b> scheme so verdicts remain verifiable in a post-quantum world,
|
| 240 |
+
and attaches <b>C2PA content credentials</b> so the provenance of generated content is transparent.
|
| 241 |
+
This anticipates EU AI Act Article 50 transparency obligations.</div>
|
| 242 |
+
<div class="status"><b>Today:</b> hybrid signing + C2PA implemented, alongside a NIST AI RMF / ISO
|
| 243 |
+
42001 / EU AI Act compliance crosswalk. <b>Roadmap:</b> third-party attestation of the crosswalk
|
| 244 |
+
mapping ahead of enforcement.</div>
|
| 245 |
+
</div>
|
| 246 |
+
|
| 247 |
+
<!-- 4.5 -->
|
| 248 |
+
<div class="mech">
|
| 249 |
+
<div class="head"><span class="num">4.5</span><span class="pill road">ROADMAP</span></div>
|
| 250 |
+
<h3>SCITT-style independent transparency</h3>
|
| 251 |
+
<div class="body">The deepest lesson of Mini Shai-Hulud is that <b>self-attestation is not enough</b>:
|
| 252 |
+
the build attested honestly to its own malicious output. Independent, append-only transparency
|
| 253 |
+
ledgers — as standardized by IETF SCITT — let third parties verify receipts without trusting the
|
| 254 |
+
producer.</div>
|
| 255 |
+
<div class="status"><b>Today:</b> internal hash-chained ledger (4.3) is live and offline-verifiable.
|
| 256 |
+
<b>Roadmap:</b> external SCITT-style transparency service with third-party inclusion proofs — we label
|
| 257 |
+
this honestly as not-yet-live.</div>
|
| 258 |
+
</div>
|
| 259 |
+
</div>
|
| 260 |
+
</section>
|
| 261 |
+
|
| 262 |
+
<!-- 5. THE BROADER SHIFT -->
|
| 263 |
+
<section>
|
| 264 |
+
<div class="eyebrow">5 · The broader shift</div>
|
| 265 |
+
<h2>From self-attestation to independent, behavioural assurance</h2>
|
| 266 |
+
<div class="grid">
|
| 267 |
+
<div class="card">
|
| 268 |
+
<h3>EU AI Act · Article 50</h3>
|
| 269 |
+
<p>Transparency obligations for AI-generated content take effect <b>August 2, 2026</b>. a11oy’s
|
| 270 |
+
C2PA content credentials and hybrid signing (4.4) are built toward exactly this — provenance of
|
| 271 |
+
generated content, transparent and verifiable.</p>
|
| 272 |
+
</div>
|
| 273 |
+
<div class="card">
|
| 274 |
+
<h3>IETF SCITT</h3>
|
| 275 |
+
<p>Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency and Trust — independent, append-only ledgers that let
|
| 276 |
+
third parties verify receipts without trusting the producer. The direct standards answer to the
|
| 277 |
+
self-attestation gap (4.5, roadmap).</p>
|
| 278 |
+
</div>
|
| 279 |
+
<div class="card">
|
| 280 |
+
<h3>OMB · risk-based shift</h3>
|
| 281 |
+
<p>The 2026 OMB action rescinding the prior secure-software-development self-attestation mandate
|
| 282 |
+
in favor of a risk-based approach reflects the same realization: an attestation checkbox is not a
|
| 283 |
+
risk control. Behaviour and replayable evidence are.</p>
|
| 284 |
+
</div>
|
| 285 |
+
</div>
|
| 286 |
+
</section>
|
| 287 |
+
|
| 288 |
+
<!-- TALK TO US -->
|
| 289 |
+
<section>
|
| 290 |
+
<div class="card">
|
| 291 |
+
<h3>Tabletop it against a live instance</h3>
|
| 292 |
+
<p>We are happy to walk through a Mini Shai-Hulud tabletop against a live a11oy instance — what the
|
| 293 |
+
artifact-behaviour monitor would have flagged, what the 3-axis check would have rejected, and what
|
| 294 |
+
the governance ledger would let you prove and revoke after the fact. Live signed APIs and the GAP1
|
| 295 |
+
behavioural monitor are available now at <a href="https://a11oy.net">a11oy.net</a>.</p>
|
| 296 |
+
</div>
|
| 297 |
+
</section>
|
| 298 |
+
|
| 299 |
+
<!-- REFERENCES -->
|
| 300 |
+
<section>
|
| 301 |
+
<div class="eyebrow">References</div>
|
| 302 |
+
<ol class="reflist">
|
| 303 |
+
<li>Cloud Security Alliance, “Mini Shai-Hulud: When Signed Provenance Certified a Supply Chain Worm,” May 15, 2026. <a href="https://labs.cloudsecurityalliance.org/research/csa-research-note-mini-shai-hulud-supply-chain-sigstore-2026/">labs.cloudsecurityalliance.org</a></li>
|
| 304 |
+
<li>Open Source For U, “Hackers Abuse GitHub Actions and SLSA Signing to Spread Malware Across Open Source Ecosystems,” May 14, 2026. <a href="https://www.opensourceforu.com/2026/05/hackers-abuse-github-actions-and-slsa-signing-to-spread-malware-across-open-source-ecosystems/">opensourceforu.com</a></li>
|
| 305 |
+
<li>EU AI Act Service Desk FAQ. <a href="https://ai-act-service-desk.ec.europa.eu/en/faq">ai-act-service-desk.ec.europa.eu</a>; Latham & Watkins, “AI Act Update,” May 13, 2026. <a href="https://www.lw.com/en/insights/ai-act-update-eu-resolves-to-change-rules-and-extend-deadlines">lw.com</a></li>
|
| 306 |
+
<li>IETF SCITT Working Group, Datatracker (draft-ietf-scitt-architecture; draft-dawkins-scitt-ai-article50-00, filed May 25, 2026). <a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/scitt/">datatracker.ietf.org/wg/scitt</a></li>
|
| 307 |
+
<li>Wiley Law, “OMB Rescinds Secure Software Development Mandate in Favor of a Risk-Based Approach,” Jan 29, 2026. <a href="https://www.wiley.law/alert-OMB-Rescinds-Secure-Software-Development-Mandate-in-Favor-of-a-Risk-Based-Approach">wiley.law</a></li>
|
| 308 |
+
</ol>
|
| 309 |
+
</section>
|
| 310 |
+
|
| 311 |
+
</div>
|
| 312 |
+
|
| 313 |
+
<footer>
|
| 314 |
+
a11oy showcase · doctrine v11 · A signature is not proof of safety · behaviour-over-attestation ·
|
| 315 |
+
prove-or-downgrade · Λ = Conjecture 1 (advisory, < 1.0) · trust < 100% · 0 runtime CDN ·
|
| 316 |
+
every maturity claim labelled LIVE / ROADMAP.<br>
|
| 317 |
+
Live proofs fetched from <span style="color:var(--acc2)">/api/a11oy/v1/{pinn/certificate, compliance}</span> — honest NO-LIVE-DATA fallback, never fabricated.
|
| 318 |
+
About SZL Holdings · sovereign-compute, AI-governance & defense-tech, NYC · UEI [PLACEHOLDER: UEI] · CAGE [PLACEHOLDER: CAGE] · NAICS 541715.
|
| 319 |
+
</footer>
|
| 320 |
+
|
| 321 |
+
<script>
|
| 322 |
+
// 0-CDN inline. Prove what we can, LIVE, against real a11oy endpoints; otherwise
|
| 323 |
+
// render an HONEST NO-LIVE-DATA chip — never a fabricated value.
|
| 324 |
+
(function(){
|
| 325 |
+
function setLive(id, ok, label, href){
|
| 326 |
+
var el = document.getElementById(id);
|
| 327 |
+
if(!el) return;
|
| 328 |
+
var pill = ok ? '<span class="pill live">LIVE ✓</span>'
|
| 329 |
+
: '<span class="pill warn">NO-LIVE-DATA</span>';
|
| 330 |
+
var v = href && ok
|
| 331 |
+
? '<span class="v"><a href="'+href+'">'+label+'</a></span>'
|
| 332 |
+
: '<span class="v">'+label+'</span>';
|
| 333 |
+
el.innerHTML = pill + v;
|
| 334 |
+
}
|
| 335 |
+
function probe(url, id, label, href){
|
| 336 |
+
fetch(url, {headers:{'accept':'application/json'}})
|
| 337 |
+
.then(function(r){ return r.ok ? r.json().catch(function(){return {};}) : null; })
|
| 338 |
+
.then(function(j){ setLive(id, j!==null, label, href); })
|
| 339 |
+
.catch(function(){ setLive(id, false, label, href); });
|
| 340 |
+
}
|
| 341 |
+
// 4.1 — certified live PINN (physics-informed) certificate.
|
| 342 |
+
probe('/api/a11oy/v1/pinn/certificate', 'pinn-live',
|
| 343 |
+
'PINN certificate (GAP1 behaviour monitor)', '/api/a11oy/v1/pinn/certificate');
|
| 344 |
+
// 4.2/4.4 — NIST AI RMF / ISO 42001 / EU AI Act compliance crosswalk.
|
| 345 |
+
probe('/api/a11oy/v1/compliance', 'comp-live',
|
| 346 |
+
'NIST AI RMF / ISO 42001 / EU AI Act crosswalk', '/compliance');
|
| 347 |
+
})();
|
| 348 |
+
</script>
|
| 349 |
+
</body>
|
| 350 |
+
</html>
|